

chapter - 19

cloud  
Computing



## Concept

- delivery of IT capabilities (metered service)
- storage, elasticity, management (automated)
- network, resource pool, virtualization

IaaS (Infrastructure; hardware, OS → API)

PaaS (Platform; dev tools, management, deployment)

SaaS (Software; applications through Internet)

IDAaaS (Identity; IAM - SSO, MFA, IGIA)

SECaaaS (Security; Penetration, auth, IDS, management)

CaaS (Container; Virtualisation of Container engine)

FaaS (Function; application's functionality)

## Cloud Models

Public (public use; Internet)


Private (Infrastructure - Single Company)

Community (Shared Infrastructure - Multiple Company)

Hybrid (combination of 2 or more clouds)

Multi (dynamic heterogeneous; combines workload across multiple cloud vendors)

## NIST Cloud Deployment Reference Architecture



cloud consumer (end user; subscriber)

cloud provider (person who hosts the service)

cloud carrier (provides connectivity, transportation)

Cloud Auditor (independent assessments)

cloud broker (manage use, performance, delivery)

## cloud storage Architecture

- Stores digital data in logical pools.
- Three layers: Frontend, Middleware, Backend.
- Front → end user (API, data storage)
- Middleware → functions (replication, duplicate)
- Backend → hardware implementation.





Figure 19.8: Cloud storage architecture

## Providers

- Amazon Web Service (AWS)
- Google Cloud
- IBM cloud
- Microsoft Azure.


# Containers

Container Technology Architecture




Virtualization → run multiple OS.

Containers → share OS's Kernel libraries.



# Docker

- open source technology used for developing, packaging, running application, dependencies.




# Microservice

- monolithic divided to sub-application.
- packaged into Docker containers

# Docker Networking


- connects multiple containers workloads.
- developed on Container Network Model (CNM)

- CNM provides application portability.
- Network drivers available for Host, bridge, overlay, MacVlan, None.



## Container Orchestration


- automated process of managing lifecycle of software containers, environments -
- used for scheduling, distributing work across multiple clusters -



## Kubernetes

- K8, open source, portable, extensible, orchestration platform by Google.
- manages containerised application

Kubernetes Cluster Architecture




Docker → container on single OS

Kubernetes → Manage docker installed on  
Multiple OS.

- create, manage, update, scale, destroy containers.

### Kubernetes Deployment



**Kubernetes and Docker run  
together to build and run  
containerized applications**

# Serverless Computing

- Serverless architecture / FaaS
- simplifies the process of application deployment as eliminates need for managing server, hardware . (Azure Functions, AWS Lambda)




Containers	Serverless Computing
⊕ The developer is responsible for defining container configuration files along with the operating system, software, libraries, storage, and networking	⊕ The developer only needs to develop and upload code to support serverless computing; the entire provisioning process is taken care of by the cloud service provider
⊕ Once initiated, the container runs continuously until the developer stops or destroys it	⊕ Once completed running, the serverless function is automatically destroyed by the cloud environment
⊕ A container needs server support even when the container is not executing any programs	⊕ Serverless deployment charges only for the resources consumed
⊕ There is no time restriction for the code running inside the container	⊕ Timeout is enabled on serverless functions
⊕ Containers support running on a cluster of host nodes	⊕ The underlying host infrastructure is transparent to developers
⊕ Containers store data in temporary storage or mapped storage volumes	⊕ Serverless functions do not support temporary storage; instead, data is stored in the object storage medium
⊕ Containers support both complex applications and lightweight microservices	⊕ Serverless functions are suitable only for microservices applications
⊕ Developers can select their choice of language and runtime for applications running in a container	⊕ Language selection for serverless functions is restricted by the cloud service provider

# Kubernetes Vulnerability

Vulnerabilities	Description
1. No Certificate Revocation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kubernetes does not support certificate revocation</li> <li>Attackers can exploit the certificate before it is replaced across the entire cluster</li> </ul>
2. Unauthenticated HTTPS Connections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Though Kubernetes uses PKI, connections between the components are not authenticated properly</li> <li>Attackers can gain unauthorized access to kubelet-managed Pods and retrieve sensitive information</li> </ul>
3. Exposed Bearer Tokens in Logs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bearer tokens are logged in hyperkube kube-apiserver system logs</li> <li>Attackers having access to the system logs can impersonate a legitimate user</li> </ul>
4. Exposure of Sensitive Data via Environment Variables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Environmental variables allow settings to be derived from the variables</li> <li>Attackers can gain access to the stored values through environment logging</li> </ul>
5. Secrets at Rest not Encrypted by Default	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Secrets defined by users are not encrypted by default</li> <li>Attackers gaining access to etcd servers can retrieve unencrypted secrets</li> </ul>
6. Non-constant Time Password Comparison	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kube-apiserver using basic password authentication, does not perform secure comparison of secret values</li> <li>Attackers can launch timing attacks to retrieve passwords</li> </ul>
7. Hardcoded Credential Paths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If the cluster token and the root CA are stored in different locations, an attacker can insert a malicious token and the root CA to gain access to the entire cluster</li> </ul>
8. Log Rotation is not Atomic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>During log rotation, if the kubelet is restarted, all the logs may be erased</li> <li>The attacker waits for the log rotation to happen by monitoring it and then tries to remove all the logs</li> </ul>
9. No Back-off Process for Scheduling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No back-off process for scheduling the execution of Kubernetes pods</li> <li>This causes a tight loop as the scheduler continuously schedules a pod that is rejected by the other processes</li> </ul>
10. No Non-reputation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If debug mode is disabled, kube-apiserver does not record user actions</li> <li>Attackers can directly interact with kube-apiserver and perform various malicious activities</li> </ul>


## Service Hijacking - Social Engineering

- Password Guessing, Password Cracking
- reveal Password, phishing.
- reset password, reveal Password, phishing .




# Network Sniffing

- Passwords, Session Cookies, UDDI, SOAP, WSDL configurations.




# Side channel attacks

- Malicious VM near target cloud Server
- shared physical resource to steal data.



## Wrapping Attack

- translation of SOAP message in TLS layer.
- duplicate message body at send to user



## Man in the cloud Attack

- exploit to manipulate communication b/w two parties (Dropbox / Google)
- Uses victim's synchronisation token
- replaces original → victim's token.


# Cloud Hopper Attack (MSP, Phishing)

- triggered at Managed Service Provider (MSP)
- Spear phishing emails.




# Cloud CryptoJacking

- Unauthorised use of mine digital currency.



# Cloudborne Attack (bare Metal)

- resides in bare metal cloud server
- implants malicious backdoor in firmware



## Cloud Hacking

- gains access to data, blocks access to Cloud Services
- used for data exfiltration, unauthorised access, misuse access, illicit processing power, DDoS

## Container Vulnerability Scanning

- Container Image = OS + app + runtime

- Contains open source framework Vulnerabilities
- Tools: Trivy, Clair, Dadga to identify Vulnerability in Containers

## Kubernetes - Vulnerability Scanning

Tool: Sysdig.

- Identifies Kubernetes Vulnerability in CI/CD Pipeline
- It also validates images at orchestration level.

## Enumerating S3 Buckets

Simple Storage Service (S3) → AWS

↳ files, folders stored via Web APIs

- Inspecting source code of HTML files.
- Burp Suite → Perform bruteforce to identify URL.
- Robtex → Identify subdomains of the URLs.

- Bing → reverse IP search to find domains
- Google dorks → initial to Search S3 bucket URL.

## Identifying Open S3 buckets

- Tool: S3Scanner.py
- identifies open S3 bucket - AWS, retrieves content
- Info contains - files, folder, text files, images, videos, backup files, credentials.

## Enumerating Kubernetes etcd

- etcd → distributed, key-value storage.
  - stores cluster data, discovery, objects
- enumerates etcd processes to identify endpoints connected to Kubernetes

ps -ef | grep apiserver

## Enumerating AWS account ID

- AWS identifies with unique ID
- with Account ID, resource enumeration,  
IAM role assumption, lambda invocation can  
be done.
- It can be enumerated via
  - AWS error messages
  - Github code
  - Screenshots
  - Public EBS, AMIs
  - RDS Snapshots.

## Enumerating IAM roles

- Analyzes AWS error msgs to reveal IAM roles.

- Users can perform n-attempts to assume role.
- if failed → response reveals info about roles.
- Can enumerate:
  - IAM Usernames
  - AWS Services in use.
  - 3rd Party in use.

## Enumerating Bucket Permissions

- Tools: S3 Inspector
- enumerates AWS S3 bucket permission.
- enumerates Info:
  - about each bucket
  - Public / Private
  - Permissions
  - list of URLs

# Exploiting Amazon cloud Infrastructure

- Tools: Nimbostatus.
- fingerprints, exploits Amazon cloud.
- enumerates access for current IAM role,  
create new Aws user, extract credentials  
from metadata.
- dump credentials, permission, instance Metadata.

# Exploiting Misconfigured AWS S3

1. identify S3 buckets
2. Setup Aws CLI (aws-cli)
3. extract access keys. (Users → CSV → keys)
4. Configure aws-cli (aws configure)
5. identify Vulnerable S3 buckets.
6. Exploit S3 buckets -

## Compromise AWS - IAM Credentials

- Repository Misconfiguration
- Social Engineering
- Password Reuse
- Aws application Vulnerabilities.
- Exploit 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Software
- Insider threats.

## Hijacking Misconfigured IAM roles:

- Tool : Pacu (open source exploitation framework)
- 'AWS' : '\*' (any user can assume, obtain credentials)

## Cracking AWS access keys

- Tool : Dumpster Diver.
- Scans hardcoded secret keys .(Aws, SSL)

## Exploiting Docker Containers

1. Abuse Aws Creds. (Enumerate ECR)
2. Pull target docker Container, Images.
3. Create backdoor image.
4. Push backdoor docker image to ECR.

## Exploit docker Remote API

- retrieve files from Docker Host
- Scan Internal Network.
- retrieve Credentials.
- Query databases.

## Hacking Container Volumes

Volumes : NFS, iSCSI

- exploit weak, default configurations to launch privilege escalation attacks, lateral movement.
- Accessing Master Node (API, etcd - easy)
- Accessing Node (Pod → Node - easy)
- Accessing Container (configure hostpath volume type)

## CloudGraat AWS

- allows to hone cybersecurity skills by creating, completing several CTFs.

## Exploiting SSRF Vulnerability

- Gain access to cloud metadata services such as EC2 (HTTP, SSRF → Possibility)
- retrieve AWS IAM credentials.

- Add credentials to local aws-cli.
- Gain Access to data stored in S3 buckets

## AWS IAM Privilege Escalation

- Create new policy Version.  
iam: Create Policy Version.
- Assign default Policy Version to existing Version
- Create EC2 instance with existing Profile
- Create new user access key.
- Create or update login profile
- Attach policy to user/group/role.
- Create/update inline policy for user/group/role
- Add user to group.

## Privilege Escalation - Google Storage Bucket

- GCP Bucket Brute → tool.
- enumerate buckets, access, privilege escalation
- enumerate bucket policy → direct HTTP
- used for privilege escalations.

## Backdoor - Docker Images

Tool : Dockerscan

- analyses, performs various malicious activity such as scanning networks, identify registry, analyse images, modify images.
- It can trojanise Ubuntu base image.

## Covering Tracks

- disable logging functionality by pausing Cloud Trail Service :

aws cloudtrail stop-logging :

aws cloudtrail delete-trail

## Maintain Access

- installs backdoor to AWS using
  - Manipulation of user data
  - Creating EC2 Instances
  - Inserting a backdoor
  - Manipulating access keys :
    - ↳ rabbit-lambda
    - ↳ cli-lambda

# AWS Hacking Tool : AWS Run

- automated Scripts for hacking phases.

## Reconnaissance

- `./validate_iam_access_keys.py -i /tmp/keys.txt -o /tmp/out.json` → Checks access validity and returns the identity information of the principal
- `./validate_s3_buckets.py -i /tmp/words.txt -o /tmp/out.json` → Checks whether the buckets exist and returns basic identifying information
- `./validate_iam_principals.py -a 123456789012 -i /tmp/words.txt -o /tmp/out.json` → Checks whether the principals exist in specific account

## Privilege Escalation

- `./dump_instance_attributes.py -u -o /tmp/` → Retrieves the specified EC2 instance attributes
- `./assume_roles.py -o /tmp/out.json` → Attempts to assume all roles (ARNs) in a file
- `./add_iam_policy.py -u myuser -r myrole -g mygroup` → Adds the administrator and all action policy to a given user, role, or group
- `./bouncy_bouncy_cloudy_cloud.py -i instance-id -e exfiltration-endpoint` → Bounces a given ec2 instance and rewrites its user data

## Maintaining Access


- `rabbit_lambda` → Responds to user delete events by creating more copies of the deleted user
- `backdoor_created_users_lambda` → Adds an access key to each newly created user
- `backdoor_created_roles_lambda` → Adds a trust relationship to each newly created role
- `backdoor_created_security_groups_lambda` → Adds a given inbound access rule to each newly created security group

## Clearing tracks

- `./disrupt_cloudtrail.py -s` → Attempts to disrupt/cripple cloudtrail logging in the specified way



# Cloud Security



Deterrent - reduce attacks

Preventive - strengthen by minimising / eliminating


Detective - detect, react

Corrective - minimise by limiting damage

## Zero Trust Networks

Zero Trust Model → No user is trusted

Zero Trust Network



# International Cloud Security Organisation

- assist professionals with best practices, awareness, policies → resilience.

CSA → Cloud Security Alliance

- ↳ promote best practices, awareness for cloud security.

## Security Tools:

- Qualys Cloud Platform } Platform
- McAfee MVision cloud }
- Aqua (Scans Container, Images)
- Kube-bench (Permission, Auth → Kubernetes)
- Protego (Serverless → Lifecycle Security)