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Where Art Thou Heap Metadata?

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Contents

1	Introduction	5
1.1	Project Overview	5
1.2	Background	6
1.3	Approach	7
1.4	Accomplishments	7
1.5	Publications	8
1.6	Software	8
2	Summary of Research and Results	9
2.1	Family Tree of Glibc Allocators	9
2.2	Lock-Free Data Structures	11
2.3	Formal Analysis	12
3	Implementation Details	15
3.1	Metadata	15
3.2	Testing and Benchmarking	16
3.3	Possible Improvements	17
4	Conclusion	21
A	Survey of Malloc Implementations	25
A.1	Apple (OS X and iOS)	25
A.1.1	LibMalloc	25
A.1.2	BMalloc	26
A.2	Windows	27
A.2.1	Browser-specific memory allocators	27
A.2.2	Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit	28
A.2.3	Windows 8	28

List of Figures

1.1	Schematic Layout of a Standard Heap	6
1.2	Schematic Heap with Separate Metadata	7
2.1	The family tree of C memory allocators.	10

List of Tables

3.1	SPEC CPU Benchmarks: original GLIBC	18
3.2	SPEC CPU Benchmarks: psmalloc2	18
3.3	SPEC CPU Benchmarks: elfpa	19
3.4	SPEC CPU Benchmarks: sri-glibc	19

Chapter 1

Introduction

This document summarizes the research performed under Darpa Contract Number N66001-15-C-4061 by SRI International, and presents the project’s results. The project started in August 2015 and was completed in August 2017. The Principal Investigator for this project was Drew Dean, until his departure in July 2016. Ian A. Mason took over as PI after Drew Dean left. The co-investigators were Bruno Dutertre (SRI), Jorge Navas (SRI), and Dan Wallach (Rice University).

1.1 Project Overview

Almost all modern programs make extensive use of dynamically allocated data structures such as linked lists, trees, and other pointer- or reference-filled data structures. If the lifetime of the data exceeds the lifetime of the function or method allocating the data, as is often the case, then the data can not be allocated on the stack, and is instead allocated from the heap.¹ Dynamically allocated data structures are popular because they allow programs not to have hard-coded limits in them, and adapt their memory use to the actual usage of the program, rather than a developer’s best guess as to how the application will be used.

There are two primary downsides to dynamically allocated data structures:

1. Naïve use of dynamic memory allocation can incur significant performance cost.
2. Pointer usage errors can introduce additional security vulnerabilities into software, particularly a class of vulnerability known as a heap overflow.

¹There are conflicting uses of the word “heap” as a heap is also the name of a specific data structure. We use the computer science systems terminology in this white paper, where a process’ address space is divided into sections commonly referred to as code (aka text), data, heap, and stack space.



Figure 1.2: Schematic Heap with Separate Metadata. Color codes are as in Fig. 1.1.

1.3 Approach

We propose to refactor the implementation of `malloc()` and `free()` to produce a heap layout as shown in Figure 1.2. The important difference is that the `malloc` metadata is held in a separate memory region, one that is not contiguous with the heap. This metadata region is allocated by the operating system at a randomized address, and so its location cannot be deduced from the address of the client memory.

This separation improves security, but its implementation requires a mechanism for locating the metadata associated with a particular client memory address. Implementing this *lookup mechanism* efficiently—especially in a multi-threaded situation—is the core problem we face in this project.

In the single-threaded case, a hash table is an efficient data structure that adds minimal overhead to finding the metadata associated with a dynamically allocated pointer. This prevents simple errors from corrupting `malloc` metadata. Instead of reallocated heap data getting confused with `malloc` metadata (as in CERT-2002-07), an attacker would need primitives to both read the pointer to this region, and overwrite arbitrary memory locations. While such attack primitives are certainly possible, the attacker’s workload has been increased, and the current stockpile of heap overflow vulnerabilities become obsolete. A side benefit of our approach is that a double free bug can be readily detected and ignored or logged for debugging purposes. In an ideal world, the `malloc` metadata would be stored in a separate protection domain. In the CHERI architecture developed by SRI and Cambridge University in DARPA’s CRASH program, this would be easy to implement efficiently with capabilities. Conventional machines would need to use another process to guarantee separation, which may impose too much overhead, depending on the performance of interprocess communication mechanisms.

1.4 Accomplishments

In year one of this project, we produced several prototypes, culminating with an alpha version of a variant of `glibc`’s `malloc` for x86-64 Linux called `sri-glibc`. This allocator does not include any metadata in client memory. It is *thread safe*, and introduces no

new contention compared to the glibc original. Ongoing benchmarking indicates that the overhead is often very much less than 10%. One of the key ingredients to `sri-glibc` is an efficient lock-free mechanism that maps client addresses to the arena the memory belongs to.

In year two, we focused on verification and re-implementation of our hash table. The version we developed in year one had several concurrency bugs that we fixed in year two. In addition, we have addressed a significant issue related to memory management. Our hash tables rely on linear probing and expand when the current capacity is insufficient. This creates larger and larger copies of the table. Old copies eventually become inaccessible and not touched by any thread. Our year-one implementation did not keep track of this and never released any copy. The new implementation detects when old copies are no longer necessary and releases the corresponding memory to the operating system. We have developed our new hash-table implementation as a stand-alone package, independent of malloc.

We have also formalized key aspects of the hash-table implementation, namely the growing and data migration mechanism. We have developed a state-machine model of these mechanisms and verified critical properties using the SAL model checker.

1.5 Publications

The following paper describes improvements to the SeaHorn static analyzer that were developed as part of this project, in an attempt to prove the absence of null pointer dereferences in openBSD's malloc:

Arie Gurfinkel and Jorge A. Navas, A Context-Sensitive Memory Model for Verification of C/C++ Programs, *Static Analysis Symposium (SAS 2017)*.

This paper will be presented at the 24th Static Analysis Symposium to be held in New York City from August 30th to September 1st, 2017.

1.6 Software

We have developed several prototypes of malloc and lock-free hash tables during the project. Our re-implementation of GNU Libc's malloc that separates metadata from the head is publicly available under an open-source license at <https://github.com/SRI-CSL/sri-glibc-malloc>.

Chapter 2

Summary of Research and Results

The main results of this project are prototype implementations of malloc libraries, and implementations of lock-free hash tables. We also applied verification tools including static analyzers and model checkers to these software implementation and algorithms.

2.1 Family Tree of Glibc Allocators

Most of the malloc prototypes we developed belong to the family of memory allocators commonly used with Linux, in particular the Glibc-based distributions. These include most Linux distributions that do not target embedded systems. Figure 2.1 gives an abridged family tree of these memory allocators.

The root of the tree is Doug Lea’s malloc (`dlmalloc`), which was born in 1987. It was originally intended for single threaded applications with scarce resources. Gloger’s allocator (`ptmalloc2`) extends `dlmalloc` with *arenas*. Arenas are independent self-contained heaps that can be utilized simultaneously by separate threads, reducing contention for global locks. Glibc’s built-in memory allocator is a direct descendent of `ptmalloc2`. `Ptmalloc2`’s main attraction over Glibc malloc is its ease of compilation. Glibc malloc is deeply entwined in the Glibc infrastructure and is very difficult to extract into a stand-alone library. Glibc has also evolved somewhat since its fork from `ptmalloc2`, the arena locking is somewhat more complex, and the metadata has grown to include skip lists for the bin free lists.

Piessens’s `Dnmalloc` [28] is a package from 2005 that modified `dlmalloc` to move its metadata out of the heap, much like our proposal. This implementation used a lookup table based on a 32 bit address space that could not be extended to modern x86-64 hardware.

The green nodes in Figure 2.1 show three prototypes that we developed in this project.




Figure 2.1: The family tree of C memory allocators starting from Doug Lea’s work in the 1990s. Blue allocators are ancestors of our work. Green allocators have been developed within this project.

- Our first prototype (`dsmalloc`) generalized Doug Lea’s `malloc` along the lines of `dnmalloc` by implementing linear hashing, a version of dynamic hashing that uses a variation of Larson’s algorithm as published in [10].
- Our second prototype (`psmalloc2`) builds upon Gloger’s `malloc` (`ptmalloc2`). `psmalloc2` succeeds in removing almost all metadata from client memory. The only remaining piece of metadata is the index of the arena the memory belongs to. From a security point of view, what is critical is that the metadata in the heap is an integer, not a pointer. If the integer is corrupted (either by accident or by malice), `free()` or `realloc()` won’t be able to find the pointer, and can signal an error, but these routines won’t go chasing attacker supplied pointers and end up overwriting security-critical data.

- In our final prototype `sri-glibc`, we eliminated the need for an arena number in the client chunk by implementing a lock-free API to determine arena index from client pointer. We also tailored the metadata to improve performance by reducing the number of hash table lookups. This `sri-glibc` prototype is an alpha version. We tried to keep changes to a minimum, in the hope an upstream adoption, however as the changes added up, a cleaner approach becomes more apparent, and eventually essential.

In addition to the allocators mentioned previously—which all descend from Doug Lea’s `malloc`—we also examined `malloc` implementations in Windows and Apple’s OS X and iOS. A summary of implementation and security features is given in the Appendix.

2.2 Lock-Free Data Structures

Because we separate metadata from client memory, all our prototypes require a separate allocation mechanism for the metadata and the related data structures. These are not full-fledged allocators since they are dedicated to allocating objects of small range of (small) sizes. We call these *pool allocators*. To avoid excessive overhead, we wanted our pool allocators to be lock-free. This led us to Maged Michael’s paper on scalable, lock-free dynamic memory allocation [14]. This paper received PLDI’s “2004 Most Influential Paper Award” in 2014. The following quote explains this award.

Maged Michaels PLDI04 paper is considered a landmark in memory allocation for multi-threaded programs, presenting the first completely lock-free general-purpose user-space allocator. It provides good performance with respect to scalability, speed and space efficiency, while at the same time only relying on common hardware and OS support. The work is highly regarded and frequently referenced, and is also the basis of multiple memory allocator implementations, both in IBM products and in follow-on research.

Working from a 32-bit x86 implementation of Michael’s algorithm [21], we have developed a 64-bit x86_64 version (`elfpa`) that has no pointer metadata in the client memory. This is a full `malloc` implementation that relies on an almost lock-free hash table as a lookup mechanism.

Implementing a lock-free lookup was a major accomplishment of our project that enabled us to remove all metadata from Glibc’s `malloc` library. This solved a key difficulty, namely, efficiently mapping an arbitrary client pointer to the relevant arena without incurring the cost of a locking contention.

In year one of the project, we implemented two versions of lock-free dynamic hash table. Both were influenced by Maier’s paper [12]. Both implementations are based on

linear probing hash tables that expands when the current capacity is insufficient. The most complex aspect of such tables is the expansion phase. In one version, we relied on pthread locking and signaling primitives to allow a single thread to grow the table. This prevents concurrent access to the table while it is growing, which we considered a tolerable tradeoff. This implementation could not be ported to Glibc as the pthread primitives are not available. Instead, we developed another growing mechanism that requires no locking. In the growing phase, each thread that accesses the table must pay its due by migrating key-value pairs from the old table to the new one.

In year two, we continued developing and improving the lock-free dynamic hash table. We started a clean general-purpose version of the table, independent of malloc. The overall design did not change. The table maps 64 bit keys (i.e., integer or pointers) to 64 bit values. We use linear probing and store the entries in a fixed-size array. When this array is full, we create a new copy of double its size and migrate data from the previous array to the new array. As mentioned previously, this migration process is performed in a decentralized fashion. Any thread that accesses the hash table must first copy a fixed number of entries from the old to the new array. We also improved the algorithm so that old array copies that are no longer useful can be freed and the memory they use can be reclaimed by the operating system. For this purpose, we rely on reference counting to keep track of the number of threads that have a pointer to each array copy. Properly managing and updating these reference counters turned out to be quite difficult, and forced us to use locks in some critical parts of the code to avoid race conditions. The new implementation is then not entirely lock free. However, the locks are used only in limited contexts during the migration process and initialization of some data structures. In normal usage, operations such as adding or removing entries, and searching for a key do not require any locks. Appendix ?? presents the hash-table design and algorithms in detail.

To get confidence in this hash-table implementation, we performed extensive stress testing. We also applied formal verification to key parts of the migration process.

2.3 Formal Analysis

In year two of the project, we investigated several formal-method tools and applied them to existing malloc implementations and to our own code, including our new dynamic hash table.

Static Analysis of Malloc

We have applied static analysis tools to a simplified version of OpenBSD's memory allocation library. This library implements a so-called BIBOP (Big Bag of Pages) allocation

algorithm. This allocator was implemented by Otto Moerbeek and was described at the EuroBSD Conference in 2009 [18]. This allocator is an interesting target for analysis since it is relatively simple and the code is small, but the allocator achieves good performance.

In a first attempt, we applied the SeaHorn static analyzer [6] to this code, without any modification. SeaHorn is an open-source verification tool for safety properties of programs. It works at the level of LLVM bitcode so it can be easily applied to software written in C or C++. SeaHorn can check safety properties such as the absence of null-pointer dereferences and buffer overflows. It can also verify user-provided properties written as C-like assertions. Our initial goal was to show that the OpenBSD malloc did not have null-pointer dereferences.

It turned out that some of the algorithmic tricks used by OpenBSD were beyond what can be modeled in SeaHorn, because the backend solver used by SeaHorn works on problem formulated in linear arithmetic. The OpenBSD code uses various bit-level encoding that do not translate to linear arithmetic. As a result, analysis with SeaHorn does not work well on the original code. The modeling is too imprecise and SeaHorn produces too many false positives.

We addressed these issues by replacing problematic parts of the code with simpler variants (sometimes using non-deterministic constructs) that are easier for SeaHorn to handle. We were able to prove the absence of null-pointer dereferences for simple test drivers that allocate constant-size chunks of memory. We then extended these drivers to simulate an arbitrary number of calls to malloc immediately followed by calls to free. Each malloc uses a non-deterministic size argument. This test corresponds to the following loop:

```
while (*) { sz = random(); p = malloc(sz); free(p); }
```

For this example, we did not obtain a complete proof with SeaHorn. The tool did not find safe inductive invariants. But we could explore the code using SeaHorn's bounded model checking engine after unrolling all the loops eight times. We did not find any null pointer dereference.

A detailed analysis showed that the invariants necessary to prove the absence of null-pointer dereference are beyond what the backend solver can produce. For example, some of them require learning facts about integer divisibility and other require quantifiers.

Overall, we found that automated verification of malloc algorithms (even relatively simple ones) is beyond the reach of current static analysis techniques. Semi-automated techniques where the code is annotated by hand with invariants, pre-conditions, and post-conditions might be applicable (e.g., using FramaC [9]). We did not have the resource for such an exercise within the project.

Modeling and Verification of Lock-Free Algorithms

Chapter 3

Implementation Details

We now give more details about `sri-glibc` malloc. As all malloc-based memory management libraries, it manages system memory on behalf of client software. It gets memory from the operating system using system calls such as `sbrk` and `mmap`. System memory comes in large page-aligned blocks that the library splits into smaller sub-blocks called *chunks*. Client software obtains new chunks via calls to `malloc` and `realloc`, and releases chunks via calls to `free`. Glibc maintains various data structures, such as tables and lists, to manage these chunks.¹

As we discussed previously, Glibc malloc attempts to minimize contention for multi-threaded applications by maintaining several independent heaps called *arenas*. In single-threaded applications, Glibc relies on a single main arena. In the multi-threaded case, each thread is transparently assigned a separate arena for its allocation.

3.1 Metadata

Most traditional malloc implementations (including all those listed in Figure 2.1) manage memory by keeping track of the start, size, status (e.g., in use, free, and mmaped), and other information about client memory. In current Glibc, the metadata is stored as a header in each chunk. It consists of the following fields:

```
struct malloc_chunk {
    INTERNAL_SIZE_T    prev_size;
    INTERNAL_SIZE_T    size;
    struct malloc_chunk* fd;
    struct malloc_chunk* bk;
```

¹An interesting feature of the Glibc family of allocators is that they maintain the invariant that there are no adjacent free chunks. This is achieved by coalescing adjacent free chunks.

```

    struct malloc_chunk* fd_nextsize;
    struct malloc_chunk* bk_nextsize;
};

```

The most important fields are `size` and `prev_size`, which store the size of a chunk and the size of the previous chunk, respectively. Because all sizes are rounded up to multiples of 16, the low-order bits of the `size` field store status information: whether or not the previous chunk is in use, whether it is mmapped, and whether it belongs to the main arena.² The remaining fields are used only for free chunks. They are pointers in various lists of free blocks, called *bins*. The metadata for a memory chunk at address `a` is stored in a header (at address `a - 16`).

Given an arbitrary client pointer, assumed to be the start of a valid chunk, glibc reads the header to determine whether the chunk is mmapped. If so, the chunk is handled directly by the operating system. Otherwise, the first step in all operations is to determine the chunk’s arena and lock it. Arena indices are not stored explicitly in the metadata. Instead they are computed using offset calculations and pointer-chasing tricks.

Our prototype reuses most of the existing Glibc concepts, data structures, and algorithms. We only remove the metadata headers from the client chunks and move them into a separate region of memory (as shown in Figure 1.2). The main challenge is to replace the simple header read by an alternative lookup mechanism. Simple ideas such as a global hash-table are too inefficient to be practical.

Our solution is a two-step procedure. First, from an arbitrary pointer, we determine in a *lock-free fashion* the arena to which the pointer belongs. As an additional security feature, this first step detects whether a client pointer is the start of a valid chunk. Once the arena is determined, we lock it as in normal glibc, and access the chunk’s metadata using a linear dynamic hash table (as in [10]). Each arena has its own local hash table that stores metadata for every chunk in that arena. The important property is that this scheme does not incur more locking overhead than the original glibc.

3.2 Testing and Benchmarking

We have validated all our prototypes on a set of applications that make heavy use of dynamic-memory allocation. Our primary tests include the Yices regression tests, benchmarks for Cryptominisat, a multi-threaded Boolean SAT solver, and the SPEC CPU 2006 integer benchmark suite.

Yices is an SMT solver developed by SRI [5]. It is written in C and includes more than 900 regression tests. We chose Yices as a testing target because we are in control

²On 32-bit machines, the sizes are typically multiples of 8, not 16, but the status fields are the same.

of the code and because it extensively uses `malloc`, `realloc`, and `free`. The Yices regression tests revealed bugs in existing `malloc` such as `dnmalloc` and in Schneider’s implementation of Michael’s lock-free `malloc`. All our prototypes successfully pass all Yices regression tests.

We selected Cryptominisat to exercise our prototypes in a multi-threaded application. Cryptominisat is an open-source SAT solver developed by Mate Soos [24]. It is a relatively large application written in C++. It is memory-intensive and can be run in multi-threaded mode. It is easy to test Cryptominisat using large problems available from the SAT solvers competitions. Many of them require significant runtime for Cryptominisat and require large numbers of calls to the `malloc` functions.

We used Yices and Cryptominisat primarily for validation and debugging. For more extensive performance measurements (and comparison with baseline), we ran the SPEC CPU 2006 integer benchmark suite [4]. This benchmarking amounted to several days of CPU time. We have completed benchmarking of the original GLibc `malloc`, of `pmalloc2`, of our 64-bit implementation of Maged Michael’s `malloc`, and of preliminary versions of `sri-glibc`. Benchmarking of the final `sri-glibc` is ongoing. Results are shown in Tables 3.1 to 3.4. Each table follows the standard SPEC CPU format, together with a overhead percentage, and represents the average of 10 runs. The two important columns are the third and fifth. The third one displays the average run time per benchmark family in seconds, while the fifth displays the percentage difference between the third column of this `malloc` version compared to the base `glibc` version. These benchmark results are just preliminary ones, and should really just be used to get a general sense of the performance of each prototype.

3.3 Possible Improvements

From our profiling efforts on `glibc`, it was clear that significant amounts of overhead were going into metadata lookups. In traditional `glibc`’s `malloc`, every block has its own metadata inline, just below the address of the pointer being given to `malloc`’s caller. Consequently, when `free` is called, all that `free` needs to do is subtract a constant from the pointer and it has all the metadata it needs. Because this metadata represents a security risk, wherein an attacker who can perform a heap overflow can overwrite this metadata, the primary goal of SRI’s project was to relocate this metadata elsewhere. Consequently, the HeapMetadata project added a, per arena, hashtable to map from a heap pointer to its corresponding metadata structure.

Using this hashtable, relative to the original process of just doing some pointer arithmetic, can be a non-trivial cost when the number of live pointers grows into the millions. Benchmark applications which rapidly allocate and free very small objects are particu-

Benchmark	Base (s)	Run time (s)	Base Ratio	% Overhead (%)
400.perlbench	9770	271	36.1	0
401.bzip2	9650	378	25.5	0
403.gcc	8050	232	34.7	0
429.mcf	9120	200	45.6	0
445.gobmk	10490	374	28.0	0
456.hmmer	9330	354	26.3	0
458.sjeng	12100	429	28.2	0
462.libquantum	20720	318	65.3	0
464.h264ref	22130	443	49.9	0
471.omnetpp	6250	299	20.9	0
473.astar	7020	305	23.0	0
483.xalancbmk	6900	180	38.4	0

Table 3.1: SPEC CPU Benchmarks: original GLIBC

Benchmark	Base (s)	Run time (s)	Base Ratio	% Overhead (%)
400.perlbench	9770	331	29.5	22
401.bzip2	9650	376	25.6	-1
403.gcc	8050	260	31.0	12
429.mcf	9120	208	43.8	4
445.gobmk	10490	373	28.2	-1
456.hmmer	9330	356	26.2	0
458.sjeng	12100	421	28.8	-2
462.libquantum	20720	315	65.8	-1
464.h264ref	22130	443	50.0	0
471.omnetpp	6250	423	14.8	41
473.astar	7020	307	22.9	0
483.xalancbmk	6900	513	13.4	185

Table 3.2: SPEC CPU Benchmarks: psmalloc2

Benchmark	Base (s)	Run time (s)	Base Ratio	% Overhead (%)
400.perlbench	9770	517	18.9	90
401.bzip2	9650	403	23.9	6
403.gcc	8050	388	20.7	67
429.mcf	9120	227	40.1	13
445.gobmk	10490	403	26.0	7
456.hmmer	9330	386	24.2	9
458.sjeng	12100	472	25.6	10
462.libquantum	20720	327	63.4	2
464.h264ref	22130	489	45.3	10
471.omnetpp	6250	286	21.9	-5
473.astar	7020	313	22.4	2
483.xalancbmk	6900	156	44.2	-14

Table 3.3: SPEC CPU Benchmarks: elfpa

Benchmark	Base (s)	Run time (s)	Base Ratio	% Overhead (%)
400.perlbench	9770	336	29.0	23
401.bzip2	9650	409	23.6	8
403.gcc	8050	259	31.1	11
429.mcf	9120	241	37.9	20
445.gobmk	10490	404	26.0	8
456.hmmer	9330	384	24.3	8
458.sjeng	12100	463	26.2	7
462.libquantum	20720	331	62.6	4
464.h264ref	22130	481	46.0	8
471.omnetpp	6250	437	14.3	46
473.astar	7020	334	21.0	9
483.xalancbmk	6900	232	29.7	28

Table 3.4: SPEC CPU Benchmarks: sri-glibc

larly impacted by these costs.

Our first effort was to simulate a read-cache that sits in front of this hashtable. With as few as 16 entries in the cache, our simulations indicated a hit rate as high as 50% for these highly impacted benchmark applications. This suggested that a cache might be beneficial. Implementing this cache did indeed significantly reduce the CPU cache-misses encountered when running the impacted benchmarks, but *benchmark performance did not improve*. The cost of looping through the cache to find a hit turned out to add enough overhead to the cache misses to negate the benefits of cache hits.

We also constructed a read cache with only two elements. Our data showed that this much smaller cache would have a hitrate of approximately 28%, with code that would be much more efficient (e.g., avoiding branches by using conditional-move instructions). Nonetheless, benchmark performance again did not improve.

Lastly, the hashtable is implemented in the standard fashion where entries that map to the same bucket are stored as a linked list (also called “separate chaining”³). We hypothesized that when an entry is found in one of these linked lists, we could relocate it to the head of the list. This takes constant time, and would ensure that a “hot” entry would be found sooner. Performance measurements showed performance improvements of approximately 4% on the relevant benchmarks.

³Wikipedia has a nice discussion of how hashtable collisions are commonly handled. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash_table\#Collision_resolution

Chapter 4

Conclusion

We have produced several prototypes allocators, most of which were derived from the glibc family tree, depicted in Figure 2.1. We also implemented Maged Michael’s lock-free allocator, and a variety of lock-free data structures. This work culminates with an alpha version of a variant of glibc’s malloc for x86-64 Linux called `sri-glibc`. This allocator does not include any metadata in client memory. It is *thread safe*, and introduces no new contention compared to the glibc original. Ongoing benchmarking indicates that the overhead is often very much less than 10%. One of the key ingredients to `sri-glibc` is an efficient lock-free mechanism that maps client addresses to the arena the memory belongs to.

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Appendix A

Survey of Malloc Implementations

A.1 Apple (OS X and iOS)

Security researchers have paid attention to Apple operating systems, [20] but its memory allocator has received less attention. Some discussion appears in Miller and Zovi [16, 17] in 2009 and 2012. The earliest public discussion seems to be from Nemo [19] in 2005.

As of 2016, Apple uses two different `malloc` implementations: `libmalloc` and `bmalloc`. `libmalloc` appears to date from Apple’s acquisition of NeXT, while `bmalloc` is a brand new system, used in Apple’s Safari browser. Both are distributed as open source on Apple’s web site [1, 2]. `bmalloc` is also distributed as part of Apple’s open source Webkit [3] (i.e., the open source project from which Apple’s Safari browser is derived).

A.1.1 LibMalloc

`libmalloc` is implemented in C and exports a superset of the usual `malloc` routines. Notably, it has a concept of *zones*, allowing a program to allocate fresh memory from any zone. Under the hood, these zones are essentially the same as the *arenas* used in the glibc memory allocators. With Apple explicitly exposing these zones, a multi-threaded program can explicitly manage multiple zones to avoid locking contention when memory is allocated.

Zones also support *batch allocation*, facilitating efficient allocation of large numbers of objects of the same size. Apple’s developer pages promote these and other `libmalloc`-specific features.¹ Apple also supports zone-specific allocation in its Co-

¹<https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Performance/Conceptual/ManagingMemory/Articles/MemoryAlloc.html>

coa Objective-C libraries² and apparently zone allocation is also used inside the newer Swift programming environment.³

The downside of `libmalloc`'s approach, however, is that alternative `malloc` implementations do not implement the various zone-related methods and are not drop-in compatible with programs or libraries that expect to have the extended `libmalloc` features.

`libmalloc` gives explicit credit to the Hoard allocator as an influence on its design. This analysis focuses on management of the “tiny” regions, used for small object sizes.

Tiny objects are allocated from *regions*. Each region is 1MB in size and holds 64520 16-byte *blocks*. A region also has a *region trailer* which contains the metadata for the region. The trailer includes a bitmask to track the free/busy state of each tiny block. When a block is allocated, it has no per-block header or trailer. Free blocks are maintained using a doubly-linked list.

Apple's design, in the presence of a use-after-free situation, potentially allows attackers to have access to the free-list pointers. Furthermore, if an attacker can overflow the last block in a region, the attacker will then have access to that region's metadata.

`libmalloc` maintains a checksum in its heap metadata, added sometime between 2009 and 2012, that defeats some heap metadata overwrite attacks. A checksum is stored in the high four bits of each free-list pointer, based on a randomly-generated cookie [16].

`libmalloc` also has a variety of flags that radically change how it operates, along with a related *Guard Malloc* library⁴. These help developers in finding memory errors in their programs. They have a serious impact upon performance. They could potentially be repurposed for security if their performance could be improved. Of note, `MallocGuardEdges` adds guard pages around large blocks, which will cause memory overruns to abort. Also, several environment variables instruct `libmalloc` to perform consistency checks on its heap. If corruption is detected, the process will abort.

A.1.2 BMalloc

Before 2015, the Webkit browser used Google's `tcmalloc`, then Apple abruptly replaced it with `bmalloc`.

The `bmalloc` implementation does not presently have the standard `malloc` API. Instead, a family of similarly-named calls (“`mbmalloc`”, “`mbcalloc`”, “`mbfree`”, etc.) are provided, along with an internal switch that can route these calls to the “real” `malloc`

²<https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/General/Conceptual/CocoaEncyclopedia/ObjectAllocation/ObjectAllocation.html>

³<http://www.russbishop.net/swift-how-did-i-do-horrible-things>

⁴<https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/Performance/Conceptual/ManagingMemory/Articles/MallocDebug.html>

implementation or handle them internally. A program linked against `bmalloc` can then be switched over to a third-party `malloc` implementation. `bmalloc` does not expose anything analogous to the “zone” features of `libmalloc`.

`bmalloc` has a unique design. It could be best described as “lazy”, in that when a block is freed, a pointer to it is placed in a fixed-size buffer. In the common case, allocation and free operations are constant time, with a very low cost.

`bmalloc` supports multiple *heaps*. A heap has *small pages* which in turn have *small lines*. `bmalloc` tracks the free space within these small lines. Then, for each of a variety of *size classes*, `bmalloc` maintains “bump allocators” which are backed by those small lines. Objects are allocated starting at the beginning of a line and continuing sequentially to the end.

Each heap has an asynchronous “scavenger” which processes its free lists, looking for memory it can reuse. If the scavenger gets behind, the normal allocation and memory freeing routines can also do the same work.

Unlike `libmalloc`, memory objects in `bmalloc` never hold metadata when they’re freed. Instead of an inline free list, there is a counter in the header for each line of memory to track how much is in use versus how much is free. If the counter indicates a line of memory is entirely unused, it can be recycled for future allocations.

The metadata resides in headers at the front of each heap. The asynchronous nature of the free-list scavenger makes it harder for an attacker to predict the state of the heap at any given time, which is otherwise essential to Heap Feng Shui attacks.

`bmalloc` has no explicit features to detect use-after-free or double-free operations which might be exploited as part of an attack, but it has clearly been engineered to make some attacks more difficult.

A.2 Windows

Microsoft’s Windows memory allocator has been the subject of regular attention from the hacking community. In response, Microsoft has developed particular security solutions for Internet Explorer and legacy systems going back to Windows XP. As part of their ongoing security efforts, Microsoft has also been improving the general resistance of the default `malloc` implementation that ships with Windows. Here, we focus particularly on the design in Windows 8.

A.2.1 Browser-specific memory allocators

Circa 2014, Internet Explorer introduced two new defenses [23, 26].

Memory protector Newly freed objects are zeroed out but are not immediately made available for reuse. Instead, a mark-and-sweep style system detects whether there are live references from the current call stack to any of these heap objects after they’ve been freed. This is effective at defeating “use after free” attacks.

Isolated heap This exposes multiple memory arenas to the user level, similar to Apple’s `libmalloc` (see Section A.1.1). Operations that could potentially cross arenas, like a `realloc`, will fail. This allows Internet Explorer to isolate potentially attackable objects (e.g., aspects of the HTML DOM) from system objects. This could help defeat some classes of heap overflow attacks.

In Windows 10, Microsoft rolled out “MemGC”, which provides additional memory protections for its Edge and Internet Explorer 10 browsers [27]. MemGC provides a concurrent mark-and-sweep garbage collector, which originates with Microsoft’s JavaScript implementation, but which also serves the rest of the browser runtime system.

A.2.2 Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit

Also in 2014, Microsoft released the fifth version of its Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET5) [13]. EMET5 can be applied to versions of Windows as old as Windows XP, and has a variety of features, such as being able to prevent an application like Microsoft Word from loading an Adobe Acrobat plugin. To hinder heap attacks, EMET5 adds:

Heap spraying Preallocates blocks in regions that known heap-spray attacks like to use. (Trivial for new attacks to work around.)

Null page The page at the bottom of memory is pre-allocated to defeat attacks meant to trick the memory allocator into giving a reference to the zero / null address.

ASLR + DEP In addition to defending against a variety of other attacks, EMET adds some randomness to where `malloc`’s pages will be located.

A.2.3 Windows 8

The Windows 8 heap memory allocator is sufficiently complicated that any discussion here will necessarily be superficial.

The basic design of Microsoft’s heap allocator is very similar to other arena-based allocators, with a front-end “low fragmentation heap” (LFH) that manages large numbers of small allocations, and a back-end that allocates memory from the operating system and feeds it to the LFHs, as necessary.

Where Windows Vista and earlier versions arranged free blocks as a doubly-linked list, Windows 8 now uses a bitmap, placing critical metadata out of the reach of attackers. Similarly, where metadata is still present, it is generally encoded (i.e., XORed with a constant), to make it hard for attackers to do anything useful.

The most comprehensive explanation and analysis of the Windows 8 heap allocator can be found in Valasek and Mandt [25]. They describe the structures and algorithms in great detail. Johnson and Miller [8] discuss ongoing mitigations within Microsoft's heap allocator. With specific reference to heap allocation attacks, a Microsoft technical report [15] summarizes the changes in Windows 8:

Heap integrity checks `malloc` and `free` perform checks on the metadata and terminate the computation if corruption is detected.

Fatal exceptions In older versions, when `malloc` or `free` had some sort of error, they would swallow it, possibly returning `null`, and thus giving attackers multiple attempts at any given attack. All errors are now immediately fatal.

Freeing metadata Hawkes [7] shows how a use-after-free attack, where the attacker can overwrite a pointer to the heap metadata, could then allow an attacker to attack the heap metadata structure itself. Windows 8 has specific logic in it to detect this attack.

Encoded metadata A function pointer in each heap header is XORed with a constant to make it unusable by an attacker. That constant is now relocated to where it's (hopefully) not easily read or written by an attacker. Encoding is also used to protect metadata for the "low fragmentation heap".

Guard pages All large allocations (> 1MB on a 64-bit machine) go directly to the VM system, which creates a trailing guard page. Smaller allocations come from "heap segments" which also now have trailing guard pages. In some cases, these heap segments are broken up, nondeterministically, with additional guard pages.

Allocation ordering Allocations are also done in a nondeterministic order, making it harder for an attacker to do Heap Feng Shui.

Seeley [22] observes that, while allocation order is randomized, the higher-level block allocations made from the operating system won't be. He estimates a lower-bound 50% chance of successfully performing a heap attack on Windows 8, while pointing out how much easier it would be on Windows 7 and earlier. Liu [11] makes similar observations.