WiFi access point mode does not work on 2.0.4 #9
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Hi dmitryelj, Thanks for the information. This issue caused by wpa_supplicant.service, it will occupy wlan0. So that hostapd couldn't launch with wlan0. You can replace /lib/systemd/system/wpa_supplicant.service with below lines: This issue will be fixed in a future release. Thanks, |
jamess-huang
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[ Upstream commit ec4fbd64751de18729eaa816ec69e4b504b5a7a2 ] Dmitry reported a lockdep splat [1] (false positive) that we can fix by releasing the spinlock before calling icmp_send() from ip_expire() This is a false positive because sending an ICMP message can not possibly re-enter the IP frag engine. [1] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.10.0+ #29 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- modprobe/12392 is trying to acquire lock: (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 but task is already holding lock: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] ip_expire+0x51/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:201 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}: validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] ip_defrag+0x3a2/0x4130 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:669 ip_check_defrag+0x4e3/0x8b0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:713 packet_rcv_fanout+0x282/0x800 net/packet/af_packet.c:1459 deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:1834 [inline] dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x294/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:1890 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:2903 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xab0 net/core/dev.c:2923 sch_direct_xmit+0x31f/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:182 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_resolve_output+0x6b9/0xb10 net/core/neighbour.c:1308 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:478 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x8b8/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_do_fragment+0x1d93/0x2720 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:672 ip_fragment.constprop.54+0x145/0x200 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:545 ip_finish_output+0x82d/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:314 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 raw_sendmsg+0x26de/0x3a00 net/ipv4/raw.c:655 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:761 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a3/0x9f0 net/socket.c:1985 __sys_sendmmsg+0x25c/0x750 net/socket.c:2075 SYSC_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2106 [inline] SyS_sendmmsg+0x35/0x60 net/socket.c:2101 do_syscall_64+0x2e8/0x930 arch/x86/entry/common.c:281 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a -> #0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1830 [inline] check_prevs_add+0xa8f/0x19f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1940 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:468 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:476 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xf6c/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_finish_output+0xa29/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:316 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 icmp_push_reply+0x372/0x4d0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:394 icmp_send+0x156c/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:754 ip_expire+0x40e/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:239 call_timer_fn+0x241/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1268 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1307 [inline] __run_timers+0x960/0xcf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1601 run_timer_softirq+0x21/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1614 __do_softirq+0x31f/0xbe7 kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:657 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:962 apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:707 __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:254 [inline] atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:26 [inline] rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs kernel/rcu/tree.c:350 [inline] __rcu_is_watching kernel/rcu/tree.c:1133 [inline] rcu_is_watching+0x83/0x110 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1147 rcu_read_lock_held+0x87/0xc0 kernel/rcu/update.c:293 radix_tree_deref_slot include/linux/radix-tree.h:238 [inline] filemap_map_pages+0x6d4/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2335 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:3231 [inline] do_read_fault mm/memory.c:3265 [inline] do_fault+0xbd5/0x2080 mm/memory.c:3370 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:3600 [inline] __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x2cb0 mm/memory.c:3714 handle_mm_fault+0x1e2/0x480 mm/memory.c:3751 __do_page_fault+0x4f6/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1397 do_page_fault+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1460 page_fault+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1011 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(&q->lock)->rlock); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); lock(&(&q->lock)->rlock); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 10 locks held by modprobe/12392: #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff81329758>] __do_page_fault+0x2b8/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1336 #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8188cab6>] filemap_map_pages+0x1e6/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2324 #2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] #2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] pte_alloc_one_map mm/memory.c:2944 [inline] #2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] alloc_set_pte+0x13b8/0x1b90 mm/memory.c:3072 #3: (((&q->timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81627e72>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:175 [inline] #3: (((&q->timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81627e72>] call_timer_fn+0x1c2/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1258 #4: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] #4: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] ip_expire+0x51/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:201 #5: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8389a633>] ip_expire+0x1b3/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:216 #6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock.h:309 [inline] #6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] icmp_xmit_lock net/ipv4/icmp.c:219 [inline] #6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] icmp_send+0x803/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:681 #7: (rcu_read_lock_bh){......}, at: [<ffffffff838ab9a1>] ip_finish_output2+0x2c1/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:198 #8: (rcu_read_lock_bh){......}, at: [<ffffffff836d1dee>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x23e/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3324 #9: (dev->qdisc_running_key ?: &qdisc_running_key){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff836d3a27>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 12392 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.10.0+ #29 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_circular_bug+0x307/0x3b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1204 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1830 [inline] check_prevs_add+0xa8f/0x19f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1940 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:468 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:476 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xf6c/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_finish_output+0xa29/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:316 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 icmp_push_reply+0x372/0x4d0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:394 icmp_send+0x156c/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:754 ip_expire+0x40e/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:239 call_timer_fn+0x241/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1268 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1307 [inline] __run_timers+0x960/0xcf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1601 run_timer_softirq+0x21/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1614 __do_softirq+0x31f/0xbe7 kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:657 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:962 apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:707 RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:254 [inline] RIP: 0010:atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:26 [inline] RIP: 0010:rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs kernel/rcu/tree.c:350 [inline] RIP: 0010:__rcu_is_watching kernel/rcu/tree.c:1133 [inline] RIP: 0010:rcu_is_watching+0x83/0x110 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1147 RSP: 0000:ffff8801c391f120 EFLAGS: 00000a03 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801c391f148 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055edd4374000 RDI: ffff8801dbe1ae0c RBP: ffff8801c391f1a0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 1ffff10038723e25 R13: ffff8801dbe1ae00 R14: ffff8801c391f680 R15: dffffc0000000000 </IRQ> rcu_read_lock_held+0x87/0xc0 kernel/rcu/update.c:293 radix_tree_deref_slot include/linux/radix-tree.h:238 [inline] filemap_map_pages+0x6d4/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2335 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:3231 [inline] do_read_fault mm/memory.c:3265 [inline] do_fault+0xbd5/0x2080 mm/memory.c:3370 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:3600 [inline] __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x2cb0 mm/memory.c:3714 handle_mm_fault+0x1e2/0x480 mm/memory.c:3751 __do_page_fault+0x4f6/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1397 do_page_fault+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1460 page_fault+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1011 RIP: 0033:0x7f83172f2786 RSP: 002b:00007fffe859ae80 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 000055edd4373040 RBX: 00007f83175111c8 RCX: 000055edd4373238 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f8317510970 RBP: 00007fffe859afd0 R08: 0000000000000009 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000064 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000055edd4373040 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffe859afe8 R15: 0000000000000000 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jamess-huang
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Apr 13, 2018
Once an object is put into quarantine, we no longer own it, i.e. object could leave the quarantine and be reallocated. So having set_track() call after the quarantine_put() may corrupt slab objects. BUG kmalloc-4096 (Not tainted): Poison overwritten ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: 0xffff8804540de850-0xffff8804540de857. First byte 0xb5 instead of 0x6b ... INFO: Freed in qlist_free_all+0x42/0x100 age=75 cpu=3 pid=24492 __slab_free+0x1d6/0x2e0 ___cache_free+0xb6/0xd0 qlist_free_all+0x83/0x100 quarantine_reduce+0x177/0x1b0 kasan_kmalloc+0xf3/0x100 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 kmem_cache_alloc+0x109/0x3e0 mmap_region+0x53e/0xe40 do_mmap+0x70f/0xa50 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x147/0x1b0 SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x2c7/0x5b0 SyS_mmap+0x1b/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x1a0/0x4e0 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a INFO: Slab 0xffffea0011503600 objects=7 used=7 fp=0x (null) flags=0x8000000000004080 INFO: Object 0xffff8804540de848 @offset=26696 fp=0xffff8804540dc588 Redzone ffff8804540de840: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ Object ffff8804540de848: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b b5 52 00 00 f2 01 60 cc kkkkkkkk.R....`. Similarly, poisoning after the quarantine_put() leads to false positive use-after-free reports: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in anon_vma_interval_tree_insert+0x304/0x430 at addr ffff880405c540a0 Read of size 8 by task trinity-c0/3036 CPU: 0 PID: 3036 Comm: trinity-c0 Not tainted 4.7.0-think+ #9 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x68/0x96 kasan_report_error+0x222/0x600 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x61/0x70 anon_vma_interval_tree_insert+0x304/0x430 anon_vma_chain_link+0x91/0xd0 anon_vma_clone+0x136/0x3f0 anon_vma_fork+0x81/0x4c0 copy_process.part.47+0x2c43/0x5b20 _do_fork+0x16d/0xbd0 SyS_clone+0x19/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x1a0/0x4e0 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Fix this by putting an object in the quarantine after all other operations. Fixes: 80a9201a5965 ("mm, kasan: switch SLUB to stackdepot, enable memory quarantine for SLUB") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-1-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Bug: 64145065 (cherry-picked from 4a3d308d6674fabf213bce9c1a661ef43a85e515) Change-Id: Iaa699c447b97f8cb04afdd2d6a5f572bea439185 Signed-off-by: Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
jamess-huang
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May 14, 2018
commit 1514839b366417934e2f1328edb50ed1e8a719f5 upstream. This patch fixes NULL pointer crash due to active timer running for abort IOCB. From crash dump analysis it was discoverd that get_next_timer_interrupt() encountered a corrupted entry on the timer list. #9 [ffff95e1f6f0fd40] page_fault at ffffffff914fe8f8 [exception RIP: get_next_timer_interrupt+440] RIP: ffffffff90ea3088 RSP: ffff95e1f6f0fdf0 RFLAGS: 00010013 RAX: ffff95e1f6451028 RBX: 000218e2389e5f40 RCX: 00000001232ad600 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff95e1f6f0fdf0 RDI: 0000000001232ad6 RBP: ffff95e1f6f0fe40 R8: ffff95e1f6451188 R9: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000016 R11: 0000000000000016 R12: 00000001232ad5f6 R13: ffff95e1f6450000 R14: ffff95e1f6f0fdf8 R15: ffff95e1f6f0fe10 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 Looking at the assembly of get_next_timer_interrupt(), address came from %r8 (ffff95e1f6451188) which is pointing to list_head with single entry at ffff95e5ff621178. 0xffffffff90ea307a <get_next_timer_interrupt+426>: mov (%r8),%rdx 0xffffffff90ea307d <get_next_timer_interrupt+429>: cmp %r8,%rdx 0xffffffff90ea3080 <get_next_timer_interrupt+432>: je 0xffffffff90ea30a7 <get_next_timer_interrupt+471> 0xffffffff90ea3082 <get_next_timer_interrupt+434>: nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 0xffffffff90ea3088 <get_next_timer_interrupt+440>: testb $0x1,0x18(%rdx) crash> rd ffff95e1f6451188 10 ffff95e1f6451188: ffff95e5ff621178 ffff95e5ff621178 x.b.....x.b..... ffff95e1f6451198: ffff95e1f6451198 ffff95e1f6451198 ..E.......E..... ffff95e1f64511a8: ffff95e1f64511a8 ffff95e1f64511a8 ..E.......E..... ffff95e1f64511b8: ffff95e77cf509a0 ffff95e77cf509a0 ...|.......|.... ffff95e1f64511c8: ffff95e1f64511c8 ffff95e1f64511c8 ..E.......E..... crash> rd ffff95e5ff621178 10 ffff95e5ff621178: 0000000000000001 ffff95e15936aa00 ..........6Y.... ffff95e5ff621188: 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff ................ ffff95e5ff621198: 00000000000000a0 0000000000000010 ................ ffff95e5ff6211a8: ffff95e5ff621198 000000000000000c ..b............. ffff95e5ff6211b8: 00000f5800000000 ffff95e751f8d720 ....X... ..Q.... ffff95e5ff621178 belongs to freed mempool object at ffff95e5ff621080. CACHE NAME OBJSIZE ALLOCATED TOTAL SLABS SSIZE ffff95dc7fd74d00 mnt_cache 384 19785 24948 594 16k SLAB MEMORY NODE TOTAL ALLOCATED FREE ffffdc5dabfd8800 ffff95e5ff620000 1 42 29 13 FREE / [ALLOCATED] ffff95e5ff621080 (cpu 6 cache) Examining the contents of that memory reveals a pointer to a constant string in the driver, "abort\0", which is set by qla24xx_async_abort_cmd(). crash> rd ffffffffc059277c 20 ffffffffc059277c: 6e490074726f6261 0074707572726574 abort.Interrupt. ffffffffc059278c: 00676e696c6c6f50 6920726576697244 Polling.Driver i ffffffffc059279c: 646f6d207325206e 6974736554000a65 n %s mode..Testi ffffffffc05927ac: 636976656420676e 786c252074612065 ng device at %lx ffffffffc05927bc: 6b63656843000a2e 646f727020676e69 ...Checking prod ffffffffc05927cc: 6f20444920746375 0a2e706968632066 uct ID of chip.. ffffffffc05927dc: 5120646e756f4600 204130303232414c .Found QLA2200A ffffffffc05927ec: 43000a2e70696843 20676e696b636568 Chip...Checking ffffffffc05927fc: 65786f626c69616d 6c636e69000a2e73 mailboxes...incl ffffffffc059280c: 756e696c2f656475 616d2d616d642f78 ude/linux/dma-ma crash> struct -ox srb_iocb struct srb_iocb { union { struct {...} logio; struct {...} els_logo; struct {...} tmf; struct {...} fxiocb; struct {...} abt; struct ct_arg ctarg; struct {...} mbx; struct {...} nack; [0x0 ] } u; [0xb8] struct timer_list timer; [0x108] void (*timeout)(void *); } SIZE: 0x110 crash> ! bc ibase=16 obase=10 B8+40 F8 The object is a srb_t, and at offset 0xf8 within that structure (i.e. ffff95e5ff621080 + f8 -> ffff95e5ff621178) is a struct timer_list. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #4.4+ Fixes: 4440e46 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Add IOCB Abort command asynchronous handling.") Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@cavium.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 76b8db0d480e8045e1a1902fc9ab143b3b9ef115 ] On some platforms(e.g. rk3399 board), we can call hcd_add/remove consecutively without calling usb_put_hcd/usb_create_hcd in between, so hcd->flags can be stale. If the HC dies due to whatever reason then without this patch we get the below error on next hcd_add. [173.296154] xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.2.auto: HC died; cleaning up [173.296209] xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.2.auto: xHCI Host Controller [173.296762] xhci-hcd xhci-hcd.2.auto: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 6 [173.296931] usb usb6: We don't know the algorithms for LPM for this host, disabling LPM. [173.297179] usb usb6: New USB device found, idVendor=1d6b, idProduct=0003 [173.297203] usb usb6: New USB device strings: Mfr=3, Product=2, SerialNumber=1 [173.297222] usb usb6: Product: xHCI Host Controller [173.297240] usb usb6: Manufacturer: Linux 4.4.21 xhci-hcd [173.297257] usb usb6: SerialNumber: xhci-hcd.2.auto [173.298680] hub 6-0:1.0: USB hub found [173.298749] hub 6-0:1.0: 1 port detected [173.299382] rockchip-dwc3 usb@fe800000: USB HOST connected [173.395418] hub 5-0:1.0: activate --> -19 [173.603447] irq 228: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option) [173.603493] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.4.21 #9 [173.603513] Hardware name: Google Kevin (DT) [173.603531] Call trace: [173.603568] [<ffffffc0002087dc>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x160 [173.603596] [<ffffffc00020895c>] show_stack+0x20/0x28 [173.603623] [<ffffffc0004b28a8>] dump_stack+0x90/0xb0 [173.603650] [<ffffffc00027347c>] __report_bad_irq+0x48/0xe8 [173.603674] [<ffffffc0002737cc>] note_interrupt+0x1e8/0x28c [173.603698] [<ffffffc000270a38>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1d4/0x25c [173.603722] [<ffffffc000270b0c>] handle_irq_event+0x4c/0x7c [173.603748] [<ffffffc00027456c>] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xb4/0x124 [173.603777] [<ffffffc00026fe3c>] generic_handle_irq+0x30/0x44 [173.603804] [<ffffffc0002701a8>] __handle_domain_irq+0x90/0xbc [173.603827] [<ffffffc0002006f4>] gic_handle_irq+0xcc/0x188 ... [173.604500] [<ffffffc000203700>] el1_irq+0x80/0xf8 [173.604530] [<ffffffc000261388>] cpu_startup_entry+0x38/0x3cc [173.604558] [<ffffffc00090f7d8>] rest_init+0x8c/0x94 [173.604585] [<ffffffc000e009ac>] start_kernel+0x3d0/0x3fc [173.604607] [<0000000000b16000>] 0xb16000 [173.604622] handlers: [173.604648] [<ffffffc000642084>] usb_hcd_irq [173.604673] Disabling IRQ #228 Signed-off-by: William wu <wulf@rock-chips.com> Acked-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jun 28, 2018
[ Upstream commit d754941225a7dbc61f6dd2173fa9498049f9a7ee ] If, for any reason, userland shuts down iscsi transport interfaces before proper logouts - like when logging in to LUNs manually, without logging out on server shutdown, or when automated scripts can't umount/logout from logged LUNs - kernel will hang forever on its sd_sync_cache() logic, after issuing the SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE cmd to all still existent paths. PID: 1 TASK: ffff8801a69b8000 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffff8801a69c3a30] __schedule at ffffffff8183e9ee #1 [ffff8801a69c3a80] schedule at ffffffff8183f0d5 #2 [ffff8801a69c3a98] schedule_timeout at ffffffff81842199 #3 [ffff8801a69c3b40] io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff8183e604 #4 [ffff8801a69c3b70] wait_for_completion_io_timeout at ffffffff8183fc6c #5 [ffff8801a69c3bd0] blk_execute_rq at ffffffff813cfe10 #6 [ffff8801a69c3c88] scsi_execute at ffffffff815c3fc7 #7 [ffff8801a69c3cc8] scsi_execute_req_flags at ffffffff815c60fe #8 [ffff8801a69c3d30] sd_sync_cache at ffffffff815d37d7 #9 [ffff8801a69c3da8] sd_shutdown at ffffffff815d3c3c This happens because iscsi_eh_cmd_timed_out(), the transport layer timeout helper, would tell the queue timeout function (scsi_times_out) to reset the request timer over and over, until the session state is back to logged in state. Unfortunately, during server shutdown, this might never happen again. Other option would be "not to handle" the issue in the transport layer. That would trigger the error handler logic, which would also need the session state to be logged in again. Best option, for such case, is to tell upper layers that the command was handled during the transport layer error handler helper, marking it as DID_NO_CONNECT, which will allow completion and inform about the problem. After the session was marked as ISCSI_STATE_FAILED, due to the first timeout during the server shutdown phase, all subsequent cmds will fail to be queued, allowing upper logic to fail faster. Signed-off-by: Rafael David Tinoco <rafael.tinoco@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…s found [ Upstream commit 72f17baf2352ded6a1d3f4bb2d15da8c678cd2cb ] If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if different from the current one. However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we should continue walking through attributes using the current table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested attributes. For example, given this sequence: 1 OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY 2 OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL 3 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID 4 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC 5 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST 6 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL 7 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC 8 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST 9 OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT 10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK 11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute TinkerBoard#3, and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting attributes TinkerBoard#9 to TinkerBoard#11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is 15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the wrong table: [ 7654.586496] ================================================================== [ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430 [ 7654.610983] [ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 TinkerBoard#1 [ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016 [ 7654.631379] Call Trace: [ 7654.634108] [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 7654.639843] [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290 [ 7654.647129] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.654607] [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330 [ 7654.661406] [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40 [ 7654.668789] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.676076] [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch] [ 7654.684234] [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 [ 7654.689968] [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590 [ 7654.696574] [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch] [ 7654.705122] [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0 [ 7654.712503] [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21 [ 7654.719401] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.726298] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.733195] [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50 [ 7654.740187] [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0 [ 7654.746406] [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 7654.752914] [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40 [ 7654.758456] [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch] [snip] [ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 7655.138226] ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch] [ 7655.145507] [ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 7655.152514] ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa [ 7655.160585] ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa [ 7655.176701] ^ [ 7655.184372] ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05 [ 7655.192431] ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.200490] ================================================================== Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Fixes: 982b527 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2c0aa08631b86a4678dbc93b9caa5248014b4458 ] Scenario: 1. Port down and do fail over 2. Ap do rds_bind syscall PID: 47039 TASK: ffff89887e2fe640 CPU: 47 COMMAND: "kworker/u:6" #0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9 TinkerBoard#1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3 TinkerBoard#2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518 TinkerBoard#3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c TinkerBoard#4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675 TinkerBoard#5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3 TinkerBoard#6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8 TinkerBoard#7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95 [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 0000000000000000 RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00 RCX:ffffffff81c99d88 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff896019ee08e8 RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00 RBP: ffff898e35f15df0 R8: ffff896019ee08c8 R9:0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:ffff896019ee08c0 R13: ffff889b77f6fe68 R14: ffffffff81c99d80 R15: ffffffffa022a1e0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 TinkerBoard#8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm] TinkerBoard#9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6 TinkerBoard#10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0 TinkerBoard#11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6 PID: 45659 TASK: ffff880d313d2500 CPU: 31 COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap" #0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4 TinkerBoard#1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf TinkerBoard#2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7 TinkerBoard#3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb TinkerBoard#4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm] TinkerBoard#5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma] TinkerBoard#6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds] TinkerBoard#7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds] TinkerBoard#8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670 PID: 45659 PID: 47039 rds_ib_laddr_check /* create id_priv with a null event_handler */ rdma_create_id rdma_bind_addr cma_acquire_dev /* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */ cma_attach_to_dev cma_ndev_work_handler /* event_hanlder is null */ id_priv->id.event_handler Signed-off-by: Guanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Honglei Wang <honglei.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Yanjun Zhu <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dec 5, 2018
[ Upstream commit 2bbea6e117357d17842114c65e9a9cf2d13ae8a3 ] when mounting an ISO filesystem sometimes (very rarely) the system hangs because of a race condition between two tasks. PID: 6766 TASK: ffff88007b2a6dd0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "mount" #0 [ffff880078447ae0] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 TinkerBoard#1 [ffff880078447b48] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffff8168ed49 TinkerBoard#2 [ffff880078447b58] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8168c995 TinkerBoard#3 [ffff880078447bb8] mutex_lock at ffffffff8168bdef TinkerBoard#4 [ffff880078447bd0] sr_block_ioctl at ffffffffa00b6818 [sr_mod] TinkerBoard#5 [ffff880078447c10] blkdev_ioctl at ffffffff812fea50 TinkerBoard#6 [ffff880078447c70] ioctl_by_bdev at ffffffff8123a8b3 TinkerBoard#7 [ffff880078447c90] isofs_fill_super at ffffffffa04fb1e1 [isofs] TinkerBoard#8 [ffff880078447da8] mount_bdev at ffffffff81202570 TinkerBoard#9 [ffff880078447e18] isofs_mount at ffffffffa04f9828 [isofs] TinkerBoard#10 [ffff880078447e28] mount_fs at ffffffff81202d09 TinkerBoard#11 [ffff880078447e70] vfs_kern_mount at ffffffff8121ea8f TinkerBoard#12 [ffff880078447ea8] do_mount at ffffffff81220fee TinkerBoard#13 [ffff880078447f28] sys_mount at ffffffff812218d6 TinkerBoard#14 [ffff880078447f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007fd9ea914e9a RSP: 00007ffd5d9bf648 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000000a5 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: 00007fd9ec2bc210 RSI: 00007fd9ec2bc290 RDI: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000c0ed0001 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007fd9ec2bc040 R13: 00007fd9eb6b2380 R14: 00007fd9ec2bc210 R15: 00007fd9ec2bcf30 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task was trying to mount the cdrom. It allocated and configured a super_block struct and owned the write-lock for the super_block->s_umount rwsem. While exclusively owning the s_umount lock, it called sr_block_ioctl and waited to acquire the global sr_mutex lock. PID: 6785 TASK: ffff880078720fb0 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "systemd-udevd" #0 [ffff880078417898] __schedule at ffffffff8168d605 TinkerBoard#1 [ffff880078417900] schedule at ffffffff8168dc59 TinkerBoard#2 [ffff880078417910] rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff8168f605 TinkerBoard#3 [ffff880078417980] call_rwsem_down_read_failed at ffffffff81328838 TinkerBoard#4 [ffff8800784179d0] down_read at ffffffff8168cde0 TinkerBoard#5 [ffff8800784179e8] get_super at ffffffff81201cc7 TinkerBoard#6 [ffff880078417a10] __invalidate_device at ffffffff8123a8de TinkerBoard#7 [ffff880078417a40] flush_disk at ffffffff8123a94b TinkerBoard#8 [ffff880078417a88] check_disk_change at ffffffff8123ab50 TinkerBoard#9 [ffff880078417ab0] cdrom_open at ffffffffa00a29e1 [cdrom] TinkerBoard#10 [ffff880078417b68] sr_block_open at ffffffffa00b6f9b [sr_mod] TinkerBoard#11 [ffff880078417b98] __blkdev_get at ffffffff8123ba86 TinkerBoard#12 [ffff880078417bf0] blkdev_get at ffffffff8123bd65 TinkerBoard#13 [ffff880078417c78] blkdev_open at ffffffff8123bf9b TinkerBoard#14 [ffff880078417c90] do_dentry_open at ffffffff811fc7f7 TinkerBoard#15 [ffff880078417cd8] vfs_open at ffffffff811fc9cf TinkerBoard#16 [ffff880078417d00] do_last at ffffffff8120d53d TinkerBoard#17 [ffff880078417db0] path_openat at ffffffff8120e6b2 TinkerBoard#18 [ffff880078417e48] do_filp_open at ffffffff8121082b TinkerBoard#19 [ffff880078417f18] do_sys_open at ffffffff811fdd33 TinkerBoard#20 [ffff880078417f70] sys_open at ffffffff811fde4e TinkerBoard#21 [ffff880078417f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff81698c49 RIP: 00007f29438b0c20 RSP: 00007ffc76624b78 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffffffff81698c49 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00007f2944a5fa70 RSI: 00000000000a0800 RDI: 00007f2944a5fa70 RBP: 00007f2944a5f540 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000020 R10: 00007f2943614c40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffff811fde4e R13: ffff880078417f78 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 00007f2944a4b010 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This task tried to open the cdrom device, the sr_block_open function acquired the global sr_mutex lock. The call to check_disk_change() then saw an event flag indicating a possible media change and tried to flush any cached data for the device. As part of the flush, it tried to acquire the super_block->s_umount lock associated with the cdrom device. This was the same super_block as created and locked by the previous task. The first task acquires the s_umount lock and then the sr_mutex_lock; the second task acquires the sr_mutex_lock and then the s_umount lock. This patch fixes the issue by moving check_disk_change() out of cdrom_open() and let the caller take care of it. Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2efd4fca703a6707cad16ab486eaab8fc7f0fd49 ] Syzbot reported a read beyond the end of the skb head when returning IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR: BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242 CPU: 0 PID: 4501 Comm: syz-executor128 Not tainted 4.17.0+ TinkerBoard#9 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1125 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x138/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1219 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1261 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline] put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242 ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl+0x1cf3/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:719 ip6_datagram_recv_ctl+0x41c/0x450 net/ipv6/datagram.c:733 rawv6_recvmsg+0x10fb/0x1460 net/ipv6/raw.c:521 [..] This logic and its ipv4 counterpart read the destination port from the packet at skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4. With MSG_MORE and a local SOCK_RAW sender, syzbot was able to cook a packet that stores headers exactly up to skb_transport_offset(skb) in the head and the remainder in a frag. Call pskb_may_pull before accessing the pointer to ensure that it lies in skb head. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAF=yD-LEJwZj5a1-bAAj2Oy_hKmGygV6rsJ_WOrAYnv-fnayiQ@mail.gmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+9adb4b567003cac781f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dec 7, 2018
commit 89da619bc18d79bca5304724c11d4ba3b67ce2c6 upstream. Kernel panic when with high memory pressure, calltrace looks like, PID: 21439 TASK: ffff881be3afedd0 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "java" #0 [ffff881ec7ed7630] machine_kexec at ffffffff81059beb TinkerBoard#1 [ffff881ec7ed7690] __crash_kexec at ffffffff81105942 TinkerBoard#2 [ffff881ec7ed7760] crash_kexec at ffffffff81105a30 TinkerBoard#3 [ffff881ec7ed7778] oops_end at ffffffff816902c8 TinkerBoard#4 [ffff881ec7ed77a0] no_context at ffffffff8167ff46 TinkerBoard#5 [ffff881ec7ed77f0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8167ffdc TinkerBoard#6 [ffff881ec7ed7838] __node_set at ffffffff81680300 TinkerBoard#7 [ffff881ec7ed7860] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8169320f TinkerBoard#8 [ffff881ec7ed78c0] do_page_fault at ffffffff816932b5 TinkerBoard#9 [ffff881ec7ed78f0] page_fault at ffffffff8168f4c8 [exception RIP: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+47] RIP: ffffffff8168edef RSP: ffff881ec7ed79a8 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffffea0019740d00 RCX: ffff881ec7ed7fd8 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 0000000000000016 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: ffff881ec7ed79a8 R8: 0000000000000246 R9: 000000000001a098 R10: ffff88107ffda000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffff881ec7ed7a80 R15: ffff881be3afedd0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 It happens in the pagefault and results in double pagefault during compacting pages when memory allocation fails. Analysed the vmcore, the page leads to second pagefault is corrupted with _mapcount=-256, but private=0. It's caused by the race between migration and ballooning, and lock missing in virtballoon_migratepage() of virtio_balloon driver. This patch fix the bug. Fixes: e225042 ("virtio_balloon: introduce migration primitives to balloon pages") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Huang Chong <huang.chong@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 934140ab028713a61de8bca58c05332416d037d1 ]
cachefiles_read_waiter() has the right to access a 'monitor' object by
virtue of being called under the waitqueue lock for one of the pages in its
purview. However, it has no ref on that monitor object or on the
associated operation.
What it is allowed to do is to move the monitor object to the operation's
to_do list, but once it drops the work_lock, it's actually no longer
permitted to access that object. However, it is trying to enqueue the
retrieval operation for processing - but it can only do this via a pointer
in the monitor object, something it shouldn't be doing.
If it doesn't enqueue the operation, the operation may not get processed.
If the order is flipped so that the enqueue is first, then it's possible
for the work processor to look at the to_do list before the monitor is
enqueued upon it.
Fix this by getting a ref on the operation so that we can trust that it
will still be there once we've added the monitor to the to_do list and
dropped the work_lock. The op can then be enqueued after the lock is
dropped.
The bug can manifest in one of a couple of ways. The first manifestation
looks like:
FS-Cache:
FS-Cache: Assertion failed
FS-Cache: 6 == 5 is false
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:494!
RIP: 0010:fscache_put_operation+0x1e3/0x1f0
...
fscache_op_work_func+0x26/0x50
process_one_work+0x131/0x290
worker_thread+0x45/0x360
kthread+0xf8/0x130
? create_worker+0x190/0x190
? kthread_cancel_work_sync+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This is due to the operation being in the DEAD state (6) rather than
INITIALISED, COMPLETE or CANCELLED (5) because it's already passed through
fscache_put_operation().
The bug can also manifest like the following:
kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:69!
...
[exception RIP: fscache_enqueue_operation+246]
...
TinkerBoard#7 [ffff883fff083c10] fscache_enqueue_operation at ffffffffa0b793c6
TinkerBoard#8 [ffff883fff083c28] cachefiles_read_waiter at ffffffffa0b15a48
TinkerBoard#9 [ffff883fff083c48] __wake_up_common at ffffffff810af028
I'm not entirely certain as to which is line 69 in Lei's kernel, so I'm not
entirely clear which assertion failed.
Fixes: 9ae326a ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem")
Reported-by: Lei Xue <carmark.dlut@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Anthony DeRobertis <aderobertis@metrics.net>
Reported-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reported-by: Kiran Kumar Modukuri <kiran.modukuri@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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pushed a commit
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Dec 7, 2018
[ Upstream commit 2efd4fca703a6707cad16ab486eaab8fc7f0fd49 ] Syzbot reported a read beyond the end of the skb head when returning IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR: BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242 CPU: 0 PID: 4501 Comm: syz-executor128 Not tainted 4.17.0+ TinkerBoard#9 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1125 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x138/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1219 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1261 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline] put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242 ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl+0x1cf3/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:719 ip6_datagram_recv_ctl+0x41c/0x450 net/ipv6/datagram.c:733 rawv6_recvmsg+0x10fb/0x1460 net/ipv6/raw.c:521 [..] This logic and its ipv4 counterpart read the destination port from the packet at skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4. With MSG_MORE and a local SOCK_RAW sender, syzbot was able to cook a packet that stores headers exactly up to skb_transport_offset(skb) in the head and the remainder in a frag. Call pskb_may_pull before accessing the pointer to ensure that it lies in skb head. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAF=yD-LEJwZj5a1-bAAj2Oy_hKmGygV6rsJ_WOrAYnv-fnayiQ@mail.gmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+9adb4b567003cac781f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dec 7, 2018
commit 89da619bc18d79bca5304724c11d4ba3b67ce2c6 upstream. Kernel panic when with high memory pressure, calltrace looks like, PID: 21439 TASK: ffff881be3afedd0 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "java" #0 [ffff881ec7ed7630] machine_kexec at ffffffff81059beb TinkerBoard#1 [ffff881ec7ed7690] __crash_kexec at ffffffff81105942 TinkerBoard#2 [ffff881ec7ed7760] crash_kexec at ffffffff81105a30 TinkerBoard#3 [ffff881ec7ed7778] oops_end at ffffffff816902c8 TinkerBoard#4 [ffff881ec7ed77a0] no_context at ffffffff8167ff46 TinkerBoard#5 [ffff881ec7ed77f0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff8167ffdc TinkerBoard#6 [ffff881ec7ed7838] __node_set at ffffffff81680300 TinkerBoard#7 [ffff881ec7ed7860] __do_page_fault at ffffffff8169320f TinkerBoard#8 [ffff881ec7ed78c0] do_page_fault at ffffffff816932b5 TinkerBoard#9 [ffff881ec7ed78f0] page_fault at ffffffff8168f4c8 [exception RIP: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+47] RIP: ffffffff8168edef RSP: ffff881ec7ed79a8 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffffea0019740d00 RCX: ffff881ec7ed7fd8 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 0000000000000016 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: ffff881ec7ed79a8 R8: 0000000000000246 R9: 000000000001a098 R10: ffff88107ffda000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffff881ec7ed7a80 R15: ffff881be3afedd0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 It happens in the pagefault and results in double pagefault during compacting pages when memory allocation fails. Analysed the vmcore, the page leads to second pagefault is corrupted with _mapcount=-256, but private=0. It's caused by the race between migration and ballooning, and lock missing in virtballoon_migratepage() of virtio_balloon driver. This patch fix the bug. Fixes: e225042 ("virtio_balloon: introduce migration primitives to balloon pages") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Huang Chong <huang.chong@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bauuuuu
pushed a commit
to Bauuuuu/debian_kernel
that referenced
this issue
Dec 7, 2018
[ Upstream commit 934140ab028713a61de8bca58c05332416d037d1 ]
cachefiles_read_waiter() has the right to access a 'monitor' object by
virtue of being called under the waitqueue lock for one of the pages in its
purview. However, it has no ref on that monitor object or on the
associated operation.
What it is allowed to do is to move the monitor object to the operation's
to_do list, but once it drops the work_lock, it's actually no longer
permitted to access that object. However, it is trying to enqueue the
retrieval operation for processing - but it can only do this via a pointer
in the monitor object, something it shouldn't be doing.
If it doesn't enqueue the operation, the operation may not get processed.
If the order is flipped so that the enqueue is first, then it's possible
for the work processor to look at the to_do list before the monitor is
enqueued upon it.
Fix this by getting a ref on the operation so that we can trust that it
will still be there once we've added the monitor to the to_do list and
dropped the work_lock. The op can then be enqueued after the lock is
dropped.
The bug can manifest in one of a couple of ways. The first manifestation
looks like:
FS-Cache:
FS-Cache: Assertion failed
FS-Cache: 6 == 5 is false
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:494!
RIP: 0010:fscache_put_operation+0x1e3/0x1f0
...
fscache_op_work_func+0x26/0x50
process_one_work+0x131/0x290
worker_thread+0x45/0x360
kthread+0xf8/0x130
? create_worker+0x190/0x190
? kthread_cancel_work_sync+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
This is due to the operation being in the DEAD state (6) rather than
INITIALISED, COMPLETE or CANCELLED (5) because it's already passed through
fscache_put_operation().
The bug can also manifest like the following:
kernel BUG at fs/fscache/operation.c:69!
...
[exception RIP: fscache_enqueue_operation+246]
...
TinkerBoard#7 [ffff883fff083c10] fscache_enqueue_operation at ffffffffa0b793c6
TinkerBoard#8 [ffff883fff083c28] cachefiles_read_waiter at ffffffffa0b15a48
TinkerBoard#9 [ffff883fff083c48] __wake_up_common at ffffffff810af028
I'm not entirely certain as to which is line 69 in Lei's kernel, so I'm not
entirely clear which assertion failed.
Fixes: 9ae326a ("CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem")
Reported-by: Lei Xue <carmark.dlut@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Anthony DeRobertis <aderobertis@metrics.net>
Reported-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Reported-by: Kiran Kumar Modukuri <kiran.modukuri@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Hi all.
WiFi access point mode with hostapd works nice on 2.0.1 but stopped working on 2.0.4.
"sudo service hostapd status" error:
hostapd.service - LSB: Advanced IEEE 802.11 management daemon
Active: active (exited) since Wed 2018-01-31 09:19:22 UTC; 38s ago
Process: 630 ExecStart=/etc/init.d/hostapd start (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS)
CGroup: /system.slice/hostapd.service
Jan 31 09:19:21 tinkerboard hostapd[630]: Starting advanced IEEE 802.11 management: hostapderror: unexpectedly disconnected from boot status daemon
The workaround was found on the forum https://tinkerboarding.co.uk/forum/thread-997.html but it looks like a bug anyway.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: