Linux SDK update

tools/jenkins/include/patches/python27/00351-cve-2019-20907-fix-infinite-loop-in-tarfile.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Rishi <rishi_devan@mail.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 13:51:00 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 00351-cve-2019-20907-fix-infinite-loop-in-tarfile.patch
+
+00351 #
+Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module
+(CVE-2019-20907).
+See: https://bugs.python.org/issue39017
+---
+ Lib/tarfile.py                                    |   2 ++
+ Lib/test/recursion.tar                            | Bin 0 -> 516 bytes
+ Lib/test/test_tarfile.py                          |   7 +++++++
+ .../2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst      |   1 +
+ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 Lib/test/recursion.tar
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
+index adf91d53823..574a6bb279d 100644
+--- a/Lib/tarfile.py
++++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
+@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ class TarInfo(object):
+
+             length, keyword = match.groups()
+             length = int(length)
++            if length == 0:
++                raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
+             value = buf[match.end(2) + 1:match.start(1) + length - 1]
+
+             keyword = keyword.decode("utf8")
+diff --git a/Lib/test/recursion.tar b/Lib/test/recursion.tar
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b8237251964983f54ed1966297e887636cd0c5f4
+GIT binary patch
+literal 516
+zcmYdFPRz+kEn=W0Fn}74P8%Xw3X=l~85kIuo0>8xq$A1Gm}!7)KUsFc41m#O8A5+e
+I1_}|j06>QaCIA2c
+
+literal 0
+HcmV?d00001
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+index 89bd738aea0..45921562f52 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py
+@@ -325,6 +325,13 @@ class CommonReadTest(ReadTest):
+ class MiscReadTest(CommonReadTest):
+     taropen = tarfile.TarFile.taropen
+
++    def test_length_zero_header(self):
++        # bpo-39017 (CVE-2019-20907): reading a zero-length header should fail
++        # with an exception
++        with self.assertRaisesRegexp(tarfile.ReadError, "file could not be opened successfully"):
++            with tarfile.open(support.findfile('recursion.tar')) as tar:
++                pass
++
+     def test_no_name_argument(self):
+         with open(self.tarname, "rb") as fobj:
+             tar = tarfile.open(fileobj=fobj, mode=self.mode)
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000000..ad26676f8b8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2020-07-12-22-16-58.bpo-39017.x3Cg-9.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module (CVE-2019-20907).

tools/jenkins/include/patches/python27/00354-cve-2020-26116-http-request-method-crlf-injection-in-httplib.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: AMIR <31338382+amiremohamadi@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 00:46:10 +0430
+Subject: [PATCH] 
+ 00354-cve-2020-26116-http-request-method-crlf-injection-in-httplib.patch
+
+00354 #
+Reject control chars in HTTP method in httplib.putrequest to prevent
+HTTP header injection
+
+Backported from Python 3.5-3.10 (and adjusted for py2's single-module httplib):
+- https://bugs.python.org/issue39603
+- https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/18485 (3.10)
+- https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/21946 (3.5)
+
+Co-authored-by: AMIR <31338382+amiremohamadi@users.noreply.github.com>
+---
+ Lib/httplib.py                                | 16 +++++++
+ Lib/test/test_httplib.py                      | 46 +++++++++++++++++++
+ .../2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst  |  2 +
+ 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/httplib.py b/Lib/httplib.py
+index fcc4152aaf2..a63677477d5 100644
+--- a/Lib/httplib.py
++++ b/Lib/httplib.py
+@@ -257,6 +257,10 @@ _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x20\x7f-\xff]')
+ #  _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
+ # We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.
+
++# These characters are not allowed within HTTP method names
++# to prevent http header injection.
++_contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x1f]')
++
+ # We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
+ # servers will otherwise respond with a 411
+ _METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
+@@ -935,6 +939,8 @@ class HTTPConnection:
+         else:
+             raise CannotSendRequest()
+
++        self._validate_method(method)
++
+         # Save the method for use later in the response phase
+         self._method = method
+
+@@ -1020,6 +1026,16 @@ class HTTPConnection:
+         # On Python 2, request is already encoded (default)
+         return request
+
++    def _validate_method(self, method):
++        """Validate a method name for putrequest."""
++        # prevent http header injection
++        match = _contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re.search(method)
++        if match:
++            raise ValueError(
++                    "method can't contain control characters. %r "
++                    "(found at least %r)"
++                    % (method, match.group()))
++
+     def _validate_path(self, url):
+         """Validate a url for putrequest."""
+         # Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+index d8a57f73530..b5fec9aa1ec 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+@@ -385,6 +385,51 @@ class HeaderTests(TestCase):
+                 conn.putheader(name, value)
+
+
++class HttpMethodTests(TestCase):
++    def test_invalid_method_names(self):
++        methods = (
++            'GET\r',
++            'POST\n',
++            'PUT\n\r',
++            'POST\nValue',
++            'POST\nHOST:abc',
++            'GET\nrHost:abc\n',
++            'POST\rRemainder:\r',
++            'GET\rHOST:\n',
++            '\nPUT'
++        )
++
++        for method in methods:
++            with self.assertRaisesRegexp(
++                    ValueError, "method can't contain control characters"):
++                conn = httplib.HTTPConnection('example.com')
++                conn.sock = FakeSocket(None)
++                conn.request(method=method, url="/")
++
++
++class HttpMethodTests(TestCase):
++    def test_invalid_method_names(self):
++        methods = (
++            'GET\r',
++            'POST\n',
++            'PUT\n\r',
++            'POST\nValue',
++            'POST\nHOST:abc',
++            'GET\nrHost:abc\n',
++            'POST\rRemainder:\r',
++            'GET\rHOST:\n',
++            '\nPUT'
++        )
++
++        for method in methods:
++            with self.assertRaisesRegexp(
++                    ValueError, "method can't contain control characters"):
++                conn = httplib.HTTPConnection('example.com')
++                conn.sock = FakeSocket(None)
++                conn.request(method=method, url="/")
++
++
++
+ class BasicTest(TestCase):
+     def test_status_lines(self):
+         # Test HTTP status lines
+@@ -1010,6 +1055,7 @@ class TunnelTests(TestCase):
+ @test_support.reap_threads
+ def test_main(verbose=None):
+     test_support.run_unittest(HeaderTests, OfflineTest, BasicTest, TimeoutTest,
++                              HttpMethodTests,
+                               HTTPTest, HTTPSTest, SourceAddressTest,
+                               TunnelTests)
+
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000000..990affc3edd
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++Prevent http header injection by rejecting control characters in
++http.client.putrequest(...).

tools/jenkins/include/patches/python27/00355-CVE-2020-27619.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 19 May 2021 15:20:30 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 00355-CVE-2020-27619.patch
+
+00355 #
+No longer call eval() on content received via HTTP in the CJK codec tests
+Backported from the python3 branches upstream: https://bugs.python.org/issue41944
+Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1889886
+
+Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
+Co-authored-by: Florian Bruhin <me@the-compiler.org>
+---
+ Lib/test/multibytecodec_support.py | 22 +++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Lib/test/multibytecodec_support.py b/Lib/test/multibytecodec_support.py
+index 5b2329b6d84..53b5d64d453 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/multibytecodec_support.py
++++ b/Lib/test/multibytecodec_support.py
+@@ -279,30 +279,22 @@ class TestBase_Mapping(unittest.TestCase):
+             self._test_mapping_file_plain()
+
+     def _test_mapping_file_plain(self):
+-        _unichr = lambda c: eval("u'\\U%08x'" % int(c, 16))
+-        unichrs = lambda s: u''.join(_unichr(c) for c in s.split('+'))
++        def unichrs(s):
++            return ''.join(unichr(int(x, 16)) for x in s.split('+'))
+         urt_wa = {}
+
+         with self.open_mapping_file() as f:
+             for line in f:
+                 if not line:
+                     break
+-                data = line.split('#')[0].strip().split()
++                data = line.split('#')[0].split()
+                 if len(data) != 2:
+                     continue
+
+-                csetval = eval(data[0])
+-                if csetval <= 0x7F:
+-                    csetch = chr(csetval & 0xff)
+-                elif csetval >= 0x1000000:
+-                    csetch = chr(csetval >> 24) + chr((csetval >> 16) & 0xff) + \
+-                             chr((csetval >> 8) & 0xff) + chr(csetval & 0xff)
+-                elif csetval >= 0x10000:
+-                    csetch = chr(csetval >> 16) + \
+-                             chr((csetval >> 8) & 0xff) + chr(csetval & 0xff)
+-                elif csetval >= 0x100:
+-                    csetch = chr(csetval >> 8) + chr(csetval & 0xff)
+-                else:
++                if data[0][:2] != '0x':
++                    self.fail("Invalid line: {!r}".format(line))
++                csetch = bytes.fromhex(data[0][2:])
++                if len(csetch) == 1 and 0x80 <= csetch[0]:
+                     continue
+
+                 unich = unichrs(data[1])