QA on Part 5

spinoza/ethics-1.html

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ <h3>Definitions</h3>
     <dt>Definition 6</dt>
     <dd>
       <p>By <dfn>God</dfn>, I mean a being absolutely infinite &mdash; that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.</p>
-      <p>Explanation &mdash; I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.</p>
+      <p id='ethics-1.html#def7-explanation'>Explanation &mdash; I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.</p>
     </dd>
   </di>
   <di id='def7'>
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ <h3>Definitions</h3>
     <dt>Definition 8</dt>
     <dd>
       <p>By <dfn>eternity</dfn>, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.</p>
-      <p>Explanation &mdash; Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.</p>
+      <p id='ethics-1.html#def8-explanation'>Explanation &mdash; Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.</p>
     </dd>
   </di>
 </dl>

spinoza/ethics-2.html

@@ -37,21 +37,21 @@ <h3>Definitions</h3>
     <dt>Definition 3</dt>
     <dd>
       <p>By <dfn>idea</dfn>, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing.</p>
-      <p>Explanation &mdash; I say conception rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.</p>
+      <p id='def3-explanation'>Explanation &mdash; I say conception rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.</p>
     </dd>
   </di>
   <di id='def4'>
     <dt>Definition 4</dt>
     <dd>
       <p>By an <dfn>adequate idea</dfn>, I mean an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.</p>
-      <p>Explanation &mdash; I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object (ideatum).</p>
+      <p id='def4-explanation'>Explanation &mdash; I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object (ideatum).</p>
     </dd>
   </di>
   <di id='def5'>
     <dt>Definition 5</dt>
     <dd>
       <p><dfn>Duration</dfn> is the indefinite continuance of existing.</p>
-      <p>Explanation &mdash; I say indefinite, because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of the thing, but does not take it away.</p>
+      <p id='def5-explanation'>Explanation &mdash; I say indefinite, because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of the thing, but does not take it away.</p>
     </dd>
   </di>
   <di id='def6'>
@@ -498,8 +498,8 @@ <h3>Propositions</h3>
       <p id='prop44-proof'>Proof &mdash; It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly (<a href='#prop41'>Proposition 41</a>), namely (<a href='ethics-1.html#axiom6'>Axiom 6 of Part 1</a>), as they are in themselves &mdash; that is (<a href='ethics-1.html#prop29'>Proposition 29 of Part 1</a>), not as contingent, but as necessary.  Q.E.D.</p>
       <p id='prop44-corollary1'>Corollary 1 &mdash; Hence it follows, that it is only through our imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the future or the past, as contingent.</p>
       <p id='prop44-corollary1-note'>Note &mdash; How this way of looking at things arises, I will briefly explain.  We have shown above (<a href='#prop17'>Proposition 17</a> and its <a href='#prop17-corollary'>Corollary</a>) that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence.  Further (<a href='#prop18'>Proposition 18</a>), we showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the other &mdash; that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence.  Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some more quickly, some at equal speed.  Thus, let us suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that today he again sees Peter in the morning.  It is evident, from <a href='#prop18'>Proposition 18</a>, that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon &mdash; that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time.  If it should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not both together.  His imagination will therefore waver; and, with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one, then the other &mdash; that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent.  This wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past, or future.</p>
-      <p id='prop44-corollary1'>Corollary 2 &mdash; It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis specie).</p>
-      <p id='prop44-corollary1-proof'>Proof &mdash; It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary (<a href='#prop34'>Proposition 44</a>).  Reason perceives this necessity of things (<a href='#prop41'>Proposition 41</a>) truly &mdash; that is (<a href='ethics-1.html#axiom6'>Axiom 6 of Part 1</a>), as it is in itself.  But (<a href='ethics-1.html#prop16'>Proposition 16</a>) this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.  We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (<a href='#prop38'>Proposition 38</a>), which answer to things common to all, and which (<a href='#prop37'>Proposition 37</a>) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.</p>
+      <p id='prop44-corollary2'>Corollary 2 &mdash; It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis specie).</p>
+      <p id='prop44-corollary2-proof'>Proof &mdash; It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary (<a href='#prop34'>Proposition 44</a>).  Reason perceives this necessity of things (<a href='#prop41'>Proposition 41</a>) truly &mdash; that is (<a href='ethics-1.html#axiom6'>Axiom 6 of Part 1</a>), as it is in itself.  But (<a href='ethics-1.html#prop16'>Proposition 16</a>) this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.  We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (<a href='#prop38'>Proposition 38</a>), which answer to things common to all, and which (<a href='#prop37'>Proposition 37</a>) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.</p>
     </dd>
   </di>
   <di id='prop45'>