Introduction to Monero

And a lesson in privacy and coin equality

Justin Ehrenhofer Organizer, Monero Community Workgroup Compliance Analyst, DV Chain





a communitydriven,



open source project that




makes safe digital cash




and owns up to its shortcomings You may have met a Monero enthusiast in a situation like this:

(We can't help it)









Real Problems Monero Addresses



Strong, ubiquitous privacy



Coin equality (fungibility)



Accessible PoW mining (RandomX)



Adaptive block size and fees

Real Problems Monero Addresses



Strong, ubiquitous privacy



Coin equality (fungibility)



Accessible PoW mining (RandomX)




Adaptive block size and fees

Cryptocurrency network privacy is less than the sum of its parts





Transaction Structure and Tracing






Transaction Structure and Tracing






Transaction Tracing


? XMR ? XMR



Monero has REAL privacy, not POTENTIAL privacy

If there are issues with privacy, we discuss and patch them openly, not blame users





Advisory note for users making use of subaddresses

Posted by: Justin Ehrenhofer / knaccc October 18, 2019

Dear participants of the Monero ecosystem,

After some new limitations of subaddresses were found, this post should help clarify the use-cases of subaddresses and the privacy protections that they provide.

Monero added subaddresses to its software to allow simpler OpSec management.

For many users, subaddresses are a more elegant way to receive transactions than integrated addresses or main addresses. However, subaddresses are not as robust as using entirely different seeds for each desired disparate identity.

In summary, the below chart should help explain the relative privacy protections of different address behaviors. From a user experience perspective, subaddresses are far more user-friendly than using addresses from completely different seeds, while still providing a level of privacy protection that is sufficient for most use-cases.

Optional CoinJoin zkSNARKs Lelantus CoinSwap PerfectlyPrivateTM

is a bad solution for the wrong problem

Results of a fungibility exercise

Name to Alice	
Alice to Bob 🛑	
Bob to Charlie	


Results of a fungibility exercise

- People avoided the tainted cards
- Some would only accept tainted for "something extra"
- Most people would pay more for "fresh cards"
- In reality, who among the attendees pays for Chainalysis?




Reality


- Chain analysis companies will most likely mark the use of any optional privacy as higher risk (this is enforced by several tools)
- Mandatory mining to shielded doesn't fix
- Optional privacy often harms fungibility, not helps




Privacy is hard. Coin equality is harder.


Proportion of transactions w/ 1+ deducible ring over time











Transactions w/o deducible ring











What's next?






CLSAG

More efficient transactions

Arcturus, Triptych Larger ringsizes 128-256

How YOU should participate



Get educated masteringmonero.com moneromeans.money



Get started cakewallet.com




Join the community communityworkgroup.org

Conclusion

- Monero transactions use ring signatures and stealth addresses
- Monero beginners have reasonably strong privacy by default
- Privacy needs to be thought of on a network implementation basis, not on a single-user basis
- Monero is the only network that seems to care about real privacy
- Monero is the only network that prevents mass surveillance
- Watch for more efficient transactions soon, and much larger ringsizes in the medium-term future

Questions?

justin@ehrenhofer.org @JEhrenhofer



Get educated
masteringmonero.com
moneromeans.money



Get started cakewallet.com



Join the community communityworkgroup.org