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filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message
CVE-2014-3145, CVE-2014-3144 The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned -- allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the netlink attribute. The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the message while looking for the netlink attribute. The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3. ,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]-- | ld #0x87654321 | ldx #42 | ld #nla | ret a `--- ,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]-- | ld #0x87654321 | ldx #42 | ld #nlan | ret a `--- ,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]-- | ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0) | ld #0 | ldx #42 | ld #nlan | ret a `--- Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math for the remainder calculation right. Fixes: 4738c1d ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction") Fixes: d214c75 ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..") Cc: Patrick McHardy <email@example.com> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <firstname.lastname@example.org> Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <email@example.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <firstname.lastname@example.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <email@example.com> Change-Id: I3740d1d5825ff7f8c28ee28e9f310d4b271b84b6
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