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Leaking

SafeSlingerProject edited this page Nov 24, 2014 · 3 revisions

SafeSlinger Exchange and Messenger are designed your privacy in mind. We have designed a number of features that differentiate us from other messaging systems to prevent inadvertent privacy leaks.

Voice Recognition

Foe every text message you type, and every text box in the Messenger we have disabled the ability to use the microphone to perform voice recognition. Using voice recognition allows the operating system to send your voice to be translated to the operating systems' servers which means that the message you are composing you thought was secret can now be read by a 3rd party. We disabled voice recognition to prevent this privacy leak.

Background Proof of Delivery

We have intentionally not implemented a proof of delivery system in the background since to do so reveals privacy data to your sender such as: online/offline status, if you've deleted the sender from your contacts. In the future we may implement a proof of delivery in the foreground, meaning proof of delivery could be sent back to the sender only when you decide to send a new message, never in the background.

Notifications

We never allow the display of decrypted content, sender, or other meta-data in the notifications you receive for new messages. Instead, we simply display "SafeSlinger Message Available" which you can tap to open the application with your passphrase to reveal the content of the message. This makes sure that your privacy is not leaked through message notifications as in the article Easily Extracting (“encrypted”) Messages from Threema, TextSecure, Chadder, WhatsApp, Hangouts and Co. by Max Kolhagen and Siegfried Rasthofer.

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