



0x2E5BC438539d0f68667570946a8Fe0e938Bc2





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Global Disclaimer

This document serves as a disclaimer for the crypto smart contract audit conducted by Skeleton Ecosystem. The purpose of the audit was to review the codebase of the smart contracts for potential vulnerabilities and issues. It is important to note the following:

Limited Scope: The audit is based on the code and information available up to the audit completion date. It does not cover external factors, system interactions, or changes made after the audit. The audit itself can not guarantee 100% safaty and can not detect common scam methods like farming and developer sell-out.

No Guarantee of Security: While we have taken reasonable steps to identify vulnerabilities, it is impossible to guarantee the complete absence of security risks or issues. The audit report provides an assessment of the contract's security as of the audit date.

Continued Development: Smart contracts and blockchain technology are evolving fields. Updates, forks, or changes to the contract post-audit may introduce new risks that were not present during the audit.

Third-party Code: If the smart contract relies on third-party libraries or code, those components were not thoroughly audited unless explicitly stated. Security of these dependencies is the responsibility of their respective developers.

Non-Exhaustive Testing: The audit involved automated analysis, manual review, and testing under controlled conditions. It is possible that certain vulnerabilities or issues may not have been identified.

Risk Evaluation: The audit report includes a risk assessment for identified vulnerabilities. It is recommended that the development team carefully reviews and addresses these risks to mitigate potential exploits.

Not Financial Advice: This audit report is not intended as financial or investment advice. Decisions regarding the use, deployment, or investment in the smart contract should be made based on a comprehensive assessment of the associated risks.

By accessing and using this audit report, you acknowledge and agree to the limitations outlined above. Skeleton Ecosystem and its auditors shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect damages resulting from the use of the audit report or the smart contract itself.

Please consult with legal, technical, and financial professionals before making any decisions related to the smart contract.

SKELETON ECOSYSTEM SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

DRAGON 3D ERC20

Overview

Contract Name	Dragon 3D
Ticker/Simbol	DRGN3D
Blockchain	Ethereum ERC20
Contract Address	0x2E5BC438539d0f68667570946a8Fe0e938Bc2261
Creator Address	0x9412336D45b80896384494ac8C6E7ee4c486aea8
Current Owner Address	0x000000000000000000000000000000000000
Contract Explorer	https://etherscan.io/token/0x2e5bc438539d0f68667 570946a8fe0e938bc2261#code
Compiler Version	v0.8.16+commit.07a7930e
License	MIT
Optimisation	Yes with 200 Runs
Total Supply	500,000,000 DRGN3D
Decimals	9

Creation/Audit


Contract Deployed	27.01.2024
Audit Created	11.03.2024
Audit Update	V 1.0

Verified Socials

Website	https://www.dragon3d.app/
Telegram	https://t.me/Dragon3DPortal
Twitter (X)	https://twitter.com/dragon3d_eth



Contract Function Analysis





Contract Verified	✓	The contract source code is uploaded to blockchain explorer and is open source, so everybody can read it.
Contract Ownership		0x000000000000000000000000000000000000
Виу Тах	1 %	Shows the taxes for purchase transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Sell Tax	1 %	Shows the taxes for sell transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Honeypot Analyse	✓	Holder is able to buy and sell. If honeypot: The contract blocks sell transfer from holder wallet. Multiple events may cause honeypot. Trading disabled, extremely high tax
Liqudity Status	>	Liqudity status on 11.03.2024 Lp Locked: 100.00% Pinklock for 320 days.
Trading Disable Functions	✓	No Trading suspendable function found. If a suspendable code is included, the token maybe neither be bought or sold (honeypot risk). If contract is renounced this function can't be used
Set Fees function	⚠ max 10 %	Fee Setting function found. Contract Renounced. This function can not be triggered by the owner. The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than
Proxy Contract	✓	49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk). Not a Proxy contract
Mint Function	>	No Mint Function detected Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and effect the price of the token. Owner can mint new tokens and sell.




Balance Modifier Function Blacklist Function	>	No Balance Modifier function found. If there is a function for this, the contract owner can have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses. For example revoke the bought tokens from the holders wallet. Common form of scam: You buy the token, but it's disappearing from your wallet. No Blacklist Setting function found. If there is a blacklist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally. Example: you buy the token and right after your Wallet getting blacklisted. Like so you will be unable to sell. Honeypot Risk.
Whitelist Function	A	Whitelist Setting function found. Contract Renounced. This function can not be triggered by the owner. If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)
Hidden Owner Analysis	~	No Hidden or multi owner with authorisation For contract with a hidden owner, developer can still manipulate the contract even if the ownership has been abandoned.
Retrieve Ownership Function	✓	No Functions found which can retrieve ownership of the contract. If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it. Also known as fake renounce.
Self Destruct Function	>	No Self Destruct function found. If this function exists and is triggered, the contract will be destroyed, all functions will be unavailable, and all related assets will be erased.
Specific Tax Changing Function	✓	No Specific Tax Changing Functions found. If it exists, the contract owner may set a very outrageous tax rate for assigned address to block it from trading. Can assign all wallets at once!
Trading Cooldown Function	✓	No Trading Cooldown Function found. If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying. Like a temporary honeypot.
Max Transaction and Holding Modify Function	A	Max Transaction and Holding Modify function found. Contract Renounced. This function can not be triggered by the owner. If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot
Transaction Limiting Function	✓	No Transaction Limiter Function Found. The number of overall token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk)



Details of Risk - Attention Items

Removing Risk of contract function based on renounced ownership



Following detected contract functions serve as informational purposes about the contract. The owner has no more authorisation to trigger the following functions.

Whitelist

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner

If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)

```
ftrace | funcSig

function excludeFromFee(address _addresst, bool _statust) external onlyOwner {

lisexcludedFromFee[_addresst] = _statust;

lisexcludedFromFee[_addresst] = _statust;

lisexcludedFromFee[_addresst] = _statust;
```



Max Transaction and Holding Modify function

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner

If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot

```
function changeMaxTxAmount(
               uint256 maxTxAmount1
           ) public onlyOwner returns (bool) {
               maxTxAmount = _maxTxAmount1;
               return true;
           function changeMaxWalletAmount(
               uint256 _maxWalletAmount†
           ) public onlyOwner returns (bool) {
1241
               maxWalletAmount = _maxWalletAmount1;
               return true;
           receive() external payable {}
```

▲ Fee Setting function (Max 10%)

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner


The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).

```
ftrace | funcSig
            function changeTaxForLiquidityAndMarketing(
               uint256 _taxForLiquidity1,
               uint256 _taxForMarketingf
            ) public onlyOwner returns (bool) {
                    (_taxForLiquidity| + _taxForMarketing|) <= 10,</pre>
1202
                    "ERC20: total tax must not be greater than 10%"
1203
                taxForLiquidity = _taxForLiquidity1;
1204
                taxForMarketing = _taxForMarketing1;
1205
1207
               return true;
1208
1209
```





Total Findings: 5



- **High Severity Issues:** High possibility to cause problems, need to be resolved.
- **Medium Severity Issue:** Will likely cause problems, recommended to resolve.
- **Low Severity Issues:** Won't cause problems, but for improvement purposes could be adjusted.
- Informational Severity Issues: Not harmful in any way, information for the developer team.



Contract Security List of Found Issues

- High severity Issues: (0)
- Medium severity issues: (0)
- Low severity issues: (4)
 - Missing Events
 - Long number literals
 - Outdated compiler Version
 - Approve of Front Running Attack
- Informational severity issues: (1)
 - Public Functions Should be Declared External



Contract Weakness Classisication

THE SMART CONTRACT WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION REGISTRY (SWC REGISTRY) IS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION SCHEME PROPOSED IN EIP-1470. IT IS LOOSELY ALIGNED TO THE TERMINOLOGIES AND STRUCTURE USED IN THE COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE) WHILE OVERLAYING A WIDE RANGE OF WEAKNESS VARIANTS THAT ARE

ID	Description	Al	Manual	Result
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Passed	Passed	Passed



SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Passed	Passed	Passed



Detected High and Medium Severity Vulnerability Description.

Approve of front running attack. Also known as Sandwich bot attack. (2 Items)

Item: 1	Location:	Line 747-754	Severity:	
iteiii. I	LUCALIUII.	LINE /4/-/34	severity.	Low

Function The approve() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function approve can be front-run by abusing the approve function. Remedation 1. Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent frontrunners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
function approve(
   address spendert,
   uint256 amount1
) external virtual override returns (bool) {
   address owner = _msgSender();
    _approve(owner, spender1, amount1);
   return true;
```




Item: 2	Location:	Line 913-928	Severity:	Low
---------	-----------	--------------	-----------	-----

The spendAllowance() method overrides current allowance Function regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function spendAllowance can be front-run by abusing the approve function. Remedation 3. Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent frontrunners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions. 4. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
function _spendAllowance(
   address ownert,
   address spendert,
   uint256 amount1
) internal virtual {
   uint256 currentAllowance = allowance(ownert, spendert);
    if (currentAllowance != type(uint256).max) {
       require(
           currentAllowance >= amount1,
            "ERC20: insufficient allowance"
       unchecked {
            _approve(ownert, spendert, currentAllowance - amountt);
```




Contract Flow Graph






Contract Interaction Graph





Inheritance Graph





Contract Functions

Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
IUniswapV2Fact ory	Interface			
L	feeTo	External [Nol
L	feeToSetter	External 🎚		МО[
L	allPairsLength	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	getPair	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	allPairs	External 🎚		NO
L	createPair	External 🏻		Nol
L	setFeeTo	External 🏿		Nol
L	setFeeToSetter	External 🎚		Nol
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
L	name	External 🎚		Nol
L	symbol	External 🎚		NO
L	decimals	External 🎚		Nol
L	totalSupply	External 🏻		Nol
L	balanceOf	External 🎚		Nol
L	allowance	External 🏻		Nol
L	approve	External 🏿		Nol
L	transfer	External 🏿		Nol
L	transferFrom	External [NO
L	DOMAIN_SEPAR ATOR	External 🌡		Nol



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	PERMIT_TYPEHA SH	External 🏻		Nol
L	nonces	External 🎚		МО[
L	permit	External 🎚		По[
L	MINIMUM_LIQUI DITY	External 🎚		Nol
L	factory	External 🎚		NO[
L	token0	External 🎚		По[
L	token1	External 🎚		По[
L	getReserves	External 🎚		По[
L	price0Cumulativ eLast	External 🏻		Nol
L	price1Cumulativ eLast	External [Nol
L	kLast	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	mint	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	burn	External 🎚		МО[
L	swap	External 🎚		NO[
L	skim	External 🎚		Мо[
L	sync	External 🎚		МО[
L	initialize	External 🎚		ПоП
IUniswapV2Rout er01	Interface			
L	factory	External [Nol
L	WETH	External [ио[
L	addLiquidity	External [Nol



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	addLiquidityETH	External 🌡	gp	Nol
L	removeLiquidity	External 🎚		NO[
L	removeLiquidity ETH	External 🏻		Nol
L	removeLiquidity WithPermit	External 🎚		Nol
L	removeLiquidity ETHWithPermit	External 🎚		Nol
L	swapExactToke nsForTokens	External 🎚		lon
L	swapTokensFor ExactTokens	External 🎚		lon
L	swapExactETHF orTokens	External 🎚	ďВ	lon
L	swapTokensFor ExactETH	External 🎚		Nol
L	swapExactToke nsForETH	External 🎚		Nol
L	swapETHForExa ctTokens	External 🏻	ďĐ	Nol
L	quote	External 🎚		Мо[
L	getAmountOut	External 🎚		Мо[
L	getAmountIn	External 🎚		МО[
L	getAmountsOut	External 🎚		NO[
L	getAmountsIn	External 🎚		NO[
IUniswapV2Rout er02	Interface	IUniswapV2Rout er01		
L	removeLiquidity ETHSupportingF eeOnTransferTo kens	External 🌡		NO[



removeLiquidity ETHWithPermit SupportingFeeO nTransferToken s wapExactETHF orTokensSuppor tingFeeOnTrans ferTokens L swapExactToke nsforTokensSupp portingFeeOnTr ansferTokens External L swapExactToke nsforTokensSupp portingFeeOnTr ansferTokens External L swapExactToke nsforTokensSupp portingFeeOnTr ansferTokens External No No External No No IERC2O Interface L totalSupply External No No L transfer External No No L transfer External No No No L transfer External No No No L transfer External No No No L deamonce External No No L transferFrom External No No No IERC2O L transferFrom External No No No IERC2O External No No No IERC2O External No No IERC2O External No No IERC2O External External No No IERC2O External External No No IERC2O External No No IERC2O External No IERC2O Interface IERC2O External No IERC2O III III III III III III III	Contract	Туре		Bases	
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L nsForTokensSup portingFeeOnTr ansferTokens L swapExactToke nsForEtHSuppo rtingFeeOnTran sferTokens External	L	orTokensSuppor tingFeeOnTrans	External 🏻	ФD	NO[
L name External NO NO L transferFrom External NO NO ERCZOMetadat a Interface IERCZO NO L symbol External NO NO	L	nsForTokensSup portingFeeOnTr	External 🌡		ио[
L totalSupply External No No L balanceOf External No No L transfer External No No L allowance External No No L approve External No No L transferFrom External No No L transferFrom External No No L transferFrom External No No L symbol External No No L symbol External No No	L	nsForETHSuppo rtingFeeOnTran	External 🌡		No[
L balanceOf External NO	IERC20	Interface			
L transfer External NO L allowance External NO L approve External NO L transferFrom External NO IERC20Metadat a Interface IERC20 L name External NO L symbol External NO NO	L	totalSupply	External [Nol
L allowance External NO L approve External NO L transferFrom External NO IERC20Metadat a Interface IERC20 NO L name External NO L decimals External NO External NO NO NO	L	balanceOf	External 🎚		NOÎ
L approve External I NOI L transferFrom External I NOI IERC20Metadat a Interface IERC20 L name External I NOI L decimals External I NOI L symbol External I NOI	L	transfer	External 🎚		МОД
L transferFrom External NO	L	allowance	External 🎚		Мо[
IERC20Metadat a Interface IERC20 L name External NO L decimals External NO	L	арргоvе	External 🎚		Мо[
a Interrace IERC20 L name External I NOI L decimals External I NOI L symbol External I NOI	L	transferFrom	External [Nol
L decimals External \(\) NO\(\) L symbol External \(\) NO\(\)		Interface	IERC20		
L symbol External (NO(L	name	External [NO
Symbol External g 100 g	L	decimals	External [NO
Context Implementation	L	symbol	External [No[
	Context	Implementation			
L _msgSender Internal 🖺	L	_msgSender	Internal 🖺		



Contract	Туре		Bases	
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
L		Public 🎚		NOÎ
L	owner	Public 🎚		Мо[
L	_checkOwner	Internal 🖺		
L	renounceOwner ship	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	transferOwners hip	Public 🏿		onlyOwner
L	_transferOwner ship	Internal 🖺		
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadat a		
L		Public 🎚		Nol
L	symbol	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	name	External [Nol
L	balanceOf	Public 🎚		NOÎ
L	decimals	Public 🎚		NO[
L	totalSupply	External 🎚		Nol
L	allowance	Public 🎚		Nol
L	transfer	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	арргоvе	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	transferFrom	External 🎚		МОД
L	decreaseAllowa nce	External 🏻		Nol
L	increaseAllowan ce	External 🌡		NOÎ



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	_mint	Internal 🖺		
L	_burn	Internal 🖺		
L	_арргоvе	Internal 🖺		
L	_spendAllowanc e	Internal 🖺		
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
Dragon3D	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
L	postLaunch	External [onlyOwner
L		Public 🎚		ERC20
L	updatePair	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	excludeFromFee	External [onlyOwner
L	_swapAndLiquif Y	Private 🖺		lockTheSwap
L	_swapTokensFo rEth	Private 🖺		lockTheSwap
L	_addLiquidity	Private 🖺		lockTheSwap
L	changeMarketin gWallet	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	changeTaxForLi quidityAndMark eting	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	changeSwapThr esholds	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	changeMaxTxA mount	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	changeMaxWall etAmount	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L		External [Gip	Nol



Function can modify state

§()•

Function is payable



Audit Scope

Audit Method.

Our smart contract audit is an extensive methodical examination and analysis of the smart contract's code that is used to interact with the blockchain. Goal: discover errors, issues and security vulnaribilities in the code. Findings getting reported and improvements getting suggested.

Automatic and Manual Review

We are using automated tools to scan functions and weeknesses of the contract. Transfers, integer over-undeflow checks such as all CWE events.

Tools we use:

Visual Studio Code **CWE SWC** Solidity Scan SVD

In manual code review our auditor looking at source code and performing line by line examination. This method helps to clarify developer's coding decisions and business logic.

Skeleton Ecosystem

https://skeletonecosystem.com

https://github.com/SkeletonEcosystem/Audits

