




RING SIGNATURES




Monero Privacy Components




Ring Signatures and Plausible Deniability



History of Ringsizes in Monero




0-Decoy Attack and Chain Reaction



key image


0-Decoy Attack and Chain Reaction




0-Decoy Attack and Chain Reaction



Chain Split and Key Image Reuse




Chain Split and Key Image Reuse



Mining Pool Public Data

Data: supportxmr.com



Blocks Found

Page: 1 ▾ Rows per page: 15 ▾ 1 - 15 of 27307

Valid	Time Found	Reward	Height	Hash	Effort
✓	16 minutes ago	4.102809267926	1,633,941	f5cf4623ce9d5...	14 %

Payments Made

Page: 1 ▾ Rows per page: 15 ▾ 1 - 15 of 35734

Time Sent	Transaction Hash	Amount	Fee	Mixin
an hour ago	ea7319aef8df...	0.955813965382 XMR	0.00639756 XMR	6

Mining Pool Public Data

Data: supportxmr.com

*Secret churning
Blackball coinbase outputs*

Blocks Found

Page: 1 Rows per page: 15 1 - 15 of 27307

Valid	Time Found	Reward	Height	Hash	Effort
✓	16 minutes ago	4.102809267926	1,633,941	f5cf4623ce9d5...	14 %


Modified input selection algorithm

Payments Made


Page: 1 Rows per page: 15 1 - 15 of 35734

Time Sent	Transaction Hash	Amount	Fee	Mixin
an hour ago	ea7319aef8df...	0.955813965382 XMR	0.00639756 XMR	6


Mining Pool Public Data



Mining Pool Public Data



High Output Control (Exchanges & Wallets)






What Can You Do?



Blackball Known Compromised Outputs

- Exclude them from your ring signature
- Items to exclude:
 - 0-decoy transaction inputs (low priority)
 - Unique inputs used on several chains with identical key images
 - Public pool data
 - Outputs known to be controlled by large wallets and exchange (difficult to obtain)

Churn



ANONYMITY SET



Spend During Good Times

- Avoid spending shortly before or after times when the network has a high proportion of poisoned outputs
- Impossible to avoid all of these since not all information is public, but can work around announced chain splits, etc. if possible
- Avoid spending if the Monero network is being spammed with transactions




Different Types of Linkability

Linking Subaddresses and Transactions




<SUBADDRESS 1>



key image

<SUBADDRESS 2>



key image



Linking (Sub)Addresses to Real-World Identity

Adding additional entropy before and after sending funds to someone who knows your identity, including friends, family, merchants, and KYC/AML exchanges

Churn before making these transactions





Linking Outputs

You want every output you touch to have no association with any other outputs you have

Ideally a trait in a completely fungible system, but Monero is not completely fungible against all heuristics, only plausible deniability



Always churn every output separately, and churn every time you receive funds, including non-churn change from your transactions



Challenges for Increasing the Ringsize



Ringsize Challenges





Summary

- Covered 4 different ways for ring signatures to lose plausible deniability
- Covered several considerations for heuristic tests
- Covered best-practices for using Monero's ring signatures correctly in a variety of use-cases
- Covered the challenges of increasing Monero's ringsize



Thank You!



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