

Velvet Capital

Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by ShellBoxes

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The Velvet Capital Contract in the Velvet Capital Repository

Repo	Commit Hash
https://github.com/Velvet-Capital/ protocols	ba5b6b32df759f630e325fe79d7ea2f5b27adbcc

Files	MD5 Hash	
IndexFactory.sol	90b903abbee8d3408911e68590eb78d9	
venus/TokenMetadata.sol	4f29f2a716c50bc79a9985796ad71016	
vault/Vault.sol	41dc52219f88b7b837049292499865b1	
vault/VelvetSafeModule.sol	dc36378af5ebdc1b1c05fd0afcf574ab	
rebalance/Rebalancing.sol	3065c03665f7ad41cad87df676ed03d6	
oracle/PriceOracle.sol	d40d2841203eb00bb0f89ef49fe48e0c	
core/Adapter.sol	c3320d2591ecf6fd77aa69b34b134904	
core/IndexSwap.sol	c7b32711672a5aa40e20071ef8865478	
core/IndexSwapLibrary.sol	5cf0e02bbc0fab372840bb8da87bc523	
access/AccessController.sol	7c6ebf3f7895b68592678d8ae60044d6	

Re-Audit Scope

Repo	Commit Hash
https://github.com/Velvet-Capital/ protocols	0a6f765208d29c7517943a77bd8f69afd294073b

Files	MD5 Hash	
IndexFactory.sol	bff7883ec6ed23ff2d1fa5a81e8d05ad	
vault/Vault.sol	a904e54d8d8f940fb9a4fc5acd09cf43	
vault/VelvetSafeModule.sol	0e1591a95eee0c75a23a3b23528a4b47	
rebalance/Rebalancing.sol	e8287269e47f0a055772fe8bab84d877	
oracle/PriceOracle.sol	d84fd8f3ae0e8211be634d530e2da024	
core/Adapter.sol	d40d2157831cf036b266a22bc07982b9	
core/IndexSwap.sol	2767e6c91449c486234c8948b2d1c6c5	
core/IndexSwapLibrary.sol	f2c944c2350b6ab9369e4c3ea1bf3fa1	
access/AccessController.sol	c5d6636302b07cb401ac2d7d8f55b8a5	

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1 Introduction

Velvet Capital engaged ShellBoxes to conduct a security assessment on the Velvet Capital beginning on August 26th, 2022 and ending September 12th, 2022. In this report, we detail our methodical approach to evaluate potential security issues associated with the implementation of smart contracts, by exposing possible semantic discrepancies between the smart contract code and design document, and by recommending additional ideas to optimize the existing code. Our findings indicate that the current version of smart contracts can still be enhanced further due to the presence of many security and performance concerns.

This document summarizes the findings of our audit.

1.1 About Velvet Capital

Velvet Capital is a DeFi protocol that helps people & institutions create tokenized index funds, portfolios & other financial products with additional yield.

The protocol provides all the necessary infrastructure for financial product development being integrated with AMMs, Lending protocols and other DeFi primitives to give users a diverse asset management toolkit.

Issuer	Velvet Capital	
Website	https://velvet.capital	
Туре	Solidity Smart Contract	
Audit Method	Whitebox	

1.2 Approach & Methodology

ShellBoxes used a combination of manual and automated security testing to achieve a balance between efficiency, timeliness, practicability, and correctness within the audit's scope. While manual testing is advised for identifying problems in logic, procedure, and implementation, automated testing techniques help to expand the coverage of smart contracts and can quickly detect code that does not comply with security best practices.

1.2.1 Risk Methodology

Vulnerabilities or bugs identified by ShellBoxes are ranked using a risk assessment technique that considers both the LIKELIHOOD and IMPACT of a security incident. This framework is effective at conveying the features and consequences of technological vulnerabilities.

Its quantitative paradigm enables repeatable and precise measurement, while also revealing the underlying susceptibility characteristics that were used to calculate the Risk scores. A risk level will be assigned to each vulnerability on a scale of 5 to 1, with 5 indicating the greatest possibility or impact.

- Likelihood quantifies the probability of a certain vulnerability being discovered and exploited in the untamed.
- Impact quantifies the technical and economic costs of a successful attack.
- Severity indicates the risk's overall criticality.

Probability and impact are classified into three categories: H, M, and L, which correspond to high, medium, and low, respectively. Severity is determined by probability and impact and is categorized into four levels, namely Critical, High, Medium, and Low.



Likelihood

2 Findings Overview

2.1 Summary

The following is a synopsis of our conclusions from our analysis of the Velvet Capital implementation. During the first part of our audit, we examine the smart contract source code and run the codebase via a static code analyzer. The objective here is to find known coding problems statically and then manually check (reject or confirm) issues highlighted by the tool. Additionally, we check business logics, system processes, and DeFi-related components manually to identify potential hazards and/or defects.

2.2 Key Findings

In general, these smart contracts are well-designed and constructed, but their implementation might be improved by addressing the discovered flaws, which include, 2 high-severity, 1 medium-severity, 11 low-severity, 10 informational-severity vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities	Severity	Status
A.1. The Investor Can Spend His Funds Without Minting	HIGH	Fixed
Index Tokens		
A.2. The User's tokens Can Get Burned Without With-	HIGH	Fixed
drawing All His Funds		
A.3. The Record Index Can Overflow	MEDIUM	Fixed
A.4. Missing Value Verification	LOW	Fixed
A.5. Missing Address Verification	LOW	Fixed
A.6. Owner Can Renounce Ownership	LOW	Acknowledged
B.1. Missing Address Verification	LOW	Fixed
B.2. Owner Can Renounce Ownership	LOW	Acknowledged
C.1. Owner Can Renounce Ownership	LOW	Acknowledged
D.1. Missing Address Verification	LOW	Fixed
E.1. Missing Address Verification	LOW	Fixed
F.1. Owner Can Renounce Ownership	LOW	Acknowledged

G.1. Missing Address Verification	LOW	Fixed
I.1. Missing Address Verification	LOW	Fixed
A.7. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Fixed
B.3. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Fixed
C.2. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Fixed
D.2. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Fixed
E.2. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Fixed
F.2. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Fixed
G.2. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Fixed
H.1. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Fixed
I.2. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Fixed
J.1. Floating Pragma	INFORMATIONAL	Fixed

3 Finding Details

A IndexSwap.sol

A.1 The Investor Can Spend His Funds Without Minting Index Tokens [HIGH]

Description:

The users call the investInFund function in order to invest BNB and mint an amount of index tokens. If a user invests an amount that is lower than vaultBalance/tokenBalanceInUSD[i] for every token, the investedAmountAfterSlippageBNB will be equal to zero due to a type conversion error. Therefore, the user will spend his funds without minting any index tokens that will allow him to withdraw his funds later.

Code:

Listing 1: IndexSwap.sol

```
amount = indexSwapLibrary.calculateSwapAmounts(
       IIndexSwap(address(this)),
188
       tokenAmount,
189
       tokenBalanceInBNB,
190
      vaultBalance
191
192 );
   investedAmountAfterSlippage = _swapETHToTokens(
       tokenAmount,
       amount,
196
       slippage
197
  );
198
   uint256 investedAmountAfterSlippageBNB = indexSwapLibrary
       . getTokenPriceUSDETH(investedAmountAfterSlippage);
201
```

```
uint256 vaultBalanceBNB = indexSwapLibrary._getTokenPriceUSDETH(
       vaultBalance
204
  );
205
   if (totalSupply() > 0) {
       tokenAmount = mintShareAmount(
209
           investedAmountAfterSlippageBNB,
210
           vaultBalanceBNB
211
       ):
212
   } else {
213
       tokenAmount = investedAmountAfterSlippageBNB;
214
215
   _mint(msg.sender, tokenAmount);
```

Listing 2: IndexSwapLibrary.sol

```
function calculateSwapAmounts(
       IIndexSwap _index,
140
       uint256 tokenAmount,
       uint256[] memory tokenBalanceInUSD,
142
       uint256 vaultBalance
   ) public view returns (uint256[] memory) {
144
       uint256[] memory amount = new uint256[](_index.getTokens().length);
145
       if (_index.totalSupply() > 0) {
146
           for (uint256 i = 0; i < _index.getTokens().length; i++) {</pre>
147
              amount[i] = tokenBalanceInUSD[i].mul(tokenAmount).div(
148
                  vaultBalance
149
              );
           }
       }
152
       return amount;
153
  }
154
```

```
Likelihood – 4
Impact – 5
```

Recommendation:

Consider requiring msg.value to be greater than vaultBalance/tokenBalanceInUSD[i].

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by verifying tokenBalanceInUSD[i]*tokenAmount to be greater than vaultBalance.

A.2 The User's tokens Can Get Burned Without Withdrawing All His Funds [HIGH]

Description:

The withdrawFund function is used to withdraw the funds invested in the tokens listed in the tokens array. However, there is a scenario where the amount to be withdrawn of a specific token or multiple ones can round to zero. If the tokenBalance * tokenAmount is lower than totalSupplyIndex, then the amount variable will be equal to zero due to a type conversion error.

Code:

Listing 3: IndexSwap.sol

```
tokenAmount <= balanceOf(msg.sender),</pre>
239
           "caller is not holding given token amount"
240
       );
2/1
       uint256 sumBalance=0;
243
       uint256[] memory arrayOfTokenAmount = new uint256[](_tokens.length);
244
       uint256 totalSupplyIndex = totalSupply();
       burn(msg.sender, tokenAmount);
247
       for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {</pre>
249
           uint256 tokenBalance = indexSwapLibrary.getTokenBalance(
250
               IIndexSwap(address(this)),
251
               tokens[i],
252
               adapter.getETH() == tokens[i]
253
           );
254
           uint256 amount = tokenBalance.mul(tokenAmount).div(
256
               totalSupplyIndex
257
           );
258
```

Likelihood – 3

Impact - 5

Recommendation:

Given that the caller chooses the tokenAmount argument and that the worst-case scenario is 1, consider requiring the tokenBalance variable to be higher than the totalSupplyIndex variable.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by verifying tokenBalance*tokenAmount to be greater than totalSupplyIndex.

A.3 The Record Index Can Overflow [MEDIUM]

Description:

The index attribute in the Record struct is an uint8. In the case where the length of the tokens array is greater than 255, the index attribute will overflow and start again from zero.

Code:

Listing 4: IndexSwap.sol

```
function initToken(address[] calldata tokens, uint96[] calldata denorms)
      external
      onlyOwner
124
125
      require(tokens.length == denorms.length, "INVALID INIT INPUT");
126
      require(_tokens.length == 0, "INITIALIZED");
      uint256 len = tokens.length;
      uint256 totalWeight = 0;
129
      for (uint256 i = 0; i < len; i++) {
130
          records[tokens[i]] = Record({
131
              lastDenormUpdate: uint40(block.timestamp),
132
              denorm: denorms[i],
133
              index: uint8(i)
134
          });
135
          tokens.push(tokens[i]);
          totalWeight = totalWeight.add(denorms[i]);
      }
139
      require(totalWeight == TOTAL WEIGHT, "INVALID WEIGHTS");
140
```

```
emit LOG_PUBLIC_SWAP_ENABLED();
143 }
```

Likelihood – 3 Impact – 3

Recommendation:

Consider limiting the length of the tokens array to 255, or change the type of the index.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by changing the type of the index attribute to uint256.

A.4 Missing Value Verification [LOW]

Description:

Certain functions lack a value safety check, the values of the arguments should be verified to allow only the ones that comply with the contract's logic. In the constructor, the contract must ensure that _maxInvestmentAmount and _feePointBasis are different from zero, also, in the initToken the contract must ensure that denorms are lower than TOTAL_WEIGHT.

Code:

Listing 5: IndexSwap.sol

```
string memory _name,
string memory _symbol,
string memory _symbol,
address _outAsset,
address _vault,
uint256 _maxInvestmentAmount,
address indexSwapLibrary,
```

```
address _adapter,
95
       address _accessController,
96
       address _tokenMetadata,
97
      uint256 feePointBasis,
98
       address treasury
99
   ) TokenBase(_name, _symbol) {
       vault = vault;
101
       outAsset = outAsset; //As now we are tacking busd
102
      MAX INVESTMENTAMOUNT = maxInvestmentAmount;
103
       indexSwapLibrary = IIndexSwapLibrary( indexSwapLibrary);
104
       adapter = IAdapter( adapter);
105
       accessController = IAccessController( accessController);
106
       tokenMetadata = TokenMetadata( tokenMetadata);
107
      paused = false;
108
      feePointBasis = feePointBasis;
110
      treasury = payable( treasury);
112 }
```

Likelihood – 1 Impact – 3

Recommendation:

We recommend that you verify the values provided in the arguments. The issue can be addressed by utilizing a require statement.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by verifying the values provided in the arguments to comply with the logic of the contract.

A.5 Missing Address Verification [LOW]

Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the address, the address-type arguments should include a zero-address test, otherwise, the contract's functionality may become inaccessible. In the constructor, the _outAsset, _vault, _indexSwapLibrary, _adapter, _accessController, _tokenMetadata and the _treasury arguments should be verified to be different from the address(0).

Code:

Listing 6: IndexSwap.sol

```
constructor(
      string memory _name,
89
      string memory symbol,
90
      address _outAsset,
      address vault,
      uint256 maxInvestmentAmount,
      address indexSwapLibrary,
94
      address adapter,
95
      address accessController,
96
      address _tokenMetadata,
97
      uint256 feePointBasis,
98
      address treasury
99
    TokenBase(_name, _symbol) {
      vault = _vault;
101
      outAsset = _outAsset; //As now we are tacking busd
      MAX INVESTMENTAMOUNT = maxInvestmentAmount;
103
      indexSwapLibrary = IIndexSwapLibrary( indexSwapLibrary);
104
      adapter = IAdapter( adapter);
105
      accessController = IAccessController( accessController);
106
      tokenMetadata = TokenMetadata( tokenMetadata);
107
      paused = false;
108
```

```
feePointBasis = _feePointBasis;
treasury = payable(_treasury);
}
```

Likelihood – 1 Impact – 3

Recommendation:

We recommend that you make sure the addresses provided in the arguments are different from the address(0).

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by requiring the addresses provided in the arguments to be different from the address(0)

A.6 Owner Can Renounce Ownership [LOW]

Description:

Typically, the account that deploys the contract is also its owner. Consequently, the owner is able to engage in certain privileged activities in his own name. In smart contracts, the renounceOwnership function is used to renounce ownership, which means that if the contract's ownership has never been transferred, it will never have an Owner, rendering some owner-exclusive functionality unavailable.

Code:

Listing 7: IndexSwap.sol 32 contract TokenBase is ERC20Burnable, Ownable, ReentrancyGuard {

Likelihood – 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

We recommend that you prevent the owner from calling renounceOwnership without first transferring ownership to a different address. Additionally, if you decide to use a multisignature wallet, then the execution of the renounceOwnership will require for at least two or more users to be confirmed. Alternatively, you can disable Renounce Ownership functionality by overriding it.

Status - Acknowledged

The Velvet team has acknowledged the risk, stating that it is a risk with low-probability of occurrence.

A.7 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.6. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts will not unintentionally be deployed using another pragma, which in some cases may be an obsolete version, that may introduce issues to the contract system.

Code:

Listing 8: IndexSwap.sol

```
12 pragma solidity ^0.8.6;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by locking the pragma version to 0.8.16.

B IndexFactory.sol

B.1 Missing Address Verification [LOW]

Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the address, the address-type arguments should include a zero-address test, otherwise, the contract's functionality may become inaccessible. In the constructor, the _uniswapRouter, _treasury, _indexSwapLibrary, _tokenMetadata, _baseAdapterAddress and the _baseRebalancingAddres arguments should be verified to be different from the address(0).

Code:

Listing 9: IndexSwapLibrary.sol

```
constructor(
      address _uniswapRouter,
44
      address _outAsset,
45
      address treasury,
46
      address _indexSwapLibrary,
47
      address _tokenMetadata,
48
      address _baseAdapterAddress,
      address baseRebalancingAddres
  ) {
      require(_outAsset != address(0), "Invalid Out Asset");
52
```

```
uniswapRouter = _uniswapRouter;

outAsset = _outAsset;

treasury = _treasury;

indexSwapLibrary = _indexSwapLibrary;

tokenMetadata = _tokenMetadata;

noVtokenMetadata = Clones.clone(tokenMetadata);

baseRebalancingAddress = _baseRebalancingAddres;

baseAdapterAddress = _baseAdapterAddress;

}
```

Likelihood – 1 Impact – 3

Recommendation:

We recommend that you make sure the addresses provided in the arguments are different from the address(0).

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by requiring the addresses provided in the arguments to be different from the address(0)

B.2 Owner Can Renounce Ownership [LOW]

Description:

Typically, the account that deploys the contract is also its owner. Consequently, the owner is able to engage in certain privileged activities in his own name. In smart contracts, the renounceOwnership function is used to renounce ownership, which means that if the contract's ownership has never been transferred, it will never have an Owner, rendering some owner-exclusive functionality unavailable.

Listing 10: IndexFactory.sol

```
12 contract IndexFactory is Ownable {
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

We recommend that you prevent the owner from calling renounceOwnership without first transferring ownership to a different address. Additionally, if you decide to use a multisignature wallet, then the execution of the renounceOwnership will require for at least two or more users to be confirmed. Alternatively, you can disable Renounce Ownership functionality by overriding it.

Status - Acknowledged

The Velvet team has acknowledged the risk, stating that it is a risk with low-probability of occurrence.

B.3 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.6. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts will not unintentionally be deployed using another pragma, which in some cases may be an obsolete version, that may introduce issues to the contract system.

Listing 11: IndexFactory.sol

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.6;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by locking the pragma version to 0.8.16.

C TokenMetadata.sol

C.1 Owner Can Renounce Ownership [LOW]

Description:

Typically, the account that deploys the contract is also its owner. Consequently, the owner is able to engage in certain privileged activities in his own name. In smart contracts, the renounceOwnership function is used to renounce ownership, which means that if the contract's ownership has never been transferred, it will never have an Owner, rendering some owner-exclusive functionality unavailable.

Listing 12: TokenMetadata.sol

```
16 contract TokenMetadata is Ownable {
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

We recommend that you prevent the owner from calling renounceOwnership without first transferring ownership to a different address. Additionally, if you decide to use a multisignature wallet, then the execution of the renounceOwnership will require for at least two or more users to be confirmed. Alternatively, you can disable Renounce Ownership functionality by overriding it.

Status - Acknowledged

The Velvet team has acknowledged the risk, stating that it is a risk with low-probability of occurrence.

C.2 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.6. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts will not unintentionally be deployed using another pragma, which in some cases may be an obsolete version, that may introduce issues to the contract system.

Listing 13: TokenMetadata.sol

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.6;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by locking the pragma version to 0.8.16.

D IndexSwapLibrary.sol

D.1 Missing Address Verification [LOW]

Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the address, the address-type arguments should include a zero-address test, otherwise, the contract's functionality may become inaccessible. In the constructor, the _oracle, _tokenMetadata and the _weth arguments should be verified to be different from the address(0).

Listing 14: IndexSwapLibrary.sol

```
constructor(
address _oracle,
address _weth,

TokenMetadata _tokenMetadata

) {
    oracle = IPriceOracle(_oracle);
    wETH = _weth;
    tokenMetadata = _tokenMetadata;
}
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

We recommend that you make sure the addresses provided in the arguments are different from the address(0).

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by requiring the addresses provided in the arguments to be different from the address(0)

D.2 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.6. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts will not unintentionally be deployed using another pragma, which in some cases may be an obsolete version, that may introduce issues to the contract system.

Code:

Listing 15: IndexSwapLibrary.sol

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.6;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 1

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by locking the pragma version to 0.8.16.

E Rebalancing.sol

E.1 Missing Address Verification [LOW]

Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the address, the address-type arguments should include a zero-address test, otherwise, the contract's functionality may become inaccessible. In the init function, the _index, _indexSwapLibrary, _adapter, _accessController and the _tokenMetadata arguments should be verified to be different from the address(0).

Code:

Listing 16: Rebalancing.sol

```
function init(
      IIndexSwap _index,
      address _indexSwapLibrary,
      address _adapter,
61
      address accessController,
62
      address tokenMetadata
63
  ) external initializer {
      index = IIndexSwap( index);
65
      indexSwapLibrary = IndexSwapLibrary(_indexSwapLibrary);
66
      adapter = IAdapter( adapter);
67
      accessController = AccessController( accessController);
      tokenMetadata = TokenMetadata( tokenMetadata);
70
```

Risk Level:

```
Likelihood – 1
Impact – 3
```

Recommendation:

We recommend that you make sure the addresses provided in the arguments are different from the address(0).

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by requiring the addresses provided in the arguments to be different from the address(0)

E.2 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.6. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts will not unintentionally be deployed using another pragma, which in some cases may be an obsolete version, that may introduce issues to the contract system.

Code:

Listing 17: Rebalancing.sol

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.6;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by locking the pragma version to 0.8.16.

F PriceOracle.sol

F.1 Owner Can Renounce Ownership [LOW]

Description:

Typically, the account that deploys the contract is also its owner. Consequently, the owner is able to engage in certain privileged activities in his own name. In smart contracts, the renounceOwnership function is used to renounce ownership, which means that if the contract's ownership has never been transferred, it will never have an Owner, rendering some owner-exclusive functionality unavailable.

Code:

Listing 18: PriceOracle.sol

```
contract PriceOracle is Ownable {
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

We recommend that you prevent the owner from calling renounceOwnership without first transferring ownership to a different address. Additionally, if you decide to use a multisignature wallet, then the execution of the renounceOwnership will require for at least two or more users to be confirmed. Alternatively, you can disable Renounce Ownership functionality by overriding it.

Status - Acknowledged

The Velvet team has acknowledged the risk, stating that it is a risk with low-probability of occurrence.

F.2 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.6. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts will not unintentionally be deployed using another pragma, which in some cases may be an obsolete version, that may introduce issues to the contract system.

Code:

Listing 19: PriceOracle.sol

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.6;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by locking the pragma version to 0.8.16.

G VelvetSafeModule.sol

G.1 Missing Address Verification [LOW]

Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the address, the address-type arguments should include a zero-address test, otherwise, the contract's functionality may become inaccessible. In the constructor function, the _owner argument should be verified to be different from the address(0).

Code:

Listing 20: VelvetSafeModule.sol

```
constructor(address _owner) {
   bytes memory initializeParams = abi.encode(_owner);
   setUp(initializeParams);
   moduleOwner = msg.sender;
}
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

We recommend that you make sure the addresses provided in the arguments are different from the address(0).

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by requiring the addresses provided in the arguments to be different from the address(0)

G.2 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.6. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts will not unintentionally be deployed using another pragma, which in some cases may be an obsolete version, that may introduce issues to the contract system.

Code:

Listing 21: VelvetSafeModule.sol

```
n pragma solidity ^0.8.6;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood – 1

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by locking the pragma version to 0.8.16.

H AccessController.sol

H.1 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.6. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts will not unintentionally be deployed using another pragma, which in some cases may be an obsolete version, that may introduce issues to the contract system.

Code:

Listing 22: PriceOracle.sol

pragma solidity ^0.8.6;

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by locking the pragma version to 0.8.16.

I Adapter.sol

I.1 Missing Address Verification [LOW]

Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the address, the address-type arguments should include a zero-address test, otherwise, the contract's functionality may become inaccessible. In the init function, the _accessController, _pancakeSwapAddress, _safe and the _to-kenMetadata arguments should be verified to be different from the address(0).

Code:

Listing 23: Adapter.sol

```
46 function init(
      address _accessController,
      address _pancakeSwapAddress,
      address _safe,
      address tokenMetadata
50
  ) external initializer {
      pancakeSwapRouter = IUniswapV2Router02( pancakeSwapAddress);
52
      accessController = AccessController( accessController);
53
      safe = IVault( safe);
54
      tokenMetadata = TokenMetadata( tokenMetadata);
55
56 }
```

Risk Level:

```
Likelihood – 1
Impact – 3
```

Recommendation:

We recommend that you make sure the addresses provided in the arguments are different from the address(0).

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by requiring the addresses provided in the arguments to be different from the address(0)

I.2 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.6. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts will not unintentionally be deployed using another pragma, which in some cases may be an obsolete version, that may introduce issues to the contract system.

Code:

Listing 24: Adapter.sol

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.6;
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by locking the pragma version to 0.8.16.

J Vault.sol

J.1 Floating Pragma [INFORMATIONAL]

Description:

The contract makes use of the floating-point pragma 0.8.6. Contracts should be deployed using the same compiler version. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts will not unintentionally be deployed using another pragma, which in some cases may be an obsolete version, that may introduce issues to the contract system.

Code:

Listing 25: PriceOracle.sol

pragma solidity ^0.8.6;

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

Consider locking the pragma version. It is advised that floating pragma should not be used in production. Both truffle-config.js and hardhat.config.js support locking the pragma version.

Status - Fixed

The Velvet team has fixed the issue by locking the pragma version to 0.8.16.

4 Best Practices

BP.1 Use clone Instead Of new

Description:

There is one potential problem about using new to deploy contract, which is high gas costs. And that is where we can use cloning. When using clone, each contract will have its own state and simply uses the implementation contract as library. If you always deploy the same kind of contract, it is unnecessarily to waste gas costs for the bytecode. Any contract will have almost identical bytecode, so we do not have to store all bytecode again and again for each deployment.

Code:

Listing 26: IndexFactory.sol

```
72 AccessController accessController = new AccessController();
```

Listing 27: IndexFactory.sol

```
82 Vault _safe = new Vault();
```

Listing 28: IndexFactory.sol

```
IndexSwap indexSwap = new IndexSwap(
       name,
93
94
       symbol,
       outAsset,
       address( safe),
96
       maxInvestmentAmount,
97
       indexSwapLibrary,
98
       address( adapter),
99
       address(accessController),
100
       tokenMetaDataInit,
101
       feePointBasis,
102
       treasury
103
```

5 Tests

Results:

```
No need to generate any newer typings.
56 chainId
 Tests for IndexFactory
   Tests for IndexFactory contract
0xC9E96fe9a02aAdacd48a7C9C5463Fb9db092dEB6 indexSwapAddress
indexSwap deployed to: 0xC9E96fe9a02aAdacd48a7C9C5463Fb9db092dEB6
     IndexFactory Contract
        should check Index token name and symbol
        initialize should revert if total Weights not equal 10,000 (40ms
           \hookrightarrow )
0xe9e7cea3dedca5984780bafc599bd69add087d56 busdInstance.address
0x2170Ed0880ac9A755fd29B2688956BD959F933F8 ethInstance.address
        Initialize IndexFund Tokens
BigNumber { value: "99632682673576004" }
        Invest 0.1BNB into Top10 fund (17001ms)
BigNumber { value: "2092273025076068549" }
        Invest 2BNB into Top10 fund (477ms)
BigNumber { value: "3088583481237683721" }
        Invest 1BNB into Top10 fund (472ms)
        Investment should fail when contract is paused
        update Weights should revert if total Weights not equal 10,000
           \hookrightarrow (39ms)
        should revert to charge fees
        should Update Weights and Rebalance (1082ms)
        should Update Weights and Rebalance (1170ms)
        should Update Weights and Rebalance (470ms)
        should charge fees and treasury balance should increase (660ms)
        updateTokens should revert if total Weights not equal 10,000
```

```
should update tokens (8080ms)
        withdrawal should revert when contract is paused
        should unpause
        should pause
        should revert unpause
        should unpause
        when withdraw fund more then balance
        should withdraw fund and burn index token successfully (1020ms)
        should withdraw tokens directly instead of BNB (2127ms)
 Tests for IndexSwap
   Tests for IndexSwap contract
Vault deployed to: 0xb12F0Ea584AcB5b676054e0F4f36EAa10d93A560
indexSwap deployed to: 0x0e03350D11F24839373262143B46D8d68E5E6649
     IndexSwap Contract
        should check Index token name and symbol
        initialize should revert if total Weights not equal 10,000
        Initialize IndexFund Tokens
BigNumber { value: "99632257869298897" }
        Invest 0.1BNB into Top10 fund (2095ms)
BigNumber { value: "2092264081331241238" }
        Invest 2BNB into Top10 fund (447ms)
BigNumber { value: "3088570272941503209" }
        Invest 1BNB into Top10 fund (749ms)
        Investment should fail when contract is paused
        update Weights should revert if total Weights not equal 10,000
        should revert to charge fees
        should Update Weights and Rebalance (762ms)
        should Update Weights and Rebalance (852ms)
        should Update Weights and Rebalance (475ms)
        should charge fees and treasury balance should increase (279ms)
        updateTokens should revert if total Weights not equal 10,000
        owner should be able to add asset manager
```

Non Rebalancing access address calling update function

```
non owner should not be able to add asset manager
        new asset manager should update tokens (1918ms)
        withdrawal should revert when contract is paused
        should unpause
        should pause
        should revert unpause
        should unpause
       when withdraw fund more then balance
        should withdraw fund and burn index token successfully (982ms)
        should withdraw tokens directly instead of BNB (704ms)
 Tests for priceOracle
   Tests for priceOracle contract
     priceOracle Contract
BigNumber { value: "5720306034396906000" }
        Get ETH/WBNB price (1380ms)
BigNumber { value: "12704811147575256000" }
       Get BTC/ETH price (1878ms)
BigNumber { value: "3599928816839989" }
       Get BUSD/WBNB price (1711ms)
BigNumber { value: "2008720000000" }
       Get BTC/USD price (1237ms)
BigNumber { value: "2008720000000000000000" }
        Get BTC/USD price
BigNumber { value: "1592807622410000000000" }
       Get ETH/USD price
BigNumber { value: "100000000000000000" }
       Get BUSD/USD price
BigNumber { value: "99964080000000000" }
       Get DAI/USD price
BigNumber { value: "278890638630000000000" }
       Get WBNB/USD price
BigNumber { value: "6159000000000000" }
        Get DOGE/USD price (1690ms)
```

6 Static Analysis (Slither)

Description:

ShellBoxes expanded the coverage of the specific contract areas using automated testing methodologies. Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework, was one of the tools used. Slither was run on all-scoped contracts in both text and binary formats. This tool can be used to test mathematical relationships between Solidity instances statically and variables that allow for the detection of errors or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs throughout the entire codebase.

Results:

```
'npx hardhat compile --force' running
Generating typings for: 60 artifacts in dir: typechain for target:
   \hookrightarrow ethers-v5
Successfully generated 104 typings!
Compiled 58 Solidity files successfully
Solidity 0.8.10 is not fully supported yet. You can still use Hardhat,
   \hookrightarrow but some features, like stack traces, might not work correctly.
Learn more at https://hardhat.org/hardhat-runner/docs/reference/solidity
   \hookrightarrow -support
Adapter. swapETHToToken(address, uint256, address, uint256) (contracts/core
   \hookrightarrow /Adapter.sol#108-148) sends eth to arbitrary user
Dangerous calls:
- IWETH(t).deposit{value: swapAmount}() (contracts/core/Adapter.sol
    \hookrightarrow #119)
 - swapResult = pancakeSwapRouter.swapExactETHForTokens{value:
```

```
\hookrightarrow core/Adapter.sol#128-135)
 - swapResult = pancakeSwapRouter.swapExactETHForTokens{value:

⇒ swapAmount}(getSlippage(swapAmount, slippage,getPathForETH(t)),
   \hookrightarrow sol#138-145)
Adapter. swapTokenToETH(address, uint256, address, uint256) (contracts/core
   \hookrightarrow /Adapter.sol#158-216) sends eth to arbitrary user
Dangerous calls:
- (success) = address(to).call{value: swapResult}() (contracts/core/
   \hookrightarrow Adapter.sol#169)
- (success) = address(to).call{value: swapAmount}() (contracts/core/
   \hookrightarrow Adapter.sol#203)
Adapter.lendBNB(address,address,uint256,address) (contracts/core/Adapter
   \hookrightarrow .sol#238-255) sends eth to arbitrary user
Dangerous calls:
- vToken.mint{value: amount}() (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#252)
Adapter.redeemBNB(address,uint256,address) (contracts/core/Adapter.sol
   \hookrightarrow #277-296) sends eth to arbitrary user
Dangerous calls:
- (success) = address(to).call{value: address(this).balance}() (
   Rebalancing.buyTokens(uint256[],uint256[],uint256,uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#179-203) sends eth to arbitrary user
Dangerous calls:
- adapter. swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
   \hookrightarrow sends eth to arbitrary user
Dangerous calls:
- (success) = address(index.treasury()).call{value: amount}() (
```

```
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #functions-that-send-ether-to-arbitrary-destinations
Initializable is re-used:
- Initializable (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy

    /utils/Initializable.sol#57-149)
- Initializable (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/utils/
   \hookrightarrow Initializable.sol#57-149)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  Reentrancy in IndexSwap.investInFund(uint256) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
  \hookrightarrow sol#170-226):
External calls:
- (tokenBalanceInBNB, vaultBalance) = indexSwapLibrary.

    getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap(address(this))) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow core/IndexSwap.sol#184-185)
- investedAmountAfterSlippage = _swapETHToTokens(tokenAmount,amount,
   ⇔ slippage) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#194-198)
 - swapResult = adapter._swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(t,swapAmount
    External calls sending eth:
- investedAmountAfterSlippage = _swapETHToTokens(tokenAmount,amount,
   - swapResult = adapter._swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(t,swapAmount
    State variables written after the call(s):
- _mint(msg.sender,tokenAmount) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#217)
 - _totalSupply += amount (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/
    \hookrightarrow ERC20/ERC20.sol#262)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
```

```
OwnableUpgradeable.__gap (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-

→ upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol#87) shadows:

- ContextUpgradeable.__gap (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-

    □ upgradeable/utils/ContextUpgradeable.sol#36)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
   Adapter. swapETHToToken(address, uint256, address, uint256) (contracts/core
   \hookrightarrow /Adapter.sol#108-148) ignores return value by IWETH(t).transfer(
   Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #unchecked-transfer

InputData (contracts/vault/VelvetSafeModule.sol#15-17) has incorrect

    ← ERC20 function interface:InputData.transfer(address, uint256) (
   Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #incorrect-erc20-interface

Adapter.lendToken(address,address,uint256,address) (contracts/core/

    Adapter.sol#219-236) uses a dangerous strict equality:

- assert(bool)(vToken.mint(_amount) == 0) (contracts/core/Adapter.sol
   \hookrightarrow #233)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #dangerous-strict-equalities

Contract locking ether found:
Contract ERC20Mock (contracts/mock/ERC20Mock.sol#6-39) has payable
    \hookrightarrow functions:
 - ERC20Mock.constructor(string, string, address, uint256) (contracts/mock
    \hookrightarrow /ERC20Mock.sol#7-14)
But does not have a function to withdraw the ether
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #contracts-that-lock-ether
```

```
IndexFactory.validIndexId(uint256) (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#168-172)
  \hookrightarrow contains a tautology or contradiction:
- indexfundId >= 0 && indexfundId <= IndexSwapInfolList.length - 1 (
   Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  Adapter. swapTokenToETH(address, uint256, address, uint256).success scope 0
  \hookrightarrow initialized
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #uninitialized-local-variables

Rebalancing.sellTokens(uint256[],uint256[],uint256) (contracts/rebalance
  \hookrightarrow /Rebalancing.sol#114-172) ignores return value by adapter.

    redeemBNB(tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[i]),swapAmount,

    address(this)) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#145-149)

Rebalancing.sellTokens(uint256[],uint256[],uint256) (contracts/rebalance
  \hookrightarrow /Rebalancing.sol#114-172) ignores return value by adapter.
  ⇔ swapTokenToETH(index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address(this),
  Rebalancing.buyTokens(uint256[],uint256[],uint256,uint256) (contracts/

    adapter._swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
  \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  → adapter.redeemBNB(tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[

    i_scope_0]),tokenBalance,address(this)) (contracts/rebalance/
  \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#328-332)
Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
```

```
    adapter._swapTokenToETH(index.getTokens()[i_scope_0],tokenBalance

    ,address(this),_slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol

   Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)

    index.getTokens()[i]),amount,index.treasury()) (contracts/

    rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#391-395)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #unused-return

TokenBase.constructor(string, string). name (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol
   \hookrightarrow #33) shadows:
- ERC20. name (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.
    \hookrightarrow sol#42) (state variable)
TokenBase.constructor(string, string). symbol (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#33) shadows:
- ERC20. symbol (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20
    \hookrightarrow .sol#43) (state variable)
IndexSwap.constructor(string, string, address, address, uint256, address,

    → address,address,address,uint256,address)._name (contracts/core/)

   \hookrightarrow IndexSwap.sol#89) shadows:
- ERC20._name (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.
    \hookrightarrow sol#42) (state variable)
IndexSwap.constructor(string, string, address, address, uint256, address,

→ address, address, address, uint256, address). symbol (contracts/core/)
   \hookrightarrow IndexSwap.sol#90) shadows:
- ERC20._symbol (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20
    \hookrightarrow .sol#43) (state variable)
ERC20Mock.constructor(string, string, address, uint256).name (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow mock/ERC20Mock.sol#8) shadows:
- ERC20.name() (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.
    \hookrightarrow sol#62-64) (function)
 - IERC20Metadata.name() (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/
```

```
ERC20Mock.constructor(string, string, address, uint256).symbol (contracts/

    mock/ERC20Mock.sol#9) shadows:
- ERC20.symbol() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
   \hookrightarrow ERC20.sol#70-72) (function)
- IERC20Metadata.symbol() (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/
   VelvetSafeModule.constructor(address). owner (contracts/vault/

    ∀elvetSafeModule.sol#22) shadows:

- OwnableUpgradeable. owner (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-
   VelvetSafeModule.setUp(bytes). owner (contracts/vault/VelvetSafeModule.
  \hookrightarrow sol#45) shadows:
- OwnableUpgradeable. owner (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-

    upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol#22) (state variable)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #local-variable-shadowing

Vault.transferModuleOwnership(address) (contracts/vault/Vault.sol#19-25)
  \hookrightarrow should emit an event for:
- moduleOwner = newOwner (contracts/vault/Vault.sol#24)
VelvetSafeModule.transferModuleOwnership(address) (contracts/vault/

→ VelvetSafeModule.sol#33-39) should emit an event for:
- moduleOwner = newOwner (contracts/vault/VelvetSafeModule.sol#38)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  IndexFactory.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address
  \hookrightarrow zero-check on :
 - uniswapRouter = _uniswapRouter (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#53)
IndexFactory.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address
  \hookrightarrow check on :
 - treasury = treasury (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#55)
```

```
IndexFactory.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address

    → ,address). indexSwapLibrary (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#47) lacks

   \hookrightarrow a zero-check on :
 - indexSwapLibrary = indexSwapLibrary (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#56)
IndexFactory.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address

    ,address)._tokenMetadata (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#48) lacks a

   \hookrightarrow zero-check on :
 - tokenMetadata = tokenMetadata (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#57)
IndexFactory.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address

→ ,address). baseRebalancingAddres (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#50)

   \hookrightarrow lacks a zero-check on :
 - baseRebalancingAddress = _baseRebalancingAddres (contracts/
     \hookrightarrow IndexFactory.sol#60)
IndexFactory.constructor(address,address,address,address,address,address

→ ,address). baseAdapterAddress (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#49)

   \hookrightarrow lacks a zero-check on :
 - baseAdapterAddress = baseAdapterAddress (contracts/IndexFactory.sol
     \hookrightarrow #61)
IndexFactory.setOutAsset(address). outAsset (contracts/IndexFactory.sol
   \hookrightarrow #195) lacks a zero-check on :
 - outAsset = outAsset (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#197)
Adapter._swapTokenToETH(address,uint256,address,uint256).to (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow core/Adapter.sol#161) lacks a zero-check on :
 - (success) = address(to).call{value: swapResult}() (contracts/core/
     \hookrightarrow Adapter.sol#169)
 - (success) = address(to).call{value: swapAmount}() (contracts/core/
     \hookrightarrow Adapter.sol#203)
IndexSwap.constructor(string,string,address,address,uint256,address,

→ address, address, address, uint256, address). vault (contracts/core/)

   \hookrightarrow IndexSwap.sol#92) lacks a zero-check on :
 - vault = vault (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#101)
IndexSwap.constructor(string, string, address, address, uint256, address,

→ address,address,uint256,address). outAsset (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow core/IndexSwap.sol#91) lacks a zero-check on :
```

```
- outAsset = outAsset (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#102)
IndexSwap.constructor(string, string, address, address, uint256, address,

→ address,address,uint256,address)._treasury (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow core/IndexSwap.sol#99) lacks a zero-check on :
 - treasury = address( treasury) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#111)
IndexSwap.updateTreasury(address)._newTreasury (contracts/core/IndexSwap
  \hookrightarrow .sol#420) lacks a zero-check on :
 - treasury = newTreasury (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#424)
IndexSwapLibrary.constructor(address,address,TokenMetadata). weth (
  - wETH = weth (contracts/core/IndexSwapLibrary.sol#35)
Vault.executeTransactionETH(address, uint256). to (contracts/vault/Vault.
  \hookrightarrow sol#27) lacks a zero-check on :
 - (successReturn) = address( to).call{value: value}() (contracts/vault
    \hookrightarrow /Vault.sol#32)
Module.setAvatar(address). avatar (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/
  - avatar = avatar (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/core/
    \hookrightarrow Module.sol#25)
Module.setTarget(address)._target (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/
  - target = _target (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/core/
    \hookrightarrow Module.sol#33)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #missing-zero-address-validation

IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
  \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: tokenBalance =
  \hookrightarrow IndexSwap.sol#250-254)
IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
  \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: tokens[i] ==

    adapter.getETH() (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#261)
```

```
IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: tokenMetadata.

    vTokens(_tokens[i]) != address(0) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol)

   \hookrightarrow #262)
IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: adapter.

    pullFromVault(IIndexSwap(address(this)), tokens[i],amount,

    address(adapter)) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#263-268)

IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: bal = adapter.

    redeemBNB(tokenMetadata.vTokens( tokens[i]),amount,msg.sender) (
   IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: adapter.

    pullFromVault(IIndexSwap(address(this)), tokens[i],amount,

    address(this)) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#278-283)

IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: IWETH( tokens[i]).

    withdraw(amount) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#285)

IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: (success) =

    address(msg.sender).call{value: amount}() (contracts/core/
   \hookrightarrow IndexSwap.sol#288-290)
IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: adapter.

    pullFromVault(IIndexSwap(address(this)), tokens[i], amount,

    address(adapter)) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#294-299)

IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: sw = adapter.
   IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256, uint256, bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#233-324) has external calls inside a loop: adapter.
   → pullFromVault(IIndexSwap(address(this)), tokens[i],amount,msg.
```

```
IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/
 \hookrightarrow IndexSwapLibrary.sol#45-105) has external calls inside a loop: i
 \hookrightarrow #55)
IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/

    tokenMetadata.vTokens( index.getTokens()[i]) != address(0) (
 IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/
  \hookrightarrow IndexSwapLibrary.sol#45-105) has external calls inside a loop:

    index.getTokens()[i] != wETH (contracts/core/IndexSwapLibrary.

 \hookrightarrow sol#62)
IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/
 IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/

    ⇒ tokenBalance = token.balanceOfUnderlying( index.vault()) (

 IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/
 \hookrightarrow IndexSwapLibrary.sol#45-105) has external calls inside a loop:
 \hookrightarrow tokenBalanceUSD = _getTokenAmountInUSD(_index.getTokens()[i],
 IndexSwapLibrary. getTokenAmountInUSD(address, uint256) (contracts/core/
  IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/
 \hookrightarrow IndexSwapLibrary.sol#45-105) has external calls inside a loop:
```

```
IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/
  IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/
  \hookrightarrow IndexSwapLibrary.sol#45-105) has external calls inside a loop:
  → #81-84)
IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/

    tokenBalance = IERC20( index.getTokens()[i]).balanceOf( index.

    vault()) (contracts/core/IndexSwapLibrary.sol#87-89)

IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/

    tokenBalanceUSD = getTokenAmountInUSD( index.getTokens()[i],

    tokenBalance) (contracts/core/IndexSwapLibrary.sol#90-93)

IndexSwapLibrary.calculateSwapAmounts(IIndexSwap, uint256, uint256[],
  Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362) has external calls inside a
  → loop: i scope 0 < index.getTokens().length (contracts/rebalance/</pre>
  \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#308)
Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362) has external calls inside a
  → loop: tokenBalance = indexSwapLibrary.getTokenBalance(index,index

    i_scope_0]) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#311-315)

Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362) has external calls inside a
```

```
Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362) has external calls inside a
  → loop: adapter._pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i_scope_0],

    tokenBalance,address(this)) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol

  \hookrightarrow #318-323)
Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362) has external calls inside a
  → loop: tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[i scope 0]) !=

    address(0) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#325-326)

Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362) has external calls inside a
  → loop: adapter.redeemBNB(tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[
  \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#328-332)
Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362) has external calls inside a
  → loop: index.deleteRecord(index.getTokens()[i scope 0]) (contracts
  Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/

    → rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362) has external calls inside a

  Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362) has external calls inside a
  → loop: adapter._pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i_scope_0],
  \hookrightarrow sol#337-342)
Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362) has external calls inside a

    tokenBalance,address(this),_slippage) (contracts/rebalance/
  \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#343-348)
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
```

```
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)

    index.getTokens()[i]) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol

  \hookrightarrow #372-376)
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
  \hookrightarrow has external calls inside a loop: amount = tokenBalance.mul(index
  \hookrightarrow sol#378-380)
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
  Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
  \hookrightarrow has external calls inside a loop: tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.

    getTokens()[i]) != address(0) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.

  \hookrightarrow sol#383)
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)

    index.getTokens()[i],amount,address(adapter)) (contracts/

    rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#384-389)

Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
  \hookrightarrow has external calls inside a loop: adapter.redeemBNB(tokenMetadata

    ∴ vTokens(index.getTokens()[i]),amount,index.treasury()) (
  Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
  \hookrightarrow has external calls inside a loop: FeeCharged(block.timestamp,

    index.getTokens()[i],amount) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol

  \hookrightarrow #436)
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)

    index.getTokens()[i],amount,address(this)) (contracts/rebalance/
  \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#397-402)
```

```
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
   \hookrightarrow has external calls inside a loop: IWETH(index.getTokens()[i]).

    withdraw(amount) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#404)

Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
   \hookrightarrow has external calls inside a loop: (success) = address(index.
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#406-408)
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)

→ has external calls inside a loop: tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.)

    getTokens()[i]) != address(0) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.

   \hookrightarrow sol#412)
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
   \hookrightarrow has external calls inside a loop: adapter. pullFromVault(index,

    index.getTokens()[i],amount,address(adapter)) (contracts/

    → rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#413-418)

Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)

    tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[i]),index.getTokens()[i],

   \hookrightarrow #420-425)
Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)

    index.getTokens()[i],amount,index.treasury()) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#427-432)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ /#calls-inside-a-loop

Variable 'Adapter._swapTokenToETH(address,uint256,address,uint256).

    success (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#169)' in Adapter.

   \hookrightarrow Adapter.sol#158-216) potentially used before declaration: (

    success) = address(to).call{value: swapAmount}() (contracts/core/
   \hookrightarrow Adapter.sol#203)
```

```
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #pre-declaration-usage-of-local-variables
Reentrancy in IndexFactory.createIndex(string, string, uint256, uint256,
   ⇔ bool) (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#64-166):
External calls:
- adapter.init(address(accessController),uniswapRouter,address(safe),

    tokenMetaDataInit) (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#85-90)

- rebalancing.init(IIndexSwap(address(indexSwap)),indexSwapLibrary,

    address( adapter), address(accessController), tokenMetaDataInit) (
   State variables written after the call(s):
- IndexSwapInfolList.push(IndexSwaplInfo(address(indexSwap),address(

    rebalancing),owner())) (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#129-131)

Reentrancy in IndexSwap.investInFund(uint256) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
   \hookrightarrow sol#170-226):
External calls:
- (tokenBalanceInBNB, vaultBalance) = indexSwapLibrary.

    getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap(address(this))) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow core/IndexSwap.sol#184-185)
- investedAmountAfterSlippage = swapETHToTokens(tokenAmount,amount,
   - swapResult = adapter._swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(t,swapAmount
    External calls sending eth:
- investedAmountAfterSlippage = swapETHToTokens(tokenAmount,amount,
   ⇔ slippage) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#194-198)
 - swapResult = adapter._swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(t,swapAmount
    State variables written after the call(s):
- mint(msg.sender,tokenAmount) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#217)
 - balances[account] += amount (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
    \hookrightarrow token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#263)
```

```
Reentrancy in Rebalancing.rebalance(uint256) (contracts/rebalance/
  \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#208-243):
External calls:
- (tokenBalanceInBNB, vaultBalance) = indexSwapLibrary.

→ getTokenAndVaultBalance(index) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.

   \hookrightarrow sol#223-224)
- sumWeightsToSwap = sellTokens(oldWeights, newWeights, slippage) (
   - adapter. pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address
    \hookrightarrow (this)) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#134-139)
 - adapter.redeemBNB(tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[i]),
    ⇔ swapAmount,address(this)) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol
    \hookrightarrow #145-149)
 - IWETH(index.getTokens()[i]).withdraw(swapAmount) (contracts/

    rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#151)

 - adapter. pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address
    - adapter._swapTokenToETH(index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address(this
    - buyTokens(oldWeights,newWeights,sumWeightsToSwap, slippage) (
   - adapter. swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
    ⇔ swapAmount,index.vault(),_slippage) (contracts/rebalance/
    \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
External calls sending eth:
- buyTokens(oldWeights,newWeights,sumWeightsToSwap, slippage) (
   - adapter._swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
    \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
State variables written after the call(s):
- lastRebalanced = block.timestamp (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol
   \hookrightarrow #242)
```

```
Reentrancy in Rebalancing.setPause(bool) (contracts/rebalance/
  \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#84-106):
External calls:
- index.setPaused( state) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#90)
State variables written after the call(s):
- lastPaused = block.timestamp (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#91)
Reentrancy in Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (
  ⇔ contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362):
External calls:
- index.updateRecords(tokens,denorms) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.
   \hookrightarrow sol#355)
- index.updateTokenList(tokens) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol
   \hookrightarrow #357)
- rebalance(slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#359)
 - (tokenBalanceInBNB, vaultBalance) = indexSwapLibrary.
    \hookrightarrow sol#223-224)
 - adapter. pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address
    - adapter._swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
    \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
 - adapter.redeemBNB(tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[i]),
    \hookrightarrow #145-149)
 - IWETH(index.getTokens()[i]).withdraw(swapAmount) (contracts/

    rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#151)
 - adapter._pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address
    - adapter._swapTokenToETH(index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address(this
    External calls sending eth:
- rebalance(slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#359)
```

```
- adapter. swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
    ⇔ swapAmount,index.vault(), slippage) (contracts/rebalance/
    \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
State variables written after the call(s):
- rebalance( slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#359)
 - lastRebalanced = block.timestamp (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.
    \hookrightarrow sol#242)
Reentrancy in Rebalancing.updateWeights(uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#249-262):
External calls:
- index.updateRecords(index.getTokens(),denorms) (contracts/rebalance/
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#259)
- rebalance( slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#260)
 - (tokenBalanceInBNB, vaultBalance) = indexSwapLibrary.

    getTokenAndVaultBalance(index) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.

    \hookrightarrow sol#223-224)
 - adapter. pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address
    \hookrightarrow (this)) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#134-139)
 - adapter. swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
    \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
 - adapter.redeemBNB(tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[i]),
    ⇔ swapAmount,address(this)) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol
    \hookrightarrow #145-149)
 - IWETH(index.getTokens()[i]).withdraw(swapAmount) (contracts/

    rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#151)

 - adapter. pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address
    - adapter. swapTokenToETH(index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address(this
    External calls sending eth:
- rebalance( slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#260)
 - adapter. swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
    ⇔ swapAmount,index.vault(), slippage) (contracts/rebalance/
```

```
\hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
State variables written after the call(s):
- rebalance( slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#260)
 - lastRebalanced = block.timestamp (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.
    \hookrightarrow so1#242)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2

Reentrancy in IndexFactory.createIndex(string, string, uint256, uint256,
  ⇔ bool) (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#64-166):
External calls:

    adapter.init(address(accessController), uniswapRouter, address(safe),

    tokenMetaDataInit) (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#85-90)

Event emitted after the call(s):
- IndexCreation(address(indexSwap), name, symbol,outAsset,address( safe
   → ),maxInvestmentAmount,address( adapter),address(accessController
   Reentrancy in IndexFactory.createIndex(string, string, uint256, uint256,
  ⇔ bool) (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#64-166):
External calls:
- adapter.init(address(accessController),uniswapRouter,address(safe),
   - rebalancing.init(IIndexSwap(address(indexSwap)),indexSwapLibrary,

→ address( adapter), address(accessController), tokenMetaDataInit) (
   Event emitted after the call(s):
- IndexCreation(address(indexSwap),_name,_symbol,outAsset,address(_safe
   → ),maxInvestmentAmount,address(_adapter),address(accessController
   - RebalanceCreation(address(rebalancing)) (contracts/IndexFactory.sol

→ #133)

Reentrancy in Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.
  \hookrightarrow sol#365-440):
External calls:
```

```
- adapter._pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],amount,address(

    adapter)) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#384-389)

- adapter.redeemBNB(tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[i]),amount,

→ index.treasury()) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#391-395)

- adapter._pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],amount,address(this
   - IWETH(index.getTokens()[i]).withdraw(amount) (contracts/rebalance/
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#404)
- (success) = address(index.treasury()).call{value: amount}() (
   - adapter. pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],amount,address(

    adapter)) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#413-418)

- adapter.redeemToken(tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[i]),index
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#420-425)
- adapter. pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],amount,index.

    treasury()) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#427-432)

External calls sending eth:
- (success) = address(index.treasury()).call{value: amount}() (
   Event emitted after the call(s):
- FeeCharged(block.timestamp,index.getTokens()[i],amount) (contracts/

    rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#436)

Reentrancy in IndexSwap.investInFund(uint256) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
  \hookrightarrow sol#170-226):
External calls:
- (tokenBalanceInBNB, vaultBalance) = indexSwapLibrary.

    getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap(address(this))) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow core/IndexSwap.sol#184-185)
- investedAmountAfterSlippage = _swapETHToTokens(tokenAmount,amount,
   \hookrightarrow _slippage) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#194-198)
 - swapResult = adapter. swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(t,swapAmount
    External calls sending eth:
```

```
- investedAmountAfterSlippage = _swapETHToTokens(tokenAmount,amount,
   - swapResult = adapter._swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(t,swapAmount
   Event emitted after the call(s):
- InvestInFund(block.timestamp, msg.sender, msg.value, tokenAmount) (
   - Transfer(address(0), account, amount) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   - mint(msg.sender,tokenAmount) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#217)
Reentrancy in Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (
  ⇔ contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362):
External calls:
- index.updateRecords(tokens,denorms) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.
   \hookrightarrow so1#355)
- index.updateTokenList(tokens) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol
   - rebalance( slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#359)
 - (tokenBalanceInBNB, vaultBalance) = indexSwapLibrary.
   \hookrightarrow sol#223-224)
 - adapter._pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address
   - adapter. swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
 - adapter.redeemBNB(tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[i]),
   \hookrightarrow #145-149)
 - IWETH(index.getTokens()[i]).withdraw(swapAmount) (contracts/

    rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#151)
 - adapter. pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address
```

```
- adapter._swapTokenToETH(index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address(this
   External calls sending eth:
- rebalance( slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#359)
 - adapter._swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- UpdatedTokens(block.timestamp,tokens,denorms) (contracts/rebalance/
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#361)
Reentrancy in Rebalancing.updateWeights(uint96[],uint256) (contracts/
  \hookrightarrow rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#249-262):
External calls:
- index.updateRecords(index.getTokens(),denorms) (contracts/rebalance/
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#259)
- rebalance(slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#260)
 - (tokenBalanceInBNB, vaultBalance) = indexSwapLibrary.
   \hookrightarrow sol#223-224)
 - adapter._pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address
   - adapter. swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
   ⇔ swapAmount,index.vault(),_slippage) (contracts/rebalance/
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
 - adapter.redeemBNB(tokenMetadata.vTokens(index.getTokens()[i]),
   \hookrightarrow #145-149)
 - IWETH(index.getTokens()[i]).withdraw(swapAmount) (contracts/

    rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#151)
 - adapter._pullFromVault(index,index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address
   - adapter._swapTokenToETH(index.getTokens()[i],swapAmount,address(this
   External calls sending eth:
```

```
- rebalance(_slippage) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#260)
 - adapter. swapETHToToken{value: swapAmount}(index.getTokens()[i],
    \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#195-200)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- UpdatedWeights(block.timestamp,denorms) (contracts/rebalance/
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#261)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

Adapter.lendToken(address,address,uint256,address) (contracts/core/
  Dangerous comparisons:
- assert(bool)(vToken.mint( amount) == 0) (contracts/core/Adapter.sol
   \hookrightarrow #233)
IndexSwap. swapETHToTokens(uint256, uint256], uint256) (contracts/core/
  Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool, string)(address(this).balance >= swapAmount, not enough
   ⇔ bnb) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#347)
Rebalancing.setPause(bool) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#84-106)
  \hookrightarrow uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- lastRebalanced > lastPaused || block.timestamp >= (lastPaused + 600)
   Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
   Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool, string)(lastFeeCharged < lastRebalanced, Fee has already
   \hookrightarrow been charged after the last rebalancing!) (contracts/rebalance/
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#366-369)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #block-timestamp
```

```
AddressUpgradeable.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (node_modules/
   → @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/AddressUpgradeable.sol
   \hookrightarrow #174-194) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/

    AddressUpgradeable.sol#186-189)

Clones.clone(address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones
   \hookrightarrow .sol#25-34) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones.sol
    \hookrightarrow #26-32)
Clones.cloneDeterministic(address, bytes32) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   - INLINE ASM (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones.sol
    \hookrightarrow #44-50)
Clones.predictDeterministicAddress(address,bytes32,address) (

→ node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones.sol#57-72) uses

   \hookrightarrow assembly
- INLINE ASM (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones.sol
    \hookrightarrow #62-71)
Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   - INLINE ASM (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol
    \hookrightarrow #213-216)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
   Different versions of Solidity is used:
- Version used: ['>=0.6.0', '>=0.7.0<0.9.0', '^0.8.0', '^0.8.1',
    \leftrightarrow '^0.8.2', '^0.8.6']
 - ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@chainlink/contracts/src/v0.8/Denominations.sol
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@chainlink/contracts/src/v0.8/interfaces/
    → AggregatorInterface.sol#2)
 - ^0.8.0 (node modules/@chainlink/contracts/src/v0.8/interfaces/
    → AggregatorV2V3Interface.sol#2)
```

```
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@chainlink/contracts/src/v0.8/interfaces/
   → AggregatorV3Interface.sol#2)
- >=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/safe-contracts/contracts/
   \hookrightarrow common/Enum.sol#2)
- >=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/core/Module.
   \hookrightarrow sol#4)
- >=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/factory/
   - >=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/guard/
   \hookrightarrow BaseGuard.sol#2)
- >=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/guard/
   \hookrightarrow Guardable.sol#2)
- >=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/interfaces/
   \hookrightarrow IAvatar.sol#4)
- >=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/interfaces/
   \hookrightarrow IGuard.sol#2)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/
   → OwnableUpgradeable.sol#4)
- ^0.8.2 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/
   \hookrightarrow Initializable.sol#4)
- ^0.8.1 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/
   → AddressUpgradeable.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/
   - ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol
   \hookrightarrow #4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/IAccessControl.
   \hookrightarrow sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones.sol#4)
- ^0.8.2 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/utils/
   \hookrightarrow Initializable.sol#4)
```

- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard

 \hookrightarrow .sol#4)

```
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#4)
```

- ^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol → #4)

- ^0.8.1 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#4)

- ^0.8.6 (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#2)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/access/AccessController.sol#12)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#15)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#12)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/core/IndexSwapLibrary.sol#12)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/interfaces/IAccessController.sol#12)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/interfaces/IAdapter.sol#15)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/interfaces/IIndexSwap.sol#12)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/interfaces/IIndexSwapLibrary.sol#11)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/interfaces/IPriceOracle.sol#2)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/interfaces/IRebalancing.sol#15)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router02.sol#2)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/interfaces/IVault.sol#11)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/interfaces/IWETH.sol#2)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/mock/ERC20Mock.sol#2)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/oracle/PriceOracle.sol#2)

```
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#15)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/vault/Vault.sol#3)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/vault/VelvetSafeModule.sol#11)
 - ^0.8.6 (contracts/venus/ComptrollerInterface.sol#2)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/venus/IVBNB.sol#2)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/venus/TokenMetadata.sol#10)
- ^0.8.6 (contracts/venus/VBep20Interface.sol#2)
 - ^0.8.6 (contracts/venus/VBep20Storage.sol#2)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #different-pragma-directives-are-used
solc-0.8.10 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@chainlink/contracts/src/v0.8/
   \hookrightarrow Denominations.sol#3) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@chainlink/contracts/src/v0.8/
   \hookrightarrow interfaces/AggregatorInterface.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node_modules/@chainlink/contracts/src/v0.8/
   \hookrightarrow interfaces/AggregatorV2V3Interface.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node_modules/@chainlink/contracts/src/v0.8/
   \hookrightarrow interfaces/AggregatorV3Interface.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version>=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/safe-contracts/</pre>
   Pragma version>=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/
   Pragma version>=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/
   \hookrightarrow factory/FactoryFriendly.sol#4) is too complex
Pragma version>=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/
   \hookrightarrow guard/BaseGuard.sol#2) is too complex
Pragma version>=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/
   \hookrightarrow guard/Guardable.sol#2) is too complex
```

```
Pragma version>=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/

    interfaces/IAvatar.sol#4) is too complex

Pragma version>=0.7.0<0.9.0 (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/
   Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/
   \hookrightarrow access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.2 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/
   \hookrightarrow proxy/utils/Initializable.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.1 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/
   \hookrightarrow utils/AddressUpgradeable.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/
   \hookrightarrow utils/ContextUpgradeable.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/
   Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/
   Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/
   \hookrightarrow Ownable.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones.
   \hookrightarrow sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.2 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/utils/
   Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/security/
   Pragma version^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
   \hookrightarrow ERC20.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
   \hookrightarrow IERC20.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
   \hookrightarrow extensions/ERC20Burnable.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/

    ⇔ extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#4) allows old versions

Pragma version 0.8.1 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address
   \hookrightarrow .sol#4) allows old versions
```

```
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context
   \hookrightarrow .sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings
   \hookrightarrow .sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/
   \hookrightarrow introspection/ERC165.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/
   \hookrightarrow introspection/IERC165.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version 0.8.0 (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/
   \hookrightarrow SafeMath.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version>=0.6.0 (node modules/@uniswap/lib/contracts/libraries/
   \hookrightarrow TransferHelper.sol#3) allows old versions
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in AddressUpgradeable.sendValue(address, uint256) (

    → node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/

    AddressUpgradeable.sol#60-65):
- (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (node_modules/
    \hookrightarrow #63)
Low level call in AddressUpgradeable.functionCallWithValue(address, bytes

    □ upgradeable/utils/AddressUpgradeable.sol#128-139):

- (success, returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/
   ← @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/AddressUpgradeable.sol
   Low level call in AddressUpgradeable.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,

→ string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/
   \hookrightarrow AddressUpgradeable.sol#157-166):
- (success,returndata) = target.staticcall(data) (node_modules/
   \hookrightarrow #164)
```

```
Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (node_modules/
   - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (node modules/
   ⇔ @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#63)
Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address, bytes, uint256,
   - (success, returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node modules/
   ⇔ @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#137)
Low level call in Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (
   → node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#157-166):
- (success, returndata) = target.staticcall(data) (node modules/
   ⇔ @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#164)
Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (
   → node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#184-193):
- (success, returndata) = target.delegatecall(data) (node modules/
   ⇔ @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#191)
Low level call in TransferHelper.safeApprove(address,address,uint256) (

→ node modules/@uniswap/lib/contracts/libraries/TransferHelper.sol

  \hookrightarrow #7-18):
- (success, data) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x095ea7b3,to,
   → value)) (node_modules/@uniswap/lib/contracts/libraries/
   \hookrightarrow TransferHelper.sol#13)
Low level call in TransferHelper.safeTransfer(address,address,uint256) (

→ node_modules/@uniswap/lib/contracts/libraries/TransferHelper.sol

  - (success, data) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0xa9059cbb,to,
   → value)) (node_modules/@uniswap/lib/contracts/libraries/
   Low level call in TransferHelper.safeTransferFrom(address,address,

→ address, uint256) (node modules/@uniswap/lib/contracts/libraries/
  \hookrightarrow TransferHelper.sol#33-45):
- (success, data) = token.call(abi.encodeWithSelector(0x23b872dd,from,to
```

```
Low level call in TransferHelper.safeTransferETH(address, uint256) (

→ node_modules/@uniswap/lib/contracts/libraries/TransferHelper.sol

   - (success) = to.call{value: value}(new bytes(0)) (node_modules/
   Low level call in Adapter. swapTokenToETH(address, uint256, address,

    uint256) (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#158-216):
- (success) = address(to).call{value: swapResult}() (contracts/core/
   \hookrightarrow Adapter.sol#169)
- (success) = address(to).call{value: swapAmount}() (contracts/core/
   \hookrightarrow Adapter.sol#203)
Low level call in Adapter.redeemBNB(address,uint256,address) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow core/Adapter.sol#277-296):
- (success) = address(to).call{value: address(this).balance}() (
   Low level call in IndexSwap.investInFund(uint256) (contracts/core/
   \hookrightarrow IndexSwap.sol#170-226):
- (success) = address(msg.sender).call{value: address(this).balance}()
   Low level call in IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256,uint256,bool) (
   - (success) = address(msg.sender).call{value: amount}() (contracts/core
   \hookrightarrow /IndexSwap.sol#288-290)
Low level call in Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/
   \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#365-440):
- (success) = address(index.treasury()).call{value: amount}() (
   Low level call in Vault.executeTransactionETH(address, uint256) (

    contracts/vault/Vault.sol#27-34):
- (successReturn) = address( to).call{value: value}() (contracts/vault/
   \hookrightarrow Vault.sol#32)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #low-level-calls
```

```
BaseGuard (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/guard/BaseGuard.sol
  AccessController (contracts/access/AccessController.sol#16-79) should
  Adapter (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#35-349) should inherit from IAdapter
  IndexSwapLibrary (contracts/core/IndexSwapLibrary.sol#22-177) should
  Rebalancing (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#33-448) should inherit
  Vault (contracts/vault/Vault.sol#7-43) should inherit from IVault (
  VelvetSafeModule (contracts/vault/VelvetSafeModule.sol#19-73) should

→ inherit from IVault (contracts/interfaces/IVault.sol#15-25)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  Function IUniswapV2Router.WETH() (contracts/interfaces/IUniswapV2Router.
  \hookrightarrow sol#7) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

    #conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
Parameter Module.setAvatar(address)._avatar (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/

    ⇒ zodiac/contracts/core/Module.sol#23) is not in mixedCase

Parameter Module.setTarget(address)._target (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/

    ⇒ zodiac/contracts/core/Module.sol#31) is not in mixedCase

Parameter Guardable.setGuard(address)._guard (node_modules/@gnosis.pm/

    ⇒ zodiac/contracts/guard/Guardable.sol#19) is not in mixedCase

Function OwnableUpgradeable. Ownable init() (node modules/@openzeppelin
```

```
\hookrightarrow not in mixedCase
Function OwnableUpgradeable.__Ownable_init_unchained() (node_modules/
   → @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol
  \hookrightarrow #33-35) is not in mixedCase
Variable OwnableUpgradeable.__gap (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-

→ upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol#87) is not in mixedCase

Function ContextUpgradeable. Context init() (node modules/@openzeppelin
  \hookrightarrow in mixedCase
Function ContextUpgradeable. Context init unchained() (node modules/
   \hookrightarrow #21-22) is not in mixedCase
Variable ContextUpgradeable. gap (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-

    □ upgradeable/utils/ContextUpgradeable.sol#36) is not in mixedCase

Parameter IndexFactory.createIndex(string, string, uint256, uint256, bool).
  → name (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#65) is not in mixedCase
Parameter IndexFactory.createIndex(string, string, uint256, uint256, bool).
   \hookrightarrow symbol (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#66) is not in mixedCase
Parameter IndexFactory.createIndex(string, string, uint256, uint256, bool).
  \hookrightarrow mixedCase
Parameter IndexFactory.createIndex(string, string, uint256, uint256, bool).
  \hookrightarrow _feePointBasis (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#68) is not in
  \hookrightarrow mixedCase
Parameter IndexFactory.initializeTokens(uint256,address[],uint96[]).

    → tokens (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#180) is not in mixedCase

Parameter IndexFactory.initializeTokens(uint256,address[],uint96[]).
  Parameter IndexFactory.setIndexSwapLibrary(address). indexSwapLibrary (
  Parameter IndexFactory.setOutAsset(address). outAsset (contracts/
   Variable IndexFactory.IndexSwapInfolList (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#28)
  \hookrightarrow is not in mixedCase
```

```
Parameter Adapter.init(address,address,address,address).

→ accessController (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#47) is not in

  \hookrightarrow mixedCase
Parameter Adapter.init(address,address,address,address).

→ pancakeSwapAddress (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#48) is not in

  \hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
Parameter Adapter.init(address,address,address,address). safe (contracts
  \hookrightarrow /core/Adapter.sol#49) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Adapter.init(address,address,address,address). tokenMetadata (
  Function Adapter. pullFromVault(IIndexSwap,address,uint256,address) (
  Parameter Adapter. pullFromVault(IIndexSwap,address,uint256,address).
  Function Adapter. swapETHToToken(address, uint256, address, uint256) (
  Parameter Adapter. swapETHToToken(address, uint256, address, uint256).

⇒ slippage (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#112) is not in mixedCase

Function Adapter. swapTokenToETH(address, uint256, address, uint256) (
  Parameter Adapter. swapTokenToETH(address, uint256, address, uint256).

    ⇒ _slippage (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#162) is not in mixedCase

Parameter Adapter.lendToken(address,address,uint256,address).

    underlyingAsset (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#220) is not in

  \hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
Parameter Adapter.lendToken(address,address,uint256,address). vAsset (
  Parameter Adapter.lendToken(address,address,uint256,address)._amount (
  Parameter Adapter.lendToken(address,address,uint256,address)._to (
  Parameter Adapter.lendBNB(address,address,uint256,address).
  \hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
```

```
Parameter Adapter.lendBNB(address,address,uint256,address)._vAsset (
  Parameter Adapter.lendBNB(address,address,uint256,address)._amount (
  Parameter Adapter.lendBNB(address,address,uint256,address)._to (
  Parameter Adapter.redeemToken(address,address,uint256,address). vAsset (
  Parameter Adapter.redeemToken(address,address,uint256,address).
  Parameter Adapter.redeemToken(address,address,uint256,address). amount (
  Parameter Adapter.redeemToken(address,address,uint256,address). to (
  Parameter Adapter.redeemBNB(address, uint256, address). vAsset (contracts/
  Parameter Adapter.redeemBNB(address,uint256,address). amount (contracts/
  Parameter Adapter.redeemBNB(address, uint256, address)._to (contracts/core
  \hookrightarrow /Adapter.sol#280) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Adapter.getSlippage(uint256,uint256,address[]). amount (
  Parameter Adapter.getSlippage(uint256,uint256,address[])._slippage (
  Constant Adapter.divisor_int (contracts/core/Adapter.sol#44) is not in
  \hookrightarrow UPPER CASE WITH UNDERSCORES
Event IndexSwapLOG_PUBLIC_SWAP_ENABLED() (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol
  \hookrightarrow #115) is not in CapWords
Parameter IndexSwap.investInFund(uint256)._slippage (contracts/core/
  \hookrightarrow IndexSwap.sol#170) is not in mixedCase
Parameter IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256,uint256,bool). slippage (
  Parameter IndexSwap.setPaused(bool). state (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol
  \hookrightarrow #374) is not in mixedCase
```

```
Parameter IndexSwap.getRecord(address)._token (contracts/core/IndexSwap.
  \hookrightarrow sol#405) is not in mixedCase
Parameter IndexSwap.updateTreasury(address)._newTreasury(contracts/core
  \hookrightarrow /IndexSwap.sol#420) is not in mixedCase
Variable IndexSwap._tokens (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#60) is not in
  \hookrightarrow mixedCase
Variable IndexSwap. records (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#63) is not in
  \hookrightarrow mixedCase
Variable IndexSwap.MAX INVESTMENTAMOUNT (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol
  \hookrightarrow #69) is not in mixedCase
Parameter IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap). index (
  Parameter IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenBalance(IIndexSwap,address,bool).

    index (contracts/core/IndexSwapLibrary.sol#112) is not in

  \hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
Parameter IndexSwapLibrary.calculateSwapAmounts(IIndexSwap,uint256,

    uint256[],uint256). index (contracts/core/IndexSwapLibrary.sol

  \hookrightarrow #140) is not in mixedCase
Function IndexSwapLibrary. getTokenAmountInUSD(address, uint256) (
  Function IndexSwapLibrary. getTokenPriceUSDETH(uint256) (contracts/core/
  Function IAdapter._pullFromVault(IIndexSwap,address,uint256,address) (

→ contracts/interfaces/IAdapter.sol#31-36) is not in mixedCase

Function IAdapter._swapETHToToken(address,uint256,address,uint256) (
  Function IAdapter. swapTokenToETH(address, uint256, address, uint256) (
  Event IIndexSwapLOG_PUBLIC_SWAP_ENABLED() (contracts/interfaces/
  Function IIndexSwap.TOTAL_WEIGHT() (contracts/interfaces/IIndexSwap.sol
  \hookrightarrow #21) is not in mixedCase
Function IIndexSwapLibrary. getTokenAmountInUSD(address,uint256) (
```

```
\hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
Function IIndexSwapLibrary. getTokenPriceUSDETH(uint256) (contracts/
  Function IPriceOracle. addFeed(address,address,AggregatorV2V3Interface)
  Function IUniswapV2Router02.WETH() (contracts/interfaces/

→ IUniswapV2Router02.sol#7) is not in mixedCase

Function PriceOracle. addFeed(address,address,AggregatorV2V3Interface) (

→ contracts/oracle/PriceOracle.sol#41-52) is not in mixedCase

Function PriceOracle. updateFeed(address,address,AggregatorV2V3Interface

→ ) (contracts/oracle/PriceOracle.sol#60-66) is not in mixedCase

Parameter PriceOracle.getPriceTokenUSD(address, uint256). base (contracts
  Parameter Rebalancing.init(IIndexSwap,address,address,address,address).
  \hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
Parameter Rebalancing.init(IIndexSwap,address,address,address,address).
  \hookrightarrow in mixedCase
Parameter Rebalancing.init(IIndexSwap,address,address,address).

    → adapter (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#61) is not in

  \hookrightarrow mixedCase
Parameter Rebalancing.init(IIndexSwap,address,address,address).
  \hookrightarrow in mixedCase
Parameter Rebalancing.init(IIndexSwap,address,address,address).
  \hookrightarrow mixedCase
Parameter Rebalancing.setPause(bool)._state (contracts/rebalance/
  \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#84) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Rebalancing.sellTokens(uint256[],uint256[],uint256).
  \hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
```

```
Parameter Rebalancing.sellTokens(uint256[],uint256[],uint256).

    → newWeights (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#116) is not in

  \hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
Parameter Rebalancing.sellTokens(uint256[],uint256[],uint256). slippage

→ (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#117) is not in mixedCase

Parameter Rebalancing.buyTokens(uint256[],uint256[],uint256,uint256).
  \hookrightarrow mixedCase
Parameter Rebalancing.buyTokens(uint256[],uint256[],uint256,uint256).

→ newWeights (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#181) is not in

  \hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
Parameter Rebalancing.buyTokens(uint256[],uint256[],uint256,uint256).

    ⇒ _slippage (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#183) is not in

  \hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
Parameter Rebalancing.rebalance(uint256). slippage (contracts/rebalance/
  Parameter Rebalancing.updateWeights(uint96[],uint256). slippage (
  Parameter Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256). slippage
  Parameter Rebalancing.updateTreasury(address). newAddress (contracts/
  Parameter Vault.executeTransactionETH(address, uint256). to (contracts/

    vault/Vault.sol#27) is not in mixedCase

Parameter Vault.executeTransactionOther(address,uint256,address)._to (
  Parameter Vault.executeTransactionOther(address,uint256,address)._token
  Parameter VelvetSafeModule.executeTransactionETH(address,uint256)._to (

→ contracts/vault/VelvetSafeModule.sol#52) is not in mixedCase

Parameter VelvetSafeModule.executeTransactionOther(address,uint256,

→ address). to (contracts/vault/VelvetSafeModule.sol#61) is not in

  \hookrightarrow \mathtt{mixedCase}
```

```
Parameter VelvetSafeModule.executeTransactionOther(address,uint256,
   \hookrightarrow address). token (contracts/vault/VelvetSafeModule.sol#63) is not
   \hookrightarrow in mixedCase
Parameter TokenMetadata.add(address,address). underlying (contracts/

    → venus/TokenMetadata.sol#19) is not in mixedCase

Parameter TokenMetadata.add(address,address)._vToken (contracts/venus/

    → TokenMetadata.sol#19) is not in mixedCase

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Variable IUniswapV2Router.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,
   \hookrightarrow interfaces/IUniswapV2Router.sol#12) is too similar to

→ IUniswapV2Router.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,

    interfaces/IUniswapV2Router.sol#13)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #variable-names-are-too-similar

Variable IndexFactory.constructor(address,address,address,address,

→ address,address,address). baseRebalancingAddres (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow IndexFactory.sol#50) is too similar to IndexFactory.
   ⇔ baseRebalancingAddress (contracts/IndexFactory.sol#19)
Variable IndexSwap.MAX INVESTMENTAMOUNT (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol
   \hookrightarrow #69) is too similar to IndexSwap.constructor(string, string,

→ address, address, uint256, address, address, address, address, uint256,

→ address). maxInvestmentAmount (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#93)

Variable IUniswapV2Router02.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256

→ ,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountADesired (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow interfaces/IUniswapV2Router02.sol#12) is too similar to

→ IUniswapV2Router02.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,
```

```
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  Clones.clone(address) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones
  \hookrightarrow .sol#25-34) uses literals with too many digits:
- mstore(uint256, uint256)(ptr_clone_asm_0,0
  Clones.clone(address) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones
  \hookrightarrow .sol#25-34) uses literals with too many digits:
- mstore(uint256,uint256)(ptr clone asm 0 + 0x28,0

→ ) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones.sol#30)

Clones.cloneDeterministic(address, bytes32) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
  \hookrightarrow contracts/proxy/Clones.sol#43-52) uses literals with too many
  \hookrightarrow digits:
- mstore(uint256,uint256)(ptr cloneDeterministic asm 0,0
  Clones.cloneDeterministic(address, bytes32) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/
  \hookrightarrow digits:
- mstore(uint256,uint256)(ptr cloneDeterministic asm 0 + 0x28,0
  Clones.predictDeterministicAddress(address,bytes32,address) (

→ node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones.sol#57-72) uses

  \hookrightarrow literals with too many digits:
- mstore(uint256,uint256)(ptr predictDeterministicAddress asm 0,0
  Clones.predictDeterministicAddress(address,bytes32,address) (

    → node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/Clones.sol#57-72) uses

  \hookrightarrow literals with too many digits:
```

```
- mstore(uint256,uint256)(ptr_predictDeterministicAddress_asm_0 + 0x28
   Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  BaseGuard (node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/guard/BaseGuard.sol
   \hookrightarrow #8-38) does not implement functions:
- BaseGuard.checkAfterExecution(bytes32,bool) (node modules/@gnosis.pm/

    zodiac/contracts/guard/BaseGuard.sol#37)

- BaseGuard.checkTransaction(address, uint256, bytes, Enum.Operation,

    uint256,uint256,uint256,address,address,bytes,address) (

    → node modules/@gnosis.pm/zodiac/contracts/guard/BaseGuard.sol

   \hookrightarrow #23-35)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  \hookrightarrow #unimplemented-functions
OwnableUpgradeable. gap (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts-

    ∀elvetSafeModule (contracts/vault/VelvetSafeModule.sol#19-73)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #unused-state-variable

IndexSwap.indexPrice (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#42) should be
  \hookrightarrow constant
VBep20Storage.underlying (contracts/venus/VBep20Storage.sol#8) should be
  \hookrightarrow constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation

→ #state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant

renounceOwnership() should be declared external:
- OwnableUpgradeable.renounceOwnership() (node modules/@openzeppelin/
```

```
grantRole(bytes32,address) should be declared external:
- AccessControl.grantRole(bytes32,address) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
    revokeRole(bytes32,address) should be declared external:
- AccessControl.revokeRole(bytes32,address) (node modules/@openzeppelin
    renounceRole(bytes32,address) should be declared external:
- AccessControl.renounceRole(bytes32,address) (node modules/
    ⇔ @openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol#173-177)
renounceOwnership() should be declared external:
- Ownable.renounceOwnership() (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
    \hookrightarrow access/Ownable.sol#54-56)
transferOwnership(address) should be declared external:
- Ownable.transferOwnership(address) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
    name() should be declared external:
- ERC20.name() (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.
   \hookrightarrow sol#62-64)
symbol() should be declared external:
- ERC20.symbol() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
   \hookrightarrow ERC20.sol#70-72)
decimals() should be declared external:
- ERC20.decimals() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
   \hookrightarrow ERC20.sol#87-89)
transfer(address, uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.transfer(address, uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts
   \hookrightarrow /token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#113-117)
approve(address, uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.approve(address, uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/
    \hookrightarrow token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#136-140)
transferFrom(address,address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (node modules/
    ⇔ @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#158-167)
increaseAllowance(address, uint256) should be declared external:
```

```
- ERC20.increaseAllowance(address, uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   decreaseAllowance(address, uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20.decreaseAllowance(address, uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   burn(uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20Burnable.burn(uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/

    token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20Burnable.sol#20-22)

burnFrom(address, uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20Burnable.burnFrom(address,uint256) (node modules/@openzeppelin/
   createIndex(string,string,uint256,uint256,bool) should be declared
  \hookrightarrow external:
- IndexFactory.createIndex(string,string,uint256,uint256,bool) (
   initializeTokens(uint256,address[],uint96[]) should be declared external
- IndexFactory.initializeTokens(uint256,address[],uint96[]) (contracts/
   \hookrightarrow IndexFactory.sol#178-188)
setIndexSwapLibrary(address) should be declared external:
- IndexFactory.setIndexSwapLibrary(address) (contracts/IndexFactory.sol
   \hookrightarrow #190-193)
setOutAsset(address) should be declared external:
- IndexFactory.setOutAsset(address) (contracts/IndexFactory.sol
   setupRole(bytes32,address) should be declared external:
- AccessController.setupRole(bytes32,address) (contracts/access/
   pullFromVault(IIndexSwap, address, uint256, address) should be declared
   \hookrightarrow external:
- Adapter. pullFromVault(IIndexSwap,address,uint256,address) (contracts
   \hookrightarrow /core/Adapter.sol#76-99)
swapETHToToken(address, uint256, address, uint256) should be declared
  \hookrightarrow external:
```

```
- Adapter._swapETHToToken(address,uint256,address,uint256) (contracts/
    \hookrightarrow core/Adapter.sol#108-148)
_swapTokenToETH(address,uint256,address,uint256) should be declared
   \hookrightarrow external:
- Adapter. swapTokenToETH(address, uint256, address, uint256) (contracts/
    \hookrightarrow core/Adapter.sol#158-216)
investInFund(uint256) should be declared external:
- IndexSwap.investInFund(uint256) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol
    \hookrightarrow #170-226)
withdrawFund(uint256,uint256,bool) should be declared external:
- IndexSwap.withdrawFund(uint256,uint256,bool) (contracts/core/
    \hookrightarrow IndexSwap.sol#233-324)
setPaused(bool) should be declared external:
 - IndexSwap.setPaused(bool) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#374-376)
updateRecords(address[],uint96[]) should be declared external:
- IndexSwap.updateRecords(address[],uint96[]) (contracts/core/IndexSwap
    \hookrightarrow .sol#384-399)
getTokens() should be declared external:
 - IndexSwap.getTokens() (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#401-403)
getRecord(address) should be declared external:
 - IndexSwap.getRecord(address) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol#405-407)
updateTokenList(address[]) should be declared external:
- IndexSwap.updateTokenList(address[]) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol
    \hookrightarrow #409-414)
deleteRecord(address) should be declared external:
- IndexSwap.deleteRecord(address) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol
    \hookrightarrow #416-418)
updateTreasury(address) should be declared external:
- IndexSwap.updateTreasury(address) (contracts/core/IndexSwap.sol
    \hookrightarrow #420-425)
getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) should be declared external:
- IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenAndVaultBalance(IIndexSwap) (contracts/core/
    getTokenBalance(IIndexSwap,address,bool) should be declared external:
```

```
- IndexSwapLibrary.getTokenBalance(IIndexSwap,address,bool) (contracts/
   calculateSwapAmounts(IIndexSwap,uint256,uint256[],uint256) should be
   \hookrightarrow declared external:
- IndexSwapLibrary.calculateSwapAmounts(IIndexSwap,uint256,uint256[],
   getTokenPriceUSDETH(uint256) should be declared external:
- IndexSwapLibrary. getTokenPriceUSDETH(uint256) (contracts/core/
   mint(address, uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20Mock.mint(address,uint256) (contracts/mock/ERC20Mock.sol#16-18)
burn(address, uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20Mock.burn(address,uint256) (contracts/mock/ERC20Mock.sol#20-22)
transferInternal(address,address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20Mock.transferInternal(address,address,uint256) (contracts/mock/
   \hookrightarrow ERC20Mock.sol#24-30)
approveInternal(address,address,uint256) should be declared external:
- ERC20Mock.approveInternal(address,address,uint256) (contracts/mock/
   \hookrightarrow ERC20Mock.sol#32-38)
getAggregatorInterface() should be declared external:
- PriceOracle.getAggregatorInterface() (contracts/oracle/PriceOracle.
   \hookrightarrow sol#19)
_addFeed(address,address,AggregatorV2V3Interface) should be declared
   \hookrightarrow external:
- PriceOracle._addFeed(address,address,AggregatorV2V3Interface) (
   updateFeed(address,address,AggregatorV2V3Interface) should be declared
   \hookrightarrow external:
- PriceOracle._updateFeed(address,address,AggregatorV2V3Interface) (
   getUsdEthPrice(uint256) should be declared external:
- PriceOracle.getUsdEthPrice(uint256) (contracts/oracle/PriceOracle.sol
   getPriceTokenUSD(address, uint256) should be declared external:
```

```
- PriceOracle.getPriceTokenUSD(address,uint256) (contracts/oracle/
    setPause(bool) should be declared external:
- Rebalancing.setPause(bool) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol
    \hookrightarrow #84-106)
updateWeights(uint96[],uint256) should be declared external:
- Rebalancing.updateWeights(uint96[],uint256) (contracts/rebalance/
    \hookrightarrow Rebalancing.sol#249-262)
updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) should be declared external:
- Rebalancing.updateTokens(address[],uint96[],uint256) (contracts/

    rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#291-362)

feeModule() should be declared external:
- Rebalancing.feeModule() (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.sol#365-440)
updateTreasury(address) should be declared external:
- Rebalancing.updateTreasury(address) (contracts/rebalance/Rebalancing.
    \hookrightarrow sol#442-444)
transferModuleOwnership(address) should be declared external:
- Vault.transferModuleOwnership(address) (contracts/vault/Vault.sol
    \hookrightarrow #19-25)
executeTransactionETH(address, uint256) should be declared external:
- Vault.executeTransactionETH(address, uint256) (contracts/vault/Vault.
    \hookrightarrow sol#27-34)
executeTransactionOther(address, uint256, address) should be declared
   \hookrightarrow external:
- Vault.executeTransactionOther(address, uint256, address) (contracts/
    \hookrightarrow vault/Vault.sol#36-42)
transferModuleOwnership(address) should be declared external:
- VelvetSafeModule.transferModuleOwnership(address) (contracts/vault/

    VelvetSafeModule.sol#33-39)

executeTransactionETH(address, uint256) should be declared external:
- VelvetSafeModule.executeTransactionETH(address,uint256) (contracts/
    executeTransactionOther(address, uint256, address) should be declared
   \hookrightarrow external:
```

Conclusion:

Most of the vulnerabilities found by the analysis have already been addressed by the smart contract code review.

7 Conclusion

In this audit, we examined the design and implementation of Velvet Capital contract and discovered several issues of varying severity. Velvet Capital team addressed 20 issues raised in the initial report and implemented the necessary fixes, while classifying the rest as a risk with low-probability of occurrence. Shellboxes' auditors advised Velvet Capital Team to maintain a high level of vigilance and to keep those findings in mind in order to avoid any future complications.



For a Contract Audit, contact us at contact@shellboxes.com