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New rules suggested for AD Container WRITE_DAC & WRITE_OWNER detection + DNS Server DLL injection #4606

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title: Remote DLL injection failed on DNS server
id: b1a0f90c-cde2-4aea-9535-d2cbd9f87236
description: Detects Remote DLL injection failed on DNS server
kind: evtx
status: experimental
date: 2024/03/06
author: Charles BLANC-ROLIN @woundride
references:
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/from-dnsadmins-to-system-to-domain-compromise
- https://phackt.com/dnsadmins-group-exploitation-write-permissions
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1055.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: dns-server
detection:
selection:
EventID: 150
param1|startwith:
- '\\'
param1|endswith:
- '.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
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title: AD Container WriteDAC
id: 57bc5954-f99b-44b5-a5e9-fb061e6d3532
description: Detects WRITE_DAC to Container object > possible AdminSDHolder Backdooring
kind: evtx
status: experimental
date: 2023/11/30
modified: 2024/05/09
author: Charles BLANC-ROLIN @woundride
references:
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/how-to-abuse-and-backdoor-adminsdholder-to-obtain-domain-admin-persistence
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/standard-access-rights
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1222.001
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4662
ObjectServer: 'DS'
AccessMask: '0x40000'
ObjectType|contains:
- 'bf967a8b-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
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@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
title: AD Container WriteOwner
id: bde92e8e-e311-4bbd-bfd9-c824941d8248
description: Detects WRITE_OWNER to Container object > possible AdminSDHolder Backdooring
kind: evtx
status: experimental
date: 2023/11/30
modified: 2024/05/09
author: Charles BLANC-ROLIN @woundride
references:
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/how-to-abuse-and-backdoor-adminsdholder-to-obtain-domain-admin-persistence
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/standard-access-rights
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1222.001
- attack.t1098
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4662
ObjectServer: 'DS'
AccessMask: '0xc0000'
ObjectType|contains:
- 'bf967a8b-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical