A Specification of NCCU BFT Consensus Protocol for Go Ethereum

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Revision 2

In this document, we use the term **nodes** to refer to the Ethereum clients participating the consensus protocol. There are two types of nodes, proposers and validators. Consensus is divided into heights. For each height H, the system will commit a block B^H . To commit block B^H , we may process multiple rounds at height H. Note that in each round, we have one proposer (chosen in a round-robin fashion in each round) and the rest of nodes are validators. In the following description, we use $+\frac{2}{3}$ to denote a number greater than $\frac{2}{3} \times n$, where n is the number of nodes. In addition, we use (H, R) to denote round R at height H.

General Message Structure

During the consensus process, nodes broadcast messages. Messages have the form $M_{X,H,R,u}(B)$. A message contains the sender of the message u, the height H and round R in which u broadcasts the message, and the message type M_X . There are four messages types, $Proposal_{VotingInstruction}$, $Proposal_{NewBlock}$, $Vote_{Proposal}$, and $Vote_{PreCommit}$. Note that B refers to a block and may be nil.

Votes and Locksets

During the consensus process, nodes broadcast votes. A vote is nothing but a message. Specifically, a vote has the form $Vote_{X,H,R,u}(B)$, and there are two types of votes, $Vote_{Proposal}$ and $Vote_{PreCommit}$. Apart from the information stored in a message, $Vote_{X,H,R,u}(B)$ also contains a hash of block B. Nodes will save votes in **locksets** for future reference. A lockset $Lockset_{X,H,R,u}$ must store $+\frac{2}{3}$ votes $Vote_{X',H',R',u'}(B')$ such that H' = H, R' = R, and X' = X. Note that we may have $Vote_{X,H,R,u_1}(B_1)$ and $Vote_{X,H,R,u_2}(B_2)$ in $Lockset_{X,H,R,u}$ such that $u_1 \neq u_2$ and $B_1 \neq B_2$. Moreover, B_1 may be nil.

Proposals

In the beginning of each round, a proposer u will broadcast a proposal. A proposal is a message and has the form $Proposal_{X,H,R,u}(B)$. There are two types of proposals, $Proposal_{VotingInstruction}$ and $Proposal_{NewBlock}$. Other information contained in a proposal is listed below.

- $Proposal_{VotingInstruction,H,R,u}(B)$:
 - 1. Block B,
 - 2. A lockset $Lockset_{Proposal,H,R',u}$ for some R' < R.
- $Proposal_{NewBlock,H,R,u}(B)$:
 - 1. Block B,
 - 2. If R = 0, the message also contains $Lockset_{PreCommit,H-1,R',u}$ for some round R' in height H 1.

Quorum of a lockset S, Quorum(S)

If there are $+\frac{2}{3}$ votes for the same block B in a lockset S and $B \neq nil$, then Quorum(S) = B. Otherwise, we say Quorum(S) does not exist.

Validity of Messages and Locksets

Consider message $M_{X,H',R',u}(B)$. For the message to be valid in (H,R), H' must be equal to H, R' must be equal to R, and the signature must be consistent with u. Note that a vote is a message, and a vote is valid in (H,R) if it is a valid message in (H,R). Moreover, we may save votes in locksets for future reference. Recall that a lockset $Lockset_{X,H,R,u}$ must store $+\frac{2}{3}$ votes $Vote_{X',H',R',u'}(B')$ such that H' = H, R' = R, and X' = X. We say that $Lockset_{X,H,R,u}$ is valid if all the votes in it are valid in (H,R) and are from different nodes. For the message $Proposal_{X,H,R,u}(B)$ to be considered valid, u must be the proposer of (H,R). Moreover, the following constraints must be satisfied:

- $Proposal_{VotingInstruction,H,R,u}(B)$: The message must contain a lockset $Lockset_{Proposal,H,R',u}$ such that:
 - 1. R' < R.
 - 2. $Lockset_{Proposal,H,R',u}$ is valid.
 - 3. $Quorum(Lockset_{Proposal,H,R',u}) = B$.

- $Proposal_{NewBlock,H,R,u}(B)$: If R = 0, then the message must contain $Lockset_{PreCommit,H-1,R',u}$ such that:
 - 1. $Lockset_{PreCommit,H-1,R',u}$ is valid.
 - 2. $Quorum(Lockset_{PreCommit,H-1,R',u}) = B^{H-1}$, where B^{H-1} is the block committed in height H-1.

Signature and Hash Function

When a node broadcasts a message, it needs to sign the message. In our implementation, we use the built-in ECDSA signature. The signer can sign the data with private key. The produced signature is in the (V, R, S) format. The signer's address can be derived from the signature (V, R, S) using secp256k1 elliptic curve. On the other hand, a message may contain a hash of Block. In our implementation, we use the built-in keccak256 hash function.

Consensus Steps

Next, we consider the steps for a node u in (H, R), $R = 0, 1, 2, \cdots$.

Step 1 (Propose):

If u is a proposer:

- 1. If u has broadcast $Vote_{PreCommit}$ (not for nil) in Height H previously, and the most recent one is $Vote_{PreCommit,H,R',u}(B)$, $Prop = Proposal_{VotingInstruction,H,R,u}(B)$. Otherwise, create a new block B and set $Prop = Proposal_{NewBlock,H,R,u}(B)$.
- 2. Broadcast Prop and go to step 2.

Otherwise, go to Step 2.

Step 2 (Prevote):

If u has broadcast $Vote_{PreCommit}$ in Height H (not for nil) previously, and the most recent one is $Vote_{PreCommit,H,R_1,u}(B_1)$, then set $R_u = R_1$ and $B_u = B_1$.

Otherwise, set $R_u = -\infty$ and $B_u = nil$.

If u receives a valid $Proposal_{VotingInstruction,H,R,u'}(B_2)$ with lockset $Lockset_{Proposal,H,R_2,u'}$ within TimeoutProposal after (H,R) starts, then set $R_{VI} = R_2$ and $B_{VI} = B_2$.

Otherwise, set $B_{VI} = nil$.

Case 1: $B_{VI} \neq nil$ and $R_{VI} \geq R_u$: Broadcast $Vote_{Proposal,H,R,u}(B_{VI})$ and go to Step 3.

Case 2: $B_u \neq nil$: Broadcast $Vote_{Proposal,H,R,u}(B_u)$ and go to Step 3.

Case 3: u receives a valid $Proposal_{NewBlock,H,R,u'}(B)$ within TimeoutProposal after (H,R) starts: Broadcast $Vote_{Proposal,H,R,u}(B)$ and go to Step 3.

Case 4: Otherwise: Broadcast $Vote_{Proposal,H,R,u}(nil)$ and go to Step 3.

Step 3 (Precommit):

- 1. Collect a valid lockset $Lockset_{Proposal,H,R,u}$ of $Vote_{Proposal}$.
- 2. Wait for TimeoutProposalVote to store more votes in Lockset_{Proposal,H,R,u}.
- 3. If $Quorum(Lockset_{Proposal,H,R,u}) = B$ exists, broadcast $Vote_{PreCommit,H,R,u}(B)$. Otherwise, broadcast $Vote_{Precommit,H,R,u}(nil)$. Note that if a quorum exists before TimeoutProposalVote, u can stop collecting votes.
- 4. Go to Step 4.

Step 4 (Commit):

- 1. Collect a valid lockset $Lockset_{PreCommit,H,R,u}$ of $Vote_{PreCommit}$.
- 2. Wait for TimeoutPrecommitVote to store more votes in Lockset_{PreCommit,H,R,u}.
- 3. If $Quorum(Lockset_{PreCommit,H,R,u}) = B$ exists, commit B and go to Step 1 in (H+1,0).
- 4. Otherwise, go to Step 1 in (H, R + 1).

Validity of a Block

Once a node u commits a block B in (H,R), it stores to levelDB a key-value pair $(Hash(B), Lockset_{PreCommit,H,R,u})$. Nodes could load $Lockset_{PreCommit}$ to verify blocks or to sync with others. More specifically, a block B of height H is valid if the key-value pair $(Hash(B), Lockset_{PreCommit,H,R,u})$ satisfying the following constraints:

- 1. $Lockset_{PreCommit,H,R,u}$ is a valid lockset.
- 2. $Quorum(Lockset_{PreCommit,H,R,u}) = B$.

Constant setting

- *TimeoutProposal*: The Maximum time for waiting a proposal. This is set to 3 seconds initially.
- TimeoutProposalVote: The maximum time for waiting more $Vote_{Proposal}$. This is set to 1 second initially.
- TimeoutPrecommitVote: The maximum time for waiting more $Vote_{PreCommit}$. This is set to 1 seconds initially.
- TimeoutFactor: This is the factor used to extend the above timeouts after each round. More specifically, TimeoutX in round $R = TimeoutX \times TimeoutFactor^R$. TimeoutFactor is set to 1.5.