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
# Closing Note

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# Where I am coming from ...

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*Ég geng i hring  
i kringum allt, sem er.  
Og utan þessa hrings  
er veröld mín.*



# NordSec 2013

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- The 18th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems will take place at the Arctic Hotel in Ilulissat, Greenland, from 18th to 21st October 2013.
- <http://nordsec2013.imm.dtu.dk/>

# Starting point – Computer security

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The problem arises from a combination of factors that includes: the extension of resource sharing concepts to networks of computers; and the slowly growing recognition of security inadequacies of currently available computer systems.

[Anderson Report, 1972]

# Thesis 1

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- The problem is not “the emergence of complex resource sharing computer systems” but the inability to talk about such systems.
- We must use language fit for discussing the phenomena we want to investigate.

# The meaning of words

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When I use a word, it means just what  
I choose it to mean — neither more  
nor less.

~~Humpty Dumpty~~  
Wittgenstein

# CERT Advisory CA-2000-02

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- Malicious HTML Tags Embedded in Client Web Requests
  - What makes a tag malicious?
- Because one source is injecting code into pages sent by another source, this vulnerability has also been described as “cross-site” scripting.
  - Can we have XSS without scripts??

# Understanding an attack

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- Via the method by which it is executed?
  - E.g. code injection
- Via the violation of a security property within the system?
  - E.g. elevation of privilege
- Via the violation of a security property of the application?
  - E.g. cookie stealing in violation of SOP

# Thesis 2

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XSS is an access control problem.

# Access Control

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- There exists a language (conceptual framework) for discussing access control since the 1980s (at the latest).
- There are principals, subjects, objects, access operations (access rights), and reference monitors.

# Subjects and principals

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- A **principal** is an entity that can be **granted access** to objects or can make statements affecting access control decisions [aka delegation].
- **Subjects** operate on behalf of **principals**; access is based on the principal's name bound to the subject in some unforgeable manner at authentication time.  
[M. Gasser et al.: The Digital Distributed System Security Architecture, NCSC 1989]
- “Subjects speak for principals.”

# Once upon a time ...

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- Principal names [had to] be globally unique, human-readable and memorable, easily and reliably associated with known people.
- So called identity-based access control or – better – user-centric access control.
- Life was simple: policy owner = policy enforcer = resource owner

# ... but times are changing

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- Applications are becoming the new principals!
- Principals need to have names so that policies can refer to them.
  - How to name an application? Unique names?
- Access requests need to be authenticated.
  - Which principal is a subject speaking for? CSP!
- Principals need to be authorized.
  - CORS?

# Mad New World

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- Whose interests are captured by the policy?
- Why does the browser “trust” the policy received?
- Why does the server “trust” that the policy is enforced?

# Security model for applications

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- If applications are the new principals, what are the new subjects?
  - Units of computation bound to a principal in some unforgeable manner at authentication (?) time.
  
- The title of W3C Draft [Runtime and Security Model for Web Applications](#) is promising.
  - The security model will have to go beyond an interface standard to meet its promise.

# Closing Note

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- Roger Needham:  
Internet times; the wheel of reincarnation is spinning faster.
- Let's spin the wheel.



qujanaq