



0x37A7458443178d1C8C2887C9122261b715B6





Table of Contents

Table of Contents	1
Disclaimer	2
Overview	3
Creation/Audit Date	3
Verified Socials	3
Contract Functions Analysis	4
Contract Safety and Weakness	8
Detected Vulnerability Description	12
Contract Flow Graph	15
Contract Interaction Graph	16
Inheritance Graph	17
Contract Desciptions	18
Audit Scope	30



Global Disclaimer

This document serves as a disclaimer for the crypto smart contract audit conducted by Skeleton Ecosystem. The purpose of the audit was to review the codebase of the smart contracts for potential vulnerabilities and issues. It is important to note the following:

Limited Scope: The audit is based on the code and information available up to the audit completion date. It does not cover external factors, system interactions, or changes made after the audit. The audit itself can not guarantee 100% safaty and can not detect common scam methods like farming and developer sell-out.

No Guarantee of Security: While we have taken reasonable steps to identify vulnerabilities, it is impossible to guarantee the complete absence of security risks or issues. The audit report provides an assessment of the contract's security as of the audit date.

Continued Development: Smart contracts and blockchain technology are evolving fields. Updates, forks, or changes to the contract post-audit may introduce new risks that were not present during the audit.

Third-party Code: If the smart contract relies on third-party libraries or code, those components were not thoroughly audited unless explicitly stated. Security of these dependencies is the responsibility of their respective developers.

Non-Exhaustive Testing: The audit involved automated analysis, manual review, and testing under controlled conditions. It is possible that certain vulnerabilities or issues may not have been identified.

Risk Evaluation: The audit report includes a risk assessment for identified vulnerabilities. It is recommended that the development team carefully reviews and addresses these risks to mitigate potential exploits.

Not Financial Advice: This audit report is not intended as financial or investment advice. Decisions regarding the use, deployment, or investment in the smart contract should be made based on a comprehensive assessment of the associated risks.

By accessing and using this audit report, you acknowledge and agree to the limitations outlined above. Skeleton Ecosystem and its auditors shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect damages resulting from the use of the audit report or the smart contract itself.

Please consult with legal, technical, and financial professionals before making any decisions related to the smart contract.



Overview

Contract Name	ElonDiablo
Ticker/Simbol	\$EDT
Blockchain	Binance Smart Chain BEP20
Contract Address	0x37A7458443178d1C8C2887C9122261b715B6f08B
Creator Address	0x8096955003F92B7882F586Eb7aaa224adbf7E6eF
Current Owner Address	0x000000000000000000000000000000000000
Contract Explorer	https://bscscan.com/address/0x37a7458443178d1c8 c2887c9122261b715b6f08b#code
Compiler Version	v0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404
License	MIT
Optimisation	Yes with 200 Runs
Total Supply	661,624.990287 \$EDT
Decimals	18

Creation/Audit

Contract Deployed	23.01.2024
Audit Created	13.02.2024
Audit Update	V 1.0

Verified Socials


Website	https://elondiablo.com/
Telegram	https://t.m/ElonDiablo
Twitter (X)	https://twitter.com/ElonDiablo



Contract Function Analysis

Pass Attention Item ARisky Item





Contract Verified	✓	The contract source code is uploaded to blockchain explorer and is open source, so everybody can read it.
Contract		0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000
Ownership		Sometimes referred to as the "zero address" or "dead address" and is not owned by anyone.
Buy Tax	3 %	Shows the taxes for purchase transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Sell Tax	3 %	Shows the taxes for sell transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Honeypot Analyse	✓	Holder is able to buy and sell. If honeypot: The contract blocks sell transfer from holder wallet. Multiple events may cause honeypot. Trading disabled, extremely high tax
Liqudity Status	>	Liqudity status on 12.02.2024 100% Locked for 100170 Days on Gempad Locker
Trading	✓	No Trading suspendable function found.
Disable Functions		If a suspendable code is included, the token maybe neither be bought or sold (honeypot risk). If contract is renounced this function can't be used
Set Fees function		Fee Setting function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.
	A	The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).
Proxy Contract	✓	Not a Proxy contract with authorisations.
Mint Function	~	No Mint Function detected
		Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and
		effect the price of the token. Owner can mint new tokens and sell.




Balance Modifier	✓	No Balance Modifier function found. If there is a function for this, the contract owner can have the
Function		authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses. For example revoke the bought tokens from the holders wallet. Common form of scam: You buy the token, but it's disappearing from your wallet.
Blacklist	✓	No Blacklist Setting function found.
Function		If there is a blacklist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally. Example: you buy the token and right after your Wallet getting blacklisted. Like so you will be unable to sell. Honeypot Risk.
Whitelist Function	A	Whitelist Setting function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.
		If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)
Hidden Owner		No Hidden or multi owner with authorisation
Analysis	✓	For contract with a hidden owner, developer can still manipulate the contract even if the ownership has been abandoned.
Retrieve Ownership Function	~	No Functions found which can retrieve ownership of the contract.
. Giledieli		If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it. Also known as fake renounce.
Self Destruct	✓	No Self Destruct function found.
Function		If this function exists and is triggered, the contract will be destroyed, all functions will be unavailable, and all related assets will be erased.
Specific Tax	✓	No Specific Tax Changing Functions found.
Changing Function		If it exists, the contract owner may set a very outrageous tax rate for assigned address to block it from trading. Can assign all wallets at once!
Trading Cooldown	A	Trading Cooldown Function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.
Function	max 300s	If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying. Like a temporary honeypot.
Max Transaction	A	Max Transaction and Holding Modify function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.
and Holding Modify Function	min 0.05%	If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot
Transaction	✓	No Transaction Limiter Function Found.
Limiting Function		The number of overall token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk)



Details of Risk - Attention Items

Removing Risk of contract function based on renounced ownership



Following detected contract functions serve as informational purposes about the contract. The owner has no more authorisation to trigger the following functions.



Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.

The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).

```
ftrace | funcSig
function updateFees(
   uint256 deadBuy1,
   uint256 deadSell1,
  uint256 marketingBuy1,
  uint256 marketingSellt,
  uint256 liquidityBuyt,
   uint256 liquiditySellt,
   uint256 RewardsBuyt,
   uint256 RewardsSell1,
   uint256 devBuy1,
   uint256 devSell1
) public onlyOwner {
   buyDeadFees = deadBuy1;
   buyMarketingFees = marketingBuy1;
   buyLiquidityFee = liquidityBuy1;
   buyRewardsFee = RewardsBuy1;
    sellDeadFees = deadSellf;
    sellMarketingFees = marketingSellf;
    sellLiquidityFee = liquiditySellf;
    sellRewardsFee = RewardsSell†;
   buyDevFee = devBuy1;
    sellDevFee = devSell†;
```



Whitelist

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.

If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)

```
// exclude a wallet from fees
ftrace | funcSig
function setExcludeFees(address account), bool excluded) public onlyOwner {
    _isExcludedFromFees[account1] = excluded1;
    emit ExcludeFromFees(account1, excluded1);
```

▲ Max Transaction and Holding Modify Function (Min. 0.05%]

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.

If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot

```
// set max wallet, can not be lower than 0.05% of supply
function setmaxWallet(uint256 value) external onlyOwner {
   valuet = valuet * (10**18);
   require(value1 >= _totalSupply / 2000, "max wallet cannot be set to less than 0.05%");
   maxWallet = value1:
```

Trading cooldown (max 300 sec.)

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.


If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying. Like a temporary honeypot.

```
ftrace | funcSig
           function setcooldowntimer(uint256 value) external onlyOwner {
               require(valuet <= 300, "cooldown timer cannot exceed 5 minutes");
1201
               cooldowntimer = value1;
```



Contract Security

Total Findings: 8



- **High Severity Issues:** High possibility to cause problems, need to be resolved.
- **Medium Severity Issue:** Will likely cause problems, recommended to resolve.
- Low Severity Issues: Won't cause problems, but for improvement purposes could be adjusted.
- Informational Severity Issues: Not harmful in any way, information for the developer team.



Contract Security List of Found Issues

- High severity Issues: (0)
- Medium severity issues: (1)
 - Authorization through tx.origin
- Low severity issues: (6)
 - Missing Events
 - Long number literals
 - Low level calls
 - Outdated Compiler Version
 - Floating Pragma
 - Approve of front running attack (Sandwich bots)
- Informational severity issues: (1)
 - Public Functions Should be Declared External



Contract Weakness Classisication

THE SMART CONTRACT WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION REGISTRY (SWC REGISTRY) IS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION SCHEME PROPOSED IN EIP-1470. IT IS LOOSELY ALIGNED TO THE TERMINOLOGIES AND STRUCTURE USED IN THE COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE) WHILE OVERLAYING A WIDE RANGE OF WEAKNESS VARIANTS THAT ARE

ID	Description	AI	Manual	Result
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	High	Medium	Medium
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Passed	Passed	Passed



SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed	Passed	Passed
3VVC-126	DOS WICH BIOCK GAS LITTIC	rasseu	rasseu	rasseu
SWC-129	Typographical Error	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Passed	Passed	Passed



Detected High and Medium Severity Vulnerability Description.

lack Authorization through tx.origin (6 Items)

Item: 1	Location:	Line 1412	Severity:	Medium
Item: 1	Location:	Line 1506	Severity:	Medium
Item: 1	Location:	Line 1508	Severity:	Medium
Item: 1	Location:	Line 1522	Severity:	Medium
Item: 1	Location:	Line 1523	Severity:	Medium
Item: 1	Location:	Line 1603	Severity:	Medium

Function	In Solidity, tx.origin is a global variable that returns the address of
	the account that sent the transaction. Using the variable for
	authorization could make a contract vulnerable. For example, if
	an authorized account calls a malicious contract which triggers it
	to call the vulnerable contract that passes an authorization check
	since tx.origin returns the original sender of the transaction
	which in this case is the authorized account.
Remedation	tx.origin should not be used for authorization in smart contracts.
	It does have some legitimate use cases, for example, To prevent
	external contracts from calling the current contract, you can
	implement a require of the form require(tx.origin == msg.sender).
	This prevents intermediate contracts from calling the current
	contract, thus limiting the contract to regular codeless addresses.



\triangle Approve of front running attack (2 Items)

Low	Item: 1	Location:	Line 277-285	Severity:	Low
-----	---------	-----------	--------------	-----------	-----

Function	The approve() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function approve can be front-run by abusing the _approve function.
Remedation	Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable
	gas price for transactions. This can help prevent front- runners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions.
	Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
ftrace | funcSig
function approve(address spender1, uint256 amount1)
   virtual
   override
   returns (bool)
   _approve(_msgSender(), spender1, amount1);
```



Item: 2 Location: Line 287-302 Severity: Low

Function

The _transferfrom() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account.

This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account.

Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function.

The function approve can be front-run by abusing the approve function.

Remedation

- Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent frontrunners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions.
- 2. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
ftrace|funcSig

function transferFrom(

address sender1,

address recipient1,

uint256 amount1

) public virtual override returns (bool) {

_transfer(sender1, recipient1, amount1);

_approve(

sender1,

_msgSender(),

_allowances[sender1][_msgSender()].sub(

amount1,

"ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"


));

return true;

302
}
```




Contract Flow Graph






Contract Interaction Graph



Inheritance Graph





Contract Functions

Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Context	Implementation			
L	_msgSender	Internal 🖺		
L	_msgData	Internal 🖺		
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
L	name	External 🎚		ПоП
L	symbol	External [No[
L	decimals	External [Nol
L	totalSupply	External 🎚		Nol
L	balanceOf	External 🎚		NO[
L	allowance	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	арргоvе	External 🎚		NO[
L	transfer	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	transferFrom	External 🎚		NO[
L	DOMAIN_SEPAR ATOR	External [NO[
L	PERMIT_TYPEHA SH	External 🏻		Nol
L	nonces	External 🎚		NO[
L	permit	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	MINIMUM_LIQUI DITY	External [Nol
L	factory	External [Пои



L			
	token0	External 🎚	NO[
L	token1	External 🎚	NOÎ
L	getReserves	External [NO[
L	price0Cumulativ eLast	External [Nol
L	price1Cumulativ eLast	External [Nol
L	kLast	External 🎚	NO
L	mint	External 🎚	NO
L	burn	External 🎚	NO
L	swap	External 🌡	МОД
L	skim	External 🎚	МО[
L	sync	External 🎚	NO
L	initialize	External [lon
IUniswapV2Fact ory	Interface		
L	feeTo	External 🎚	NO
L	feeToSetter	External 🌡	NO
L	getPair	External 🎚	NO
L	allPairs	External 🎚	Nol
L	allPairsLength	External 🎚	NO
L	createPair	External 🎚	NO
L	setFeeTo	External 🎚	NO
L	setFeeToSetter	External [lon
IERC20	Interface		
L	totalSupply	External [Мо[



L	balanceOf	External 🎚	NO[
L	transfer	External 🎚	Nol
L	allowance	External 🎚	Мо[
L	арргоvе	External 🎚	Мо[
L	transferFrom	External 🎚	Nol
IERC20Metadat a	Interface	IERC20	
L	name	External 🎚	Мо[
L	symbol	External 🎚	NO[
L	decimals	External 🎚	Пои
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadat a	
L		Public 🎚	NOÎ
L	name	Public 🎚	NO[
L	symbol	Public 🎚	NO
L	decimals	Public 🎚	NO[
L	totalSupply	Public 🎚	NOÎ
L	balanceOf	Public 🎚	NOÎ
L	transfer	Public 🌡	NO[
L	allowance	Public 🌡	Nol
L	approve	Public 🌡	Nol
L	transferFrom	Public 🌡	NOÎ
L	increaseAllowan ce	Public 🏻	Nol
L	decreaseAllowa nce	Public 🎚	Nol



L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	_mint	Internal 🖺		
L	_burn	Internal 🖺		
L	_арргоvе	Internal 🖺		
L	_beforeTokenTr ansfer	Internal 🖺		
DividendPaying TokenOptionalIn terface	Interface			
L	withdrawableDi videndOf	External 🎚		Пои
L	withdrawnDivid endOf	External 🎚		Пои
L	accumulativeDiv idendOf	External 🎚		ПоЛ
DividendPaying TokenInterface	Interface			
L	dividendOf	External 🎚		NO
L	distributeDivide nds	External 🎚	dia	Пои
L	withdrawDivide nd	External 🎚		Поп
SafeMath	Library			
L	add	Internal 🖺		
L	sub	Internal 🖺		
L	sub	Internal 🖺		
L	mul	Internal 🖺		
L	div	Internal 🖺		
L	div	Internal 🖺		



L	mod	Internal 🖺		
L				
,	mod	Internal 🖺		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
L		Public 🎚		NO[
L	owner	Public 🎚		NO[
L	renounceOwner ship	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
١	transferOwners hip	Public 🎚		only0wner
SafeMathInt	Library			
L	mul	Internal 🖺		
L	div	Internal 🖺		
L	sub	Internal 🖺		
L	add	Internal 🖺		
L	abs	Internal 🖺		
L	toUint256Safe	Internal 🖺		
SafeMathUint	Library			
L	toInt256Safe	Internal 🖺		
IUniswapV2Rout er01	Interface			
L	factory	External [Nol
L	WETH	External [Nol
L	addLiquidity	External [Nol
L	addLiquidityETH	External [<u>cio</u>	Nol
L	removeLiquidity	External [Nol



L	removeLiquidity	External [NO
	ETH	LACEITIAL	•	1008
L	removeLiquidity WithPermit	External 🏻		Nol
L	removeLiquidity ETHWithPermit	External 🏻		Пои
L	swapExactToke nsForTokens	External 🎚		Пои
L	swapTokensFor ExactTokens	External 🎚		Пои
L	swapExactETHF orTokens	External 🎚	<u>cin</u>	Nol
L	swapTokensFor ExactETH	External 🌡		NOÎ
L	swapExactToke nsForETH	External [Nol
L	swapETHForExa ctTokens	External 🎚	ďВ	Nol
L	quote	External 🎚		Nol
L	getAmountOut	External [Nol
L	getAmountIn	External [Nol
L	getAmountsOut	External [Nol
L	getAmountsIn	External [Nol
IUniswapV2Rout er02	Interface	IUniswapV2Rout er01		
L	removeLiquidity ETHSupportingF eeOnTransferTo kens	External [•	NOÏ
L	removeLiquidity ETHWithPermit SupportingFeeO nTransferToken s	External 🏻		NO[
L	swapExactToke nsForTokensSup	External 🎚		NOÎ



	portingFeeOnTr ansferTokens			
L	swapExactETHF orTokensSuppor tingFeeOnTrans ferTokens	External [Ф	NOÏ
L	swapExactToke nsForETHSuppo rtingFeeOnTran sferTokens	External 🌡		No[
DividendPaying Token	Implementation	ERC20, DividendPaying TokenInterface, DividendPaying TokenOptionalIn terface		
L		Public 🎚		ERC20
L		External [<u>an</u>	ио[
L	distributeDivide nds	Public 🎚	<u>dip</u>	Nol
L	withdrawDivide nd	Public 🌡		Nol
L	_withdrawDivid endOfUser	Internal 🖺		
L	dividendOf	Public 🎚		Nol
L	withdrawableDi videndOf	Public 🌡		Nol
L	withdrawnDivid endOf	Public 🎚		NO[
L	accumulativeDiv idendOf	Public 🌡		NOÎ
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	_mint	Internal 🖺		
L	_burn	Internal 🖺		
L	_setBalance	Internal 🖺		



ElonDiablo	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
L		Public 🌡		ERC20
L	decimals	Public 🎚		NO[
L		External 🎚	d D	ПоП
L	updateStakingA mounts	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	enableTrading	External [onlyOwner
L	setPresaleWalle t	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setExcludeFees	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setExcludeDivid ends	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setIncludeDivide nds	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setCanTransfer Before	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setLimitsInEffec t	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setGasPriceLimi t	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setcooldowntim er	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setmaxWallet	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	enableStaking	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	stake	Public 🎚		МО[
L	setSwapTrigger Amount	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	enableSwapAnd Liquify	Public 🏿		onlyOwner
L	setAutomatedM arketMakerPair	Public 🏿		onlyOwner



L	setAllowCustom Tokens	Public 🌡	onlyOwner
L	setAllowAutoRei nvest	Public 🎚	onlyOwner
L	_setAutomated MarketMakerPa ir	Private 🖺	
L	updateGasForPr ocessing	Public [onlyOwner
L	transferAdmin	Public 🎚	onlyOwner
L	updateTransfer Fee	Public 🌡	onlyOwner
L	updateFees	Public 🌡	onlyOwner
L	getStakingInfo	External [Nol
L	getTotalDividen dsDistributed	External 🌡	NOÎ
L	isExcludedFrom Fees	Public 🌡	Nol
L	withdrawableDi videndOf	Public 🌡	Nol
L	dividendTokenB alanceOf	Public 🌡	Пои
L	getAccountDivid endsInfo	External 🎚	Nol
L	getAccountDivid endsInfoAtIndex	External 🌡	NOÎ
L	processDividend Tracker	External 🎚	Nol
L	claim	External 🎚	МО[
L	getLastProcesse dIndex	External 🏻	NOÎ
L	getNumberOfDi videndTokenHol ders	External 🏻	NO[



L	setAutoClaim	External 🎚	NOÎ
L	setReinvest	External 🎚	NO[
L	setDividendsPa used	External 🎚	onlyOwner
L	isExcludedFrom AutoClaim	External 🎚	Nol
L	isReinvest	External 🏻	NO[
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺	
L	getStakingBalan ce	Private 🖺	
L	swapAndLiquify	Private 🖺	
L	swapTokensFor Eth	Private 🖺	
L	updatePayoutTo ken	Public 🎚	onlyOwner
L	getPayoutToken	Public 🎚	Nol
L	setMinimumTok enBalanceForAu toDividends	Public 🏿	onlyOwner
L	setMinimumTok enBalanceForDi vidends	Public 🌡	onlyOwner
L	addLiquidity	Private 🖺	
L	forceSwapAndS endDividends	Public 🎚	onlyOwner
L	swapAndSendDi vidends	Private 🖺	
L	multiSend	Public 🌡	onlyOwner
L	airdropToWallet s	External [onlyOwner
ElonDiabloDivid endTracker	Implementation	DividendPaying Token, Ownable	



L		Public 🎚	DividendPaying Token
L	decimals	Public 🌡	NO[
L	name	Public 🎚	Nol
L	symbol	Public 🎚	NO[
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺	
L	withdrawDivide nd	Public 🎚	Пои
L	isExcludedFrom AutoClaim	External 🎚	onlyOwner
L	isReinvest	External 🎚	onlyOwner
L	setAllowCustom Tokens	External 🎚	onlyOwner
L	setAllowAutoRei nvest	External [onlyOwner
L	excludeFromDiv idends	External 🎚	onlyOwner
L	includeFromDivi dends	External [onlyOwner
L	setAutoClaim	External 🎚	onlyOwner
L	setReinvest	External 🌡	onlyOwner
L	setMinimumTok enBalanceForAu toDividends	External [onlyOwner
L	setMinimumTok enBalanceForDi vidends	External [onlyOwner
L	setDividendsPa used	External 🎚	onlyOwner
L	getLastProcesse dIndex	External [Nol
L	getNumberOfTo kenHolders	External 🌡	Nol



L	getAccount	Public 🌡		NO
L	getAccountAtIn dex	Public 🌡		Пои
L	setBalance	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	process	Public 🎚		Мо[
L	processAccount	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	updateUniswap V2Router	Public [onlyOwner
L	updatePayoutTo ken	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	getPayoutToken	Public 🎚		Мо[
L	_reinvestDivide ndOfUser	Private 🖺		
L	_withdrawDivid endOfUser	Internal 🖺	•	
Iterable/Mapping	Library			
L	get	Internal 🖺		
L	getIndexOfKey	Internal 🖺		
L	getKeyAtIndex	Internal 🖺		
L	size	Internal 🖺		
L	set	Internal 🖺		
١	remove	Internal 🖺		

Function can modify state

Function is payable



Audit Scope

Audit Method.

Our smart contract audit is an extensive methodical examination and analysis of the smart contract's code that is used to interact with the blockchain. Goal: discover errors, issues and security vulnaribilities in the code. Findings getting reported and improvements getting suggested.

Automatic and Manual Review

We are using automated tools to scan functions and weeknesses of the contract. Transfers, integer over-undeflow checks such as all CWE events.

Tools we use:

Visual Studio Code **CWE SWC** Solidity Scan SVD

In manual code review our auditor looking at source code and performing line by line examination. This method helps to clarify developer's coding decisions and business logic.

Skeleton Ecosystem

https://skeletonecosystem.com

https://github.com/SkeletonEcosystem/Audits

