

# SKELETON ECOSYSTEM

SMART CONTRACT AUDIT



**eXtreme Beans**  
**[eXtreme]**  
**BEP 20**

0xc91b3b4bc5e91CF5b655b5DCFa5F84b43A3665df



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## Global Disclaimer

This document serves as a disclaimer for the crypto smart contract audit conducted by Skeleton Ecosystem. The purpose of the audit was to review the codebase of the smart contracts for potential vulnerabilities and issues. It is important to note the following:

**Limited Scope:** The audit is based on the code and information available up to the audit completion date. It does not cover external factors, system interactions, or changes made after the audit. The audit itself can not guarantee 100% safety and can not detect common scam methods like farming and developer sell-out.

**No Guarantee of Security:** While we have taken reasonable steps to identify vulnerabilities, it is impossible to guarantee the complete absence of security risks or issues. The audit report provides an assessment of the contract's security as of the audit date.

**Continued Development:** Smart contracts and blockchain technology are evolving fields. Updates, forks, or changes to the contract post-audit may introduce new risks that were not present during the audit.

**Third-party Code:** If the smart contract relies on third-party libraries or code, those components were not thoroughly audited unless explicitly stated. Security of these dependencies is the responsibility of their respective developers.

**Non-Exhaustive Testing:** The audit involved automated analysis, manual review, and testing under controlled conditions. It is possible that certain vulnerabilities or issues may not have been identified.

**Risk Evaluation:** The audit report includes a risk assessment for identified vulnerabilities. It is recommended that the development team carefully reviews and addresses these risks to mitigate potential exploits.

**Not Financial Advice:** This audit report is not intended as financial or investment advice. Decisions regarding the use, deployment, or investment in the smart contract should be made based on a comprehensive assessment of the associated risks.

By accessing and using this audit report, you acknowledge and agree to the limitations outlined above. Skeleton Ecosystem and its auditors shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect damages resulting from the use of the audit report or the smart contract itself.

Please consult with legal, technical, and financial professionals before making any decisions related to the smart contract.

## Overview

Contract Name	eXtremeBeans
Ticker/Symbol	eXtreme
Blockchain	Binance Smart Chain BEP20
Contract Address	0xc91b3b4bc5e91CF5b655b5DCFa5F84b43A3665df
Creator Address	0x3e08993e96c78009b483D454610aa648d641bA01
Current Owner Address	0x3e08993e96c78009b483D454610aa648d641bA01
Contract Explorer	<a href="https://bscscan.com/token/0xc91b3b4bc5e91cf5b655b5dcfa5f84b43a3665df">https://bscscan.com/token/0xc91b3b4bc5e91cf5b655b5dcfa5f84b43a3665df</a>
Compiler Version	v0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404
License	MIT
Optimisation	Yes with 10000 Runs
Total Supply	750,000 eXtreme
Decimals	18

## Creation/Audit

Contract Deployed	18 Oct 2023
Audit Created	24 Oct 2023
Audit Update	V 1.0

## Verified Socials

Website	<a href="https://extremebeans.live/">https://extremebeans.live/</a>
Telegram	<a href="https://t.me/eXtremeBeans">https://t.me/eXtremeBeans</a>
Twitter (X)	<a href="https://x.com/eXtremeBeansX">https://x.com/eXtremeBeansX</a>

## Contract Function Analysis



Pass




Attention Item




Risky Item

Pass

Attention



Contract Verified		The contract source code is uploaded to blockchain explorer and is open source, so everybody can read it.
Contract Ownership		0x3e08993e96c78009b483D454610aa648d641bA01
Buy Tax	4 %	Shows the taxes for purchase transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Sell Tax	4 %	Shows the taxes for sell transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Honeypot Analyse		Holder is able to buy and sell. If honeypot: The contract blocks sell transfer from holder wallet. Multiple events may cause honeypot. Trading disabled, extremely high tax
Liquidity Status		LP Lock Status on 24.10.2023: Lp Locked: 89.39% Pinklock for 361 days. Lp Locked: 5.12% Pinklock for 357 days. Lp Burned: 5.36%
Trading Disable Function		Trading suspendable function found. If a suspendable code is included, the token maybe neither be bought or sold (honeypot risk). If contract is renounced this function can't be used
Set Fees function	 4% max	Fee Setting function found The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).
Proxy Contract		Not a proxy contract!
Mint Function		No Mint Function detected Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and effect the price of the token. Owner can mint new tokens and sell.

Balance Modifier Function		<p>No Balance Modifier function found.</p> <p>If there is a function for this, the contract owner can have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses. For example revoke the bought tokens from the holders wallet. Common form of scam: You buy the token, but it's disappearing from your wallet.</p>
Blacklist Function		<p>No Blacklist Setting function</p> <p>If there is a blacklist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally. Example: you buy the token and right after your Wallet getting blacklisted. Like so you will be unable to sell. Honeypot Risk.</p>
Whitelist Function		<p>Whitelist Setting function found but Contract</p> <p>If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for addresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)</p>
Hidden Owner Analysis		<p>No Hidden Owner found</p> <p>For contract with a hidden owner, developer can still manipulate the contract even if the ownership has been abandoned. Fake renounce.</p>
Retrieve Ownership Function		<p>No functions found which can retrieve ownership of the contract.</p> <p>If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it. Also known as fake renounce.</p>
Self Destruct Function		<p>No Self Destruct function found.</p> <p>If this function exists and is triggered, the contract will be destroyed, all functions will be unavailable, and all related assets will be erased.</p>
Specific Tax Changing Function		<p>No Specific Tax Changing Functions found.</p> <p>If it exists, the contract owner may set a very outrageous tax rate for assigned address to block it from trading. Can assign all wallets at once!</p>
Trading Cooldown Function		<p>Trading Cooldown Function found. If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying. Like a temporary honeypot.</p>
Max Transaction and Holding Modify Function		<p>Max Transaction and Holding Modify function found.</p> <p>If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot</p>
Transaction Limiting Function		<p>No Transaction Limiter Function Found.</p> <p>The number of overall token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk)</p>

## Details of Risk - Attention Items

### ⚠ Set Fee (remediation: renounce ownership)

The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded

Lowering risk: 4% max fee setting function found

```

1295         totalSellFees = sellRewardsFee
1296         .add(sellLiquidityFee)
1297         .add(sellMarketingFees)
1298         .add(sellListFee);
1299
1300         totalBuyFees = buyRewardsFee
1301         .add(buyLiquidityFee)
1302         .add(buyMarketingFees)
1303         .add(buyListFee);
1304
1305         require(totalSellFees <= 4 && totalBuyFees <= 4, "total fees cannot exceed 4% sell or 4% buy");
1306
  
```

### ⚠ Set Transfer Fee (remediation: renounce ownership)

The transfer between wallets has a high fee! 80% (Max 80% setting)

```

1266         function updateTransferFee(uint256 newTransferFee) public onlyOwner {
1267             require (newTransferFee <= 80, "transfer fee cannot exceed 80%");
1268             transferFee = newTransferFee;
1269             emit UpdateTransferFee(transferFee);
1270         }
1271
  
```

### ⚠ Max Transaction and Holding Modify Function. Max transfer and wallet can set to zero! (remediation: renounce ownership)


If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. At zero transfer amount, its honeypot risks


```


1109         maxWallet = totalTokenSupply / 500; //
1110         swapTokensAtAmount = totalTokenSupply / 1000; //
1111         canTransferBeforeTradingIsEnabled[owner()] = true;
1112         canTransferBeforeTradingIsEnabled[address(this)] = true;
1113     }
  
```


## Contract Security


Total Findings: 8



 **High Severity Issues:** High possibility to cause problems, need to be resolved.

 **Medium Severity Issue:** Will likely cause problems, recommended to resolve.

 **Low Severity Issues:** Won't cause problems, but for improvement purposes could be adjusted.

 **Informational Severity Issues:** Not harmful in any way, information for the developer team.



## Contract Security

### List of Found Issues

#### High severity Issues: (0)

#### Medium severity issues: (2)

- TX Origin used
- Approve front running attack

#### Low severity issues: (4)

- Missing Events
- Long Number Literals
- Floating Pragma
- Dos with failed Call

#### Informational severity issues: (2)

- Hard Coded Address
- Public Functions Should be Declared External

## Contract Weakness Classisication

THE SMART CONTRACT WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION REGISTRY (SWC REGISTRY) IS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION SCHEME PROPOSED IN EIP-1470. IT IS LOOSELY ALIGNED TO THE TERMINOLOGIES AND STRUCTURE USED IN THE COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE) WHILE OVERLAYING A WIDE RANGE OF WEAKNESS VARIANTS THAT ARE SPECIFIC TO SMART CONTRACTS.

ID	Description	AI	Manual	Result
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	Low	Passed	Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Medium	Low	Low
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	High	Medium	Medium
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Passed	Passed	Passed

SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Passed	Passed	Passed

## Detected High and Medium Severity Vulnerability Description.

### ⚠ TX Origin Used (6 Items)

Item: 1	Location:	Line 1395	Severity:	■ Medium
Item: 2	Location:	Line 1489	Severity:	■ Medium
Item: 3	Location:	Line 1491	Severity:	■ Medium
Item: 4	Location:	Line 1505	Severity:	■ Medium
Item: 5	Location:	Line 1506	Severity:	■ Medium
Item: 6	Location:	Line 1586	Severity:	■ Medium

<b>Function</b>	In Solidity, tx.origin is a global variable that returns the address of the account that sent the transaction. Using the variable for authorization could make a contract vulnerable. For example, if an authorized account calls a malicious contract which triggers it to call the vulnerable contract that passes an authorization check since tx.origin returns the original sender of the transaction which in this case is the authorized account.
<b>Remediation</b>	tx.origin should not be used for authorization in smart contracts. It does have some legitimate use cases, for example, To prevent external contracts from calling the current contract, you can implement a require of the form <code>require(tx.origin == msg.sender)</code> . This prevents intermediate contracts from calling the current contract, thus limiting the contract to regular codeless addresses.

⚠️ Approve of Front running Attack. Example Sandwich bots  
(2 Items)

Item: 1	Location:	Line 260-268	Severity:	Medium
---------	-----------	--------------	-----------	--------

<b>Function</b>	<p>The approve() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function.</p> <p>The function approve can be front-run by abusing the _approve function.</p>
<b>Remediation</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent front-runners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions.</li> <li>2. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-runattack</li> </ol>

```

260  ftrace | funcSig
261  function approve(address spender!, uint256 amount!)
262  {
263    public
264    virtual
265    override
266    returns (bool)
267  {
268    _approve(_msgSender(), spender!, amount!);
269    return true;
  
```


Item: 2	Location: Line 270-285	Severity: <span style="background-color: yellow;">■</span> Medium
---------	------------------------	---

<b>Function</b>	<p>The transferFrom() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account.</p> <p>This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function.</p> <p>The function transferFrom can be front-run by abusing the _approve function.</p>
<b>Remediation</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent front-runners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions.</li> <li>2. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-runattack</li> </ol>


```

270  ftrace | funcSig
271  function transferFrom(
272      address sender!,
273      address recipient!,
274      uint256 amount!
275  ) public virtual override returns (bool) {
276      _transfer(sender!, recipient!, amount!);
277      _approve(
278          sender!,
279          _msgSender(),
280          allowances[sender!][_msgSender()].sub(
281              amount!,
282              "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"
283          );
284      return true;
285  }
286
  
```

## Contract Flow Graph




## Contract Interaction Graph



























































































## Inheritance Graph


























## Contract Functions











































Contract	Type	Bases		
L	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
<b>Context</b>	Implementation			
L	_msgSender	Internal 		
L	_msgData	Internal 		
<b>IUniswapV2Pair</b>	Interface			
L	name	External 		NO 
L	symbol	External 		NO 
L	decimals	External 		NO 
L	totalSupply	External 		NO 
L	balanceOf	External 		NO 
L	allowance	External 		NO 
L	approve	External 		NO 
L	transfer	External 		NO 
L	transferFrom	External 		NO 
L	DOMAIN_SEPARATOR	External 		NO 
L	PERMIT_TYPEHASH	External 		NO 
L	nonces	External 		NO 
L	permit	External 		NO 


























L	MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY	External 		NO 
L	factory	External 		NO 
L	token0	External 		NO 
L	token1	External 		NO 
L	getReserves	External 		NO 
L	price0CumulativeLast	External 		NO 
L	price1CumulativeLast	External 		NO 
L	kLast	External 		NO 
L	mint	External 		NO 
L	burn	External 		NO 
L	swap	External 		NO 
L	skim	External 		NO 
L	sync	External 		NO 
L	initialize	External 		NO 
<b>IUniswapV2Factory</b>	Interface			
L	feeTo	External 		NO 
L	feeToSetter	External 		NO 
L	getPair	External 		NO 
L	allPairs	External 		NO 
L	allPairsLength	External 		NO 
L	createPair	External 		NO 

L	setFeeTo	External ¶		NO ¶
L	setFeeToSetter	External ¶		NO ¶
<b>IERC20</b>	Interface			
L	totalSupply	External ¶		NO ¶
L	balanceOf	External ¶		NO ¶
L	transfer	External ¶		NO ¶
L	allowance	External ¶		NO ¶
L	approve	External ¶		NO ¶
L	transferFrom	External ¶		NO ¶
<b>IERC20Metadata</b>	Interface	IERC20		
L	name	External ¶		NO ¶
L	symbol	External ¶		NO ¶
L	decimals	External ¶		NO ¶
<b>ERC20</b>	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata		
L		Public ¶		NO ¶
L	name	Public ¶		NO ¶
L	symbol	Public ¶		NO ¶
L	decimals	Public ¶		NO ¶
L	totalSupply	Public ¶		NO ¶
L	balanceOf	Public ¶		NO ¶
L	transfer	Public ¶		NO ¶














L	allowance	Public 		NO 
L	approve	Public 		NO 
L	transferFrom	Public 		NO 
L	increaseAllowance	Public 		NO 
L	decreaseAllowance	Public 		NO 
L	_transfer	Internal 		
L	_mint	Internal 		
L	_burn	Internal 		
L	_approve	Internal 		
L	_beforeTokenTransfer	Internal 		
<b>DividendPayingTokenOptionallInterface</b>	Interface			
L	withdrawableDividendOf	External 		NO 
L	withdrawnDividendOf	External 		NO 
L	accumulativeDividendOf	External 		NO 
<b>DividendPayingTokenInterface</b>	Interface			
L	dividendOf	External 		NO 
L	distributeDividends	External 		NO 



L	withdrawDivide nd	External ↓		NO↓
<b>SafeMath</b>	Library			
L	add	Internal 		
L	sub	Internal 		
L	sub	Internal 		
L	mul	Internal 		
L	div	Internal 		
L	div	Internal 		
L	mod	Internal 		
L	mod	Internal 		
<b>Ownable</b>	Implementation	Context		
L		Public ↓		NO↓
L	owner	Public ↓		NO↓
L	renounceOwner ship	Public ↓		onlyOwner
L	transferOwners hip	Public ↓		onlyOwner
<b>SafeMathInt</b>	Library			
L	mul	Internal 		
L	div	Internal 		
L	sub	Internal 		
L	add	Internal 		
L	abs	Internal 		







































L	toUint256Safe	Internal 		
<b>SafeMathUint</b>	Library			
L	toInt256Safe	Internal 		
<b>IUniswapV2Router01</b>	Interface			
L	factory	External 		NO 
L	WETH	External 		NO 
L	addLiquidity	External 		NO 
L	addLiquidityETH	External 		NO 
L	removeLiquidity	External 		NO 
L	removeLiquidityETH	External 		NO 
L	removeLiquidityWithPermit	External 		NO 
L	removeLiquidityETHWithPermit	External 		NO 
L	swapExactTokensForTokens	External 		NO 
L	swapTokensForExactTokens	External 		NO 
L	swapExactETHForTokens	External 		NO 
L	swapTokensForExactETH	External 		NO 
L	swapExactTokensForETH	External 		NO 
L	swapETHForExactTokens	External 		NO 

L	quote	External 		NO 
L	getAmountOut	External 		NO 
L	getAmountIn	External 		NO 
L	getAmountsOut	External 		NO 
L	getAmountsIn	External 		NO 
<b>IUniswapV2Router02</b>	Interface	IUniswapV2Router01		
L	removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External 		NO 
L	removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External 		NO 
L	swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External 		NO 
L	swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External 		NO 
L	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External 		NO 
<b>DividendPayingToken</b>	Implementation	ERC20, DividendPayingTokenInterface, DividendPayingTokenOptionalInterface		














































L		Public 🔒		ERC20
L		External 🔒		NO 🔒
L	distributeDividends	Public 🔒		NO 🔒
L	withdrawDividend	Public 🔒		NO 🔒
L	_withdrawDividendOfUser	Internal 🔒		
L	dividendOf	Public 🔒		NO 🔒
L	withdrawableDividendOf	Public 🔒		NO 🔒
L	withdrawnDividendOf	Public 🔒		NO 🔒
L	accumulativeDividendOf	Public 🔒		NO 🔒
L	_transfer	Internal 🔒		
L	_mint	Internal 🔒		
L	_burn	Internal 🔒		
L	_setBalance	Internal 🔒		
<b>eXtremeBeans</b>	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
L		Public 🔒		ERC20
L	decimals	Public 🔒		NO 🔒
L		External 🔒		NO 🔒
L	updateStakingAmounts	Public 🔒		onlyOwner
L	enableTrading	External 🔒		onlyOwner



L	setPresaleWallet	External ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setExcludeFees	Public ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setExcludeDividends	Public ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setIncludeDividends	Public ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setCanTransferBefore	External ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setLimitsInEffect	External ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setGasPriceLimit	External ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setcooldowntimer	External ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setMaxWallet	External ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	enableStaking	Public ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	stake	Public ⓘ		NOⓘ
L	setSwapTriggerAmount	Public ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	enableSwapAndLiquify	Public ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setAutomatedMarketMakerPair	Public ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setAllowCustomTokens	Public ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	setAllowAutoReinvest	Public ⓘ		onlyOwner
L	_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair	Private 🔒		

L	updateGasForProcessing	Public 		onlyOwner
L	transferAdmin	Public 		onlyOwner
L	updateTransferFee	Public 		onlyOwner
L	updateFees	Public 		onlyOwner
L	getStakingInfo	External 		NO 
L	getTotalDividendsDistributed	External 		NO 
L	isExcludedFromFees	Public 		NO 
L	withdrawableDividendOf	Public 		NO 
L	dividendTokenBalanceOf	Public 		NO 
L	getAccountDividendsInfo	External 		NO 
L	getAccountDividendsInfoAtIndex	External 		NO 
L	processDividendTracker	External 		NO 
L	claim	External 		NO 
L	getLastProcessedIndex	External 		NO 
L	getNumberOfDividendTokenHolders	External 		NO 
L	setAutoClaim	External 		NO 
L	setReinvest	External 		NO 

L	setDividendsPaused	External 🔒	🔒	onlyOwner
L	isExcludedFromAutoClaim	External 🔒		NO 🔒
L	isReinvest	External 🔒		NO 🔒
L	_transfer	Internal 🔒	🔒	
L	getStakingBalance	Private 🔒		
L	swapAndLiquify	Private 🔒	🔒	
L	swapTokensForEth	Private 🔒	🔒	
L	updatePayoutToken	Public 🔒	🔒	onlyOwner
L	getPayoutToken	Public 🔒		NO 🔒
L	setMinimumTokenBalanceForAutoDividends	Public 🔒	🔒	onlyOwner
L	setMinimumTokenBalanceForDividends	Public 🔒	🔒	onlyOwner
L	addLiquidity	Private 🔒	🔒	
L	forceSwapAndSendDividends	Public 🔒	🔒	onlyOwner
L	swapAndSendDividends	Private 🔒	🔒	
L	multiSend	Public 🔒	🔒	onlyOwner
L	airdropToWallets	External 🔒	🔒	onlyOwner

<b>eXtremeBeans DividendTracker</b>	Implementation	DividendPaying Token, Ownable		
L		Public 		DividendPaying Token
L	decimals	Public 		NO 
L	name	Public 		NO 
L	symbol	Public 		NO 
L	_transfer	Internal 		
L	withdrawDividend	Public 		NO 
L	isExcludedFrom AutoClaim	External 		onlyOwner
L	isReinvest	External 		onlyOwner
L	setAllowCustom Tokens	External 		onlyOwner
L	setAllowAutoRe invest	External 		onlyOwner
L	excludeFromDiv idends	External 		onlyOwner
L	includeFromDivi dends	External 		onlyOwner
L	setAutoClaim	External 		onlyOwner
L	setReinvest	External 		onlyOwner
L	setMinimumTok enBalanceForAu toDividends	External 		onlyOwner
L	setMinimumTok enBalanceForDi vidends	External 		onlyOwner

L	setDividendsPa used	External !		onlyOwner
L	getLastProcesse dIndex	External !		NO!
L	getNumberOfT okenHolders	External !		NO!
L	getAccount	Public !		NO!
L	getAccountAtIn dex	Public !		NO!
L	setBalance	External !		onlyOwner
L	process	Public !		NO!
L	processAccount	Public !		onlyOwner
L	updateUniswap V2Router	Public !		onlyOwner
L	updatePayoutT oken	Public !		onlyOwner
L	getPayoutToken	Public !		NO!
L	_reinvestDividen dOfUser	Private 		
L	_withdrawDivid endOfUser	Internal 		
<b>IterableMappi ng</b>	Library			
L	get	Internal 		
L	getIndexOfKey	Internal 		
L	getKeyAtIndex	Internal 		
L	size	Internal 		
L	set	Internal 		

L	remove	Internal 		
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Function  
can modify  
state



Function  
is payable

## Audit Scope

### Audit Method.

Our smart contract audit is an extensive methodical examination and analysis of the smart contract's code that is used to interact with the blockchain. Goal: discover errors, issues and security vulnerabilities in the code. Findings getting reported and improvements getting suggested.

### Automatic and Manual Review

We are using automated tools to scan functions and weaknesses of the contract. Transfers, integer over-undeflow checks such as all CWE events.

### Tools we use:

Visual Studio Code

CWE

SWC

Solidity Scan

SVD

In manual code review our auditor looking at source code and performing line by line examination. This method helps to clarify developer's coding decisions and business logic.

## Skeleton Ecosystem

<https://skeletonecosystem.com>

<https://github.com/SkeletonEcosystem/Audits>

