



# Where did my data go? Evaluation of Distributed Ledger Technologies' Suitability for Personal Data Provenance in Healthcare and Finance

Bachelor's Thesis of

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# **Contents**

1	Intro	oductio	on			1
2	Data	Prover	nance			3
3	Data	Prover	nance Requirements			4
	3.1	Gener	ral	 		6
	3.2	Health	hcare	 		7
	3.3	Financ	ice	 		8
4	Dist	ributed	Ledger Technologies			9
	4.1	Types	s and Characteristics	 		9
		4.1.1	Public/Private	 		9
		4.1.2	Permissioned/Permisionless	 		9
	4.2	DLT a	and Data Provenance	 		9
	4.3	DLT i	in Healthcare	 		9
		4.3.1	Current State	 		9
		4.3.2	HyperLedger Fabric	 		9
	4.4	DLT i	in Finance	 		9
		4.4.1	Current State	 		9
		4.4.2	Ethereum	 		9
5	Eval	uated M	Mapping			10
6	Disc	ussion				11
	6.1	Princi	iple Findings	 		11
	6.2	Implic	cations for Practice	 		11
	6.3	Implic	cations for Research	 		11
	6.4	Limita	ations and Future Work	 		11
7	Con	clusion				12
Bil	bliogr	aphy				13

### 1 Introduction

With e-health [Eys01], e-finance [AMS02], cloud services, 'Internet of Things', social media, etc. spreading and growing by the day, data exchanged, analysed or produced by intelligent devices become more and more difficult to trace [17]. It is often unknown how information is collected, how it is further processed, by whom, and for what purpose [Zub15]. This kind of information is often referred to as *data provenance* (DP), where "The provenance of a data item includes information about the processes and sources that lead to its creation and current representation" [GD07, p. 3]. The purpose of provenance is to extract relatively simple explanations for the existence of some piece of data from some complex workflow of data manipulation.

With digitalisation, the concern with potential exposure of private and sensitive personal information is rising [TQV21], and with it, the significance of DP [BT19]. Also, information is not only personal and private, but also proprietary. Consumers should know if their data had been manipulated and how, in a network, that provides interoperability and connects actors in a secure, trustworthy, transparent and 'user friendly' way [Sun+14].

An increasing amount of research is being done to utilize DP technologies [BT19] in the fields of *healthcare* [Mar+20; LAC19; Le 18; HK21; Rah+20; Sun+14], *finance* [Sin+20; Liu+21; SAD19; Sir+19], supply-chain [Man+18], cloud services [Xia+17], scientific research [SPG05], etc.

A lot of progress has been made recently regarding personal data and its protection [12][13][14]. In European data protection law, everybody has the right to know where the organisation accountable got his data from, what the data was used for, where it was transferred to and how long it is stored, regardless of location [, GDPR]. However, laws and regulations alone cannot provide consumers with information about their personal data (16). The regulations created the need for tools, which can enable consumers to exercise their rights.

Unfortunately, many tools failed to meet the requirements of such technology (17–19). In order for such tools to work, a combination of not only proper standards and legislation is needed, but also international adoption as well as mature and suitable technologies and architectures for their development (16). When improperly designed, DP tools can be a severe threat to the consumer and in a networked environment with a lot of actors this can be a complex and costly system to implement and manage (17).

There are tools that partially solve some of the existing problems like owning your data, knowing where it is stored and what's happening to it (34), others provide full access to all personal data along information flows (24) or easy-to-understand visualization techniques (35). However, these tools are still built in a centralised manner. While centralised databases provide advantages in terms of, for instance, maintainability, they have drawbacks in terms of their availability, performance (bottlenecks), and don't necessarily solve the issue with untrustworthiness (p. 266-267) (36).

To desire a one-fits-all solution is unrealistic. Recently, however, the *distributed ledger technologies* (DLTs) are on the rise and steadily becoming more versatile in terms of applicable

use cases (37). DLT has been developed to keep a distributed immutable ledger of financial transactions (36). The ledger can be seen as a provenance record of, say, bitcoins; and it is therefore unsurprising that DLT could be used to record provenance in other settings. By leveraging the global-scale computing power of distributed networks, a DLT-based DP can provide integrity, authenticity, transparency, accountability, provenance and trustworthiness through its decentralized architecture, immutable record of transactions, lack of single authority, consensus mechanisms, smart contracts, tamper-proof storage of data, etc. (38–40).

There are, however, different DLTs and they vary from each other in many ways such as their design, purpose, way of access, way of governance and so on (51). So it is important to understand the characteristics, capabilities and trade-offs of individual DLTs (52) in order to select the most suitable approach for personal DP in the field of *healthcare* and *finance*. This leads us to the research question: What are the properties of Distributed Ledger Technologies that make them beneficial/suitable for personal data provenance in healthcare and finance?

In the next section, take a closer look at Data Provenance, followed by Requirements and Use Cases in section three. In section four we describe DLTs, their characteristics, capabilities, available approaches and implementations, whereas section 5 presents an evaluated mapping of our selected DLT approaches to the DP requirements. This is followed by discussion consisting of principle findings, implications for practice, implications for research, limitations and future work in section six. Then we end the work with a brief conclusion in section seven.

## 2 Data Provenance

In this work we define *data provenance* (DP) as an approach that can be used to record not only metadata, data origin and/or data operation, but also processes that act on data and agents that are responsible for those processes. Most importantly, this should be achieved in a secure, trustworthy and transparent way, that ensures accountability and is in accordance to international laws and regulation, with the well-being of the consumer in mind.

## **3 Data Provenance Requirements**

Data Provenance approaches/technologies, suitable for tracing the origin and source of personal data and the processes that led to its current state, have to fulfil a number of requirements. In this section we describe the requirements derived from the available literature, as well as others, which *we think* are essential for the use cases investigated in our work. We differentiate between the following roles in our use cases:

Healthcare: Patient, Physician, Institution

Finance: Consumer, Institution

General: Data Subject (Sender/Receiver)

## 3.1 General

Group	Requirement	Description	
	Identification	Associates each Data Subject with an unique identifier and allows identification.	
User	Anonymity/ Unlinkability	Give the possibility to send, receive or access data in an anonymous or pseudonymous way. However, provenance is an example for a possible conflict between transparency and unlinkability.	
	Ownership	Allows Data Subjects to get an overview, request or perform changes and deletion of the data that they own.	
	Accessibility	Allows Data Subjects with access to view, store, retrieve, move or manipulate data, based on their access rights.	
	Traceability/ Transparency	Give information on what transmitting principle was used, what type of data, for what purpose and to whom the information was sent. How data is collected; how, when, where it is stored.	
Data	Completeness	Collecting complete provenance information can fully take advance to track data and actions for identity management, edetection, etc. Incomplete provenance information may lead detection missing and suppression of abnormal behaviors.	
	Granularity	Not only the process derivation of a data file should be traced, but also the components of files such as paragraphs, shapes and images should be traced with regard to their origins. In short, finegrained provenance information helps achieve highly precise anomaly detection and auditing.	
	Scalability	With the increase of the data volume and the number of operations, it should be possible to store complete provenance information without risks of information loss.	
System	Interoperability	By definition - the capability to communicate, execute programs or transfer data between various systems in a manner that re- quires Data Subjects to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics of those systems.	
	Usability	Provides clear interfaces and structures that display security aspects, required data, digital traces, policies, possible threats in an understandable way (usage of icons, graphs, etc.). Also managing security (and privacy) is not the primary task of the user.	
	Trustworthiness	Ensures trust between Data Sender and Receiver with exchange of credentials, statement and certification, signatures, transparency and fulfilment of the other requirements.	
Security	Confidentiality	Ensures non-disclosure of data traveling over the network to unauthorised Data Subjects.	
	Integrity	Ensures that the Data Receiver may detect unauthorised changes made to the data.	
	Availability	Ensuring that data and is provenance is available to Data Subjects, when and where they need it.	
Other	Policies	Enforce laws (GDPR, etc.) and regulations such as purpose limitation, data minimisation, Data Subject access rights.	
Other	Logging	Provides mechanisms to log and timestamp the transfer of the data between Data Subjects.	

#### 3.2 Healthcare

In regard to medical treatment and patient safety, the importance of data, its origins and quality have long been recognised in clinical research [Cur+17] [Muh14]. Creating trust relationships among the various actors is vital - e.g., evidence-based medicine and healthcare-related decisions using third-party data are essential to patient safety [Mar+20]. DP is also crucial for solving confidentiality issues with healthcare information like accidental disclosures, insider curiosity and insider subornation [Rin97].

Group	Use Case Requirements
User	A patient might feel that important information should be shared, but is reluctant to do so if the information is attributed to their unique identity. Also, analysis of medical data by Institutions is an useful tool, but should not be done in a way that may link personal medical data to a specific patient. It is important that the different actors can view, store, retrieve, move, request changes/deletion or manipulate medical data based on their ownership and access rights (e.g. patients checking prescriptions, physicians issuing/altering prescriptions, institutions verifying prescriptions).
Data	Information on what transmitting principle was used, what type of medical data, for what purpose and to whom the information was sent is essential. It is important how medical data is collected; how, when, where it is stored, for incomplete data can impact decisions and put the patients' health and life at risk. Fine-grained provenance information helps achieve highly precise anomaly detection and auditing, which can improve decision making, diagnosing and patient safety.
System	e-Health is a field in which big volumes of medical data are produced, exchanged and analysed. Therefore, usage of international standards that enforces security and patient safety are essential: the quality of the patients' treatment should not depend on the quality of a specific software. It's not patients or physicians job to analyse complex data flows. The system should also provide clear interfaces and structures that display information in an understandable way (usage of icons, graphs, etc.). Trust is fundamental, for that the physician-to-patient relationship is jeopardised when patients do not trust that their personal medical data will be kept confidential, and that this information will not be utilised for purposes other than medical.
Security	There must not be any disclosure of medical data traveling over the network to unauthorised actors. Data must be accurate and changes should be detectable, other-wise patients' health and life are at risk. Also, medical data and its provenance should be available and ready for immediate use, especially in cases of emergency

#### 3.3 Finance

In online banking, digital money and digital financial services, the importance of information about transactions, money flow, money origin, credit scores and financial decisions is becoming bigger and bigger since the emergence of e-finance [AHS02]. DP is of great use not only in investigating money laundering [Ung+06], tracing donations [Sir+19], charities [Sin+20] or illegal funding [Tei18], but also loans and financing, mortgages, trading of currencies, insurance policies and others [But20]. However, 'big tech' are also venturing into financial services [Boi+21]. While being accused for abuse of market power and anti-competitive behaviour, they are also famous for not giving extensive information on how personal data is analysed, processed or interacted with by third parties and international or government organisations [, RV19], which has a negative impact on the consumers' ability to trace their personal data.

Group	Use Case Requirements
User	Without ownership or access to their own information, consumers cannot be certain if their data is inaccurate, obsolete, or otherwise inappropriate. [4372] The fear of abuse alters consumer behaviour and anonymity can be misused by criminals [238168]. A balance between identification and unlinkability must be achieved. Consumers should be able to perform operations in an pseudonymous way, that ensure ownership (pseudonyms are not improperly used by others) and ensure individuals are held accountable for abuses created under any of their pseudonyms. [4372]
Data	Tracing leads to transparency among actors. It should be possible to trace messages, transactions, what information and how it has been collected, analysed or processed (e.g. if donation funds are utilized properly or not). (aid) Data must be complete, accurate and fine-grained, in order to achieve precise anomaly and fraud detection and not negatively impact decision making or put consumers, institutions and their money or financial data at risk.[fine-grained]
System	Institutions generally have an interest in maintaining good relations with consumers and share many of the same interests and concerns. [4372] To ensure trust, institutions need efficient, interlinked and, in a way, pervasive record-keeping system (fingerprint), while still providing consumers with monitoribility and control. Such systems may also have to handle a large amount of transactions.[4372] Easily scalable system can bring efficiency gains and lower entry barriers for consumers, however, there should be ways to prevent discrimination, abuse of market power, anti-competitive and monopolistic use of data. [bigtech]
Security	Where there is money related information, the actors involved are a potential subject to numerous types of crime. Non-disclosure, accuracy and availability of data, as well as state-of-the art security measures are, therefore, of great importance, in order to prevent theft, fraud, money laundering or terrorist related activity.

# **4 Distributed Ledger Technologies**

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## **4.1 Types and Characteristics**

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4.1.1 Public/Private

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4.1.2 Permissioned/Permisionless

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#### 4.2 DLT and Data Provenance

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#### 4.3 DLT in Healthcare

4.3.1 Current State

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4.3.2 HyperLedger Fabric

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#### 4.4 DLT in Finance

4.4.1 Current State

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4.4.2 Ethereum

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# **5 Evaluated Mapping**

## 6 Discussion

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**6.1 Principle Findings** 

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**6.2 Implications for Practice** 

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**6.3 Implications for Research** 

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**6.4 Limitations and Future Work** 

# 7 Conclusion

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