



# Orderly Protocol – Contracts

NEAR Smart Contract Security  
Audit

Prepared by: Halborn

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# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW



## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Orderly Protocol engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their smart contracts beginning on May 30th, 2022 and ending on June 16th, 2022 . The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository [Orderly Protocol](#), commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

## 1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided two weeks for the engagement and assigned two full-time security engineers to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineers are blockchain and smart-contract security experts with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by Orderly Protocol . The main ones are the following:

- Enforced `fee_collector` checks on each function that leads to account creation process
- Users withdrawal are released after certain period of time if the operator is idle
- Improved ownership transfer process has been introduced
- A check has been implemented to prevent accounts to have multiple privileged roles at once
- Improved validation of trade pairs has been introduced to avoid e. g. overwriting old pairs or adding malicious pairs.



## 1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
- Smart contract manual code review and walk-through to identify any logic issue.
- Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could led to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.
- Finding unsafe Rust code usage (`cargo-geiger`)
- Test coverage review (`cargo tarpaulin`).
- On chain testing of core functions(`near-cli`, `NEAR-API-JS`)
- Deployment of Smart Contracts (`kurtosis`, `near localnet`)
- Scanning of Rust dependencies for known vulnerabilities (`cargo audit`).

### RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk

level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

#### RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

#### RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

- 10 - CRITICAL
- 9 - 8 - HIGH
- 7 - 6 - MEDIUM
- 5 - 4 - LOW
- 3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

## 1.4 SCOPE

Code repository: <https://gitlab.com/orderly-network/protocol>

### 1. NEAR Orderly Protocol Smart Contract

(a) Commit ID: [df1e384d9854905415bd203087820a624abde4071](#)

(b) Contracts in scope:

- contract\_utils.rs
- contract.rs
- event.rs
- lib.rs
- operator.rs
- owner.rs
- tests.rs
- token\_balance.rs
- types.rs

Out-of-scope: External libraries and financial related attacks.

## 2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	2	4	1	2

### LIKELIHOOD

IMPACT

	(HAL-05) (HAL-06)			
(HAL-07)	(HAL-04)	(HAL-03)	(HAL-01)	
				(HAL-02)
(HAL-08) (HAL-09)				

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
HAL01 - FEE COLLECTOR COULD BE REGISTERED AS USER	High	SOLVED - 20/09/2022
HAL02 - USERS CANNOT RETRIEVE THEIR FUNDS WITHOUT OPERATOR'S APPROVAL	High	SOLVED - 20/09/2022
HAL03 - WEAK PRIVILEGE SEPARATION	Medium	SOLVED - 20/09/2022
HAL04 - PRIVILEGED ADDRESS CAN BE TRANSFERRED WITHOUT CONFIRMATION	Medium	SOLVED - 20/09/2022
HAL05 - INSECURE PAIRS MANAGEMENT LOGIC	Medium	SOLVED - 20/09/2022
HAL06 - EXCESSIVELY CENTRALIZED FEATURES	Medium	SOLVED - 20/09/2022
HAL07 - MISSING AUTHORIZATION CHECK	Low	SOLVED - 20/09/2022
HAL08 - REDUNDANT CODE	Informational	SOLVED - 20/09/2022
HAL09 - OPERATOR KEY IS NOT DELETED ON OPERATOR CHANGE	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED



# FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



### 3.1 (HAL-01) FEE COLLECTOR COULD BE REGISTERED AS USER - HIGH

#### Description:

The `create_user_account` successfully enforces multiple restrictions on newly created user, such as not being the `fee_collector` and the caller being the signer of the transaction. However, this restriction could be bypassed, as the `user_deposit_token` function will add any depositor to the `users` list just by checking that they are not already part of it.

In this way, the `fee_collector` could sign itself as a user just by depositing through the `user_deposit_native_token` function.

In order to create a user who is a `fee_collector` in the same time, one has to:

- create a legitimate `fee_collector`, and then
- perform a deposit to have an account created

Below snippet shows the code responsible for the issue:

#### Code Location:

Listing 1: `src/contract.rs` (Line 408)

```
408 #[payable]
409 pub fn user_deposit_native_token(&mut self) {
410     let user = env::predecessor_account_id();
411     let amount = env::attached_deposit();
412     self.user_deposit_token(user, NATIVE_TOKEN.parse().unwrap(),
413         ↳ amount);
414 }
415 fn user_deposit_token(&mut self, user: AccountId, token: AccountId
416     ↳ , amount: u128) {
417     if amount == 0 {
418         // don't bother creating useless state and emitting
```

```
↳ unnecessary event
418         return;
419     }
420
421     if !self.users.contains(&user) {
422         self.users.insert(&user);
423         Self::emit_event(Event::CreateUserAccount(user.clone()));
424     }
425
```

#### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 4**

**Impact - 4**

#### Recommendation:

Modify the `user_deposit_token` function, so it calls `create_user_account` for users that are not already registered instead of adding them directly to the list.

#### Remediation plan:

**SOLVED:** The issue was solved in commit [11a5ae159463086741141083ae86e30e80fad69a](#) by adding another check if the user about to be added is not already a fee collector.



## 3.2 (HAL-02) USERS CANNOT RETRIEVE THEIR FUNDS WITHOUT OPERATOR'S APPROVAL - HIGH

### Description:

The architecture of `asset-manager` allows for user withdrawals only if they are requested by users and approved by `operator_manager`. However, there is no possibility for users to retrieve their funds if the operator do not approve the withdrawal request.

This might lead to disallowing users to reclaim their funds against their will in some situations. The withdrawal process is as follows:

- user create withdraw request
- the request is either approved and funds are released,
- or the withdrawal is performed by operator and in such case it can't exceed requested amount

### Code Location:

Listing 2: `src/contract.rs` (Lines 139,140)

```

112 pub fn user_request_withdraw(&mut self, token: AccountId, amount:
    ↳ U128) {
113     let amount = amount.0;
114     let user = env::predecessor_account_id();
115
116     if amount == 0 {
117         // don't bother creating useless state and emitting
    ↳ unnecessary event
118         return;
119     }
120
121     if self
122         .user_withdraw_requests
123         .contains_key(&user_token_to_key(&user, &token))
124     {

```

```

125         env::panic_str("User had already created a withdraw
↳ request for this token");
126     }
127
128     let token_balance = self.user_token_balance(user.clone(),
↳ token.clone()).0;
129
130     if token_balance < amount {
131         env::panic_str("Insufficient token balance");
132     }
133
134     let request = WithdrawRequest {
135         amount: amount.into(),
136         request_time: env::block_timestamp(),
137     };
138
139     self.user_withdraw_requests
140         .insert(&user_token_to_key(&user, &token), &request);
141
142     Self::emit_event(Event::WithdrawRequest {
143         user,
144         token,
145         amount: amount.into(),
146     })
147 }

```

**Risk Level:****Likelihood - 5****Impact - 3****Recommendation:**

It is recommended to introduce a method for users to retrieve their funds. In case e.g. lost to operator account is lost or a malicious actor using it, the funds might never be returned to users. One of the possibilities might be to release these funds without approval after certain period of lockout time, similarly to e.g. staking mechanisms.

Remediation plan:

**SOLVED:** The issue was solved in commit [11a5ae159463086741141083ae86e30e80fad69a](#) by adding the ability to perform manual withdrawals after the maximum `operator` idle time is exceeded.

### 3.3 (HAL-03) WEAK PRIVILEGE SEPARATION – MEDIUM

#### Description:

It was observed that the `owner` could set itself as a `operator_manager` and `fee_collector`, both upon initialization and through “set” functions. This functionality violates the principle of least privilege giving the owner additional privileges. Moreover, the owner has a possibility of changing `operator_manager` and `fee_collector` which grants him absolute control over the whole contract.

#### Code Location:

Listing 3: `src/owner.rs` (Line 18)

```
18 pub fn set_owner(&mut self, owner: AccountId) {  
19     self.assert_owner();  
20     self.owner = owner;  
21 }
```

Listing 4: `src/owner.rs` (Line 32)

```
32 pub fn set_operator_manager(&mut self, operator_manager: AccountId  
↳ ) {  
33     self.assert_owner_or_operator();  
34     self.operator_manager = operator_manager;  
35 }
```

Listing 5: `src/contract.rs` (Line 338)

```
338 pub fn set_fee_collector(&mut self, fee_collector: AccountId) {  
339     self.assert_owner_or_operator();  
340     if self.users.contains(&fee_collector) {  
341         env::panic_str("fee collector can't be a trading account")  
↳ ;  
342     }  
343     let old_collector = self.fee_collector.clone();
```

```

344     if fee_collector == old_collector {
345         return;
346     }
347
348     self.fee_collector = fee_collector;
349 }

```

Listing 6: src/contract.rs (Line 66)

```

66 #[init]
67 pub fn new(owner: AccountId, operator_manager: AccountId,
↳ fee_collector: AccountId) -> Self {//@audit-ok
68     Self {
69         owner,
70         operator_manager,
71         operator_access_key: None,
72         users: LookupSet::new(StorageKey::Users),
73         user_keys: UnorderedMap::new(StorageKey::UserKeys),
74         user_token_balances: UnorderedMap::new(StorageKey::
↳ UserTokenBalances),
75         user_withdraw_requests: LookupMap::new(StorageKey::
↳ UserWithdrawRequests),
76         pairs_tokens_whitelist: LookupMap::new(StorageKey::
↳ PairsTokensWhitelist),
77         tokens_whitelist: UnorderedSet::new(StorageKey::
↳ TokensWhitelist),
78         fee_collector,
79         fee_collector_balance: LookupMap::new(StorageKey::
↳ FeeCollectorBalance),
80     }
81 }

```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 3

Impact - 4

**Recommendation:**

It is recommended to add another check to not allow the owner to set itself as `operator_manager` or `fee_collector` and separate the roles from itself, so each of them is managed by itself instead of all being managed by the owner.

**Remediation plan:**

**SOLVED:** The issue was solved in commit `11a5ae159463086741141083ae86e30e80fad69a` by adding additional checks if certain account already has other privileges enabled.

### 3.4 (HAL-04) PRIVILEGED ADDRESS CAN BE TRANSFERRED WITHOUT CONFIRMATION - MEDIUM

#### Description:

An incorrect use of the `set_owner` or `set_operator_manager` functions from the contract could set the affected privileged roles to an incorrect address, unwillingly losing control of the contract, which cannot be undone in any way. Currently, the `owner` and `operator_manager` of the contract can change their addresses using the aforementioned function in a `single transaction` and without confirmation from the new address.

#### Code Location:

Listing 7: `src/owner.rs` (Line 18)

```
18 pub fn set_owner(&mut self, owner: AccountId) {  
19     self.assert_owner();  
20     self.owner = owner;  
21 }
```

Listing 8: `src/owner.rs` (Line 32)

```
32 pub fn set_operator_manager(&mut self, operator_manager: AccountId  
↳ ) {  
33     self.assert_owner_or_operator();  
34     self.operator_manager = operator_manager;  
35 }
```

#### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 2

Impact - 4

#### Recommendation:

The `set_owner` or `set_operator_manager` functions should follow a two steps process, being split into `set_owner` and `accept_owner` functions. The latter one requiring the transfer to be completed by the recipient, effectively protecting the contract against potential typing errors compared to single-step role transfer mechanisms.

#### Remediation plan:

**SOLVED:** The issue was solved in commit `11a5ae159463086741141083ae86e30e80fad69a` by adding additional `approve_request` logic.



## 3.5 (HAL-05) INSECURE PAIRS MANAGEMENT LOGIC – MEDIUM

### Description:

The logic of adding new pairs to `pairs_tokens_whitelist` includes several features, which might lead to confusion and/or security vulnerabilities. These are as follows:

- there is no validation check if the pair that is being added already exists, if so, the old pair will be overwritten without notification (the name will become the same, but the tokens it holds will be overwritten)
- there is no token validation if tokens (account ids) in a pair differs, so it is possible to add pairs AA like `BTCBTC` or `USDCUSDC`. It was proven in different projects in the past that such behavior might lead to draining funds via price-based attacks if price calculation between asset is performed (e.g. on external AMM)
- the pairs cannot be removed once added
- there is no case normalization check which means that e.g. `"BTCUSDT"` and `"BtCUSDT"` will be considered different pairs. This might lead to confusion in future usage.
- Moreover, the pair name can contain non-alphanumeric characters, which might lead to web2 vulnerabilities like Cross-Site Scripting, Template Injections, or more sophisticated attacks.

Below is the responsible code snippet followed by a unit test has been developed in order to reproduce the issue and show results as output:

## Code Location:

## Listing 9: src/contract.rs (Lines 203,204)

```

197 // Add pair to the whitelist.
198     /// # Transaction panics
199     ///
200     /// * If caller is not owner
201     pub fn add_whitelist_pair(&mut self, pair_symbol: String,
    ↪ account_ids: (AccountId, AccountId)) {
202         self.assert_owner();
203         self.pairs_tokens_whitelist
204             .insert(&pair_symbol, &account_ids);
205     }

```

## Listing 10: src/tests.rs

```

1
2 #[test]
3 fn pairspairs() {
4     let mut contract = contract!();
5
6     let token_id1 = "spot_btc.test.near";
7     let token_id2 = "usdc.test.near";
8     let fee_token = "ft-manager.test.near";
9
10    let user_id1 = "alice";
11    let user_id2 = "bob";
12
13    create_user_account!(contract, user_id1);
14    create_user_account!(contract, user_id2);
15
16    set_token_allowed!(contract, token_id1, true);
17    set_token_allowed!(contract, token_id2, true);
18    set_token_allowed!(contract, fee_token, true);
19
20    add_whitelist_pair!(
21        contract,
22        String::from("SPOT_BTC_USDC"),
23        (
24            AccountId::from_str("spot_btc.test.near").unwrap(),
25            AccountId::from_str("usdc.test.near").unwrap()
26        )
27    );

```

```

28
29     add_whitelist_pair!(
30         contract,
31         String::from("SPOT_BTC_USDC"),
32         (
33             AccountId::from_str("spot_btc.test.near").unwrap(),
34             AccountId::from_str("usdc.test.near").unwrap()
35         )
36     );
37
38     add_whitelist_pair!(
39         contract,
40         String::from("SPOT_BTC_USDC"),
41         (
42             AccountId::from_str("spot_btc.test.near").unwrap(),
43             AccountId::from_str("usdc.test.near").unwrap()
44         )
45     );
46
47     add_whitelist_pair!(
48         contract,
49         String::from("SPOT_bTC_USDC"),
50         (
51             AccountId::from_str("spot_btc.test.near").unwrap(),
52             AccountId::from_str("spot_btc.test.near").unwrap()
53         )
54     );
55
56     add_whitelist_pair!(
57         contract,
58         String::from("SPOT_bTC_USDC"),
59         (
60             AccountId::from_str("usdc.test.near").unwrap(),
61             AccountId::from_str("usdc.test.near").unwrap()
62         )
63     );
64
65     add_whitelist_pair!(
66         contract,
67         String::from("exploitattempt<s>aaaa</s>"),
68         (
69             AccountId::from_str("spot_btc.test.near").unwrap(),
70             AccountId::from_str("spot_btc.test.near").unwrap()
71         )

```

```

72     );
73
74     let pairstr = String::from("SPOT_BTC_USDC");
75     println!("uppercase: {:?}\n", contract.pairs_tokens_whitelist.
↳ get(&pairstr));
76
77     let pairstr = String::from("SPOT_bTC_USDC");
78     println!("mixedcase: {:?}\n", contract.pairs_tokens_whitelist.
↳ get(&pairstr));
79
80     let pairstr = String::from("web2exploitattempt<s>aaaa</s>");
81     println!("web2exploitattempt: {:?}\n", contract.
↳ pairs_tokens_whitelist.get(&pairstr));
82
83 }
84

```

#### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 2**

**Impact - 5**

#### Recommendation:

It is recommended to increase pair management security via implementing following features:

- controlling, how already existing pairs are handled (should they be overwritten as it is now?)
- considering adding remove (delisting) possibility
- validating pairs not to have double the same account IDs as members (AA pairs)
- normalizing pair name, e.g. by declining non-alphanumeric characters with `is_alphanumeric` and then converting the names to uppercase.

#### Remediation plan:

**SOLVED:** The issue was fixed in commit [11a5ae159463086741141083ae86e30e80fad69a](#) by adding additional checks on symbol format, uniqueness check, alphanumeric check and whether the symbol already exists.

## 3.6 (HAL-06) EXCESSIVELY CENTRALIZED FEATURES - MEDIUM

### Description:

A functionality was found allowing the owner to delete key information from the contract's storage, effectively locking the funds of any user who has participated in the Orderly Protocol.

In addition to malicious actors compromising the admin account, insiders could leverage this functionality to cause griefing on their users and the organization and deleting the contract.

Normally, the contract's account shouldn't be easily deleted due to `DeleteAccountWithLargeState` error. However, after clearing of contract storage, this operation should be possible.

If the owner account is compromised and state is already deleted, the attacker can further potentially delete the contract, draining all NEAR balance to their wallet using NEAR's account delete feature.

### Code Location:

Listing 11: src/owner.rs (Line 38)

```
38 pub fn clear_on_remove(&mut self) {  
39     self.assert_owner();  
40     self.user_keys.clear();  
41     self.tokens_whitelist.clear();  
42     self.user_token_balances.clear();  
43 }
```

### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 2

Impact - 5

**Recommendation:**

It is recommended to consider if allowing such operation on contract is needed. Moreover, it is recommended to use a multisignature wallet for sensitive accounts.

**Reference:**

- <https://stackoverflow.com/questions/70616916/how-to-delete-near-account-with-l>
- <https://docs.near.org/docs/tools/near-cli#near-delete>

**Remediation plan:**

**SOLVED:** The issue was fixed in commit [11a5ae159463086741141083ae86e30e80fad69a](#) by completely removing this function.

## 3.7 (HAL-07) MISSING AUTHORIZATION CHECK - LOW

### Description:

It was noticed that function `operator_execute_match` which is called by `operator_execute_action` does not employ authorization check like `assert_contract_or_operator`. The function does not contain any logic so far, so there is no impact on calling it, but it is being highlighted in order to pay attention to it in further development process, as it would allow performing actions on behalf of operator.

### Code Location:

Listing 12: `src/operator.rs` (Lines 164-166)

```
161     /// Process a single operator action.
162     pub fn operator_execute_action(&mut self, action:
    ↳ OperatorAction) -> PromiseOrValue<()> {
163         match action {
164             OperatorAction::Execution(execution) => {
165                 self.operator_execute_match(execution);
166                 PromiseOrValue::Value(())
167             }
168             OperatorAction::Withdraw {
169                 account_id,
170                 token_id,
171             } => self.operator_withdraw_approve(account_id,
    ↳ token_id),
172         }
173     }
```

Listing 13: `src/operator.rs` (Line 182)

```
175     /// Execute match and update amounts on the account.
176     /// Receives two sides of the trade and how much filled.
177     ///
178     /// # Transaction panics
179     /// * Invalid signatures on the orders.
```



```

180     /// * Non matching orders.
181     /// * Not enough funds on the account to update after match.
182     fn operator_execute_match(&mut self, _execution: Execution) {}
183

```

#### Listing 14: src/types.rs

```

68 pub struct Execution {
69     // pair: u32,
70     // taker: Order,
71     // taker_signature: Signature,
72     // maker: Order,
73     // maker_signature: Signature,
74     //
75     // filled_amount: Balance,
76 }
77

```

#### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 4**

#### Recommendation:

It is recommended to ensure the `operator_manager` authorization check in further development.

#### Remediation plan:

**SOLVED:** The issue was solved in commit [11a5ae159463086741141083ae86e30e80fad69a](#) : the aforementioned operation no longer exists.

## 3.8 (HAL-08) REDUNDANT CODE - INFORMATIONAL

### Description:

It was found that some code present in the smart contract is not used. For both optimization and clearer code reasons, it is recommended to verify, if the code can be removed.

User creation already forbids the `fee_collector` from registering. As the `user_announce_key` function checks if the calling user is part of the `users` list, accounts that pass this check will always pass the second one.

### Code Location:

Listing 15: `src/contract.rs` (Line 219)

```
219 if self.fee_collector == user {  
220     env::panic_str("user account shouldn't be fee collector");  
221 }
```

Listing 16: `src/contract.rs` (Line 182)

```
179 if self.users.contains(&user) {  
180     env::panic_str("user account already exists");  
181 }  
182 if &user == &self.fee_collector {  
183     env::panic_str("user could not be fee_collector");  
184 }
```

Moreover, upon compilation it was noticed that some declared variables are not used, which was highlighted by the compiler:

## Listing 17

```

1 warning: unused variable: `batch_id`
2   --> src/operator.rs:304:9
3     |
4 304 |         batch_id: i64,
5     |         ^^^^^^^^^ help: if this is intentional, prefix it
    with an underscore: `_batch_id`
6     |
7     = note: `#[warn(unused_variables)]` on by default
8
9 warning: unused variable: `meta`
10  --> src/operator.rs:305:9
11    |
12 305 |         meta: MetaResponse,
13    |         ^^^^ help: if this is intentional, prefix it with an
    underscore: `_meta`
14
15 warning: `asset-manager` (lib) generated 2 warnings

```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

## Recommendation:

Remove the `fee_collector` check from `user_announce_key`, as it is already implicit for anyone who is part of the `users` list. Examine if aforementioned variables should be used; otherwise, it is recommended to remove them from the contract code.

## Remediation plan:

**SOLVED:** The issue no longer exist in commit [11a5ae159463086741141083ae86e30e80fad69a](#) because the code was changed. Compilation warnings are not present now.

## 3.9 (HAL-09) OPERATOR KEY IS NOT DELETED ON OPERATOR CHANGE - INFORMATIONAL

### Description:

When changing `operator_manager`, their access key held in storage is unaffected, which means the previous key will be matched to the new `operator_manager`. This might cause confusion or unnecessary gas expenditures until realized and changed.

### Code Location:

#### Listing 18: `src/owner.rs`

```
32     pub fn set_operator_manager(&mut self, operator_manager:
↳ AccountId) {
33         self.assert_owner_or_operator();
34         self.operator_manager = operator_manager;
35     }
```

### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 1**

### Recommendation:

On changing `operator_manager`, any storage related solely to the old user should be cleared.

### Remediation plan:

**ACKNOWLEDGED:** The `\client team` acknowledged this finding.



# AUTOMATED TESTING



## 4.1 AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

### Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was `cargo audit`, a security scanner for vulnerabilities reported to the RustSec Advisory Database. All vulnerabilities published in <https://crates.io> are stored in a repository named The RustSec Advisory Database. `cargo audit` is a human-readable version of the advisory database which performs a scanning on Cargo.lock. Security Detections are only in scope. To better assist the developers maintaining this code, the auditors are including the output with the dependencies tree, and this is included in the cargo audit output to better know the dependencies affected by unmaintained and vulnerable crates.

ID	package	Short Description
<a href="#">RUSTSEC-2020-0071</a>	time 0.1.43	Potential segfault in the time crate, upgrade to >=0.2.23

### Code Location:

#### Listing 19: Dependency tree

```

1 time 0.1.43
2   chrono 0.4.19
3     near-primitives 0.10.0
4       near-vm-logic 0.10.0
5         near-sdk 4.0.0-pre.7
6           near-contract-standards 4.0.0-pre.7
7             asset-manager 0.1.0
8               asset-manager 0.1.0

```

cargo outdated

Listing 20

```

1 Name                                     Project
↳                                     Compat  Latest  Kind      Platform
2 ----                                     -
↳                                     -
3 ahash->getrandom                        0.2.6
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    cfg(any(
↳ target_os = "linux", target_os = "android", target_os = "windows",
↳ target_os = "macos", target_os = "ios", target_os = "freebsd",
↳ target_os = "openbsd", target_os = "netbsd", target_os = "
↳ dragonfly", target_os = "solaris", target_os = "illumos",
↳ target_os = "fuchsia", target_os = "redox", target_os = "cloudabi
↳ ", target_os = "haiku", target_os = "vxworks", target_os = "
↳ emscripten", target_os = "wasi"))
4 ahash->once_cell                        1.12.0
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    cfg(not(all(
↳ target_arch = "arm", target_os = "none")))
5 ahash->version_check                    0.9.4
↳                                     ---      Removed  Build     ---
6 aho-corasick->memchr                    2.5.0
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
7 bitvec->funty                           1.1.0
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
8 bitvec->radium                          0.6.2
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
9 bitvec->tap                             1.0.1
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
10 bitvec->wyz                            0.2.0
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
11 blake2->crypto-mac                     0.8.0
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
12 blake2->digest                         0.9.0
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
13 blake2->opaque-debug                   0.3.0
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
14 block-buffer->block-padding             0.2.1
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
15 block-buffer->generic-array             0.14.5
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
16 borsh->borsh-derive                    0.9.3
↳                                     ---      0.8.2    Normal    ---
17 borsh->borsh-derive                    0.9.3
↳                                     ---      Removed  Normal    ---
18 borsh->hashbrown                       0.11.2

```

```

↳          ---      0.9.1      Normal      ---
19 borsh->hashbrown          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
↳          ---      0.8.2      Normal      ---
20 borsh-derive->borsh-derive-internal          0.9.3
↳          ---      0.8.2      Normal      ---
21 borsh-derive->borsh-derive-internal          0.9.3
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
22 borsh-derive->borsh-schema-derive-internal          0.9.3
↳          ---      0.8.2      Normal      ---
23 borsh-derive->borsh-schema-derive-internal          0.9.3
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
24 borsh-derive->proc-macro-crate          0.1.5
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
25 borsh-derive->proc-macro2          1.0.39
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
26 borsh-derive->syn          1.0.96
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
27 borsh-derive-internal->proc-macro2          1.0.39
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
28 borsh-derive-internal->quote          1.0.18
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
29 borsh-derive-internal->syn          1.0.96
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
30 borsh-schema-derive-internal->proc-macro2          1.0.39
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
31 borsh-schema-derive-internal->quote          1.0.18
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
32 borsh-schema-derive-internal->syn          1.0.96
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
33 c2-chacha->cipher          0.2.5
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
34 c2-chacha->ppv-lite86          0.2.16
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
35 chrono->libc          0.2.126
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
36 chrono->num-integer          0.1.45
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
37 chrono->num-traits          0.2.15
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
38 chrono->serde          1.0.137
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
39 chrono->time          0.1.43
↳          ---      Removed      Normal      ---
40 chrono->winapi          0.3.9

```



```

↳          ---      Removed   Normal      cfg(windows
↳ )
41 cipher->generic-array          0.14.5
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
42 cpufeatures->libc              0.2.126
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      aarch64-apple
↳ -darwin
43 crypto-common->generic-array   0.14.5
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
44 crypto-common->typenum         1.15.0
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
45 crypto-mac->generic-array      0.14.5
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
46 crypto-mac->subtle             2.4.1
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
47 curve25519-dalek->byteorder    1.4.3
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
48 curve25519-dalek->digest       0.9.0
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
49 curve25519-dalek->rand_core    0.5.1
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
50 curve25519-dalek->subtle       2.4.1
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
51 curve25519-dalek->zeroize      1.5.5
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
52 derive_more->convert_case      0.4.0
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
53 derive_more->proc-macro2       1.0.39
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
54 derive_more->quote             1.0.18
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
55 derive_more->rustc_version     0.4.0
↳          ---      Removed   Build      ---
56 derive_more->syn               1.0.96
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
57 digest->block-buffer           0.10.2
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
58 digest->crypto-common          0.1.3
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
59 digest->generic-array          0.14.5
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
60 digest->subtle                 2.4.1
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
61 ed25519->signature             1.5.0

```

↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
62	ed25519-dalek->curve25519-dalek			3.2.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
63	ed25519-dalek->ed25519			1.5.2
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
64	ed25519-dalek->rand			0.7.3
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
65	ed25519-dalek->serde			1.0.137
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
66	ed25519-dalek->sha2			0.9.9
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
67	ed25519-dalek->zeroize			1.5.5
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
68	fixed-hash->byteorder			1.4.3
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
69	fixed-hash->rand			0.8.5
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
70	fixed-hash->rustc-hex			2.1.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
71	fixed-hash->static_assertions			1.1.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
72	form_urlencoded->matches			0.1.9
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
73	form_urlencoded->percent-encoding			2.1.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
74	generic-array->typenum			1.15.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
75	generic-array->version_check			0.9.4
↳	---	Removed	Build	---
76	getrandom->cfg-if			1.0.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
77	getrandom->js-sys			0.3.57
↳	---	Removed	Normal	cfg(all(
↳	target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))			
78	getrandom->libc			0.2.126
↳	---	Removed	Normal	cfg(unix)
79	getrandom->wasi			0.10.2+wasi-
↳	snapshot-preview1	---	Removed	Normal
↳	wasi")			cfg(target_os = "
80	getrandom->wasi			0.9.0+wasi-
↳	snapshot-preview1	---	Removed	Normal
↳	"wasi")			cfg(target_os = "
81	getrandom->wasm-bindgen			0.2.80
↳	---	Removed	Normal	cfg(all(

```

↳ target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))
82 hashbrown->ahash                                0.7.6
↳ --- 0.4.7 Normal ---
83 hashbrown->ahash                                0.7.6
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
84 idna->matches                                    0.1.9
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
85 idna->unicode-bidi                               0.3.8
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
86 idna->unicode-normalization                     0.1.19
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
87 impl-codec->parity-scale-codec                 2.3.1
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
88 impl-trait-for-tuples->proc-macro2             1.0.39
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
89 impl-trait-for-tuples->quote                   1.0.18
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
90 impl-trait-for-tuples->syn                     1.0.96
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
91 indexmap->autocfg                               1.1.0
↳ --- Removed Build ---
92 indexmap->hashbrown                             0.11.2
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
93 js-sys->wasm-bindgen                            0.2.80
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
94 log->cfg-if                                     1.0.0
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
95 near-account-id->borsh                          0.9.3
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
96 near-account-id->serde                         1.0.137
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
97 near-crypto->arrayref                          0.3.6
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
98 near-crypto->blake2                             0.9.2
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
99 near-crypto->borsh                              0.9.3
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
100 near-crypto->bs58                              0.4.0
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
101 near-crypto->c2-chacha                         0.3.3
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
102 near-crypto->curve25519-dalek                 3.2.0
↳ --- Removed Normal ---
103 near-crypto->derive_more                      0.99.17

```

	---	Removed	Normal	---
104	near-crypto->ed25519-dalek			1.0.1
	---	Removed	Normal	---
105	near-crypto->lazy_static			1.4.0
	---	Removed	Normal	---
106	near-crypto->libc			0.2.126
	---	Removed	Normal	---
107	near-crypto->near-account-id			0.10.0
	---	Removed	Normal	---
108	near-crypto->parity-secp256k1			0.7.0
	---	Removed	Normal	---
109	near-crypto->primitive-types			0.10.1
	---	Removed	Normal	---
110	near-crypto->rand			0.7.3
	---	Removed	Normal	---
111	near-crypto->rand_core			0.5.1
	---	Removed	Normal	---
112	near-crypto->serde			1.0.137
	---	Removed	Normal	---
113	near-crypto->serde_json			1.0.81
	---	Removed	Normal	---
114	near-crypto->subtle			2.4.1
	---	Removed	Normal	---
115	near-crypto->thiserror			1.0.31
	---	Removed	Normal	---
116	near-primitives->base64			0.13.0
	---	Removed	Normal	---
117	near-primitives->borsh			0.9.3
	---	Removed	Normal	---
118	near-primitives->bs58			0.4.0
	---	Removed	Normal	---
119	near-primitives->byteorder			1.4.3
	---	Removed	Normal	---
120	near-primitives->bytesize			1.1.0
	---	Removed	Normal	---
121	near-primitives->chrono			0.4.19
	---	Removed	Normal	---
122	near-primitives->derive_more			0.99.17
	---	Removed	Normal	---
123	near-primitives->easy-ext			0.2.9
	---	Removed	Normal	---
124	near-primitives->hex			0.4.3
	---	Removed	Normal	---
125	near-primitives->near-crypto			0.10.0

↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
126	near-primitives->near-primitives-core			0.10.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
127	near-primitives->near-rpc-error-macro			0.10.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
128	near-primitives->near-vm-errors			0.10.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
129	near-primitives->num-rational			0.3.2
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
130	near-primitives->primitive-types			0.10.1
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
131	near-primitives->rand			0.7.3
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
132	near-primitives->reed-solomon-erasure			4.0.2
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
133	near-primitives->regex			1.5.6
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
134	near-primitives->serde			1.0.137
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
135	near-primitives->serde_json			1.0.81
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
136	near-primitives->sha2			0.9.9
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
137	near-primitives->smart-default			0.6.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
138	near-primitives->validator			0.12.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
139	near-primitives-core->base64			0.11.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
140	near-primitives-core->borsh			0.9.3
↳	---	0.8.2	Normal	---
141	near-primitives-core->borsh			0.9.3
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
142	near-primitives-core->bs58			0.4.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
143	near-primitives-core->derive_more			0.99.17
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
144	near-primitives-core->hex			0.4.3
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
145	near-primitives-core->lazy_static			1.4.0
↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
146	near-primitives-core->near-account-id			0.10.0
↳	---	0.14.0	Normal	---
147	near-primitives-core->near-account-id			0.10.0



	↳	---	0.5.0	Normal	---
169		near-vm-errors->near-account-id			0.10.0
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
170		near-vm-errors->near-rpc-error-macro			0.10.0
	↳	---	0.5.0	Normal	---
171		near-vm-errors->near-rpc-error-macro			0.10.0
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
172		near-vm-errors->serde			1.0.137
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
173		near-vm-logic->borsh			0.9.3
	↳	---	0.8.2	Normal	---
174		near-vm-logic->near-account-id			0.10.0
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
175		near-vm-logic->near-crypto			0.10.0
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
176		near-vm-logic->near-primitives			0.10.0
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
177		near-vm-logic->near-primitives-core			0.10.0
	↳	---	0.1.0	Normal	---
178		near-vm-logic->near-vm-errors			0.10.0
	↳	---	3.1.0	Normal	---
179		near-vm-logic->ripemd160			0.9.1
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
180		num-bigint->autocfg			1.1.0
	↳	---	Removed	Build	---
181		num-bigint->num-integer			0.1.45
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
182		num-bigint->num-traits			0.2.15
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
183		num-integer->autocfg			1.1.0
	↳	---	Removed	Build	---
184		num-integer->num-traits			0.2.15
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
185		num-rational->autocfg			1.1.0
	↳	---	Removed	Build	---
186		num-rational->num-bigint			0.3.3
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
187		num-rational->num-integer			0.1.45
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
188		num-rational->num-traits			0.2.15
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
189		num-rational->serde			1.0.137
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
190		num-traits->autocfg			1.1.0

	↳	---	Removed	Build	---
191		parity-scale-codec->arrayvec			0.7.2
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
192		parity-scale-codec->bitvec			0.20.4
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
193		parity-scale-codec->byte-slice-cast			1.2.1
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
194		parity-scale-codec->impl-trait-for-tuples			0.2.2
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
195		parity-scale-codec->parity-scale-codec-derive			2.3.1
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
196		parity-scale-codec->serde			1.0.137
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
197		parity-scale-codec-derive->proc-macro-crate			1.1.3
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
198		parity-scale-codec-derive->proc-macro2			1.0.39
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
199		parity-scale-codec-derive->quote			1.0.18
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
200		parity-scale-codec-derive->syn			1.0.96
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
201		parity-secp256k1->arrayvec			0.5.2
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
202		parity-secp256k1->cc			1.0.73
	↳	---	Removed	Build	---
203		parity-secp256k1->cfg-if			0.1.10
	↳	---	Removed	Build	---
204		parity-secp256k1->rand			0.7.3
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
205		primitive-types->fixed-hash			0.7.0
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
206		primitive-types->impl-codec			0.5.1
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
207		primitive-types->uint			0.9.3
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
208		proc-macro-crate->>thiserror			1.0.31
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
209		proc-macro-crate->toml			0.5.9
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
210		proc-macro2->unicode-ident			1.0.0
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
211		quote->proc-macro2			1.0.39
	↳	---	Removed	Normal	---
212		rand->getrandom			0.1.16



```

↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
213 rand->libc          0.2.126
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      cfg(unix)
214 rand->rand_chacha  0.2.2
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      cfg(not(
↳ target_os = "emscripten"))
215 rand->rand_chacha  0.3.1
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
216 rand->rand_core    0.5.1
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
217 rand->rand_core    0.6.3
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
218 rand->rand_hc       0.2.0
↳          ---      Removed   Development ---
219 rand_chacha->ppv-lite86 0.2.16
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
220 rand_chacha->rand_core 0.5.1
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
221 rand_chacha->rand_core 0.6.3
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
222 rand_core->getrandom 0.1.16
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
223 rand_core->getrandom 0.2.6
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
224 rand_hc->rand_core   0.5.1
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
225 reed-solomon-erasure->smallvec 1.8.0
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
226 regex->aho-corasick 0.7.18
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
227 regex->memchr        2.5.0
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
228 regex->regex-syntax  0.6.26
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
229 ripemd160->block-buffer 0.9.0
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
230 ripemd160->digest    0.9.0
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
231 ripemd160->opaque-debug 0.3.0
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
232 rustc_version->semver 1.0.9
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---
233 serde->serde_derive 1.0.137
↳          ---      Removed   Normal      ---

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234 serde_derive->proc-macro2          1.0.39
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
235 serde_derive->quote                 1.0.18
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
236 serde_derive->syn                   1.0.96
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
237 serde_json->indexmap                1.8.2
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
238 serde_json->itoa                    1.0.2
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
239 serde_json->ryu                     1.0.10
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
240 serde_json->serde                   1.0.137
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
241 sha2->block-buffer                 0.9.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
242 sha2->cfg-if                       1.0.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
243 sha2->cpufeatures                  0.2.2
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
    ↳ target_arch = "aarch64", target_arch = "x86_64", target_arch = "
    ↳ x86")
244 sha2->digest                       0.9.0
    ↳ --- 0.10.3 Normal ---
245 sha2->digest                       0.9.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
246 sha2->opaque-debug                 0.3.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
247 signature->digest                  0.10.3
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
248 signature->rand_core                0.6.3
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
249 smart-default->proc-macro2          1.0.39
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
250 smart-default->quote                1.0.18
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
251 smart-default->syn                  1.0.96
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
252 syn->proc-macro2                   1.0.39
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
253 syn->quote                          1.0.18
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
254 syn->unicode-ident                 1.0.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---

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255 synstructure->proc-macro2          1.0.39
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
256 synstructure->quote                 1.0.18
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
257 synstructure->syn                   1.0.96
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
258 synstructure->unicode-xid           0.2.3
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
259 thiserror->thiserror-impl           1.0.31
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
260 thiserror-impl->proc-macro2          1.0.39
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
261 thiserror-impl->quote                1.0.18
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
262 thiserror-impl->syn                  1.0.96
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
263 time->libc                           0.2.126
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
264 time->winapi                         0.3.9
    ↳ --- Removed Development ---
265 tinyvec->tinyvec-macros              0.1.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
266 toml->serde                          1.0.137
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
267 uint->byteorder                      1.4.3
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
268 uint->crunchy                        0.2.2
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
269 uint->hex                            0.4.3
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
270 uint->static_assertions              1.1.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
271 unicode-normalization->tinyvec       1.6.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
272 url->form_urlencoded                 1.0.1
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
273 url->idna                            0.2.3
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
274 url->matches                         0.1.9
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
275 url->percent-encoding                 2.1.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
276 validator->idna                     0.2.3
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---

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277 validator->lazy_static 1.4.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
278 validator->regex 1.5.6
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
279 validator->serde 1.0.137
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
280 validator->serde_derive 1.0.137
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
281 validator->serde_json 1.0.81
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
282 validator->url 2.2.2
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
283 validator->validator_types 0.12.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
284 wasm-bindgen->cfg-if 1.0.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
285 wasm-bindgen->wasm-bindgen-macro 0.2.80
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
286 wasm-bindgen-backend->bumpalo 3.10.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
287 wasm-bindgen-backend->lazy_static 1.4.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
288 wasm-bindgen-backend->log 0.4.17
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
289 wasm-bindgen-backend->proc-macro2 1.0.39
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
290 wasm-bindgen-backend->quote 1.0.18
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
291 wasm-bindgen-backend->syn 1.0.96
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
292 wasm-bindgen-backend->wasm-bindgen-shared 0.2.80
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
293 wasm-bindgen-macro->quote 1.0.18
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
294 wasm-bindgen-macro->wasm-bindgen-macro-support 0.2.80
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
295 wasm-bindgen-macro-support->proc-macro2 1.0.39
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
296 wasm-bindgen-macro-support->quote 1.0.18
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
297 wasm-bindgen-macro-support->syn 1.0.96
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
298 wasm-bindgen-macro-support->wasm-bindgen-backend 0.2.80
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---

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299 wasm-bindgen-macro-support->wasm-bindgen-shared 0.2.80
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
300 winapi->winapi-i686-pc-windows-gnu 0.4.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal i686-pc-
    ↳ windows-gnu
301 winapi->winapi-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu 0.4.0
    ↳ --- Removed Normal x86_64-pc-
    ↳ windows-gnu
302 zeroize->zeroize_derive 1.3.2
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
303 zeroize_derive->proc-macro2 1.0.39
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
304 zeroize_derive->quote 1.0.18
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
305 zeroize_derive->syn 1.0.96
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---
306 zeroize_derive->synstructure 0.12.6
    ↳ --- Removed Normal ---

```

**Risk Level:**

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 1**

**Recommendation:**

Beware of using dependencies and packages that are no longer supported by developers or have publicly known security flaws, even when they are not currently exploitable.



THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

// HALBORN

