ESBMC (the Efficient SMT-based Context-Bounded Model Checker) is a mature, permissively licensed open-source context-bounded model checker for verifying single- and multithreaded C/C++, CUDA, CHERI, Kotlin, Python, and Solidity programs. It can automatically verify predefined safety properties (e.g., bounds check, pointer safety, overflow) and user-defined program assertions.
ESBMC supports:
- The Clang compiler as its C/C++/CHERI/CUDA frontend;
- The Soot framework via Jimple as its Java/Kotlin frontend;
- The ast2json package as its Python frontend;
- Implements the Solidity grammar production rules as its Solidity frontend;
- Supports IEEE floating-point arithmetic for various SMT solvers.
ESBMC also implements state-of-the-art incremental BMC and k-induction proof-rule algorithms based on Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) and Constraint Programming (CP) solvers.
We provide some background material/publications to help you understand exactly what ESBMC can offer. These are available online. You can also check the ESBMC architecture for further information about our main components.
Our main website is esbmc.org.
To compile ESBMC on Ubuntu 24.04 with LLVM 14 and the SMT solver Z3:
sudo apt update
sudo apt-get install -y clang-14 llvm-14 clang-tidy-14 python-is-python3 python3 git ccache unzip wget curl bison flex g++-multilib linux-libc-dev libboost-all-dev libz3-dev libclang-14-dev libclang-cpp-dev cmake
git clone https://github.com/esbmc/esbmc.git
mkdir build && cd build
cmake ../esbmc -DENABLE_Z3=1
make -j4
To build ESBMC with other operating systems and SMT solvers, please see the BUILDING file.
The user can also download the latest ESBMC binary for Ubuntu and Windows from the releases page.
As an illustrative example to show some of the ESBMC features, consider the following C code:
#include <math.h>
int main() {
unsigned int N = nondet_uint();
double x = nondet_double();
if(x <= 0 || isnan(x))
return 0;
unsigned int i = 0;
while(i < N) {
x = (2*x);
assert(x>0);
++i;
}
assert(x>0);
return 0;
}Here, ESBMC is invoked as follows:
$esbmc file.c --k-induction
Where file.c is the C program to be checked, and --k-induction selects the k-induction proof rule. The user can choose the SMT solver, property, and verification strategy. For this particular C program, ESBMC provides the following output as the verification result:
*** Checking inductive step
Starting Bounded Model Checking
Unwinding loop 2 iteration 1 file ex5.c line 8 function main
Not unwinding loop 2 iteration 2 file ex5.c line 8 function main
Symex completed in: 0.001s (40 assignments)
Slicing time: 0.000s (removed 16 assignments)
Generated 2 VCC(s), 2 remaining after simplification (24 assignments)
No solver specified; defaulting to Boolector
Encoding remaining VCC(s) using bit-vector/floating-point arithmetic
Encoding to solver time: 0.005s
Solving with solver Boolector 3.2.0
Encoding to solver time: 0.005s
Runtime decision procedure: 0.427s
BMC program time: 0.435s
VERIFICATION SUCCESSFUL
Solution found by the inductive step (k = 2)
We refer the user to our documentation webpage for further examples of the ESBMC's features.
ESBMC detects errors in software by simulating a finite prefix of the program execution with all possible inputs. Classes of implementation errors that can be detected include:
- User-specified assertion failures
- Out-of-bounds array access
- Illegal pointer dereferences, such as:
- Dereferencing null
- Performing an out-of-bounds dereference
- Double-free of malloc'd memory
- Misaligned memory access
- Integer overflows
- Undefined behavior on shift operations
- Floating-point for NaN
- Divide by zero
- Memory leaks
Concurrent software (using the pthread api) is verified by explicitly exploring interleavings, producing one symbolic execution per interleaving. By default, pointer-safety, array-out-of-bounds, division-by-zero, and user-specified assertions will be checked for; one can also specify options to check concurrent programs for:
- Deadlock (only on pthread mutexes and convars)
- Data races (i.e. competing writes)
- Atomicity violations at visible assignments
- Lock acquisition ordering
By default, ESBMC performs a "lazy" depth-first search of interleavings -- it can also encode (explicitly) all interleavings into a single SMT formula.
Many SMT solvers are currently supported:
- Z3 4.8+
- Bitwuzla
- Boolector 3.0+
- MathSAT
- CVC4
- CVC5
- Yices 2.2+
In addition, ESBMC can be configured to use the SMTLIB interactive text format with a pipe to communicate with an arbitrary solver process, although not-insignificant overheads are involved.
A limited subset of C++98/03 is supported, too -- a library modeling the STL is also available.
We provide a short video that explains ESBMC:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uJ5Jn0sxm08&t=2182s
This video was delivered as part of a technical talk on exploiting the SAT revolution for automated software verification in a workshop between Arm Research and the University of Manchester.
We offer a post-graduate course in software security that explains the internals of ESBMC.
https://ssvlab.github.io/lucasccordeiro/courses/2020/01/software-security/index.html
This course unit introduces students to basic and advanced approaches to formally building verified trustworthy software systems, where trustworthiness comprises five attributes: reliability, availability, safety, resilience and security.
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Yiannis Charalambous, Norbert Tihanyi, Ridhi Jain, Youcheng Sun, Mohamed Amine Ferrag, Lucas C. Cordeiro. A New Era in Software Security: Towards Self-Healing Software via Large Language Models and Formal Verification. Technical Report, CoRR abs/2305.14752, 2023. DOI
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Rafael Menezes, Daniel Moura, Helena Cavalcante, Rosiane de Freitas, Lucas C. Cordeiro . ESBMC-Jimple: verifying Kotlin programs via jimple intermediate representation In ISSTA'22, pp. 777-780, 2022. DOI
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Franz Brauße, Fedor Shmarov, Rafael Menezes, Mikhail R. Gadelha, Konstantin Korovin, Giles Reger, Lucas C. Cordeiro. ESBMC-CHERI: towards verification of C programs for CHERI platforms with ESBMC In ISSTA'22, pp. 773-776, 2022. DOI
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Felipe R. Monteiro, Mikhail R. Gadelha, Lucas C. Cordeiro. Model checking C++ programs. In Softw. Test. Verification Reliab. 32(1), 2022. DOI, Video, Open access.
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Mikhail R. Gadelha, Lucas C. Cordeiro, Denis A. Nicole. An Efficient Floating-Point Bit-Blasting API for Verifying C Programs. In VSTTE, pp. 178-195, 2020. DOI
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Mikhail Y. R. Gadelha, Felipe R. Monteiro, Jeremy Morse, Lucas C. Cordeiro, Bernd Fischer, Denis A. Nicole. ESBMC 5.0: an industrial-strength C model checker. In ASE, pp. 888-891, 2018. DOI
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Jeremy Morse, Lucas C. Cordeiro, Denis A. Nicole, Bernd Fischer. Model checking LTL properties over ANSI-C programs with bounded traces. In Softw. Syst. Model. 14(1), pp. 65-81, 2015. DOI
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Mikhail Y. R. Gadelha, Hussama Ibrahim Ismail, Lucas C. Cordeiro. Handling loops in bounded model checking of C programs via k-induction. In Int. J. Softw. Tools Technol. Transf. 19(1), pp. 97-114, 2017. DOI
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Phillipe A. Pereira, Higo F. Albuquerque, Isabela da Silva, Hendrio Marques, Felipe R. Monteiro, Ricardo Ferreira, Lucas C. Cordeiro. SMT-based context-bounded model checking for CUDA programs. In Concurr. Comput. Pract. Exp. 29(22), 2017. DOI
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Lucas C. Cordeiro, Bernd Fischer, João Marques-Silva. SMT-Based Bounded Model Checking for Embedded ANSI-C Software. In IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 38(4), pp. 957-974, 2012. DOI
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Lucas C. Cordeiro, Bernd Fischer. Verifying multi-threaded software using smt-based context-bounded model checking. In ICSE, pp. 331-340, 2011. DOI
- Distinguished Paper Award at ICSE’11
- Best Paper Award at SBESC’15
- Most Influential Paper Award at ASE’23
- Best Tool Paper Award at SBSeg'23
- 35 awards from international competitions on software verification (SV-COMP) and testing (Test-Comp) 2012-2024 at TACAS/FASE (Strength: Bug Finding and Code Coverage).
This video describes how to obtain, build and run ESBMC-CHERI on an example.
A pre-compiled binary for Linux is available in the pre-release ESBMC-CHERI, for other systems/archs the BUILDING.md document explains the necessary installation steps.
ESBMC is open-source software mainly distributed under the Apache License 2.0. It contains a significant amount of other people's software. However, please see the COPYING file to explain who owns what and under what terms it is distributed.
We'd be extremely happy to receive contributions to improve ESBMC (under the terms of the Apache License 2.0). Please file a pull request against the public GitHub repo if you'd like to submit anything. General discussion and release announcements will be made via GitHub. Please post an issue on GitHub and contact us about research or collaboration.
Please review the developer documentation if you want to contribute to ESBMC.
ESBMC is a fork of CBMC v2.9 (2008), the C Bounded Model Checker. The primary differences between the two are:
- CBMC focuses on SAT-based encodings of unrolled programs, while ESBMC targets SMT-based encodings.
- CBMC's concurrency support is an entirely symbolic encoding of a concurrent program in one SAT formula, while ESBMC explores each interleaving individually using context-bounded verification.
- CBMC uses a modified C parser written by James Roskind and a C++ parser based on OpenC++, while ESBMC relies on the Clang front-end.
- ESBMC implements the Solidity grammar production rules as its Solidity frontend, while CBMC does not implement a Solidity frontend.
- ESBMC verifies Kotlin programs with a model of the standard Kotlin libraries and checks a set of safety properties, while CBMC cannot handle Kotlin programs.
- CBMC implements k-induction, requiring three different calls: to generate the CFG, to annotate the program, and to verify it, whereas ESBMC handles the whole process in a single call. Additionally, CBMC does not have a forward condition to check if all states were reached and relies on a limited loop unwinding.
- ESBMC adds some additional types to the program's internal representation.
ESBMC is a joint project of the Federal University of Amazonas (Brazil), the University of Manchester (UK), the University of Southampton (UK), and the University of Stellenbosch (South Africa).
The ESBMC development was supported by various research funding agencies, including CNPq (Brazil), CAPES (Brazil), FAPEAM (Brazil), EPSRC (UK), Royal Society (UK), British Council (UK), European Commission (Horizon 2020), and companies including ARM, Intel, Motorola Mobility, Nokia Institute of Technology and Samsung. The ESBMC development is currently funded by ARM, EPSRC grants EP/T026995/1 and EP/V000497/1, Ethereum Foundation, EU H2020 ELEGANT 957286, Intel, Motorola Mobility (through Agreement N° 4/2021), and Soteria project awarded by the UK Research and Innovation for the Digital Security by Design (DSbD) Programme.