



CHALMERS
UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

SecArchUnit: Extending ArchUnit to support validation of security architectural constraints

Master's Thesis in Software Engineering

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MASTER'S THESIS 2020:NN

SecArchUnit: Extending ArchUnit to support validation of security architectural constraints

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CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
Gothenburg, Sweden 2020

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Todo list

Outline chapters	3
Specific example that requires additional information	19
Show rule definition for each constraint	19
Show how each constraint is used in our toy app	19
Parts of this section probably belong in the background	22
Describe our information flow analysis, reference existing approaches	22
Diagram of changes to ArchUnit domain	22
Show rule definition for each constraint	22
Show how each constraint is used in our toy app	22
adjust sections as necessary	24

An Informative Headline describing the Content of the Report

A Subtitle that can be Very Much Longer if Necessary

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Abstract

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Contents

Todo list	iii
List of Figures	xi
List of Tables	xii
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Scope	2
1.2 Research questions	2
1.3 Research contribution	2
1.4 Limitations	2
1.5 Thesis outline	3
2 Background	4
2.1 Software architecture	4
2.2 Architectural security constraints	4
2.3 ArchUnit	4
2.4 Architectural conformance monitoring	4
3 Methodology	5
3.1 Data collection	5
3.2 Processing	6
3.3 Validation	7
3.3.1 Solution Proposal	7
3.3.2 Controlled Experiment	7
3.3.2.1 Performance metrics	8
3.3.2.2 Projects used in evaluation	8
4 Selection of Architectural Security Constraints	9
4.1 Compiled List of Security Constraints	9
4.2 Final Selection	9
4.2.1 Log all security events	11
4.2.2 Enforce AuthN/AuthZ at single point	11
4.2.3 Messages are sent from a central point	12
4.2.4 Validate user input	12
4.2.5 Restrict thread spawning	13
4.2.6 Sensitive information must stay within trust boundary	13

4.2.7	Secrets must not be exposed in log messages	14
5	Enforcing Constraints	15
5.1	Support in ArchUnit as-is	15
5.1.1	Log all security events	16
5.1.2	Enforce AuthN/AuthZ at single point	16
5.1.3	Messages are sent from a central point	18
5.2	Injecting Information into Source Code	19
5.2.1	Validate user input	19
5.2.2	Restrict thread spawning	20
5.3	Extending ArchUnit Analysis	21
5.3.1	Extensions	22
5.3.2	Sensitive information must stay within trust boundary	22
5.3.3	Secrets must not be exposed in log messages	22
6	Evaluation	24
6.1	Selection of systems	24
6.2	Comparison with similar tools	24
	Bibliography	25

List of Figures

3.1	Overview of the process of mapping the three sources to constraints .	7
5.1	An example of a system, for the purpose of illustrating how the constraints are applied.	17
5.2	Applying constraint 4 to the model of the example system using added annotations.	20
5.3	The immediate context of the <code>MethodProcessor</code> class in <code>ArchUnit</code> , responsible for processing instructions.	22
5.4	Changes made to <code>MethodProcessor</code> and its surroundings.	23

List of Tables

4.1	Security constraints and their related CIAA goals.	10
4.2	Constraints that have been selected for enforcement.	10
6.1	Results from validating constraints 1-5 using various static analysis tools.	24

1

Introduction

In the age of an ever more digitalized world, ensuring the security of software systems becomes an increasingly more critical task. The increased severeness is true in particular, as systems are being developed based on the principle of permanent connectivity [1]. Services ranging from those offered by governmental agencies to that of social media are always connected to the open internet, potentially creating a large surface of attack. Although the great importance of a securely designed system is widely known, developing a secure system is a challenging task as far from all software engineers are security specialists, or for that matter, particularly educated in security aspects [2].

Introducing a weakness into a system can be done in every part of the software development lifecycle. An early introduction often leads to a more costly fix as the scope of the flaw is increased [3]. Typically, weaknesses are categorized as either implementation bugs (e.g. buffer overflow) or design flaws (e.g. client-side validation) where the later commonly has a more extensive scope and is the responsibility of the architect [4]. However, this binary division might be too simplified as it assumes a securely designed is correctly implemented, meaning that there is no discrepancy between the "intended architecture" and the actual one found in the source code. Jasser [5] considers violations of the architectural security design as a third type of category with a comparable impact to that of design flaws.

Deviations from the intended architecture are not unique to the initial implementation of a system. Over time, subsequent changes made to the system, often due to new requirements, frequently lead to further discrepancy called software erosion [6]. Proponents of the agile methodology also somewhat worsen the problem of erosion as the reduction of upfront design severely hinders the design of the architecture [7]. Many of the tools and techniques produced by academia to try and remedy the frequent violations of architectural design have failed to gain much adoption in the industry [6]. Of the few that have, architectural design documentation is the most prominent and widely included in numerous software processes. While the technique is well adopted, performing it formally to allow for automatic compliance monitoring is seldomly done, which causes developers to rely on the less scalable method of manual reviews [6].

A recently developed tool called ArchUnit¹ has provided architects with the capability to express architectural constraints through Java unit testing frameworks. ArchUnit is not the first tool developed for architectural conformance checking. It possibly is, however, the first to leverage already existing testing infrastructure (Unit testing) in a manner that allows for testing over time. In its current form, ArchUnit has not provided any explicit functionality to test security constraints. Thus, the objective of this thesis is to explore the feasibility of expressing and enforcing typical security architectural constraints through ArchUnit.

1.1 Scope

This study focuses on architectural measures that aid in fulfilling a security goal. Moreover, these measures should be possible to enforce through static analysis of Java bytecode. Any measures related to the configuration (of an application or operating system), the file-system, or other run-time properties that cannot be validated through static code analysis are deemed to be out of scope.

1.2 Research questions

To fulfill the objective of the study, the following research questions have been defined:

- RQ1: What architectural security constraints can be validated using the tool?
- RQ2: What modifications can be made to the tool in order to facilitate the validation of additional constraints?

1.3 Research contribution

This study aims to show how architectural security constraints can be validated with the help of a static analysis tool. The thesis demonstrates applications of the tool to several open source systems, over time, in an evaluation of its efficacy and precision in terms of detecting violations of constraints.

1.4 Limitations

The thesis, and the modified version of ArchUnit, is not aimed at being a complete solution for all security architectural constraints. Instead, the study is performed to provide an initial evaluation of the possibility of using ArchUnit as an alternative to already existing techniques of static conformance checking.

The principle of ArchUnit may very well apply to programming languages other than Java. Though, the limited scope of the thesis makes it unfeasible to provide

¹<https://www.archunit.org/>

functionality to analyze source-code in additional languages.

1.5 Thesis outline

The remainder of this report is structured as follows.

Outline chapters

Chapter 2: Provides a general background to the topic of software architecture and architectural security constraints. In addition, the ArchUnit framework is introduced and compared to previously developed tools for architectural conformance.

Chapter 3: design of our evaluation, how systems are chosen, the protocol for testing the tool, how to assert the ground truth, process of mapping constraints to rules

Chapter 4: composing the architectural constraints, our final constraints, what they prevent and how they are expressed

Chapter 5: expressing and enforcing constraints with the tool, the identification of missing information / tool features

Chapter 6: results from the empirical validation

Chapter 6: discussion, answer our research questions

Chapter 7: conclusion

2

Background

This chapter...

2.1 Software architecture

[8], [9], [10], [11], [12],

2.2 Architectural security constraints

[13], [1], [14],

Security goals, CIAA...

2.3 ArchUnit

Overview of functionality

ASM, class/method visitors

2.4 Architectural conformance monitoring

[15], [16], [17], [18], [6], [19], [20], [21],

3

Methodology

This chapter describes the adopted method for collecting relevant constraints, relating these to the common security-goals of CIAA, and later mapping them to functionality within ArchUnit. Second, this chapter presents the validation plan for expressing security constraints with ArchUnit (as is) by means of an illustration and for expressing additional constraints by means of a controlled experiment.

3.1 Data collection

The relevance of the security architectural constraints included in the study was ensured by performing a review of security measures and common weaknesses and compiling the result to a list of constraints. Completeness was not the primary goal of the review, but rather to provide a set of constraints derived from previous knowledge. Presented below are the three sources used to form the final list.

CAWE catalog: The Common Architectural Weakness Enumeration catalog [22] details 224 common weaknesses in security architectures. Each entry has a description of the weakness and exemplifications of how it could manifest itself in the source code, when applicable. In some entries, there are recommendations on what techniques can be used to detect the weakness, along with mitigation strategies.

Security patterns: Similar to the usage of general design patterns made famous in [23], security patterns provide a reusable and domain-independent solution to a known problem. More specifically, this study focused on security patterns for the design phase, as defined in [2]. While the security pattern repository¹ lists over 170 security patterns, not all are provided with sufficient detail or at the appropriate level of abstraction. As a result, the report by Scandariato et al. [24] which provides a filtered list of patterns.

Security rules: Architectural security rules constrain the implementation of a system while being less solution-oriented compared to security patterns. Eden and Kazman differentiate architectural security rules from those defined on a level of source code based on two criteria, locality and intension/extension [25]. Architectural rules are both non-local and intensional, meaning that they affect all or several parts of the system while having “infinitely-many possible instances”. In [5], Jasser

¹<http://sefm.cs.utsa.edu/repository/>

presents a catalog of architectural security rules. Although the entire catalog of 150 security rules is not yet available, the initial list of 22 included in the paper was used in our study.

3.2 Processing

Starting from each of the three sources of architectural constraints described in Section 3.1, the first step of the process, shown in Figure 3.1, was to select entries that were within the scope of the project. The criteria for inclusion were the following:

1. The entry must be related to the architectural design of a system, i.e., non-local and intensional.
2. It must be possible to enforce the entry through static analysis. Examples of non-enforceable constraints include, but is not limited to; "No two instances of a microservice are deployed on the same machine" as the number of machines deployed is a dynamic property.
3. Although somewhat included in the first criterion as it is a local issue, an entry must not relate to the correctness or best practice of the implementation of an algorithm. Examples include the practice of using session tokens with time-limited validity.
4. The entry must only relate to the system under design, thus ignoring the correctness and security of any external dependencies.
5. The entry must not be dependent on externally defined data, such as in the case of user permission.

Additionally, we deemed measures defined as the absence of certain functionality as less valuable due to the increased difficulty of enforcement [14].

Previous research on design notations of secure systems have shown a skew towards confidentiality and integrity while having little or no support for availability and accountability. We considered it necessary for the final list of constraints to include all of the security goals. As a consequence, once we had selected the applicable entries, we categorized them according to the security goals of CIAA. This categorization ensured that the final list of constraints covered all security goals.

The last part of compiling a list of security architectural constraints involved combining the selected entries to remove duplicates and group similar concepts. Duplication involved both a single source having several entries, such as CAWE having input validation weakness for multiple tools and technologies (e.g., SQL, LDAP) and different sources having entries for the same concept, such as the security pattern input guard and the previously mentioned input validation weaknesses. Grouping similar concepts also allowed for the constraints to be more general, thus making them applicable for a broader set of systems.




Figure 3.1: Overview of the process of mapping the three sources to constraints

3.3 Validation

The validation of our results will be performed in two ways, depending on whether or not a constraint required any modification of ArchUnit or additional information in the source-code. The latter category carries a higher degree of scientific value thus motivating a more thorough validation procedure. In the sections below, both types of procedures will be described.

3.3.1 Solution Proposal

As described in Section 2.3, ArchUnit already provides functionality to perform conformance testing of architectural constraints. However, it is unclear whether the framework supports the enforcement of security architectural constraints. The mapping of security architectural constraints to that of rules in ArchUnit allows us to perform a *proposal of solution* as described in [26]. This type of validation is intended to propose a novel or significantly improved technique without rigorous validation. Instead, a proof of concept or small example is used to facilitate later validation.

3.3.2 Controlled Experiment

In contrast to constraints which may be implemented through already existing functionality, those requiring extension to either the API or additional information within the source-code are not guaranteed to reliably detect violations of the intended architecture. Therefore, validation is performed using a laboratory experiment [27] in order to increase the precision of the measurement.

Integration with already existing testing frameworks is a prominent advantage of ArchUnit. As testing is generally performed overtime to ensure that a system does not degrade, the focus of the experiment is to determine whether ArchUnit can detect changes to security architectural constraints between two versions.

3.3.2.1 Performance metrics

The imbalance between the designer, who needs to ensure that every single aspect of a system is secure, and the attacker, who needs to succeed only once, influences the metrics chosen to represent how well the extension to ArchUnit performs. Precision and recall were the metrics of choice, with the greater importance placed on the latter.

3.3.2.2 Projects used in evaluation

Systems to be included in the validation needed to fulfill two mandatory criteria. First and foremost was the fact that they need open source and written in Java as the static analysis of ArchUnit relies on the source-code. Secondly, there needed to be at minimum two different snapshots in order to fulfill the goal of comparing subsequent changes to a system.

In addition to the mandatory criteria, other aspects were also considered to reduce bias in the validation process. Systems which had already been analyzed in previous literature [28, 18] would provide an existing architecture and its security analysis, which we leverage as ground truth in our experiment. Additionally, systems which have a well documented architecture and security requirements and were within a reasonable size can further help mitigate potential internal validity threats.

4

Selection of Architectural Security Constraints

This chapter describes the result of compiling a list of security constraints, as described in the previous chapter, and the final selection of constraints used in the validation of the tool.

4.1 Compiled List of Security Constraints

The processed collection of security constraints can be seen in Table 4.1. There are in total 18 constraints. As mentioned in Section 3.2, each constraint was categorized according to the goals of CIAA to ensure full coverage.

Although both the architectural rules found in Jasser [5] and the security patterns presented in Scandariato et al. [24] were at the appropriate level of design, many of the weaknesses presented in CAWE were not. Common examples include; CAWE-259 "Use of hard-coded password" where the weakness is reliant on a local change of behavior rather than the architectural structure; and CAWE-263 "Password aging with long expiration" where the weakness is introduced by a single variable most likely defined outside of the source code. As a result, a far lower percentage of entries were included from the CAWE-catalog compared to the remaining two sources.

4.2 Final Selection

As explained in Section 1.4, the aim is not to demonstrate the enforceability of as many constraints as possible, but rather to investigate the feasibility of using the tool in this manner. To that end, a subset of the full list of security constraints is selected for enforcement. The final list contains 7 architectural security constraints, as this allows us to cover at least one constraint from each goal. The selected constraints can be seen in Table 4.2. The remainder of this section presents each selected constraint in further detail.

ID	Constraint	Goal
1	Exceptions shown to the client must be sent to a sanitizer	Confidentiality
2	Sensitive information must not bleed to components with lower security classification	Confidentiality
3	Sensitive information must be encrypted before transmission	Confidentiality
4	Every outbound message must be sent from a single component responsible for transmissions	Confidentiality
5	Data that passes a trust boundary must first be sent to a component responsible for hiding or removing sensitive data	Confidentiality
6	Secrets must not be exposed in log messages	Confidentiality
7	The system must not provide functionality to decrypt secured log messages	Confidentiality
8	Output passing between components must be validated against its specification	Integrity
9	Input from a user must pass through a component validating the data	Integrity
10	The session object must not be accessible to the user	Integrity
11	Components must store its state as restorable checkpoints	Availability
12	Spawning of threads must be limited or throttled	Availability
13	The system must not have multiple points of access	Accountability
14	At least one checkpoint must be initialized after successful authentication and authorization	Accountability
15	Methods related to security events must call the logger	Accountability
16	Authentication and authorization must each be enforced in a single component	Accountability
17	Security relevant log messages must be encrypted and immutable	Accountability

Table 4.1: Security constraints and their related CIAA goals.

#	# _{4.1}	Constraint
1	15	Methods related to security events must call the logger
2	16	Authentication and authorization must each be enforced in a single component
3	4	Every outbound message must be sent from a single component responsible for transmissions
4	9	Input from a user must pass through a component validating the data
5	12	Spawning of threads must be limited or throttled
6	2	Sensitive information must not bleed to components with lower security classification
7	6	Secrets must not be exposed in log messages

Table 4.2: Constraints that have been selected for enforcement.

4.2.1 Log all security events

Description: In any system, several components either directly change or process data, which represents the system's asset, or indirectly by invoking other components to act on its behalf. In either case, the request to perform a particular action originates from an actor (user or external process) who should later be held accountable. As a consequence, the system should log a security event before performing an action that could breach the specified security policies. Although the term security event has become somewhat ambiguous, the definition used in the context of this report comes from the SANS Institute: "An event is an observable occurrence in an information system that actually happened at some point in time." ¹

Typical enforcement: The usage of the *audit interceptor* forces all requests from a user to first be sent to a component responsible for logging the request and later forwarding it to the intended target.

Sources: CAWE 223/778, Jasser rule 5, Security pattern *Audit interceptor*.

Attack scenario: A typical scenario where the logging of security events increases a system's resilience to attacks is that of failed login attempts. An attacker may try and guess the credentials of a user by employing a brute-force attack. During the attack, the attacker performs several failed attempts at guessing the credentials, (hopefully) causing the system to either increase the time between repeated attempts or lock the account entirely though with the added effect of decreased availability for the intended user. Although this type of defense temporarily hinders the attacker, a log of failed attempts facilitates the detection of malicious actors and enables administrators to impose more permanent measures.

4.2.2 Enforce AuthN/AuthZ at single point

Description: Any system that has more than one user needs to incorporate functionality for authentication (AuthN), as well as authorization (AuthZ) if the privileges between users differ. The difficulty in complex systems where components handle different functionality, thus receiving separate requests and creating multiple entry points, is the fact that the components may have been designed to use various mechanisms of authentication. Instead, AuthN/AuthZ should be delegated to a single component to ensure consistent behavior across all entry points.

Typical enforcement: Designing a single component responsible for AuthN/AuthZ mechanisms across several points of entry. Several third-party libraries exist that provide such features as well as language extending specifications such as Jakarta EE (formerly J2EE).

Sources: CAWE 288/420/592, Security pattern *Authentication enforcer* and *Authorization enforcer*

Attack scenario: In system where the following conditions are true:

¹<https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/events-incidents-646>

- There are multiple points of entry;
- There are different mechanisms to provide AuthN/AuthZ, some having a greater certainty that a user is properly authenticated or authorized to perform an action
- and all points of entry share the same session object

An attacker may try and gain access to the least trusted point of entry and later use the granted authority to access services or operation normally requiring a greater level of trust.

4.2.3 Messages are sent from a central point

Description: Communication with external actors, whether they are a client connecting to a server, or the system sending data to a third party, is commonly performed over insecure networks using several components. Encryption is the preferred method of securing such communication against potential attackers, whereas removing secrets from the data to be sent ensures that a user only sees non-sensitive information. Having a single component responsible for any outbound communication reduces the risk of information disclosure (e.g. transmitting a sensitive message via an insecure sender or disclosing implementation details through stack traces), and can prevent harmful output from reaching the client (e.g. cross-site scripting attacks from other users).

Typical enforcement: Outbound messages can be intercepted before transmission to facilitate output sanitization. Similarly, outgoing messages can be forced to pass through a single component, designated as the sending point. This sending point can handle sanitization and decide whether the sender is allowed to carry the specified message.

Sources: Jasser rules 11 and 12.

Attack scenario: A blog website may properly use a delegated component for the sanitized transmission of some data (e.g. blog entries) but fail to do so for others (e.g. comments). An attacker who posts a comment containing HTML tags may then hijack the browser session of other users visiting the site.

4.2.4 Validate user input

Description: The ability to receive and process user input is fundamental to every computer system. However, the same input is also the primary source of untrusted data as an attacker possesses full control of what the system receives. Assuming that all data passed to a system is safe to process can have severe consequences when interpreting user input as a part of a query, often referred to as injection. In order to prevent an attacker from compromising the system by injection, all user input must be validated.

Typical enforcement: Placing a component performing validation between the

user's input and the component processing the data ensures that the input can be trusted. The approach is commonly referred to as the security pattern *input guard*.

Sources: CAWE 20/59/74-79/88-91/93-99/138/150/349/352/472/473/502/601/641/643/652/790-797/942, Security pattern *input guard*.

Attack scenario: In an application that uses user input to build a SQL query to retrieve a specific account number (as seen in Listing 4.1) an attacker may construct the request to retrieve all accounts by adding characters that break the query and introduces new parameters, such as ' or '1'='1. The resulting operation would retrieve all customer accounts, thus exposing sensitive information.

```
1 String query = "SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE  
2     custID='" + userInput + "'";
```

Listing 4.1: Example of a vulnerable SQL query

4.2.5 Restrict thread spawning

Description: Computers have finite resources in terms of memory, CPU time and network bandwidth. Systems should be designed with this in mind, employing measures to avoid exhausting the computer's resources. This constraint limits the number of threads that can be spawned on behalf of actors, which could otherwise lead to exhaustion of the CPU.

Typical enforcement: Tasks can be dispatched to a pool of worker threads that is not allowed to grow beyond a fixed size. Moreover, various mechanisms can be employed to throttle or limit requests such that a single actor cannot occupy all of the allotted threads.

Sources: CAWE 770.

Attack scenario: An attacker may initiate many requests that are each handled by the system in a separate thread. By initiating requests at a higher rate than the server is able to process them, the resources at the server are eventually exhausted. This leads to a denial of service to any legitimate actors attempting to access the system.

4.2.6 Sensitive information must stay within trust boundary

Description: Generally, a specific set of components, which have stricter security requirements constraining their implementation, handles the sensitive data within a system. Should that information leak to less secure components, the risk of exposing secrets to the user, and a potential attacker, increases significantly. In order to prevent leakage to less secure components, sensitive information must stay within a trust boundary.

Typical enforcement: A typical approach is to manually review methods that receives or send information to other components and ensure that they do not expose

any secrets. As for automated enforcement, various information flow analysis tools, like JOANA², can be employed to detect these types of information leaks within a system.

Sources: CAWE 488.

Attack scenario: An asset may be leaked from a component that is supposed to service a single actor, such as a session object, to a component that multiple actors have shared access to. This may subsequently lead to the asset being illegitimately accessed by a malicious actor.

4.2.7 Secrets must not be exposed in log messages

Description: Many systems handle secrets that should never touch permanent storage. A password is perhaps the most common example of such a secret. While great care can be taken on the design level to ensure that these secrets are not stored to disk, they may still be exposed unintentionally through log messages. In order to prevent such exposure, messages that are sent to the logger must not contain secrets.

Typical enforcement: Similar to the constraint described in Section 4.2.6, the typical approach is to manually review calls to the logger to ensure that no secrets are exposed, with the potential ability to use information flow analysis tools.

Sources: CAWE 359/532, Jasser rule 13.

Attack scenario: Log messages may be accessible to actors who are not otherwise granted direct access to the secrets. By exploiting an unintentional leak of secrets into the log messages, an attacker could systematically extract these without facing the intended restrictions.

²<https://pp.ipd.kit.edu/projects/joana/>

5

Enforcing Constraints

This chapter explains how the constraints are expressed and validated with the tool. The constraints are divided into three distinct categories. The first category contains the constraints that are possible to express in ArchUnit as-is. The second category describes constraints that are enforceable with the help of additional information in source code. The third and final category details constraints that require an extension of ArchUnit to be possible to enforce.

5.1 Support in ArchUnit as-is

ArchUnit contains an extensive vocabulary for expressing typical architectural constraints. These constraints are generally composed of three parts. The first part indicates the type of Java construct that should be inspected. These constructs include classes, methods, fields and constructors. The second part contains a predicate that selects a subset of these constructs. The third part defines the condition that must hold true for all the selected constructs.

An example of a rule defined solely using this standard vocabulary can be seen in Listing 5.1, where each of the three aforementioned parts of the constraint has been separated into their own line. The rule is a simple example of complete mediation, where some internal classes must only be accessed through a mediator.

```
1 ArchRule rule = classes()  
2     .that().resideInAPackage("..internal..")  
3     .should().onlyBeAccessed().byAnyPackage("..mediator..");
```

Listing 5.1: Example of a rule that is expressed with the standard vocabulary.

In situations where this vocabulary is insufficient for expressing a constraint, there is a possibility to define custom predicates and conditions over any given construct. These can be supplied as arguments to the `that()` and `should()` methods. Custom predicates and conditions are used extensively in our implementation, as will be made apparent in the following sections.

5.1.1 Log all security events

This constraint is expressed with the assumption that there are services, in the form of classes, that are responsible for performing security related events. Any publicly accessible methods in these services perform a security event and must therefore contain a call to the logging facility.

The definition of the architectural rule can be seen in Listing 5.2. The predicate that selects the security services, and the class that is responsible for logging, are passed as arguments to the architectural rule. This leaves no need for injecting information into the source code of the target system. Furthermore, by using a predicate to select the security services, the developer is left with some flexibility in how they decide to apply the constraint. As opposed to a plain list of classes, a predicate can match all classes belonging to a specific package or following a set naming scheme, minimizing the need for revisiting the constraint as the system evolves.

```
1 ArchRule logSecurityEvents(  
2     DescribedPredicate<? super JavaClass>  
3         securityServicesDescriptor,  
4     Class<?> logger) {  
5     return methods()  
6         .that().haveModifier(JavaModifier.PUBLIC)  
7         .and().areDeclaredInClassesThat(securityServicesDescriptor)  
8         .should(callMethod(declaredIn(logger)));  
9 }
```

Listing 5.2: Rule definition for constraint 1.

In the example system, illustrated in Figure 5.1, the logging facility is the class named `Logger` while the only security service is the `UserService` class. An application of the constraint on this system can be as simple as the one shown in Listing 5.3.

```
1 @ArchTest  
2 ArchRule logSecurityEvents = SecArchUnit  
3     .logSecurityEvents(type(UserService.class), Logger.class);
```

Listing 5.3: Application of constraint 1 to the example system.

5.1.2 Enforce AuthN/AuthZ at single point

The second constraint is defined in terms of two concepts: an authentication point and an authentication enforcer. Authentication is performed through a method call to the authentication enforcer, which is a class whose sole responsibility is to authenticate an actor. This call should occur at the authentication point, and at no other points in the system, for the sake of ensuring a uniform authentication mechanism throughout the system. Authorization is enforced in the same manner, with the concepts of an authorization point and an authorization enforcer.

The definition of the second constraint is detailed in Listing 5.4. The constraint is

5. Enforcing Constraints




Figure 5.1: An example of a system, for the purpose of illustrating how the constraints are applied.

defined as two separate rules, for the sake of clarity, but their implementations are identical.

```

1 ArchRule enforceAuthenticationAtCentralPoint (
2     Class<?> authenticationPoint,
3     Class<?> authenticator) {
4     return CompositeArchRule.of(
5         theClass(authenticationPoint)
6         .should(callMethod(declaredIn(authenticator)))
7     ).and(
8         methods()
9         .that().areDeclaredIn(authenticator)
10        .should(onlyBeAccessedBy(authenticationPoint))
11    );
12 }
13
14 ArchRule enforceAuthorizationAtCentralPoint (
15     Class<?> authorizationPoint,
16     Class<?> authorizer) {
17     return enforceAuthenticationAtCentralPoint(
18         authorizationPoint,
19         authorizer
20     );
21 }

```

Listing 5.4: Rule definition for constraint 2.

In the example system, the authentication and authorization points are both situated in the `UserService` class while authentication and authorization are enforced by the classes `UserAuthenticator` and `UserAuthorizer` respectively. The application of the rule can be seen in Listing 5.5.

```

1 @ArchTest
2 ArchRule enforceAuthentication = SecArchUnit
3     .enforceAuthenticationAtCentralPoint(UserService.class,
4         UserAuthenticator.class);
5
6 @ArchTest
7 ArchRule enforceAuthorization = SecArchUnit
8     .enforceAuthorizationAtCentralPoint(UserService.class,
9         UserAuthorizer.class);

```

Listing 5.5: Application of constraint 2 to the example system.

5.1.3 Messages are sent from a central point

The third constraint dictates that all outbound messages are sent from a central sending point. The intent is to have a single point that handles output sanitization or performs other safety checks on messages before they are sent. The act of sending a message is defined as a method call to a sender with at least one argument, which is assumed to contain the message contents. The reasoning is that any class should be allowed to create and pass around a sender instance without violating the constraint.

The rule definition can be seen in Listing 5.6. Since there can be multiple sender classes in a system, e.g. one for HTTP requests and one for SMTP messages, the rule accepts a predicate that can select all these sender classes.

```

1 ArchRule sendOutboundMessagesFromCentralPoint(
2     Class<?> sendingPoint,
3     DescribedPredicate<? super JavaClass> senderDescriptor) {
4     return methods()
5         .that().areDeclaredInClassesThat(senderDescriptor)
6         .and(haveAtLeastOneParameter)
7         .should(onlyBeAccessedBy(sendingPoint));
8 }

```

Listing 5.6: Rule definition for constraint 3.

Listing 5.7 showcases how the constraint can be applied to the example system. In this system, there is a single sender class `HttpResponse`, responsible for returning a response to a client. The central sending point is the `OutboundMessageSanitizer` class.

```

1 @ArchTest
2 ArchRule centralSendingPoint = SecArchUnit
3     .sendOutboundMessagesFromCentralPoint(
4         OutboundMessageSanitizer.class,
5         type(HttpResponse.class)
6     );

```

Listing 5.7: Application of constraint 3 to the example system.

5.2 Injecting Information into Source Code

Some of the architectural constraints require that the developer injects additional information into the source code. In some cases, this information is simply an indicator that says something about an entire class. Naming the class with a specific suffix is one approach to accomplish this. Another approach is to implement an empty interface, which is the technique used with Java's `Serializable`¹ interface.

In other cases, however, the information may be required for methods of arbitrary signatures and even specific fields. For the purposes of flexibility and minimizing the obtrusiveness of our approach, any extra information is expressed in the form of annotations. These can be applied to classes, fields, methods and parameters without changing the underlying architecture of the system.

The need for additional information within the source code becomes apparent in the case where a class contains public methods with varying degrees of security requirements. A typical example is found in constraint 4, where a class is responsible for handling user input. Some methods might receive predefined values, such as in the case of checkboxes, whereas others treat strings entered by the user. The former type of input is guaranteed to be safe, whereas the latter entirely under the control of the attacker, thus introducing the need for sanitation. Using the broader predicate of entire classes (described in section 5.1) would not allow the constraint to be limited to specific methods within a class (those receiving potentially malicious input), and later trace a call to a method providing sanitation. Thus, annotations provide the granularity needed to limit the scope of a constraint to only the applicable code units.

5.2.1 Validate user input

User input comes in many forms, and as such, it is impossible to define a single algorithm to validate properly every single type. The problem grows further as queries (such as SQL) or other types of processed data (such as XML), each with its own set of grammar, are often formed using strings. As a consequence, the implemented constraint is more abstract as it checks whether a class that receives user input is said to either perform validation on its own or delegate the task another method. In total, four distinct cases conforming to the constraint were considered:

- *Method A* is annotated with both **UserInput** and **InputValidator**.
- *Method A* is annotated with **UserInput** and calls a *method B* that is annotated with **InputValidator**.
- *Method A* is annotated with **UserInput** and is only called by methods that are annotated with **InputValidator**.

The rule definition can be seen in Listing 5.8. As shown, the **UserInput** annotation is used on line 3 to limit the set of applicable code units, whereas the custom

Specific example that requires additional information

Show rule definition for each constraint

Show how each constraint is used in our toy app

¹<https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/io/Serializable.html>




Figure 5.2: Applying constraint 4 to the model of the example system using added annotations.

condition `performDirectOrIndirect` implements the logic to detect violations for each of the three cases outlined above.

```

1 public static ArchRule validateUserInput() {
2     return codeUnits()
3         .that().areAnnotatedWith(UserInput.class)
4         .should(performDirectOrIndirectValidation);
5 }

```

Listing 5.8: Rule definition for constraint 4.

In the example system, a user publishes a status update in the form of a string that the `UserService` class receives. The status is then passed to the `StatusSanitizer` class, where it is validated. The affected methods of each class are marked with the appropriate annotation, as shown in figure 5.2.

5.2.2 Restrict thread spawning

While `resources` is a broad term, this constraint focuses on preventing the exhaustion of CPU and memory resources through the creation of new threads and processes. As such, every block of code that contains a call to the `start()` method of a `Thread`² or any of its subclasses, must be marked as containing a resource restriction mechanism. The same rule is applied for calls to `ProcessBuilder.start()`³ and `Runtime.exec()`³, which lead to the creation of new processes.

The marking is done with the help of an annotation, either on the relevant method

²<https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Thread.html>

³<https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Process.html>

or the entire class. The decision of how the restriction mechanism is implemented is left to the developer of the system.

```
1 public static ArchRule limitResourceAllocation() {
2     return noClasses()
3         .that().areNotAnnotatedWith(ResourceRestriction.class)
4         .should().callMethodWhere(
5             aThreadIsStartedWithoutRestriction
6         ).orShould().callMethodWhere(
7             aProcessIsStartedWithoutRestriction
8         );
9 }
```

Listing 5.9: Rule definition for constraint 5.

5.3 Extending ArchUnit Analysis

In the current ArchUnit API, a rule that aims to constrain method calls can only be defined in terms of the type signatures of the method and its parameters. This is a non-issue when the arguments being passed to a method are of the same type as the parameters. However, in cases where a method parameter accepts a "more general" type, such as an `Object`, there is no way for ArchUnit to constrain the types of the objects that are actually being passed as arguments.

Consider constraint 7, which aims to ensure that no secrets are passed to the logger. Say there is a `Secret` annotation that marks all the classes whose instances must not be passed to the logger. We can attempt to enforce the constraint with the current ArchUnit API and a custom predicate, as seen in Listing 5.10. However, a typical logger class will accept either a plain string, or a format string along with an array of objects to be formatted. In such cases, this architectural rule will be unable to catch secrets that are passed to the logger.

```
1 public static ArchRule doNotLogSecrets(Class<?> logger) {
2     return noClasses()
3         .should().callMethodWhere(
4             parameterTypeAnnotatedWith(Secret.class)
5             .and(targetOwner(type(logger)))
6         );
7 }
```

Listing 5.10: A first attempt to implement constraint 7.

For the final 2 constraints, there is a need for an extension that allows constraints to be defined against arguments, rather than parameters. There should also be hints about where these arguments may have been derived from, e.g. which types that make up the components of a concatenated string. In the following sections, we will describe the extensions that have been made to ArchUnit and how these are utilized in the definitions of our constraints.




Figure 5.3: The immediate context of the `MethodProcessor` class in ArchUnit, responsible for processing instructions.

5.3.1 Extensions

ArchUnit builds its representation of the architecture using ASM⁴, a Java bytecode analysis framework. ASM reads bytecode and generates callbacks to methods in its various visitor classes⁵. The visitor of most interest to us is `MethodVisitor`, which is responsible for processing the contents of a method, constructor or static initializer. These are collectively named *code units* in ArchUnit’s domain, i.e. anything that contains code.

Parts of this section probably belong in the background

ArchUnit extends the `MethodVisitor` class in `MethodProcessor`, which primarily visits instructions related to field accesses and method invocations (see Figure 5.3). ArchUnit processes these instructions into information about accesses between Java members, not entirely unlike the information provided by a static call graph.

Java, as a stack-oriented programming language, passes arguments to method calls and field assignments via the operand stack [29]. As such, inspecting the arguments passed to a method requires inspecting the state of this stack at the time of a method call. ASM provides an extension of its `MethodVisitor` class, called `AnalyzerAdapter`, which is capable of simulating the effect that each instruction has on the operand stack. As seen in Figure 5.4, our extension makes `MethodProcessor` extend this class and utilize the information about the operand stack to perform information flow analysis.

5.3.2 Sensitive information must stay within trust boundary

...

5.3.3 Secrets must not be exposed in log messages

...

Describe our information flow analysis, reference existing approaches

Diagram of changes to ArchUnit domain

Show rule definition for each constraint

Show how each constraint is used in our toy app

⁴<https://asm.ow2.io/>

⁵<https://asm.ow2.io/javadoc/org/objectweb/asm/package-summary.html>




Figure 5.4: Changes made to `MethodProcessor` and its surroundings.

6

Evaluation

adjust sections as
necessary

6.1 Selection of systems

6.2 Comparison with similar tools

...

The results from this comparison can be seen in Table 6.1.

Tool	TP	FP	FN	Precision	Recall
SecArchUnit	19	1	2	0.95	0.90
SonarQube plugin	17	1	4	0.94	0.81
PMD plugin	15	1	6	0.94	0.71

Table 6.1: Results from validating constraints 1-5 using various static analysis tools.

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