
Formalising Sigma-Protocols and commitment schemes within EasyCrypt

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Abstract

► in English... ◄

Resumé

► in Danish... ◄

Acknowledgments



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Chapter 1

Introduction

► Maybe add database example from CertiCrypt paper? ◀

Computer-aided cryptography is an active area of research that combines the fields of formal verification and cryptography to develop formal machine-checkable proofs approaches to cryptographic protocol design as well as the implementations of said protocols [3].

► Formal verification is ... ◀

the field of cryptography has in recent times lend itself to “game hopping” approach to design-level security of protocols. In this approach security is modelled as the probability of an adversary, with varying degrees of power, breaking the intended design of the protocol. This is done usually done by either proving that it is impossible for the adversary to break to protocol by mathematical reasoning on the possible choices the adversary can make or proving that breaking the protocol is computationally equivalent to solving a, presumably, difficult problem.

The problem with this approach is that these game reduction are often prone to implicit assumptions and rely on peer-reviewing of the proof of security.

Finally, cryptographic design does not led it self to implementation level security issues, which is usually left to domain expert when implementing the protocols.

Computer-aided cryptographic can help us solve these problems by making the assumptions more transparent, but moreover it also makes the logical reasoning more transparent. Since formal proofs can only proceed by applying logical rules, then an error can only arise from having a flaw in the core logic or in one of the assumptions made for the protocol.

Having formally verified software is especially important when it is used as a building block in bigger and more complex protocols. One such example of a fundamental building block in cryptology is Zero knowledge arguments, which since their introduction has been in many complex cryptographic protocols. Most notably they have found important use on the blockchain and in the GMW compiler, which can compile any passively secure protocol into a active secure one.

One problem with Zero-knowledge arguments is that they usually fall into two categories: They are either efficient, but to specialised, or they are generalised but too inefficient. A example of the former is Schnorr protocol, which allows us to prove knowledge of a discrete logarithm.

This has led to a new class of protocols known as *Succinct Non-interactive ARgu-*

ments of Knowledge, also known as SNARKS, which aim to improve on the generalised zero knowledge protocols by reducing the size of the proof and moves the bulk of the work to prover, such that SNARKS can be quickly verified but are expensive to make.

►reference◄

Since these generalised zero-knowledge compilers can be used within applications where security is critical it is important to that they have been rigorously studied and formally proven.

In this paper we will therefore look at the ZKBoo protocol by Giacomelli et al. [7], which can generate zero-knowledge proofs for any relation, assuming the relation can be expressed as a circuit, with a bound on the proof size.

In doing so we will develop a rich formalisation of Σ -protocols they relate to Zero-knowledge. Moreover, we will show how to create a fully verified toolchain for constructing a generalised zero-knowledge compiler based on ZKBoo.

the main contribution of this thesis is . . .

►Goal: Develop a rich formalisation that be the basis for future formal analysis of zero-knowledge protocols◄

Outline In chapter 2 . . . Then in chapter 3 we introduce the relevant background in regards to Σ -Protocols, Commitment schemes and Multi-part computations.

Chapter 2

EasyCrypt

In this chapter we introduce the EasyCrypt proof assistant . . .

EasyCrypt provides us with three important logics: a relational probabilistic Hoare logic (**rPHL**), a probabilistic Hoare logic (**pHL**), and a Hoare logic. Furthermore, EasyCrypt also has an Higher-order ambient logic, in which the three previous logics are encoded within. This Higher-order logic allows us to reason about mathematical constructs, which in turn lets us reason about them within the different Hoare logics. The ambient logic also allows us to relate judgement the three different types of Hoare logics, since they all have an equivalent representation in the ambient logic.

2.1 Types and Operators

2.2 Theories, Abstract theories and Sections

To structure proofs and code EasyCrypt uses a language construction called theories. By grouping definitions and proofs into a theory they become available in other files by “requiring” them. For example, to make use of EasyCrypt’s existing formalisation of integers, it can be made available in any given file by writing:

To avoid the theory name prefix of all definitions “require import” can be used in-place of “require”, which will add all definitions and proof of the theory to the current scope without the prefix.

Any EasyCrypt file with the “.ec” file type is automatically declared as a theory.

Abstract Theories To model parametric protocols, i.e. protocols that can work on many different types we use EasyCrypt’s abstract theory functionality. An abstract theory allows us to model protocols and proof over generic types. There are currently two ways of declaring an abstract theory. First, by using the “theory” keyword within any

```
require Int .  
  
const two : int = Int.(+) Int.One Int.One .
```

Listing 2.1: EasyCrypt theories: importing definitions

file allows the user to define abstract types, which can be used throughout the scope of the abstract theory, i.e. everything in-between the “theory” and “end theory” keywords. Second, an abstract theory file can be declared by using the “.eca” file type. This works much like using the “.ec” file type to declare theories.

Sections Sections provide much of the same functionality, but instead of quantifying over types sections allows us to quantify everything within the section over modules axiomatised by the user.

An example of this, is having a section for cryptographic security of a protocols, where we quantify over all instances of adversaries, that are guaranteed to terminate.

2.3 Modules and procedures

To model algorithms within EasyCrypt the module construct is provided. A module is a set of procedures and a record of global variables, where all procedures are written in EasyCrypt embedded programming language, pWhile. **pWhile is a mild generalization of the language proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [2006]?**

Modules are, by default, allowed to interact with all other defined modules. This is due to all procedures are executed within shared memory. This is to model actual execution of procedures, where the procedure would have access to all memory not protected by the operating system.

From this, the set of global variables for any given module, is all its internally defined global variables and all variables the modules procedures could potentially read or write during execution. This is checked by a simple static analysis, which looks at all execution branches within all procedures of the module.

A module can be seen as EasyCrypt’s abstraction of the class construct in object-oriented programming languages.

► Example of modules ◀

Modules Types Modules types is another features of EasyCrypt modelling system, which enables us to define general structures of modules, without having to implement the procedures. A procedure without an implementation is called abstract, while a implemented one (The ones provided by modules) are called concrete.

An important distinction between abstract and non-abstract modules is that, while non-abstract modules define a global state, in the sense of global variables, for the procedures to work within, the abstract counter-part does not. This has two important implications, first it means that defining abstract modules does not affect the global variables/state of non-abstract modules. **Moreover, it is also not possible to prove properties of abstract modules, since there is no context to prove properties within.**

It is, however, possible to define higher-order abstract modules with access to the global variables and procedures of another abstract module.

This allows us to quantitate over all possible implementations of an abstract module in our proofs. This implications of this, is that it is possible to define adversaries and then proving that no matter what choice the adversary makes during execution, he will not be able to break the security of the procedure.

► Example of abstract modules ◀

```

module IND-CPA(A : Adversary) = {
  proc main() : bool = {
    var m0, m1, b, b', sk, pk;

    (sk, pk) = key_gen();

    (m0, m1) = A.choose(pk);

    b <\$ dbool;

    b' = A.guess(enc(sk, m_b));

    return b == b'
  }
}

```

Listing 2.2: nextHopInfo: IND-CPA Game

2.4 Probabilistic Hoare Logic

To formally prove security of a cryptographic protocol we commonly do we in the way of so-called game-based proofs, we define a game against a malicious adversary, and say that the protocol is secure, if the adversary cannot win said game. An common example of this is IND-CPA security, where an probabilistic polynomial time adversary is given access to an PKE-oracle and is allowed to send two messages to the oracle, namely m_0, m_1 . The oracle then chooses a random bit, b , and sends the encryption of m_b back to the adversary. Then, if the adversary can guess which of the two messages where encrypted we wins. To reason about such within EasyCryptwe first describe the game within a module:

►Problems with game: A should know what PKE schemes is used. A bit too psuedo-code-ish◄

Now, to prove security we would like to show that the adversary cannot win this game with probability better than randomly guessing values of b' , i.e. $\frac{1}{2}$.

This formulated in one of two ways:

$$\text{forall}(Adv <: \text{Adversaries}) \& m, \text{Pr}[\text{IND-CPA}(Adv).main() @ \& m : res] = 1\%r / 2\%r \quad (2.1)$$

$$\text{forall}(Adv <: \text{Adversaries}), \text{phoare}[\text{IND-CPA}(Adv).main : true ==> res] = 1\%r / 2\%r \quad (2.2)$$

Both are equivalent representations, but the former is in the ambient logic of EasyCrypt, whilst the latter is in the pHL logic.

To prove this, we step though the game using the logic rules of the pHL logic. But, how can we guarantee that there does not exists any possible implementation of the adversary, such that we he is able to succeed? To prove this we either have to somehow prove, that such an adversary cannot exists within the current game, or we can relate this game to another one, where adversary can only perform random guesses. To do this we need to utilise the pRHL logic.

2.5 Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic

the pRHL logic allows us to reason about the join outcome distribution of two programs. This allows us to reason about equality of games.

To bring it back to the game of IND-CPA, we could define an alternative game, where the Oracle always sends back a random element from the ciphertext space. This is often referred to as the ideal case, where as the oracle previously introduced is referred to as the real one.

We can then formulate equality between the two games as:

$$\text{forall}(Adv <: Adversary) \& m, Pr[IND-CPA(Adv).main() @ \& m : res] = Pr[IND-CPA(Adv).real() @ \& m : res] \quad (2.3)$$

$$\text{forall}(Adv <: Adversary), equiv[IND-CPA(Adv).main \ IND-CPA(Adv).real : true ==> = \{res\}] \quad (2.4)$$

where $= \{res\}$ is notation for the outcome distributions begin equal.

► **When referring to indistinguishability we are referring to the notion given by EC** ◀

Chapter 3

Background

This section aims to introduce some of the fundamental definitions and concepts used throughout this thesis. This section will foremost give a rudimentary and informal introduction, while the later chapters will provide more rigours formalisations and proofs of security. First, we start by describing Σ -protocols, along with its security definitions and extensions.

3.1 Zero-Knowledge

3.2 Sigma Protocols

Originally introduced by Cramer [▶reference◀](#), Σ -protocols are two-party protocols with a three-move-form, based on a, computationally hard, relation R , such that $(h, w) \in R$ if h is an instance of a computationally hard problem, and w is the solution to h . Σ -protocols then allows a prover, P , who knows the solution w , to convince a verify, V , of the existence of w , without explicitly showing w to him.




Figure 3.1: Σ -Protocol

The following section aims to introduce the definition of Σ -protocols, along with its notions of security. The following section is based on the presentation of Σ -protocols by Damgaard [6].

[▶explain the flow of the protocol. what is a ... ◀](#)

Definition 3.2.1 (Σ -Protocol Security). To prove security of a Σ -protocols, we require three properties, namely, **Completeness**, **Special Soundness**, and **Special Honest**

Verifier Zero Knowledge (SHVZK).

Completeness Protocol should always succeed with correct output, if both parties are honest.

►remove paragraphs and make definitions with text below.◄

Special Soundness Given two, accepting, transcripts, with different challenges it is possible to compute an accepting witness for the statement in the relation.

The special soundness property is important for ensuring that a cheating prover cannot succeed. Given special soundness, if the protocol is run multiple times, his advantage becomes negligible, since special soundness implies that there can only exist one challenge, for any given message a , which can make the protocol accept, without knowing the witness. Therefore, given a challenge space with cardinality c , the probability of a cheating prover succeeding in convincing the verifier is $\frac{1}{c}$. The protocol can then be run multiple times, to ensure negligible probability.

Can also be generalised to s -Special Soundness, which requires that the witness can be constructed, given s accepting conversations.

Definition 3.2.2 (Special Soundness). Given a Σ -Protocol S for some relation R with public input h and two any accepting transcripts (a, e, z) and (a, e', z') where both transcripts have the same initial message, a and $e \neq e'$.

Then we say that S satisfies 2-special soundness if, there exists an efficient ►what is efficient?◄ algorithm, which we call the “witness_extractor”, that given the two transcripts outputs a valid witness for the relation R .

SHVZK ►Write zero-knowledge section and reference it◄ Zero knowledge is proven by giving a simulator. Not possible to define for corrupted verifier, since the challenge can become exponentially long.

- Exists an polynomial-time simulator M .
- Given statement, x , and challenge, e , output an accepting conversation (a, e, z) .
- Conversation should have the same distribution as an conversation between honest parties.

3.3 Commitment Schemes

Commitment schemes is another fundamental building block in cryptography, and has a strong connection to Σ -Protocols ►reference◄. Commitment schemes facilitates an interaction between two parties, $P1$ and $P2$, where $P1$ can generate a commitment of a message, which he can send to $P2$, without revealing what his original message where. At a later point $P1$ can then send the message to $P2$, who is then able to verify that $P1$ has not altered his message since creating the commitment. More formally a commitment schemes is defined as:

Definition 3.3.1 (Commitment Schemes). A commitment schemes is a tuple of algorithms $(KeyG, Com, Ver)$, where:

- $(ck, vk) \leftarrow \text{KeyG}()$, provides key generation.
- $(c, d) \leftarrow \text{Com}(ck, m)$ generates a commitment c of the message m along with a opening key d , which can be revealed at a later time.
- $\{true, false\} \leftarrow \text{Ver}(vk, c, m, d)$ checked whether the commitment c was generated from m and opening key d .

For a commitment schemes to be secure it is required to satisfy three properties: **Correctness**, **Binding**, and **Hiding**.

Correctness A commitment scheme is said to be correct, if a commitment (c, d) made by a honest party will always be accepted by the verification procedure of another party, i.e:

$$\Pr[\text{Ver}(vk, c, m, d) | (c, d) = \text{Com}(ck, m) \wedge (ck, vk) \leftarrow \text{KeyG}()] = 1.$$

Binding The binding property states that a party committing to a message will not be able to successfully convince another party, that he has committed to another message, i.e. $(c, d) \leftarrow \text{Com}(ck, m)$, will not be able to find an alternative opening key d' and message m' such that $(c, d') \leftarrow \text{Com}(ck, m')$.

►write binding game◄

►Stat, perfect, comp variants◄

►All games parametrised by security param. Not used in formal definition◄

Hiding The Hiding property states that a party given a commitment c , will not be able to extract the message m , which the commitment was based on.

3.4 Multi-Part Computation (MPC)

Consider the problem, where n parties, called P_1, \dots, P_n , with corresponding input values $\mathbf{x} = x_1, \dots, x_n$ want to compute a commonly known function, $f : (\text{input})^n \rightarrow \text{output}$, such that every party agrees on the same output y , such that $y = f(\mathbf{x})$, but none of them learns the inputs to function, barring their own.

►Different notions of security. We need passive.◄

This is the exact problem that MPC aims to solve.

Definition 3.4.1 (Correctness).

Definition 3.4.2 (d-Privacy).

Chapter 4

Formalising commitment schemes

This section aims to give a generalised formalisation of commitment schemes and their security in a way that makes it possible and easy to reason about the security properties of arbitrary instantiations of commitment schemes. Moreover, the formalisation provides a standard interface for other protocols to interact with commitment schemes. In this section we will introduce two flavours of commitment schemes. The first version formalises key-based commitment schemes, where it is necessary for the two parties to share a key. The other is a more idealised variant of commitment schemes, which does not require the parties to share any keys between them, and only assumes they share the function specification of the commitment schemes. The latter variant is usually instantiated by one-way/hash functions.

4.1 Key-based commitment schemes

For Key-based commitment schemes we fix to following types:

```
type: public_key  
      secret_key  
      commitment  
      message  
      randomness
```

Here we specifically fix a type “randomness” which is responsible for making two commitments to the same message look different. Technically this randomness could just be part of the “commitment” type, which is the type defining what values commitments takes. The choice of separating the two types, however, makes the formalisations of security easier to work with, which we will see later in this section.

With the types fixed we then define a key-based commitment scheme as the following functions and procedures:

Here verification of commitments and key pairs are modelled as function, since we assume these function to always be deterministic and lossless. There should be need to sample additional randomness to verify these. Moreover, if the verification algorithms

```

op validate_key (sk : secret_key , pk : public_key) : bool.
op verify (pk : public_key) (m : message) (c : commitment) (d :
  randomness) : bool.

module type Committer = {
  proc * key_gen() : secret_key * public_key
  proc commit(sk : secret_key , m : message) : commitment * randomness
}.

```

Listing 4.1: Key-Based commitment specification

cannot terminate within a reasonable amount of time, then it is probably not worth studying the commitment scheme further.

The committer is modelled as a module with two procedures. One for generating key pairs and one for committing to messages. This models the fact that a commit is able to hold state and make random choice, while the commitments he makes should be easily verifiable by anyone knowing the public key, without having to keep state about the committer.

By separating the verification functions from the committers procedures we get a formalisation closer to the real world, where verification functions should not be able to read any of the state of the committer. This could alternatively have been modelled with the verifier being a module, but allowing the verify to keep state complicates proofs, since verifier two messages could potentially have an effect on each other **►rewrite this◄**. This is in contrast to previous work [8], which has proven problematic to work with, when applying the formalisation of commitment schemes in larger protocols (Section 7.3). **►Rewrite in sec 7.3 that it is needed to swap the order of verifying commitments◄**

We then attain the following definitions of security:

Definition 4.1.1 (Correctness). A commitment scheme C is correct if the following procedures always succeeds.

Definition 4.1.2 (Hiding). A commitment scheme C is ... **►Explain how the adversary can express multiple levels of hiding.◄**

Definition 4.1.3 (Binding). A commitment scheme C is ... **►Explain how the adversary can express multiple levels of binding.◄**

►Mention randomness distributions?◄

4.2 Key-less commitment schemes

►Is this section necessary?◄ We furthermore formalise a variant of commitment schemes that we key-less. This is formalised independently from the key-based commitment schemes, since the change in function signatures makes it incompatible with the key-based formalisation, they would potentially be merged into one formalisation, which allows for both to be used whenever a commitment scheme is required. The main reason for not doing this is that proofs of protocols depending on commitment schemes can become easier when it is not necessary to quantify over keys (See section 7.3 for an

example of this). Ideally it should be proven that the two formalisation are compatible wrt. security, and one can be used in place of the other, but this has been beyond the scope of this thesis.

The functions and procedures used by the key-less commitment schemes are identical to the ones listed in Figure 4.1 for the key-based commitment schemes with the only difference being all references to the public and secret keys has been removed. Furthermore, the Committer module now only contains one procedure `commit`, since there is no longer a need to generate key pairs.

Moreover, the security definitions remain the same but, again, with the key generation removed along with the references to the secret and public keys.

4.3 Alternative definitions of security

Based on the previously defining notions of security we also introduce a number of alternative definitions, some which can be directly derivable from our original definitions, whilst the others does not offer an easy reduction but intuitively capture the same aspects of security.

Lemma 4.3.1 (Alternative correctness). A commitment scheme C is correct if given as input a valid key pairs (sk, pk) then the verifier with public key pk will always accept commitments made by the committer using secret key sk .

Proof.

□

Definition 4.3.2 (Perfect Hiding). A commitment scheme C offers perfect hiding, if the output distribution of two committers with the same state but different messages are perfectly indistinguishable.

►equiv statement here◄

Definition 4.3.3 (Alternative Binding). A commitment scheme C offers binding...

The definition of hiding only works in the perfect case, but it is much easier to work with within EasyCrypt when this is the case. This is due to most proofs being stated as indistinguishability proofs, which are bothersome to convert to adversarial proofs.

The definition of binding allows us to ...

4.4 Concrete instantiation: Pedersen Commitment

To show the workability of the proposed formalisation we show that it can be used to instantiate the key-based Pedersen commitment scheme. Pedersen's commitment scheme is based on the discrete logarithm assumption

►Mention DL in background?◄

The Pedersen commitment scheme is a protocol run between a committer C and a receiver R . Both parties have before running the protocol agreed on a group (\mathcal{G}, q, g) , where q is the order of \mathbb{G} and g is the generator for the group.

When the committer want to commit the a message m he does the following:

- Sample a key $h \in_R \mathbb{G}$

- Sample a random opening $d \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ and sends the key and commitment $c = g^d h^m$ to R.

► **Alternatively the receiver could sample the key for better security?** ◀

At a later time, when C is ready to show the value he committed to, he sends the message and random opening, (m', d') to R, when then runs the following verification steps:

- R computes $c' = g^{d'} h^{m'}$ and checks that $c = c'$.

From this description it is clear that the verification step is simply a function taking as input the key, commitment, message and opening and does a deterministic computations. This fits perfectly within our formalisation of the Receiver, we therefore instantiate our commitment scheme framework with the following:

```
clone export Commitment as Com with
  type public_key <- group (* group element *)
  type secret_key <- group
  type commitment <- group
  type message <- F.t (* Finite field element, like  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  *)
  type randomness <- F.t

  op dm = FDistr.dt, (* Distribution of messages *)
  op dr = FDistr.dt, (* Distribution of randomness *)
  op verify_pk (m : message) c (r : randomness) = g^r * pk^m = c,
  op valid_key (sk : secret_key) (pk : public_key) = (sk = pk).

module Pedersen : Committer = {
  proc key_gen() : secret_key * public_key = {
    a <$ dr;
    h = g^a;

    return (h, h);
  }

  proc commit(sk : secret_key, m : message) = {
    r <$ dr;
    c = g^r * (sk^m);

    return (c, r);
  }
}.
```

Listing 4.2: Pedersen instantiation

Here we use the Cyclic Group theory from EC to generate the agreed upon group and model uniform distributions of messages and randomness by...

Proofs are handled by the ambient logics implementation of group operations.

To prove security of the protocol we should that the previous definitions of correctness, hiding and binding can be proven true.

Lemma 4.4.1 (Pedersen correctness). We must prove that the game outputs true.

Proof. trivial. □

Lemma 4.4.2 (Pedersen hiding). We show that Pedersen has perfect hiding by definition 4.1.2.

Proof. Program is indistinguishable from game committing to random choice of message. No adversary can guess a random bit better than $\frac{1}{2}$. \square

Lemma 4.4.3 (Pedersen Binding). We show computation binding under definition 4.1.3 by showing that an adversary winning the binding game can be used to break the discrete logarithm.

Proof. Define DLog game. \square

In this section we have seen ...

Chapter 5

Formalising Σ -Protocols

This section will aim to formalise Σ -protocols according to the definitions set out in section 3.2, with a sufficiently general set-up to allow easy instantiation of arbitrary concrete protocols.

Moreover, we show that any protocol that adheres to this abstract specification of a Σ -Protocol can be compounded together whilst still being secure.

We then end this section by formalising the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, which allows us to make any Σ -Protocol non-interactive in the random oracle model. This also implies that Σ -Protocols are Zero-knowledge in the random oracle model, since Special honest verifier zero-knowledge ensures zero-knowledge in the presence of an honest verifier. If we remove the verifier then he can always be assumed honest.

5.1 Defining Σ -Protocols

We start by defining the types for any arbitrary Σ -Protocol:

type: statement
witness
message
challenge
response

These types correspond to the types from Figure 3.1.

Furthermore, we fix a relation $R : (\text{statement} \times \text{witness}) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ along with a distribution over challenges. This distribution is used to model a honest verifier which will always generate a random challenge. Since distributions are probabilistic programs within EasyCrypt we require that sampling from the distribution is always successful. This is referred to as the distribution being lossless.

We then define the Σ -protocol itself to be a series of probabilistic procedures:

```
module type SProtocol = {  
  proc init(h : statement, w : witness) : message  
  proc response(h : statement, w : witness,  
               m : message, e : challenge) : response  
}
```

```

module Completeness(S : SigmaProtocol) = {
  proc main(h : input , w : witness) : bool = {
    var a, e, z;
    a = S.init(h,w);
    e <$ dchallenge;
    z = S.response(h, a, e);
    v = S.verify(h, a, e, z);
    return v;
  }
}.

```

Listing 5.2: Completeness game for Σ -Protocols

```

proc verify(h : statement , m : message , e : challenge , z : response
) : bool
proc witness_extractor(h : statement , m : message , e : challenge
list , z : response list) : witness option
proc simulator(h : statement , e : challenge) : message * response
}

```

Listing 5.1: Abstract procedures of Σ -Protocols

Here all procedures are modelled into the same module. This allows the Verifier procedure to access the global state of the Prover. This could lead to invalid proofs of security. It is therefore important to not implement a `verify` procedure which access global state of the `SProtocol` module. This could have been alleviated by splitting the `SProtocol` module into multiple different modules with only the appropriate procedures inside. This would remove any potential for human error when defining a Σ -Protocol, but it makes it more bothersome to instantiate a Σ -Protocol in `EasyCrypt`. Ultimately, we decided on having everything defined within the same module.

►Here gen is ...◄

An instantiation of a Σ -Protocol is then an implementation of the procedures in Listing 5.2.

We then model security as a series of games:

Definition 5.1.1 (Completeness). We say that a Σ -protocol, S , is complete, if the probabilistic procedure in 5.2 outputs 1 with probability 1, i.e.

$$\forall h, w, R \ h \ w \implies Pr[\text{Completeness}(S).\text{main}(h, w) = \text{true}] = 1. \quad (5.1)$$

One problem with definition 5.1.1 is that quantification over challenges is implicitly done when sampling from the random distribution of challenges. This mean that reasoning about the challenges are done within the probabilistic Hoare logic, and not the ambient logic. If we at some later point need the completeness property to hold for a specific challenge, then that is not true by this definition of completeness, since the ambient logic does not quantify over the challenges. To alleviate this problem we introduce a alternative definition of completeness:

Definition 5.1.2 (Alternative Completeness). We say that a Σ -protocol, S , is complete if:

$$\forall h, w, e, R \ h \ w \implies Pr[\text{Completeness}(S).\text{special}(h, w, e) = \text{true}] = 1. \quad (5.2)$$

Where the procedure “Completeness(S).special” is defined as

```

proc special(h : statement, w : witness, e : challenge) : bool = {
  var a, z, v;

  a = S.init(h, w);
  z = S.response(h, w, a, e);
  v = S.verify(h, a, e, z);

  return v;
}

```

Now, since the alternative procedure no longer samples from a random distribution it is not possible to prove equivalence between the two procedure, but to show that this alternative definition is still captures what is means for a protocol to be complete we have the following lemma:

Lemma 5.1.3. Given that definition 5.1.2 then it must hold that definition 5.1.1 holds, given the same public input and witness.

This can be stated in EasyCryptas:

```

lemma special_implies_main (S <: SProtocol) h' w':
  (∀ h' w' e',
    phoare[ special : (h = h' /\ w = w' /\ e = e') ==> res ] = 1%r)
  =>
  phoare[ Completeness(S).main : (h = h' /\ w = w') ==> res ] = 1%r.

```

Proof. First we start by defining an intermediate game:

```

proc intermediate(h : input, w : witness) : bool = {
  e <$ dchallenge;
  v = special(h, w, e);
  return v;
}

```

From this it is easy to prove equivalence between the two procedures “intermediate” and “main” by simply inlining the procedures and moving the sampling to the first line of each program. This will make the two programs equivalent.

Now, we can prove the lemma by instead proving:

```

lemma special_implies_main (S <: SProtocol) h' w':
  (forall h' w' e', phoare[ special : (h = h' /\ w = w' /\ e = e') ==>
    res ] = 1%r) =>
  phoare[ intermediate : (h = h' /\ w = w') ==> res ] = 1%r.

```

The proof then proceeds by first sampling e and then proving the following probabilistic Hoare triplet: $true \vdash \{\exists e', e = e'\} \text{special}(h, w, e) \{true\}$. Now, we can move the existential from the pre-condition into the context:

$$e' \vdash \{e = e'\} \text{special}(h, w, e) \{true\}$$

Which then is proven by the hypothesis of the “special” procedure being complete.

►variable declarations have been omitted◄

□

```

module SpecialSoundness(S : SProtocol) = {
  proc main(h : statement, m : message, c c' : challenge, z z' :
    response) : bool = {
    var w, v, v';

    v = S.verify(h, m, c, z);
    v' = S.verify(h, m, c', z');

    w = S.witness_extractor(h, m, c, c', z, z');

    return (c <> c' /\ (R h w) /\ v /\ v');
  }
}.

```

Listing 5.3: 2-special soundness game

Definition 5.1.4 (Special Soundness). Given a Σ -Protocol S for some relation R with public input h and two any accepting transcripts (a, e, z) and (a, e', z') where both transcripts have the same initial message, a and $e \neq e'$.

We then define special soundness as winning the game defined in Listing 5.3 with probability 1.

Definition 5.1.5 (Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge). Given a Σ -Protocol S for some relation R with public input h and witness w , then S is said to be Special Honest Verifier Zero-knowledge (SHVZK), if there exists a simulator that given input h outputs a transcript (a, e, z) , which is indistinguishable from the transcript observed by running S on input h, w .

►define indistinguishability◄ ►Statistical and computation indistinguishability in EC?◄

Definition 5.1.6. S is said to be a Σ -Protocol if it implements the procedures in figure 5.1 and satisfy the definitions of completeness, special soundness, and special honest verifier zero-knowledge.

►Argue that games corresponds to original definitions◄

►To prove composition we assume to following relations to be true ...and this only hold if both inputs are in the domain of R .◄

5.2 Composition Protocols

Given our formalisation of Σ -Protocols we now show that our formalisation composes in various ways. More specially it is possible to prove knowledge of relations compounded by the logical operators “AND” and “OR”. The benefit of this is...

5.2.1 AND

Given two Σ -Protocols, S_1 with relation $R_1(h_1, w_1)$ and S_2 with relation $R_2(h_2, w_2)$ we define the AND construction to be a Σ -Protocol proving knowledge of the relation $R((h_1, h_2), (w_1, w_2)) = R_1(h_1, w_1) \wedge R_2(h_2, w_2)$.

The construction of AND protocol is then a Σ -Protocol running both S_1 and S_2 as sub-procedures. To formalise this we start by declaring the AND construction as an instantiation of a Σ -Protocol. To do this we first need to define the types for which the protocol works of. But before we can define the types of the AND construction we need to know the types of the underlying Σ -Protocols S_1 and S_2 . To denote the types of S_i we use the notation: type_i

Type: $\text{statement} = \text{statement}_1 \times \text{statement}_2$
 $\text{witness} = \text{witness}_1 \times \text{witness}_2$
 $\text{message} = \text{message}_1 \times \text{message}_2$
 $\text{challenge} = \text{challenge}_1 = \text{challenge}_2$
 $\text{response} = \text{response}_1 \times \text{response}_2$

We then define the AND construction as a module parametrised by Σ -Protocols satisfying the type signatures of S_1 and S_2 , which can be seen in Listing 5.4. This might seem restrictive, since the AND construction can now only be made from Σ -Protocol with the specific type signature of S_1 and S_2 , but recall that the entire AND construction is quantified over the types given in the type declaration. This means that the types of S_1 and S_2 can be fixed to any arbitrary types and therefore can express any Σ -Protocol. But, if S_1 and S_2 are any arbitrary Σ -Protocols, then why are the AND construction parametrised by Σ -Protocols satisfying the type signatures of S_1 and S_2 rather than just parametrising the AND construction be any two Σ -protocols? Ideally, this would how the AND construction is formalised, but due to how EasyCrypt handles types we need to declare the types of the AND construction and ensure that the procedures are typeable. The only way of ensuring this is by fixing the types of the underlying Σ -Protocols before instantiation the AND construction as a Σ -Protocol.

Security Given the AND constructions instantiation of a Σ -Protocols we simply need to prove the security definitions given in section 5.1 with regards to the module ANDProtocol

Lemma 5.2.1 (AND Completeness). Assume Σ -Protocols P_1 and P_2 are complete then Module ANDProtocol(P_1, P_2) satisfy completeness definition 5.1.1

Proof. By inlining the procedures of ANDProtocol(P_1, P_2) in Completeness(ANDProtocol).special we see that it is equivalent to: Completeness(P_1).special; Completeness(P_2).special. Which is true by our assumption of P_1 and P_2 being complete. We need to use the special definition of the completeness game here, since the challenge e is given by a Verifier running the AND construction. And the sub-protocols are, therefore, not allowed to sample their own challenges and need to use the challenge from the AND construction. \square

► Write protocol as diagram? ◀

```

module ANDProtocol (P1 : S1, P2 : S2) = {
  proc init(h : statement, w : witness) = {
    (h1, h2) = h;
    (w1, w2) = w;

    a1 = P1.init(h1, w1);
    a2 = P2.init(h2, w2);
    return (a1, a2);
  }

  proc response(h : statement, w : witness, m : message, e :
    challenge) : response = {
    (m1, m2) = m;
    (h1, h2) = h;
    (w1, w2) = w;

    z1 = P1.response(h1, w1, m1, e);
    z2 = P2.response(h2, w2, m2, e);
    return (z1, z2);
  }

  proc verify(h : statement, m : message, e : challenge, z : response
    ) : bool = {
    (h1, h2) = h;
    (m1, m2) = m;
    (z1, z2) = z;

    v = P1.verify(h1, m1, e, z1);
    v' = P2.verify(h2, m2, e, z2);

    return (v /\ v');
  }
}

```

Listing 5.4: AND construction

Lemma 5.2.2 (AND special soundness).

$$\begin{aligned}
& R(h_1, h_2)(w_1, w_2) \\
& \wedge \Pr[P_1.\text{verify}(h_1, w_1, e, z)] = 1 \\
& \wedge \Pr[P_2.\text{verify}(h_2, w_2, e', z')] = 1 \\
& \implies \Pr[\text{SpecialSoundness}(\text{ANDProtocol}(P_1, P_2)).\text{main}] = 1
\end{aligned}$$

Proof. trivial by construction □

Lemma 5.2.3 (AND SHVZK). Given Σ -Protocols P_1 and P_2 that satisfy SHVZK then AND is SHVZK

Proof. Construction □

5.2.2 OR

►Needed to change relation◄

Concluding remarks on composition protocols

5.3 Fiat-Shamir Transformation

The Fiat-Shamir transformation is a technique for converting Σ -protocols into zero-knowledge protocols. Σ -Protocols almost satisfy the definition of zero-knowledge, the only problem is that Σ -Protocols only guarantee zero-knowledge given the verifier is honest. This is stated by the Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge property. However, if we can alter the protocol to force the verifier to always be honest, then the protocol, by definition, must be zero-knowledge. The Fiat-Shamir transformation achieves this by removing the verifier from the protocol and thus making it non-interactive. The verifier is then replaced by a random oracle, which generates a random challenge based on the first message of the prover, thus it works exactly like an honest verifier in the interactive protocol. However, since the random oracle is a sub-procedure of the prover he is allowed to make polynomially many call to the oracle in the hopes of getting a good challenge.

5.3.1 Oracles

To formalise this transformation we first formalise what we expect a random oracle to do...

5.3.2 Non-interactive Σ -Protocol

We can define the non-interactive version of the protocol as:

5.3.3 Security

And we can then prove completeness and zero-knowledge of the protocol by...

Soundness, however, cannot be proven by the definition of special soundness from Σ -Protocols, since the Prover has gained more possibilities of cheating the verifier. We could prove some arbitrary bounds, but to get a meaningful proof of soundness for the Fiat-Shamir transformation we would need the rewinding lemma, which is yet unclear how to do in proof assistants ►reference proving/disproving this◄.

5.4 Concrete instantiation: Schnorr protocol

To show the workability of the proposed formalisation we show that it can be used to instantiate Schnorr's protocol. The Schnorr's protocol is run between a Prover C and a Verifier R. Both parties have before running the protocol agreed on a group (\mathcal{G}, q, g) , where q is the order of \mathbb{G} and g is the generator for the group. Schnorr's protocol is a Σ -Protocol for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm. Formally it is a Σ -Protocol for the relation $R \text{ h } w = h = g^w$

When the P wants to prove knowledge of the w to V he starts by constructing a message $a = g^r$ for some random value r . The Verifier will then generate a random challenge, e , which is a bit-string of some arbitrary length that defines the security of the protocol. Based on this challenge P then constructs a response $z = r + e * w$ and sends it to V. To verify the transcript (a, e, z) V then checks if $g^z = a * h^e$.

From this general description it is clear that this protocol fits within our formalisation of Σ -Protocol procedures. We then define the appropriate types and instantiate the protocol using our Σ -Protocol formalisation:

```
clone export SigmaProtocols as Sigma with
  type statement <- group, (* group element *)
  type witness   <- F.t,   (* Finite field element, like  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  *)
  type message   <- group,
  type challenge <- F.t,
  type response  <- F.t,

  op R h w = (h = g^w)
  op dchallenge = FDistr.dt (* Distribution of messages *)
  proof *.
  realize dchallenge_llfuni. by split; [apply FDistr.dt_ll | apply
    FDistr.dt_funi].

module Schnorr : SProtocol = {
  var r : F.t
  proc init(h : statement, w : witness) : message = {
    r <$ FDistr.dt;
    return g^r;
  }

  proc response(h : statement, w : witness, a : message, e :
    challenge) : response = {
    return r + e * w;
  }
}
```

```

proc verify(h : statement, a : message, e : challenge, z : response
) : bool = {
  return (gz = a · (he));
}

```

Listing 5.5: Schnorr instantiation

Here we first discharge the assumption that the challenge are lossless, uniform and fully distributed by using the EasyCrypt theories about distributions and cyclic groups.

To prove security of the protocol we show that the it satisfies the security definitions from section 5.1.

Lemma 5.4.1 (Schnorr correctness). $R h w \implies \Pr[\text{Completeness}(\text{Schnorr}).\text{main}(h, w)] = 1$

Proof. To prove correctness we need to prove two things:

1. That the procedure always terminates
2. That it always outputs true

1) Since all procedures bar the random sampling in Schnorr are arithmetic operations they can never fail. The random sampling have been proven to be lossless. Therefore the procedures always terminates.

2) After running all sub-procedures of the correctness game the output of the procedure is

$$\begin{aligned}
 g^{r+e \cdot w} &= g^r \cdot h^e \\
 \iff g^{r+e \cdot w} &= g^r \cdot g^{w \cdot e} & R h w = (h = g^w) \\
 \iff g^r \cdot g^{e \cdot w} &= g^r \cdot g^{w \cdot e}
 \end{aligned}$$

Which is easily proven by EasyCrypt automation tools for algebraic operations. \square

Lemma 5.4.2 (Schnorr soundness).

$$\begin{aligned}
 e \neq e' &\implies \\
 \Pr[\text{verify}(a, e, z)] &= 1 \implies \\
 \Pr[\text{verify}(a, e', z')] &= 1 \implies \\
 \Pr[\text{Soundness}(\text{Schnorr})(a, [e, e'], [z, z'])] &= 1
 \end{aligned}$$

Proof. We start by defining the witness extractor for Schnorr's protocol:

```

proc witness_extractor(h : statement, m : message, e : challenge list
, z : response list) : witness = {
  return (z[0] - z[1]) / (e[0] - e[1]);
}

```

► **Define list indexing in background chapter** ◀ To prove that the soundness game succeeds we need the following

1. Both transcripts are accepting
2. The witness extractor produces a valid witness for the relation R

1) By stepping through the while loop of the soundness game we can show that all transcripts must be accepting by our assumptions.

2) Running all procedures of the soundness game we are left with showing:

$$\begin{aligned} R(h, (z - z')/(e - e')) &= (h = g^{((z - z')/(e - e'))}) \\ &= (h = g^{((z - z')/(e - e'))}) \end{aligned}$$

► **Rest like pen and paper proof but with cyclic group theory operations** ◀

□

Lemma 5.4.3 (Schnorr SHVZK).

$$\text{equiv}[\text{SHVZK}(\text{Schnorr}).\text{ideal} \sim \Pr[\text{SHVZK}(\text{Schnorr}).\text{real} := \{h, e\} \wedge R(h, w^{\text{real}}) \implies \{res\}]$$

Proof. We start by defining the simulator for Schnorr's protocol:

```
proc simulator(h : statement, e : challenge) = {
  z <$ FDistr.dt;
  a = gz * h(-e);
  return (a, z);
}
```

To prove SHVZK we must prove the output indistinguishability of the following procedures: To prove this we use EasyCrypt coupling functionality to show that

```
proc real(h, w, e) = {
  r <$ FDistr.dt;
  a = gr;
  z = r + e · w;
  return (a, e, z);
}
```

```
proc ideal(h, e) = {
  z <$ FDistr.dt;
  a = gz * h(-e);
  return (a, e, z);
}
```

$r^{\text{real}} \equiv z^{\text{ideal}} - e \cdot w^{\text{real}}$ and that $z^{\text{ideal}} \equiv r^{\text{real}} + e \cdot w^{\text{real}}$. This is easily prove, since the distribution is full and uniform, and the group is closed under addition and multiplication. All these facts follow directly from the cyclic group theory in EasyCrypt. By the coupling functionality we are then for the rest of the proof allowed to assume: $r^{\text{real}} = z^{\text{ideal}} - e \cdot w^{\text{real}}$ and $z^{\text{ideal}} = r^{\text{real}} + e \cdot w^{\text{real}}$. We then use this to show output

indistinguishability:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (a^{real}, e, z^{real}) &= (g^{r^{real}}, e, r^{real} + e \cdot w^{real}) \\
 &= (g^{r^{real}}, e, z^{ideal} - e \cdot w^{real} + e \cdot w^{real}) \\
 &= (g^{z^{ideal} - e \cdot w^{real}}, e, z^{ideal}) \\
 &= (g^{z^{ideal}} \cdot g^{w^{real} - e}, e, z^{ideal}) \\
 &= (g^{z^{ideal}} \cdot h^{(-e)}, e, z^{ideal}) \\
 &= (a^{ideal}, e, z^{ideal})
 \end{aligned}$$

Which is proven by EasyCrypt's automation tools. □

►Define generalised notation for comparing views in background chapter◀
►The proofs have been relatively easy thanks to the strong support for algebraic groups in EC◀

Conclusion In this section we have seen ...

Chapter 6

Generalised Zero-Knowledge compilation

We have previously seen a concrete instantiation of a Σ -protocol with the relation being the discrete logarithm problem, namely Schnorr’s protocol. We have also seen how it was possible to prove Schnorr’s protocol to be secure in a formal setting though EasyCrypt.

►Mention zkSNARKS?◄

There exists an infinite set of possible relations, for which we could want to provide zero-knowledge proofs of. It is therefore infeasible to design a protocol for each relation and proving its security.

An example of this is the GMW-compiler . . . , or the example system from [1].

We therefore need a more generalised approach, that is able to generate zero-knowledge proof for an entire family of relations rather than a specific relation. One such family of relations is the pre-image under group homomorphisms . . .

Another important factor of zero-knowledge compilers is the reduce the proof size. ZK proofs are notoriously expensive to run.

6.1 ZKBOO

The ZKBoo protocol, which was invented by Giacomelli et al. [7], is a zero-knowledge compiler for relations, which can be expressed as the pre-image of a group homomorphism, i.e.

$$R \text{ h } w = \phi(w) = h$$

Where h is the public input and w is the witness.

The principle idea of this protocol is based on a technique called “MPC in the head”. Recall from section 3.4, that the theory of Multipart Computation allows us, for any given function taking n inputs to securely compute output y for the function. We then have by definition 3.4.2 that as long as less than $d \leq n$ views are available to the adversary, then the inputs to the function are private.

Now, if we instead of proving the knowledge of a witness satisfying $\phi(w) = h$ we revealed a run, i.e. the views, of a MPC protocol computing the above function, but with the witness distributed amongst all parties then we have the claims:

Lemma 6.1.1. By correctness (definition 3.4.1), and assuming that the input share to the parties where indeed a valid distribution of the witness, then we can conclude that the witness is the pre-image of the public input

Lemma 6.1.2. By d-privacy (definition 3.4.2) if less than d views are revealed, then the witness is not revealed.

Which ultimately gives us:

Lemma 6.1.3. From lemma 6.1.1 and lemma 6.1.2 it follows that MPC can be used to create an zero-knowledge protocol for the pre-image of a group homomorphism.

Before we go into proving the above lemmas, we first need to address how we are to actually perform the MPC protocol. Having to depend on n different parties to perform a zero-knowledge protocol is not a feasible solution, so instead of recruiting the help of n external parties to perform the protocol we instead perform the entire protocol locally by simulating every party in the protocol. This is commonly refereed to as performing the protocol “in the head”.

►implication on security by having all parties locally◄

The following section we then, in order, be dedicated to explaining how to distribute the witness to multiple parties, and decomposing the original single input into an MPC protocol computing the function take n inputs. Then, having properly defined the MPC protocol, we will show how to use the “MPC in the head” protocol to make a zero-knowledge protocol to and prove lemma 6.1.3.

6.1.1 (2,3)-Function Decomposition

(2,3)-Function decomposition is a general technique given a function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ and a input value $x \in X$ to compute the value $f(x)$ by splitting it into three computational branches, where revealing tow of the branches reveals no information about the input x . Through-out this section we will simply refer the a (2,3)-Function decomposition as \mathcal{D} .

►General description◄

Based on the security definitions from MPC (Section 3.4) we can then define the two necessary properties from [7] for security of our (2,3)-Function decomposition, namely, correctness and privacy.

Definition 6.1.4 (Correctness). A (2,3)-decomposition \mathcal{D} is correct if $\forall x \in X, \Pr[\phi(x) = \Phi_\phi^*(x)] = 1$. **►Change notation to account for randomness◄**

Definition 6.1.5 (Privacy). A (2,3)-decomposition \mathcal{D} is 2-private if it is correct and for all challenges $e \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S_e such that:

$$\forall x \in X, (\{\mathbf{k}_i, \mathbf{w}_i\}_{i \in \{e, e+1\}}, \mathbf{y}_{e+2}) \equiv S_e(x)$$

Where $(\{\mathbf{k}_i, \mathbf{w}_i\}_{i \in \{e, e+1\}}, \mathbf{y}_{e+2})$ is produced by running \mathcal{D} on input x

(2,3)-Function Decomposition for Arithmetic circuits

►For the scope of this thesis we simplify this assumption, and only look at functions, which can be represented as a arithmetic circuit in some finite integer ring.

If the function is represented as an integer arithmetic circuit, then a general technique exists for perform the (2,3)-Decomposition ◀

▶ Describe technique for 2,3 decomp of arith. ◀

6.1.2 Making the protocol zero-knowledge

▶ Proof size of ZKboo ◀

Chapter 7

Formalising ZKBoo

In this chapter we show how to use our previous formalisations of Σ -Protocols and commitment schemes to formalise the ZKBoo protocol introduced in the previous chapter. Here we will show how to instantiate ZKBoo with our Σ -Protocol formalisation and then show how we can use our formalisation of commitment protocols to prove the security of ZKBoo.

The goal of formalising ZKBoo is two-fold. First, we show that our previous formalisations are indeed applicable to larger protocols. Second, we aim to gather insight into how `EasyCrypt` can help in formalising protocols larger than the usual toy examples like El-Gamal and Schnorr.

Outline First, in section 7.1 we find develop a formalisation of arithmetic circuits within `EasyCrypt`, which allows us the reason about evaluating the circuit to a value and guide the formalisation of the decomposition. Next, in section 7.2 we formalise the (2,3)-Decomposition of arithmetic circuits as defined in section 7.1. This ultimately leads to section 7.3 where we use the formalisation of arithmetic circuits and their (2,3)-Decomposition to instantiate ZKBoo as a Σ -Protocol and then prove its security.




Figure 7.1: Outline of ZKBoo formalisation

Preliminary notation Throughout this chapter use the letter e to denote an integer in $\{1,2,3\}$. Moreover, we define arithmetic on e such that $3 + 1 = 1$.

7.1 Formalising Arithmetic circuits

In this section we will introduce the concept of arithmetic circuits and how they can be represented. Primarily we recall the usual definition of circuits as graph and discuss how to evaluate circuits programmatically. From this we introduce a number of restrictions to our formalisation which makes their easier to work with, whilst still being expressive

enough to use in the ZKBoo protocol. Based on these restrictions we then formulate an alternative representation for arithmetic circuits and give a number of key definitions, which are needed for reasoning about the structure of a circuit and the evaluation of circuits.

7.1.1 Representing an arithmetic circuit

An arithmetic circuit is in its most general form express a function ϕ over some arbitrary field \mathbb{Z}_q , where $\phi : \mathbb{Z}_q^k \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^l$

To express arbitrary (Arithmetic) computations in a ring of finite field we use the following four gates, Add to constant (ADDC), multiply by constant (MULTC), addition of two wires (ADD), and multiplication of two wires (MULT).

The goal of this section is to formulate a representation of the function ϕ , which only depends on the aforementioned gate types to perform computations. Before doing so, however, we start by stating a number of simplifying assumptions about our arithmetic circuits. First, we only allow the circuit to have one input value and one output value, in other words: $k = l = 1$ in the definition of ϕ . This assumption exists pure to make it easier to reason about the inputs and output of the function. The formalisation in this section could be altered to allow for arbitrary inputs with minor alterations, which we will discuss later. **►Discuss this later◄**

Based on these simplifying assumptions we can now recall the graph representation of a circuit:

Definition 7.1.1 (Arithmetic Circuit). An Arithmetic circuit is a graph $C = (W, G)$ where W is the internal wires between the gates and G is the set of gates within the circuit. Then, we let $i \in G$ be first gate of the circuit, i.e. its only input and $o \in G$ be the output gate, for which there must exists a path from i to o in W . Specifically, o is a gate with only one in-going wire and no out-going wire. The means that the value of the circuit can be read by reading the value of the in-going wire to o .

►Define in- and out-wires?◄

Finally, for all gates $g \in G$ there must exists path in W from i to o going through g , since if this was not the case, the gate does not contribute the output of the gates and can therefore be removed from the graph without changing the semantic meaning of the circuit.

To define evaluation of a circuit we would then need compute the value of the in-wire of o , but this can only be done if we have computed all other wires in the circuit. Moreover, the value of the out-wires of a given gate, g , can only be computed if all in-wires of g has already been computed to a value. It is clear from this that we need to define an order of evaluation, such that we only try to compute the out-wire of a gate if we know that all in-wires has been computed.

To define the order of evaluation we follow the work of [2] and introducing an alternative representation of Arithmetic circuits, which naturally gives us a well-defined evaluation order:

Definition 7.1.2 (List representation of arithmetic circuits). Given an arithmetic circuit C as defined by definition 7.1.1 we define the list representation of C as computing a

```

type encoded_gate = [
  | ADDC of (int * int)
  | MULTC of (int * int)
  | MULT of (int * int)
  | ADD of (int * int)
].

```

Listing 7.1: Type declaration of gates

linear ordering, O , of G , which gives each gate in G an unique index. **►Why do we remove i and o ?◄** We then let the list representation C_L be defined as:

$$C_L[j] = Enc(O(G \setminus \{i\})[j], W)$$

Where $Enc : gate \rightarrow W \rightarrow \text{encoded gate}$, is a function taking as input a gate and the wires of the circuit and produces an encoded gate. The encoded gate contains type information about gate but also stores the indexes (From the linear ordering) of the gates, whose out-going wires are the in-going wires of the gate. The type declaration of the encoded gates can be seen in figure 7.1.

►Tikz example showing the two representations◄

►This representation does not allows for optimisations like parallel computations◄

Linear ordering A linear ordering O is a function that when applied to G assigns a unique index to each gate in G . One example of such function defining a linear ordering is a breadth-first search, where each gate in the circuit graph is labelled according to at which time the BFS reached the gate. This labelling would start at gate i and end at o .

A special property of the linear ordering induced by a BFS labelling is that a gate can only be visited when all nodes that the gates computation can depend on has already been visited. This ensure that for a node indexed i it only depends on out-wires of nodes with index less-than i .

This ordering allows us to convert the graph representation into a list representation, where the gate at index i is the node with index i by the linear ordering. However, since the gates i performs no computation and only exists to add the input value to the graph we exclude it from the list representation, and shift every index one down.

Encoded gates A gate is then a type, which defined its operation along with a tuple (l, r) where l is the index of left input wire and r is the index of the right input wire. In the case of unary gates like ADDC and MULTC the tuple is (l, c) where l is the input wire and c is the constant used in the computation.

But we need to encode W into this list. To do this we encode the information about input wires into the types of the gates themselves, as seen in figure 7.1.

One important aspect of the list representation of circuits is that it allows us to easily define an evaluation order, where we are ensure that we are not computing the value of a gate before the previous gates has been computed. To capture this notion of a valid evaluation order we give the following definition:

►Define notation for list indexing?◄

```

op eval_gate (g : gate, s : int list) : int =
  with g = MULT inputs => let (i, j) = inputs in
                           let x = (nth 0 s i) in
                           let y = (nth 0 s j) in x * y
  with g = ADD inputs => let (i, j) = inputs in
                           let x = (nth 0 s i) in
                           let y = (nth 0 s j) in x + y
  with g = ADDC inputs => let (i, c) = inputs in
                           let x = (nth 0 s i) in x + c
  with g = MULTC inputs => let (i, c) = inputs in
                           let x = (nth 0 s i) in x * c.

op eval_circuit_aux (c : circuit, s : int list) : int list =
  with c = [] => s
  with c = g :: gs =>
    let r = eval_gate g s in
    eval_circuit_aux gs (rcons s r).

op eval_circuit (c : circuit, s : state) : output =
  last 0 (eval_circuit_aux c s).

```

Listing 7.2: Circuit evaluation function

Definition 7.1.3 (Valid circuit). An arithmetic circuit in list representation C_L is valid if for every entry i in the list it holds that:

- $C[i]$ is a gate type
- the input wires of $C[i]$ have index less than i .
- the input wires of $C[i]$ have index greater than or equals to 0.

From this representation of circuits as a list of gates, where gates are types, it is possible to define the semantic meaning of this representation, by defining the evaluation function, which can be seen in figure 7.2. The evaluation is broken into two parts: First we have a function for evaluating one gate to an intermediate values. Second, we have a procedure for evaluating the entire circuits which calls the former function. To evaluate a single gate, we first need to determine which gate it is. This can be done by utilizing the power of the EasyCrypt type system, which allows us to pattern match on the type of the gate as seen in listing 7.2.

Then, if the circuit is valid the evaluation order is the indexes of the list representation. We know that if we are computing index i of the circuit, then indices $[0 \dots i - 1]$ have already been computed. Perform the appropriate function then reduces to looking up the values of the previously computed gates and applying them to the function appropriate for the type of the gate.

Computing the entire circuit then follows from the same fact, that gates are always evaluated in the order they appear in the list, and no gate can depend on the result of gates, which have a higher index than itself. By continually performing gate evaluation of the next entry in the list and saving the result into “state” where each index corresponds to the computed value of the gate at that index in the circuit, and calling recursively on the list with the first entry removed, then the output of the gate will be in the last

entry of the state, when there are no more gates to compute. Assuming that there is only one output gate.

Definition 7.1.4 (State of list representation). For a list representation of a circuit C_L we give the following recursive definition of the state:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{state}[0] &= \text{input value} \\ \text{state}[i > 0] &= \text{eval_gate } C_L[i-1] \text{ state}[i-1] \end{aligned}$$

Here we recall that input gate has been removed from the list representation and $C_L[0]$ is the first non-input gate in the circuit. From this it also follows that

$$\text{size state} = \text{size } C_L + 1 \quad (7.1)$$

We then have that any valid circuit c can be compute to a value y as $\text{eval_circuit}(c, [\text{input}]) = y$. This can also be stated as a probabilistic procedure as $\Pr[\text{eval_circuit}(c, [\text{input}]) = y] = 1$.

To reason about functions and procedures about functions we have the following lemma:

Lemma 7.1.5 (Function/Procedure relation). $\forall f, \text{inputs}, \text{output}: f(\text{inputs}) = \text{output} \iff \Pr[f(\text{inputs}) = \text{output}] = 1$.

Proof.

- “ \Rightarrow ”: Trivial
- “ \Leftarrow ”: by contradiction?

□

- **ZKBoo paper gives no notion of a valid evaluation order - needed for security** ◀
- **Graph representation isomorphic to list representation?** ◀

7.2 (2,3) Decomposition of circuits

In this section we ... formalisation based on the description of arithmetic circuits...

► **mention MPC** ◀

In its most general form, we can define the decomposition as a procedure taking as input three views and random tapes, and a circuit and produces three new views. ► **rewrite? - Random tapes = set of random choices** ◀ More specifically the decomposition work by incrementally evaluating a gate based on previously compute views, which yield new shares that can be appended to the view. This process of evaluating a single gate based on the view of evaluating the previous gate can then be repeated until all gates have been computed. This overall idea has been captured in the procedure in figure 7.3, where it is assumed access to a function eval_gate , which has signature: $\text{eval_gate} : \text{circuit} \Rightarrow \text{party} \Rightarrow (\text{view} * \text{view}) \Rightarrow (\text{random_tape} * \text{random_tape}) \Rightarrow \text{share}$, ► **explain eval gate better?** ◀ where party is a integer in $\{1, 2, 3\}$ that determines which party is computing the share. ► **Say that eval gate implements the function in the ZKBoo section** ◀

```

proc compute(c : circuit , w1 w2 w3 : view , k1 k2 k3 : random_tape)
= {
  while (c <> []) {
    g = oget (ohead c);
    r1 <$ dinput;
    r2 <$ dinput;
    r3 <$ dinput;
    k1 = (rcons k1 r1);
    k2 = (rcons k2 r2);
    k3 = (rcons k3 r3);
    v1 = eval_gate g 1 w1 w2 k1 k2;
    v2 = eval_gate g 2 w2 w3 k2 k3;
    v3 = eval_gate g 3 w3 w1 k3 k1;
    w1 = (rcons w1 v1);
    w2 = (rcons w2 v2);
    w3 = (rcons w3 v3);
    c = behead c;
  }
  return (k1 , k2 , k3 , w1 , w2 , w3);
}

```

Listing 7.3: Incremental decomposition procedure

The output of the decomposition can then be defined as summing the last share from each view that has been compute by the aforementioned procedure. More formally the output is:

$$\text{Output}(w_1, w_2, w_3) = \sum_{i \in \{1,2,3\}} \text{last } w_i \quad (7.2)$$

Definition 7.2.1 (Correctness of views). For any three views (list of shares), w_1, w_2, w_3 , with equal length, we say that they contain valid shares of computing a circuit c , if it holds:

$$\forall 0 \leq i < \text{size } c, \sum_{p \in \{1,2,3\}} w_p[i] = s[i] \quad (7.3)$$

where s is the list of intermediate values produces by calling `eval_circuit_aux` in figure 7.2.

Additionally a share is only valid, if it has been produced by functions used by the decomposition.

$$\forall 0 \leq i < \text{size } c - 1, w_e[i+1] = \text{eval_gate } c[i] w_e w_{e+1} \quad (7.4)$$

To express that the views satisfy the above definition we use the notation **Valid**(c, w_1, w_2, w_3) to express that w_1, w_2, w_3 are valid views for the decomposition of c

Handling randomness Looking at `compute` we see that `compute` we make three random choices for each gate and then save those choices to some random tapes. These tapes are then returned. They are used to keep track of the random choices made throughout the protocol, such that views can be verified. For most proof the specific values contained within the random tapes are not imporant, since the random values are

only there to cancel eachother out whilst making the shares look randomly distributed. We therefore omit the random tapes for most procedures and proofs in this section, since they are static? When the random tapes are important for the security we will mentioned how.

The reason for sampling random values at each iteration of the while loop instead of all at once is to be able to reason about the specific random choices made at this time in the computation. This is especially important to be able to relate two procedures running at the same iteration of the while loop...

7.2.1 Correctness

Ultimately want to prove:

Lemma 7.2.2 (Decomposition correctness).

$$\Pr[\text{eval_circuit}(c, [\text{input}]) = y] = \Pr[\text{decomposition}(c, [\text{input}]) = y]$$

i.e. The output distribution of the two programs are perfectly indistinguishable. From lemma 7.1.5 we have that circuit evaluation always succeeds. This lemma, therefore, also implies that the decomposition always succeeds.

To prove the above lemma we first introduce a helper lemma:

Lemma 7.2.3 (Stepping lemma for decomposition). For any valid circuit c in list representation, it is possible to split the circuit into two parts c_1, c_2 where $c = c_1 ++ c_2$ ($++$ is list concatenation). let w_1, w_2, w_3 be the resulting views of decomposing c and **Valid**(c_1, w_1, w_2, w_3) and let computing c_2 with initial views w_1, w_2, w_3 output views w'_1, w'_2, w'_3 . Then **Valid**(c, w'_1, w'_2, w'_3).

Alternatively this is stated as:

$$\mathbf{Valid}(c_1, w_1, w_2, w_3) \implies \Pr[\text{compute}(c_2, w_1, w_2, w_3) : \mathbf{Valid}(c, w'_1, w'_2, w'_3)] = 1$$

Proof. The proof proceeded by induction on the list c .

- Base case $c = []$: trivially true since an empty circuit is the identity function.
- Induction step $c = c' ++ [g]$:
 - Inline definitions to get `compute_stepped`
 - We use to induction hypotheses to compute c' which give us **Valid**(c_1, w_1, w_2, w_3).
 - We then need to prove, that we can compute any gate on top of the valid views to produce a new set of valid views.

□

Proof of lemma 7.2.2. By unfolding the definition we are left with proving that the last share from each of the views produced by `compute` are equal to the output of evaluating the circuit, which is true by lemma 7.2.3

□

►Our formalisation differs by imposing stricter restrictions on the shares computed...◄

7.2.2 2-Privacy

To prove 2-Privacy we need to first define a simulator capable of producing indistinguishable views for two of the parties. To simulator is given by the procedure `simulate` and function `simulator_eval` in figure 7.4. `simulator_eval` is a function that evaluates a single gate from the point of view of party “p”. In the cases of evaluating ADDC ADD MULTC gates the simulator simply calls the `eval_gate` function, since these computations are performed “locally” for each party, i.e. they do not depend on the shares from the other parties in the protocol. When evaluating MULT gates shares needs to be distributed amongst the parties, but to evaluate the output of the MULT gate for any given party it only depends on the parties own share and the share of the “next” party, i.e. for party one he only depends on his own shares and the shares from party two. Since the simulator simulates the view of party e and $e + 1$ the view of party e can be computed normally with the `eval_gate` function. For simulating the view of party $e + 1$ we use the fact that shares should be uniformly random distributed, and simply sample a random value for the view. This is true by equation **►Make sim mult function in zkboo chapter◄**, where the difference between two random values are added to the share, effectively making the share appear random too. **►rewrite this◄** In this case the view of party e can always be computationally reconstructed by looking at the view of party $e + 1$, but the view of party $e + 1$ cannot be verified, since the view of party $e + 2$ is unknown, which makes it seem valid.

►Where we use that compute and simulate sample randomness at the time of computation◄

The procedure `simulate` is simply a wrapper around `simulator_eval`, which is responsible for constructing the views and sampling randomness incrementally for each gate in the circuit, much like how `compute` is a wrapper around `eval_gate`.

To compare the views output by the simulator and the ones produced by the decomposition we fix two procedures `real` and `simulated`, where the first return two views and the final share of the third view and the latter returns the two views output by the simulator and a fake final share of the third view. These procedures can be seen in figure 7.5.

We are then ready to state 2-privacy as the following lemma:

Lemma 7.2.4 (Decomposition 2-Privacy). We say that the decomposition protocol offers 2-Privacy, if the output distributions between `real` and `simulated` are indistinguishable.

►Why must h be in the domain of R here, but not in correctness?◄

This can be stated in rPHL as:

$$h \in \text{Domain}(R) \implies \text{equiv}[\text{real} \sim \text{simulated} := \{e, h\} \implies \{res\}].$$

To prove this lemma we first prove that running `compute` and `simulate` with the same random choices will produce indistinguishable views corresponding to the challenge and summing the output shares of `compute` will yield the same value as evaluating the circuit. This effectively inlines the correctness property in the proof of the simulator. This is necessary to be able to reason about the existence of the view of party $e + 2$, which would make the views produced by the simulated equal to honestly produces views. More specifically the inlined correctness property gives us ...

```

op simulator_eval (g : gate, p : int, e : int, w1 w2 : view, k1 k2 k3
: int list) =
with g = MULT inputs =>
  if (p - e %% 3 = 1) then (nth 0 k3 (size w1 - 1)) else eval\_gate g
    p w1 w2 k1 k2
with g = ADDC inputs =>
  eval\_gate g p w1 w2 k1 k2
with g = MULTC inputs => eval\_gate g p w1 w2 k1 k2
with g = ADD inputs => eval\_gate g p w1 w2 k1 k2.

proc simulate(c : circuit, e : int, w1 w2 : view, k1 k2 k3 :
  random_tape) = {
  while (c <> []) {
    g = oget (ohead c);
    r1 <$ dinput;
    r2 <$ dinput;
    r3 <$ dinput;
    k1 = (rcons k1 r1);
    k2 = (rcons k2 r2);
    k3 = (rcons k3 r3);
    v1 = simulator_eval g e e w1 w2 k1 k2 k3;
    v2 = simulator_eval g (e+1) e w2 w1 k1 k2 k3;
    w1 = (rcons w1 v1);
    w2 = (rcons w2 v2);
    c = behead c;
  }
}

```

Listing 7.4: Simulator

```

proc real((c,y) : statement, w : witness, e : challenge) = {
  (y1,y2,y3,w1,w2,w3) = compute(c);
  return (we,we+1,ye+2)
}

proc simulated((c, y) : statement, e : challenge) = {
  (we,we+1) = simulate(c, e);
  ye = last we;
  ye+1 = last we+1;
  ye+2 = y - (ye + ye+1)
  return (we,we+1,ye+3)
}

```

Listing 7.5: Real/Simulated view of decomposition

This is stated as the following lemma:

► **Define notation for referring the views from protocol one and the views from protocol 2** ◀

Lemma 7.2.5. Given a valid arithmetic circuit in list representation with challenge e and intermediate circuit computations/state s the following holds:

$$\text{equiv}[\text{compute} \sim \text{simulated} : = \{h, e, w_e, w_{e+1}\} \implies = \{w'_e, w'_{e+1}\}]$$

Moreover, we require that the input views w_1, w_2, w_3 satisfies the correctness property from equation 7.3.

Additionally this property must also hold for the views w'_1, w'_2, w'_3 produced by running compute. This is equivalent to part of the **Valid** property used in the proof of correctness.

Proof. We proceed by induction on the list representation of the circuit c :

- Base Case $c = []$: trivial
- Induction Case $c = g :: cs$:
- Write this as program steps like in [4]?

$$\text{compute}(g :: gs, w_1, w_2, w_3) \sim \text{simulate}(g :: gs, w'_1, w'_2, w'_3)$$

□

Proof of lemma 7.2.4. By applying lemma 7.2.5 we have that the views output by both procedures are indistinguishable. All we have left to prove is that $y_{e+2}^{\text{real}} \equiv y_{e+2}^{\text{simulated}}$. To prove this we use the equation 7.3, which states that the shares of the real views always sum to the intermediate values of computing the circuit to conclude

$$y = y_1^{\text{real}} + y_2^{\text{real}} + y_3^{\text{real}} \iff y_{e+2}^{\text{real}} = y - (y_e^{\text{real}} + y_{e+1}^{\text{real}})$$

Then by $(y_e^{\text{real}} + y_{e+1}^{\text{real}}) \equiv (y_e^{\text{real}} + y_{e+1}^{\text{real}})$ it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} y_{e+2}^{\text{real}} &= y - (y_e^{\text{real}} + y_{e+1}^{\text{real}}) \\ &\equiv y - (y_e^{\text{simulated}} + y_{e+1}^{\text{simulated}}) \\ &= y_{e+2}^{\text{simulated}} \end{aligned}$$

□

7.3 ZKBOO

► **Throughout this section we will introduce the instantiated sigma protocol...** ◀

Since the ZKBoo protocol is an instantiation of a Σ -Protocol we start by defining the types as specified in section 5.

```

type statement = (circuit * int).
type witness   = int.
type message   = output * output * output * Commit.commitment *
                Commit.commitment * Commit.commitment.
type challenge = int.
type response  = (random_tape * view * random_tape * view).

```

The relation is then all tuples of circuits outputs and inputs, where it holds that evaluating the circuit with the input returns the output. We formally encode this as

$$R = \{((c,y),w) \mid \text{eval_circuit } c \ w = y\}. \quad (7.5)$$

We then add the restriction, that the challenge is always a integer in $\{1,2,3\}$. Moreover, we recall from section 6.1, that ZKBoo depends on a commitment scheme. Here we follow [7] and use a key-less commitment scheme. We therefore assume the existence of a commitment scheme, Com, which is an instantiation of the key-less commitment scheme formalisation from section 7.3. Furthermore, we simply our proof burden by requiring Com to satisfy the alternative perfect hiding property from definition 4.3.2 as well as the alternative binding property from definition 4.3.3 with probability *binding_prob*.

With these preliminaries in place we are now ready formalise the ZKBoo protocol. First, we start by defining the sub-procedures needed for the verify procedure. Recall from section 6.1, that the Verifier accepts a transcript (a, e, z) if z is a valid opening of the views w_e and w_{e+1} commitment to in a and that every entry in w_e has been produced by the procedure defining the decomposition. This step of validating that w_e has been produced in accordance with the decomposition is given by equation 7.4. This equation can be encoded within EasyCrypt as a predicate: **►Change the procedure to use the naming from the report◀**

```

pred valid_view p (view view2 : view) (c : circuit) (k1 k2 :
  random_tape) =
  (forall i, 0 <= i /\ i + 1 < size view =>
    (nth 0 view (i + 1)) = phi_decomp (nth (ADDC(0,0)) c i) i p view
    view2 k1 k2).

```

Predicates allows us to use quantifiers to assert properties within EasyCrypt, which are nice to reason about especially in pre and post condition of procedures. Predicates, however, have no computation aspect to them and are pure logical. Having a predicate reasoning quantifying over all integers, for example, is perfectly legal, but this is obviously not possible to express as a computation, since it would take indefinitely many computations to verify a property for indefinitely many integers. A predicate, therefore, cannot be used within procedures, since they are not required to be computable. The quantification in equation 7.4, however, only need finitely many computations to verify the property, since it is bounded by the size of the circuit. We can, therefore, define a computable function which for each entry check if the property holds and then returns if the property holds for all entries. This can clearly be computed in time proportional to the size of the circuit and the time it takes to compute one share of the decomposition. This function is given by:

```

op valid_view_op p (view view2 : view) (c : circuit) (k1 k2 :
  random_tape) =

```

```

(foldr (fun i acc ,
        acc /\ (nth 0 view (i + 1)) = phi_decomp (nth (ADDC(0,0))
        c i) i p view view2 k1 k2)
true (range 0 (size view - 1))).

```

This function allows us to computationally validate the property from equation 7.4, but it is harder to reason about, since we have to reason about every computational step of the function before we can verify the property holds. We would therefore want our function to use our function in the implementation of ZKBoo, but use the predicate whenever we need to reason about the security of the protocol. To achieve this we introduce the following lemma, which allows us to use the predicate over the function when applicable:

Lemma 7.3.1 (valid_view predicate/op equivalence). $\forall p, w1, w2, c, k1, k2: \text{valid_view } p \ w1 \ w2 \ c \ k1 \ k2 \iff \text{valid_view_op } p \ w1 \ w2 \ c \ k1 \ k2$

With a way to validate the views we can instantiate the ZKBoo protocol from section 6.1 as a Σ -Protocol in our formalisation by implementing the algorithms from figure 5.1, which can be seen in figure 7.6. **►Assumes existence of decomposition protocol◄**

We then, automatically, by our formalisation of Σ -Protocols get definition of security and only need to prove them ... **►wording◄**

Lemma 7.3.2. ZKBoo satisfy Σ -Protocol completeness definition 5.1.1.

Proof. We start by observing that committing to (w_i, k_i) in init and the verifying the commitment in verify is equivalent to the correctness game for commitment schemes defined in 4.

We therefore inline the completeness game, and replace the calls to the commitment procedures with the correctness game:

```

proc intermediate_main(h : statement, w : witness, e : challenge) = {
  (c, y) = h;
  (x1, x2, x3) = Phi.share(w);
  (k1, k2, k3, w1, w2, w3) = Phi.compute(c, [x1], [x2], [x3]);
  y_i = last 0 w_i;

  valid_com1 = Correctness.main((w_e, k_e));
  valid_com2 = Correctness.main((w_{e+1}, k_{e+1}));
  commit((w_{e+2}, k_{e+2}));
  valid_share1 = valid_view_output y_e w_e;
  valid_share2 = valid_view_output y_{e+1} w_{w+1};
  valid = valid_view_op e w_e w_{e+1} c k_e k_{e+1};

  valid_length = size c = size w_e - 1 /\ size w_e = size w_{e+1};

  return valid_output_shares y y1 y2 y3 /\ valid_com1 /\ valid_com2
    /\ valid_share1 /\ valid_share2 /\ valid /\ valid_length;
}

```

Listing 7.7: Intermediate game for completeness

We then prove the correctness of intermediate_main by showing that the procedure returns true for any $e \in \{1, 2, 3\}$.

Case $e = 1$: For the procedure to return true we need to following to hold:

```

global variables = w1, w2, w3, k1, k2, k3.

proc init(h : statement, w : witness) = {
  (x1, x2, x3) = Share(w);
  (k1, k2, k3, w1, w2, w3) = Decompose(c, x1, x2, x3);
   $c_i = \text{Commit}(w_i, k_i)$ ;
   $y_i = \text{last } 0 \ w_i$ ;
  return (y1, y2, y3, w1, w2, w3);
}

proc response(h : statement, w : witness, m : message, e : challenge)
  = {
  return ( $k_e, w_e, k_{e+1}, w_{e+1}$ )
}

proc verify(h : statement, m : message, e : challenge, z : response)
  = {
  (y1, y2, y3, c1, c2, c3) = m;
  (c, y) = h;

  (k1', w1', k2', w2') = open;
  valid_com1 = verify ( $w'_e, k'_e$ ) c1;
  valid_com2 = verify ( $w'_{e+1}, k'_{e+1}$ ) c2;
  valid_share1 = last 0  $w'_e = y1$ ;
  valid_share2 = last 0  $w'_e = y2$ ;
  valid = valid_view_op 1  $w'_1 \ w'_2 \ c \ k'_1 \ k'_2$ ;
  valid_length = size c = size  $w'_e - 1 \wedge$  size  $w'_1 =$  size  $w'_2$ ;

  return y = y1 + y2 + y3 /\ valid_com1 /\ valid_com2 /\ valid_share1
    /\ valid_share2 /\ valid /\ valid_length
}

```

Listing 7.6: ZKBoo Σ -Protocol instantiation

- All variables must be true
- commit must be lossless such that procedure always terminates
 - commit must be lossless by completeness of commitment scheme
 - formalise this?

The other cases are the same.

□

Lemma 7.3.3. Assuming perfect hiding from definition 4.3.2 then ZKBoo satisfy Special Honest Verifier Zero-knowledge definition 5.1.5

Proof. To prove shvzk we show that running the real and the ideal procedures with the same inputs and identical random choices produces indistinguishable output values. The proof is proceeded by casing on the value of the challenge e . To proof for the different values are identical so we suffice in showing only the case of $e = 1$. When $e = 1$ the two procedures are:

```

proc real(h, w, e) = {
  (x1, x2, x3) = Share(w);
  (k1, k2, k3, w1, w2, w3) =
    compute(c, x1, x2, x3);
   $c_i = \text{Commit}((w_i, k_i));$ 
   $y_i = \text{last } 0 \ w_i;$ 

  a = (y1, y2, y3, c1, c2, c3)
  z = (ke, we, ke+1, we+1)

  if (verify(h, a, e, z)) {
    Some return (a, e, z);
  }
  return None;
}

```

```

proc ideal(h, e) = {
  (* From Decomposition *)
  ( $w_e, w_{e+1}, y_{e+2}$ ) = simulated;

  (* Generate random list of
  shares *)
   $w_{e+2} = \text{dlist dinput (size } w_1);$ 
   $k_{e+2} = \text{dlist dinput (size } k_1);$ 
   $y_e = \text{last } 0 \ w_e;$ 
   $y_{e+1} = \text{last } 0 \ w_{e+1};$ 
   $c_i = \text{commit}((w_i, k_i));$ 
  a = (y1, y2, y3, c1, c2, c3);
  z = (we, we+1);

  if (verify(h, a, e, z)) {
    Some return (a, e, z);
  }
  return None;
}

```

By 2-Privacy of the decomposition we know that compute and simulate are indistinguishable procedures, when the view e_{e+2} produced by compute is never observed. This is fortunately the case here, we when calling the sub-procedure simulate in the ideal case, we know that the properties ensured by the correctness of the decomposition must also hold in the ideal case. This means that the views produced by simulate must also produce views which satisfy the correctness property for the views 7.2.1. This is enough to make the verify procedure return true.

We, therefore, only need to argue that c_{e+2} are identically distributed for both of the procedures. In the real case c_{e+2} is simply committing to the view produces by the decomposition. In the ideal case, however, it is a commitment to a list of random values but due out assumption of perfect hiding these two commitments are identically distributed.

The rest of the out values are indistinguishable by the 2-Privacy property. \square

►Change order so this lemma comes last◄ ►Problem: compute sample random values - tape is complete already in this instance◄

Lemma 7.3.4. Given a commitment scheme, where an adversary can produce three pairs commitments, where at least one pair has different openings with probability p , then ZKBoo satisfy the 3-Special Soundness property with probability p .

Proof. The proof has three distinct steps. First, we show that the inputs z_1, z_2, z_3 to witness_extractor procedure will be valid and consistent openings revealing the views w_1, w_2, w_3 which has been produced by the same call to compute with probability $1 - p$. Next, we show that given views w_1, w_2, w_3 which correspond to three views produced by the same call to compute, then a valid witness can be extracted. Ultimately, we show that Special Soundness game can be won with probability $(1 - p)$

Consistent views To check if the views are valid we use the verify procure, which check that valid_view_op return true. By lemma 7.1.5 we know that this is equivalent to equation 7.4. From this we can define the following procedure for checking validity and consistency of the openings:

```

proc extract_views(h : statement, m : message, z1 z2 z3 : response) =
{
  v1 = verify(h, m, 1, z1);
  v2 = verify(h, m, 2, z2);
  v3 = verify(h, m, 3, z3);

  (w1, w2) = z1;
  (w2', w3) = z2;
  (w3', w1') = z3;
  (y1, y2, y3, c1, c2, c3) = m;
  cons = bind_three(c1, c2, c3, (w1, k1), (w1', k1'), (w2, k2), (w2',
    k2'), (w3, k3), (w3', k3'));

  return v1 /\ v2 /\ v3;
}

```

Listing 7.8: Consistency procedure

Here we are given two potential openings for each view, namely w_e and w'_e . Ideally $w_e = w'_e$ but if it is possible for the adversary to win the binding game for three commitments then the openings might be inconsistent. We therefore let the procedure call bind_three, which returns true if the adversary has broken the binding game. This is bound to a variable cons, which is not returned. This allows us to encode the consistency check as auxiliary information such that the return value of the procedure is still equivalent to only calling verify on the three responses.

From this we can state the following:

Lemma 7.3.5. $\Pr[\text{extract_views}(h, m, z_1, z_2, z_3) : v_1 \wedge v_2 \wedge v_3 \wedge w_i = w'_i] = (1 - \text{binding_prob})$

Proof. Special soundness assumes that all transcripts are accepting, we can therefore conclude that $v_1 \wedge v_2 \wedge v_3$ must hold. We are then left with showing that `bind_three` proves that the views are consistent with probability $(1 - \text{binding_prob})$. This is true by our assumption of Com having binding. \square

Witness extraction Given that all openings correspond to the same call of `compute` and **Valid**(c, w_1, w_2, w_3) we must then show that $w = w_1[0] + w_2[0] + w_3[0] \implies y = \text{eval_circuit}(c, w)$ i.e. the witness is the sum of all the input shares to the parties of the decomposition.

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{eval_circuit}(c, w_1[0] + w_2[0] + w_3[0]) = y \\ \iff & \Pr[\text{eval_circuit}(c, w_1[0] + w_2[0] + w_3[0]) = y] \\ & = \Pr[(w'_1, w'_2, w'_3) \leftarrow \text{compute}(c, w_1[0], w_2[0], w_3[0]); \left(\sum_{i \in \{1,2,3\}} \text{last } w'_i \right) = y] \end{aligned}$$

We then show that we can traverse the computations of the decomposition in reverse:

Lemma 7.3.6. $\Pr[(w'_1, w'_2, w'_3) \leftarrow \text{compute}(c, w_1[0], w_2[0], w_3[0]); (\sum_{i \in \{1,2,3\}} \text{last } w'_i) = y]$

Now, we can it is possible to show that for each iteration of the while-loop in `compute` it must preserve the property that

$$\forall j \in \{1, 2, 3\} \forall 0 \leq i < \text{size } w'_j : w'_j[i] = w_j[i]$$

by **Valid**(c, w_1, w_2, w_3), which asserts that each view has precisely been constructed by the `compute` procedure with the appropriate randomness.

Moreover, we have that $\sum_{i \in \{1,2,3\}} \text{last } w_i = y$ since the transcripts containing the views are accepted by the `verify` procedure, which proves that the witness can be reconstructed if all the views of the decomposition is given.

Special Soundness The soundness game can be restated as the following procedure returning true with probability $1 - p$

```

proc alt_soundness(h, m, z1, z2, z3) = {
  v = consistent_views(h, m, z1, z2, z3);
  w = witness_extractor(h, m, [1;2;3], [z1;z2;z3]);

  if (w = None \/\ !v) {
    return false;
  } else {
    w_get = oget w;
    return R h w_get;
  }
}

```

Lemma 7.3.7. The above procedure has output distribution indistinguishable from the soundness game from definition 5.1.4 instantiated with ZKBoo, i.e. $\Pr[\text{alt_soundness}] = \Pr[\text{soundness}(\text{ZKBoo})]$

```

proc witness_extractor(h : statement, a : message, e : challenge list
, z : response list) = {
  [z1; z2; z3] = z;
  (k1'', w1'', k2'', w2'') = z1;
  (k2', w2', k3'', w3'') = z2;
  (k3', w3', k1', w1') = z3;

  if (k1'' = k1' /\ w1'' = w1' /\ k2'' = k2' /\ w2'' = w2' /\ k3'' =
    k3' /\ w3'' = w3') {
    ret = Some( (first 0 w1') + (first 0 w2') + (first 0 w3') );
  } else {
    ret = None;
  }
  return ret;
}

```

Listing 7.9: ZKBoo witness extractor

Proof. By inlining all sub-procedure calls from both procedures we have equivalent calls to `verify` and `witness_extractor`. The only differences between the two procedures is that `consistent_views` call the binding game, but the value from the binding game is never returned, so it does not affect the output distribution. \square

We can then show conclude the proof of the main lemma by applying lemma 7.3.7. From this we need to show: $\Pr[\text{alt_soundness} : \text{true}] = (1 - \text{binding_prob})$. Which follows from applying lemma 7.3.5 and 7.3.6. \square

► Formal verification does not tell us about efficiency ◀

Conclusion In this chapter we have seen how to apply our formalisations of Σ -Protocols and commitment schemes to a MPC based protocol...

Formal proofs like these can help us gain insight into the security of the protocols. The security of the ZKBoo protocol is entirely dependent on the security properties of the underlying decomposition and commitment scheme being state properly. For example, if the decomposition does not ensure that all the shares in the views has been produced according to the decomposition algorithm, then ZKBoo offers no guarantee about

Moreover, they help us expose some of the more subtle details important for proving security of cryptographic protocols, like requiring certain procedures to be lossless since...

Chapter 8

Reflections and Conclusion

8.1 Related Work

Sigma protocols has been done in a lesser extend in EasyCrypt. Much of the same work has been done in Isabelle/CryptHOL by Butler et al..

Barthe et al. formalised Σ -Protocols within CertiCrypt, and proved the security of the Σ^ϕ -Protocol, which proves knowledge of the pre-image of a group homomorphism. ZKBoo protocol described in section 6.1 and the Σ^ϕ -Protocol prove knowledge of the same relation, but ZKBoo has reduced proof size? **►Examine differences◄**.

phi assumes the group homomorphism to be special?

►Differences between the works◄

Commitment schemes has been formalized in EasyCrypt by Metere and Dong.

►Differences between the works◄

formalised general zero knowledge compilers have been explored, with some notable work by Almeida et al. and PINOCCIO.

►Differences between the works◄

8.2 Discussion

►How has EC been to work with◄ ►What is the future for cryptographers using EC◄ ►Possible code extraction?◄

8.3 Future work

Thesis has created a workable formalisation, as show by the formalisation of ZKBoo. ZKBoo can be improved to make it more applicable in real applications **►Cite ZKBoo+ paper◄**

- Explore rewinding in EC
- Other Zero-knowledge protocols
- Expand the toolchain
 - Prove list representation equiv to graph

- Conversion from function to circuit (Metaprogramming?) ASTs not available? I/O not possible
- Proposed standard zk interfaces?

8.4 Conclusion

►conclude on the problem statement from the introduction◀

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