

## Company Name

## Security Assessment Finding Report

September 7, 2020



## Security Assessment Finding Report

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## 1 Confidentiality Statement

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SSec may share this document with auditors under non-disclosure agreements to demonstrate penetration test requirement compliance.

### 2 Disclaimer

A penetration test is considered a snapshot in time. The findings and recommendations reflect the information gathered during the assessment and not any changes or modifications made outside of that period.

Time-limited engagements do not allow for a full evaluation of all security controls. SSec prioritized the assessment to identify the weakest security controls an attacker would exploit. SSec recommends conducting similar assessments on an annual basis by internal or third-party assessors to ensure the continued success of the controls.

### 3 Contact Information


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| Company Name    |           |                         |
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| Sudneo          | Pentester | Phone: 123456789        |
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### 4 Assessment Overview

From May 20th, 2019 to May 29th, 2019, SSec engaged CN to evaluate the security posture of its infrastructure compared to current industry best practices that included an external penetration test. All testing performed is based on the NIST SP 800-115 Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment, OWASP Testing Guide (v4), and customized testing frameworks. Phases of penetration testing activities include the following:

- Planning Customer goals are gathered and rules of engagement obtained.
- Discovery Perform scanning and enumeration to identify potential vulnerabilities, weak areas, and exploits.
- Attack Confirm potential vulnerabilities through exploitation and perform additional discovery upon new access.
- Reporting Document all found vulnerabilities and exploits, failed attempts, and company strengths and weaknesses.





## 5 Assessment Components

External Penetration Test

An external penetration test emulates the role of an attacker attempting to gain access to an internal network without internal resources or inside knowledge. A SSecengineer attempts to gather sensitive information through open-source intelligence (OSINT), including employee information, historical breached passwords, and more that can be leveraged against external systems to gain internal network access. The engineer also performs scanning and enumeration to identify potential vulnerabilities in hopes of exploitation.

## 6 Findings Severity Classification

The following table defines levels of severity and corresponding CVSS score range that are used throughout the document to assess vulnerability and risk impact.

Table 1: Summary of the findings severity classification used.

|               | CVSS v3  |  |
|---------------|----------|--|
| Severity      | Score    | Definition   |
|               | Range    |  |
| Critical      | 9.0-10.0 | Exploitation is straightforward and usually results in   |
|               |          | system-level compromise. It is advised to form a plan    |
|               |          | of action and patch immediately.                         |
| High          | 7.0-8.9  | Exploitation is more difficult but could cause elevated  |
|               |          | privileges and potentially a loss of data or downtime.   |
|               |          | It is advised to form a plan of action and patch as      |
|               |          | soon as possible.  |
| Moderate      | 4.0-6.9  | Vulnerabilities exist but are not exploitable or require |
|               |          | extra steps such as social engineering. It is advised    |
|               |          | to form a plan of action and patch after high-priority   |
|               |          | issues have been resolved.                               |
| Low           | 0.1-3.9  | Vulnerabilities are non-exploitable but would reduce     |
|               |          | an organizations attack surface. It is advised to form   |
|               |          | a plan of action and patch during the next mainte-       |
|               |          | nance window.  |
| Informational | N/A      | No vulnerability exists. Additional information is       |
|               |          | provided regarding items noticed during testing,         |
|               |          | strong controls, and additional documentation.           |



## 7 Scope

The overview of the scope of the engagement is described in Table 2. Full details can be attached in Appendix.

Table 2: Scope of the engagement

| Assessment                | Details        |
|---------------------------|----------------|
| External Penetration Test | 10.10.100.0/24 |
|                           | 10.100.10.0/24 |

### 7.1 Scope Exclusion

Per client request, SSec did not perform any Denial of Service attacks during testing.

### 7.2 Client Allowances

did not provide any allowances to assist the testing.



## 8 Executive Summary

SSec evaluated CNs external security posture through an external network penetration test from May 20th, 2019 to May 29th, 2019. By leveraging a series of attacks, SSec found critical level vulnerabilities that allowed full internal network access to the CN headquarter office. It is highly recommended that CN address these vulnerabilities as soon as possible as the vulnerabilities are easily found through basic reconnaissance and exploitable without much effort.

### 8.1 Attack Summary

The following table describes how SSec gained internal network access, step by step.

| Step | Action                                  | Recommendation                 |
|------|---|--------------------------------|
| 1    | Perform port scan on CN's               | Disable or protect ports which |
|      | infrastructure don't need to be public. |                                |

### 8.2 Security Strengths

SIEM alerts of vulnerability scan During the assessment, the CN security team alerted SSec engineers of detected vulnerability scanning against their systems. The team was successfully able to identify the SSec engineers attacker IP address within minutes of scanning and was capable of blacklisting SSec from further scanning actions.

## 8.3 Security Weaknesses


Missing Password Policy SSec successfully performed password attacks using lists of common passwords. Several systems of CN were compromised using this method. Enabling a password policy that requires a minimum password complexity could protect the organization from similar attacks.



## 9 Vulnerabilities by Impact

Figure 1 illustrates the vulnerabilities found by impact.

Figure 1: Vulnerabilities by Impact



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## 10 External Penetration Test Findings

## 10.1 Insufficient Lockout Policy - Outlook Web App (Critical)

| Description: | CN allowed unlimited logon attempts against their Outlook Web App (OWA) services. This configuration allowed brute force and password guessing attacks in which SSec used to gain access to CNs internal network. |
|--------------|---|
| Impact:      | Critical  |
| System:      | 10.100.0.1  |
| References:  | <ul> <li>NIST SP800-53r4 AC-17 - Remote Access</li> <li>NIST SP800-53r4 AC-7(1) - Unsuccessful<br/>Logon Attempts; Automatic Account Lock</li> </ul>  |

### 10.1.1 Exploitation Proof of Concept

SSec gathered historical breached data found in credentials dumps. The data amounted to 868 total account credentials (Note: A full list of compromised accounts can be found in Demo Company-867-19 Full Findings.xslx.).

SSec used the gathered credentials to perform a credential stuffing attack against the OWA login page. Credential stuffing attacks take previously known credentials and attempt to use them on login forms to gain access to company resources. SSec was unsuccessful in the attack but was able to gather additional sensitive information from the OWA server in the form of username enumeration.

#### 10.1.2 Remediation

| Who:     | IT Team   |
|----------|---|
| Vector:  | Remote  |
| Actions: |   |
| 1        | VPN and OWA login with valid credentials did not require Multi- |
|          | Factor Authentication (MFA). SSec recommends CN implement       |
|          | and enforce MFA across all external-facing login services.      |



| 2 | OWA name itted unlimited lagin attamata CC as recommended ON       |
|---|--|
| 2 | OWA permitted unlimited login attempts. SSec recommends CN         |
|   | restrict logon attempts against their service.                     |
| 3 | CN permitted a successful login via a password spraying attack,    |
|   | signifying a weak password policy. SSec recommends the following   |
|   | password policy, per the Center for Internet Security (CIS):       |
|   | password policy, per the conter for internet security (Cis).       |
|   | • 14 characters or longer  |
|   | Use different passwords for each account accessed                  |
|   | Coo different pass north for each account decessed                 |
|   | • Do not use words and proper names in passwords, regardless       |
|   | of language  |
|   |  |
| 4 | OWA permitted user enumeration.SSec recommends CN synchro-         |
| 4 | nize valid and invalid account messages. Additionally, SSec recom- |
|   | ļ .  |
|   | mends that CN:   |
|   | Train employees on how to create a proper password                 |
|   | Train employees on now to create a proper password                 |
|   | • Check employee credentials against known breached pass-          |
|   | words  |
|   | words  |
|   | Discourage employees from using work emails and usernames          |
|   | as login credentials to other services unless absolutely neces-    |
|   | · ·  |
|   | sary   |
|   |  |



### 10.2 Unprotected Backup File (Low)

| Description: | The file backup.zip is left unprotected on a server |
|--------------|---|
| Impact:      | Low   |
| System:      | 10.100.0.10   |
| References:  |   |
|              | Owasp - Page on files permissions                   |

### 10.2.1 Exploitation Proof of Concept

To find the file SSec accessed the machine 10.100.0.10 and verified the following:

file /var/backups/backups.zip

### 10.2.2 Remediation

| Who:     | Operations                                  |
|----------|---|
| Vector:  | Local                                       |
| Actions: |   |
| 1        | Delete the file or restrict its permissions |



### 10.3 Exposed service (Moderate)

| Description: | Some server's port is open and unprotected |
|--------------|--|
| Impact:      | Moderate                                   |
| System:      | 10.100.0.11                                |
| References:  | N/A  |

### 10.3.1 Exploitation Proof of Concept

All it takes is a Curl request:

curl -XPOST https://10.100.0.11/gimmefile.php -d 'file=test.txt'

### 10.3.2 Remediation

| Who:     | IT team                      |
|----------|------------------------------|
| Vector:  | Remote                       |
| Actions: |                              |
| 1        | Close the port if not public |



## 10.4 Bad Server Name (Informational)

| Description: | Some server names are hard to memorize |
|--------------|--|
| Impact:      | Informational                          |
| System:      | hjwowjsmc.example.org                  |
| References:  | N/A                                    |

### 10.4.1 Exploitation Proof of Concept

hostname

### 10.4.2 Remediation

| Who:     | IT Team           |
|----------|-------------------|
| Vector:  | Local             |
| Actions: |                   |
| 1        | Rename the server |



## 10.5 SQL Injection in Backoffice (High)

| Description: | The Backoffice site has multiple SQL Injections |
|--------------|---|
| Impact:      | High  |
| System:      | backoffice.example.org                          |
| References:  |   |
|              | • Nist Reference - Nist Input validation        |

### 10.5.1 Exploitation Proof of Concept

SSec managed to exploit several vulnerabilities

curl https://backoffice.example.org?id=1' OR '1'='1'\#

### 10.5.2 Remediation

| Who:     | Development Team                                |
|----------|---|
| Vector:  | Remote  |
| Actions: |   |
| 1        | Implement Input validation for the id parameter |
| 2        | parameter                                       |



# 11 Additional Reports and Scans (Informational)

SSec provides all clients with all report information gathered during testing. This includes vulnerability scans and a detailed findings spreadsheet. For more information, please see the following documents:

- Demo Company-867-19 Full Findings.xslx
- Demo Company-867-19 Vulnerability Scan Summary.xslx
- Demo Company-867-19 Vulnerability Scan by Host.pdf