Added Joao Martins to our acknowledgements list

advisories/third-party/2019-001.md

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ __Workaround #2:__ Temporarily disable the RACK TCP stack.
 
 __Description:__ An attacker can force the Linux kernel to segment its responses into multiple TCP segments, each of which contains only 8 bytes of data. This drastically increases the bandwidth required to deliver the same amount of data. Further, it consumes additional resources (CPU and NIC processing power). This attack requires continued effort from the attacker and the impacts will end shortly after the attacker stops sending traffic.
 
+
 __Fix:__ Two patches [PATCH_net_3_4.patch](2019-001/PATCH_net_3_4.patch) and [PATCH_net_4_4.patch](2019-001/PATCH_net_4_4.patch) add a sysctl which enforces a minimum MSS, set by the `net.ipv4.tcp_min_snd_mss` sysctl. This lets an administrator enforce a minimum MSS appropriate for their applications.
 
 __Workaround:__ Block connections with a low MSS using one of the supplied [filters](2019-001/block-low-mss/README.md). (The values in the filters are examples. You can apply a higher or lower limit, as appropriate for your environment.) Note that these filters may break legitimate connections which rely on a low MSS. Also, note that this mitigation is only effective if TCP probing is disabled (that is, the `net.ipv4.tcp_mtu_probing` sysctl is set to 0, which appears to be the default value for that sysctl).
@@ -75,6 +76,6 @@ We thank Eric Dumazet for providing Linux fixes and support.
 
 We thank Bruce Curtis for providing the Linux filters.
 
-We thank Jonathan Lemon and Alexey Kodanev for helping to improve the Linux patches.
+We thank Jonathan Lemon, Alexey Kodanev and Joao Martins for helping to improve the Linux patches.
 
 We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Tyler Hicks in testing fixes, refining the information about vulnerable versions, and providing assistance during the disclosure process.