# **How Many Copies Is Enough?**

# A Flexible, Replicable Simulation Framework for Assessing Storage Risk

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#### **Problem to Solve**

- How to protect a large, valuable, digital document collection
  - How many copies do you need to keep it safe?
  - Where to put the copies?
  - Are you sure they're still there?
  - Whether to use compression, encryption, … ?
- Not much hard data on which to base policy decisions
- We developed a flexible, replicable simulation framework
- We aim to provide some guidance, based on some common, but not universal, calibration points.

# The Model We're Using

- You have a collection of digital documents
- You contract with some outside agencies to store copies of your collection
  - Specialized servers
  - Commercial cloud storage providers
    - Amazon, Google, Rackspace, BackBlaze, Dropbox, ...
- You "audit" the servers with some frequency
  - Do they still have copies of all documents?
  - Replace any copies missing or corrupted

#### Our Basic Data, to Extrapolate

- Not keyed to any specific problems
- Will supply many hints on how to extrapolate from our data to your situations
  - Number of docs, doc sizes, storage shelf sizes
  - Server failure rates
  - Audit strategies
- Experimental results
  - you can simulate with your own parameters

#### **Assumptions**

- Everything costs
  - Storing multiple copies
  - Higher quality services to store your docs
    - Data generally not available about "quality"
  - Bandwidth for auditing
- Our goal:
  - Provide data showing general tradeoffs
    - Use to set broad policies
  - Provide a framework to model specific characteristics
    - Use to check specific practices

#### **Two Types of Failures**

- One document at a time
  - Cosmic ray, disk block failure
- All documents in a collection
  - Local catastrophe
  - Economic downturn, change of business strategy
  - Loss of encryption key
- All failures are silent (to the client = library)
  - Until you try to retrieve a document
- Some failures are correlated
  - Local environment can affect block failures
  - Global conditions can affect multiple providers

#### Single Document Failure

- Common: A copy of a document dies on a particular server
- Documents are fragile
  - Compressed, encrypted: small failure makes document unreadable
- Variation: Repairable documents
  - Small failure damages only one segment
  - Model this as a set of smaller docs

#### **Institutional Failure**

- Less common: A server dies, losing all the documents it contains
  - Institutional failure due to fire, flood, war, economic downturn, etc.
- Infrequent but dangerous, particularly if correlated

### **Digital Simulation Programs**


- Input
  - error rates, numbers of copies, auditing rate, etc.
- Output
  - number of documents permanently lost over the life of the test
- Discrete-event simulation
  - Failure events happen at random intervals
  - Audits are regularly scheduled
- Open source
  - Open license, available on Github

#### **Observations**

- For one copy, simple Poisson calculation yields failure rates
  - But hard to observe on simple graphs


#### **Hard to Compare Curves**

- e<sup>-something</sup> is a fading exponential curve
- Easier to compare if plotted as logs to straighten the lines



# One Copy? All Losses Are Permanent Losses

For copies = 1, losses are unacceptable (auditing can't help)




#### **Good News & Bad News**

- Bad news: if anyone really understands the "quality" of modern storage, he/she is not talking
- Good news: we \*think\* that modern storage methods, like those used in cloud storage, are very reliable, high quality
- Strategy: Structure storage to protect your collection from variations in reliability

# **Two Copies? Definitely Not Enough**

For copies = 2, losses decline a lot with increased auditing permanent losses (percentage of collection) 9 No audit Annual audit Quarterly aud 0 20 10 50 100 200 500 1000 sector lifetime (megahours)


# **Three Copies? Marginal**




# Four Copies? Looks Good

For copies = 4, losses decline only very slightly with increased auditing permanent losses (percentage of collection) 3.0 No audit LO.  $\alpha$ 2.0 ξ Annual audit Quarterly audit 20 50 100 10 200 500 1000 sector lifetime (megahours)

#### **Five Copies? Works**







# Size Doesn't Matter (for Modeling)

- Document sizes and error rates scale easily
  - Larger doc presents a larger target area
  - For a constant rate of block errors, larger doc will be hit more often
- Scales precisely as you would expect
  - 10x larger doc is hit 10x as often
    OR
  - 10x larger doc + 1/10 block error rate is hit 1x as often
  - (or 10x larger doc with 10x longer block lifetime)

# Initial State With Small and Large Files




# **Errors Are More Likely to Strike**Larger Targets, Proportionally





# **Measured Doc Losses** vs Sizes and Lifetimes

DocSize = 5 MB, permanent losses vs lifetime




# 10X Larger Docs (50 MB)






# 100X Larger (500 MB)

#### DocSize = 500 MB




# 1000X Larger (5000 MB)

#### DocSize = 5000 MB



# **Re-scale Lifetimes to Match Various Sizes**

DocSize comparison, all overlaid on scaled lifetimes: 10x larger file with 10x longer lifetime yields same results




# **Effect of Compression**

- Assume recoverablility rate R and compression rate C
- Show how this is equivalent to changing collection and document size
- Note that if C>R always a win
- Note areas where if C<R still saves sufficient space to store another copy
  - Does this make up for higher failure rate from compression?

# Institutional Failures Are Dangerous

- You protect your collection with N copies
- An institution fails, removing one copy entirely
  - Until this is discovered during the next audit cycle, you actually have only N-1 copies
- If a second institution should fail near the same time, then only N-2 copies
- Correlation of institutional failures?
  - Economic downturn
  - Regional conditions
  - Copies kept too close together, e.g, in-house

#### Recession → Failures → Losses



# **Several Auditing Strategies**


- TOTAL: every audit cycle, check every copy of every document
- SEGMENTED: check part of collection at intervals during the audit cycle
  - Entire collection checked every audit cycle (sampled without replacement)
- RANDOM SEGMENTED: check randomly selected part of collection at intervals during the audit cycle
  - Selected with replacement: some documents will be missed in the cycle
- POPULARITY: divide collection into pieces, audit some more frequently

### **Tricky Audits Don't Help**

- Total or segmented audit is always better than random audit
  - E.g., auditing randomly selected 1/4 of the collection every quarter
    - Some documents will be missed entirely if the audit set is selected with replacement
  - (Note: segmented is very slightly better than total, because it looks at some failures earlier when failure rates are very high)

#### **Random Selection Leaves Errors**

Auditing random selection each quarter is not as effective as auditing a fixed one-fourth of the collection each quarter



#### **Preliminary Conclusions - 1**

- More copies are better (duh!)
- Auditing is essential to collection health
  - Protects collection over huge range of "quality"
  - Very frequent auditing is probably overkill
  - Tricky auditing (subsets, random) is less effective

#### Other: Questions- 2

- Institutional failures are pernicious -- but how often do they occur?
  - The problem: a silent institutional failure reduces the number of redundant copies you have stored
  - Risk is increased until you discover the problem (in auditing) and provision a new server
    - Thought you had four copies? Well, for a period of time, you actually have only three.
    - And another failure before the audit reduces copies to two
    - Failures may be correlated due to economic conditions, wars

#### Other: Questions - 3

- How many copies do you need to limit losses?
  - Limit permanent losses to some part of the collection?
  - Better: How many to keep likelihood of any permanent loss under some percentage?
    - 5 per cent, 1 per cent, 0.1 per cent?
  - For institutional failures, how many copies to keep likelihood of total loss under some percentage?

#### **Audit We Must**

- Auditing is expensive (in bandwidth, bytes moved, time)
  - Read back all the contents of all the documents?
  - We should work toward efficient auditing functions

#### What Next?

 Q: What information do you need to manage your libraries?

# **Backup**

#### Form of the Data

- Fixed number of documents, fixed time
  - Scale to your needs
- Number of copies varies, 1 to 10
- Reliability of storage servers varies
  - Very little real data in this area
- Auditing strategies vary
- Document size varies (but doesn't matter)

#### **Institutional Failures**

- (NEED GRAPH)
- Assume baseline # of copies, quality and auditing yields 0 loss in the absence of institutional failure
- Closed form compare expected loss vs. frequency of business failure events (inverse of business half-life?)
- Recession → pushes failure curve out