SKELETON ECOSYSTEM



SMART CONTRACT AUDIT



0xC88FA015FAF703a1BA38d76F92D21c8ECF43F





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Global Disclaimer

This document serves as a disclaimer for the crypto smart contract audit conducted by Skeleton Ecosystem. The purpose of the audit was to review the codebase of the smart contracts for potential vulnerabilities and issues. It is important to note the following:

Limited Scope: The audit is based on the code and information available up to the audit completion date. It does not cover external factors, system interactions, or changes made after the audit. The audit itself can not guarantee 100% safaty and can not detect common scam methods like farming and developer sell-out.

No Guarantee of Security: While we have taken reasonable steps to identify vulnerabilities, it is impossible to guarantee the complete absence of security risks or issues. The audit report provides an assessment of the contract's security as of the audit date.

Continued Development: Smart contracts and blockchain technology are evolving fields. Updates, forks, or changes to the contract post-audit may introduce new risks that were not present during the audit.

Third-party Code: If the smart contract relies on third-party libraries or code, those components were not thoroughly audited unless explicitly stated. Security of these dependencies is the responsibility of their respective developers.

Non-Exhaustive Testing: The audit involved automated analysis, manual review, and testing under controlled conditions. It is possible that certain vulnerabilities or issues may not have been identified.

Risk Evaluation: The audit report includes a risk assessment for identified vulnerabilities. It is recommended that the development team carefully reviews and addresses these risks to mitigate potential exploits.

Not Financial Advice: This audit report is not intended as financial or investment advice. Decisions regarding the use, deployment, or investment in the smart contract should be made based on a comprehensive assessment of the associated risks.

By accessing and using this audit report, you acknowledge and agree to the limitations outlined above. Skeleton Ecosystem and its auditors shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect damages resulting from the use of the audit report or the smart contract itself.

Please consult with legal, technical, and financial professionals before making any decisions related to the smart contract.

SKELETON ECOSYSTEM SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

BASED LONG ERC20

Overview

Contract Name	long
Ticker/Simbol	long
Blockchain	Base ERC20
Contract Address	0xC88FA015FAF703a1BA38d76F92D21c8ECF43F02c
Creator Address	0xD7323cC43fc27245Ff631843727f0547771E9487
Current Owner Address	0x000000000000000000000000000000000000
Contract Explorer	https://basescan.org/address/0xc88fa015faf703a1ba38 d76f92d21c8ecf43f02c#code
Compiler Version	v0.8.15+commit.e14f2714
License	MIT
Optimisation	Yes with 200 Runs
Total Supply	100,000,000,000 long
Decimals	18

Creation/Audit

Contract Deployed	08.02.2024
Audit Created	01.03.2024
Audit Update	V 1.0

Verified Socials


Website	https://basedlong.com/
Telegram	https://t.me/basedlong
Twitter (X)	https://x.com/BasedLong



Contract Function Analysis

Pass Attention Item ARisky Item





Contract Verified	>	The contract source code is uploaded to blockchain explorer and is open source, so everybody can read it.
Contract Ownership		OxD7323cC43fc27245Ff631843727f0547771E9487 Sometimes referred to as the "zero address" or "dead address" and is not owned by anyone.
Виу Тах	0 %	Shows the taxes for purchase transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Sell Tax	0 %	Shows the taxes for sell transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Honeypot Analyse	✓	Holder is able to buy and sell. If honeypot: The contract blocks sell transfer from holder wallet. Multiple events may cause honeypot. Trading disabled, extremely high tax
Liqudity Status	✓	Liqudity status on 01.03.2024 100% Lp Tokens Burned
Trading Disable Functions	✓	No Trading suspendable function found. If a suspendable code is included, the token maybe neither be bought or sold (honeypot risk). If contract is renounced this function can't be used
Set Fees function	>	No Fee Setting function found. The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).
Proxy Contract	✓	Not a Proxy contract with authorisations.
Mint Function	✓	No Mint Function detected Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and effect the price of the token. Owner can mint new tokens and sell.



Balance Modifier Function Blacklist Function	A	No Balance Modifier function found. If there is a function for this, the contract owner can have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses. For example revoke the bought tokens from the holders wallet. Common form of scam: You buy the token, but it's disappearing from your wallet. No Blacklist Setting function found.
		If there is a blacklist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally. Example: you buy the token and right after your Wallet getting blacklisted. Like so you will be unable to sell. Honeypot Risk.
Whitelist		No Whitelist Setting function found.
Function	A	If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)
Hidden Owner		No Hidden or multi owner with authorisation
Analysis	A	For contract with a hidden owner, developer can still manipulate the contract even if the ownership has been abandoned.
Retrieve Ownership Function	A	No Functions found which can retrieve ownership of the contract. If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it. Also known as fake renounce.
Self Destruct	~	No Self Destruct function found.
Function		If this function exists and is triggered, the contract will be destroyed, all functions will be unavailable, and all related assets will be erased.
Specific Tax	✓	No Specific Tax Changing Functions found.
Changing Function		If it exists, the contract owner may set a very outrageous tax rate for assigned address to block it from trading. Can assign all wallets at once!
Trading		No Trading Cooldown Function found
Function sell the token within		If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying. Like a temporary honeypot.
Max		No Max Transaction and Holding Modify function found.
Transaction and Holding Modify Function	✓	If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot
Transaction		No Transaction Limiter Function Found.
Limiting Function		The number of overall token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk)




Details of Risk - Attention Items

No Risky Contract Functions Found



Contract Security Total Findings: 5



- **High Severity Issues:** High possibility to cause problems, need to be resolved.
- **Medium Severity Issue:** Will likely cause problems, recommended to resolve.
- Low Severity Issues: Won't cause problems, but for improvement purposes could be adjusted.
- Informational Severity Issues: Not harmful in any way, information for the developer team.

SKELETON ECOSYSTEM SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

BASED LONG ERC20

Contract Weakness Classisication

THE SMART CONTRACT WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION REGISTRY (SWC REGISTRY) IS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION SCHEME PROPOSED IN EIP-1470. IT IS LOOSELY ALIGNED TO THE TERMINOLOGIES AND STRUCTURE USED IN THE COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE) WHILE OVERLAYING A WIDE RANGE OF WEAKNESS VARIANTS THAT ARE

- High severity Issues: (0)
- Medium severity issues: (0)
- Low severity issues: (4)
 - Missing Events
 - Long number literals
 - Outdated Compiler Version
 - Approve of Front Running Attack
- Informational severity issues: (1)
 - Public Functions Should be Declared External



ID	Description	Al	Manual	Result
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Passed	Passed	Passed



SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-131	Presence of unused variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-132	Unexpected Ether balance	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-133	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-134	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-135	Code With No Effects	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-136	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	Passed	Passed	Passed



Detected High and Medium Severity Vulnerability Description.

✓ No High and Medium Severity Velnerability Issues Found

Approve of Front Running Attack (Sandwich bots) (2 Item)

Item: 1	Location:	Line 272-275	Severity:	Low
			,	- LUVV

Function The approve() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function approve can be front-run by abusing the approve function. Remedation 1. Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent frontrunners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions. 2. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
function approve(address spender1, uint256 amount1) public virtual override returns (bool) {
    _approve(_msgSender(), spender1, amount1);
    return true;
```



Item: 2	Location:	Line 290-305	Severity:	Low
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
Function The transferFrom() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function approve can be front-run by abusing the approve function. Remedation 1. Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent front-runners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions. 2. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run

```
rtrace | tuncsig
function transferFrom(
   address sender1.
   address recipient1.
   uint256 amount1
) public virtual override returns (bool) {
   _transfer(sender1, recipient1, amount1);
   uint256 currentAllowance = _allowances[sendert][_msgSender()];
   require(currentAllowance >= amount1, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance");
   unchecked {
        _approve(sender1, _msgSender(), currentAllowance - amount1);
   return true;
```

attack




Contract Flow Graph






Contract Interaction Graph





Inheritance Graph





Contract Functions

Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Context	Implementation			
L	_msgSender	Internal 🖺		
L	_msgData	Internal 🖺		
IERC20	Interface			
L	totalSupply	External 🎚		МО[
L	balanceOf	External 🎚		Мо[
L	transfer	External 🎚		Мо[
L	allowance	External 🎚		Мо[
L	арргоvе	External 🎚		Мо[
L	transferFrom	External [Nol
IERC20Metadat a	Interface	IERC20		
L	name	External 🎚		NO[
L	symbol	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	decimals	External 🎚		Пои
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadat a		
L		Public 🎚		ио[
L	name	Public 🎚		Мо[
L	symbol	Public 🎚		NOÎ
L	decimals	Public 🎚		МО[



Contract	Туре	Bases			
L	totalSupply	Public 🎚		МО[
L	balanceOf	Public 🎚		Мо[
L	transfer	Public 🎚		Nol	
L	allowance	Public 🎚		No[
L	арргоvе	Public 🎚		Мо[
L	transferFrom	Public 🎚		МО[
L	increaseAllowan ce	Public [Nol	
L	decreaseAllowa nce	Public [lon	
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺			
L	_mint	Internal 🖺			
L	_burn	Internal 🖺			
L	_approve	Internal 🖺			
L	_beforeTokenTr ansfer	Internal 🖰			
L	_afterTokenTran sfer	Internal 🖺			
long	Implementation	ERC20			
L		Public 🌡		ERC20	

Function can modify state

Function is payable



Audit Scope

Audit Method.

Our smart contract audit is an extensive methodical examination and analysis of the smart contract's code that is used to interact with the blockchain. Goal: discover errors, issues and security vulnaribilities in the code. Findings getting reported and improvements getting suggested.

Automatic and Manual Review

We are using automated tools to scan functions and weeknesses of the contract. Transfers, integer over-undeflow checks such as all CWE events.

Tools we use:

Visual Studio Code **CWE SWC** Solidity Scan SVD

In manual code review our auditor looking at source code and performing line by line examination. This method helps to clarify developer's coding decisions and business logic.

Skeleton Ecosystem

https://skeletonecosystem.com

https://github.com/SkeletonEcosystem/Audits

