

Memory size in the Prisoner's Dilemma

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Abstract

In this manuscript we build upon a framework provided in 1989 for the study of these strategies and identify the best responses of memory one players. The aim of this work is to show the limitations of memory one strategies in multi-opponent interactions. A number of theoretic results are presented.

1 Introduction

The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is a two player person game used in understanding the evolution of co-operative behaviour. Each player can choose between cooperation (C) and defection (D). The decisions are made simultaneously and independently. The normal form representation of the game is given by:

$$S_p = \begin{pmatrix} R & S \\ T & P \end{pmatrix} \quad S_q = \begin{pmatrix} R & T \\ S & P \end{pmatrix} \quad (1)$$

where S_p represents the utilities of the first player and S_q the utilities of the second player. The payoffs, (R, P, S, T) , are constrained by equations (2) and (3). Constraint (2) ensures that defection dominates cooperation and constraint (3) ensures that there is a dilemma. Because the sum of the utilities for both players is better when both choose cooperation. The most common values used in the literature are $(3, 1, 0, 5)$ [3].

$$T > R > P > S \quad (2)$$

$$2R > T + S \quad (3)$$

The PD is a one shot game, however it is commonly studied in a manner where the history of the interactions matters. The repeated form of the game is called the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) and in the 1980s following the work of [4, 5] it attracted the attention of the scientific community.

In [4] and [5], the first well known computer tournaments of the IPD were performed. A total of 13 and 63 strategies were submitted in computer code and competed against each other in a round robin tournament. All contestants competed against each other, themselves and random strategy and the winner was decided on the average score a strategy achieved and not in the number of wins. The strategies were allowed access to the full history of each match. The history included the previous moves of both the player and the opponent. How many turns of history that a strategy would use, the memory size, was left to the creator of the strategy to decide.

The winning strategy of both tournaments was a strategy called Tit for Tat. Tit for Tat is a strategy which

starts by cooperating and then mimics the last move of it's opponent. This is a strategy which makes use of the previous move of the opponent only and it's called a reactive strategy. Reactive strategies have been used to explore best behavior in the IPD and a framework for studying such strategies was introduced in [12]. This was later used to introduce other reactive strategies such as Generous Tit For Tat [13].

Reactive strategies are a subset of memory one strategies. Memory one strategies similarly are only concern with the previous turn. However, they take into consideration both players' recent moves to decide on an action. Several successful memory one strategies are found in literature, for example Pavlov [11].

A well known set of memory one strategies were introduced in [15] called zero determinant (ZD) strategies. The ZD strategies, manage to force a linear relationship between the score of the strategy and the opponent. The authors showed that ZD strategies were a set of strategies that could dominate any evolutionary opponent, in pairwise interactions. ZD strategies were dominating using a single size memory and authors questioned the usefulness of memory in the IPD.

The ZD strategies tracked a lot of attention. It was stated that "Press and Dyson have fundamentally changed the viewpoint on the Prisoner's Dilemma" [16]. In [16], the Axelrod's tournament have been re-run including ZD strategies and a new set of ZD strategies the Generous ZD.

Even so, ZD and memory one strategies have also received criticism. In [10], the 'memory of a strategy does not matter' statement was questioned. A set of more complex strategies, strategies that take in account the entire history set of the game, were trained and proven to be more robust than ZD strategies.

1.1 The Problem

In this manuscript we explore the size of memory for strategies of IPD.


The purpose of this work is to consider a given memory one strategy in a similar fashion to [15]. However whilst [15] found a way for a player to manipulate an opponent, this work will consider an optimisation approach to identify the best response to that opponent. In essence the aim is to produce a compact method of identifying the best memory one strategy against a given opponent.

In the second part of this manuscript we explore the limitation of these best response strategies. This is achieved by comparing the performance of an optimal memory one strategy, for a given environment, with the performance of a more complex strategy. The type of complex strategy used is described in depth in the following Sections. Keep in mind, that the complex strategies used here has a memory greater than one and it keeps track of the initial move.


2 Methodology

In [12] a framework was introduced to study the interactions of memory one strategies modelled as a stochastic process. The work [15] of is also build upon at manuscript. There it is stated that if a strategy is concerned with only the outcome of a single turn then there are four possible 'states' the strategy could be in. These are CC, CD, DC, CC . A memory one strategy is denoted by the probabilities of cooperating after each of these states, $p = (p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4) \in \mathbb{R}_{[0,1]}^4$. A diagrammatic representation of such strategy is given in Figure 1a.

Moreover, if two players are moving from state to state using the transition probabilities, this can be modelled as a Markov process of four states, shown by Figure 1b. The transition matrix M of Figure 1b is defined as,



(a) Diagrammatic representation of a memory one strategy.



(b) Markov chain on a PD game.

$$M = \begin{bmatrix} p_1 q_1 & p_1 (-q_1 + 1) & q_1 (-p_1 + 1) & (-p_1 + 1) (-q_1 + 1) \\ p_2 q_3 & p_2 (-q_3 + 1) & q_3 (-p_2 + 1) & (-p_2 + 1) (-q_3 + 1) \\ p_3 q_2 & p_3 (-q_2 + 1) & q_2 (-p_3 + 1) & (-p_3 + 1) (-q_2 + 1) \\ p_4 q_4 & p_4 (-q_4 + 1) & q_4 (-p_4 + 1) & (-p_4 + 1) (-q_4 + 1) \end{bmatrix}. \quad (4)$$

where the vector of the stationary probabilities of is v (given in the Appendix). Combining the stationary vector v with the payoff matrices allow us to retrieve the expected outcome for each player. Thus, the utility for player p against q , denoted as $u_q(p)$, can be defined by,

$$u_q(p) = v \times S_p. \quad (5)$$

The analytical formulation gives the advantage of time. That is because the payoffs of a match between two opponents are now retrievable without simulating the actual match itself. This analytical formulation will be used hereupon and it will allow us to study best responses in an analytical way.

Though this formulation, which was described in 1989 [12], have been used in several different works not many insights have been given for form of $u_q(p)$. Here we present one of our first results which concerns the form $u_q(p)$. That is that $u_q(p)$ is given by a ratio of two quadratic forms, as presented by Theorem 1.

Theorem 1 *The expected utility of a memory one strategy $p \in \mathbb{R}_{[0,1]}^4$ against a memory one opponent strategy $q \in \mathbb{R}_{[0,1]}^4$, denoted as $u_q(p)$, can be written as a ratio of two quadratic forms:*

$$u_q(p) = \frac{\frac{1}{2} p Q p^T + c p + a}{\frac{1}{2} p \bar{Q} p^T + \bar{c} p + \bar{a}}, \quad (6)$$

where Q, \bar{Q} 4×4 matrices defined by the transition probabilities of the opponent q_1, q_2, q_3, q_4 as follows:

$$Q = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -(q_1 - q_3)(q_2 - 5q_4 - 1) & q_3(q_1 - q_2) & -5q_3(q_1 - q_4) \\ -(q_1 - q_3)(q_2 - 5q_4 - 1) & 0 & (q_2 - q_3)(q_1 - 3q_4 - 1) & (q_3 - q_4)(5q_1 - 3q_2 - 2) \\ q_3(q_1 - q_2) & (q_2 - q_3)(q_1 - 3q_4 - 1) & 0 & 3q_3(q_2 - q_4) \\ -5q_3(q_1 - q_4) & (q_3 - q_4)(5q_1 - 3q_2 - 2) & 3q_3(q_2 - q_4) & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (7)$$

$$\bar{Q} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -(q_1 - q_3)(q_2 - q_4 - 1) & (q_1 - q_2)(q_3 - q_4) & (q_1 - q_4)(q_2 - q_3 - 1) \\ -(q_1 - q_3)(q_2 - q_4 - 1) & 0 & (q_2 - q_3)(q_1 - q_4 - 1) & (q_1 - q_2)(q_3 - q_4) \\ (q_1 - q_2)(q_3 - q_4) & (q_2 - q_3)(q_1 - q_4 - 1) & 0 & -(q_2 - q_4)(q_1 - q_3 - 1) \\ (q_1 - q_4)(q_2 - q_3 - 1) & (q_1 - q_2)(q_3 - q_4) & -(q_2 - q_4)(q_1 - q_3 - 1) & 0 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (8)$$

c and \bar{c} , are 4×1 vectors defined by:

$$c = \begin{bmatrix} q_1(q_2 - 5q_4 - 1) \\ -(q_3 - 1)(q_2 - 5q_4 - 1) \\ -q_1q_2 + q_2q_3 + 3q_2q_4 + q_2 - q_3 \\ 5q_1q_4 - 3q_2q_4 - 5q_3q_4 + 5q_3 - 2q_4 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (9)$$

$$\bar{c} = \begin{bmatrix} q_1(q_2 - q_4 - 1) \\ -(q_3 - 1)(q_2 - q_4 - 1) \\ -q_1q_2 + q_2q_3 + q_2 - q_3 + q_4 \\ q_1q_4 - q_2 - q_3q_4 + q_3 - q_4 + 1 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (10)$$

Finally, $a = -q_2 + 5q_4 + 1$ and $\bar{a} = -q_2 + q_4 + 1$.

The formulation of $u_q(p)$ has been validated using numerical experiments. Several memory one players were matched against 20 opponents and their theoretical utility $u_q(p)$ was compared to a simulated one. Figure 2 indicates that the formulation of $u_q(p)$ as a quadratic ratio successfully captures the simulated behaviour.

The simulated utility, denoted as $U_q(p)$ has been calculated using [1]. It is an open research framework for the study of the IPD and is described in [9]. Note that when referring to $U_q(p)$ here onwards we mean the simulated utility calculated with [1].




Figure 2: Differences between simulated and analytical results.

Now that the analytical formulation has been validated in the following Sections is used to explore bests responses in memory one strategies. Moreover, the new formulation of Theorem 1 allow us to retrieve a number of theoretical results. These are also discussed in the next sections.

3 Analytically Results

In the introduction a question was raised: which memory one strategy is the **best response** against another memory one? This will be considered as an optimisation problem, where a memory one strategy p wants

to optimise it's utility $u_q(p)$ against an opponent q . The decision variable is the vector p and the solitary constrains $p \in \mathbb{R}_{[0,1]}^4$. The optimisation problem is given by (11).

$$\begin{aligned} \max_p : \quad & \frac{\frac{1}{2}pQp^T + c^T p + a}{\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}p^T + \bar{c}^T p + \bar{a}} \\ \text{such that :} \quad & p \in \mathbb{R}_{[0,1]}^4. \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

3.1 Convexity

This work is concerned with a fractional optimisation problem of quadratic forms. Initially, the convexity, whether or not $u_q(p)$ is concave [8], is checked (concave because is a maximisation problem).

To test the hypothesis that $u_q(p)$ is concave an empirical analysis was performed using computer code. It was shown that there exists at least one point for which the definition of concavity does not hold.

Several articles in fractional optimisation of quadratic forms that were non concave can be found [6, 7]. Though in these works both the numerator and denominator of the fractional problem were concave. In [2] it is stated that a quadratic form will be concave if and only if it's symmetric matrix is negative semi definite. In Appendix, it is proved that neither the numerator or the denominator of equation (6) are concave.

3.2 Best responses

The non concavity of $u(p)$ indicates multiple local optimal points. Thus we are not searching a single optimal point but a set of candidate optimal points. The aim is to introduce a compact way of constructing the candidate set. Once the set is defined the point that maximises $u(p)$ corresponds to the best response strategy.

The problem considered is a bounded because $p \in \mathbb{R}_{[0,1]}^4$. Because of this it is known that the candidate solutions will exist either at the boundaries of the feasible solution space, either within that space. The method of Lagrange Multipliers and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions also agrees with this conclusion. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are used because our constrains are inequalities.

Thus the candidate solution set is constructed as follows:

- any or all of p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4 are $\in 0, 1$
- the rest or all of p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4 are given by the roots of $\frac{du}{dp}$.

The derivative $\frac{du}{dp}$ is given by,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{du}{dp} &= \frac{(\frac{1}{2}pQp^T + cp + a)'(\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}p^T + \bar{c}p + \bar{a}) - (\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}p^T + \bar{c}p + \bar{a})'(\frac{1}{2}pQp^T + cp + a)}{(\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}p^T + \bar{c}p + \bar{a})^2} \\ &= \frac{(pQ + c)(\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}p^T + \bar{c}p + \bar{a}) - (p\bar{Q} + \bar{c})(\frac{1}{2}pQp^T + cp + a)}{(\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}p^T + \bar{c}p + \bar{a})^2} \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

For equation 12 to be zero, the numerator must fall to zero and the denominator can not nullified. Thus we conclude that the best response of a memory one strategy in match is given by Lemma 2.

Lemma 2 *The optimal behaviour of a memory one strategy player (p^*) against a given opponent q is given by:*

$$p^* = \operatorname{argmax}(u_q(p)), \quad p \in S_q,$$

where the set S_q is defined as

$$S_q = \{0, \bar{p}, 1\}^4$$

where the vector \bar{p} is the vector for which the following conditions are true:

$$(pQ + c)(\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}p^T + \bar{c}p + \bar{a}) - (p\bar{Q} + \bar{c})(\frac{1}{2}pQp^T + cp + a) = 0 \quad (13)$$

and

$$\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}p^T + \bar{c}p + \bar{a} \neq 0 \quad (14)$$

Note that equation 13 is a 4— polynomial system of 4 variables. Each polynomial corresponds to a partial derivative of $u_q(p)$.

A question that arises immediately after capturing best responses of memory one strategies in pairwise interactions is: What is the optimal memory player against multiple opponents, in a tournament environment. Let us consider a collection of opponents: $\{q^{(1)}, q^{(2)}, \dots, q^{(N)}\}$, finding the optimal behaviour is captured as:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_p : \quad & \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N u_q^{(i)}(p) \\ \text{st} : \quad & p \in \mathbb{R}_{[0,1]} \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

where,

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N u_q^{(i)}(p) = \frac{1}{N} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N (\frac{1}{2}pQ^{(i)}p^T + c^{(i)}p + a^{(i)}) \prod_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^N (\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}^{(j)}p^T + \bar{c}^{(j)}p + \bar{a}^{(j)})}{\prod_{i=1}^N (\frac{1}{2}p\bar{Q}^{(i)}p^T + \bar{c}^{(i)}p + \bar{a}^{(i)})}. \quad (16)$$

Thus, we are optimising against the average utility over the set of opponents. Note that the best response can not be captured by optimising against the mean opponent. Thus,

$$\max_p \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N u_q^{(i)}(p) \neq \max_p u_{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N q^{(i)}}(p). \quad (17)$$

A number of numerical experiments have been performed for cases where $p = (p, p, p, p)$ and $p = (p_1, p_2, p_1, p_2)$. This was done in order to compare the right hand side of equation (17) to the left. The fact that equation (17) holds is evident by Figure 3.




Figure 3: Hypothesis.

A similar approach to the one considered for problem 11 needs to be used for problem 15 as well. The candidate solutions set would be constructed by considering the bounds of the feasible space and the roots of the derivative $\frac{d}{dp} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N u_q^{(i)}(p)$. The derivative is given by,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d}{dp} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N u_q^{(i)}(p) = & \frac{(\sum_{i=1}^N Q_N^{(i)'} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^N Q_D^{(i)} + \sum_{i=1}^N Q_D^{(i)'} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^N Q_N^{(i)} - (\sum_{i=1}^N Q_D^{(i)} \times \prod_{i=1}^N Q_D^{(i)} - (\sum_{i=1}^N Q_D^{(i)'} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^N Q_D^{(i)}) \times (\sum_{i=1}^N Q_N^{(i)} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^N Q_D^{(i)})}{(\prod_{i=1}^N Q_D^{(i)})^2} \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

where,

$$\begin{aligned} Q_N^{(i)} &= \frac{1}{2} p Q^{(i)} p^T + c^{(i)} p + a^{(i)}, \\ Q_N^{(i)'} &= p Q^{(i)} + c^{(i)}, \\ Q_D^{(i)} &= \frac{1}{2} p \bar{Q}^{(i)} p^T + \bar{c}^{(i)} p + \bar{a}^{(i)}, \\ Q_D^{(i)'} &= p \bar{Q}^{(i)} + \bar{c}^{(i)}. \end{aligned}$$

Extracting the roots of equation's (18) numerator is not an easy task. This also applied to equation (13). Both equations are a system of 4 polynomials and the degree of the polynomials is gradually increasing every time an extra opponent is taken into account.

Because of that no further analytical consideration is given to problems 11 and 15. Instead both best responses of memory one strategies, pairwise and in multi interactions, will be solved using numerical methods. The methods and their results are discussed in the following Section.

Though best responses can now longer be explored in an exact analytical way, there are still many advantages by the formulation of Theorem 3. In the following subsection several theoretical results and exact ways of Identifying best responses in constrained versions of problem 15 are presented. Moreover, the robustness of defection in specific interactions is investigated.

3.3 Purely random

A subset of memory one strategies are the purely random player. Purely random player....

Purely random strategies are a set of memory one strategies where the transition probabilities of each state are the same. The optimisation problem of (11) now has an extra constraint and is re written as,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_p : u_q(p) \\ \text{such that : } 0 \leq p \leq 1. \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

Note that u utility for a random player is now a function of a single unknown. Solving analytically can be handled. the utility is not given by and the maximum degree of the derivative it is known. Moreover the degree of the derivative of the average utilities can also be calculated and we know that it can not exceed the degree of $2N + 2$.

Thus in order to maximise we know the size of the candidate solution and the optimistically one is chosen from the set. This is given by Lemma

Theorem 3 (Optimisation of purely random player in a tournament) *The optimal behaviour of a purely random player (p, p, p, p) in an N -memory one player tournament, $\{q_{(1)}, q_{(2)} \dots, q_{(N)}\}$ is given by:*

$$p^* = \operatorname{argmax}_{i=1}^N u_q^{(i)}(p), \quad p \in S_{q(i)},$$

where the set S_q is defined as:

$$S_q = \bigcup_{\lambda_i \neq \frac{d o_i}{d i_i}} U_{i=1}^{2N} \lambda_i \cup \{0, 1\},$$

and λ_i are the eigenvalues of the companion matrix corresponding to the numerator of

$$\frac{d}{dp} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N u_q^{(i)}(p).$$

Note that the size of candidate solutions is $1 \leq |S_{q(i)}| \leq 2N + 2$.

For the case of the purely random players two more theoretical results are discussed. These are the cases where:

- the opponent has manage to make us indifferent
- the best behaviour is pure strategy.

The importance of these two lemmas is as follow equivlently. Being indifferent means that a plaers action no longer affect the game. Indentifying when a player makes a indifferent is good. Moreover by pure strategy we mean that a player would want to act as a defector or cooperator, as amixed stragegy is not ideal.

The results are given equivlently by Lemmas 4 and 5 and they are respective to the actions of the opponent.

Lemma 4 *A given memory one player, (q_1, q_2, q_3, q_4) , makes a **purely random** player, (p, p, p, p) , indifferent if and only if, $-q_1 + q_2 + 2q_3 - 2q_4 = 0$ and $(q_2 - q_4 - 1)(q_1 - 2q_2 - 5q_3 + 7q_4 + 1) - (q_2 - 5q_4 - 1)(q_1 - q_2 - q_3 + q_4) = 0$.*

Lemma 5 *Against a memory one player, (q_1, q_2, q_3, q_4) , a **purely random** player would always play a pure strategy if and only if $(q_1 q_4 - q_2 q_3 + q_3 - q_4)(4q_1 - 3q_2 - 4q_3 + 3q_4 - 1) = 0$.*

3.4 Reactive Strategies

Reactive strategies are a set of memory one strategies where they only take into account the opponents's previous moves. The optimisation problem of (11) now has an extra constraint and is re written as,

$$\begin{aligned} \max_p : u_q(p) \\ \text{such that : } p_1 = p_3 \text{ and } p_2 = p_4 \\ 0 \leq p_1, p_2 \leq 1. \end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

Such as tit for tat descirbed in Section Introduction. Reactive strageties allow us to look at u_p as a function of two unknow. Thus the partial derivates are 2 over 2 variables. This system can be solve analytically usin various methods. The method discribed in this work which has be choosen to be appropitate is the resultant theory. An example of this is given in lter sections, section??.

3.5 Stability of defection

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