



Stationary Equilibrium

Mini-Course: Heterogenous Agent Macro

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Introduction

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2. No interactions (only passive distribution)

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 1. What determines income and wealth inequality?
 2. What determines the real interest rate?

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 1. What determines income and wealth inequality?
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- **Code:** Based on the **GEModelTools** package
 1. Is in active development
 2. You can help to improve interface, find bugs and suggest features

Documentation: See **GEModelToolsNotebooks**

Original package: **SSJ** + **courses** (*more complicated back-end*)

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- **Literature:** Aiyagari (1994)

1. Introduction
2. Ramsey-recap
3. HANC
4. Stationary Equilibrium
5. Code
6. Calibration
7. HANC-Gov
8. Summary

Ramsey-recap

Ramsey: Firms

- **Production function:** $Y_t = F(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t)$ [note timing of capital]
where Γ_t is technology
- **Profits:** $\Pi_t = Y_t - w_t L_t - r_t^K K_{t-1}$
- **Profit maximization:** $\max_{K_{t-1}, L_t} \Pi_t$
 1. Rental rate: $\frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial K_{t-1}} = 0 \Leftrightarrow r_t^K = F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t)$
 2. Real wage: $\frac{\partial \Pi_t}{\partial L_t} = 0 \Leftrightarrow w_t = F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t)$

Zero profits: $\Pi_t = 0 \Rightarrow$

$$Y_t = w_t L_t + r_t^K K_{t-1} \text{ [functional income distribution]}$$

Ramsey: Zero-profit mutual fund

- Owns all capital
- Capital depreciate with rate $\delta \in (0, 1)$,

$$K_t = (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + I_t$$

- Deposits (from households), A_{t-1} : The rate of return is

$$r_t = r_t^K - \delta$$

- Balance sheet:

$$A_{t-1} = K_{t-1}$$

- **Utility maximization:**

$$v_0(A_{-1}^{hh}) = \max_{\{C_t^{hh}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(C_t^{hh})$$

s.t.

$$A_t^{hh} = (1 + r_t)A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh} - C_t^{hh}$$

Exogenous labor supply: $L_t^{hh} = 1$

- **Euler-equation** (implied by Lagrangian):

$$u'(C_t^{hh}) = \beta(1 + r_{t+1})u'(C_{t+1}^{hh})$$

Ramsey: Market Clearing

- **Capital market:** $K_t = A_t = A_t^{hh}$

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- **Capital market:** $K_t = A_t = A_t^{hh}$
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- **Goods market:** $Y_t = C_t^{hh} + I_t$
- **Walras:** Capital and labor market clears \Rightarrow goods market clears

$$\begin{aligned}C_t^{hh} + I_t &= [(1 + r_t)A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh} - A_t^{hh}] + (K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}) \\&= [(1 + r_t)K_{t-1} + w_t L_t - K_t] + (K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}) \\&= r_t^K K_{t-1} + w_t L_t \\&= Y_t\end{aligned}$$

- **Simplified form:**

$$\begin{aligned}u'(C_t^{hh}) &= \beta(1 + F_K(\Gamma_t, K_t, 1) - \delta)u'(C_{t+1}^{hh}) \\K_t &= (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + F(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, 1) - C_t^{hh}\end{aligned}$$

- **Simplified form:**

$$u'(C_t^{hh}) = \beta(1 + F_K(\Gamma_t, K_t, 1) - \delta)u'(C_{t+1}^{hh})$$

$$K_t = (1 - \delta)K_{t-1} + F(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, 1) - C_t^{hh}$$

- **Extended form:**

$$r_t^K = F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t)$$

$$w_t = F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t)$$

$$r_t = r_t^K - \delta$$

$$A_t = K_t$$

$$A_t^{hh} = (1 + r_t)A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh} - C_t^{hh}$$

$$u'(C_t^{hh}) = \beta(1 + r_{t+1})u'(C_{t+1}^{hh})$$

$$A_t = A_t^{hh}$$

$$L_t = L_t^{hh}$$

Ramsey: As an equation system

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_t^K - F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ w_t - F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ r_t - (r_t^K - \delta) \\ A_t - K_t \\ A_t^{hh} - ((1 + r_t)A_{t-1}^{hh} + w_t L_t^{hh} - C_t^{hh}) \\ u'(C_t^{hh}) - \beta(1 + r_{t+1})u'(C_{t+1}^{hh}) \\ A_t - A_t^{hh} \\ L_t - L_t^{hh} \\ \forall t \in \{0, 1, \dots\}, \text{ given } K_{-1} \end{bmatrix} = 0$$

Note I: There is *perfect foresight*.

Note II: This is the so-called *sequence-space* formulation.

Ramsey: Steady state

- **Euler-equation** can be solved for K_{ss} :

$$u'(C_{ss}) = \beta(1 + F_K(\Gamma_{ss}, K_{ss}, 1) - \delta)u'(C_{ss}) \Leftrightarrow$$
$$F_K(K_{ss}, 1) = \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta$$

- **Accumulation equation** then implies C_{ss} :

$$K_{ss} = (1 - \delta)K_{ss} + F(\Gamma_{ss}, K_{ss}, 1) - C_{ss} \Leftrightarrow$$
$$C_{ss} = (1 - \delta)K_{ss} + F(\Gamma_{ss}, K_{ss}, 1) - K_{ss}$$

HANC



- **Model blocks:**

1. **Firms:** Rent capital from mutual fund and hire labor from the households, produce with given technology, and sell output goods
2. **Mutual funds:** Own capital and rent it to firms, take deposits and pay return to household
3. **Households:** Face idiosyncratic productivity shocks, supplies labor exogenously and makes consumption-saving decisions
4. **Markets:** Perfect competition in labor, goods and capital markets

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3. The Standard Incomplete Markets (SIM) model

Heterogeneous households

- **Utility maximization** for household i :

$$v_0(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = \max_{\{c_{it}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_i^t u(c_{it})$$

s.t.

$$\ell_{it} = \phi_i z_{it}, \quad \mathbb{E}[\phi_i] = 1$$

$$a_{it} = (1 + r_t) a_{it-1} + w_t \ell_{it} - c_{it} + \Pi_t$$

$$\log z_{it+1} = \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1}, \quad \psi_{it} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_\psi, \sigma_\psi), \quad \mathbb{E}[z_{it}] = 1$$

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- **Incomplete markets due to borrowing constraint**

(fancy words: partial self-insurance, lack of Arrow-Debreu securities)

Recursive formulation

- **Value function** (at decision)

$$v_t(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = \max_{c_t} u(c_t) + \beta \underline{v}_{t+1}(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it})$$

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- **Beginning-of-period value function** (before shock realization):

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- **Envelop-condition:**

$$\underline{v}_{a,t}(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it-1}, a_{it-1}) \equiv \frac{\partial \underline{v}_t}{\partial a_{it-1}} = \mathbb{E} [(1 + r_t)u'(c_{it}) \mid \beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it-1}, a_{it-1}]$$

Proof: Using *variation argument* (see previous lecture)

Euler-equation:

$$\begin{aligned}c_{it}^{-\sigma} &= \beta_i v_{a,t+1}(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it}) \\&= \beta_i \mathbb{E}_t [v_{a,t+1}(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it+1}, a_{it})] \\&= \beta_i (1 + r_{t+1}) \mathbb{E}_t [u'(c_{it+1})] \\&= \beta_i (1 + r_{t+1}) q(z_{it}, a_{it})\end{aligned}$$

where q is the *post-decision marginal value of cash*

Distributions and aggregates

- **Policy functions:** Aggregate prices are hidden as inputs, i.e.

$$x_t^*(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = x^*(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}, \{r_\tau, w_\tau, \Pi_\tau\}_{\tau \geq t}) \text{ for } x \in \{a, \ell, c\}$$

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- **Distributions** (vector of probabilities):

1. Beginning-of-period: \underline{D}_t over $\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it-1}$ and a_{it-1}

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3. Savings transition: $\underline{D}_{t+1} = \Lambda'_t D_t$ where again

$$\Lambda_t = \Lambda(\{r_\tau, w_\tau, \Pi_\tau\}_{\tau \geq t})$$

Interpretation: »The aggregate policy function«

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Interpretation: »The aggregate policy function«

- **Aggregate consumption and savings:**

$$X_t^{hh} = \int x_t^*(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) dD_t = X^{hh}(\{r_\tau, w_\tau, \Pi_\tau\}_{\tau=0}^t, \underline{D}_0) \text{ for } x \in \{a, \ell, c\}$$

Equation system

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_t^K - F_K(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ w_t - F_L(\Gamma_t, K_{t-1}, L_t) \\ r_t - (r_t^K - \delta) \\ A_t - K_t \\ \underline{D}_t - \Pi'_z \underline{D}_t \\ \underline{D}_{t+1} - \Lambda'_t \underline{D}_t \\ A_t - A_t^{hh} \\ L_t - L_t^{hh} \\ \forall t \in \{0, 1, \dots\}, \text{ given } \underline{D}_0 \end{bmatrix} = 0$$

where $K_{-1} = \int a_{it-1} d\underline{D}_0$

1. **Perfect foresight** wrt. aggregate variables
2. **Stationary equilibrium:** Time-constant solution.
3. **Transition path:** Time-varying solution due to e.g. initial conditions or temporary deviations of exogenous variables.

- **Must be solved *numerically*:**
- **Household problem:** $u(c_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$
 1. Discretize and evaluate with interpolation
 2. Make recursion until convergence
- **Transition path:**
 1. Find the stationary equilibrium
 2. Find Jacobian around stationary equilibrium (*later*)
 3. Solve using quasi-Newton solver (*later*)

Solution of household problem

- **Solve:** Separately for each β_i , ϕ_i and z_{it}

1. Find solution from FOC for each \tilde{a}_{it} in exogenous grid

$$\tilde{c}_{it}^{-\sigma} = \beta_i \underline{v}_{a,t+1}(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, \tilde{a}_{it}) \Leftrightarrow \tilde{c}_{it} = \left(\beta_i \underline{v}_{a,t+1}(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, \tilde{a}_{it}) \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

2. Calculate endogenous grid $\tilde{m}_{it} = \tilde{a}_{it} + \tilde{c}_{it}$
3. Interpolate at $m_{it} = (1 + r_t)a_{it-1} + w_t\phi_i z_{it} + \Pi_t$ to get optimal a_{it}
4. Enforce constraint by $a_{it} = \max\{a_{it}, 0\}$
5. Consumption is $c_{it} = m_{it} - a_{it}$

- **Expection:**

$$\underline{v}_{a,t}(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it-1}, a_{it-1}) = \sum_{i_z=0}^{\#z-1} \pi_{i_z-, i_z} (1 + r_t) c_{it}^{-\rho}$$

Market clearing

- **Capital market:** $K_t = A_t = \int a_t^*(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_t$
- **Labor market:** $L_t = \int \ell_t^*(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_t = \int \phi_i z_{it} d\mathbf{D}_t = 1$
- **Goods market:** $Y_t = C_t^{hh} + I_t$
- **Walras:** Capital and labor market clears \Rightarrow goods market clears

$$\begin{aligned} C_t^{hh} + I_t &= \int c_{it}^* d\mathbf{D}_t + [K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}] \\ &= \int [(1 + r_t)a_{it-1} + w_t\phi_i z_{it} - a_{it}] d\mathbf{D}_t \\ &= [(1 + r_t)K_{t-1} + w_t L_t - K_t] + [K_t - (1 - \delta)K_{t-1}] \\ &= r_t^K K_{t-1} + w_t L_t \\ &= Y_t \end{aligned}$$

Numerical histogram simulation

- **Initial distribution:** Choose $\underline{D}_0(z_{-1}, a_{-1})$, which is defined on $\mathcal{G}_z \times \mathcal{G}_a$ and sum to 1 \equiv *histogram*

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Implementation

- **Toy example:** simple_histogram_simulation.xlsx
 - **Grids:** $\mathcal{G}_z = \{\underline{z}, \bar{z}\}$ and $\mathcal{G}_a = \{0, 1\}$
 - **Transition matrix:** $\pi_{0,0} = \pi_{1,1} = 0.5$
 - **Policy function:**
 - Low income: $a^*(\underline{z}, 0) = a^*(\underline{z}, 1) = 0$
 - High income: Let $a^*(\bar{z}, 0) = 0.5$ and $a^*(\bar{z}, 1) = 1$
 - **Initial distribution:** $\underline{D}_0(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } z_{it} = \underline{z} \text{ and } a_{it} = 0 \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$
 - **Task:** Calculate by hand the transitions to

$$\underline{D}_0, \underline{D}_1, \underline{D}_1, \dots$$

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- **Comparison with Monte Carlo:** See ConSavModel/

1. **Pro:** Computationally efficient and no randomness
2. **Con:** Introduces a non-continuous distribution

Side-note: Matrix formulation

- The histogram method can be written in **matrix form**:

$$\underline{D}_t = \Pi'_z \underline{D}_t$$
$$\underline{D}_{t+1} = \Lambda'_t \underline{D}_t$$

where

\underline{D}_t is vector of length $\#_z \times \#_a$

D_t is vector of length $\#_z \times \#_a$

Π'_z is derived from the π_{i_z-, i_z} 's

Λ'_t is derived from the ι 's and ω 's

- **Further details:** Young (2010), Tan (2020), Ocampo and Robinson (2024), Bayer et. al. (2024)
- **Notebook:** ConSavModel/Extra. The matrix formulation.ipynb

Stationary Equilibrium

Stationary equilibrium - equation system

The **stationary equilibrium** satisfies

$$\begin{bmatrix} r_{ss}^K - F_K(\Gamma_{ss}, K_{ss}, L_{ss}) \\ w_{ss} - F_L(\Gamma_{ss}, K_{ss}, L_{ss}) \\ r_{ss} - (r_{ss}^K - \delta) \\ A_{ss} - K_{ss} \\ \underline{D}_{ss} - \Pi'_z \underline{D}_{ss} \\ \underline{D}_{ss} - \Lambda'_{ss} \underline{D}_{ss} \\ A_{ss} - A_{ss}^{hh} \\ L_{ss} - L_{ss}^{hh} \end{bmatrix} = 0$$

Note I: Households still move around »inside« the distribution due to idiosyncratic shocks

Note II: Steady state for aggregates (quantities and prices) and the distribution as such

Stationary equilibrium - more verbal definition

For a given Γ_{ss}

1. Quantities K_{ss} and L_{ss} ,
2. prices r_{ss} and w_{ss} (always $\Pi_{ss} = 0$),
3. the distribution \mathbf{D}_{ss} over β_i , ϕ_i , z_{it} and a_{it-1}
4. and the policy functions a_{ss}^* , ℓ_{ss}^* and c_{ss}^*

are such that

1. Household maximize expected utility (policy functions)
2. Firms maximize profits (prices)
3. \mathbf{D}_{ss} is the invariant distribution implied by the household problem
4. Mutual fund balance sheet is satisfied
5. The capital market clears
6. The labor market clears
7. The goods market clears

Technology: $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}$

Root-finding problem in K_{ss} with the objective function:

1. Set $L_{ss} = 1$ (and $\Pi_{ss} = 0$)
2. Calculate $r_{ss} = \alpha \Gamma_{ss} (K_{ss})^{\alpha-1} - \delta$ and $w_{ss} = (1 - \alpha) \Gamma_{ss} (K_{ss})^\alpha$
3. Solve infinite horizon household problem *backwards*, i.e. find a_{ss}^*
4. Simulate households *forwards* until convergence, i.e. find \mathbf{D}_{ss}
5. Return $K_{ss} - \int a_{ss}^*(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_{ss}$

Direct implementation (alternative)

Technology: $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}$

Root-finding problem in r_{ss} with the objective function:

1. Set $L_{ss} = 1$ (and $\Pi_{ss} = 0$)
2. Calculate $K_{ss} = \left(\frac{r_{ss} + \delta}{\alpha \Gamma_{ss}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}$ and $w_{ss} = (1 - \alpha) \Gamma_{ss} (K_{ss})^\alpha$
3. Solve infinite horizon household problem *backwards*, i.e. find \mathbf{a}_{ss}^*
4. Simulate households *forwards* until convergence, i.e. find \mathbf{D}_{ss}
5. Return $K_{ss} - \int \mathbf{a}_{ss}^*(\beta_i, \phi_i, \mathbf{z}_{it}, \mathbf{a}_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_{ss}$

Indirect implementation

Technology: $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}$

Consider Γ_{ss} and δ as »free« parameters:

1. Choose r_{ss} and w_{ss}
2. Solve infinite horizon household problem *backwards*, i.e. find \mathbf{a}_{ss}^*
3. Simulate households *forwards* until convergence, i.e. find \mathbf{D}_{ss}
4. Set $K_{ss} = \int \mathbf{a}_{ss}^*(\beta_i, \phi_i, z_{it}, a_{it-1}) d\mathbf{D}_{ss}$
5. Set $L_{ss} = 1$ (and $\Pi_{ss} = 0$)
6. Set $\Gamma_{ss} = \frac{w_{ss}}{(1-\alpha)(K_{ss})^\alpha}$
7. Set $r_{ss}^K = \alpha \Gamma_{ss} (K_{ss})^{\alpha-1}$
8. Set $\delta = r_{ss}^k - r_{ss}$

Code

- **Preferences:** $u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$
 1. Discount factors: $\beta \in \{0.965, 0.975, 0.985\}$ in equal pop. shares
 2. Abilities: $\phi = 1$
 3. Relative risk aversion: $\sigma = 2$
- **Income:**
 1. AR(1): $\rho_z = 0.95$
 2. Std.: $\sigma_\psi = 0.30\sqrt{(1 - \rho_z^2)}$
- **Technology:** $F(K, L) = \Gamma K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}$
 1. Capital share: $\alpha = 0.36$
 2. TFP: $\Gamma_{ss} = 1.082$
 3. Depreciation: $\delta = 0.193$
- **Steady state:**
 1. Prices: $r_{ss} = 0.01$ and $w_{ss} = 1$
 2. Quantities: $K_{ss}/Y_{ss} = 1.776$

- **Notebook:** HANC/HANC.ipynb in github.com/NumEconCopenhagen/GEModelToolsNotebooks
- **Used packages:**
 1. EconModel: github.com/NumEconCopenhagen/EconModel
 2. ConSav: github.com/NumEconCopenhagen/ConsumptionSaving
 3. GEModelTools: github.com/NumEconCopenhagen/GEModelTools


Consumption function

- Euler-equation still necessary for $a_{it} > 0$:





$$c_{it}^{-\sigma} = \beta_i(1 + r_{t+1})\mathbb{E}_t [c_{it+1}^{-\sigma}]$$

- Precautionary saving:

1. Low consumption for low cash-on-hand \rightarrow *buffer-stock target*
2. Steep slope for low cash-on-hand \rightarrow *high MPC*




Low vs. high β_i



Distribution, D_t

- **Productivity:** Marginal distribution over only z_{it}
- **Savings:** Marginal distribution over a_{it} cond. on β_i



- **Drivers of wealth inequality:**
 1. Stochastic income
 2. Heterogeneous patience \rightarrow savings behavior

Steady state interest rate

- **Representative agent / complete markets:**

Derived from aggregate Euler-equation

$$C_t^{-\sigma} = \beta(1 + r_{t+1})C_{t+1}^{-\sigma} \Rightarrow C_{ss}^{-\sigma} = \beta(1 + r_{ss})C_{ss}^{-\sigma} \Leftrightarrow \beta = \frac{1}{1 + r_{ss}}$$

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- **Heterogeneous agents:** *No such equation exists*

1. Euler-equation replaced by asset market clearing condition
2. Idiosyncratic income risk affects the steady state interest rate

σ_ψ	PE ($r_{ss} = 1\%$), A^{hh}	GE, r_{ss}	GE, A^{hh}
0.09	2.78	1.00%	2.78
0.14	7.39	0.12%	2.97
0.19	13.68	-1.11%	3.30

Partial Equilibrium: Same interest rate.

General Equilibrium: Capital+labor market clearing.

Wealth inequality

- **Paper:** Hubmer et. al. (2021)
- **Central observation:** Wealth inequality $>$ income inequality
- **Drivers:**
 1. Heterogeneous ability?
 2. Heterogeneous patience?
 3. Income risk?
 4. Heterogeneous returns? (incl. entrepreneurship)
- **Notebook:** $\phi_i \in \{0.5, 1, 1.5\}$ with equal shares
- **Discussion:** Is non-homothetic preferences needed for right tail of the wealth distribution? Why do the rich not dis-save?

Calibration

How to choose parameters?

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 1. **Informal:** Roughly match targets by hand
 2. **Formal:**
 - 2a. Solve root-finding problem
 - 2b. Minimize a squared loss function
 3. **Estimation:** Formal with squared loss function + standard errors

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 3. **Estimation:** Formal with squared loss function + standard errors
- **Complication:** *We must always solve for the steady state for each guess of the parameters to be calibrated*

HANC-Gov

Endowment model with government

- **No production.** No physical savings instrument
- **Households:** Get stochastic endowment z_{it} of consumption good
- **Government:**
 1. Choose government spending
 2. Collect taxes, τ_t , proportional to endowment
 3. Bonds: Pays 1 consumption good next period. Price is $p_t^B < 1$

$$p_t^B B_t = B_{t-1} + G_t - \int \tau_t z_{it} d\mathbf{D}_t$$
$$\tau_t = \tau_{ss} + \eta_t + \varphi (B_{t-1} - B_{ss})$$

where η_t is a tax-shifter

- **Market clearing:**

$$B_t = A_t^{hh}$$
$$C_t^{hh} + G_t = \int z_{it} d\mathbf{D}_t = 1$$

Households:

$$\begin{aligned} v_t(z_{it}, a_{it-1}) &= \max_{c_{it}} \frac{c_{it}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t [v_{it+1}(z_{it+1}, a_{it})] \\ \text{s.t. } p_t^B a_{it} + c_{it} &= a_{it-1} + (1 - \tau_t) z_{it} \geq 0 \\ \log z_{it+1} &= \rho_z \log z_{it} + \psi_{it+1}, \psi_{it} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_\psi, \sigma_\psi), \mathbb{E}[z_{it}] = 1 \end{aligned}$$

Euler-equation:

$$c_{it}^{-\sigma} = \beta \frac{v_{a,t+1}(z_{it}, a_{it})}{p_t^B}$$

Envelope condition:

$$v_{a,t}(z_{it-1}, a_{it-1}) = c_{it}^{-\sigma}$$

Questions

1. **Define the stationary equilibrium**
2. **Solve and simulate the household problem**
with $p_{ss}^B = 0.975$ and $\tau_{ss} = 0.12$.
3. **Find the stationary equilibrium**
with $G_{ss} = 0.10$ and $\tau_{ss} = 0.12$.
4. **What happens for $\tau_{ss} \in (0.11, 0.15)$?**
5. **When is average household utility maximized?**

Summary

Summary and what's next

- **This lecture:**

1. The concept of a stationary equilibrium
2. Direction and indirect solution for stationary equilibrium
3. Histogram simulation method
4. Precautionary saving and equilibrium interest rate
5. Drivers of wealth income $>$ income inequality
6. Calibration
7. (Maximizing social welfare)
8. Introduction to the **GEModelTools** package

- **Next:** *Transitional dynamics*

- **You should:**

1. Study the code from this lecture
2. Read documentation for GEModelTools
3. Glance at Auclert et. al. (2021)