

# Security Assessment

# **PolyQuity**

Jun 28th, 2021



## **Table of Contents**

#### **Summary**

#### **Overview**

**Project Summary** 

**Audit Summary** 

**Vulnerability Summary** 

Audit Scope

#### **Findings**

MSL-01: Unused state variable

MSL-02 : State variable could be declared as immutable

MSL-03: Missing parameter check

PFP-01: Unused state variables

PFP-02: Redundant judgment

#### **Appendix**

#### **Disclaimer**

#### **About**



## **Summary**

This report has been prepared for PolyQuity smart contracts, to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of their Smart Contract as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases given they are currently missing in the repository;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.



## **Overview**

## **Project Summary**

Project Name	PolyQuity
Description	PolyQuity is committed to Liquity's vision of providing a decentralized borrowing protocol with interest-free loans, high capital efficiency, and censorship-resistant stable coins.
Platform	Polygon
Language	Solidity
Codebase	https://github.com/PolyQuity/contracts
Commit	5d66b2144c8c89a862577eb2e62bae6f3baccffa 56422e09619d6fef89f52824a5e6619132ec95f3 15906354b48d79abcd964de60c43cbd1f2581c1f

## **Audit Summary**

Delivery Date	Jun 28, 2021
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis, Manual Review
Key Components	



## **Vulnerability Summary**

Vulnerability Level	Total Count	Pending	Partially Resolved	Resolved	Acknowledged	Declined
<ul><li>Critical</li></ul>	0	0	0	0	0	0
<ul><li>Major</li></ul>	0	0	0	0	0	0
<ul><li>Medium</li></ul>	0	0	0	0	0	0
<ul><li>Minor</li></ul>	1	0	0	1	0	0
<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	4	0	0	3	1	0
<ul><li>Discussion</li></ul>	0	0	0	0	0	0

## **Audit Scope**

ID	file	SHA256 Checksum
LQT	LPRewards/LQTYUnipool.sol	a42bc9b3f6263516b97152eab79f42ad9959f8edb01e98d51bfe04eef50a01ba
ULP	LPRewards/Unipool.sol	34ef42c58b50aa7d0f06ae27181eb974a49e5fb522f5d62674c7bf60150f5434
LQL	LQTY/LQTYToken.sol	ea4ead8cda3809b2a0c3fabb54a2beee0b4e9331dbf25bdbfb5123bff7f4d58f
MSL	LQTY/MultiSig.sol	b984f14b7e993a73ae93bca37a9bca2bf3ec86d87439e02af6711a180083fe41
PFP	PriceFeed.sol	8bc99b5617f301c9623c8fbd771ea7dac2a056f2241ad2788b9aee994193ee22



#### **Review Summary**

PolyQuity is a decentralized borrowing protocol on Polygon. The scope of this audit is a part of the whole protocol. This time CertiK audited the following five contracts:


- Unipool Liquidity providers stake the UNIv2 LP tokens into Unipool to accrue rewards.
- LQTYToken An ERC20 token based on the Openzeppelin ERC20 contract.
- LQTYUnipool Similar to Unipool contract. Add some functions to stake LQTY token.
- MultiSig This contract is multi-signature. this contract makes it possible for two or more owners to sign approval as a group.
- PriceFeed PriceFeed for mainnet deployment, to be connected to Chainlink's live MATIC: USD aggregator reference contract, and a wrapper contract BandCaller, which connects to Band contract.

CertiK analyzed and conducted the source code through a variety of methods and tools, such as CertiK Formal Verification as well as manual review by smart contract experts.

At the moment, the PolyQuity team did not have testing and documentation repositories available for reference. CertiK recommends additional unit test coverage, along with documentation, to more thoroughly simulate potential use cases and functionalities for token holders. CertiK always recommends seeking multiple opinions, increased test coverage, and live sandbox deployments before a mainnet release.



## **Findings**



ID	Title	Category	Severity	Status
MSL-01	Unused state variable	Coding Style	<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	
MSL-02	State variable could be declared as immutable	Gas Optimization	<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	
MSL-03	Missing parameter check	Logical Issue	<ul><li>Minor</li></ul>	
PFP-01	Unused state variables	Coding Style	<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	
PFP-02	Redundant judgment	Logical Issue	<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	(i) Acknowledged



## MSL-01 | Unused state variable

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Coding Style	<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	LQTY/MultiSig.sol: 16	

## Description

State variable decimals is never used in contract MultiSig.

#### Recommendation

We recommend that remove the variables never used.

#### Alleviation

**[PolyQuity]**: State variables decimals is a standard ERC20 variable. We hope this MultiSig contract would be compatible with ERC20 token.



## MSL-02 | State variable could be declared as immutable

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Gas Optimization	<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	LQTY/MultiSig.sol: 21	

## Description

Private variable tokenSetter only set value in the constructor function. Declare it as immutable would save gas.

#### Recommendation

We recommend that declare the variable as immutable to save gas.

#### Alleviation

PolyQuity added immutable attribute in commit 56422e09619d6fef89f52824a5e6619132ec95f3.



## MSL-03 | Missing parameter check

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	<ul><li>Minor</li></ul>	LQTY/MultiSig.sol: 72~75	

## Description

Function add0wner is used to add a new owner address to the hasSignAdd0wner mapping. The new owner address should not be zero address.

#### Recommendation

We recommend that add a zero check for the \_new0wner parameter.

#### Alleviation

PolyQuity added a zero address check for \_new0wner in commit 56422e09619d6fef89f52824a5e6619132ec95f3.



## PFP-01 | Unused state variables

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Coding Style	<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	PriceFeed.sol: 33~36	

#### Description

State variables borrowerOperationsAddress, troveManagerAddress, and ETHUSD\_TELLOR\_REQ\_ID are never used in contract PriceFeed.

#### Recommendation

We recommend removing the variables never used.

#### Alleviation

PolyQuity removed state variable ETHUSD\_TELLOR\_REQ\_ID and keeped the others. This change is applied in commit 56422e09619d6fef89f52824a5e6619132ec95f3.



## PFP-02 | Redundant judgment

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	<ul><li>Informational</li></ul>	PriceFeed.sol: 502	Acknowledged

## Description

The else if condition is redundant.

#### Recommendation

We recommend that remove the redundant else if code.

#### Alleviation

[PolyQuity]: Our protocol is forked from Liquity which is audited already. We would not change the code to keep similar with the Liquity.



## **Appendix**

#### **Finding Categories**

#### Gas Optimization

Gas Optimization findings do not affect the functionality of the code but generate different, more optimal EVM opcodes resulting in a reduction on the total gas cost of a transaction.

#### Logical Issue

Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block.timestamp works.

#### Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

#### **Checksum Calculation Method**

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux "sha256sum" command against the target file.



### **Disclaimer**

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This report should not be used in any way to make decisions around investment or involvement with any particular project. This report in no way provides investment advice, nor should be leveraged as investment advice of any sort. This report represents an extensive assessing process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology.

Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. CertiK's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. CertiK's goal is to help reduce the attack vectors and the high level of variance associated with utilizing new and consistently changing technologies, and in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze.



#### **About**

Founded in 2017 by leading academics in the field of Computer Science from both Yale and Columbia University, CertiK is a leading blockchain security company that serves to verify the security and correctness of smart contracts and blockchain-based protocols. Through the utilization of our world-class technical expertise, alongside our proprietary, innovative tech, we're able to support the success of our clients with best-in-class security, all whilst realizing our overarching vision; provable trust for all throughout all facets of blockchain.

