



Phoenix Token PHT BEP20

0x885c99a787BE6b41cbf964174C771A9f7ec48





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SKELETON ECOSYSTEM

PHOENIX TOKEN BEP20

Global Disclaimer

This document serves as a disclaimer for the crypto smart contract audit conducted by Skeleton Ecosystem. The purpose of the audit was to review the codebase of the smart contracts for potential vulnerabilities and issues. It is important to note the following:

Limited Scope: The audit is based on the code and information available up to the audit completion date. It does not cover external factors, system interactions, or changes made after the audit. The audit itself can not guarantee 100% safaty and can not detect common scam methods like farming and developer sell-out.

No Guarantee of Security: While we have taken reasonable steps to identify vulnerabilities, it is impossible to guarantee the complete absence of security risks or issues. The audit report provides an assessment of the contract's security as of the audit date.

Continued Development: Smart contracts and blockchain technology are evolving fields. Updates, forks, or changes to the contract post-audit may introduce new risks that were not present during the audit.

Third-party Code: If the smart contract relies on third-party libraries or code, those components were not thoroughly audited unless explicitly stated. Security of these dependencies is the responsibility of their respective developers.

Non-Exhaustive Testing: The audit involved automated analysis, manual review, and testing under controlled conditions. It is possible that certain vulnerabilities or issues may not have been identified.

Risk Evaluation: The audit report includes a risk assessment for identified vulnerabilities. It is recommended that the development team carefully reviews and addresses these risks to mitigate potential exploits.

Not Financial Advice: This audit report is not intended as financial or investment advice. Decisions regarding the use, deployment, or investment in the smart contract should be made based on a comprehensive assessment of the associated risks.

By accessing and using this audit report, you acknowledge and agree to the limitations outlined above. Skeleton Ecosystem and its auditors shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect damages resulting from the use of the audit report or the smart contract itself.

Please consult with legal, technical, and financial professionals before making any decisions related to the smart contract.



Overview

Contract Name	PhoenixToken
Ticker/Simbol	РНТ
Blockchain	Binance Smart Chain BEP20
Contract Address	0x885c99a787BE6b41cbf964174C771A9f7ec48e04
Creator Address	0xF73CDec6497a643332a88A0cECaC0CAdD1E998B7
Current Owner Address	0x000000000000000000000000000000000000
Contract Explorer	https://bscscan.com/address/0x885c99a787BE6b41c bf964174C771A9f7ec48e04#code
Compiler Version	v0.8.15+commit.e14f2714
License	MIT
Optimisation	Yes with 200 Runs
Total Supply	9,829,617.835952 PHT
Decimals	18

Creation/Audit

Contract Deployed	26.11.2023
Audit Created	25.06.2024
Audit Update	V 1.0

Verified Socials

Website	https://phoenixtoken.community/
Telegram	https://t.me/phoenixtoken0
Twitter (X)	https://twitter.com/PhoenixToken0/




Contract Function Analysis



Pass Attention Item ARisky Item





Contract Verified	✓	The contract source code is uploaded to blockchain explorer and is open source, so everybody can read it.
Contract Ownership		0x000000000000000000000000000000000000
Buy Tax	5 %	Shows the taxes for purchase transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Sell Tax	5 %	Shows the taxes for sell transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Honeypot Analyse	✓	Holder is able to buy and sell. If honeypot: The contract blocks sell transfer from holder wallet. Multiple events may cause honeypot. Trading disabled, extremely high tax
Liqudity Status	>	Liqudity status on 25.06.2024 92,9% Locked for 150 Days on Mudra Locker
Trading Disable Functions	✓	No Trading suspendable function found. If a suspendable code is included, the token maybe neither be bought or sold (honeypot risk). If contract is renounced this function can't be used
Set Fees function	A	Fee Setting function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).
Proxy Contract	✓	Not a Proxy contract
Mint Function	✓	No Mint Function detected Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and effect the price of the token. Owner can mint new tokens and sell.



Balance Modifier Function	>	No Balance Modifier function found. If there is a function for this, the contract owner can have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses. For
		example revoke the bought tokens from the holders wallet. Common form of scam: You buy the token, but it's disappearing from your wallet.
Blacklist		No Blacklist and Multi-Blacklist Setting function found.
Function	>	If there is a blacklist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally. Example: you buy the token and right after your Wallet getting blacklisted. Like so you will be unable to sell. Honeypot Risk.
Whitelist Function	A	Whitelist Setting function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner
		If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)
Hidden Owner		No Hidden or multi owner with authorisation
Analysis	✓	For contract with a hidden owner, developer can still manipulate the contract even if the ownership has been abandoned.
Retrieve Ownership Function	>	No Functions found which can retrieve ownership of the contract.
T direction.		If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it. Also known as fake renounce.
Self Destruct	✓	No Self Destruct function found.
Function		If this function exists and is triggered, the contract will be destroyed, all functions will be unavailable, and all related assets will be erased.
Specific Tax	✓	No Specific Tax Changing Functions found.
Changing Function		If it exists, the contract owner may set a very outrageous tax rate for assigned address to block it from trading. Can assign all wallets at once!
Trading Cooldown	A	No Trading Cooldown Function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner. If there is a trading
Function		cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying. Like a temporary honeypot.
Мах	A	Max Transaction and Holding Modify function found.
Transaction		Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner
and Holding Modify Function		If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot
Transaction	✓	No Transaction Limiter Function Found.
Limiting Function		The number of overall token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk)



Details of Risk - Attention Items

Removing Risk of contract function based on renounced ownership



Following detected contract functions serve as informational purposes about the contract. The owner has no more authorisation to trigger the following functions.

SKELETON ECOSYSTEM SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

PHOENIX TOKEN BEP20



Set Fee

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner

The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).

```
ftrace | funcSig
function updateFees(
    uint256 deadBuy1,
    uint256 deadSell1,
    uint256 marketingBuy1,
   uint256 marketingSellt,
    uint256 liquidityBuy1,
   uint256 liquiditySellt,
    uint256 RewardsBuy1,
   uint256 RewardsSellt,
    uint256 devBuy1,
   uint256 devSell
) public onlyOwner
    buyDeadFees = deadBuy1;
    buyMarketingFees = marketingBuy1;
    buyLiquidityFee = liquidityBuy1;
buyRewardsFee = RewardsBuy1;
    sellDeadFees = deadSellf;
sellMarketingFees = marketingSellf;
    sellLiquidityFee = liquiditySell1;
    sellRewardsFee = RewardsSell1;
    buyDevFee = devBuy1;
    sellDevFee = devSell1;
   totalSellFees = sellRewardsFee
.add(sellLiquidityFee)
         .add(sellMarketingFees)
        .add(sellDevFee);
    totalBuyFees = buyRewardsFee
        .add(buyLiquidityFee)
         .add(buyMarketingFees)
         .add(buyDevFee);
    require(totalSellFees <= 100 && totalBuyFees <= 100, "total fees cannot exceed 15% sell or buy");
    emit UpdateFees(
         sellMarketingFees,
         sellLiquidityFee,
         sellRewardsFee,
         buyDeadFees,
         buyMarketingFees,
         buyLiquidityFee,
         buyRewardsFee,
         buyDevFee,
         sel1DevFee
```

▲ Whitelist (Set wallets excluded from fees)

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner

If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)

```
// exclude a wallet from fees
ftrace | funcSig
function setExcludeFees(address account), bool excluded) public onlyOwner {
    _isExcludedFromFees[account†] = excludedf;
    emit ExcludeFromFees(account1, excluded1);
```



Max Transaction and Holding Modify function

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner

If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot

```
// set max wallet, can not be lower than 0.05% of supply
function setmaxWallet(uint256 value) external onlyOwner {
   valuet = valuet * (10**18);
   require(value) >= _totalSupply / 2000, "max wallet cannot be set to less than 0.05%");
   maxWallet = value1;
```

▲ Blacklist Wallets from receiving dividend

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner

Wallets can be blacklisted from receiving dividens rewards. In some cases this is to avoid team wallets, burn address to receive rewards, in some cases holder wallets can be blacklisted as well.

```
ftrace | funcSig
            function setExcludeDividends(address account) public onlyOwner {
1164
                dividendTracker.excludeFromDividends(account1);
```

▲ Trading Cooldown (max 300 sec)

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner

If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying. Like a temporary honeypot.

```
ftrace | funcSig
function setcooldowntimer(uint256 value) external onlyOwner {
   require(value) <= 300, "cooldown timer cannot exceed 5 minutes");
    cooldowntimer = value1;
```




Update Transfer Fee

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner

The transfer fee can be updated. This means transfer between wallets gets taxed.

```
πrace | τυποδία
           function updateTransferFee(uint256 newTransferFeet) public onlyOwner {
               require (newTransferFee† <= 15, "transfer fee cannot exceed 15%");
               transferFee = newTransferFee1;
               emit UpdateTransferFee(transferFee);
1279
```

Contract Security Total Findings: 9



- High Severity Issues: High possibility to cause problems, need to be resolved.
- Medium Severity Issue: Will likely cause problems, recommended to resolve.
- Low Severity Issues: Won't cause problems, but for improvement purposes could be adjusted.
- Informational Severity Issues: Not harmful in any way, information for the developer team.

Contract Weakness Classisication

THE SMART CONTRACT WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION REGISTRY (SWC REGISTRY) IS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION SCHEME PROPOSED IN EIP-1470. IT IS LOOSELY ALIGNED TO THE TERMINOLOGIES AND STRUCTURE USED IN THE COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE) WHILE OVERLAYING A WIDE RANGE OF WEAKNESS VARIANTS THAT ARE

- High severity Issues: (0)
- Medium severity issues: (1)
 - Usage of tx. origin
- Low severity issues: (4)
 - Missing Events
 - Long number literals
 - Outdated compiler Version
 - Approve of Front Running Attack
- Informational severity issues: (2)
 - Public Functions Should be Declared External
 - State Variables Should be Declared Constant



ID	Description	AI	Manual	Result
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	low	low	low
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	High	Medium	Medium
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Passed	Passed	Passed



SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Passed	Passed	Passed



Detected High and Medium Severity Vulnerability Description.



Approve of Front running Attack (2 Item)

Location: Line 270-278 Severity:	Low

Function The approve() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function approve can be front-run by abusing the _approve function. Remedation 1. Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent frontrunners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions. 2. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
ftrace | func5ig
function approve(address spender), uint256 amount()
    virtual
    override
   returns (bool)
    _approve(_msgSender(), spender1, amount1);
    return true;
```



Line 1625-1632 Item: 2 Location: Severity: Low

Function	The swapTokensForEth() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function swapTokensForEth can be front-run by abusing the _approve function.
Remedation	 Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent front-runners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
function swapTokensForEth(uint256 tokenAmount1) private {
              address[] memory path = new address[](2);
               path[0] = address(this);
               path[1] = uniswapV2Router.WETH();
                _approve(address(this), address(uniswapV2Router), tokenAmount1);
1630
               uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(
                   tokenAmount1,
                   path,
                   block.timestamp
```



▲ Outdated Compiler Version. (18 Items)

Item: 1	Location:	Line 16	Severity:	Low
---------	-----------	---------	-----------	-----

Function	Using an outdated compiler version can be problematic especially if there are publicly disclosed bugs and issues that affect the current compiler version. The following outdated versions were detected: /phoenix.sol - ^0.8.15
Remedation	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler that should not be the most recent version, and it should not be an outdated version as well. Using very old versions of Solidity prevents the benefits of bug fixes and newer security checks. Consider using the solidity version v0.8.25, which patches most solidity vulnerabilities.

⚠ Usage of tx. origin (6 Item)


Item: 1	Location:	Limitless.sol Line 1405	Severity:	Medium
Item: 2	Location:	Limitless.sol Line 1499	Severity:	Medium
Item: 3	Location:	Limitless.sol Line 1501	Severity:	Medium
Item: 4	Location:	Limitless.sol Line 1515	Severity:	Medium
Item: 5	Location:	Limitless.sol Line 1516	Severity:	Medium
Item: 6	Location:	Limitless.sol Line 1596	Severity:	Medium

Function	In Solidity, tx.origin is a global variable that returns the address of the account that sent the transaction. Using the variable for authorization could make a contract vulnerable. For example, if an authorized account calls a malicious contract which triggers it to call the vulnerable contract that passes an authorization check since tx.origin returns the original sender of the transaction which in this case is the authorized account.
Remedation	The best way to prevent Tx Origin attacks is not to use the tx.origin for authentication purposes. Instead, it is advisable to use msg.sender You can implement a require of the form require(tx.origin == msg.sender).






Contract Flow Graph






Contract Interaction Graph





Inheritance Graph





Contract Functions

Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Context	Implementation			
L	_msgSender	Internal 🖺		
L	_msgData	Internal 🖺		
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
L	name	External 🌡		NO
L	symbol	External 🎚		NO
L	decimals	External 🎚		NO
L	totalSupply	External 🎚		Nol
L	balanceOf	External [NO
L	allowance	External 🏻		Nol
L	approve	External [NO
L	transfer	External 🏻		Nol
L	transferFrom	External 🎚		Nol
L	DOMAIN_SEPARAT OR	External 🌡		Nol
L	PERMIT_TYPEHAS H	External 🎚		Nol
L	nonces	External [NO
L	permit	External [NO
L	MINIMUM_LIQUIDI TY	External 🎚		Nol
L	factory	External [Nol
L	token0	External [Nol
L	token1	External [NOI



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	getReserves	External 🎚		Nol
L	price0Cumulative Last	External [Пои
L	price1Cumulative Last	External 🎚		Пои
L	kLast	External 🎚		NO[
L	mint	External 🎚		NO
L	burn	External 🎚		NO
L	swap	External 🎚		NO
L	skim	External 🎚		NO
L	sync	External 🎚		NO
L	initialize	External 🎚		lon
IUniswapV2Factor Y	Interface			
L	feeTo	External [Nol
L	feeToSetter	External 🎚		Nol
L	getPair	External 🎚		NO
L	allPairs	External 🎚		Nol
L	allPairsLength	External 🎚		Nol
L	createPair	External 🎚		Nol
L	setFeeTo	External 🎚		NO[
L	setFeeToSetter	External 🎚		NO[
IERC20	Interface			
L	totalSupply	External 🎚		Nol
L	balanceOf	External 🎚		Nol
L	transfer	External [Nol



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	allowance	External		Nol
L	арргоче	External 🎚		Nol
L	transferFrom	External 🏻		NOÎ
IERC20Metadata	Interface	IERC20		
L	name	External 🎚		Мо[
L	symbol	External 🎚		МО[
L	decimals	External 🏻		Nol
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata		
L		Public		Nol
L	name	Public		иоД
L	symbol	Public		иоД
L	decimals	Public 🌡		иоД
L	totalSupply	Public 🌡		иоД
L	balanceOf	Public 🌡		иоД
L	transfer	Public 🌡		иоД
L	allowance	Public 🌡		иоД
L	approve	Public 🌡		ио[
L	transferFrom	Public 🏿		Nol
L	increaseAllowance	Public 🏿		NOI
L	decreaseAllowanc e	Public 🌡		NOÏ
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	_mint	Internal 🖺		
L	_burn	Internal 🖺		



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	_approve	Internal 🖺		
L	_beforeTokenTran sfer	Internal 🖺		
DividendPayingTo kenOptionalInterf ace	Interface			
L	withdrawableDivi dendOf	External [Nol
L	withdrawnDividen dOf	External [Nol
L	accumulativeDivid endOf	External 🎚		Nol
DividendPayingTo kenInterface	Interface			
L	dividendOf	External 🎚		No.
L	distributeDividend s	External 🏻	d D	No[
L	withdrawDividend	External 🎚		Nol
SafeMath	Library			
L	add	Internal 🖺		
L	sub	Internal 🖺		
L	sub	Internal 🖺		
L	mul	Internal 🖺		
L	div	Internal 🖺		
L	div	Internal 🖺		
L	mod	Internal 🖺		
L	mod	Internal 🖺		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
L		Public 🎚		Nol



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	owner	Public 🎚		lon
L	renounceOwnersh ip	Public [onlyOwner
L	transferOwnershi P	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
Safe/MathInt	Library			
L	mul	Internal 🖺		
L	div	Internal 🖺		
L	sub	Internal 🖺		
L	add	Internal 🖺		
L	abs	Internal 🖺		
L	toUint256Safe	Internal 🖺		
SafeMathUint	Library			
L	toInt256Safe	Internal 🖺		
IUniswapV2Router 01	Interface			
L	factory	External [No.
L	WETH	External 🎚		lon
L	addLiquidity	External 🎚		lon
L	addLiquidityETH	External 🎚	ŒÞ	Пои
L	removeLiquidity	External [Пои
L	removeLiquidityE TH	External [Nol
L	removeLiquidityW ithPermit	External [Nol
L	removeLiquidityE THWithPermit	External 🏻		lon



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	swapExactTokens ForTokens	External [Nol
L	swapTokensForEx actTokens	External [lon
L	swapExactETHFor Tokens	External [ÜÞ	lon
L	swapTokensForEx actETH	External [Nol
L	swapExactTokens ForETH	External [Nol
L	swapETHForExact Tokens	External 🎚	d D	Nol
L	quote	External 🎚		Nol
L	getAmountOut	External 🌡		Nol
L	getAmountIn	External 🎚		Nol
L	getAmountsOut	External 🎚		No[
L	getAmountsIn	External 🏿		NO[
IUniswapV2Router 02	Interface	IUniswapV2Router 01		
L	removeLiquidityE THSupportingFee OnTransferTokens	External 🎚	•	NO]
L	removeLiquidityE THWithPermitSup portingFeeOnTran sferTokens	External 🎚		Nol
L	swapExactTokens ForTokensSupport ingFeeOnTransfer Tokens	External 🎚		No[
L	swapExactETHFor TokensSupporting FeeOnTransferTok ens	External 🎚	gp	NO]
L	swapExactTokens ForETHSupporting FeeOnTransferTok ens	External 🎚		NO]



Contract	Туре		Bases	
DividendPayingTo ken	Implementation	ERC20, DividendPayingTo kenInterface, DividendPayingTo kenOptionalInterf ace		
L		Public 🎚		ERC20
L		External 🎚	<u>ain</u>	Пои
L	distributeDividend s	Public [ďĐ	Nol
L	withdrawDividend	Public 🎚		Пои
L	_withdrawDividen dOfUser	Internal 🖺		
L	dividendOf	Public 🎚		Пои
L	withdrawableDivi dendOf	Public 🎚		NoÎ
L	withdrawnDividen dOf	Public 🌡		NOÏ
L	accumulativeDivid endOf	Public 🌡		NOÏ
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	_mint	Internal 🖺		
L	_burn	Internal 🖺		
L	_setBalance	Internal 🖺		
PhoenixToken	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
L		Public 🌡		ERC20
L	decimals	Public 🌡		Мо[
L		External 🎚	<u>ain</u>	Nol
L	updateStakingAm ounts	Public [onlyOwner
L	enableTrading	External 🏻		onlyOwner



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	setPresaleWallet	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setExcludeFees	Public 🎚		only0wner
L	setExcludeDividen ds	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setIncludeDividen ds	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setCanTransferBe fore	External 🏻		onlyOwner
L	setLimitsInEffect	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setGasPriceLimit	External 🏻		onlyOwner
L	setcooldowntimer	External 🎚		only0wner
L	setmaxWallet	External [only0wner
L	enableStaking	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	stake	Public [lon
L	setSwapTriggerA mount	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	enableSwapAndLi quify	Public [onlyOwner
L	setAutomatedMar ketMakerPair	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setAllowCustomT okens	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setAllowAutoRein vest	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	_setAutomatedMa rketMakerPair	Private 🖺		
L	updateGasForProc essing	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	transferAdmin	Public 🌡		only0wner
L	updateTransferFe e	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	updateFees	Public 🌡		only0wner



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	getStakingInfo	External 🌡		Nol
L	getTotalDividends Distributed	External 🎚		Nol
L	isExcludedFromFe es	Public 🎚		Nol
L	withdrawableDivi dendOf	Public 🎚		Nol
L	dividendTokenBal anceOf	Public 🎚		Nol
L	getAccountDivide ndsInfo	External [Nol
L	getAccountDivide ndsInfoAtIndex	External [lon
L	processDividendTr acker	External [Nol
L	claim	External [Nol
L	getLastProcessedI ndex	External 🌡		Nol
L	getNumberOfDivi dendTokenHolder s	External 🎚		No[
L	setAutoClaim	External 🏿		NO[
L	setReinvest	External [Nol
L	setDividendsPaus ed	External [onlyOwner
L	isExcludedFromAu toClaim	External 🌡		Nol
L	isReinvest	External 🏿		NOÏ
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	getStakingBalance	Private 🖺		
L	swapAndLiquify	Private 🖺		
L	swapTokensForEt h	Private 🖺		



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	updatePayoutTok en	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	getPayoutToken	Public 🎚		Пои
L	setMinimumToke nBalanceForAuto Dividends	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setMinimumToke nBalanceForDivide nds	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	addLiquidity	Private 🖺		
L	forceSwapAndSen dDividends	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	swapAndSendDivi dends	Private 🖺		
L	multiSend	Public 		onlyOwner
L	airdropToWallets	External [only0wner
PhoenixTokenDivi dendTracker	Implementation	DividendPayingTo ken, Ownable		
L		Public 🌡	•	DividendPayingTo ken
L	decimals	Public 🎚		Пои
L	name	Public 🎚		Пои
L	symbol	Public 🎚		Пои
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	withdrawDividend	Public 🎚		lon
L	isExcludedFromAu toClaim	External [onlyOwner
L	isReinvest	External 🏿		onlyOwner
L	setAllowCustomT okens	External [•	onlyOwner
L	setAllowAutoRein vest	External [•	onlyOwner



Contract	Туре		Bases		
L	excludeFromDivid ends	External [onlyOwner	
L	includeFromDivide nds	External [onlyOwner	
L	setAutoClaim	External 🎚		onlyOwner	
L	setReinvest	External 🎚		onlyOwner	
L	setMinimumToke nBalanceForAuto Dividends	External [onlyOwner	
L	setMinimumToke nBalanceForDivide nds	External 🎚		onlyOwner	
L	setDividendsPaus ed	External 🏻		onlyOwner	
L	getLastProcessedI ndex	External 🏻		Nol	
L	getNumberOfToke nHolders	External [Nol	
L	getAccount	Public 🎚		Nol	
L	getAccountAtInde ×	Public 🎚		Nol	
L	setBalance	External 🎚		onlyOwner	
L	process	Public 🎚		lon	
ـا	processAccount	Public 🎚		only0wner	
L	updateUniswapV2 Router	Public [onlyOwner	
L	updatePayoutTok en	Public [onlyOwner	
L	getPayoutToken	Public 🎚		Nol	
L	_reinvestDividend OfUser	Private 🖺			
L	_withdrawDividen dOfUser	Internal 🖺			



Contract	Туре	Bases		
IterableMapping	Library			
L	get	Internal 🖺		
L	getIndexOfKey	Internal 🖺		
L	getKeyAtIndex	Internal 🖺		
L	size	Internal 🖺		
L	set	Internal 🖺		
L	remove	Internal 🖺		

Function can modify state

Function is payable



Audit Scope

Audit Method.

Our smart contract audit is an extensive methodical examination and analysis of the smart contract's code that is used to interact with the blockchain. Goal: discover errors, issues and security vulnaribilities in the code. Findings getting reported and improvements getting suggested.

Automatic and Manual Review

We are using automated tools to scan functions and weeknesses of the contract. Transfers, integer over-undeflow checks such as all CWE events.

Tools we use:

Visual Studio Code **CWE SWC** Solidity Scan SVD

In manual code review our auditor looking at source code and performing line by line examination. This method helps to clarify developer's coding decisions and business logic.

Skeleton Ecosystem

https://skeletonecosystem.com

https://github.com/SkeletonEcosystem/Audits

