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fd-util: introduce fd_verify_safe_flags
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YHNdnzj committed Feb 21, 2024
1 parent ea932bd commit 1257a1f
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Showing 4 changed files with 46 additions and 37 deletions.
29 changes: 29 additions & 0 deletions src/basic/fd-util.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -913,6 +913,35 @@ int fd_is_opath(int fd) {
return FLAGS_SET(r, O_PATH);
}

int fd_verify_safe_flags(int fd) {
int flags, unexpected_flags;

/* Check if an extrinsic fd is safe to work on (by a privileged service). This ensures that clients
* can't trick a privileged service into giving access to a file the client doesn't already have
* access to (especially via something like O_PATH).
*
* O_NOFOLLOW: For some reason the kernel will return this flag from fcntl; it doesn't go away
* immediately after open(). It should have no effect whatsoever to an already-opened FD,
* and since we refuse O_PATH it should be safe.
*
* RAW_O_LARGEFILE: glibc secretly sets this and neglects to hide it from us if we call fcntl.
* See comment in missing_fcntl.h for more details about this.
*/

assert(fd >= 0);

flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (flags < 0)
return -errno;

unexpected_flags = flags & ~(O_ACCMODE|O_NOFOLLOW|RAW_O_LARGEFILE);
if (unexpected_flags != 0)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EREMOTEIO),
"Unexpected flags set for extrinsic fd: 0%o", unexpected_flags);

return 0;
}

int read_nr_open(void) {
_cleanup_free_ char *nr_open = NULL;
int r;
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17 changes: 3 additions & 14 deletions src/basic/fd-util.h
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -22,20 +22,6 @@
#define EBADF_PAIR { -EBADF, -EBADF }
#define EBADF_TRIPLET { -EBADF, -EBADF, -EBADF }

/* Flags that are safe to have set on an FD given to a privileged service to operate on.
* This ensures that clients can't trick a privileged service into giving access to a file the client
* doesn't already have access to (especially via something like O_PATH).
*
* O_NOFOLLOW: For some reason the kernel will return this flag from fcntl; it doesn't go away immediately
* after open(). It should have no effect whatsoever to an already-opened FD, but if it does
* it's decreasing the risk to a privileged service since it disables symlink following.
*
* RAW_O_LARGEFILE: glibc secretly sets this and neglects to hide it from us if we call fcntl. See comment
* in missing_fcntl.h for more details about this.
*/
#define SAFE_FD_FLAGS (O_ACCMODE|O_NOFOLLOW|RAW_O_LARGEFILE)
#define UNSAFE_FD_FLAGS(flags) ((unsigned)(flags) & ~SAFE_FD_FLAGS)

int close_nointr(int fd);
int safe_close(int fd);
void safe_close_pair(int p[static 2]);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -126,7 +112,10 @@ static inline int make_null_stdio(void) {

int fd_reopen(int fd, int flags);
int fd_reopen_condition(int fd, int flags, int mask, int *ret_new_fd);

int fd_is_opath(int fd);
int fd_verify_safe_flags(int fd);

int read_nr_open(void);
int fd_get_diskseq(int fd, uint64_t *ret);

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18 changes: 7 additions & 11 deletions src/home/homed-bus.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ int bus_message_read_blobs(sd_bus_message *m, Hashmap **ret, sd_bus_error *error
_cleanup_free_ char *filename = NULL;
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
const char *_filename = NULL;
int _fd, flags;
int _fd;

r = sd_bus_message_read(m, "{sh}", &_filename, &_fd);
if (r < 0)
Expand All @@ -111,18 +111,14 @@ int bus_message_read_blobs(sd_bus_message *m, Hashmap **ret, sd_bus_error *error

r = fd_verify_regular(fd);
if (r < 0)
return sd_bus_error_setf(error, SD_BUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "FD for %s is not a regular file", filename);
return sd_bus_error_setf(error, SD_BUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, "FD for '%s' is not a regular file", filename);

flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (flags < 0)
return -errno;

/* Refuse fds w/ unexpected flags set. In particular, we don't want to permit O_PATH FDs, since
* those don't actually guarantee that the client has access to the file. */
if (UNSAFE_FD_FLAGS(flags) != 0)
r = fd_verify_safe_flags(fd);
if (r == -EREMOTEIO)
return sd_bus_error_setf(error, SD_BUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS,
"FD for %s has unexpected flags set: 0%o",
filename, UNSAFE_FD_FLAGS(flags));
"FD for '%s' has unexpected flags set", filename);
if (r < 0)
return r;

r = hashmap_put(blobs, filename, FD_TO_PTR(fd));
if (r < 0)
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19 changes: 7 additions & 12 deletions src/journal/journald-native.c
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -356,18 +356,13 @@ void server_process_native_file(
if (st.st_size <= 0)
return;

int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (flags < 0) {
log_ratelimit_error_errno(errno, JOURNAL_LOG_RATELIMIT, "Failed to get flags of passed file, ignoring: %m");
return;
}

if (UNSAFE_FD_FLAGS(flags) != 0) {
log_ratelimit_error(JOURNAL_LOG_RATELIMIT,
"Unexpected flags of passed memory fd (0%o), ignoring message: %m",
UNSAFE_FD_FLAGS(flags));
return;
}
r = fd_verify_safe_flags(fd);
if (r == -EREMOTEIO)
return (void) log_ratelimit_error_errno(r, JOURNAL_LOG_RATELIMIT,
"Unexpected flags of passed memory fd, ignoring message.");
if (r < 0)
return (void) log_ratelimit_error_errno(r, JOURNAL_LOG_RATELIMIT,
"Failed to get flags of passed file: %m");

/* If it's a memfd, check if it is sealed. If so, we can just mmap it and use it, and do not need to
* copy the data out. */
Expand Down

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