it includes a rebellion against the philosophical impulse itself, which is felt as humiliating and unrealistic. It is natural to feel victimized by philosophy, but this particular defensive reaction goes too far. It is like the hatred of childhood and results in a vain effort to grow up too early, before one has gone through the essential formative confusions and exaggerated hopes that have to be experienced on the way to understanding anything. Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture that tries to skip it will never grow up.

There is a persistent temptation to turn philosophy into something less difficult and more shallow than it is. It is an extremely difficult subject, and no exception to the general rule that creative efforts are rarely successful. I do not feel equal to the problems treated in this book. They seem to me to require an order of intelligence wholly different from mine. Others who have tried to address the central questions of philosophy will recognize the feeling.

II

MIND

1. Physical Objectivity

The natural place to begin is with our own position in the world. One of the strongest philosophical motives is the desire for a comprehensive picture of objective reality, since it is easy to assume that that is all there really is. But the very idea of objective reality guarantees that such a picture will not comprehend everything; we ourselves are the first obstacles to such an ambition.

To the extent that the world is objectively comprehensible—comprehensible from a standpoint independent of the constitution of this or that sentient being or type of sentient being—how do sentient beings fit into it? The question can be divided into three parts. First, does the mind itself have an objective character? Second, what is its relation to those physical aspects of reality whose objective status is less doubtful? Third, how can it be the case that one of the people in the world is *me*?

I shall take up these questions in order, in this chapter and the two following. The second question is the mind-body problem. The third question, how it is possible to be anyone in particular, expresses in purest form the difficulty of finding room in the world for oneself. How can it be? Am I, or are you, really the sort of thing that could be one of the particular creatures in the world? But I shall begin with the first question—whether the mind itself can be objectively understood. It under-

lies the mind-body problem, which arises because certain features of mental life present an obstacle to the ambitions of one very important conception of objectivity. No progress can be made with the mind-body problem unless we understand this conception and examine its claims with care.

For convenience I shall refer to it as the *physical* conception of objectivity. It is not the same thing as our idea of what physical reality is actually like, but it has developed as part of our method of arriving at a truer understanding of the physical world, a world that is presented to us initially but somewhat inaccurately through sensory perception.

The development goes in stages, each of which gives a more objective picture than the one before. The first step is to see that our perceptions are caused by the action of things on us, through their effects on our bodies, which are themselves parts of the physical world. The next step is to realize that since the same physical properties that cause perceptions in us through our bodies also produce different effects on other physical things and can exist without causing any perceptions at all, their true nature must be detachable from their perceptual appearance and need not resemble it. The third step is to try to form a conception of that true nature independent of its appearance either to us or to other types of perceivers. This means not only not thinking of the physical world from our own particular point of view, but not thinking of it from a more general human perceptual point of view either: not thinking of how it looks, feels, smells, tastes, or sounds. These secondary qualities then drop out of our picture of the external world, and the underlying primary qualities such as shape, size, weight, and motion are thought of structurally.

This has turned out to be an extremely fruitful strategy. The understanding of the physical world has been expanded enormously with the aid of theories and explanations that use concepts not tied to the specifically human perceptual viewpoint. Our senses provide the evidence from which we start, but the detached character of this understanding is such that we could possess it even if we had none of our present senses, so long as we were rational and could understand the mathematical and formal properties of the objective conception of the physical world. We might even in a sense share an understanding of physics with other creatures to whom things appeared quite different, perceptually—so long as they too were rational and numerate.

The world described by this objective conception is not just centerless; it is also in a sense featureless. While the things in it have properties, none of these properties are perceptual aspects. All of those have been relegated to the mind, a yet-to-be-examined domain. The physical world

as it is supposed to be in itself contains no points of view and nothing that can appear only to a particular point of view. Whatever it contains can be apprehended by a general rational consciousness that gets its information through whichever perceptual point of view it happens to view the world from.[1]

Powerful as it has proven to be, this bleached-out physical conception of objectivity encounters difficulties if it is put forward as the method for seeking a complete understanding of reality. For the process began when we noticed that how things appear to us depends on the interaction of our bodies with the rest of the world. But this leaves us with no account of the perceptions and specific viewpoints which were left behind as irrelevant to physics but which seem to exist nonetheless, along with those of other creatures—not to mention the mental activity of forming an objective conception of the physical world, which seems not itself capable of physical analysis.

Faced with these facts one might think the only conceivable conclusion would be that there is more to reality than what can be accommodated by the physical conception of objectivity. But remarkably enough this has not been obvious to everyone. The physical has been so irresistibly attractive, and has so dominated ideas of what there is, that attempts have been made to beat everything into its shape and deny the reality of anything that cannot be so reduced. As a result, the philosophy of mind is populated with extremely implausible positions.

I have argued elsewhere[2] against the various forms of reductionism—behavioristic, causal, or functionalist—that have been offered by those seeking to make the mind safe for physical objectivity. All these theories are motivated by an epistemological criterion of reality—that only what can be understood in a certain way exists. But it is hopeless to try to analyze mental phenomena so that they are revealed as part of the "external" world. The subjective features of conscious mental processes—as opposed to their physical causes and effects—cannot be captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical world that underlies the appearances. Not only raw feels but also intentional mental states—however objective their content—must be

1. There is an excellent account of this idea in Williams (7), pp. 64–8. He calls it the *absolute* conception of reality.

2. Nagel (3). Since it's never too late for an acknowledgment, let me record that two years earlier Timothy Sprigge had proposed as the essential condition of consciousness that there must be "something it is like to be" the creature in question (Sprigge, pp. 166–8). And B. A. Farrell asked, "What would it be like to be a bat?" in 1950, though he dismissed the difficulty for materialism. (When I wrote, I hadn't read Sprigge and had forgotten Farrell.)

capable of manifesting themselves in subjective form to be in the mind at all.

The reductionist program that dominates current work in the philosophy of mind is completely misguided, because it is based on the groundless assumption that a particular conception of objective reality is exhaustive of what there is. Eventually, I believe, current attempts to understand the mind by analogy with man-made computers that can perform superbly some of the same external tasks as conscious beings will be recognized as a gigantic waste of time. The true principles underlying the mind will be discovered, if at all, only by a more direct approach.

But merely to deny the possibility of psychophysical reduction does not end the problem. There is still a question about how we are to conceive of the inclusion of subjective mental processes in the world as it really is. And there is the question of whether they can be in some other way objectively understood. Physicalism, though unacceptable, has behind it a broader impulse to which it gives distorted and ultimately self-defeating expression. That is the impulse to find a way of thinking about the world as it is, so that everything in it, not just atoms and planets, can be regarded as real in the same way: not just an aspect of the world as it appears to us, but something that is *really there*.

I think part of the explanation of the modern weakness for physicalist reduction is that a less impoverished and reductive idea of objectivity has not been available to fill out the project of constructing an overall picture of the world. The objectivity of physics was viable: it continued to yield progressively more understanding through successive application to those properties of the physical world that earlier applications had discovered.

It is true that recent developments in physics have led some to believe that it may after all be incapable of providing a conception of what is really there, independent of observation. But I do not wish to argue that since the idea of objective reality has to be abandoned because of quantum theory anyway, we might as well go the whole hog and admit the subjectivity of the mental. Even if, as some physicists think, quantum theory cannot be interpreted in a way that permits the phenomena to be described without reference to an observer, the ineliminable observer need not be a member of any particular species like the human, to whom things look and feel in highly characteristic ways. This does not therefore require that we let in the full range of subjective experience.

The central problem is not whether points of view must be admitted to the account of the *physical* world. Whatever may be the answer to that question, we shall still be faced with an independent problem about the mind. It is the phenomena of consciousness themselves that pose the

clearest challenge to the idea that physical objectivity gives the general form of reality. In response I want not to abandon the idea of objectivity entirely but rather to suggest that the physical is not its only possible interpretation.

2. *Mental Objectivity*

Even if we acknowledge the existence of distinct and irreducible perspectives, the wish for a unified conception of the world doesn't go away. If we can't achieve it in a form that eliminates individual perspectives, we may inquire to what extent it can be achieved if we admit them. Persons and other conscious beings are part of the natural order, and their mental states are part of the way the world is in itself. From the perspective of one type of being, the subjective features of the mental states of a very different type of being are not accessible either through subjective imagination or through the kind of objective representation that captures the physical world. The question is whether these gaps can be at least partly closed by another form of thought, which acknowledges perspectives different from one's own and conceives of them not by means of the imagination. A being of total imaginative flexibility could project himself directly into every possible subjective point of view, and would not need such an objective method to think about the full range of possible inner lives. But since we can't do that, a more detached form of access to other subjective forms would be useful.

There is even a point to this in the case of our own minds. We assume that we ourselves are not just parts of the world as it appears to us. But if we are parts of the world as it is in itself, then we ought to be able to include ourselves—our minds as well as our bodies—in a conception that is not tied exclusively to our own point of view. We ought, in other words, to be able to think of ourselves from outside—but in mental, not physical terms. Such a result, if it were possible, would qualify as an objective concept of mind.

What I want to do is to explain what a natural objective understanding of the mind along these lines would be—an understanding as objective as is compatible with the essential subjectivity of the mental. I believe it has its beginnings in the ordinary concept of mind, but that it can be developed beyond this. The question is, how far beyond?

As a practical matter, I have no idea how far. But I believe that there is no objection in principle to such a development, and that its possibility should already be allowed for in our conception of our own minds. I believe we can include ourselves, experiences and all, in a world con-

ceivable not from a specifically human point of view, and that we can do this without reducing the mental to the physical. But I also believe that any such conception will necessarily be incomplete. And this means that the pursuit of an objective conception of reality comes up against limits that are not merely practical, limits that could not be overcome by any merely objective intelligence, however powerful. Finally, I shall claim that this is no cause for philosophical alarm, because there is no reason to assume that the world as it is in itself must be objectively comprehensible, even in an extended sense. Some things can only be understood from the inside, and access to them will depend on how far our subjective imagination can travel. It is natural to want to bring our capacity for detached, objective understanding as much into alignment with reality as we can, but it should not surprise us if objectivity is essentially incomplete.

The aim of such understanding, the deeper aim it shares with the reductionist views which I reject, is to go beyond the distinction between appearance and reality by including the existence of appearances in an elaborated reality. Nothing will then be left outside. But this expanded reality, like physical reality, is centerless. Though the subjective features of our own minds are at the center of *our* world, we must try to conceive of them as just one manifestation of the mental in a world that is not given especially to the human point of view. This is, I recognize, a paradoxical enterprise, but the attempt seems to me worth making.

The first requirement is to think of our own minds as mere instances of something general—as we are accustomed to thinking of particular things and events in the physical world as instances and manifestations of something general. We must think of mind as a phenomenon to which the human case is not necessarily central, even though our minds are at the center of our world. The fundamental idea behind the objective impulse is that the world is not our world. This idea can be betrayed if we turn objective comprehensibility into a new standard of reality. That is an error because the fact that reality extends beyond what is available to our original perspective does not mean that all of it is available to some transcendent perspective that we can reach from here. But so long as we avoid this error, it is proper to be motivated by the hope of extending our objective understanding to as much of life and the world as we can.

By a general concept of mind I don't mean an anthropocentric concept which conceives all minds on analogy with our own. I mean a concept under which we ourselves fall as instances—without any implication that we are the central instances. My opposition to psychophysical reduction is therefore fundamentally different from that of the idealist or phenomenological tradition. I want to think of mind, like matter, as a general feature of the world. In each case we are acquainted with certain instances in our small spatiotemporal neighborhood (though in the case of matter, not only with those instances). In each case there is no guarantee as to how far beyond the initial acquaintance our understanding can go, by processes of abstraction, generalization, and experiment. The necessary incompleteness of an objective concept of mind seems fairly clear. But there is also no reason to assume that everything about the *physical* world can be understood by some possible development of our physical conception of objectivity: physical science is after all just an operation of our minds, and we have no reason to assume that their capacities in these respects, remarkable as they are, correlate fully with reality.

In both cases an expanded understanding, to the extent that we can achieve it, not only gives us access to things outside our immediate neighborhood, but should also add to our knowledge of the things with which we are already acquainted and from which the inquiry starts. This is clear with respect to familiar physical objects, which we all now think of in terms of physics and chemistry and not just phenomenally or instrumentally. With respect to mental phenomena our objective understanding is undeveloped, and it may never develop very far. But the idea of such an objective view, coming through the pursuit of a general conception of mind, is to provide us with a way of thinking that we could also bring back home and apply to ourselves.

3. Other Minds

A simpler version of the problem of placing ourselves in a world of which we are not the center appears in philosophy independently of the ambition to form a general nonidealistic conception of reality. It appears at the individual level as the problem of other minds. One might say that the wider problem of mental objectivity is an analogue at the level of mental types to the problem of other minds for individuals: not, "How can I conceive of minds other than my own?" but, "How can we conceive of minds subjectively incommensurable with our own?" In both cases we must conceive of ourselves as instances of something more general in order to place ourselves in a centerless world.

The interesting problem of other minds is not the epistemological problem, how I can know that other people are not zombies. It is the conceptual problem, how I can *understand* the attribution of mental states to others. And this in turn is really the problem, how I can con-

ceive of my own mind as merely one of many examples of mental phenomena contained in the world.

Each of us is the subject of various experiences, and to understand that there are other people in the world as well, one must be able to conceive of experiences of which one is not the subject: experiences that are not present to oneself. To do this it is necessary to have a general conception of subjects of experience and to place oneself under it as an instance. It cannot be done by extending the idea of what is immediately felt into other people's bodies, for as Wittgenstein observed, that will only give you an idea of having feelings in their bodies, not of *their* having feelings.

Though we all grow up with the required general conception that allows us to believe in genuinely other minds, it is philosophically problematic, and there has been much difference of opinion over how it works. The problem is that other people seem to be part of the external world, and empiricist assumptions about meaning have led various philosophers to the view that our attribution of mental states to others must be analyzed in terms of the behavioral evidence, or as parts of some explanatory theory of what produces observable behavior. Unfortunately, this seems to imply that mental attributions do not have the same sense in the first person as in the third.

Clearly, there must be some alternative to the assumption that anything said about other persons has to be given a reading which places it firmly in the familiar external world, comprehensible by means of the physical conception of objectivity. That leads straight to solipsism: the inability to make sense of the idea of real minds other than one's own.

In fact, the ordinary concept of mind contains the beginnings of an entirely different way of conceiving objective reality. We cannot make sense of the idea of other minds by construing it in a way which becomes unintelligible when we try to apply it to ourselves. When we conceive of the minds of others, we cannot abandon the essential factor of a point of view: instead we must generalize it and think of ourselves as one point of view among others. The first stage of objectification of the mental is for each of us to be able to grasp the idea of all human perspectives, including his own, without depriving them of their character as perspectives. It is the analogue for minds of a centerless conception of space for physical objects, in which no point has a privileged position.

The beginning of an objective concept of mind is the ability to view one's own experiences from outside, as events in the world. If this is possible, then others can also conceive of those events and one can conceive of the experiences of others, also from outside. To think in this way we use not a faculty of external representation, but a general idea

of subjective points of view, of which we imagine a particular instance and a particular form. So far the process does not involve any abstraction from the general forms of our experience. We still think of experience in terms of the familiar point of view we share with other humans. All that is involved in the external conception of mind is the imaginative use of this point of view—a use that is partly present in the memory and expectation of one's own experiences.

But we can go further than this, for the same basic method allows us to think of experiences that we can't imagine. To represent an experience from outside by imagining it subjectively is the analogue of representing an objective spatial configuration by imagining it visually. One uses ordinary appearance as a medium. What is represented need not resemble the representation in all respects. It must be represented in terms of certain general features of subjective experience—subjective universals—some instances of which one is familiar with from one's own experience. But the capacity to form universal concepts in any area enables one not only to represent the present situation from without but to think about other possibilities which one has not experienced and perhaps never will experience directly. So the pretheoretical concept of mind involves a kind of objectivity which permits us to go some way beyond our own experiences and those exactly like them.

The idea is that the concept of mind, though tied to subjectivity, is not restricted to what can be understood in terms of our own subjectivity—what we can translate into the terms of our own experience. We include the subjectively *un*imaginable mental lives of other species, for example, in our conception of the real world without betraying their subjectivity by means of a behaviorist, functionalist, or physicalist reduction. We know there's something there, something perspectival, even if we don't know what it is or even how to think about it. The question is whether this acknowledgment will allow us to develop a way to think about it.

Of course one possibility is that this particular process can go no further. We can have a concept of mind general enough to allow us to escape solipsism and ethnocentrism, but perhaps we cannot transcend the general forms of human experience and the human viewpoint. That viewpoint permits us to conceive of experiences we have not had, because of the flexibility of the human imagination. But does it allow us to detach the concept of mind from a human perspective?

The issue is whether there can be a general concept of experience that extends far beyond our own or anything like it. Even if there can, we may be unable to grasp it except in the abstract, as we are presumably unable to grasp now concepts of objective physical reality which will be developed five centuries hence. But the possibility that there is such a

concept would be sufficient motive for trying to form it. It is only if we are convinced in advance that the thing makes no sense that we can be justified in setting the limits of objectivity with regard to the mind so close to our own ordinary viewpoint.

4. *Consciousness in General*

So far as I can see the only reason for accepting such limits would be a Wittgensteinian one—namely, that such an extension or attempted generalization of the concept of mind takes us away from the conditions that make the concept meaningful. I don't know whether Wittgenstein would actually have made this objection, but it seems a natural development of his views. He observed that while experiential concepts are applied in the first person from within, not on the basis of behavioral, circumstantial, or any other kind of evidence, they also require outward criteria. To mean anything in application to oneself in the first person they must also be applicable to oneself and others on circumstantial and behavioral grounds that are not just privately available. This he took to be a consequence of a general condition of publicity that must be met by all concepts, which in turn derives from a condition that must be met by any rule of whatever kind: that there must be an objective distinction between following it and breaking it, which can be made only if it is possible to compare one's own practice with that of one's community.

I am doubtful about the final "only", and though I have no alternative theory to offer, it seems to me dangerous to draw conclusions from the argument "How *else* could it be?" But I don't wish to deny that the experiential concepts we use to talk about our own minds and those of other human beings more or less fit the pattern Wittgenstein describes. Provided Wittgenstein is not understood, as I think he should not be, as saying that behavior and so forth is what there really is and mental processes are linguistic fictions, his view that the conditions of first- and third-person ascription of an experience are inextricably bound together in a single public concept seems to me correct, with regard to the ordinary case.[3]

The question is whether the concept of experience can be extended beyond these conditions without losing all content. A negative answer would limit our thought about experience to what we can ascribe to ourselves and to others in the specified ways. The objection is that beyond these limits the distinction between correct and incorrect application of

3. Wittgenstein (2), secs. 201 ff. On the status of criteria in Wittgenstein and why they aren't offered as *analyses* of meaning see Kripke (2).

the concept is not defined, and therefore the condition of significance is not met.

In a well known passage (sec. 350) Wittgenstein says I can't extend the application of mental concepts from my own case merely by saying others have the same as I have so often had. "It is as if I were to say: 'You surely know what "It is 5 o'clock here" means; so you also know what "It's 5 o'clock on the sun" means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock.'" This is a fair reply to someone who is trying to explain what he means by saying that the stove is in pain. But could it be used to argue against all extensions of the concept beyond the range of cases where we know how to apply it? Does the general concept of experience really lose all content if an attempt is made to use it to think about cases in which we cannot now and perhaps even never could apply it more specifically? I think not. Not all such cases are like that of the time of day on the sun. That example is much more radical, for it introduces a direct contradiction with the conditions that determine the time of day—namely, position on the surface of the earth relative to the sun. But the generalization of the concept of experience beyond our capacity to apply it doesn't *contradict* the condition of application that it tries to transcend, even if some examples, like the ascription of pain to a stove, do pass the limits of intelligibility.

Admittedly, *if* someone has the concept of a type of conscious mental state and also has that mental state with any frequency, he will be able to apply it from within and without, in the way Wittgenstein describes. If he couldn't, it would be evidence that he didn't have the concept. But we don't ascribe such states only to creatures who have mental concepts: we ascribe them to children and animals, and believe that we ourselves would have experiences even if we didn't have the language. If we believe that the existence of many of the experiences we can talk about doesn't depend on the existence of these concepts, why can't we conceive at one remove of the existence of types of experience of which we don't have and perhaps could never have a complete conception and the capacity for first- and third-person ascription?

Consider first, cases where we have strong evidence that experience is present, without either knowing what its character is or being in a position to hope ever to reach an understanding of its character that will include the capacity for self-ascription. This is true of at least some of the experiences of all animals not very close to us in structure and behavior. In each case there is rich external evidence of conscious inner life, but only limited application of our own mental concepts—mostly general ones—to describe it.[4]

4. Skeptics should read Jennings.

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It is the ordinary prephilosophical concept of experience that leads to this result. We have not simply left it behind and taken off with the *word*. And the extension is not part of a private language but a natural idea shared by most human beings about what sorts of things occupy the world around them. We are forced, I think, to conclude that all these creatures have specific experiences which cannot be represented by any mental concepts of which we could have first-person understanding. This doesn't mean that we can't think about them in that general way, or perhaps in more detail but without first-person understanding—provided that we continue to regard them as subjective experiences rather than mere behavioral dispositions or functional states.

But it seems to me that we can in principle go further. We can use the general concepts of experience and mind to speculate about forms of conscious life whose external signs we cannot confidently identify. There is probably a great deal of life in the universe, and we may be in a position to identify only some of its forms, because we would simply be unable to read as behavior the manifestations of creatures sufficiently unlike us. It certainly means something to speculate that there are such creatures, and that they have minds.

These uses of the general concept of mind exemplify a theoretical step that is commonplace elsewhere. We can form the idea of phenomena that we do not know how to detect. Once the conception of a new physical particle is formed, defined in terms of a set of properties, those properties may then allow experiments to be devised which will permit its detection. In this way the progress of physical discovery has long since passed to the formation of physical concepts that can be applied only with sophisticated techniques of observation, and not by means of unaided perception or simple mechanical measurement.

Only a dogmatic verificationist would deny the possibility of forming objective concepts that reach beyond our current capacity to apply them. The aim of reaching a conception of the world which does not put us at the center in any way requires the formation of such concepts. We are supported in this aim by a kind of intellectual optimism: the belief that we possess an open-ended capacity for understanding what we have not yet conceived, and that it can be called into operation by detaching from our present understanding and trying to reach a higher-order view which explains it as part of the world. But we must also admit that the world probably reaches beyond our capacity to understand it, no matter how far we travel, and this admission, which is stronger than the mere denial of verificationism, can be expressed only in general concepts whose extension is not limited to what we could in principle know about.

It is the same with the mind. To accept the general idea of a perspective without limiting it to the forms with which one is familiar, subjectively or otherwise, is the precondition of seeking ways to conceive of particular types of experience that do not depend on the ability either to have those experiences or to imagine them subjectively. It should be possible to investigate in this way the quality-structure of some sense we do not have, for example, by observing creatures who do have it—even though the understanding we can reach is only partial.

But if we could do that, we should also be able to apply the same general idea to ourselves, and thus to analyze our experiences in ways that can be understood without having had such experiences. That would constitute a kind of objective standpoint toward our own minds. To the extent that it could be achieved, we would be able to see our minds as not merely part of the human world, something we can already do with regard to our bodies. And this would serve a natural human goal, for it is natural to seek a general understanding of reality, including ourselves, which does not depend on the fact that we *are* ourselves.

5. *The Incompleteness of Objective Reality*

In the pursuit of this goal, however, even at its most successful, something will inevitably be lost. If we try to understand experience from an objective viewpoint that is distinct from that of the subject of the experience, then even if we continue to credit its perspectival nature, we will not be able to grasp its most specific qualities unless we can imagine them subjectively. We will not know exactly how scrambled eggs taste to a cockroach even if we develop a detailed objective phenomenology of the cockroach sense of taste. When it comes to values, goals, and forms of life, the gulf may be even more profound.

Since this is so, no objective conception of the mental world can include it all. But in that case it may be asked what the point is of looking for such a conception. The aim was to place perspectives and their contents in a world seen from no particular point of view. It turns out that some aspects of those perspectives cannot be fully understood in terms of an objective concept of mind. But if some aspects of reality can't be captured in an objective conception, why not forget the ambition of capturing as much of it as possible? The world just *isn't* the world as it appears to one highly abstracted point of view that can be pursued by all rational beings. And if one can't have complete objectivity, the goal of capturing as much of reality as one can in an objective net is pointless and unmotivated.

I don't think this follows. The pursuit of a conception of the world

that doesn't put us at the center is an expression of philosophical realism, all the more so if it does not assume that everything real can be reached by such a conception. Reality is not just objective reality, and any objective conception of reality must include an acknowledgment of its own incompleteness. (This is an important qualification to the claims of objectivity in other areas as well.) Even if an objective general conception of mind were developed and added to the physical conception of objectivity, it would have to include the qualification that the exact character of each of the experiential and intentional perspectives with which it deals can be understood only from within or by subjective imagination. A being with total imaginative power could understand it all from inside, but an ordinary being using an objective concept of mind will not. In saying this we have not given up the idea of the way the world really is, independently of how it appears to us or to any particular occupant of it. We have only given up the idea that this coincides with what can be objectively understood. The way the world is includes appearances, and there is no single point of view from which they can all be fully grasped. An objective conception of mind acknowledges that the features of our own minds that cannot be objectively grasped are examples of a more general subjectivity, of which other examples lie beyond our subjective grasp as well.

This amounts to the rejection of idealism with regard to the mind. The world is not my world, or our world—not even the mental world is. This is a particularly unequivocal rejection of idealism because it affirms the reality of aspects of the world that cannot be grasped by any conception I can possess—not even an objective conception of the kind with which we transcend the domain of initial appearances. Here it can be seen that physicalism is based ultimately on a form of idealism: an idealism of restricted objectivity. Objectivity of whatever kind is not the test of reality. It is just one way of understanding reality.

Still, even if objective understanding can be only partial, it is worth trying to extend it, for a simple reason. The pursuit of an objective understanding of reality is the only way to expand our knowledge of what there is beyond the way it appears to us. Even if we have to acknowledge the reality of some things that we can't grasp objectively, as well as the ineliminable subjectivity of some aspects of our own experience which we can grasp only subjectively, the pursuit of an objective concept of mind is simply part of the general pursuit of understanding. To give it up because it cannot be complete would be like giving up axiomatization in mathematics because it cannot be complete.

In trying to explain how minds are to be included in the real world that simply exists, I have distinguished between reality and objective reality, and also between objectivity and particular conceptions of objectivity. The physical conception of objectivity is inappropriate for increasing our understanding of the the mind; and even the kind of objectivity that is appropriate for this purpose will not permit us to form a complete idea of all the various incompatible mental perspectives. These conclusions in the philosophy of mind suggest a more general principle that applies in other areas as well: one should pursue the kind of objectivity appropriate to the subject one is trying to understand, and even the right kind of objectivity may not exhaust the subject completely.

The problem of bringing together subjective and objective views of the world can be approached from either direction. If one starts from the subjective side, the problem is the traditional one of skepticism, idealism, or solipsism. How, given my personal experiential perspective, can I form a conception of the world as it is independent of my perception of it? And how can I know that this conception is correct? (The question may also be asked from the point of view of the collective human perspective rather than from that of an individual.) If on the other hand one starts from the objective side, the problem is how to accommodate, in a world that simply exists and has no perspectival center, any of the following things: (a) oneself; (b) one's point of view; (c) the point of view of other selves, similar and dissimilar; and (d) the objects of various types of judgment that seem to emanate from these perspectives.

It is this second version of the problem that particularly interests me. It is the obverse of skepticism because the *given* is objective reality—or the idea of an objective reality—and what is problematic by contrast is subjective reality. Without receiving full acknowledgment this approach has been very influential in recent analytic philosophy. It accords well with a bias toward physical science as a paradigm of understanding.

But if under the pressure of realism we admit that there are things which cannot be understood in this way, then other ways of understanding them must be sought. One way is to enrich the notion of objectivity. But to insist in every case that the most objective and detached account of a phenomenon is the correct one is likely to lead to reductive conclusions. I have argued that the seductive appeal of objective reality depends on a mistake. It is not the given. Reality is not just objective reality. Sometimes, in the philosophy of mind but also elsewhere, the truth is not to be found by travelling as far away from one's personal perspective as possible.