

## Bayesian and frequentist statistics

Bayes' theorem:

$$P(m|D) = \frac{P(m) \cdot P(D|m)}{P(D)}$$

this just follows from the laws of probability!

↳ quite powerful still!

$m$ : our model

$D$ : the data

$P(m)$ : the "prior"  
probability of  $m$


$P(D|m)$ : the likelihood

$P(D)$ : a normalizing factor

↳ whether  $D$  would have happened anyway

⇒ can only calculate this if you have other hypotheses for comparison.

## DID THE SUN JUST EXPLODE? (IT'S NIGHT, SO WE'RE NOT SURE.)



### FREQUENTIST STATISTICIAN:

THE PROBABILITY OF THIS RESULT HAPPENING BY CHANCE IS  $\frac{1}{36} = 0.027$ .  
SINCE  $p < 0.05$ , I CONCLUDE THAT THE SUN HAS EXPLODED.

### BAYESIAN STATISTICIAN:

BET YOU \$50 IT HASN'T.

## Frequentist

If the true value of the mass is 130 MeV, then if we repeat the experiment 100 times, we would twice get a measurement  $< 120$  or  $> 140$ .

Model params. one fixed + unknown. We calculate  $P(\text{data})$  given those params.

Random variables model outcome of data.

Often somewhat ad hoc: p-values, etc.

Used increasingly bc big data / machine learning / etc ...

can give POWERFUL INSIGHTS!

## Bayesian

The probability of the mass being between 120 - 140 MeV is 98%..

Consider data known / fixed. calculates probabilities of models / hypotheses / parameters.

Requires prior.  
estimation of the model's likelihood.

↓  
incorporates prior knowledge.

## Coin flip

p-value for the coin.  $\text{prob}(\text{heads}) = ?$

you flip the coin 20 times and get 15 heads.

↳ frequentist approach:

a maximum likelihood calculation gives  $p(\text{heads}) = 3/4$ .  
unfair coin!

a Bayesian statistician would be a little uneasy.

↳ param.  $p = \text{prob}(\text{heads})$

let's assume a uniform prior for  $p \Rightarrow P(m) = P(p) = 1$ .

likelihood:  $P(D|p) = \frac{20!}{5!15!} p^{15} (1-p)^5 \leftarrow \text{Binomial!}$

$P(D)$ : probability of observing  $D$  over all hypotheses i.e. all values of  $p$

$$\hookrightarrow \int_0^1 dp \, P(p) \frac{20!}{5!15!} p^{15} (1-p)^5$$

Putting it all together (uniform prior) ...

$$P(p|D) \propto P(p) \cdot P(D|p) = \frac{20!}{5! \cdot 15!} (1-p)^5 p^{15}$$

$\Rightarrow$  dropped  $P(D)$  because it integrates out to a constant.

what does this look like??  $\longrightarrow$  JUPYTER NOTEBOOK!

NB: this gives us distributions for our parameters.  
no confidence intervals etc needed here.

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A new prior: unfair coins are very rare.

You're 99% sure this is a normal coin.

$\hookrightarrow$  might have some spread around  $p=0.5$ , let's take  $\sigma=0.01$ .

1% chance of an unfair coin  $\rightarrow$  who knows what  $p$  is!

$$\Rightarrow P(p) = 0.99 \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi} \cdot 0.01} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{(p-0.5)^2}{\sigma^2}\right) + 0.01 \cdot 1$$

So this all depends on your subjective choice of prior ??

↳ Yep.

→ CLEARLY answers: how likely is your hypothesis?

This is a good thing! It allows us to quantitatively build in things that we know/suspect.

↳ If the prior changes the answer by a LOT?

Well, then the data were not very constraining.

also:  
nuisance  
param.  
Occam  
factor.

Frequentist analysis doesn't require you to spell out assumptions so clearly.

↳ uncertainty on  $p$  would come from  $\text{var}(\text{Binom})$  but couldn't talk about prob of a value of  $p$ !

↳ only  $p(\text{data})$  at some chosen  $p$ . confusing...  
doesn't give us a distribution for  $p$  either.