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draft-hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls-00.txt
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dprive H. Zhang
Internet-Draft P. Aras
Intended status: Standards Track Salesforce
Expires: September 12, 2019 W. Toorop
NLnet Labs
S. Dickinson
Sinodun IT
A. Mankin
Salesforce
March 11, 2019
DNS Zone Transfer over TLS
draft-hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls-00
Abstract
DNS zone transfers are transmitted in clear text, which gives
attackers the opportunity to collect the content of a zone by
eavesdropping on links. The DNS Transaction Signature (TSIG) is
specified to restrict direct zone transfer to authorized clients, but
it does not add confidentiality. This document specifies use of TLS
to prevent zone collection
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
Zhang, et al. Expires September 12, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft XFR over TLS March 2019
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Zone Transfer Confidentiality Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Zone Transfer with DOT - Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. TSIG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Mutual TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Session Establishment and Closing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. AXFR Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2. IXFR Sessions (?) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.3. Policies for Both AXFR and IXFR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.4. Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
11. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
12. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
13. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
DNS has a number of privacy vulnerabilities, as discussed in detail
in [I-D.bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis]. Query privacy has received
the most attention. There are now standards for three encryption
capabilities for queries and more work going on to guide deployment
[RFC7858] [RFC8484].
[RFC7626] established that the query transactions are not public and
needed protection, but on zone transfer it says only: Privacy risks
for the holder of a zone (the risk that someone gets the data) are
discussed in [RFC5936] and [RFC5155].
In what way is exposing the full content of a zone a privacy risk?
The contents of the zone could include information such as names of
persons used in names of hosts. Best practice is not to use personal
information for domain names, but many such domain names exist.
Zhang, et al. Expires September 12, 2019 [Page 2]
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There may also be regulatory or other reasons why the zone content in
full must be treated as private.
Neither of the RFCs mentioned by RFC7626 contemplates the risk that
someone gets the data through link eavesdropping.
[RFC5155] specifies NSEC3 to prevent zone enumeration, which is when
queries for the authenticated denial of existences records of DNSSEC
allow a client to walk through the entire zone. Note that the need
for this protection also motivates NSEC5; zone walking is now
possible with NSEC3 due to crypto-breaking advances, and NSEC5 is a
response to this problem.
[RFC5155] does not address data obtained outside zone enumeration
(nor does NSEC5). Preventing eavesdropping of zone transfers (this
draft) is orthogonal to preventing zone enumeration, though they aim
to protect the same information.
[RFC5936] specifies using TSIG [RFC2845] for authorization of the
clients of a zone transfer and for data integrity, but does not
express any need for confidentiality, and TSIG does not offer
encryption. Some operators use SSH tunneling or IPSEC to encrypt the
transfer data. Because the AXFR zone transfer is carried out over
TCP from DNS protocol implementations, encrypting AXFR using DNS over
TLS [RFC7858], aka DOT, seems like a simple step forward. This
document specifies how to use DOT to prevent zone collection from
zone transfers, including discussion of approaches for IXFR, which
uses UDP or TCP.
Next steps: work on questions at DNS table during Hackathon, expand
this draft, then solicit discussion on the DPRIVE mailing list.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Privacy terminology is as described in Section 3 of [RFC6973].
DNS terminology is as described in [RFC8499].
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3. Zone Transfer Confidentiality Overview
4. Zone Transfer with DOT - Authentication
4.1. TSIG
4.2. Mutual TLS
5. Session Establishment and Closing
5.1. AXFR Sessions
The connection flow in AXFR is a NOTIFY from the primary server to
the secondary server, and then an AXFR request from the secondary to
the primay after which the data flows.
The connection for AXFR SHOULD be established using port 853, as
specified in [RFC7858]. If there is no response on port 853, the
connection MAY be attempted using port 443.
TODO: diagram of connection flow for AXFR, without and with DOT
5.2. IXFR Sessions (?)
[RFC1995] specifies that Incremental Transfer may use UDP if the
entire IXFR response can be contained in a single DNS packet,
otherwise, TCP is used.
Given this, how should confidentiality of IXFR be provided? To
discuss: should IXFR have a mode in which TCP is mandatory? or
should there be an approach of starting with DNS over DTLS, and
switching to DNS over TLS with a TCP switch? In workloads where
there are frequent IXFRs, is the persistent mode that TCP-Mode would
enable (as well as the retries, a benefit?
5.3. Policies for Both AXFR and IXFR
In order to assure the confidentiality of the zone information, all
the servers (primary and secondary) MUST have a consistent
confidentiality use. If any do not, this is a weak link for
attackers to exploit. How to do this is TBD.
The entire group (the primary and all secondaries) MUST have a
consistent policy on Strict or Non-Strict mode of operation. How to
do this is TBD.
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5.4. Next Steps
Upcoming open hackathon experiments will feed into this Session
Establishment and Closing section, as much about this needs
exploration as well as dicussion on the mailing list.
6. Performance Considerations
The details in [RFC7858] about using persistent connections and TLS
Session Resume are fully applicable to DNS Transfer over DOT as well.
7. Implementation Considerations
TBA
8. IANA Considerations
TBD
9. Security Considerations
This document specifies a security measure against a DNS risk, the
risk that an attacker collects entire DNS zones through eavesdropping
on plaintext DNS zone transfers. It presents a new Security
Consideration for DNS. Some questions to discuss are: should DOT in
this new case be required to use only TLS1.3 and higher to avoid
residual exposure? How should padding be used (if it should)?
10. Acknowledgements
Benno, Shumon, Tim
11. Contributors
The following contributed significantly to the document:
12. Changelog
draft-hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls-00
o Initial commit
13. Normative References
[I-D.bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis]
Bortzmeyer, S. and S. Dickinson, "DNS Privacy
Considerations", draft-bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis-02
(work in progress), January 2019.
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[RFC1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1995, August 1996, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc1995>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
(TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.
[RFC5936] Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, Ed., "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
(AXFR)", RFC 5936, DOI 10.17487/RFC5936, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC7626] Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Privacy Considerations", RFC 7626,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7626, August 2015, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7626>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
(DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.
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[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
Authors' Addresses
Han Zhang
Salesforce
San Francisco, CA
United States
Email: hzhang@salesforce.com
Pallavi Aras
Salesforce
Herndon, VA
United States
Email: paras@salesforce.com
Willem Toorop
NLnet Labs
Science Park 400
Amsterdam 1098 XH
The Netherlands
Email: willem@nlnetlabs.nl
Sara Dickinson
Sinodun IT
Magdalen Centre
Oxford Science Park
Oxford OX4 4GA
United Kingdom
Email: sara@sinodun.com
Allison Mankin
Salesforce
Herndon, VA
United States
Email: allison.mankin@gmail.com
Zhang, et al. Expires September 12, 2019 [Page 7]