SKELETON ECOSYSTEM SMART CONTRACT AUDIT





Wojak Fork \$WORK FRC20

0x5CaD41154aD9E0A45c3c75bD1853e7345242





Table of Contents

Table of Contents	1
Disclaimer	2
Overview	3
Creation/Audit Date	3
Verified Socials	3
Contract Functions Analysis	4
Contract Safety and Weakness	9
Detected Vulnerability Description	13
Contract Flow Graph	17
Contract Interaction Graph	18
Inheritance Graph	19
Contract Desciptions	20
Audit Scope	27



Global Disclaimer

This document serves as a disclaimer for the crypto smart contract audit conducted by Skeleton Ecosystem. The purpose of the audit was to review the codebase of the smart contracts for potential vulnerabilities and issues. It is important to note the following:

Limited Scope: The audit is based on the code and information available up to the audit completion date. It does not cover external factors, system interactions, or changes made after the audit. The audit itself can not guarantee 100% safaty and can not detect common scam methods like farming and developer sell-out.

No Guarantee of Security: While we have taken reasonable steps to identify vulnerabilities, it is impossible to guarantee the complete absence of security risks or issues. The audit report provides an assessment of the contract's security as of the audit date.

Continued Development: Smart contracts and blockchain technology are evolving fields. Updates, forks, or changes to the contract post-audit may introduce new risks that were not present during the audit.

Third-party Code: If the smart contract relies on third-party libraries or code, those components were not thoroughly audited unless explicitly stated. Security of these dependencies is the responsibility of their respective developers.

Non-Exhaustive Testing: The audit involved automated analysis, manual review, and testing under controlled conditions. It is possible that certain vulnerabilities or issues may not have been identified.

Risk Evaluation: The audit report includes a risk assessment for identified vulnerabilities. It is recommended that the development team carefully reviews and addresses these risks to mitigate potential exploits.

Not Financial Advice: This audit report is not intended as financial or investment advice. Decisions regarding the use, deployment, or investment in the smart contract should be made based on a comprehensive assessment of the associated risks.

By accessing and using this audit report, you acknowledge and agree to the limitations outlined above. Skeleton Ecosystem and its auditors shall not be held liable for any direct or indirect damages resulting from the use of the audit report or the smart contract itself.

Please consult with legal, technical, and financial professionals before making any decisions related to the smart contract.

SKELETON ECOSYSTEM SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

WOJAK FORK ERC20

Overview

Contract Name	Work
Ticker/Simbol	Work
Blockchain	Ethereum ERC20
Contract Address	0x5CaD41154aD9E0A45c3c75bD1853e73452424fB2
Creator Address	0xc0Bf57Caf4d182c04FF89C1dc5c5bc978d792A82
Current Owner Address	0x000000000000000000000000000000000000
Contract Explorer	https://etherscan.io/address/0x5cad41154ad9e0a45c3c 75bd1853e73452424fb2#code
Compiler Version	v0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404
License	None
Optimisation	Yes with 200 Runs
Total Supply	1,000,000 WORK
Decimals	18

Creation/Audit

Contract Deployed	01.02.2024
Audit Created	20.02.2024
Audit Update	V 1.0

Verified Socials


Website	https://wojakfork.vip/
Telegram	https://t.me/wojakfork_community_portal
Twitter (X)	https://twitter.com/wojakfork



Contract Function Analysis

Pass Attention Item ARisky Item





Contract Verified	✓	The contract source code is uploaded to blockchain explorer and is open source, so everybody can read it.
Contract		0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000
Ownership		Sometimes referred to as the "zero address" or "dead address" and is not owned by anyone.
Виу Тах	0 %	Shows the taxes for purchase transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Sell Tax	0 %	Shows the taxes for sell transactions. Above 10% may be considered a high tax rate. More than 50% tax rate means may not be tradable. Fee can be set!
Honeypot Analyse	✓	Holder is able to buy and sell. If honeypot: The contract blocks sell transfer from holder wallet. Multiple events may cause honeypot. Trading disabled, extremely high tax
Liqudity Status	>	Liqudity status on 20.02.2024 100% Lp Tokens Burned
Trading	✓	No Trading suspendable function found.
Disable Functions		If a suspendable code is included, the token maybe neither be bought or sold (honeypot risk). If contract is renounced this function can't be used
Set Fees function	A	Fee Setting function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.
		The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).
Proxy Contract	✓	Not a Proxy contract with authorisations.
Mint Function	~	No Mint Function detected
		Mint function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden mint functions may increase the amount of tokens in circulation and
		effect the price of the token. Owner can mint new tokens and sell.




Balance Modifier Function	✓	No Balance Modifier function found. If there is a function for this, the contract owner can have the authority to modify the balance of tokens at other addresses. For
		example revoke the bought tokens from the holders wallet. Common form of scam: You buy the token, but it's disappearing from your wallet.
Blacklist Function	A	Blacklist Setting function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.
		If there is a blacklist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally. Example: you buy the token and right after your Wallet getting blacklisted. Like so you will be unable to sell. Honeypot Risk.
Whitelist Function	^	Whitelist Setting function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.
	A	If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)
Hidden Owner		No Hidden or multi owner with authorisation
Analysis	✓	For contract with a hidden owner, developer can still manipulate the contract even if the ownership has been abandoned.
Retrieve Ownership Function	>	No Functions found which can retrieve ownership of the contract.
Function		If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even after relinquishing it. Also known as fake renounce.
Self Destruct	✓	No Self Destruct function found.
Function		If this function exists and is triggered, the contract will be destroyed, all functions will be unavailable, and all related assets will be erased.
Specific Tax	✓	No Specific Tax Changing Functions found.
Changing Function		If it exists, the contract owner may set a very outrageous tax rate for assigned address to block it from trading. Can assign all wallets at once!
Trading		No Trading Cooldown Function found
Cooldown Function	>	If there is a trading cooldown function, the user will not be able to sell the token within a certain time or block after buying. Like a temporary honeypot.
Max Transaction		Max Transaction and Holding Modify function found. Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.
and Holding Modify Function	A	If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot
Transaction	~	No Transaction Limiter Function Found.
Limiting Function		The number of overall token transactions may be limited (honeypot risk)



Details of Risk - Attention Items

Removing Risk of contract function based on renounced ownership



Following detected contract functions serve as informational purposes about the contract. The owner has no more authorisation to trigger the following functions.



Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.

The contract owner may contain the authority to modify the transaction tax. If the transaction tax is increased to more than 49%, the tokens may not be able to be traded (honeypot risk).

```
function updateBuyFees(uint256 _marketingFee!, uint256 _liquidityFee!, uint256 _devFee!) external onlyOwner {

buyMarketingFee = _marketingFee!;

buyIduityFee = _liquidityFee = _buyLiquidityFee!;

buyTotalFees = buyMarketingFee + buyLiquidityFee + buyDevFee;

require(buyTotalFees <= 30, "Must keep fees at 30% or less");

}

function updateSellFees(uint256 _marketingFee!, uint256 _liquidityFee!, uint256 _devFee!, uint256 _earlySellLiquidityFee!) e

sellMarketingFee = _marketingFee!;

sellLiquidityFee = _liquidityFee!;

sellLiquidityFee = _liquidityFee!;

sellDevFee = _devFee!;

earlySellLiquidityFee = _earlySellLiquidityFee!;

earlySellMarketingFee = _earlySellMarketingFee!;

sellTotalFees = sellMarketingFee + sellLiquidityFee;

require(sellTotalFees <= 99, "Must keep fees at 99% or less");

1078

}

1079

**The sellMarketingFee = _earlySellMarketingFee + sellDevFee;

require(sellTotalFees <= 99, "Must keep fees at 99% or less");

1070

**The sellMarketingFee = _earlySellMarketingFee + sellDevFee;

require(sellTotalFees <= 99, "Must keep fees at 99% or less");

1070

**The sellMarketingFee = _earlySellMarketingFee + sellDevFee;

require(sellTotalFees <= 99, "Must keep fees at 99% or less");
```



Max Transaction and Holding Modify Function

[Min. 1.5% Wallet Size and Min. 0,5% Transaction]

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.

If there is a function for this, the maximum trading amount or maximum position can be modified. Can cause honeypot

```
function updateMaxTxnAmount(uint256 newNum1) external onlyOwner {
   require(newNum1 >= (totalSupply() * 5 / 1000)/1e18, "Cannot set maxTransactionAmount lower than 0.5%");
   maxTransactionAmount = newNum1 * (10**18);
function updateMaxWalletAmount(uint256 newNum†) external onlyOwner {
   require(newNum1 >= (totalSupply() * 15 / 1000)/le18, "Cannot set maxWallet lower than 1.5%");
   maxWallet = newNum† * (10**18);
```

Whitelist (Set Excluded Wallets)

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.

If there is a function for this Developer can set zero fee or no max wallet size for adresses (for example team wallets can trade without fee. Can cause farming)

```
10/9
           ftrace | funcSig
           function excludeFromFees(address account), bool excluded) public onlyOwner {
               _isExcludedFromFees[account†] = excluded†;
               emit ExcludeFromFees(account1, excluded1);
```

```
ftrace | funcSig
function excludeFromMaxTransaction(address updAdst, bool isExt) public onlyOwner {
    isExcludedMaxTransactionAmount[updAdst] = isExt;
```



Blacklist

Contract renounced, function can not be triggered by owner.

If there is a blacklist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally. Example: you buy the token and right after your Wallet getting blacklisted. Like so you will be unable to sell. Honeypot Risk.

```
ftrace | funcSig

function blacklistAccount (address account), bool isBlacklisted) public onlyOwner {


| blacklist[account] = isBlacklisted;

| 1087 | }
```



Contract Security

Total Findings: 7



- **High Severity Issues:** High possibility to cause problems, need to be resolved.
- **Medium Severity Issue:** Will likely cause problems, recommended to resolve.
- Low Severity Issues: Won't cause problems, but for improvement purposes could be adjusted.
- Informational Severity Issues: Not harmful in any way, information for the developer team.



Contract Security List of Found Issues

- High severity Issues: (0)
- Medium severity issues: (1)
 - Use of Tx. Origin
- Low severity issues: (5)
 - Missing Events
 - Long number literals
 - Outdated Compiler Version
 - Unchecked Array Lenght
 - Approve of Front Running Attack
- Informational severity issues: (1)
 - Public Functions Should be Declared External




Contract Weakness Classisication

THE SMART CONTRACT WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION REGISTRY (SWC REGISTRY) IS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WEAKNESS CLASSIFICATION SCHEME PROPOSED IN EIP-1470. IT IS LOOSELY ALIGNED TO THE TERMINOLOGIES AND STRUCTURE USED IN THE COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE) WHILE OVERLAYING A WIDE RANGE OF WEAKNESS VARIANTS THAT ARE

ID	Description	AI	Manual	Result
SWC-100	Function Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-101	Integer Overflow and Underflow	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-102	Outdated Compiler Version	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-103	Floating Pragma	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-104	Unchecked Call Return Value	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-105	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-106	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-107	Reentrancy	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-108	State Variable Default Visibility	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-109	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-110	Assert Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-111	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-112	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-113	DoS with Failed Call	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-114	Transaction Order Dependence	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-115	Authorization through tx.origin	High	Medium	Medium
SWC-116	Block values as a proxy for time	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-117	Signature Malleability	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-118	Incorrect Constructor Name	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-119	Shadowing State Variables	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-120	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Passed	Passed	Passed



SWC-121	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-122	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-123	Requirement Violation	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-124	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-125	Incorrect Inheritance Order	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-126	Insufficient Gas Griefing	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-127	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-128	DoS With Block Gas Limit	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-129	Typographical Error	low	Passed	Passed
SWC-129 SWC-130	Typographical Error Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	low Passed	Passed Passed	Passed Passed
	Right-To-Left-Override control character			
SWC-130	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	Passed	Passed	Passed
SWC-130 SWC-131	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) Presence of unused variables	Passed Passed	Passed Passed	Passed Passed
SWC-130 SWC-131 SWC-132	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) Presence of unused variables Unexpected Ether balance Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length	Passed Passed	Passed Passed Passed	Passed Passed Passed
SWC-130 SWC-131 SWC-132 SWC-133	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) Presence of unused variables Unexpected Ether balance Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	Passed Passed Passed	Passed Passed Passed Passed	Passed Passed Passed Passed



Detected High and Medium Severity Vulnerability Description.

⚠ Use of tx. origin (2 Item)

Item: 1	Location:	Line 1146	Severity:	M edium
Item: 2	Location:	Line 1147	Severity:	Medium

Function	In Solidity, tx.origin is a global variable that returns the address of the account that sent the transaction. Using the variable for authorization could make a contract vulnerable. For example, if an authorized account calls a malicious contract which triggers it to call the vulnerable contract that passes an authorization check since tx.origin returns the original sender of the transaction which in this case is the authorized account.
Remedation	tx.origin should not be used for authorization in smart contracts. It does have some legitimate use cases, for example, To prevent external contracts from calling the current contract, you can implement a require of the form require(tx.origin == msg.sender). This prevents intermediate contracts from calling the current contract, thus limiting the contract to regular codeless addresses.



Approve of Front Running Attack (Sandwich bots) (2 Item)

Item: 1 Lo	ocation:	Line 278-281	Severity:	Low
------------	----------	--------------	-----------	-----

Function	The approve() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an account. This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function.
	The function approve can be front-run by abusing
	the _approve function.
Remedation	 Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent front- runners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions.
	Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run attack

```
function approve(address spender1, uint256 amount1) public virtual override returns (bool) {
   _approve(_msgSender(), spender1, amount1);
```



Item: 2 Location: Line 296-304 Severity: Low

Function The transferFrom() method overrides current allowance regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, not an This can be abused by a token receiver when they try to withdraw certain tokens from the sender's account. Meanwhile, if the sender decides to change the amount and sends another approve transaction, the receiver can notice this transaction before it's mined and can extract tokens from both the transactions, therefore, ending up with tokens from both the transactions. This is a front-running attack affecting the ERC20 Approve function. The function approve can be front-run by abusing the approve function. Remedation 1. Introduce mechanisms that limit the maximum acceptable gas price for transactions. This can help prevent front-runners from drastically increasing the gas fees to prioritize their transactions. 2. Use transaction taxes to prevent against front-run

```
ftrace|funcSig

function transferFrom(

address sender1,
address recipient1,
uint256 amount1

) public virtual override returns (bool) {

_transfer(sender1, recipient1, amount1);
_approve(sender1, _msgSender(), _allowances[sender1][_msgSender()].sub(amount1, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"));

return true;

}

**Trace | funcSig
function transferFrom(
address sender1,
address sender1,
uint256 amount1

| public virtual override returns (bool) {

_transfer(sender1, _msgSender(), _allowances[sender1][_msgSender()].sub(amount1, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"));

return true;

}


**Transfer(sender1, _msgSender(), _allowances[sender1][_msgSender()].sub(amount1, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"));

**Transfer(sender1, _msgSender(), _allowances[sender1][_msgSender()].sub(amount1, "ERC20: transfer amount exceeds allowance"));
```

attack



Contract Flow Graph






Contract Interaction Graph





Inheritance Graph





Contract Functions

Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	Function Name	Visibility	Mutability	Modifiers
Context	Implementation			
L	_msgSender	Internal 🖺		
٦	_msgData	Internal 🖺		
IUniswapV2Pair	Interface			
L	name	External 🎚		Мо[
L	symbol	External 🎚		NO[
L	decimals	External 🎚		NO[
L	totalSupply	External 🎚		Nol
L	balanceOf	External [Мо[
L	allowance	External [Nol
L	approve	External [Nol
L	transfer	External [Nol
L	transferFrom	External [ио[
L	DOMAIN_SEPAR ATOR	External [Nol
L	PERMIT_TYPEHA SH	External [No¶
L	nonces	External [ио[
L	permit	External [ио[
L	MINIMUM_LIQUI DITY	External [Nol
L	factory	External [Nol



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	token0	External 🎚		NO
L	token1	External 🎚		ПоП
L	getReserves	External 🎚		NO[
L	price0Cumulativ eLast	External 🎚		NO[
L	price1Cumulativ eLast	External 🎚		Nol
L	kLast	External 🎚		NO[
L	mint	External 🎚		NO
L	burn	External 🎚		Мо[
L	swap	External 🎚		МО[
L	skim	External 🎚		NO[
L	sync	External 🎚		NO[
L	initialize	External 🎚		По[
IUniswapV2Fact ory	Interface			
L	feeTo	External 🏻		Nol
L	feeToSetter	External [Nol
L	getPair	External 🎚		Nol
L	allPairs	External 🎚		ио[
L	allPairsLength	External 🏻		МО[
L	createPair	External 🏿		ПоП
L	setFeeTo	External 🏿		ПоП
L	setFeeToSetter	External 🏻		ПоП
IERC20	Interface			



Contract	Туре		Bases	
L	totalSupply	External 🎚		Мо[
L	balanceOf	External 🎚		Мо[
L	transfer	External 🎚		Nol
L	allowance	External 🎚		Nol
L	арргоче	External 🎚		NO[
L	transferFrom	External [lon
IERC20Metadat a	Interface	IERC20		
L	name	External 🎚		Мо[
L	symbol	External 🎚		ПоП
L	decimals	External 🎚		ПоП
ERC20	Implementation	Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadat a		
L		Public 🌡		Nol
L	name	Public 🌡		Nol
L	symbol	Public 🌡		Nol
L	decimals	Public 🌡		NOÎ
L	totalSupply	Public 🌡		NOÎ
L	balanceOf	Public 🌡		NOÎ
L	transfer	Public 🌡		Nol
L	allowance	Public 🌡		Nol
L	арргоvе	Public 🌡		Nol
L	transferFrom	Public 🌡		ПоП



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	increaseAllowan ce	Public 🎚		NoÎ
L	decreaseAllowa nce	Public 🎚		Noſ
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	_mint	Internal 🖺		
L	_burn	Internal 🖺		
L	_арргоvе	Internal 🖺		
L	_beforeTokenTr ansfer	Internal 🖺		
SafeMath	Library			
L	add	Internal 🖺		
L	sub	Internal 🖺		
L	sub	Internal 🖺		
L	mul	Internal 🖺		
L	div	Internal 🖺		
L	div	Internal 🖺		
L	mod	Internal 🖺		
L	mod	Internal 🖺		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
L		Public 🎚		ПоП
L	owner	Public 🌡		Nol
L	renounceOwner ship	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	transferOwners hip	Public 🎚		only0wner



Contract	Туре		Bases	
SafeMathInt	Library			
L	mul	Internal 🖺		
L	div	Internal 🖺		
L	sub	Internal 🖺		
L	add	Internal 🖺		
L	abs	Internal 🖺		
L	toUint256Safe	Internal 🖺		
SafeMathUint	Library			
L	toInt256Safe	Internal 🖺		
IUniswapV2Rout er01	Interface			
L	factory	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	WETH	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	addLiquidity	External 🎚		NOÎ
L	addLiquidityETH	External 🎚	<u>ein</u>	NOÎ
L	removeLiquidity	External 🎚		NO[
L	removeLiquidity ETH	External 🏻		Nol
L	removeLiquidity WithPermit	External [Nol
L	removeLiquidity ETHWithPermit	External [Nol
L	swapExactToke nsForTokens	External [NOÏ
L	swapTokensFor ExactTokens	External 🏻		NO



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	swapExactETHF orTokens	External [d p	Nol
L	swapTokensFor ExactETH	External 🎚		No.
L	swapExactToke nsForETH	External 🎚		Nol
L	swapETHForExa ctTokens	External 🏻	gip	Nol
L	quote	External 🎚		NO[
L	getAmountOut	External 🎚		Мо[
L	getAmountIn	External 🎚		NO[
L	getAmountsOut	External 🎚		NO[
L	getAmountsIn	External 🎚		Nol
IUniswapV2Rout er02	Interface	IUniswapV2Rout er01		
L	removeLiquidity ETHSupportingF eeOnTransferTo kens	External 🏻		Nol
L	removeLiquidity ETHWithPermit SupportingFeeO nTransferToken s	External 🏻		NOÏ
L	swapExactToke nsForTokensSup portingFeeOnTr ansferTokens	External [NO[
L	swapExactETHF orTokensSuppor tingFeeOnTrans ferTokens	External [<u>dia</u>	NOÏ
L	swapExactToke nsForETHSuppo rtingFeeOnTran sferTokens	External 🏻		NO[



Contract	Туре		Bases	
WORK	Implementation	ERC20, Ownable		
L		Public 🎚		ERC20
L		External 🎚	ФD	NO[
L	enableTrading	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	removeLimits	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	disableTransfer Delay	External 🏻		onlyOwner
L	setEarlySellTax	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	updateSwapTok ensAtAmount	External 🏻		onlyOwner
L	updateMaxTxnA mount	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	updateMaxWall etAmount	External 🏻		onlyOwner
L	excludeFromMa xTransaction	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	updateSwapEna bled	External 🏻		onlyOwner
L	updateBuyFees	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	updateSellFees	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	excludeFromFee s	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	blacklistAccount	Public 🎚		onlyOwner
L	setAutomatedM arketMakerPair	Public 🌡		onlyOwner
L	_setAutomated MarketMakerPa ir	Private 🖺		
L	updateMarketin gWallet	External 🏻		onlyOwner



Contract	Туре	Bases		
L	updateDevWalle t	External 🎚		onlyOwner
L	isExcludedFrom Fees	Public 🌡		lon
L	_transfer	Internal 🖺		
L	swapTokensFor Eth	Private 🖺		
L	addLiquidity	Private 🖺		
L	swapBack	Private 🖺		
L	setAutoLPBurnS ettings	External [onlyOwner
L	autoBurnLiquidi tyPairTokens	Internal 🖺		
L	manualBurnLiqu idityPairTokens	External 🎚		onlyOwner

Function can modify state

Function is payable



Audit Scope

Audit Method.

Our smart contract audit is an extensive methodical examination and analysis of the smart contract's code that is used to interact with the blockchain. Goal: discover errors, issues and security vulnaribilities in the code. Findings getting reported and improvements getting suggested.

Automatic and Manual Review

We are using automated tools to scan functions and weeknesses of the contract. Transfers, integer over-undeflow checks such as all CWE events.

Tools we use:

Visual Studio Code **CWE SWC** Solidity Scan SVD

In manual code review our auditor looking at source code and performing line by line examination. This method helps to clarify developer's coding decisions and business logic.

Skeleton Ecosystem

https://skeletonecosystem.com

https://github.com/SkeletonEcosystem/Audits

