SKELETONECOSYSTEM SMART CONTRACT AUDIT



0xe2b1f3908588e2338587ed998f974ee6f63f50





Table of Contents

Table of Contents	1
Disclaimer	2
Overview	3
Creation/Audit Date	3
Verified Socials	3
Contract Functions Analysis	4
Contract Safety and Weakness	8
Detected Vulnerability Description	12
Contract Flow Graph	16
Contract Interaction Graph	17
Inheritance Graph	18
Contract Desciptions	19
Audit Scope	27

SKELETON ECOSYSTEM SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

BETHUSTLERS BEP20

Global Disclaimer

This document serves as a disclaimer for the crypto smart contract audit conducted by Skeleton Ecosystem. The purpose of the audit was to review the codebase of the smart contracts for potential vulnerabilities and issues. It is important to note the following:

Limited Scope: The audit is based on the code and information available up to the audit completion date. It does not cover external factors, system interactions, or changes made after the audit. The audit itself can not guarantee 100% safaty and can not detect common scam methods like farming and developer sell-out.

No Guarantee of Security: While we have taken reasonable steps to identify vulnerabilities, it is impossible to guarantee the complete absence of security risks or issues. The audit report provides an assessment of the contract's security as of the audit date.

Continued Development: Smart contracts and blockchain technology are evolving fields. Updates, forks, or changes to the contract post-audit may introduce new risks that were not present during the audit.

Third-party Code: If the smart contract relies on third-party libraries or code, those components were not thoroughly audited unless explicitly stated. Security of these dependencies is the responsibility of their respective developers.

Non-Exhaustive Testing: The audit involved automated analysis, manual review, and testing under controlled conditions. It is possible that certain vulnerabilities or issues may not have been identified.

Risk Evaluation: The audit report includes a risk assessment for identified vulnerabilities. It is recommended that the development team carefully reviews and addresses these risks to mitigate potential exploits.

Not Financial Advice: This audit report is not intended as financial or investment advice. Decisions regarding the use, deployment, or investment in the smart contract should be made based on a comprehensive assessment of the associated risks.

By accessing and using this audit report, you acknowledge and agree to the limitations outlined above. Skeleton Ecosystem and its auditors shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect damages resulting from the use of the audit report or the smart contract itself.

Please consult with legal, technical, and financial professionals before making any decisions related to the smart contract.



Overview

Contract Name	BetHustlers
Ticker/Simbol	BetHustlers
Blockchain	Binance Smart Chain BEP20
Contract Address	0xe2b1f3908588e2338587ed998f974ee6f63f500d
Creator Address	0x301ADb83c23010D9a76B0e34669A13D1F40c47B9
Current Owner Address	0x301ADb83c23010D9a76B0e34669A13D1F40c47B9
Contract Explorer	https://bscscan.com/address/0xe2b1f3908588e2338 587ed998f974ee6f63f500d#code
Compiler Version	v0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404
License	None
Optimisation	No with 200 Runs
Total Supply	99,999,987.03 BetHustlers
Decimals	18

Creation/Audit

Contract Deployed	31.10.2024
Audit Created	26.03.2024
Audit Update	V 1.0

Verified Socials


Website	https://bethustlerstoken.com/
Telegram	https://t.me/bethustlers_chat
Twitter (X)	https://twitter.com/bethustlers



Contract Function Analysis

Pass Attention Item ARisky Item





Contract Verified	✓	The contract source code is uploaded to blockchain explorer and is open source, so everybody can read it.
Contract Ownership		0x301ADb83c23010D9a76B0e34669A13D1F40c47B9
Buy Tax	8%	Shows the taxes for purchase transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Sell Tax	8%	Shows the taxes for sell transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Honeypot Analyse	✓	Holder is able to buy and sell. If honeypot: The contract blocks sell transfer from holder wallet. Multiple events may cause honeypot. Trading disabled, extremely high tax
Liqudity Status		Not locked on 03.05.2024
Trading Disable Functions	>	No Trading suspendable function found. If a suspendable code is included, the token maybe neither be bought or sold (honeypot risk). If contract is renounced this function can't be used
Set Fees function	⚠ Max 25%	Fee Setting function found. The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).
Proxy Contract	✓	Not a Proxy contract
Mint Function	>	No Mint Function detected Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and effect the price of the token. Owner can mint new tokens and sell.



Balance	✓	No Balance Modifier function found.
Modifier Function		If there is a function for this, the contract owner can have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses. For example revoke the bought tokens from the holders wallet. Common form of scam: You buy the token, but it's disappearing from your wallet.
Blacklist		Blacklist Setting function found.
Function	<u> </u>	If there is a blacklist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally. Example: you buy the token and right after your Wallet getting blacklisted. Like so you will be unable to sell. Honeypot Risk.
Whitelist Function	A	Whitelist Setting function found
		If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)
Hidden Owner		No Hidden or multi owner with authorisation
Analysis	✓	For contract with a hidden owner, developer can still manipulate the contract even if the ownership has been abandoned.
Retrieve Ownership Function	✓	No Functions found which can retrieve ownership of the contract.
T direction		If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it. Also known as fake renounce.
Self Destruct	✓	No Self Destruct function found.
Function		If this function exists and is triggered, the contract will be destroyed, all functions will be unavailable, and all related assets will be erased.
Specific Tax	✓	No Specific Tax Changing Functions found.
Changing Function		If it exists, the contract owner may set a very outrageous tax rate for assigned address to block it from trading. Can assign all wallets at once!
Trading Cooldown Function	✓	No Trading Cooldown Function found. If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying. Like a temporary honeypot.
Max	A	Max Transaction and Holding Modify function found.
Transaction and Holding Modify Function		If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot
Transaction	✓	No Transaction Limiter Function Found.
Limiting Function		The number of overall token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk)



Details of Risk - Attention Items



▲ Set Fee (max 25%)

The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).

```
ftrace|funcSig
function liquidityFeesSetup(uint16 _buyFee1, uint16 _sellFee1, uint16 _transferFee1) public onlyOwner {
      totalFees[0] = totalFees[0] - liquidityFees[0] + _buyFee1;
totalFees[1] = totalFees[1] - liquidityFees[1] + _sellFee1;
totalFees[2] = totalFees[2] - liquidityFees[2] + _transferFee1;
       require(totalFees[0] <= 2500 && totalFees[1] <= 2500 && totalFees[2] <= 2500, "TaxesDefaultRouter: Cannot exceed max total fee of 25%");
      liquidityFees = [ buyFeet, sellFeet, transferFeet];
  ftrace|funcSig
function autoBurnFeesSetup(uint16 _buyFee1, uint16 _sellFee1, uint16 _transferFee1) public onlyOwner {
       totalFees[0] = totalFees[0] - autoBurnFees[0] + _buyFeel;
totalFees[1] = totalFees[1] - autoBurnFees[1] + _sellFeel;
totalFees[2] = totalFees[2] - autoBurnFees[2] + _transferFeel;
require(totalFees[0] <= 2500 && totalFees[1] <= 2500 && totalFees[2] <= 2500, "TaxesDefaultRouter: Cannot exceed max total fee of 25%");
        autoBurnFees = [_buyFeet, _sellFeet, _transferFeet];
function marketingFeesSetup(uint16 _buyFee!, uint16 _sellFee!, uint16 _transferFee!) public onlyOwner {
  totalFees[0] = totalFees[0] - marketingFees[0] + _buyFee!;
  totalFees[1] = totalFees[1] - marketingFees[1] + _sellFee!;
    totalFees[2] = totalFees[2] - marketingFees[2] + _transferFee1;
require(totalFees[0] <= 2500 && totalFees[1] <= 2500 && totalFees[2] <= 2500, "TaxesDefaultRouter: Cannot exceed max total fee of 25%");
     marketingFees = [_buyFee1, _sellFee1, _transferFee1];
 ftrace|funcSig
function companyFeesSetup(uint16 _buyFee!, uint16 _sellFee!, uint16 _transferFee!) public onlyOwner {
      totalFees[0] = totalFees[0] - companyFees[0] + _buyFee1;
      totalFees[1] = totalFees[1] - companyFees[1] + _sellFee1;
totalFees[2] = totalFees[2] - companyFees[2] + _transferFee1;
      require(totalFees[0] <= 2500 && totalFees[1] <= 2500 && totalFees[2] <= 2500, "TaxesDefaultRouter: Cannot exceed max total fee of 25%");
      companyFees = [ buyFeet, sellFeet, transferFeet];
function investorFeesSetup(uint16 _buyFeet, uint16 _sellFeet, uint16 _transferFeet) public onlyOwner {
     totalFees[0] = totalFees[0] - investorFees[0] + buyFeel;
totalFees[1] = totalFees[1] - investorFees[1] + _sellFeel;
totalFees[2] = totalFees[2] - investorFees[2] + _transferFe
      require(totalFees[0] <= 2500 && totalFees[1] <= 2500 && totalFees[2] <= 2500, "TaxesDefaultRouter: Cannot exceed max total fee of 25%");
     investorFees = [_buyFee1, _sellFee1, _transferFee1];
      emit investorFeesUpdated(_buyFee1, _sellFee1, _transferFee1);
 ftrace|funcSig
function partnerFeesSetup(uint16 _buyFee1, uint16 _sellFee1, uint16 _transferFee1) public onlyOwner {
      totalFees[0] = totalFees[0] - partnerFees[0] + _buyFee1;
totalFees[1] = totalFees[1] - partnerFees[1] + _sellFee1;
totalFees[2] = totalFees[2] - partnerFees[2] + _transferFee1;
       require(totalFees[0] <= 2500 && totalFees[1] <= 2500 && totalFees[2] <= 2500, "TaxesDefaultRouter: Cannot exceed max total fee of 25%");
       partnerFees = [_buyFeet, _sellFeet, _transferFeet];
      emit partnerFeesUpdated( buyFee1, sellFee1, transferFee1);
```

Whitelist

If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)

```
ftrace | funcSig
          function excludeFromLimits(address account;, bool isExcluded;) external onlyOwner {
              _excludeFromLimits(account1, isExcluded1);
          function _excludeFromLimits(address account), bool isExcluded) internal {
              isExcludedFromLimits[account†] = isExcluded†;
              emit ExcludeFromLimits(account), isExcluded1);
460
          function excludeFromFees(address account, bool isExcluded) public onlyOwner {
              isExcludedFromFees[account1] = isExcluded1;
              emit ExcludeFromFees(account1, isExcluded1);
```

Max Transaction and Holding Modify function

If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot

```
function updateMaxTransferAmount(uint256 _maxTransferAmount1) public onlyOwner {
   require(_maxTransferAmount1 >= _maxTxSafeLimit(), "MaxTx: Limit too low");
   maxTransferAmount = _maxTransferAmount1;
   emit MaxTransferAmountUpdated(_maxTransferAmount1);
```


Blacklist function

If there is a blacklist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally. Example: you buy the token and right after your Wallet getting blacklisted. Like so you will be unable to sell. Honeypot Risk.

```
function blacklist(address account), bool isBlacklisted) external onlyOwner {
              blacklisted[account†] = isBlacklisted†;
148
              emit BlacklistUpdated(account1, isBlacklisted1);
```

Contract Security

Total Findings: 7



- **High Severity Issues:** High possibility to cause problems, need to be resolved.
- **Medium Severity Issue:** Will likely cause problems, recommended to resolve.
- Low Severity Issues: Won't cause problems, but for improvement purposes could be adjusted.
- Informational Severity Issues: Not harmful in any way, information for the developer team.

SKELETON ECOSYSTEM SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

BETHUSTLERS BEP20

Contract Security List of Found Issues

- High severity Issues: (0)
- Medium severity issues: (1)
 - Existence of Public Burn
- Low severity issues: (5)
 - Approve Front running Attack
 - Long number literals
 - Outdated Compiler Version
 - Floating Pragma
 - Missing Events
- Informational severity issues: (1)
 - Public Functions Should be Declared External



Contract Weakness Classisication

THE SMART CONTRACT WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION REGISTRY (SWC REGISTRY) IS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION SCHEME PROPOSED IN EIP-1470. IT IS LOOSELY ALIGNED TO THE TERMINOLOGIES AND STRUCTURE USED IN THE COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE) WHILE OVERLAYING A WIDE RANGE OF WEAKNESS VARIANTS THAT ARE

ID	Description	AI	Manual	Result
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Passed	Passed	Passed



SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Passed	Passed	Passed



Detected High and Medium Severity Vulnerability Description.



A Public Burn (1 Item)

Item: 1	Location:	Line ERCBurnable.sol	Severity:	Medium
		35-39		7-10-01-0111

Function	The contract was found to be using public or an
	external burn function. The function was missing access control
	to prevent another user from burning their tokens. Also, the burn
	function was found to be using a different address than
	msg.sender.
Remedation	 Consider adding access control modifiers to
	the burn function to Ensure that initialization functions
	can only be called once and only by authorized entities.
	Implement least-privilege roles using libraries like
	OpenZeppelin's Access Control.
	Add proper access control modifiers to sensitive functions,
	such as onlyOwner or custom roles.

```
ftrace | funcSig
         function burnFrom(address account1, uint256 amount1) public virtual {
             _spendAllowance(account1, _msgSender(), amount1);
             _burn(account1, amount1);
39
```



Approve of front running attack. Also known as Sandwich bot attack. (2 Items)

Item: 1	Location:	ERC.20 Line 136-140	Severity:	Low

Function	The approve() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function approve can be front-run by abusing the _approve function.
Remedation	Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent front-runners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions.
	2. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
function approve(address spender1, uint256 amount1) public virtual override returns (bool) {
   address owner = _msgSender();
_approve(owner, spender1, amount1);
```



Item: 2	Location:	ERC.20 Line 324-332	Severity:	Low
---------	-----------	---------------------	-----------	-----

The transferFrom() method overrides current allowance **Function** regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function approve can be front-run by abusing the approve function. 1. Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable Remedation gas price for transactions. This can help prevent frontrunners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions. 2. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
function _spendAllowance(address owner1, address spender1, uint256 amount1) internal virtual {
   uint256 currentAllowance = allowance(owner1, spender1);
   if (currentAllowance != type(uint256).max) {
       require(currentAllowance >= amount1, "ERC20: insufficient allowance");
       unchecked {
            _approve(owner1, spender1, currentAllowance - amount1);
```



⚠ Outdated Compiler Version. (14 Items)


Item: 1	Location:	Line	Severity:	Low

Function	Using an outdated compiler version can be problematic especially if there are publicly disclosed bugs and issues that affect the current compiler version. The following outdated versions were detected: 0.8.0 / 8.19
Remedation	It is recommended to use a recent version of the Solidity compiler that should not be the most recent version, and it should not be an outdated version as well. Using very old versions of Solidity prevents the benefits of bug fixes and newer security checks. Consider using the solidity version v0.8.23, which patches most solidity vulnerabilities.






Contract Flow Graph






Contract Interaction Graph



Inheritance Graph



Contract Functions

Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
BetHustlers	Implementation	ERC20, ERC20Burnable, Ownable2Step, TokenRecover, Initializable		
L		Public 🎚		ERC20
L	initialize	External 🎚		initializer
L		External 🎚	0.p	Nol
L	decimals	Public 🎚		Nol
L	blacklist	External 🏿		onlyOwner
L	_swapTokensForC oin	Private 🖺		
L	updateSwapThres hold	Public [onlyOwner
L	getSwapThreshol dAmount	Public [NO[
L	getAllPending	Public 🌡		Nol
L	investorAddressS etup	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	investorFeesSetu P	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	partnerAddressSe tup	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	partnerFeesSetup	Public 🏿		onlyOwner
L	companyAddressS etup	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	companyFeesSetu P	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	marketingAddress Setup	Public [onlyOwner



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	marketingFeesSet up	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	autoBurnFeesSetu P	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	_swapAndLiquify	Private 🖺		
L	_addLiquidity	Private 🖺		
L	addLiquidityFrom LeftoverTokens	External [NOÎ
L	liquidityFeesSetup	Public 🏿		onlyOwner
L	excludeFromFees	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	_updateRouterV2	Private 🖺		
L	setAMMPair	External [onlyOwner
L	_setAMMPair	Private 🖺		
L	excludeFromLimit s	External [onlyOwner
L	_excludeFromLimi ts	Internal 🖺		
L	_maxTxSafeLimit	Private 🖺		
L	updateMaxTransf erAmount	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	_beforeTokenTran sfer	Internal 🖺		
L	_afterTokenTransf er	Internal 🖺	•	
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata		
L		Public 🌡		Nol
L	name	Public 🌡		Nol
L	symbol	Public 🌡		Nol



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	decimals	Public 🎚		Nol
L	totalSupply	Public 🎚		Nol
L	balanceOf	Public 🎚		Nol
L	transfer	Public 🎚		No.
L	allowance	Public 🎚		Пои
L	approve	Public 🎚		Пои
L	transferFrom	Public 🎚		NO[
L	increaseAllowance	Public 🎚		loи
L	decreaseAllowanc e	Public 🎚		No[
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	_mint	Internal 🖺		
L	_burn	Internal 🖺		
L	_approve	Internal 🖺		
L	_spendAllowance	Internal 🖺		
L	_beforeTokenTran sfer	Internal 🖺		
L	_afterTokenTransf er	Internal 🖺	•	
ERC20Burnable	Implementation	Context, ERC20		
L	burn	Public 🎚		Nol
L	burnFrom	Public 🎚		Nol
Ownable2Step	Implementation	Ownable		
L	pendingOwner	Public 🏿		Nol
L	transferOwnershi P	Public 🎚	•	onlyOwner



Contract	Туре	Bases	
L	_transferOwnershi P	Internal 🖺	
L	acceptOwnership	Public 🎚	Nol
TokenRecover	Implementation	Ownable2Step	
L	recoverERC20	External 🎚	onlyOwner
Initializable	Implementation		
IUniswapV2Factor Y	Interface		
L	feeTo	External 🎚	Nol
L	feeToSetter	External 🎚	NOÎ
L	getPair	External [Nol
L	allPairs	External [Nol
L	allPairsLength	External [Nol
L	createPair	External 🎚	Nol
L	setFeeTo	External 🎚	МОД
L	setFeeToSetter	External 🎚	Мо[
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface		
L	name	External [ПоЛ
L	symbol	External [Nol
L	decimals	External [Nol
L	totalSupply	External [Nol
L	balanceOf	External 🎚	Nol
L	allowance	External 🎚	ио[
L	approve	External 🎚	ио[
L	transfer	External 🎚	иоД



Contract	Туре	Bases	
L	transferFrom	External [Nol
L	DOMAIN_SEPARAT OR	External 🎚	Nol
L	PERMIT_TYPEHAS H	External 🎚	Nol
L	nonces	External [NO
L	permit	External 🎚	Nol
L	MINIMUM_LIQUIDI TY	External 🎚	Nol
L	factory	External [Nol
L	token0	External [lon
L	token1	External 🎚	NO
L	getReserves	External [Nol
L	price0Cumulative Last	External 🎚	Nol
L	price1Cumulative Last	External 🎚	Пои
L	kLast	External 🎚	NO[
L	mint	External 🎚	Nol
L	burn	External [NOI
L	swap	External [NOI
L	skim	External [NO
L	sync	External [NOI
L	initialize	External [NOI
IUniswapV2Router 01	Interface		
L	factory	External [NOI
L	WETH	External 🏻	Nol



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	addLiquidity	External 🎚		Nol
L	addLiquidityETH	External [U D	Пои
L	removeLiquidity	External [Пои
L	removeLiquidityE TH	External [Nol
L	removeLiquidityW ithPermit	External [Nol
L	removeLiquidityE THWithPermit	External [Nol
L	swapExactTokens ForTokens	External [Nol
L	swapTokensForEx actTokens	External [Nol
L	swapExactETHFor Tokens	External [Œ	Nol
L	swapTokensForEx actETH	External [Nol
L	swapExactTokens ForETH	External [Nol
L	swapETHForExact Tokens	External 🌡	ďВ	NoÎ
L	quote	External 🎚		No[
L	getAmountOut	External 🎚		Пои
L	getAmountIn	External [Пои
L	getAmountsOut	External 🎚		Nol
L	getAmountsIn	External [Пои
IUniswapV2Router 02	Interface	IUniswapV2Router 01		
L	removeLiquidityE THSupportingFee OnTransferTokens	External 🏿		NO[
L	removeLiquidityE THWithPermitSup	External 🎚		lon



Contract	Туре	Bases		
	portingFeeOnTran sferTokens			
L	swapExactTokens ForTokensSupport ingFeeOnTransfer Tokens	External 🎚		NOJ
L	swapExactETHFor TokensSupporting FeeOnTransferTok ens	External 🎚	ÜE	Nol
L	swapExactTokens ForETHSupporting FeeOnTransferTok ens	External 🏻		Noĵ
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
L		Public		ио[
L	owner	Public 🎚		ио[
L	_checkOwner	Internal 🖺		
L	renounceOwnersh ip	Public 🌡	•	onlyOwner
L	transferOwnershi P	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	_transferOwnershi P	Internal 🖺		
IERC20	Interface			
L	totalSupply	External [Пои
L	balanceOf	External [Пои
L	transfer	External [ПоЛ
L	allowance	External [ПоЛ
L	approve	External [ПоЛ
L	transferFrom	External 🌡		NOÏ
IERC20Metadata	Interface	IERC20		



Contract	Туре	Bases	
L	name	External 🎚	No[
L	symbol	External 🎚	Nol
L	decimals	External 🎚	Nol
Context	Implementation		
L	_msgSender	Internal 🖺	
L	_msgData	Internal 🖺	

Function can modify state

Function is payable



Audit Scope

Audit Method.

Our smart contract audit is an extensive methodical examination and analysis of the smart contract's code that is used to interact with the blockchain. Goal: discover errors, issues and security vulnaribilities in the code. Findings getting reported and improvements getting suggested.

Automatic and Manual Review

We are using automated tools to scan functions and weeknesses of the contract. Transfers, integer over-undeflow checks such as all CWE events.

Tools we use:

Visual Studio Code **CWE SWC** Solidity Scan SVD

In manual code review our auditor looking at source code and performing line by line examination. This method helps to clarify developer's coding decisions and business logic.

Skeleton Ecosystem

https://skeletonecosystem.com

https://github.com/SkeletonEcosystem/Audits

