



Decentra Ecosystem DCE

ERC20

Oxf2c5780e2DDA407781c0C5ECCC9320D5988eA0A6







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Global Disclaimer

This document serves as a disclaimer for the crypto smart contract audit conducted by Skeleton Ecosystem. The purpose of the audit was to review the codebase of the smart contracts for potential vulnerabilities and issues. It is important to note the following:

Limited Scope: The audit is based on the code and information available up to the audit completion date. It does not cover external factors, system interactions, or changes made after the audit. The audit itself can not guarantee 100% safaty and can not detect common scam methods like farming and developer sell-out.

No Guarantee of Security: While we have taken reasonable steps to identify vulnerabilities, it is impossible to guarantee the complete absence of security risks or issues. The audit report provides an assessment of the contract's security as of the audit date.

Continued Development: Smart contracts and blockchain technology are evolving fields. Updates, forks, or changes to the contract post-audit may introduce new risks that were not present during the audit.

Third-party Code: If the smart contract relies on third-party libraries or code, those components were not thoroughly audited unless explicitly stated. Security of these dependencies is the responsibility of their respective developers.

Non-Exhaustive Testing: The audit involved automated analysis, manual review, and testing under controlled conditions. It is possible that certain vulnerabilities or issues may not have been identified.

Risk Evaluation: The audit report includes a risk assessment for identified vulnerabilities. It is recommended that the development team carefully reviews and addresses these risks to mitigate potential exploits.

Not Financial Advice: This audit report is not intended as financial or investment advice. Decisions regarding the use, deployment, or investment in the smart contract should be made based on a comprehensive assessment of the associated risks.

By accessing and using this audit report, you acknowledge and agree to the limitations outlined above. Skeleton Ecosystem and its auditors shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect damages resulting from the use of the audit report or the smart contract itself.

Please consult with legal, technical, and financial professionals before making any decisions related to the smart contract.

Overview

| Contract Name | DecentraEcosystem |
|-----------------------|--|
| Ticker/Simbol | DCE |
| Blockchain | ETHEREUM ERC20 |
| Contract Address | 0xf2c5780e2DDA407781c0C5ECCC9320D5988eA0A6 |
| Creator Address | 0xbcB64f4FF2C7BdEEd5Ff14e2Ef2FEfa041481C0F |
| Current Owner Address | 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
| Contract Explorer | https://etherscan.io/token/0xf2c5780e2DDA407781c0C 5ECCC9320D5988eA0A6#code |
| Compiler Version | v0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404 |
| License | MIT |
| Optimisation | Yes with 9999 Runs |
| Total Supply | 1,000,000 DCE |
| Decimals | 9 |

Creation/Audit


| Contract Deployed | 31.07.2024 |
|-------------------|------------|
| Audit Created | 14.08.2024 |
| Audit Update | V 1.0 |

Verified Socials

| Website | https://decentra.network |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|
| Telegram | https://t.me/DecentraERC20 |
| Twitter (X) | https://twitter.com/DecentraERC20 |



Contract Function Analysis





| Contract Verified | ✓ | The contract source code is uploaded to blockchain explorer and is open source, so everybody can read it. |
|---------------------------------|----------|--|
| Contract Ownership | | 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
| Виу Тах | 5 % | Shows the taxes for purchase transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set! |
| Sell Tax | 5 % | Shows the taxes for sell transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set! |
| Honeypot Analyse | ✓ | Holder is able to buy and sell. If honeypot: The contract blocks sell transfer from holder wallet. Multiple events may cause honeypot. Trading disabled, extremely high tax |
| Liqudity Status | ✓ | Liqudity status on 14.08.2024 100% of LP token are Burned. |
| Trading Disable Functions | ✓ | No Trading suspendable function foundIf a suspendable code is included, the token maybe neither be bought or sold (honeypot risk). If contract is renounced this function can't be used |
| Set Fees | | No Fee Setting function found |
| function | ✓ | The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk). |
| Proxy Contract | ✓ | Not a Proxy contract. |
| Mint Function | ✓ | No Mint Function detected Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and effect the price of the token. Owner can mint new tokens and sell. |




| Balance Modifier Function Blacklist | > | No Balance Modifier function found. If there is a function for this, the contract owner can have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses. For example revoke the bought tokens from the holders wallet. Common form of scam: You buy the token, but it's disappearing from your wallet. No Blacklist Setting function found. |
|---|-------------|--|
| Function | V | If there is a blacklist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally. Example: you buy the token and right after your Wallet getting blacklisted. Like so you will be unable to sell. Honeypot Risk. |
| Whitelist Function | A | Whitelist Setting function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner. If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming) |
| Hidden Owner Analysis | <u>\</u> | No Hidden or multi owner with authorisation For contract with a hidden owner, developer can still manipulate the contract even if the ownership has been abandoned. |
| Retrieve Ownership Function | > | No Functions found which can retrieve ownership of the contract. If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it. Also known as fake renounce. |
| Self Destruct Function | > | No Self Destruct function found. If this function exists and is triggered, the contract will be destroyed, all functions will be unavailable, and all related assets will be erased. |
| Specific Tax Changing Function | > | No Specific Tax Changing Functions found. If it exists, the contract owner may set a very outrageous tax rate for assigned address to block it from trading. Can assign all wallets at once! |
| Trading Cooldown Function | > | No Trading Cooldown Function found. If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying. Like a temporary honeypot. |
| Max Transaction and Holding Modify Function | > | No Max Transaction and Holding Modify function found If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot |
| Transaction Limiting Function | ✓ | No Transaction Limiter Function Found. The number of overall token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk) |



Details of Risk - Attention Items

Removing Risk of contract function based on renounced ownership



Following detected contract functions serve as informational purposes about the contract. The owner has no more authorisation to trigger functions.

Whitelist (Set Zero Fee wallets)

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.


If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)

```
function excludeFromFees(
             address accounti,
             bool excludedt
          ) external onlyOwner {
              _isExcludedFromFees[account1] = excluded1;
              emit ExcludeFromFees(account1, excluded1);
          function isExcludedFromFees(address account() public view returns (bool) {
405
              return _isExcludedFromFees[account1];
```



Contract Security

Total Findings: 6



- **High Severity Issues:** High possibility to cause problems, need to be resolved.
- **Medium Severity Issue:** Will likely cause problems, recommended to resolve.
- **Low Severity Issues:** Won't cause problems, but for improvement purposes could be adjusted.
- Informational Severity Issues: Not harmful in any way, information for the developer team.



Contract Security List of Found Issues

- High severity Issues: (0)
- Medium severity issues: (0)
- Low severity issues: (3)
 - Missing Eevents
 - Approve Front Running Attack (Sandwich Bots)
 - Outdated Compiler Version
- Informational severity issues: (3)
 - Public Functions Should be Declared External
 - State Variables Should be Declared Constant
 - Precision Loss During Division By Large Numbers

Contract Weakness Classisication

THE SMART CONTRACT WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION REGISTRY (SWC REGISTRY) IS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION SCHEME PROPOSED IN EIP-1470. IT IS LOOSELY ALIGNED TO THE TERMINOLOGIES AND STRUCTURE USED IN THE COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE) WHILE OVERLAYING A WIDE RANGE OF WEAKNESS VARIANTS THAT ARE

| ID | Description | AI | Manual | Result |
|---------|--------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| SWC-100 | Function Default Visibility | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version | low | low | low |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma | low | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return Value | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-109 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables | Passed | Passed | Passed |



| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | Passed | Passed | Passed |
|---------|--|--------|--------|--------|
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Griefing | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error | low | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-132 | Unexpected Ether balance | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-134 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-135 | Code With No Effects | Passed | Passed | Passed |
| SWC-136 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | Passed | Passed | Passed |





Detected High and Medium Severity Vulnerability Description.

▲ Outdated Compiler Version

vulnerabilities.

| item: i | Location: | Line 2 i | Severity: | Low |
|------------|--|---|---|---|
| | | | | |
| Function | especially that affect | utdated compiler version if there are publicly disc t the current compiler value ving outdated versions value v | closed bugs a ersion. | and issues |
| Remedation | compiler t should not versions o | mended to use a recent hat should not be the m t be an outdated version f Solidity prevents the b urity checks. Consider u | ost recent von as well. Using the period of | ersion, and it ng very old ug fixes and |

version v0.8.25, which patches most solidity



lack Approve of front running attack. Also known as Sandwich Bot attack. (2 Item)

| Item: 1 | Location: | Line 198-204 | Severity: | Low |
|---------|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----|
| | | | | |

| Function | The approve() method overrides current allowance |
|------------|--|
| | regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, |
| | so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a |
| | certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart |
| | contract, not an account. |
| | This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to |
| | withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. |
| | Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount |
| | and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can |
| | notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract |
| | tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up |
| | with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front- |
| | running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. |
| | The function approve can be front-run by abusing |
| | the _approve function. |
| Remedation | 1.Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum |
| | acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent |
| | front-runners from drastically increasing the gas fees to |
| | prioritize their transactions. |
| | 2.Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run |
| | attack |
| | |

```
ftrace | funcSig
function approve(
address spender1,
  uint256 amount1
) public virtual override returns (bool) {
  _approve(_msgSender(), spender1, amount1);
```



Line 206-225 Item: 2 Location: Severity: Low

Function

The TransferFrom() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account.

This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a frontrunning attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function approve can be front-run by abusing the _approve function.

Remedation


1.Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent front-runners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions.

2.Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
ftrace | funcSig
function transferFrom(
   address sendert,
    address recipient1,
   uint256 amount†
) public virtual override returns (bool) {
   uint256 currentAllowance = _allowances[sendert][_msgSender()];
    if (currentAllowance != type(uint256).max) {
           currentAllowance >= amount1,
             "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"
        unchecked {
            _approve(sender1, _msgSender(), currentAllowance - amount1);
    _transfer(sender1, recipient1, amount1);
    return true;
```




Contract Flow Graph






Contract Interaction Graph





Inheritance Graph





Contract Functions

| Contract | Туре | Bases | | |
|------------------------|--|------------------------|------------|-----------|
| L | Function Name | Visibility | Mutability | Modifiers |
| IUniswapV2Fact ory | Interface | | | |
| L | createPair | External 🏻 | | Nol |
| IUniswapV2Rout er01 | Interface | | | |
| L | factory | External [| | No[|
| ٦ | WETH | External [| | No[|
| L | addLiquidityETH | External [| <u>an</u> | No[|
| IUniswapV2Rout er02 | Interface | IUniswapV2Rout er01 | | |
| L | swapExactToke nsForETHSuppo rtingFeeOnTran sferTokens | External [| | Nol |
| IERC20 | Interface | | | |
| L | totalSupply | External [| | Nol |
| L | balanceOf | External 🏿 | | Nol |
| L | transfer | External 🎚 | | Мо[|
| L | allowance | External 🎚 | | Мо[|
| L | арргоvе | External 🎚 | | Мо[|
| ١ | transferFrom | External [| | Nol |
| IERC20Metadat a | Interface | IERC20 | | |



| Contract | Туре | | Bases | |
|----------|-----------------------|--|-------|-----------|
| L | name | External [| | МО[|
| L | symbol | External 🎚 | | ПОЙ |
| _ | decimals | External [| | Пои |
| Address | Library | | | |
| ا | sendValue | Internal 🖺 | | |
| Context | Implementation | | | |
| ١ | _msgSender | Internal 🖺 | | |
| Ownable | Implementation | Context | | |
| L | | Public 🎚 | | ПО[|
| L | owner | Public 🎚 | | Мо[|
| ١ | renounceOwner ship | Public 🌡 | | onlyOwner |
| L | transferOwners hip | Public 🌡 | | onlyOwner |
| ERC20 | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadat a | | |
| L | | Public 🎚 | | Nol |
| _ | name | Public 🎚 | | Nol |
| L | symbol | Public 🎚 | | Nol |
| L | decimals | Public 🎚 | | Nol |
| L | totalSupply | Public 🎚 | | Nol |
| L | balanceOf | Public 🎚 | | Nol |
| L | transfer | Public 🎚 | | Nol |
| L | allowance | Public 🎚 | | Nol |



| Contract | Туре | Bases | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|----------------|---|-----------|
| L | арргоvе | Public 🎚 | | МО[|
| L | transferFrom | Public 🎚 | | ПоП |
| L | increaseAllowan ce | Public [| | No |
| L | decreaseAllowa nce | Public 🎚 | | lon |
| L | _transfer | Internal 🖺 | | |
| L | _mint | Internal 🖺 | | |
| L | _burn | Internal 🖺 | | |
| ١ | _approve | Internal 🖺 | | |
| DecentraEcosys tem | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable | | |
| L | | Public 🎚 | | ERC20 |
| L | | External 🎚 | Ф | NO |
| L | claimStuckToke ns | External [| | onlyOwner |
| L | excludeFromFee s | External 🎚 | | onlyOwner |
| L | isExcludedFrom Fees | Public 🏿 | | Nol |
| L | changeFeeRecei ver | External 🎚 | | onlyOwner |
| L | enableTrading | External 🎚 | | onlyOwner |
| L | _transfer | Internal 🖺 | | |
| L | setSwapTokens AtAmount | External 🏻 | | onlyOwner |
| L | toggleSwapping | External [| | onlyOwner |
| ١ | swapAndLiquify | Private 🖺 | | |



| Contract | Туре | Bases | | |
|----------|--------------------------|-----------|--|--|
| L | swapAndSendM arketing | Private 🖺 | | |

Function can modify state

\$10

Function is payable



Audit Scope

Audit Method.

Our smart contract audit is an extensive methodical examination and analysis of the smart contract's code that is used to interact with the blockchain. Goal: discover errors, issues and security vulnaribilities in the code. Findings getting reported and improvements getting suggested.

Automatic and Manual Review

We are using automated tools to scan functions and weeknesses of the contract. Transfers, integer over-undeflow checks such as all CWE events.

Tools we use:

Visual Studio Code **CWE SWC** Solidity Scan SVD

In manual code review our auditor looking at source code and performing line by line examination. This method helps to clarify developer's coding decisions and business logic.

Skeleton Ecosystem

https://skeletonecosystem.com

https://github.com/SkeletonEcosystem/Audits

