




BUT WAIT, THERE'S MORE!



Threats

- External attacker impersonating user to access app
- External attacker modifying saved information
- External attacker intercepting traffic to modify information
- External attackers linking footage to real identity

Threats

- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage infrastructure
- External attacker launching DoS against cloud storage itself
- External attacker gained admin rights to code repository
- External attacker gaining admin rights to cloud storage

Threats

- External attacker impersonating staff to access code repository
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- Also consider compliance with legislation

REMEMBER! BASIC THREAT MODELLING

- ▶ Hacked together from Microsoft's STRIDE threat modelling approach
- ▶ Three questions:
 - ▶ What are you building?
 - ▶ What can go wrong?
- ▶ **What are you going to do about it?**




What are you going to do about it Sharon?



WELL PLAYED, SHARON.

WELL PLAYED



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
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STRIDE – SPOOFING

- ▶ Someone impersonating a user to access data on phone, code repository, cloud storage
 - ▶ Credentials hashed with secure algorithm
 - ▶ Two factor authentication on code repository and cloud storage
 - ▶ IP whitelisting to access code repository and cloud storage if possible
 - ▶ Access Control Policy
 - ▶ Accounts are tied to identity
 - ▶ Permission only given if the user needs it
 - ▶ Accounts are revoked when user leaves
 - ▶ Accounts regularly audited
 - ▶ Someone is responsible for all this







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- Access Control Policy
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

STRIDE – TAMPERING

- ▶ Data being modified on the phone, cloud storage, anywhere in between
 - ▶ File integrity by matching hashes of files at different stages
- ▶ Tampering with source code or logs
 - ▶ Log all actions of users
 - ▶ State in employee contracts what is unacceptable so they have no recourse
 - ▶ Forward logs to centralised, hardened log server with strong access control





- Access Control Policy
-
-
-



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


- Access Control Policy
- Employee contracts
-
-




ADS
Security forces
Criminal org

Trust boundary Lv. 1



- Hash creds
-



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STRIDE - REPUDIATION

- ▶ Someone claims the footage is false or of someone else
 - ▶ Other than a forensic chain of custody we can't do much about that
- ▶ For your app could someone perform an action and claim it wasn't them?





STRIDE –INFORMATION DISCLOSURE

- ▶ Footage is tied to particular users
 - ▶ Policy to review footage with lawyers before being submitted as evidence
 - ▶ Remove metadata so footage can be posted online anonymously
 - ▶ Need further controls once done a deep dive





- Access Control Policy
- Employee contracts
-
-



Threats


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
STRIDE – DENIAL OF SERVICE

- ▶ DDoS attack against the cloud storage (however that may be)
 - ▶ Employ DDoS mitigation services like Cloudflare
 - ▶ Cap how much footage a user can upload





- Access Control Policy
- Employee contracts
- Review footage before release
-



Threats


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STRIDE – ELEVATION OF PRIVILEGES

- ▶ Someone gaining administrator rights to the code repository or cloud storage
 - ▶ Log all actions by users
 - ▶ Flag multiple people of new admins being created
 - ▶ Flag multiple people of admins performing anomalous behaviour like logging in outside of work hours.

