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clean up capitalisation
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AlexanderBand committed Jan 26, 2019
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Introduction
============

The purpose of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to issue cryptographic material that allows Internet number resource holders to digitally prove they have the right to use the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and Autonomous System (AS) numbers listed on the certificate. Using their resource certificate, the legitimate holder can make authoritative, signed statements about the resources listed on it.
The purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to issue cryptographic material that allows Internet number resource holders to digitally prove they have the right to use the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses and Autonomous System (AS) numbers listed on the certificate. Using their resource certificate, the legitimate holder can make authoritative, signed statements about the resources listed on it.

To understand the structure of this PKI and its and usage, we must first look at how Internet number resources are allocated globally.

Expand All @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Before being formalised within an organisation, the allocation of Internet numbe

Jon Postel in 1994, with a map of Internet top-level domains

Initially, the IANA function was performed globally, but as the work volume grew due to the expansion of the Internet, `Regional Internet Registries <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Internet_registry>`_ (RIRs) were established over the years to take on this responsibility on a regional level. Until the available pool of IPv4 depleted in 2011, this meant that periodically a large block of IPv4 address space (typically a /8) was allocated from IANA to the RIR, who would, in turn, allocate to their member organisations. IPv6 address blocks and AS Numbers are allocated in the same way.
Initially, the IANA function was performed globally, but as the work volume grew due to the expansion of the Internet, `Regional Internet Registries <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Internet_registry>`_ (RIRs) were established over the years to take on this responsibility on a regional level. Until the available pool of IPv4 depleted in 2011, this meant that periodically a large block of IPv4 address space (typically a /8) was allocated from IANA to the RIR, who would, in turn, allocate to their member organisations. IPv6 address blocks and AS numbers are allocated in the same way.

Today, there are five RIRs responsible for the allocation and registration of Internet number resources within a particular region of the world:

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Mapping the Resource Allocation Hierarchy into the RPKI

As illustrated, the IANA has the authoritative registration of `IPv4 <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space/ipv4-address-space.xhtml>`_, `IPv6 <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-unicast-address-assignments/ipv6-unicast-address-assignments.xhtml>`_ and `AS Number <https://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers/as-numbers.xhtml>`_ resources that are allocated to the five RIRs. Each RIR `registers <https://www.nro.net/about/rirs/statistics/>`_ authoritative information on the allocations to NIRs and LIRs, and lastly, LIRs record to which End User organisation they assigned resources.

In RPKI, resource certificates attest to the allocation by the issuer of IP addresses or AS numbers to the subject. As a result, the certificate hierarchy in RPKI follows the same structure as the Internet number resource allocation hierarchy, with the exception of the IANA level. At this time, IANA does not operate a single root Certificate Authority (CA). Instead, the five RIRs each run a root CA with a trust anchor from which a chain of trust for the resources they each manage is derived.
In RPKI, resource certificates attest to the allocation by the issuer of IP addresses or AS numbers to the subject. As a result, the certificate hierarchy in RPKI follows the same structure as the Internet number resource allocation hierarchy, with the exception of the IANA level. At this time, IANA does not operate a single root certificate authority (CA). Instead, the five RIRs each run a root CA with a trust anchor from which a chain of trust for the resources they each manage is derived.

.. figure:: img/RPKI-Chain-Of-Trust.*
:align: center
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The Chain of Trust in RPKI, starting at the five RIRs

The digital certificates used in RPKI are based on X.509, standardised in `RFC 5280 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280>`_, along with extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers described in `RFC 3779 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3779>`_. Because RPKI is used in the routing security context, a common misconception is that this is the "Routing" PKI. However, certificates in this PKI are called **resource** certificates and conform to the certificate profile described in `RFC 6487 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6487>`_.
The digital certificates used in RPKI are based on X.509, standardised in `RFC 5280 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280>`_, along with extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers described in `RFC 3779 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3779>`_. Because RPKI is used in the routing security context, a common misconception is that this is the *Routing* PKI. However, certificates in this PKI are called *resource* certificates and conform to the certificate profile described in `RFC 6487 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6487>`_.

.. note:: X.509 certificates are typically used for authenticating either an
individual or, for example, a website. **In RPKI, certificates
do not include identity information**, as their only purpose is to
transfer the right to use Internet number resources.

In addition to RPKI not having any identity information, there is another important difference with commonly used X.509 PKIs, such as SSL/TLS. Instead of having to rely on a vast number of Root Certificate Authorities which come pre-installed in a browser or an operating system, RPKI relies on just five Trust Anchors, run by the RIRs. These are well established, openly governed, not-for-profit organisations. Each organisation that wishes to get an RPKI resource certificate already has a contractual relationship with one or more of the RIRs.
In addition to RPKI not having any identity information, there is another important difference with commonly used X.509 PKIs, such as SSL/TLS. Instead of having to rely on a vast number of root certificate authorities which come pre-installed in a browser or an operating system, RPKI relies on just five trust anchors, run by the RIRs. These are well established, openly governed, not-for-profit organisations. Each organisation that wishes to get an RPKI resource certificate already has a contractual relationship with one or more of the RIRs.

In conclusion, RPKI provides a mechanism to make strong, testable attestations about Internet number resources. In the next sections, we will look at how this can be used to make BGP routing more secure.
In conclusion, RPKI provides a mechanism to make strong, testable attestations about Internet number resources. In the next sections, we will look at how this can be used to make Internet routing more secure.


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