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Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

JOHN GREENEWALD JR
THE BLACK VAULT HEAVYWEAPONS

December 15, 2005

Subject: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

FOIPA No. 0997057-000

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552

- (b)(1)
- (b)(2)
- (b)(3) _____

- (b)(4)
- (b)(5)
- (b)(6)

Section 552a

- (b)(7)(A)
 - (b)(7)(B)
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 - (b)(7)(D)
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 - (k)(7)

709 page(s) were reviewed and 352 page(s) are being released.

Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, Flag Building, Suite 570, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

- The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.
- See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,



David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s) (2)

Please be advised that this is the first interim release of documents responsive to your request for all documentation on Bacteriological Warfare. This interim release consists of the following file numbers: 100-93216 Sections 1, 3 and 5. Additional releases will be made to you until processing is completed.

In an effort to expedite your request, the enclosed material is being released as it was previously processed and released to other requester. If the enclosed package contains documents or information originating with other Government agencies, that information was not referred to those agencies as part of this release.

To expedite your request, the enclosed material is being sent in advance of payment. Pursuant to Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.11 and 16.49, there is a fee of ten cents per page for duplication. No fees are assessed for the first 100 pages. This release consists of 352 pages. Please remit a check or money order, payable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the amount of \$ 25.20. The FOIPA number assigned to this request should be placed on your payment to insure proper crediting of your payment. **If payment is not received within 30 days from the date of this letter, we will administratively close this request.**

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b) (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
- (b) (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b) (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b) (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b) (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b) (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b) (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b) (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b) (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d) (5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j) (2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k) (1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k) (2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k) (4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k) (5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k) (6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k) (7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts
Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
New York, New York

FGJ:JKB
62-6795

July 8, 1941.

X 110 ✓

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

X Ju.
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Attn: Mr. L. B. Nichols, Asst. Director

Re: ~~Bacteriological Warfare by~~ Hitler:

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Informant. b7C

Dear Sir:

(1) BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

b7D

Reference is made to Mr. Nichols' telephone conversation with Mr. T. J. Donegan on Saturday, July 5, 1941, during which Mr. Nichols advised that it was the Bureau's desire to have [redacted] interviewed in connection with statements regarding the possible use of bacterial warfare by Hitler made in a book on sabotage [redacted]

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[redacted] RECORDING 100-93276-X INDEXED FILED
Mr. Nichols further advised that [redacted] MIGRATION

was reported [redacted]

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the statements [redacted] in the book on sabotage [redacted] indicated that [redacted] Hitler was experimenting with the use of diseased germs such as tularaemia, which germs, it was contemplated, would be refrigerated and then thrown from airplanes on civilian population in the prosecution of Nazi wars, as reportedly set forth in the official German Army Journal of September, 1939.

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NCL BEHIND FILE

APR 29 1955 (Mon.)

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uol/mw/bja/pam
ON 11-13-03
#977600

Director

New York, New York
July 8, 1941

informant of the New York Office, developed for the purpose of supplying information regarding the activities of German refugees, [redacted]

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[redacted] To date [redacted] has not been used as an informant by the New York Office.

On July 5th and again on July 7, 1941, [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed by Special Agent [redacted]
of this office, in accordance with Mr. Nichols' request. [redacted]
[redacted] stated that [redacted]

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[redacted] appears to be very much opposed to Hitler and his Nazi regime in Germany [redacted]

[redacted] expressed every willingness to cooperate with the Bureau and was, in all respects, frank and straightforward in his statements.

[redacted] advised that [redacted]
[redacted] knew nothing regarding Hitler's possible plans for the use of bacteriological war; that the only information he had on the subject was derived from material which he had read [redacted]

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Director

New York, New York
July 8, 1941

[redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

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According to the in-

formation received from the Bureau, [redacted]

[redacted]

At the time [redacted]

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he was interviewed by reporters from what he believed was the "New York Journal American"

[redacted] During the interview with these reporters the subject of bacteriological war evidently developed and [redacted] referred the reporters to material which he had read in the book entitled, "The Voice of Destruction", by Hermann Rauschning. On pages 1 and 2 of chapter 1 of this book Rauschning reports a conversation with Hitler when two other persons were present, during which Hitler mentioned bacteriological warfare and stated that he was then experimenting with this as to its practicability and so forth. [redacted]

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Director

New York, New York
July 8, 1941

No copy of [redacted] is being transmitted with this letter because it is believed that the Bureau is already in possession of a copy of this book and can check on the references made to it.

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[redacted] an article entitled, "The Bacteriological War", by O. Hartmann. This article, in full, was originally published in the "Norse Journal of Military Medicine" [redacted] this article, as contained on page 434 of the September, 1939 issue, Volume 9, of "Der Deutsche Militararzt."

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[redacted], photostatic copies were obtained of the article which appeared in ~~in~~ ^{Der} ~~Deutsche~~ Militararzt", as well as the original full-length article which appeared in the "Norse Journal of Military Medicine." These two photostats, together with an English translation of the German article, made by Special Agent [redacted] of the New York Office, are being transmitted herewith to the Bureau.

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[redacted] shortly after the above-mentioned article appeared in the "Der Deutsche Militararzt" the Nazi Ministry of Health circulated an article on ~~tularaemia~~ (rabbit fever) in the Reich Health Paper ("Reichsgesundheitsblatt") to all German doctors. [redacted]

[redacted] tularaemia is practically unknown in Germany and the whole of Europe, although it is much more common in the United States. It should be pointed out that tularaemia is specifically mentioned as a possibility in connection with bacteriological war in the articles

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Director

New York, New York
July 8, 1941

mentioned above. [redacted] Hitler might be seriously considering bacteriological war, in view of the fact that the Reich Ministry of Health was evidently informing German doctors on the subject of Tularaemia for which, [redacted] no antitoxin has been developed to date, so that the German medical profession might be fully familiar with the disease in case any emergency might develop subsequently.

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[redacted]
an article which had been offered for publication but never published, [redacted] entitled, "Is a War of Bacteria Possible?" Two copies of this article [redacted] [redacted] are being transmitted with copies of this letter to the Bureau. The article consists largely of [redacted] thoughts and comments regarding the article, "The Bacteriological War", which was summarized in "Der Deutsche Militararzt". [redacted]

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It should be pointed out that [redacted]

[redacted] did not recall having read anything additional on the subject in question.

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[redacted] knowledge of Hitler's character as obtained through report and by reputation only and from the material mentioned above [redacted]

Director

New York, New York
July 8, 1941

[redacted] Hitler would not hesitate to use bacteria in waging war if the exigencies of any war demanded its use to assure a Nazi victory. [redacted]

[redacted] the use of bacteria in warfare was a part of Hitler's military program which he was probably holding as an "ace in the hole". [redacted]

[redacted] the article on bacteriological war which appeared in "Der Deutsche Militararzt" could possibly have originated in Nazi brains and then have been presented in the German Military Journal as the product of a Norwegian. [redacted]

[redacted] Hartmann, the alleged author of the article, sounded more like a German than a Norwegian name.

In case the original articles might be desired subsequently by the Bureau, it should be pointed out that the photostatic copies transmitted herewith were obtained from originals in the library of the New York Academy of Medicine, 2 East 103rd Street, New York City.

Very truly yours,

E. J. Connelley
E. J. CONNELLEY,
Assistant Director.

Enclosures (5)

Special Del.

Arbeitskreis und beide Kriegshäfen zusammen. Ein vollständiger Überblick über das gemeinsame Fliegerwesen muss mit großzügigster Breite gezeichnet werden. Es besteht kein Zweifel daran, dass die militärischen Erfahrungen der Kriegshäfen bis zu 20 Jahren im engsten, ständigen Kontakt standen. Die Richtigkeit dieser These ist durch die historischen Voraussetzungen und das tatsächliche Verhalten des Kriegshafens bestätigt. Es ist jedoch schwierig, den Zusammenhang zwischen dem gemeinsamen Fliegerwesen und dem politischen und militärischen Verhalten des Deutschen Reiches während des Krieges zu untersuchen, weil es zu viele Faktoren und eine Reihe von Komplikationen vorhanden sind.

Penetrating raids of the Czech, with report of case, gunned down (Durchdringende Überschläge mit Republikaner Schußabwurfsang) - Von Dr. WILHELM MEYER (S. 152, 1955).

Am Ende eines Durchdringungsangriffs durch einen Ju 88B-Jäger wurde eine Tschetsche erlegt, offenes Parachutieren, wahrscheinlich ab 1600 m Höhe, welche nicht abgeschrägt war. Historische Beweise und Heeresberichte weisen diese Komplikationen auf, die eine Absturzsicherung nicht aufgewiesen haben. Der Angriffshöhenangriff ist offensiv. Durchdringungsangriffe sind gewöhnlich zielstrebig.

Verdächtige Kriegs-

Der kastrierungsähnliche Kriegs. Von Dr. ERNST MANN (S. 162, 1955, Nr. 142, 91 v. rechts). Zusammenfassung (S. 1938, Kriegsbericht).

Die Kritik und die Diskussion der Kriegsberichterstatter sind die Fortsetzung der Unternehmenskriegsberichterstattung. Sie enthalten oft solche Ausschreitungen, die in einer Zeitungsausgabe leicht entdeckt werden können. Und sie machen den Sinn und die Arbeit der Sekretärinnen durchaus interessant. Die jüngste Entwicklung ist in Bezug auf die Betriebsversammlungen, die zahlreiche Berichte in den Pressemedien erscheinen. Diese Berichte sind auch sehr prägnant. Sie enthalten alle wesentlichen Tatsachen. Aber ebenso wie die unangefochtenen Kriegsberichte sind sie ebenfalls sehr künstlich. Nicht selten ist es ein schöner Charakteristik, was die Aussage ist, was für eine Tarnung diese Ausschreitung ist. Eine andere Aussage ist die Meldung eines Angriffs auf die Stadt Berlin aus dem Amerikanischen Bereich aus der Richtung des Reichstagsgebäudes. Aufmerksam und USA, wird man leicht merken, dass diese Aussage über die durch den Krieg verdeckte Tarnung und supportierte, die Propaganda und Werbung aus dem Amerikanischen Bereich in diesem Bereich entsprechend T.A.-in-sicht. Eine Aussicht der Kritik am Ende zu haben. Offenbar wird wohl überall die nämliche Tatsache erwähnt, dass die Ausschreitung und eigentlich die Basis für die Kriegsberichterstattung und nicht andersherum, wenn Krieger, die das Feld gesogen, Verfehlten ausgenutzt, um sich aber wieder bewaffneten zu können, um sich auf den Angreifer und Ziel einzustellen. An dem Punkt soll die T.A. im Feldschlagzeug und eigentlich nicht abweichen können, sondern über nach ihr vorher geschossen, doch sollte jetzt auf bestimmte Ausschreitung aufmerksam werden. Verlässt ein Feldschlagzeug zuerst sein Alter, so ist es sicherlich eine Sache für die T.A. im Feldschlagzeug, ob er oder nicht unterwegs ist.

Betrachtung über die Kriegsberichterstattung und deren Schlachtfelder. Von DR. WILHELM MEYER (S. 162, 1955, Kriegsbericht).

In Abhängigkeit vom Reihenfolgen, in das die Kriegsberichterstattung erscheint, kann es Verteilung einer Tatsache durchaus vorkommen, dass sie verschiedene Verfehlungen und Organisationen des Feindes, wie sie und Sonderabteilungen, die am Kampf beteiligt waren, und andere ebenfalls durch die Feinde beteiligt, die sich bei der Temporeinführung und der Waffen- und anderen Besetzungen an beteiligen. Als Differenzierung kann hier die von Zentraleinheiten gegeben.

Zentraleinheiten (S. 1955).

zu beweisen. Eine schriftliche Dokumentation ist nach dem Schlachtfeldbericht.

Politische Kritik. Widerstandsführer. Einheitsfront, Antikommunistische Verbündete und politisch geführte Verbündete. Erste der Kriegsberichterstatter, und das ist nicht ohne Bedeutung, ist zu holen, in Konkurrenz zu dem Bereich der eigentlichen Kriegsberichterstatter. Es ist zu holen, ob es sich dabei um eine Stellungnahme handelt, die die Kriegsberichterstatter nicht unterstützen.

Kritik. Kritik und die Diskussion der Kriegsberichterstatter ist die Fortsetzung der Unternehmenskriegsberichterstattung. Sie enthalten oft solche Ausschreitungen, die in einer Zeitungsausgabe leicht entdeckt werden können. Und sie machen den Sinn und die Arbeit der Sekretärinnen durchaus interessant.

Die jüngste Entwicklung ist in Bezug auf die Betriebsversammlungen, die zahlreiche Berichte in den Pressemedien erscheinen. Diese Berichte sind auch sehr prägnant. Sie enthalten alle wesentlichen Tatsachen.

Aber ebenso wie die unangefochtenen Kriegsberichterstattungen sind sie ebenfalls sehr künstlich. Nicht selten ist es ein schöner Charakteristik, was die Aussage ist, was für eine Tarnung diese Ausschreitung ist.

Einige Aussichten der Kritik am Ende zu haben. Offenbar wird wohl überall die nämliche Tatsache erwähnt, dass die Ausschreitung und eigentlich die Basis für die Kriegsberichterstattung und nicht andersherum, wenn Krieger, die das Feld gesogen, Verfehlten ausgenutzt, um sich aber wieder bewaffneten zu können, um sich auf den Angreifer und Ziel einzustellen.

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ADDRESS ALL LETTERS, ETB-12
THE LIBRARY,
N. Y. ACADEMY OF MEDICINE,
2 EAST 108th ST., NEW YORK CITY

Deutsche
Militärarzt

4
1939

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DATE 11/14/09 BY bauer/lnw/bj/pew
Q77600

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DATE 11-14-05 BY 60267 UC/NWD/bja/FM

977600

THE BACTERIOLOGICAL WAR by O. Hartmann.

Norse Journal of Military Medicine (Vol.)
42, (Page) 45 and German Synopsis (page)
52 (1938) (In Norwegian)

After a reference to the importance of epidemics in former wars (there is given a) warning against underestimation of bacteriological attack, since in a war of the future every manner of attack will probably be seized upon and the further development of bacteriology could furnish better possibilities herefor than those of that time. The attack will apparently be directed chiefly against the civil population, insofar as one's own troops cannot be protected against contagion by immunization - during use at the front. Of the various possibilities for infection the direct infection of wounds by means of pus excitors, anthrax, tetanus and gas burns through infected projectiles is considered to be infeasible in practice, likewise a transmission of the causes of sexual diseases is out of question.

There are difficulties as to breeding or intensification of virulence against the use of diseases transmissible by air such as grippe, pneumonia, meningitis, diphtheria, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, smallpox and poliomyelitis. On the other hand the infections occurring by way of the stomach-intestinal-canal such as typhus, paratyphus, amoebic and bacillary dysentery and cholera are very usable, especially however dysentery as up to the present immunization against it (has been) impossible. In connection with this attention is called to the possibility of transmission by means of infected flies and other insects. Also Malta fever and Bang's Disease, which are transmitted from animal to man, can be used under (certain) conditions, likewise Weil's Disease by means of infected rats. More importance is to be attributed to tularemia however, as it is especially suitable, (having) exceptional contagiousness together with a lack of a specific therapy. A spread of malaria must also be considered, also the transmission of spotted typhus is completely possible, as the production of infected lice in great numbers has been mastered.

Infection with pestilence by means of rats seems less apparent, on the other hand the danger of dissemination of

A - 2

pestilence-cultures, which can be easily produced, is in reality larger. Also virus infections are possible, the transmission of parrot fever (being) especially easy. As means of attack the airplane will apparently be used and the infection result from the throwing down or strewing of cultures (which will be) probably mixed with indifferent substances of heavier specific gravity or from infected flies which are kept immovable at 10° centigrade. The distribution by espionage practices is also alluded to. Attack is to be expected soonest against thickly populated cities.

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DATE 11.14.00 BY 60267 UC/NUS/Bjg/Pmc
977600

IS A WAR OF BACTERIA POSSIBLE

Hitler makes mysterious insinuations about new frightful weapons with which he intends to annihilate his opponents. In making these statements has he in mind the war of bacteria, is this awful possibility, to which reference is made again and again, more than a devilish Utopia, is such a war of bacteria actually thinkable and feasible?

There were times during which pestilence and cholera devastated the world. These epidemics ravaged more merritoriously and more cruelly, than wars with large casualty lists. Old people, women, children fell victims to them indiscriminately. By tremendous efforts and at great pains humanity has conquered these enemies. We owe it to measures of hygiene and the findings of medical research that the most dangerous epidemics today hardly constitute a threat to the civilized parts of the world.

Only a diseased brain could evolve the thought of misusing the progress of science and its heroic discoveries: not to prevent epidemics but to engender their outbreak.

Undoubtedly everyone has heard or read of the "war of bacteria" now and then, the fewest among us have been able to form any definite conception of it. Only a small minority di-

vines that the "war of bacteria" is the most horrible, the most criminal weapon that the urge to destroy on the part of man has ever conceived. No imagination suffices to visualize the reality of this threat. That this threat is to be taken seriously, that it can be carried out and that forces are now at work to convert it into actuality, we learn unequivocally from the work of Captain O. Hartmann, reported in the magazine "Der Deutsche Militärarzt" (The German Army Physician) (Year IV, Vol. 9, page 434, September 1939).

It is a shaking experience to read this work, that considers the possibilities of the use of bacteria as a weapon in warfare, in the manner of objective and sober scientific report. At first you believe that you are learning something new about a new medical treatment in combatting epidemics and only gradually do you realize, that it is not the meaning of this work to describe a new manner of healing, but a new manner of merciless annihilation.

At first the significance of epidemics in former wars is referred to. Undoubtedly the idea of the war of bacteria is traceable to a circumstance almost totally unknown, namely that the fate of a war is decided far more by the amount of disease, than by the number of wounded. That at least has been the case in all the wars fought up to the present. In the American Civil War the ratio of wounded to diseased was 1:8.7 and in the

last World War it was 1:3.8. The thought is therefore obvious, in this "total" war of the present, to augment the number of diseased on the enemy's side by means of artificial interference, to such an extent that his activity and his fitness as a combatant is decisively impaired.

Captain Hartmann warns against depreciation of the bacteriological attack, since future wars would renounce no manner of attack whatsoever and since the further development of bacteriology has created the best possibilities for this manner of attack.

The attack by means of bacteria will in all probability be directed principally against the civilian population. Application at the front would only be expedient, if their own troops had previously been protected by inoculation from contagion by the same bacteria used in the attack.

With the most minute detail the various groups of germs are discussed that may be considered for mass dissemination. Bacteria that necessitate direct contact between the carrier and the object of attack or which must be transferred directly to wound surfaces, are unsuitable for the war of bacteria, because the likelihood of infection is not great or because the technical difficulties are too great. For these reasons wound infection by means of bullets infected with pus germs, spleen gangrene, tetanus and gas gangrene, is not practicable.

Likewise the transfer of the germs of venereal diseases might not be practicable.

Great difficulties are also foreseen in the case of infectious diseases, where infection takes place via the air route through the respiratory organs. Among these are grippe, pneumonia, meningitis, diphtheria, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, small-poxes and polyomyelitis. On the one hand the technical difficulties to be overcome in the breeding of the germs of these diseases are too great, on the other hand, it will not be possible to manufacture bacteria cultures, whose virulence is strong enough, to accomplish their work of destruction surely.

Gradually it becomes clear to us, what demands bacteria must fulfill, in order to function properly in warfare: it must be possible to breed them easily in huge masses, the bacteria cultures must possess a high and durable virulence, it must be possible to transfer them readily and unnoticed and they must breed diseases, against which there is no protection and for which there are practically no remedial possibilities.

Seen from these view points, the germs through which infection is effected by way of the gastric channel, already behave in a far more military manner. Among them are typhoid, paratyphoid, cholera, amoeba-and-bacillus dysentery. The germs of dysentery are considered as particularly valuable. Why?

Protective vaccinations may be employed against the other members of this group. Dysentery, however, enjoys the privilege, that so far it has been impossible to immunize against it, besides it can easily be caught through infected flies and other insects.

In the war of bacteria diseases will rise to honor, that thus far have only been encountered rarely on the European continent. Obviously it is advantageous to the strategy of bacteria, if the diseases that are bred, have so far been little known to the population; the panic is increased, the possibilities of protection and defence dwindle. Thus malta fever is recommended, also known as undulant fever or Brucellensis, that is somewhat prevalent in some parts of the United States, in Texas and New Mexico. It is carried through animals and the specific medical treatment has so far shown visible successes only in chronic cases. The Weil disease may be placed in the same category, which latter disease has appeared in New York so far only in three cases. It is carried through rats. In this instance treatment also is almost powerless.

Particular military significance in the war of bacteria is attributed to rabbit fever: "It is particularly adapted because of its extraordinary infectious qualities with a lack of specific therapy."

Rabbit fever has been almost unknown in Europe up to the present, while in the United States and in Japan it plays an important part. It is carried from diseased rabbits, squirrels, rats and mice by means of flies and insects to human beings and is an extremely lingering, painful and dangerous disease. Spreading it in epidemic form in densely populated residential districts would be a capital crime against humanity. "The spreading of malaria must be reckoned with," the paper continues. Malaria has already increased during and after the world war in Central Europe, because it was continually being carried in from the south-eastern fronts and because the Anophele-fly, the intermediate-carrier of malaria, has its hotbeds in Central Europe also. It would indeed be easy to accomplish an epidemic-like spreading of malaria in Europe by means of a bacteriological attack. "The infection of spotted fever is absolutely possible, because the breeding of infected lice is controlled." So the report in the magazine "Deutscher Militaerarzt" sets forth. Spotted fever, as it is well known, is only carried through lice. During the last war thousands were the victims of this terrible disease. Since lice may be counted among the greatest winners of a war, and since the fact that the civilian population is more affected in this war will lead to a far quicker failure of all hygienic precautions than in 1914-1918, it will hardly be necessary to call upon artificial help to experience the outbreak of an epidemic of spotted fever. The contemplation,

however, that the fliers of bombers in this new war, will shower millions of infected lice on the suffering countries, instead of explosives, is more horrible and more grotesque, than the visions of Dante's Inferno.

"The infection with pestilence through rats seems less likely, on the other hand the danger of dissemination of pestilence cultures, which are easily manufactured, is considerably greater." During the entire duration, of the last war, pestilence did not break out in a single spot, not even on the Asiatic fronts. If the enemies of humanity should succeed in letting loose a new epidemic of pestilence all over the earth, this would be the most atrocious crime in world history.

As far as the technical procedure in the spreading of epidemics in the war of bacteria is concerned, we learn that the plane would in all probability be the medium of attack and that infection would be brought about by throwing off and dispersing of bacteria cultures. In order to insure the "safe" landing of these devilish substances, they would be mixed with indifferent and specifically heavy substances. Still another ingenious method is mentioned. Flies become rigid at a temperature of 10° Celsius. Thus a tremendous quantity of infected flies may be placed in a plane. The "cooled" flies are thrown off like ballast and upon landing in a warmer temperature again become capable of moving - and attacking. Dissemination via

the espionage route is also referred to.

"The attack is primarily to be expected against thickly populated cities." Thus the article closes. It seems like a bad dream and if one had not seen it black on white before one's very eyes, one would consider this objective presentation of an insane and infamous plan, impossible. There is still the hope that none of the belligerent powers has put it into effect or ever will. For bacteria know no nations, no boundaries, no political phantoms. They know only one enemy: humanity, the inhabitants of our earth. In the most frightful manner this barbaric weapon should strike back at him, who dares to put it to use.

Since no madness is impossible in these wretched times, when the fate of millions is subject to the fancies and notions of a few, it is imperative that steps be taken to safeguard mankind from this extreme madness. Anyone who knowingly and notoriously becomes an accomplice in this war of bacteria, should be punished as a marauder and murderer and should not enjoy the protection of a legitimate combatant. Acquiescence in this or a similar agreement should be demanded of every nation, simultaneously with a solemn obligation, to renounce the war of bacteria in every form. The Red Cross or any other neutral organization could accept these declarations.

It is a far cry from the alleged poisoning of wells of the middle ages to the throwing off of bacteria from planes of this day and age. Civilization must be spared the disgrace, that the great deeds of her progress have led to nothing more,

than back to the road of the most sinister and inhuman
barbarism.

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Tracy.....
Mr. Rosenb.....
Mr. Carson.....
Mr. Coffey.....
Mr. Hendon.....
Mr. Holloman.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....
Files.....

February 3, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I wish to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of January 30, 1942, containing confidential information on the possible use of bacterial warfare.

This information has been placed in the hands of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service for his confidential use.

Sincerely yours,



Administrator

Hon. John Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

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DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 ucmw/bp/rmm

100-93216-XZ

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE	
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① FEB 11 1942
124

FILE: ONE
65-36320-3

January 30, 1942

RECORDED 100-93276
100-72215-X1

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Paul V. McNutt
Administrator
Federal Security Agency
Social Security Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McNutt:

3-7-90
307009

A confidential informant, [redacted] recently advised [redacted] this Bureau that [redacted] convinced that a Japanese-American war was inevitable. During an interview, [redacted] Japanese would make war on the United States within fifteen years.

b6
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b7D

This source of information further reported that [redacted]

b6
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b7D

[redacted] anthrax bacilli dysentery and typhus germs as some of the methods to be employed in the bacterial warfare.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] the Japanese would resort to this or any other means to achieve success in the present hostilities.

Sincerely yours,
FEB 1 1942

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Land	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Carson	★
Mr. Coffey	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Holloman	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Brady	

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED JAN 31 1942 41 00
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

8 FEB 1 1942 124

EX-6

RECORDED

100-93216-K1

100-932546-A

65-36920

January 30, 1942

LLL:OME

CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Director of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

DECLASSIFIED BY SDIAGS

512190

307009

A confidential informant, [redacted] recently advised this Bureau that [redacted] convinced that a Japanese-American war was inevitable. During an interview, [redacted] Japanese would make war on the United States within fifteen years.

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b6

b7C

b7D

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b6

b7C

b7D

[redacted] the Japanese would resort to this or any other means to achieve success in the present hostilities.

Very truly yours,

41701

41702

John Edgar Hoover
FBI
Director

Mr. Tolson	COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Mr. E. A. Tamm	MATTEL
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Carson	Assistant Chief of Staff
Mr. Coffey	D-2, War Department
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Holloman	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Nease	U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Miss Candy	

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
January 14, 1942

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

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DATE 3/7/90 BY SP/AB/SO 307009

Dear Sir:

Re: JAPANESE ACTIVITIES

On December 10, 1941 [redacted] b6

[redacted] appeared at the Milwaukee Field Division with the following information which may be of interest to the Bureau.

b6
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b7D

[redacted] In this interview [redacted]
forecast that Japan would make war on the United States within fifteen years. As of possible interest to the Bureau, the Milwaukee Sentinel clipping of December 8, 1941 is enclosed

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[redacted] anthrax bacilli dysentery and typhus germs
as some of the methods to be used for this bacterial warfare.

RECORDED

100-93016-N
100-93216

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
16 JAN 1942	
U. S. GOVERNMENT	

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COPY IN FILE
cc: Mrs. W.
Lt. O. J. F.
cc: S. R. 142
1/19/42
1/19/42

(initials)

b6
b7C

Director
1-14-42

Pg. 2


[REDACTED] the Japanese people [REDACTED]

would stop at absolutely nothing to win the war. He said that the human mind is incapable of visualizing the means to which the Japanese would resort to achieve their ends.

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b7D

Very truly yours,

H. T. O'Connor
Special Agent in Charge

FMF:els
Enclosure



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts
Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

Central Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

411 Flatiron Building
Norfolk, 10, Virginia
September 29, 1943

11 min.
Bacteriological
351
Ch 2589
Files [redacted]

Director, FBI

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Attention: Technical Laboratory

Dear Sir:

[redacted] at Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, Newport News, Virginia, has brought to the attention of this office some ammunition which was confiscated in [redacted]

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[redacted] had been informed [redacted]
bullets [redacted]

wooden top

It is suggested that an analysis of this ammunition be made in an effort to substantiate these allegations. The local offices of Naval and Military Intelligence have requested a copy of the report from the Technical Laboratory in connection with this matter.

Very truly yours,

G. R. McSWAIN

Special Agent in Charge


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977600

10-1-43


K

RECORDED & INDEXED

25 OCT 1943



520CT 13 1943



~~SECRET~~

COMMUNICATION #1243

PLACE:
KINGSTON, JAMAICA

DATE:
10/18/43

REPORTED BY:
CONF. INFT. S. I. S. 162

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TITLE:

BACTERIAL SABOTAGE

CHARACTER:

JAMAICA SABOTAGE - G

SYNOPSIS:

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(S)

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7-21-2004
CLASSIFIED BY nc/nus/mjh/Am 60367 AAB
DATE CLASSIFIED 07-21-2009

COMMENTS:

b1

STATUS:

~~DISCLOSED~~

REFERENCE:

NONE

Made Available to:

- () Embassy (Consulate)
() M. A.
() N. A.
() Other

Copies:

- 2 - Bureau
1 - Kingston

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

13 OCT 27 1943

RECORDED
INDEXED

EX-68

54 NOV 15 1943

~~SECRET~~

b6

b7C

BJW:AWK
100-93216
CH-2589
F-668

CONFIDENTIAL

October 16, 1943

SAC Norfolk

60267 UC/NW/Ba/PA
7-21-2004

Laboratory examination of cartridges containing wooden bullets
which were confiscated

b7D

Reference is made to your letter of September 29, 1943 transmitting six cartridges containing wooden bullets in a clip marked [redacted]

For reference purposes the clip and cartridges have been assigned Bureau file #100-93216 Q1.

The wooden bullets contained in specimen Q1 were examined for the presence of harmful chemicals, poisons and pathogenic organisms which might cause infection if splinters from the bullets came in contact with a human body, but no such substances were found.

Cartridges Q1 are identical in over-all size with Italian 6.5 mm. military ammunition and are in an Italian military clip. The cartridge cases in specimen Q1 have apparently been used and are reloaded with the wooden bullets.

Inasmuch as the wooden bullets in question are hollow and very light, it is unlikely that they were intended for battle use. They were probably made to be used as blanks in training and the wooden bullet is necessary for the cartridge to work in automatic weapons.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____

Mr. Clegg _____

Specimen Q1 was consumed during the course of the examination.

Mr. Coffey _____

Mr. Glavin _____

Two additional copies of this report are being submitted here-

Mr. Ladd _____ with for the local offices of CBI and O-2.

Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Rosen as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Mr. Tracy THE DIRECTOR

Mr. Carson WILMINGTON, N.C.

Mr. Harbo M.A.I. Attention: Colonel R. Forney

Mr. Hendon Director

Mr. Mumford 0810-2 1943 P.M.

Mr. Piper Washington, D. C.

Mr. Starke FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Quinn Talbot DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Nease 7-14-43

Miss Gandy 29-1943

6

ST

RECORDED

SEARCHED

INDEXED

FILED

OCT 20 1943

FBI - WILMINGTON, NC

REC'D OCT 21 1943

FBI - WILMINGTON, NC

REC'D OCT 22 1943

FBI - WILMINGTON, NC

REC'D OCT 23 1943

FBI - WILMINGTON, NC

REC'D OCT 24 1943

FBI - WILMINGTON, NC

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

SWR:ed

November 26, 1943

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Acers _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Starke _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____ b6
. Nease _____ b7C
ss Beahm _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. D. M. LADD

b6
b7C
b7D [redacted] advised the writer in strictest confidence that [redacted]


7253 -

[redacted] pointed out again to the writer in strictest confidence that [redacted]

73

100-93216-104

RECORDED



b6

b7C

30 b7D

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DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UC/NJW/bj

b6

b7C

Memorandum for Mr. D. M. Ladd

- 2 -

b6

b7C

b7D In accordance with instructions, I advised [redacted] that it would be perfectly all right for his agents to conduct an investigation of [redacted]. [redacted] stated that these agents will be instructed to conduct an extremely discreet investigation so that it will not evoke any undue interest in the laboratory. He stated that the agents he plans on sending are [redacted]

[redacted] stated that these agents will not submit reports through routine channels but will send memoranda directly to him and refer to the project by the code initials [redacted]

Dacosta

[redacted]
b6

b7C

GP/B



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

MJO:ACS

98-1639

December 9, 1943

Director, FBI

Re: [REDACTED] Informant

b6

b7C

b7D

Dear Sir:

This is to advise that [REDACTED] on November 10, 1943,
advised this office that [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

b7D

[REDACTED] b6

b7C

b7D

At the time of the interview, [REDACTED] was observed to enter
[REDACTED] volunteered the information

that [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

b7D



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267/vcl/mjg/jpm

RECORDED ON

EX - 54

22

B
DEC
20

b6

b7C

VAD

lud

53DEC 20 1943

COPY IN FILE

Letter to the Director
Page 2
NY-98-1639

b6
b7C
b7D

b6 Inasmuch as the Bureau has been in receipt of communications
b7C from [redacted] this letter is being directed to the Bureau in order
 to unable the Bureau to properly evaluate any subsequent communications.

b7D Very truly yours,

S.K. McKee
S. K. MCKEE,
Special Agent in Charge

✓ Edgar Hoover

Director FBI, Washington

b6

b7C

Dear Sir:-

Bob! - Well
I wrote you yesterday sending a newspaper clipping about the spread of Influenza now starting over the country might be the GERMANS SECRET WEAPON THEY BRAG so much about. One clipping was put in the paper by the Cairo Health officer Dr. Stuckey.

Here is a plan you might use to get a clue on this. The Flu mite be spread by GERMS by sabatuers and those DOCTORS are the ones who know all about GERMS and the sabatuer could be a doctor in the employ of the ENEMY. and a Doctor could play both ends of the game he could be the one who spread them or advised those who did spread the how to do it. IN EACH CITY you could watch Doctors who advise the people about how to protect against the FLU and CHECK on them like this you could send a FBI investigator to the Doctor and Say. HOW MANY CASES OF FLU ARE IN THIS CITY ? HOW MANY CASES DO YOU ATTEND TO ? HOW BAD ARE THE CASES OF FLU YOU HAVE ? OR KNOW ABOUT. ? HOW MANY DEATHS HAVE OCCURRED BY FLU THIS YEAR OR MONTH & FLU? And if the number of cases were not numerous enough or were not bad enough to justify the NOTICES he had put in the paper then you could find out who advised him to put the notice in the paper and find out who is connected to him in his line of business In POLITICS of course if he ~~is~~ is a healthy officer and

that way you mite find it was some of his connections where the enemy Saboteurs.

Resp

b6

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 uc/nus/bja/PMM

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

90

140-95216-106

906

90

RECORDED

- 1 - 106
January 4, 1944

[Redacted] b6

b7C


This Bureau has received your recent communication, and I desire to assure you that its contents will be given appropriate consideration.

Very truly yours,
2

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 uc/nms/bja/Prm

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Tracy.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Carson.....
Mr. Coffey.....
Mr. Hondon.....
Mr. McNamee.....
Mr. Quinn-Tanner.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....



b6
b7C

JAN 4 3 08 PM '44
RECEIVED
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATING ROOM
FBI - WASH. D. C.
[Signature]

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60216710/nmc/bja/PLW

December 16, 1943

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

This is a report on vibration which I believe to be sabotage.

As stated to you previously,

b6
b7C
b7D

Oct 20 1943
Bacteriological Warfare

ENCL H
100-7276-100
180


b6
b7C
b7D

INDEXED 100-7276-100

EX-31

Mechanically induced sound
new arr. necessary

b6
b7C



b6
b7C

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
F B I
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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DATE 7-21-2001 BY 60267 UC/NIS/bja/prw

Dear sir:

Just a short note which you need not answer; I realize that your time is limited.

I would like to suggest that perhaps a secret weapon of the Nazis is the meat or butter from Argentina, where the Nazi are thick, saturated with the germs which are responsible - when these foods reach the United States - for the Flu epidemic which is so disastrous to our war effort because it produces so much absenteeism. Perhaps this is accompanied by domestic German enemy alien germ spreading cooperation. I hope you will investigate this possibility.

Patriotically yours,



RECORDED

V00-95216-10

Postoffice & Clerk.

F B I

JAN 11 1944

306 100

b6

b7C

[Signature]

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



24
EPC:AF
100-93216

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

January 22, 1944

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. Tamm

Re: [redacted]

b6
b7C In my memorandum of December 31, 1943, concerning a visit with [redacted] I mentioned [redacted]. These [redacted] b7D latter designations are used by [redacted] organization to preserve [redacted] the confidential nature of some of their most secret poison preparations. I do not know what [redacted] is. However, with regard to [redacted] I quote the following from my memorandum dated August 2, 1943, following a visit to [redacted] where he had a small plant manufacturing in an experimental way [redacted]:

Bacteriological Warfare

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols *[initials]* ✓
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Piper _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____

b7D



DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NMS/bj/Pam
ON 7-21-2004

RECORDED &

Respectfully,

E. P. Coffey
E. P. Coffey

123 100-93216-10
27 JAN 26 1944
b6
b7C

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



4
w
EPC:AF

CC 7 ✓

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

December 31, 1943

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NW/b2/Pan
ON 7-21-2004

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

Re: O Bacterial Warfare

This morning I had a general conversation with [redacted]
[redacted] He confidentially stated that [redacted]

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hender _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Mumford _____
Mr. Piper _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

[redacted] In other words, we have definite information that the enemy prefers to
use bacterial warfare over gas warfare and furthermore that the enemy is
prepared and stocked up for bacterial warfare.

b6

b7C

b7D

b6

b7C

b7D



RECORDED
&
INDEXED

83 b6
b7C

100-9326-11
IS EB
27 JAN 26 1944

Memorandum for Mr. Tamm

b6


b7C

b7D

[redacted] was in the process of arranging a conference for this afternoon between OSS officials, Army officials, and his own group and he said he hoped OSS and the Army would iron out their difficulties.

Respectfully,


E. P. Coffey.



Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

1308 Masonic Temple Building
New Orleans 12, Louisiana

January 27, 1944

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. 65-1409

gml
Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Acerelli
Mr. Carson
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Starke
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy
Files

Att'n: TECHNICAL LABORATORY

Re: *P* BACTERIAL WARFARE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated June 7, 1943, in the above matter requesting that any information in regard to bacterial warfare on the part of the enemy should be forwarded to the Bureau.

On January 10, 1944, [redacted]

[redacted] advised this office that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
the subject of an espionage case in which the New York Field Division is office of origin, who is presently residing in [redacted] had furnished him with the following information:

[Large rectangular redacted area]

The informant stated that if he should obtain additional information concerning this matter from the subject he would furnish that information to this office.

Very truly yours

A. P. KITCHIN
SAC

RECORDED VOO-9326-112
& INDEXED 32 JAN 81
F B I

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NW/Bj/PAW
ON 7-21-2004

KWD:ms

b6
b7C

55 MAR 4 1944



b6

b7C

Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

American Embassy
London, England
February 15, 1944

~~SECRET~~

Communication 2443

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIRCOURIER POUCH

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Personal Attention of Director

Dear Sir:

b1

(S)

b1

(S)

b1

(S)

Very truly yours,

b6


b7C

Legal Attaché

7.21.2004

CLASSIFIED BY: 60267 UC/NMS/bja/pam
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(6) 7/21/2029

Attachments 34

ENCLOSURE 34
(27 man)*Arch 3/21/44*

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OTHERWISE

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

*100-93216**JF 13 II**27 MAR 7 1944*~~SECRET~~*WJ**Ryan**DM*

EAT: DS

~~SECRET~~

54

RECORDED

March 2, 1944

Legal Attache
American Embassy
London, England

b6

b7C

Dear [redacted]

With reference to your letter of February 15, 1944, transmitting a communication [redacted] upon (S)

the subject of bacterial warfare, I, of course, fully appreciate the very delicate nature of this subject. As you know, the matter is completely and entirely without the scope of the Bureau's jurisdiction. I am taking no action in this matter at the present time because of my desire to avoid any embarrassment to your contact in London. While logically it would appear that the Bureau should furnish the substance [redacted]

[redacted] memorandum to the proper governmental agency, probably MI-5 (S) Very Intelligence, I will not take this action until you advise whether it would in any way jeopardize your relationship with the source of your information in London. b1

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

7-21-2004

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/MJL/bjpal
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 33 (b) 7-21-2029

CC: Liaison Section - Department

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI
RECEIVED-MAR 5 1944
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Corley
Olavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Actes
Carson
Hobbo
Heaton
Munford
Starke
Quinn Tamm
Nourse
Gandy

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR

RECEIVED DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS

MAILED TO

MAR 5 1944 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DEPT. OF JUSTICE

FBI

RECEIVED-MAIL ROOM

MAR 5 1944



MAR 25 1944

RECEIVED READING ROOM

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

55 MAR 16 1944

TO : MR. E. A. TAYLOR
FROM : MR. E. P. COFFEY

RE: April 4, 1944

SUBJECT: RE: March Committee Meetings-
Joint Cryptanalysis Committee
Bacterial Warfare Committee
Committee VIII of the Board of
War Communications
National Academy of Sciences Committee
on Truth Serum
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee

b6

b7C

There follows a status report covering the month of March, 1944, regarding committees on which I serve, representing the Bureau:

INTERDEPARTMENT RADIO ADVISORY COMMITTEE: This committee held a meeting on March 2, 1944, and [redacted] Attended. Only two items at this IRAC meeting concerned the Bureau. The first was the approval without objection of the extension of authority on the FBI frequency 11490 KC whereby we are permitted to use 3 kilowatts of power and tone modulation on this frequency. The second item dealt with the move of the radio station from Juneau, Alaska to Anchorage, Alaska and resulted in the approval of nine Bureau frequencies for use at Anchorage.

With regard to the following committees, it would appear that they have all ceased to function in that no meetings have been held as long as a year in most instances. I propose, therefore, that they be eliminated henceforth from my monthly reports on committees unless it is desired that I carry them in an inactive status.

JOINT CRYPTANALYSIS COMMITTEE: This committee composed of FBI, Army, and Navy representatives serves under the Joint Intelligence Conference. No meetings were held during March and there has been no activity on the part of this committee in over fifteen months.

BACTERIAL WARFARE COMMITTEE: This is [redacted] committee. The FBI received no notice of any meetings to be held during March.

b6

COMMITTEE VIII, BOARD OF WAR COMMUNICATIONS: This is the police and municipal service committee of the Board and no meetings were held during March.

b7C

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES COMMITTEE ON TRUTH SERUM: This committee under the National Academy appears to have been abolished and the work taken over by OSS. The FBI received no notice of any meetings to be held during March.

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DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UC/NMS/bja/prm

RECORDED

EX-3

APR 26 1944

N

100-93216-114

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
APR 15 1944	
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE	
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL	FILE

ORIGINAL FILE

EPC:AF

~~SECRET~~

May 12, 1944

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~VIA GHQ ARMY/TRANSPORT COMMAND~~

[REDACTED]
Legal Attaché
American Embassy b6
London, England b7C

Dear [REDACTED]

370

Please refer to the Bureau's letter of March 2, 1944, and your letter of February 15, 1944, [REDACTED] on the [S] subject of ~~material warfare and sabotage~~.

b1

Please advise the Bureau whether you have had any further discussion and whether any further action on the part of the Bureau [S] in this matter is recommended at this time.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

CC-Liaison Section


7-21-2004
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nws/bja/pam
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3 (b) 7-21-2029

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Vohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Henion
Mr. Jumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED MAY 12 1944 *

P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

49 6 1944



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EXCEPT AS NOTED
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

American Embassy
London, England
May 18, 1944

~~SECRET~~

Communication 3051

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VIA ARMY COURIER SERVICE

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Liaison Section

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the Bureau's letter of May 12, 1944,
which made reference to the Bureau's letter of March 2, 1944 and
my letter of February 15, 1944,

b1

[redacted] on the subject of bacterial warfare ~~sabotage~~ (S)

The Bureau may take whatever action they deem appropriate
in this matter, [redacted]

b6

Very truly yours,

b6

b7C

Legal Attaché


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b7C

RECORDED

R
100-9326-116
F B I
35 JUN 1944
SERIAL NO. 1
7-21-2004

~~SECRET~~



7-21-2004
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UO/MAR/bjw/paw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(6) 7-21-2029

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

F.P.Coffey

P.C. 44



Experiments concerning defence against bacterial warfare and sabotage have been pursued in this country for some years. The subject has always been considered as ultra-secret because, apart from obvious reasons, it was considered that any leakage to the enemy, either through indiscretion or espionage, that we were interested in this subject might cause the enemy to start this type of warfare or to make propaganda about Allied intentions. Consequently most elaborate security measures have always been laid on.

At a certain stage in this research work it was felt desirable to increase the scale of experiments, and I understand that the United States was approached and certain authorities agreed to carry out very much larger scale experimental work in the U.S. than was possible over here. Liaison on this subject in this country is maintained with [redacted]

b6
b7C

It is said that bacterial warfare research in the United States comes under the U. S. Chemical Warfare Service, but it is also said that the U. S. War Department accepts no responsibility for bacterial warfare research, though they raise no objection to the Chemical Warfare Service carrying out work on it as "an agent on behalf of [redacted]"

In addition to work being done by the Chemical Warfare Service, which is centred in Camp Detrich about 40 miles from Washington, which is in charge of an ex-oil chemist named Colonel Chittick, there is a certain amount of work of a laboratory nature going on in various outside institutions which, in the past, has been under the immediate direction of [redacted]

[redacted] It is thought that there may recently have been some changes in the set up.

It is said that [redacted] has appointed two "Public Relations' Officers" for the subject of bacterial warfare research, one of them being [redacted]

b6
b7C

According to a report made by an English professor who visited America to discuss this subject, certain aspects of security were not maintained at as high a level as in England. It seems that in view of the repercussions there would be if there was the slightest leakage about this matter, the whole of this subject should be closely examined from the security point of view.

R

RECORDED 600-93216-116
F B I
4 JUN 12 1944

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY [signature]

191 Col P.C.
79 JUL 19 1944

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

EPC:AF

TO : MR. E. A. TAMM [REDACTED] 571
 FROM : E. P. COFFEY [REDACTED]
 SUBJECT: Bacterial Warfare - 100-93216
 Lt. Col. Howard Irving Cole

DATE: 6/14/44

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Nease
[REDACTED]

b6

b7C at my office today and introduced [REDACTED] is a chemist who has a lifetime of experience in leprosy, in the chemistry and treatment thereof.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED]

b6

b7C

b7D

[REDACTED] suggested that henceforth any exchange of data on the subject of bacterial warfare be handled through [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] further advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

R

EX-38

RECORDED

INDEXED

100-93216-117

In a general conversation I gathered that the work at [REDACTED] is progressing satisfactorily and that they are in production up there now. On the other hand the work at their other secret plant, which is somewhere down in [REDACTED] appears not yet to be in production.

b6

[REDACTED] further stated that requests for furnishing information to [REDACTED] would be confirmed in a letter to the Director from [REDACTED] for the present, will continue to maintain his offices in the National Academy of Sciences Building.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 602674/c/wm/bja/DKd

49
74 JUN 27 1944

EX-38

CHelsea 2-5225

Current Book Company

212 1006 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

June 8, 1944

Walter Winchell, Esq.
c/o The New York Mirror
235 E. 45th Street
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Winchell:

Recently a copy of ~~Japan's Secret Weapon~~ was forwarded you - because of its startling disclosures. Many newspapers are doing feature articles on this exposé' and if you are interested in having some "inside information" we shall be glad to assist you in every possible way.

This book is the first book - Thoroughly documented - on disease (germ) warfare, and shows that the Japanese were contemplating germ warfare as early as 1938.

We welcome your comments.

Very truly yours,

Current Publishing Co. *T*

b6

b7C

RR/EG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 uc/nus/bja/PLW

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

100-9326-118
F B T
105 37 JUN 30 1944

FIRE LABORATORY
b6
b7C

ack wwd
6-7-44 325-H46
see 100-325-H46
get copy (B)

52 JUL 31 1944 76

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

JFB:TD

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : J. F. Buckley

SUBJECT: "JAPAN'S SECRET WEAPON" -
Japanese Matter

DATE: 6-30-44

b6
b7C

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hender
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease

Reference is made to the letter recd. ^{b7C} from Walter Winchell which was addressed to him by [redacted] under date of June 8, 1944. [redacted] alleges that a copy of the book "Japan's Secret Weapon" has startling disclosures and "inside information." [redacted]

ACTION: Inasmuch as the Bureau is not in possession of the contents of this book and in view of the indication that it will probably receive widespread publicity, the NY Office was telephonically advised today to obtain a copy of the book and forward it to the Bureau immediately so that it can be reviewed.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/8/90 BY SP1 AGSC

307009

*Book received &
forwarded to laboratory
4/1/44*

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

100-93216-117
F B I

138 37 JUN 30 1944

EX-54

Ziff

52 JUL 31 1944



JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CC-287

TDB : AWK

100-93216

August 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COFFEY

Re: ~~Japan's Secret Weapon~~
by Barclay Newman - Book Review.

Following is an analysis of the contents of the above-entitled book, by Mr. Beach of this section.

"The fore part of the book is devoted to hysteria creating announcements by the author that the bacteriologists of the Japanese Military Department and the subsidized research laboratories of Japan have fully prepared disease producing organisms for bacterial warfare and sabotage; that they have used the secret weapon experimentally on China (bubonic plague, infected material dropped from airplanes) and undermined the defenders of Bataan by spreading malaria.

The author exhibits considerable knowledge of tropical disease bacteria and human parasites. He sets out to describe diseases caused by the germs and insists that the Japanese scientists have stepped up the virulence of these germs in Japanese laboratories for purposes of total destruction. He has completely ignored the fact that many of the diseases he mentions are unknown as regards the manner in which they are spread in nature as well as the fact that some of them have resisted methods of culturing.

inf

576

The end of the book is devoted to a plea for more consciousness of the dangers of what he chooses to term "Oligodynamic Warfare"; what dangers are in store for this country when the troops return to this country from the tropics at termination of hostilities. He also makes a bid for a tremendous increase in medical research and in the entire medical field to promote health and welfare in post-war years.

There is attached a book review by T. A. Bisson which was clipped from the Book of the Month Club "News" for August, 1944 and which very well describes the book from the lay standpoint. Also attached is the book itself.

CONTINUED

Respectfully,

D. J. Parsons 139

100-93216-120
F 13-3
27 SEP 6 1964



52 SEP 27 1944 168



BARCLAY NEWMAN

Japan's Secret Weapon

By BARCLAY NEWMAN

THE facts presented in this sensationaly written exposé of Japan's secret preparations for disease warfare are sufficient to establish a *prima facie* case which calls for further study and investigation. Sober evidence adduced by the author is weakened by the exaggerated tone and style of the writing. It seems clear that Japanese scientists, centered in the Tokyo Institute for Infectious Diseases, have devoted immense effort to stepping up the potency of epidemic disease carriers. Yoneji Miyagawa, director of the Institute, is pictured as a world authority in this field, which particularly includes research on viruses, bacilli, fungi, and cancer-creating chemicals. Convincing proof exists that the Japanese have resorted to disease warfare in China. The facts attending several recent outbreaks of plague in China, as well as the testimony of responsible Chinese and foreign doctors on the scene, leave small doubt of deliberate Japanese efforts to spread disease carriers. Beyond these substantial items of evidence, strengthened by the analogy in Japanese use of opium as a wholesale demoralizer, the book depends largely on innuendo and suggestion to build up its case. The more extreme prognostications of the author as to what the world is to experience from Japan's disease laboratories during the final stages of the war may also be discounted. It must be added, nevertheless, that there is a disturbing side to this book, that it is not entirely spun out of whole cloth. It would be reassuring to know that medical personnel from the armed services, preferably with a knowledge of Japanese, were engaging in a thorough examination of the whole subject. (Price, \$2.50)

T. A. BISSON

CONTAINED
IN THIS ISSUE
3/8/40 BORN AGAIN

Book of the Month Club
News. August 1944

53

100-93216-120

ENCLOSURE

188 Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

JJ
TO : D. M. Ladd
FROM : J. F. Buckley
SUBJECT: BACTERIAL WAR

DATE: August 8, 1944

b6

b7C

b6
b7C There was referred to the Bureau, by Walter Winchell, a letter from [redacted] describing a book entitled "Japan's Secret Weapon" by Barclay Newman.

This book, secured through the New York Field Office, asserts that the Japanese will engage in bacteriological warfare and purports to describe the methods which the Japanese plan to use.

ACTION:

RECORDED & INDEXED
106 EX-4

As it appears that this book is primarily of interest to the Laboratory, it is suggested that it be forwarded to the Technical Laboratory for their information.

57 Attachment 217
SEP 29 1944
RECEIVED
in Berlin Library
9-15-44 EFC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 600367

100-93216-121

Office Memorandum

• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
SWR:MGC

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

b6

FROM : Mr. S. S. Alden

b7C

SUBJECT:

DATE: December 9, 1944

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. E. A. Tamm
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Coffey
 Mr. Cleavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Carson
 Mr. Hendon
 Mr. Mumford
 Mr. Jones
 Mr. Quinn, Tamm
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Neane
 Miss Beahm
 Miss Candy

While discussing matters of interest to the Bureau with [redacted]

[redacted] Special Agent [redacted] of the Liaison Section pointed out to Colonel Moses that the Bureau was interested in receiving any information concerning foreign sabotage methods and techniques.

b6

[redacted] inquired of [redacted] whether or not the Bureau would be interested in any information pertaining to bacteriological warfare.

b7C

[redacted] explained to [redacted] to some length that it would be of great assistance to the work being carried on by the Bureau, especially pertaining to its possible use by saboteurs in the United States. [redacted] stated that he understood the Bureau's interest, but that he could not distribute information to the Bureau without the authority of certain individuals outside of the Military Intelligence Service.

It should be noted that the War Department is carrying on extensive research work of a most confidential nature dealing with bacteriological warfare. As you will recall, this work is being carried on by several isolated organizations under the supervision of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

b6

[redacted] pointed out to [redacted] that if he was furnished with a letter by the Bureau stating the Bureau's interest in bacteriological warfare information he would gladly furnish this letter to a committee which would meet and determine whether or not any information developed along these lines could be brought to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b7C

It is suggested that this be routed to the Sabotage Section for their consideration and if they are desirous of procuring this information that a letter be addressed to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Attention: [redacted] setting forth the Bureau's interest in this matter, which letter should be returned to [redacted] for personal delivery to [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2007 BY 60267/cchms/bja/PRM SPB

b6

b7C

5 DECEMBER 1944

RECORDED

SEARCHED

INDEXED

49

SERIALIZED

FILED

100-9321612
FBI
DEC 14 1944

Oregon Has Jap Balloon Hunt

PORTLAND, Or., Dec. 31 (UPI) — The Portland office of the FBI announced tonight it is investigating reports that a large Japanese balloon has been found about 10 miles west of Estacada, Or., in a heavily wooded area.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 307009
DATE 17190 BY SP1 AGS/C

100-93216-123
ENCLOSURE

CC:ELC
100-93216-123

January 11, 1945

RECORDED

Dear [redacted]

b6

b7C

Your letter of January 3, 1945, with enclosure, is before me for acknowledgment.

I have carefully noted the content of your communication and enclosure and wish to thank you for bringing the information contained therein to my attention.

If in the future you should obtain any additional information which you believe to be of interest to this Bureau, I want you to feel free to communicate directly with the Special Agent in Charge of our San Francisco Field Division which is located at Room 1729, 111 Sutter Building, San Francisco 4, California.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SEARCHED
INDEXED
SERIALIZED
FILED
DATE 3/8/90 BY SP1 AGS
307009

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

JAN 11 1945 P.M.
FBI - WASHINGTON D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

61 JAN 15 1945

DJS
EWG
M

REASON
COPY

TELETYPE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UCMW/JB/PL

FBI BUTTE 1-12-45 b6 3-47 PM
DIRECTOR [REDACTED] b7C CENT [REDACTED]

X-711
302009
JM
[REDACTED]
DRAFT BY 26: 60267/UCMW/JB/PL

[REDACTED] JAPANESE BALLOON LANDING KALISPELL, MONTANA, DECEMBER

ELEVEN, FORTYFOUR, ESPIONAGE.

HAS JUST CALLED AND REQUESTED THAT AGENTS IN EXAMINING PLACES
WHERE BALLOONS ARE FOUND, LOOK FOR SMALL VIALS. HE STATES THAT
THERE ARE ABOUT FOUR DISEASES OF LIVESTOCK WHICH COULD
PRACTICALLY WIPE OUT LIVESTOCK IN THIS COUNTRY AND THAT IT IS
REPORTED THAT LIVESTOCK DISEASE GERMS HAVE BEEN SPREAD IN RUSSIA
AND IN CHINA BY ENEMY AGENTS. (X)U

53FEB 13 1945
BANISTER
ACK AND HOLD PLS

5-50 PM OK FBI WASH DC MVC

b6
b7C

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED
Handed to ONI & P 100-93216-
1961/3/45 2PM
FEB 7 1945
ORIGINAL-DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/mel/gj/paw
ON 11-1-2004
FBI, CJ, AB/AB-25-2004
60267 uc/mel/gj/paw 11-1-2004

American Embassy
London, England
June 1, 1945

ATTENTION: SIS EUROPEAN DESK

VIA US ARMY COURIER SERVICE

Director, FBI
Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C

Dear Sir:

Re: BACTERIAL WARFARE

As of interest to the Bureau, there is set out below
a copy of a letter which [redacted]

[redacted] addressed to [redacted]

[redacted] which [redacted] made avail-

able to me:

(S)(U)

"In reviewing the files of one [redacted]
[redacted] who was engaged upon the German
bacteria warfare program the attached report was noted and was
thought to be of interest to your office. This report is dated
[redacted] and comes from a [redacted] to [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] It is a report of his trip to Switzerland from 9 to
23 August 1943, at which time he attempted to obtain information
on B. W."

The report which is classified as ~~Secret~~, reads as follows:

"SIN No. 245/43g

OKH-SIN
No. 30F/43g RECD 7-21-2004

1. [redacted] Informed by [redacted]
[redacted] subject of BW - promised aid or help on the matter.

2. Rpts expected from following on BW: German Legation Bern: 7M

b6
b7C

3. [redacted] declared himself willing to obtain
information on BW from friends.

EX-39
RECORDED & INDEXED

26
300-93216-125

300-93216-125

FOR DEFENSE



4. [redacted] Appears to be anti-German, has Jewish assistant. Has
not been approached by [redacted] However,

[redacted] - willing to get information from Moser on BW.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

50 JUL 5 1945

~~SECRET~~

5.

b6

b7C

[redacted] Described as cautious by politically reliable.
Had no information on BW - willing to work on it. [redacted]
[redacted] receives regularly the Veterinary Bulletin English,
which could be photostated on information on animal BW.

6. Contact not yet established with [redacted]

[redacted] - Working with
[redacted] acquired thru [redacted]

7.

b6

b7C

[redacted] - Carefully approached on BW.
Promised to get more information within next 2 months.
Mentions [redacted] whom he believes has
information on BW. Also referred to Dr. Plauchiger (Davos)
who has written book on disease of animals.

8.

[redacted] - contacted on BW promised
help.

9.

Confidential with representative of [redacted]

Appeared to be informed on subject and promised continued
interest. [redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

10. Confidential with [redacted] on questions
of Red Cross. [redacted] much upset of possibility of
BW. Res. of names to be contacted for further information
on BW:



Very truly yours,

J. A. Cimperman
Assistant Legal Attaché

JAC: FML

~~SECRET~~

MSW:mkm

July 6, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

b6

b7C

Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey *✓* *47* _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____

You may be interested in the following information which was reported by the SAC of the Norfolk Field Division following a Weekly Intelligence Conference on June 28, 1945.

brought with him as a guest

U.S. Army Air Forces, Langley Field, Virginia. had until recently been assigned to handling investigations concerning the landing of Japanese balloons in the states of North and South Dakota and Nebraska. The pertinent portion of the SAC's letter follows:

b6

b7C

"I was interested to learn that recently several Japanese balloons were found in that territory which were determined to have been carrying bacteria. The bacteria consisting of Anthrax, are placed in the hydrogen. I was told that such bacteria mainly effects cattle. When the bacteria lands on wheat or other types of farm land where food is being raised for the cattle, the bacteria remain in the food when it is eaten by the cattle, and upon human consumption of the milk or meat, the bacteria can be passed on. He stated that the Army is not greatly concerned over the number of such balloons which have been located, but that it does show a different trend in the Japanese attack, due to the fact that such balloons in the past have been known only to carry small bombs.

(S)(X)(U)

Respectfully,

b6

b7C



EX-6

RECORDED

1 Mm

7-6 ^{un}
100-93216
28 1400

July 6, 1945

28 1400

X MSW

SEARCHED BY 60267 UC/Nuc/bja/PDW
ON 7-21-2004

33 800 4

THIS MEMORANDUM IS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES
TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ACTION IS TAKEN AND NOT SENT TO FILES

RE

Director, FBI AIR MAIL

4-18-47

SAC, Boston

THE FAS; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

REFER FIVE-IS

*SP
T-20*

P

Reference is made to Boston letters and teletypes of an earlier date reflecting that G-2 at Boston is extremely desirous of obtaining any information pertaining to discussions of biological warfare by members of the subject organization. The Bureau has stated that it would furnish such information directly to G-2 at Washington, D. C.

[redacted] attended a meeting of [redacted]

Bacteriological Warfare
[redacted]
[redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN / 600 - 3444-52-58

SF 32 *100-93214-12* EX
RECORDED *350312*

EX-75 *100-93214-12* F B I

55 MAY 6 1947

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 JLG/mmc/bp/rmc

6-18-47

Director, FBI

4-18-47

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Inasmuch as [redacted] at Boston have indicated [redacted]

[redacted] it is felt that the Bureau may well wish to communicate the foregoing to the Army. Additional developments as disclosed to the informant will be promptly reported to the Boston Field Division and thus transmitted to the Bureau.

In the absence of specific directions, the Boston Field Division will not engage in any investigation beyond that of informant coverage.

BSQ:cwm
100-19119

COPY:FQ

EX-75



9

RECORDED 100 - 730542-X

CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Date: May 5, 1947 100 - 73216-126X

b6

To: Director of Intelligence

War Department General Staff
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

b7C

Attention: [redacted]

8

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director - Federal Bureau of Investigation

7

Subject: THE FAS; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Information has been received from a reliable and extremely confidential source that on April 16, 1947, [redacted]
[redacted]

44452 - 5

b6

b7C

b7D

RGF:mjp
100-344152

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NW/bja/PAm
ON 7.21.2004

7
68 MAY 21 1947

Recon

According to the informant. [redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

The above is furnished to you for your information and any action
deemed appropriate. It would be appreciated if you would advise whether any
of the material mentioned by [redacted] is classified by the War Department.

COPY: FQ

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 22, 1947
TELETYPE

WASH FROM NEW YORK 9 22 6-36 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

b2

[REDACTED] ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL ACT. ON THE EVENING OF
CONF. INFT. [REDACTED]
MAY TWENTY, FORTYSEVEN, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]

b7D

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-346735-224

[REDACTED] IN VIEW OF LETTER TO THE BUREAU FROM THE
BOSTON OFFICE DATED APRIL EIGHT, FORTYSEVEN ADVISING THAT CIG
STATED THAT BIOLOGICAL WARFARE IS SECOND IN SECRECY TO ATOMIC ENERGY,
THIS INFO IS BEING FORWARDED SO THAT THE BUREAU MAY ADVISE SID IF IT
SO DESIRES.

SCHEIDT

HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60216770/nms/bja/Pan

SEARCHED
INDEXED
35

100-93816-126X
100-350312
F B I
43 JUN 3 1947
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

58 JUN 10 1947

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. LADD

DATE: 9/4/47

FROM : E. G. Fitch

SUBJECT:

b6

b7C

b7D

[redacted] indicated to [redacted] that he had learned the following information through a confidential informant, the identity of which [redacted] believes to be [redacted]

✓ Mr. Tolson
 ✓ Mr. E. A. Tamm
 ✓ Mr. Clegg
 ✓ Mr. Coffey
 ✓ Mr. Glavin
 ✓ Mr. Ladd
 ✓ Mr. Nichols
 ✓ Mr. Rosen
 ✓ Mr. Tracy
 ✓ Mr. Mohr
 ✓ Mr. Carson
 ✓ Mr. Hendon
 ✓ Mr. Mumford
 ✓ Mr. Jones
 ✓ Mr. Quinn Tamm
 Tele. Room
 ✓ Mr. Nease
 Miss Beahm
 Miss Candy

b1

warfare. (S)

b1

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the Internal Security Section and that they contact key field offices and have them confidentially contact their informants with a view to developing any information along these lines.

SWR:rrr

Classified by SP8575/ccl
 Declassify per OADR 3-8-88
 #259,494

SP8575/ccl
 3-8-88
 #259,494

RECORDED
 INDEXED

45 100-95216-1
 100-73916-1
 SEP 13 1947
 34 SEP 9 1947

EX-30

TEDEXEL

700-7052/6-1666
00-93216-166X2] (S)(U)

SAC, New York

October 9, 1947

Director, FBI

RUSSIAN WAR PLANS

7/21/47
CLASSIFIED U 60267 UC/NLS/BjA/PAM
DECLASSIFY ON: 2029 (0) 7/21/2029

EX-81

b1

(S)

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b1

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
San Francisco
Los Angeles E D 11
Chicago
Boston Oct 10 1947 P.M.
Washington Field
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Lead
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

EHM:WMJ:TD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-01 BY SP8BTP/CL

Classification by SP8BTP/CL
Date 10-10-01 BY SP8BTP/CL
259-494

D

26

176

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ladd
 FROM : J. P. Coyne
 SUBJECT: RUSSIAN WAR PLANS
 INTERNAL SECURITY - R

DATE: October 15, 1947

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Olmsted _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Beard _____
 Miss Gandy _____

Reference is made to a previous memorandum submitted to you by [redacted] regarding the captioned matter, which indicated that during the time [redacted] was in Los Angeles an unknown woman had furnished information to the effect that Russia had produced a more potent weapon than the atom bomb.

[redacted] memorandum indicated this information had been obtained from [redacted]. The information furnished in [redacted] memorandum was forwarded to the Los Angeles Office. That Office was advised that further efforts would be made through the original informant to identify the unknown woman.

On October 13, 1947, Special Agent [redacted] of the Liaison Section advised that [redacted] told him the original informant in this case was [redacted] be contacted directly regarding this matter. [redacted] had furnished this information to the FBI. [redacted] might be able to identify the unknown woman.

ACTION:

b6
b7C
b7D

There is attached hereto for your approval a letter to the San Diego Office instructing them to contact [redacted] and secure from him the desired information. It should be noted that [redacted] well known to the Special Agent in Charge of the San Diego Office.

b6
b7C
b7D

RECORDED

INDEXED

FILED

Attachment ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE.

FJB:EW

b6
b7C

Classified by SP853/CAL
 Declassify on: OADR 3-8-88
 #239494

DECLASSIFIED BY 602167 UC/NUS/EP/PAC
 ON 7-21-2004

SAC, San Diego

Director, FBI

October 16, 1967

RUSSIAN WAR PLANS
INTERNAL SECURITY

RECORDED 00-93216-126X3 (S)(u)

Classified by 252-194 BY: SACR 3888
SACDOL

b1

(S)

CLASSIFIED BY: 6020742/NLO/6JH/Plan
DECLASSIFY ON: 25Y(1) 21/2029

(S)

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(S)

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[redacted] has now advised the Bureau's Liaison Section that [redacted] originally furnished this information to him and he has suggested that [redacted] could possibly identify the unknown woman referred to above. He also stated that it would be all right to tell [redacted] that he furnished this information to the Bureau.

b6

b7C

b7D

I would like to have you call upon [redacted] and endeavor to ascertain the identity of this unidentified woman and whether any additional information known to him regarding this instance.

MEM: Tolson
Eckert
Gandy
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Trotter
Mr. Durkee
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn-Tucker
Tele. Room
Mr. Rosen
Miss Pandy

145 1967 p.m.
13

DEHM:WMJ

(S) INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/01 BY SP/SP
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

b1

4
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4
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Chicago

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN WAR PLANS

DATE: October 20, 1947

Rebulet October 9 last to the New York Office.

A check of informants on Communist and Russian matters in this territory has been made regarding ~~Soviet bacteriological warfare~~ with negative results. An effort was also made to determine whether any scientists, physicians, chemists, pharmacists, or bacteriologists who are members of the Communist Party have been conducting research in bacteriology. No information has been received concerning this.

This office will continue to be alert for information of this type and the Bureau will be furnished any data coming to the attention of this office.

WLR:MAS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/Pmaw

RECORDED
INDEXED

21 OCT 22 1947

SF-114

b6

b7C

100-93216-126X1
100-93216-126X2
FBI
21 OCT 22 1947
SF-114
b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON ENVELOPE
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UC/WWE/bja/PRM

100-93016-127

JK

0 Bacteriological evidence

Lab. File destroyed Date 9/11/45

Contains:

original evidence

work sheet

1

513
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON ENVELOPE
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60367/DeWolfe/JR/AM

51 OCT 4 1945

100-93216

70M

Recorded
10-1-43
VMK

L-40

*Consumed
in Exam*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Laboratory Work Sheet

10/11/43

Bgn

Re: Laboratory Examination of wooden top
bullets.

File # 100-93216
Lab. # CH-2569

Examination requested by: Norfolk

Date of reference communication: 9-29-43 Let

Date received: 9-30-43 VMK

Examination requested: Miscellaneous (Bacteriological)

Result of Examination:

Examination by: White

Specimens submitted for examination

Q1. Six wooden topped bullets

Consumed
2 carb. guns to be retained photo
in firearms collection from 3rd mth
b6 [redacted] b7c
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UC/NW/bj/PMS

Please file

100-93216-1

100-93216-1

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NOTARY PUBLIC

PHOTOCOPIES

b7C

October 28th, 1947

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Federal Bureau Investigation,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Probably you have thought of this matter before but it still might be of some interest to you. Of course I know of your work during the war with stamps in detecting slight changes to carry messages and the sending of messages under the punctuation marks in letter.

That got me to considering the possibility of spreading pestilences by means of cultures of most virulent bacteria and spores under valuable stamps sent from, for instance USSR. I have made cultures on Petri dishes from stamps soaked off envelopes and found about everything in the line of bacteria and spores.

Stamps are usually soaked off the envelope with warm water and this whole thing could spread contagion over the whole country in short order. Of course the people could be advised to soak off the stamps in bactericidal solution.

Just an idea but it might 'pan dirt'.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UC/MWS/bjw/jmz

RECORDED
INDEXED
NOV 4 1947

100-93216-1288

1947

Ex-1A

November 3, 1947

b6
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Dear [redacted]

RECORDED INDEXED Your letter dated October 28, 1947, has been received and I do want to thank you for the patriotic motives which prompted you to write as you did. It occurred to me that you might like to read the material which I have enclosed.

EX-14

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosure

How To Fight Communism

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 600267 uc/nus/bja/rmc

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Gleavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Dancy

WIRELESS MAIL
WN:jamb:5

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAIL BOX 5

★ NOV 3 1947 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

X-264

m9

JM

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, San Diego

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN WAR PLANS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

DATE: 11/6/47

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE.

Rebulet October 16, 1947.

b6 At the request of this office [redacted] personally contacted the informant who furnished him with [redacted] referred to in reference letter. [redacted] informant advised [redacted]

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[redacted] will advise [redacted] at once upon ascertaining any such information and the General will immediately contact this office.

Confidential informants of this office on Russian and Communist matters were contacted in regard to any similar statements of this nature and none had any information that such statements had been made in this vicinity. ~~(S) (U)~~

Informants have also advised that there are no scientists, physicians, chemists, pharmacists or bacteriologists who are members of the local Communist Party and that to their knowledge no Party member in this area is presently engaged in research in bacteriology. ~~(S) (U)~~

The Bureau will be immediately advised upon receipt of any further information regarding the captioned matter. In the meantime this matter is being referred upon completion to the office of origin.

NSH:EWJ
1CO-6867

cc-Los Angeles

Classified by SPBBTJ/CRL
Declassify on: 04DR 3-8-58
959,494

RECORDED & INDEXED
108 1100-23216-128
F B I H
37 NOV 1947

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DECLASSIFIED BY 100367 ac/nw/bjpm/jpm
ON 7-21-2009

53 NOV 29 1947

~~SECRET~~
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

New York, New York

DATE: 7-21-2004
CLASSIFIED BY 6026740/Mas/bja/Ptaw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3-1, 7-21-2029

November 7, 1947
CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI

Re: ~~RUSSIAN WAR PLANS~~
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter of October 9, 1947, captioned, RUSSIAN WAR PLANS, requesting that information be obtained concerning members of the Communist Party who may be engaged in ~~Bacteriological Research~~.

Informants and other sources available to the New York office have furnished the following information.

Special Agent [redacted] on October 17, 1947, advised

that in the recent past [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

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Reference is made to letter to the Director dated December 4, 1946 from New York, captioned, "COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., DISTRICT No. 2, NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION", which sets forth information reported by [redacted] concerning [redacted] allegedly a Communist Party member; one

JMS:MFB
100-80472

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

et. 5 Army Serial
12/1/47 C.H.M.

100-93216-12891

34 NOV 12 1947

317
68 NOV 29 1947

~~SECRET~~

125 b6
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~~SECRET~~

Letter-Director
JMS:MFB
100-80472

November 7, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

According to [redacted]

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The files of the New York Office reflect that [redacted]

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in 1944 as being active members of the Northwest Section, Communist Party, in Los Angeles. [Concerning [redacted] the files of the New York Office reflect no information which could be identified with this person.] The files of this office reflect that the name [redacted] appeared on the 1942 membership list of the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS and on the mailing list of the NEW YORK CONFERENCE FOR INALIENABLE RIGHTS.

In a recent interview with Agent [redacted] advised that he would attempt to obtain more identifying data concerning [redacted]

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It has also been learned through informants and other sources that the American Association of Scientific Workers and the Association of New York Scientists, and other individuals have recently evidenced interest in bacteriological warfare.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter-Director
JMS:MFB
100-80472

November 7, 1947
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The ~~X~~ "News Letter", published by ANYS, dated August 25, 1947, made available by an informant of the New York Office, contains a paragraph captioned, "Bombs, Bacteria, and Peace", which sets forth the results of a discussion held by Dr. THEODORE ROSEBURY concerning biological warfare, concerning which it is stated it might be comparable to atomic energy as a weapon of mass destruction. A resolution was adopted by ANYS that "The UN efforts toward international control of weapons of mass destruction be supported, strengthened, and extended to include, not only atomic bombs, but biological warfare as well." (see X page 4)

Two photostatic copies of the aforementioned "News Letter" are enclosed for the Bureau.

On October 24, 1947, there appeared in the ~~X~~ New York Herald Tribune, a lengthy article by PETER KIHSS concerning bacterial warfare which reflects that, on September 26, 1947, Dr. HARRY GRUNDFEST and Dr. MAURICE B. VISSCHER submitted to the ~~X~~ United Nations General Assembly on behalf of the AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS, a bacterial warfare memorandum proposing that the Assembly instruct the UN Atomic Energy Commission to devote part of its time to the problem of bacterial warfare which the AASW considers "the pre-eminent terror weapon". The Tribune article reflects that Dr. IGNACY ZLOTOWSKI, Polish delegate to the NAEC considered the memorandum to be of great significance. (see y p4)

Two photostatic copies of the Herald Tribune article are enclosed for the Bureau.

b6 [redacted] contacts with [redacted]
b7C have been reported to the Bureau in connection with current investigations of [redacted]
[redacted] which are being conducted currently by the New York Office.

WALTER WINCHELL, during his broadcast Sunday evening, October 12, 1947, and printed in his column in the New York Daily Mirror on October 14, 1947, discussed Russia's preparation for World War III. Concerning biological warfare, WINCHELL stated, "The Communists have germ warfare already..... Every resource in the Communist Party has been converted to war. The Russians have developed germ warfare. The cholera plague in Egypt is suspect abroad of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter-Director
JMS:MFB
100-60472

November 7, 1947
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"being a Soviet experiment. There are some very suspicious things about that plague in Egypt although no positive evidence either way."

Concerning WINCHELL's comments on germ warfare, there appeared in the New York Times of October 9, 1947 a letter to the editor submitted by THEODOR ROSEBURY and ELVIN A. KABAT which comments on WINCHELL's "cholera" statement and refers to a "detailed report on bacterial warfare written in 1942 and published this year in the May issue of the Journal of Immunology.

Two copies of the ROSEBURY-KABAT letter to the Times are enclosed herewith for the Bureau.

The files of the New York Office reflect that [redacted]
are both interested in bacteriology [redacted]

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[redacted] They have in the past identified themselves with pro-Communist and pro-Russian movements though they are not known to be members of the Communist Party. They were both members of the American-Soviet Science Society which featured free exchange of scientific information between American and Soviet scientists in all fields.

[redacted] in April, 1944, was reported by a highly confidential source of the Newark Office as being a member of the Communist Party. [redacted] interest in the field of bacterial warfare is apparent. Investigation has revealed him to be pro-Communist and pro-Russian. [redacted]

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Confidential Informants have advised that [redacted]
[redacted] has also recently evidenced interest in bacterial warfare [redacted]

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[redacted] is not known to be a member of the Communist Party, but files of this office reflect that she is pro-Communist and pro-Russian.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter-Director
JMS:MFB
100-80472

November 7, 1947
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It is to be noted that on October 15, 1947, [redacted]
[redacted] advised that [redacted] in-

formed [redacted]

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The Baltimore Office, by letter to the Director, October 23, 1947, reported the portions of WALLACE's speech that were concerned with bacterial warfare.

Concerning the efforts of the ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS and the ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK SCIENTISTS and other individuals to influence the UN AEC to consider bacterial warfare along with atomic energy, [redacted]
[redacted] of the Washington Field Office and [redacted] a Confidential Informant of the New York Office, have stated that [redacted]

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Concerning [redacted] mentioned in Bureau letter of October 9, 1947, the New York Office has thus far received no information from its sources as to the identity of the woman who allegedly made the statement regarding the "Soviet weapon".

The Bureau will be advised immediately upon receipt of information to be obtained by [redacted]

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Very truly yours,

Edward Scheidt

EDWARD SCHEIDT, SAC

CC: Los Angeles

Enclosures for Bureau (6)

~~SECRET~~

N.Y. 7-19-47
Bacterial Warfare

Claim Disputed of Experiment
to Induce Cholera Outbreak

The writers of the following letter, co-authors of the report on bacterial warfare recently made public, are associate professor and assistant professor respectively, at Columbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons.

To THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

A well-known radio commentator, in his broadcast on Sunday, Oct. 12, made the following statement:

"The Russians have developed germ warfare. The cholera plague in Egypt is suspected abroad of being a Soviet experiment. There are some very suspicious things about that plague in Egypt, although there's no positive evidence either way."

In a detailed report on bacterial warfare written in 1942 and published this year in the May issue of *The Journal of Immunology*, the undersigned pointed out that cholera "may probably be dismissed as unsuitable" for warfare. We gave reasons for this statement which are as valid today as they were in 1942.

We do not know the sources of any of the radio commentator's remarks on germ warfare. Our published statements indicate that any nation attempting such warfare would be likely to choose agents other than that of cholera. If an "experimental" attack were to be launched, it would hardly be done in such a way as to attract worldwide attention, as the cholera outbreak in Egypt was sure to do, and if actual warfare were intended it would not be likely to appear as an isolated attack in a relatively unimportant quarter.

One of the focal difficulties in bacterial warfare—one of its many aspects that make elimination of these weapons urgently necessary for maintenance of peace in the world—is the problem of distinguishing between natural and artificially induced outbreaks of disease. The radio commentator chose a poor example; but there is grave danger that on other occasions ugly rumors may be circulated which will be equally baseless but less easy to scotch. Is every unusual outbreak of disease in every politically troubled spot on earth to be called bacterial warfare?

THEODOR ROSEBURY

ELVIN A. KABAT

New York, Oct. 16, 1947.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/14/04 BY lmcguffin

The U. N. Yesterday

Friday, Oct. 3, 1947

Scientists Warn Assembly on Bacterial Warfare; Belgian Premier Replies to Slav States on Balkans

WARFARE — Warning that weapons of bacterial warfare can be manufactured in any country irrespective of size or wealth, the American Association of Scientific Workers appealed to the United Nations General Assembly for immediate study to eliminate what it called "the pre-eminent terror weapon." The United States delegation reserved comment, but Poland planned to raise the issue in the Atomic Energy Commission. Story on this page.



freedom of information on its own controlled press. Speaking in the assembly's social, humanitarian and cultural committee, the former first lady said that a Soviet request for the 1948 U. N. freedom of information conference in Geneva to base its work on such principles as the exposure of warmongers would be like describing black in order to define white. Story on this page.

LOVE — Canada charged that the Soviet Union is breaking up the happy home life of a Canadian diplomat and a Moscow ballerina, and called for action by the U. N.'s Human Rights

Scientists Ask Germ-Warfare Study by U. N.

U. S. Group Asserts Single Laboratory Could Spread Tremendous Destruction

By Peter Kihss

LAKE SUCCESS, L. I., Oct. 3.—The United Nations, unable thus far to agree on controlling atomic energy, has received a fervent appeal from American scientists to start immediate study of bacterial warfare, which the scientists called "the pre-eminent terror weapon."

In a memorandum which listed eleven forms of disease already investigated for possible use in warfare against humans, animals and plants, the American Association of Scientific Workers, representing 1,500 members, pointed out that a single small laboratory could manufacture enough germs to spread death on a tremendous scale.

A milliliter—an amount that would have to be measured by dropper—of a routine preparation of parrot-fever virus contains enough material, the scientists wrote, to infect 20,000,000 humans with the deadly disease. Ordinary virus laboratories, their memorandum added, could make thousands of milliliters with only common equipment and materials.

Ask Assembly Inquiry

The American scientists simply asked the General Assembly to undertake a preliminary examination of available factual data and listed 148 references in both general and technical literature. They proposed that the Assembly then instruct the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission to devote at least part of its time to the problem.

United States delegates have called attention to the bacterial-warfare problem in scientific documents submitted to the commission, whose field embraces elimination of all mass-destruction weapons. Today they reserved comment on the new memorandum. Their position heretofore has been that the commission should concentrate first on atomic energy, where control of uranium and thorium ores makes possible a relatively simpler technological control.

Dr. Ignacy Zlotowski, Polish member of the commission, considered the new memorandum of great significance. Dr. Zlotowski said he would ask the commission to discuss the issue at its next session, which remains to be called by the new chairman, Dr. T. P. Tsang, of China.

Would Ban Mass Weapons

Agreeing that the bacterial-warfare field offers unprecedentedly difficult problems of control, Dr. Zlotowski asserted, its very existence demonstrates "it is absolutely necessary to have as a first step the immediate prohibition of weapons of mass destruction."

The bacterial-warfare memorandum was submitted Sept. 26 to Secretary General Trygve Lie and delegates of the then fifty-five members of the Assembly. Signing the covering letter were Dr. Maurice B. Vischer, association president, who is chief of the physiology department at the University of Minnesota, and Dr. Harry Grundfest, international corresponding secretary, who is assistant professor of neurology at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The new memorandum pointed out that although bacterial warfare has never been used in a military operation, it was under investigation and development by both Germany and Japan. It recalled that a report to Robert P. Patterson, then Secretary of War, on results of joint American-British-Canadian research declared on Jan. 3, 1946, that "this type of warfare cannot be discounted."


Among diseases known to have been investigated in the recent war for purposes of bacterial warfare, the report listed botulism, anthrax, rabbit fever, undulant fever, glanders, parrot fever, rinderpest, Newcastle disease of poultry, fowl plague, fungous diseases of plants and synthetic hormone poisoning of plants.

100-93216-12811

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DATE 12/14/04 BY 60267 uc/nks/bja/cb

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NEWSLETTER

August 25, 1947

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/19/01 BY 60267AC/jms/gkz
#Q77600

Next Executive
Council Meeting
9/23, 354 Chandler

Editor: R.M. Noyes

Vol. 2

c/o. G. Weeks, 456 Riverside Drive, NY 27

No. 13

Bombs, Bacteria and Peace

Bombs, Bacteria and Peace was the topic of a membership meeting of the ANYS on August 5. Dr. Theodor Rosebury, senior author of the Rosebury-Kabat Report and later group leader at Camp Dietrich, discussed the potentialities of disease-producing organisms as military weapons. Although he admitted that the effectiveness of biological warfare could not be demonstrated with certainty prior to its actual use in a war which we all hope will never come, Dr. Rosebury indicated the serious potentialities of such use. He went on to point out that work on viruses and bacterial agents is carried out in hospitals and laboratories all over the world and that production of dangerous quantities could be effected without employing such large scale equipment as is necessary for the production of dangerous amounts of fissionable material. Therefore, biological warfare does not lend itself to the type of technical controls which offer some promise for removing the danger of atomic warfare, and the problem of biological warfare becomes even more obviously the problem of the elimination of war.

Dr. Irving Kaplan of the Brookhaven National Laboratory and the ANYS Executive Council, reviewed current developments in the UNAEC and stressed the establishment of effective control of atomic energy as an important step toward the prevention of war; failure to attain effective control would be a severe set-back.

Discussion from the floor centered around biological warfare and the possibility that it might be comparable to atomic energy as a weapon of mass destruction. The following resolution was adopted unanimously: Resolved that "The UN efforts toward international control of weapons of mass destruction be supported, strengthened, and extended to include not only atomic bombs but biological warfare as well."

MILITARY CONTROL IS NOT DEAD

When the long struggle of civilian versus military control of atomic energy culminated in the passage of the McMahon Bill, many scientists felt that the domestic problem was settled and that they could henceforth devote their full efforts to the problems of international control. Unfortunately, reports from Washington indicate that military control is far from dead. Several bills have been introduced with the intention of repealing the McMahon Bill and turning control of atomic energy over to the Army outright. Although there does not appear to be any likelihood that these measures will be passed at present, we are warned to expect serious trouble when the McMahon Bill comes up for renewal in 1948. So long as people continue to think of atomic energy as a military weapon and a national monopoly, so long will the ANYS and similar groups have a problem of domestic education which must not be neglected.

Clearance & Declassification

The present situation with regard to clearance of employees of the Atomic Energy Commission was discussed at some length during the Council Meeting of the Federation of American Scientists on August 9 and 10. Several cases have arisen in which decision with regard to clearance of persons have been delayed for six months or more after they had resigned from former positions in the expectation that they could be hired immediately. Whether the final decision in such a case is one of acceptance or rejection, there is no excuse for so much delay during which a man can neither carry out useful work nor receive any remuneration.

Other cases are known in which employment has been refused or terminated for reasons which were either trivial or ridiculous. The Association of Cornell Scientists is undertaking a documented study of those cases on which it can get definite information. If you know of any case of inefficiency or injustice in clearance, please notify Dr. Robert S. Rochlin, Dept. of Physics, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

The Council also discussed the present unsatisfactory situation of declassification of report. The original directives as to material to be classified and declassified left a large region in which decision is left to the discretion of the reviewer and several cases of confusion and inconsistency have resulted.

National Science Legislation

As readers are undoubtedly aware, a bill creating a National Science Foundation has been passed by both houses of Congress and vetoed by the President. The bill as originally passed by the Senate contained two amendments; one which provided for presidential appointment for distribution of 25% of the funds to state-supported institutions according to a fixed pattern. Neither amendment was included in the bill as passed by the House, and both amendments were stricken out by the joint conference committee. President Truman vetoed the bill not because he was opposed to a Science Foundation but because the bill as passed created an agency directly responsible neither to the President nor to Congress. Apparently much of the objection to the administrative set-up came from the Bureau of the Budget which opposed the precedent of an agency in which the Government was without control over the allocation of funds. Discussion of this situation at the recent Council meeting of the FAS indicated that probably no other bill will be passed before the next presidential election. It was also emphasized that the President had shown no real leadership in the matter and had waited until the bill was reported out onto the floor before he indicated what types of legislation would and would not be acceptable to the Administration. It appears that the President has no scientific adviser in his circle of intimates.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Los Angeles 13, California
November 8, 1947.

DECLASSIFIED BY *b6 b7c b7d b7e*
ON 7.21.2004

Director, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Dear Sir:

Reurlets of October 9 and 16, 1947.

~~CONF. INFT.~~

[redacted] who is familiar with Russian activities in the Los Angeles Field Division advised that he has no knowledge concerning the war plans of the Russian Government nor has he heard any comment concerning warfare developments of the Russians from any Russian individuals with whom he is acquainted in the Los Angeles area. He further advised that he knows of no scientists, physicians, chemists or bacteriologists who are of Russian extraction who have been conducting any research in the field of bacteriology in this area.

~~CONF. INFT.~~

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[redacted] advised that they have not heard anything concerning possible Russian war developments from any Communist source. Neither informant is aware that any scientist, chemist or bacteriologist in the Los Angeles area who might be affiliated with the Communist Party is presently conducting any research in the field of bacteriology. No comment has been heard by either informant from any Communist Party member indicating that any research in bacteriological warfare or other type of warfare is being conducted by any Communist Party member in this area.

[redacted] has explained that on several occasions [redacted]

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~~CONF. INFT.~~

[redacted] were also contacted by this office for any possible information concerning the Russian war plans with negative results.

SEARCHED
&
INDEXED

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R.B.
52 NOV 29 1947 253
25

63-248

Director, FBI


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Re: RUSSIAN WAR PLANS,
INTERNAL SECURITY-R.

November 8, 1947

Confidential informants of this office who were contacted concerning possible knowledge of Russian war plans have been requested to convey any information which they might receive concerning these plans immediately to this office. The Bureau will be advised immediately upon the receipt of any information relating to Russian war plans which this office receives.

Very truly yours,


R. B. HOOD,
SAC

JMC:NAW

100-23580

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY *100-10742/NUS/bjg/PAK*
ON 7-21-2004

12/11/47

SAC, Boston

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - G;
D BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
RIFER 5-1B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to Boston letter to the Bureau dated December 3
last and to Bureau teletype to Boston captioned [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - R," dated December 6 last. (u)

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The following information has been received from the informants
indicated concerning the subject matter of the two communications referenced.

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[redacted] (u)

100-10742-263-42

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[redacted]

(u)

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[redacted] commented that [redacted]

b7C

b7D

cc: New York
MSG:tech
100-2051
cc: 100-15806
100-361394

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b7D

CLASS: A REC'D BY SPC RDH
DATE: 7-21-04 1-2-4.2 2
TIME: 9-26-10
CS 99318

RECORDED

100-93716-131

5 221

X FBI

Director from SAC, Boston

12/11/47

Re: AASGW; IS-C
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE, IS-R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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X (U)

The meeting was held at the Littauer Center [redacted]. The following were also present at the public meetings: Dr. HARLOW SHAPLEY, LAWRENCE ARGUIMBAU (both subjects of pending Internal Security investigations in Boston), CARL GUTAG of the Biology Department at Harvard, and one ALBERT HARRIS, [redacted]

[redacted] The total attendance in the informant's estimate was between 150 and 200. [redacted]

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X (U)

ROSEBURY was introduced by FURRY and began his talk with a general discussion of the various types of bacteria which would be used in bacteriological warfare. He emphasized particularly staphylococcus, rabbit fever, the bubonic germ, and tetanus. He emphasized particularly that tetanus was one virus which could be used effectively in a war which was hard to control but which, in turn, was easily disseminated and quickly effective. He then

X

Director from SAC, Boston

12/11/67

Re: AAScW; IS-C
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE, IS-R

approached the problem from the standpoint that bacteriological warfare was a much more desirable means to an end than atomic warfare, inasmuch as with BW, human life is destroyed but not property. Thus the conquering nation using bacteriological warfare is enabled to take over a physically sound plant without the usual problems connected with prisoners of war or other human elements. X (U)

HARLOW SHAPLEY arose from the audience at this time to interrupt the speaker with his own comment. SHAPLEY pointed out that ROSEBURY was underestimating the situation, inasmuch as in these times, warring nations are not interested in whether or not property or human life is destroyed. The sole aim of a warring nation is to eliminate a competing factor on the face of the earth. Accordingly, a nation such as the United States would not care whether or not the physical facilities of an enemy were left intact upon the completion of a victorious war or not so long as the disrupting force in the American ideal had been eliminated. X (U)

ROSEBURY also expressed regret at the failure of the United States and Russia to reach a political accord and warned that the entire world could be devastated in any future war. He felt that the United States proposals on the control of atomic energy were inadequate and that the United States foreign policy left little chance for peace. He expressed the hope that a new administration, a complete reversal of foreign policy, and a new approach to international problems involving Russia would find us facing many, many years of peace. X (U)

The main thesis of ROSEBURY's talk was then developed. He urged those present, and particularly the membership of the Boston-Cambridge Branch of the American Association of Scientific Workers to exert pressure through the creation of public opinion upon the United Nations so that this agency might take the necessary steps to establish international control of biological warfare. The informant points out that this thesis is one well known to most of the scientists through the work of the New York Chapter of the AAScW in filing with Dr. IGNATZ ZLOWTONSKI, Polish Delegate to the UN Commission on Atomic Energy, a copy of the ROSEBURY-KABAT report with the request that the Commission of which ZLOWTONSKI is a member take steps to establish international controls. The informant noted that ROSEBURY did not suggest any particular method of international control or, for that matter, of national control of information concerned with BW. X (U)

In the question period which followed, an unidentified individual asked ROSEBURY whether or not the Russians had competent bacteriologists who could develop the germs and cultures which he had so vividly described. ROSEBURY stated that there were such men, and delved briefly into the history

Director from SAC, Boston

12/11/47

Re: ANSWER, IS-C
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE, IS-R

of Russian science which, as explained by him, showed a strong background in this field. SHAPLEY chose to state that one of the common misconceptions about Russia was that the country lacked competent scientists. He wished to state of his own authority that Russia possessed competent scientists in not only this field but in many related fields. He received a number of requests to suggest proposals for the control of BW which he definitely brushed aside. X (U)

Immediately following his platform appearance, ROSEBURY was interviewed in the presence of [redacted] and others by a reporter from the BOSTON HERALD. The interview resulted in a front page story in the HERALD headlined "Scientists Refusing to Work on Arms, Says Dr. ROSEBURY." The interviewing reporter in his story declared that ROSEBURY had stated that scientific workers were no longer interested in doing research work on war problems. He stated that many of them had refused to work on BW projects and that in the atomic energy field, the Government was having difficulty finding competent physicists. He was surprised that the reporter was not conversant with this alleged fact. He was asked by the reporter in a series of lengthy and sharp questions, according to the informant, whether or not he would work again on BW if requested to do so by the Government. His answer, according to the informant, was accurately reported by the HERALD: "I don't think you have a right to ask me that question." He also made reference at this time and further on the platform to the fact that the Government's principal laboratories doing this work under the supervision of the War Department were located at Frederick, Maryland. X (U)

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X (U)

OPPENHEIMER
12/11/47

Director from SAC, Boston

12/11/47

Re: AASOW, IS-C
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE, IS-R

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The Bureau's attention is directed to Boston letter to the Bureau dated November 29, 1947, captioned "RUSSIAN WAR PLANS, INTERNAL SECURITY - R." The foregoing material will constitute the suggested investigation in the last paragraph of that letter.

X (U)

2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

Director from SAC, Boston

12/11/47

Re: AASoW, IS-C
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE, IS-R

Subsequent to the dictation of the foregoing, information was received from [redacted] on 12/10/47 that [redacted]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

RECORDED BY TELETYPE
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WED 20 NOV 1947

TELETYPE

BOSTON 2 FROM WASH 20 6-28 PM

SAC URGENT

RUSSIAN WAR PLANS, IS DASH R. REURLET OCTOBER NINE, NINETEEN
FORTYSEVEN REGARDING MEMBERS OF CP ENGAGED IN BACTERIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH. EXPEDITE RESULTS OF YOUR INQUIRIES.

HOOVER

END

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60247 uc/NLS/bja/PAM

SAC, Boston

November 26, 1947

Director, FBI

RUSSIAN WAR PLANS

To my letter dated October 9, 1947, in the captioned case.

It is desired that you furnish the results of your inquiries as requested in my letter of October 9, 1947. This investigation should be expedited inasmuch as the War Department has requested the Bureau's assistance concerning this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-04 BY 60267 UC/NMS/bjfpam

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COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 10
★ NOV 26 1947 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Smith

71 DEC 3 1947 100

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100

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Wt
✓
TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC Boston
SUBJECT:

~~RUSSIAN WAR PLANS~~
 INTERNAL SECURITY - R

DATE: 11-29-47

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7-21-2004 BY 603267 uc/nus/bja/fmc

Reurlets 10-9-47 and 11-26-47 and teletype of 11-20-47 in the above-captioned case in which the Bureau requests this office to contact informants and Communists in Russian matters regarding a statement allegedly made by a woman in New York to the effect that "the Soviet Union has a weapon at least equal to the U. S. atom bomb."

Informants of the Boston Office have been unable to furnish any information with respect to the alleged statement of the woman in New York, nor have these informants been able to furnish much information regarding the identity of the scientists, physicians, chemists, pharmacists or bacteriologists who are members of the Communist Party who have been conducting research in bacteriology.

It is noted from a review of the files of the Boston Office that the New York Times of May 20, 1947 contains an editorial entitled, "Bacterial Warfare." This editorial gives credit to Doctors ~~THEODOR ROSEBURY~~ and ~~ELVIN A. KABAT~~ for having published the most comprehensive paper on bacterial warfare in print.

With respect to the problem of bacterial warfare the Boston Office notified the New York Office by letter dated August 6, 1947 under the caption of "American Association of Scientific Workers; IS-C" that THEODOR ROSEBURY delivered a lecture on biological warfare at the Marine Biological Laboratories, Woods Hole, Massachusetts, sometime prior to July 28, 1947 and points out that ROSEBURY released a report on biological warfare in May, 1947 under the auspices of the AAScW.

By letter dated April 5, 1947 the Boston Office forwarded to the Bureau under the caption, "AAScW; IS-C" a photostatic copy of the "News Letter of the AAScW" published at New York under date of October, 1947. This news letter contains an article, "Bacterial Warfare--An Infectious Route to Peace?"

The News Letter article on Bacterial Warfare refers to the report on "Bacterial Warfare" by THEODOR ROSEBURY and ELVIN A. KABAT which

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30 DEC 29 1947

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Director, FBI

11-29-47

brought to public attention a weapon on which many governments have been performing extensive research in recent years.

In referring to biological warfare the News Letter of the American Association of Scientific Workers, October 1947 issue, states, "the importance of this weapon (referring to biological warfare) may be judged from the facts that one fluid ounce of the virus of psittacosis (parrot fever), unconcentrated, contains enough to infect about a half billion humans and that this is only one of many such biological products, some of which can be disbursed in aerosols. Since all such bacterial agents of death can be produced in small biological laboratories by methods practically indistinguishable from those used in making disease-fighting preparations, control by international inspection is obviously not feasible."

Conf. Inst.
On November 15, 1947 [redacted] provided the Boston Office with the results of a conversation between [redacted]

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[redacted] and a member of the CPA in 1945 at [redacted]

[redacted] (phonetic). who has been identified by [redacted]

According to [redacted]

[redacted]
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Director, FBI

11-29-47

~~KCoy 10-29-47~~

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The Boston Office will advise the Bureau regarding the results of the December 9, 1947 meeting which the Boston Office has been told will be held in order to discuss the problem of Biological Warfare. The Boston Office will, of course, keep the Bureau informed of any subsequent information coming to its attention regarding any activity on the part of scientific persons who are members of the Communist Party who may be or have been conducting research in bacteriology.

CC-New York

100-21198
RWD:mad

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, San Francisco
 SUBJECT: RUSSIAN WAR PLANS

DATE: December 1, 1947

Reference is made to the letter from the Bureau dated October 9, 1947 wherein it is requested that this office contact informants on Communist and Russian matters for information bearing on statements allegedly made to [redacted] by a woman who arrived in Los Angeles from New York to the effect that "in the inner circles (Communist Party) the Soviet need no longer have any qualms about asserting itself, etc."

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All confidential informants and sources of information on Communist and Russian matters in the San Francisco Field Office territory have been alerted for information bearing on the statements contained in referenced letter. These informants and sources have been instructed to be particularly alert to statements made regarding Soviet bacteriological warfare. As of this date these informants have been unable to furnish any pertinent information bearing on the aforementioned matter.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UC/NLS/bja/DKAR

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60-25527-1947

Director, FBI

December 23, 1947

SAC, New York

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

REFER 5 IS

Reference is made to letter to the Director, December 3, 1947 from Boston, concerning the captioned matter, which requests the New York office to furnish Boston with a summary of derogatory information concerning [redacted]

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In this connection reference is made to the report of SA [redacted] [redacted] New York, dated December 20, 1947 entitled, CINRAD, a copy of which has been furnished to Boston. This report on pages 6 and 7, sets forth information from the files of the New York office concerning [redacted]

The following appeared in the ED SULLIVAN's column in the "New York Daily News", December 20, 1947:

"At Boston, University of Illinois proxy GEORGE D. STODDARD said, 'Technology called national defense is mobilizing and monopolizing U. S. scientists, who are afraid to decline'. Same day, at Cambridge, bacteriologist Dr. THEODORE ROSEBURY announced that 'U. S. scientists are flatly refusing to work on military developments, preferring fundamental research.'"

For the information of the Boston office [redacted]

[redacted], in 1942 wrote a report on Bacterial Warfare which was released for publication in 1947 and appeared in the May 1947 issue of "Journal of Immunology". Photostatic copies of this article were forwarded to the Bureau on November 8, 1947 in connection with the case entitled "IGNACY ZLOTOWSKI, INTERNAL SECURITY - R".

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Inquiry by the New York Office has determined that [redacted] mentioned in referenced Boston letter, is [redacted] of the "Journal of Immunology" published by Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore, Maryland.

The New York office considers this matter RUC'd to Boston by this letter.
cc: Boston

JMS:ja

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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DATE 9-17-81 BY SP7mraem

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DECLASSIFIED BY *60267 UC/MAB/jga/PRM*
ON *7-21-2004*

CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSANGER

Date: January 12, 1948
To: Chief of Naval Intelligence, *CONFIDENTIAL*
Department of the Navy
Constitution Avenue
Washington 25, D. C.
From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Subject: Internal Security - R

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In connection with the captioned matter which was recently discussed with you by Special Agent of this Bureau, the following additional information is set forth. U.

A confidential informant of this Bureau advised that

Original filed in C-1 - 2-5364-5

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71 JAN 20 1948
J. H. PH. *EM*

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnee _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

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Classified by *261 VET/DR*
Declassify DC: *OADR*

26 JAN 27 1948

RECORDED *100-73216-72*
FBI - WASH. D. C.
71 JAN 20 1948

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: *14-23*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 UC/NW/BG/PAM

INDEXED

~~Bacteriological Warfare~~

Bacteriological Warfare

M.S. Green

By Albert Deutsch

Report on Army Tests Reveals Germs as Powerful 'Terror Weapons'

While our physical scientists were working feverishly at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and other centers to construct the atom bomb, groups of biological scientists were engrossed in experimental work at Camp Detrick, Maryland, with that other horrendous agent of annihilation—bacterial warfare, or BW for short. One of these groups worked with meticulous care on the development of deadly airborne bacteria and viruses, and on tests of their effect on laboratory animals.

The frightening results are described in cold, dull, technical terminology in a newly-published opus entitled *Experimental Air-Borne Infections*, published by the Society of American Bacteriologists. The senior author, Dr. Theodor Rosebury, of Columbia University, directed this particular Camp Detrick project. He is co-author, with Dr. Elvin A. Kabat, of the report on *Bacterial Warfare* that created a sensation some months ago.

The extraordinary thing about the new Rosebury book is that it never mentions bacterial warfare even once, although it describes in minute detail some of the laboratory experiments aimed primarily at perfecting bacterial agents of deliberate destruction.



Deutsch

Markable Success in Spreading Infection

The book represents the first scientific work reporting quantitative methods of successfully spreading highly infectious bacteria and viruses by air routes, under far more precise controls than had ever been used before.

The Rosebury group at Camp Detrick (the Army's main chemical warfare center during the war) succeeded in stabilizing all but one of the highly infective bacterial agents they worked with. The main agents used were the bacteria producing brucellosis, glanders, melioidosis and tularemia. The Detrick BW experimenters also studied several virulent viruses producing psittacosis, or parrot disease.

So successful were the scientists that at the end of their experiments they were able to predict with deadly accuracy the exact dose of every effective bacterial agent required to infect or to kill a particular species of animal used in the laboratory. The Rosebury book contains tables giving the exact number of bacteria needed in a suspension or "cloud" to ensure "desired results."

The Detrick experiments were incomplete, inasmuch as they naturally could not include results on the ultimate object of BW—man himself.

"We did not have a Hiroshima or a Nagasaki for bacterial warfare, thank God," Dr. Rosebury tartly comments.

Bacteriological Warfare

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Clipping from
P.M.
page 11
1-13-48

52 FEB 10 1948

The most highly effective bacterial agent proved to be tularemia, which produces in man a prostrating disease with prolonged disability, although most victims recover. The most deadly disease agent the experimenters used was the *bacillus Whitmore*, which produces melioidosis, a rare disease in man apparently limited to the Malay Archipelago and surrounding areas in the Orient.

'Terror' Angle Makes Effective BW Agent

It is the very rarity of melioidosis that makes it a potentially terrible weapon of warfare. Of 95 recorded cases in man, only five are known to have survived, and in each of the latter the disease was of long duration. BW experts have been impressed by the fact, as Rosebury puts it in his earlier report on BW, that "it induces a highly fatal disease of man, it is foreign to the experience of most of the world, and may thus be said to epitomize the exotic terror with which the idea of bacterial warfare is invested in the popular mind."

The psittacosis virus, the Detrick experiments proved, has an amazing virulence. A single milliliter (about 16 drops or three-hundredths of an ounce) contains about 20,000,000 infective doses for man! Under conditions of laboratory control, the psittacosis virus spread in cloud chambers was 18 per cent effective. Under uncontrolled conditions, even if only one-hundredth of one per cent were able to reach its victims, the results would be calamitous.

In spite of the highly infective and lethal bacteria and viruses handled by the Rosebury group at Camp Detrick over a two-year period, only one researcher was infected. This man was Dr. Rosebury himself, who came down with a case of psittacosis caused by inhaling viruses escaping from a leaking ampule. Rosebury was hospitalized for sixteen days, and was cured by doses of penicillin and sulfadiazine—the first psittacosis recovery definitely attributable to these chemotherapeutic agents. The victim, with the aid of his colleagues, very promptly utilized his own case to determine successfully the infective dose of psittacosis for man.

The BW experiments at Camp Detrick had extremely important results for the future of public health research. Methods were devised with great ingenuity for handling dangerous bacterial agents with perfect safety. Some of the safety methods have been incorporated in the new laboratory for research in infectious diseases built by the U. S. Public Health Service at Bethesda, Maryland. A number of drug companies have also duplicated these safety measures in their own laboratories. The Camp Detrick project in BW perfected measures for controlling quantitative and qualitative results of bacterial research that may produce rich rewards in the search for methods of combatting air-borne disease germs, as well as for producing them.

~~Bacteriological Warfare~~

M. S. D. 1940

By Albert Deutsch

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Clipping from

P. M.

page 11

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DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NME/bja/FBI
ON 7-21-2024

Date: January 16, 1948

CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

To: Director of Intelligence
Department of the Army General Staff
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Colonel L. R. Forney, Chief,
Security Group

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: Bacteriological Warfare

BACTERIAL WARFARE

Reference is made to my memorandum of December 16, 1947 concerning the captioned matter. You will recall that information was set forth in my memorandum that Dr. Theodor Rosebury was scheduled to lecture on bacteriological warfare on December 9, 1947 under the sponsorship of the American Association of Scientific Workers.

A confidential informant of this Bureau who has been reliable in the past, has now advised that Dr. Rosebury recently gave the lecture referred to above at the Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. The total attendance at this meeting was estimated by the informant to have been between 150 and 200 persons.

According to this informant Rosebury was introduced by Wendell H. Perry, Assistant Professor of Physics at Harvard University and began his talk with a general discussion of the various types of bacteria which would be used in bacteriological warfare. The informant stated that Dr. Rosebury emphasized particularly staphylococcus, rabbit fever, the bubonic germ and tetanus. He emphasized particularly that tetanus was one virus which could be used effectively in warfare and which would be hard to control, but which in turn, could be easily disseminated and quickly effective. The informant advised that he then approached the problem from the standpoint that bacteriological warfare was a much more desirable means to an end than atomic warfare inasmuch as with bacteriological warfare, ~~the~~ life is destroyed, but not property. Thus, according to Dr. Rosebury, the conquering nation using bacteriological warfare would be able to take over a physically sound ~~people~~ without ~~any~~ ~~problems~~ connected with prisoners of war or other ~~humans~~.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. T. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy

EEH:mms/mmo
100-23763 JAN 19 1948 P.M.
cc-Scottiday
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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DATE 9-21-87

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The informant stated that Dr. Harlow Shapley, Director of the Harvard Observatory, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., arose from the audience at that point in Dr. Rosebury's lecture to interrupt the speaker with his own comment. The informant stated that Shapley pointed out that Dr. Rosebury was underestimating the situation inasmuch as in these times warring nations were not interested in whether or not property or human life was destroyed. Shapley stated that the sole aim of a warring nation was to eliminate a competing factor on the face of the earth. According to the informant, Shapley said that a nation such as the United States would not care whether the physical facilities of an enemy were left intact upon the completion of a victorious war so long as the disrupting force in the American ideal had been eliminated.

The informant said that Dr. Rosebury expressed regret at the failure of the United States and Russia to reach a political accord and warned that the entire world could be devastated in any future war. According to the informant, Dr. Rosebury stated that he felt that the United States' proposals on the control of atomic energy were inadequate and that the United States' foreign policy left little chance for peace. Dr. Rosebury expressed the hope that a new administration, a complete reversal of foreign policy, and a new approach to international problems involving Russia would find us facing many years of peace.

According to the informant, the main thesis of Dr. Rosebury's talk was then developed. He urged those present and particularly the membership of the Boston-Cambridge branch of the American Association of Scientific Workers to exert pressure through the creation of public opinion upon the United Nations so that this agency might take the necessary steps to establish international control of biological warfare. The informant noted that Dr. Rosebury did not suggest any particular method of international control or, for that matter, of national control of information concerned with bacteriological warfare.

According to this informant, in the question period that followed Dr. Rosebury's lecture, an unidentified individual asked Dr. Rosebury whether or not the Russians had competent bacteriologists who could develop the germs and cultures which he had described. Dr. Rosebury stated that there were such men and delved briefly into the history of Russian science which, as explained by him, showed a strong background in this field. According to the informant, Harlow Shapley again arose to state that one of the common misconceptions about Russia was that that country lacked competent scientists. The informant advised that Shapley stated that he knew that Russia possessed competent scientists in not only this field, but in many related fields. According to the informant, Shapley received a number of requests at that time to suggest proposals for the control of

bacteriological warfare which he brushed aside.

The informant advised that immediately following Dr. Rosebury's platform appearance, he was interviewed by a reporter from the Boston Herald newspaper. This interview resulted in a front page story in this newspaper headlined "Scientists Refusing to Work on Arms, Says Dr. Rosebury". The interviewing reporter in his story declared that Dr. Rosebury had stated that scientific workers were no longer interested in doing research work on war problems. He stated that many of them had refused to work on bacteriological warfare projects and that in the atomic energy field, the Government was having difficulty finding competent physicists. The article reflected that Dr. Rosebury was surprised that the reporter was not conversant with this alleged fact. According to the Bureau's informant, Dr. Rosebury was asked by the newspaper reporter in a series of lengthy questions, whether or not he would work on bacteriological warfare if requested by the United States Government. His answer according to the informant was accurately reported by the Boston Herald newspaper: "I don't think you have a right to ask me that question". The informant advised that Dr. Rosebury also made reference during his conversation with the reporter to the fact that the Government's principal laboratories doing work in connection with bacteriological warfare under the supervision of the War Department were located at Frederick, Maryland. X (U)

The informant stated that following the meeting [redacted]

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X (U)

The above data is submitted to you for your information and any action you may desire to take. You will be kept currently advised of information received by this Bureau concerning the captioned matter.

By Albert Deutsch

Report on Army Tests Reveals Germs as Powerful Terror Weapons'

While our physical scientists were working feverishly at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and other centers to construct the atom bomb, groups of biological scientists were engrossed in experimental work at Camp Detrick, Maryland, with that other horrendous agent of annihilation—bacterial warfare, or BW for short. One of these groups worked with meticulous care on the development of deadly airborne bacteria and viruses, and on tests of their effect on laboratory animals.

The frightening results are described in cold, dull, technical terminology in a newly-published opus entitled *Experimental Air-Borne Infections*, published by the Society of American Bacteriologists. The senior author, Dr. Theodor Rosebury, of Columbia University, directed this particular Camp Detrick project. He is co-author, with Dr. Elvin A. Kabat, of the report on *Bacterial Warfare* that created a sensation some months ago.

The extraordinary thing about the new Rosebury book is that it never mentions bacterial warfare even once, although it describes in minute detail some of the laboratory experiments aimed primarily at perfecting bacterial agents of deliberate destruction.

Remarkable Success in Spreading Infection

The book represents the first scientific work reporting quantitative methods of successfully spreading highly infectious bacteria and viruses by air routes, under far more precise controls than had ever been used before.

The Rosebury group at Camp Detrick (the Army's main chemical warfare center during the war) succeeded in stabilizing all but one of the highly infective bacterial agents they worked with. The main agents used were the bacteria producing brucellosis, glanders, melioidosis and tularemia. The Detrick BW experimenters also studied several virulent viruses producing psittacosis, or parrot disease.

So successful were the scientists that at the end of their experiments they were able to predict with deadly accuracy the exact dose of every effective bacterial agent required to infect or to kill a particular species of animal used in the laboratory. The Rosebury book contains tables giving the exact number of bacteria needed in a suspension or "cloud" to ensure "desired results."

The Detrick experiments were incomplete, inasmuch as they naturally could not include results on the ultimate object of BW—man himself.

"We did not have a Hiroshima or a Nagasaki for bacterial warfare, thank God," Dr. Rosebury tersely comments.



Deutsch

The most highly effective bacterial agent proved to be tularemia, which produces in man a prostrating disease with prolonged disability, although most victims recover. The most deadly disease agent the experimenters used was the *bacillus Whitmore*, which produces melioidosis, a rare disease in man apparently limited to the Malay Archipelago and surrounding areas in the Orient.

'Terror' Angle Makes Effective BW Agent

It is the very rarity of melioidosis that makes it a potentially terrible weapon of warfare. Of 95 recorded cases in man, only five are known to have survived, and in each of the latter the disease was of long duration. BW experts have been impressed by the fact, as Rosebury puts it in his earlier report on BW, that "it induces a highly fatal disease of man; it is foreign to the experience of most of the world, and may thus be said to epitomize the exotic terror with which the idea of bacterial warfare is invested in the popular mind."

The psittacosis virus, the Detrick experiments proved, has an amazing virulence. A single milliliter (about 16 drops or three-hundredths of an ounce) contains about 20,000,000 infective doses for man! Under conditions of laboratory control, the psittacosis virus spread in cloud chambers was 18 per cent effective. Under uncontrolled conditions, even if only one-hundredth of one per cent were able to reach its victims, the results would be calamitous.

In spite of the highly infective and lethal bacteria and viruses handled by the Rosebury group at Camp Detrick over a two-year period, only one researcher was infected. This man was Dr. Rosebury himself, who came down with a case of psittacosis caused by inhaling viruses escaping from a leaking ampule. Rosebury was hospitalized for sixteen days, and was cured by doses of penicillin and sulfadiazine—the first psittacosis recovery definitely attributable to these chemotherapeutic agents. The victim, with the aid of his colleagues, very promptly utilized his own case to determine successfully the infective dose of psittacosis for man.

The BW experiments at Camp Detrick had extremely important results for the future of public health research. Methods were devised with great ingenuity for handling dangerous bacterial agents with perfect safety. Some of the safety methods have been incorporated in the new laboratory for research in infectious diseases built by the U. S. Public Health Service at Bethesda, Maryland. A number of drug companies have also duplicated these safety measures in their own laboratories. The Camp Detrick project in BW perfected measures for controlling quantitative and qualitative results of bacterial research that may produce rich rewards in the search for methods of combatting air-borne disease germs, as well as for producing them.

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SERIALIZATION.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 6036212/nas/bsj/Pmar

New York, New York

December 20, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

RE: CINRAD
INTERNAL SECURITY (R)

Dear Sir:

Enclosed are copies of the report of SA [redacted]
[redacted] dated 12/20/47 at New York entitled CINRAD.

The attention of the Bureau and offices receiving this letter is directed to the fact that some of the information in the enclosed report was obtained from technical informants and particularly that some of the material concerns [redacted] and former Vice-President HENRY WALLACE.

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This has been called to your attention in order that consideration may be given to the aforementioned in the event distribution to outside agencies of any of the information in the report is contemplated.

Very truly yours,

DECLASSIFIED BY 600247 UC/NW/bja/FBI
ON 7-21-2004

EDWARD SCHEIDT
SAC

5 Encls.

cc: San Francisco - 3 Encls.
cc: Boston - 1 Encl.

RECORDED

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JMS:els
100-47343

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL = 8

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100-190625-2761-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **SAN FRANCISCO**

FILE NO. **100-47343** **43**

REPORT MADE AT NEW YORK	DATE WHEN MADE 12/20/47	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 5/8-12/15/47	REPORT MADE BY [Redacted]	b6
TITLE CINRAD		CHARACTER OF CASE DECLASSIFIED BY <i>60267 ucl/mus/bjol/akc</i> NATIONAL SECURITY - 1 ON <i>7-21-2004</i>		

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

CONFIDENTIAL

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- P -

APPROVED AND FORWARDED	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
COPIES OF THIS REPORT		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5 - Bureau 3 - San Francisco 2 - Boston (Info) 3 - New York 	ENCLOSURE	RECORDED 100-93216-132
		FEB 1 '52 [FEG 3 1948]
		INITIALS ON ORIGINAL = 8

NY 100-47343

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REFERENCE: Bureau File 100-190625 b7C
Report of SA [redacted] 2/8/47, New York.

DETAILS:

DR. MILDA NEWELL PHILLIPS

[redacted] subsequent to a council meeting of the PAB held at New York City on February 1 and 2, 1947, had the minutes of the meeting mimeographed and distributed amongst member groups of the PAB.

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b7C In the minutes for the February 1st meeting, [redacted] in commenting on an article by former Assistant Secretary of War JOHN J. McCLOY in the "Infantry Journal", referred to a "tritium bomb" as being the object of Atomic Energy Commission (NEC) research.

Investigation by the Bureau revealed that though the McCLOY article was discussed at the PAB meeting, the word "tritium" had not been mentioned nor had it appeared in the McCLOY article. The Atomic Energy Commission has advised that the word "tritium" in itself is not objectionable but if associated with Atomic Energy Commission weapon research it is objectionable from a security standpoint.

Investigation of [redacted] had not developed the exact source from which [redacted]

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On April 23, 1947, shortly after [redacted] release of information concerning [redacted], Confidential Informant [redacted] advised [redacted]

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On May 17, 1947 [redacted] with Confidential Informant [redacted]

NY 100-47343

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Concerning [redacted] the files of the New York Office reflect that his name appeared on the mailing list of the American Peace Mobilization in 1941. The July 26, 1941 issue of the Daily Worker contains an article stating that LEONARD KLECK, newspaperman and military analyst, would appear as a speaker on the program "The World Against Hitler", held at the Manhattan Center July 30, 1941 under the sponsorship of "New Masses".

MARY van KLECK.

This individual wrote an article appearing in the August 1947 issue of "Soviet Russia Today" captioned "Atomic Energy - Opportunity for International Cooperation". The article indicates that it is based on an address van KLECK delivered at an assembly on American-Soviet relations under the auspices of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship at the Commodore Hotel, New York City on June 17, 1947.

In her article van KLECK supports the view of the Russian GROMIKO plan for control of atomic energy by the United Nations as opposed to the BARUCH plan of the United States. She wrote in part as follows: "Thus the BARUCH report, while explaining in highly dramatic terms the danger of world destruction, nevertheless does not recognize that destruction cannot be diverted by 'control' of the bomb and that atomic energy for peace cannot be developed by the Authority charged with punishing those who use the bomb. Rather the bomb must be eliminated with the United States, as its sole possessor, taking the lead in calling for international agreement with proper provision for enforcement in which the Security Council of the United Nations maintaining all its principles of agreed action by the great powers, is fortunately the instrument at hand for this immediate and initial task. Thereafter comes the cooperative task of development of atomic energy, again within the framework of a successfully cooperative United Nations on a world-wide scale."

van KLECK's article also reflects that atomic energy for the advancement of the welfare of the world, and the atom bomb as a destructive use of atomic energy are distinct and opposite applications. She reiterates that the bomb should first be destroyed and outlawed, then development and control of atomic energy can proceed. She points out that the GROMIKO plan encompasses this viewpoint.

NY 200-47343

Concerning [redacted] the New York Office files reflect
that [redacted] She has been a
frequent contributor to "Soviet Russia Today", a pro-Russian periodical.
She has been and is a member of numerous local and national Communist
front organizations. Confidential Informant [redacted]
[redacted] advised an agent of the New York Office that [redacted]
[redacted] to be a member of the Communist Party.

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Dr. HARRY GRUNDFEST and
The Association of Scientific Workers

It is to be noted that Dr. HARRY GRUNDFEST is the international
corresponding secretary of the New York branch of the American Association
of Scientific Workers, in which organization he is very active.

On October 4, 1947 there appeared in the New York Herald
Tribune newspaper a lengthy article by PETER HINSCH, reporting that HARRY
GRUNDFEST and MAURICE VASSERINE, on behalf of the AASW, had submitted to
the United Nations General Assembly on September 26, 1947 a memorandum
concerning bacterial warfare. The cover letter signed by GRUNDFEST and
VASSERINE (National President of the AASW) requested that the General
Assembly undertake a preliminary examination of available factual data
and proposed that the Assembly instruct the UNAEC to devote part of its
time to the problem of bacterial warfare, "the preeminent terror weapon".
The memorandum lists eleven forms of disease already investigated for
possible use in warfare against humans, animals and plants, and pointed
out that a single small laboratory could manufacture enough germs to
spread death on a tremendous scale.

The newspaper article further states that Dr. IGNACY ELSTOWSKI,
Polish member of the UNAEC, considered the new memorandum to be of great
significance and that he had stated that he would ask the Commission to
discuss the issue at its next session. ELSTOWSKI asserted that the very
existence of the field of bacterial warfare demonstrates "it's absolutely
necessary to have as a first step the immediate prohibition of weapons
of mass destruction".

It is pointed out that [redacted] is the subject of a
current investigation being conducted by the New York Office. Additional
information concerning him is set forth later in this report.

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furnished by

Confidential Informant [redacted]

NY 100-47343

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Confidential Informant [redacted] on October 27, 1947, advised that

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It is to be noted that to date there has been no indication that the aforementioned dinner has been held or that further plans for it have been arranged.

ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK SCIENTISTS

Confidential Informant [redacted]

[redacted] advised on October 31, 1947 that [redacted]

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[made available by Confidential Informant]

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Confidential Informant [redacted]

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NY 100-47343

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In connection with the aforementioned, reference is made to the Washington Field letter to the Bureau dated September 15, 1947 concerning the Federation of American Scientists, which reflects that Washington Field Confidential Informant [redacted]

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It is to be noted that the files of the New York Office reflect that [redacted]

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[redacted] is an active member of the Association of New York Scientists and the American Association of Scientific Workers. He is not known to be a member of the Communist Party but in the past, however, has identified himself with pro-Communist activities such as the Morris U. Schappes Defense Committee, the New York Conference for Inalienable Rights, and the American-Soviet Science Society, Inc.

[redacted] the Society, which fostered full exchange of scientific information between American and Soviet scientists in all fields. Investigation by the New York Office reflects that the Society is not active at the present time. The Schappes Defense Committee which functioned between 1941 and 1943, was formed for the purpose of persuading Governor THOMAS DENEY of New York State to release SCHAPPEE, who had been convicted of perjury in 1941 in connection with the New York State's Raupp-Goodert Committee investigation of Communism in the New York schools.

* A report on bacterial warfare written in 1942 by THEODORE ROSEBURY and ELVIN A. KABAT, bacteriologists at Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, which report was recently released and has been published in the May 1947 issue of the Journal of Immunology.

NY 100-47343

Confidential Informant [redacted] advised that THEODORE ROSENTHAL, during the summer of 1947, had delivered a lecture on biological warfare at the Marine Biological Laboratories, Woods Hole, Massachusetts [redacted]
[redacted]

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On November 15, 1947 Confidential Informant [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted]

Confidential Informant [redacted] has identified [redacted] of the Program Committee of the Boston-Cambridge Branch of the AASeW for 1947-1948.

Confidential Informant [redacted] advised on December 3, 1947 that ROSENTHAL would deliver his lecture on biological warfare at the new Lecture Hall at Harvard University under the sponsorship of the Boston-Cambridge Chapter of the AASeW. It is to be noted, as indicated previously in this report, that in reference to ROSENTHAL's discussion on biological warfare at an AASeW meeting on August 25, 1947, Washington Field Informant [redacted] and Confidential Informant [redacted] of the New York Office reported that [redacted]

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Confidential Informant [redacted] has advised that [redacted] recent past has been in contact frequently with [redacted] concerning [redacted] had nothing of a subversive nature to report.

[redacted] also advised on August 14, 1947 that [redacted]

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Confidential Informants [redacted] advised on October 9, 1947

that [redacted]

NY 100-47343

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[redacted]
On October 10, 1947 the same informants advised [redacted]

[redacted] The informant did not know, however, where
[redacted]

Informants [redacted]

[redacted] advised

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NY 100-47343

LEADS.

NEW YORK DIVISION

At New York City

Will continue to report pertinent information developed in connection with this case in accordance with Bureau Bulletin #99, Series 1947, dated October 15, 1947, and in accordance with instructions concerning COMTAE as set forth in SAC letter #164, series 1947, dated December 16, 1947.

One copy of this report has been designated for the Boston Office inasmuch as it contains information of interest to that office, particularly in connection with the activities of the American Association of Scientific Workers.

NY 200-47343

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

[redacted] Confidential informants mentioned in the report of SA [redacted] dated December 20, 1947 at New York, are as follows:

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[redacted] - [redacted]

[redacted] - [redacted]

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[redacted] - [redacted]

- [redacted]

[redacted] who has requested that his
identity be kept confidential.

[redacted] - [redacted]

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[redacted] - [redacted]

- [redacted]

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RECORDED

SAC, New York

January 27, 1948

Director, FBI

GINRAD
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

7 [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-24-2004 BY [redacted] UC/NUS/bja/Pkm

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Reference is made to the report of Special Agent [redacted] dated December 20, 1947, at New York, New York, in the case entitled "Ginrad, Internal Security - R." A review of this report reflects that it has not been prepared pursuant to the latest Bureau instructions. In regard to the section of this report captioned [redacted] your attention is directed to SAC Letter No. 164, Series 1947, dated December 16, 1947. The information received by your office relating to the subject matter referred to in this letter should be reported in letter or report form under the caption [redacted] Internal Security - R."

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In connection with the material contained in the referenced report relating to bacteriological warfare you are instructed to include such information in the future under the caption "Bacteriological Warfare."

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From a review of the information in the Bureau's files regarding [redacted] it is believed desirable that the New York Office should institute an investigation of [redacted] in order to determine his activities. It is noted that he is a member of the American Association of Scientific Workers and is in frequent contact with numerous scientists suspected of pro-Communist and pro-Russian activities in the New York Field Office territory. You are instructed to review the files of your Office regarding [redacted] and to submit the pertinent information concerning him in the first investigative report emanating from your Office.

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[redacted] The Boston Office is requested to review its file concerning [redacted] and to furnish its information to the New York Office.

CC: Boston

100-190625

Tolson _____
E. A. Tamm _____
Clegg _____
Olavin _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Ugan _____
Jurnea _____
Arbo _____
Schr _____
Washington _____
Ann Tamm _____
Room _____
Use _____
Rey _____

EHM:mer

60FEB141948

MAILED DUPLICATE YELLOW

Director, FBI

February 7, 1948

SAC, New York

RUSSIAN WAR PLANS
SOVIET WAR PLANS
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-21-2004 BY 6034071c/mw/lja/prmc

Reference New York letter dated November 7, 1947, concerning information made available by Confidential Informant [redacted]

This informant recently advised SA [redacted] that [redacted]
[redacted]

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b6 The indices of the New York Office contain no reference to the BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES, INC., and do not reflect any information concerning [redacted] other than that set forth in reference letter.
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Concerning the [redacted] allegedly a Communist Party member and [redacted] advised that this individual is [redacted] [redacted] Infer-
mation concerning [redacted] membership in the Communist Party at Los Angeles has been set forth in referenced letter.

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[redacted] was unable to furnish any additional information concerning the location of [redacted]. However, in this connection reference is made to page 38 of the report of SA [redacted] dated June 24, 1947, at New York, entitled [redacted] was.; INTERNAL SECURITY - R, which reflects that a highly confidential source made available to the New York Office in March, 1947, [redacted]

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The New York indices contain no reference to the [redacted]

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NY 100-80472

Letter to the Director

information obtained concerning him during the course of investigation tends to reflect that he is pro-Russian. He is not known to have been engaged in bacteriological research.

The files of the New York Office reflect that Dr. WILLIAM MARIAS MALISOFF, who until his recent death was the subject of an INTERNAL SECURITY - R investigation by the New York Office, had conducted considerable research with the BOGOMOLETZ sera.

Concerning [redacted] the files of the New York Office reflect that Confidential Informant [redacted] in May, 1943, reported that [redacted]

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The New York files also reflect that [redacted] [redacted] was born in New York City on March 10, 1909. He was closely associated with [redacted] with aliases, subject of an INTERNAL SECURITY - F investigation by the New York Office. On several occasions he was in contact with [redacted] ESPIONAGE - G." Investigation in this case reflected that [redacted]

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There is no indication, however, that [redacted] is or was engaged in biological or bacteriological research.

In an effort to determine whether any known members of the Communist Party were known to be engaged in biological or bacteriological research, the following confidential informants have also been contacted with negative results:

[redacted]
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NY 100-80472

Letter to the Director

Reference is made to New York teletype to the Bureau dated January 5, 1948, entitled "SOVIET WAR PLANS" which contains information reported to the New York Office by an informant to the effect that [redacted] [redacted] of New York City, a "Communist Party member . . . works for Soviet Intelligence on research on biological warfare." A separate case had been opened in the New York Office concerning [redacted] and investigation to date reflects that [redacted]

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[redacted] Investigation to date does not reflect that he is engaged in biological research.

No additional information is available in the New York Office at the present time concerning members of the Communist Party who are known to be engaged in research in biology and bacteriology. Therefore this matter is being placed in a closed status by this office. However, in the event pertinent information is received in the future, the Bureau will be advised.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. E.A. Tamm
 FROM : D.M. Ladd
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

b6 [redacted] (Phonetic)
 b7C

~~SECRET~~

DATE: February 26, 1948

~~CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NWC/bip/pmc~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 7-21-2029~~

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Baum _____
 Miss Onday _____

JM [redacted] Naval Intelligence, came to my office on February 25, 1948, at 3:30 p.m.

[redacted] stated that has been in touch with [redacted] (phonetic).
 a leading scientist working on biological warfare at [redacted].
 [redacted] reportedly stated that no other scientist knows the type of work he is doing at [redacted]. [redacted] stated that when he talked to [redacted] the latter advised him that there is presently a move on among scientists for the purpose of throwing the whole biological warfare information obtained to date open to all scientists. [redacted] is very much concerned with the disastrous effects that this type of warfare could have on civilization generally. Because of this concern, [redacted] wanted to furnish information he has concerning biological warfare to counter-intelligence agencies of this Government.

b6 [redacted] stated that he came to me and intends to go to the Intelligence Division of the Army and CIA for the purpose of sending a representative to a meeting at which [redacted] will furnish information regarding biological warfare. [redacted] further stated that when definite plans for this meeting are made he would advise me.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that [redacted] of the Laboratory be designated to represent this Bureau at the meeting to be addressed by [redacted]

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 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
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 ON 11-1-2004
 AG, EJ, OGA 10-25-2004
 60267 UC/NWC/bip/pmc 11-1-2004

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR
 FROM : E. A. Tamm
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: March 1, 1948

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Mr. Larson
 Mr. A. Tamm
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosedale
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Carlson
 Mr. Eggen
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Hickey
 Mr. Hickey
 Mr. Jennings
 Mr. Quinn Tamm
 Tele. Room
 Miss Beahm
 Miss Gandy

I don't think a Bureau representative should attend any meeting addressed by [redacted] on the subject of biological warfare. There is bound to be publicity about such a meeting, and I think it would be well if the Bureau were not involved in this publicity.

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[redacted] has been in touch with the Bureau from time to time on a very casual basis through the suggestion of [redacted]

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From these contacts we know that the work which [redacted] is doing is not of interest to the Bureau, and I do not think, consequently, that we should be involved in any way in this situation.

EAT:FA

I agree

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9 agree

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ON 1
 was informed in
 accordance with
 above JFD
 3/19/48



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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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 DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60367 UC/NMS/tp/ptw

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, New York

SUBJECT: ~~SOVIET WAR PLANS~~
~~BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE~~

DATE: March 15, 1948

Enclosed is an article from the March 5, 1948 issue of the "Brooklyn Eagle" (New York) which reflects a statement made by Dr. VINCENT P. MAZZOLA of New York charging that German scientists are working with the Russians toward the perfection of bacteriological methods of offense and that the Soviet Union would prefer to conquer this nation by germ warfare rather than use atomic or cosmic ray weapons.

The article also reflects that Dr. MAZZOLA demanded that sufficient funds be appropriated for agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, intimating that this would be a method of combatting Communism.

This is furnished for the Bureau's information.

Enc. (1)

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DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 uc/nwo/bja/prm

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DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60367 DC/MVS/bja/Ptm

100-97376-140

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON ENCL^D
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-21-2004 BY 60262 UC/NMS/bjap/mw

ENC. (1) TO BUREAU

NEW YORK FILE #100-80472

$\text{MgO}_{\text{tot}} \approx 3.8 - 14.0$

* BROOKLYN EAGLE

Charges Russia Girds For Germ War on U. S.

The Soviet Union would prefer to conquer this nation by germ warfare rather than use atomic or cosmic ray weapons, Dr. Vincent P. Mazzola, gynecologist at St. Peter's and Long Island College Hospital, declared last night.

Charging that a great many German scientists—"and maybe Hitler himself"—are working with the Russians behind the Iron Curtain toward perfection of bacteriological methods of offense, Dr. Mazzola told a meeting of the Catholic Action Institute at St. Vincent's Home for Boys, 66 Boerum Place, that Stalin, in any attempt at invasion of the United States, would wish to preserve its edifices and industrial plants.

Atomic and cosmic ray weapons, he pointed out, would demolish the very structures invading armies would wish to save.

Dr. Mazzola was the first of four weekly speakers scheduled to address the institute which

has been organized by the Kings County Chapter, Catholic War Veterans, "for the information and guidance" of C. W. V. members and their families.

"This is the hour," Dr. Mazzola said, for international solidarity of all peoples possessing a moral rather than a materialistic philosophy; bipartisan action and support to preserve freedom and to "crush Red-Fascist fifth column activities."

Demanding that sufficient funds be appropriated for agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, he added that a prime weapon against communism would be to enable the individual worker to earn enough to "support his family well."


The Rev. Charles J. Bermel, county chaplain of the C. W. V., outlined the purpose of the series of lectures.

Allan F. Matthews, first county vice commander, presided.

Subjects of the next three classes, scheduled for March 11, 18 and April 1, respectively, are "Charity—the Motivating Force of Catholic Action"; "Catholic War Veterans, Their Families, and What Part They Play in Catholicism and Catholic Action," and "Practical Catholicism and Catholic Action."

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FBI-BROOKLYN
TRAVELING AGENT

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DATE 7-21-2004 BY [Signature]

CLIPPING FILE CLASS

B. Y. Brooklyn Eagle
MAR 5 1948
PATTI FILED FOR CLASSIFICATION BY [Signature]

mo
Director, FBI

March 12, 1948

SAC, New York

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Enclosed is an article from the March 6, 1948 issue of the "New York Herald Tribune" which is concerned with a statement made by RICHARD L. MEIFF of the Federation of American Scientists relative to biological warfare.

This is furnished to the Bureau and Washington Field for information purposes.

*Enc. (1) filed with original.
cc Washington Field (Enc. 1)*

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160-93216-141
F B I
65 MAR 19 1948

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

JNS:MTH
100-85795

22 MAR 22 1948

ORIGINAL COPY INDEXED

1 April 1948

Dear Mr. Ladd:

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[redacted] With reference to the attached memorandum, [redacted] advises me that you will not be able to send representatives to this meeting. I very much hope you will reconsider your decision since it is my belief that the sessions will be beneficial to all agencies. I feel that the subject of the meeting is so important from a counter-intelligence viewpoint that it will require the concerted efforts of all Federal agencies to cope with it. As you know, these will be merely exploratory sessions which will not commit any agency to any course of action. We would appreciate having the benefit of your comments in the light of FBI's broad experience in the field of counter-intelligence.

Sincerely,

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141-100-93216-113
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S. [Signature]

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RECORDED
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EX-138

April 12, 1948

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

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Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear [redacted]

Mr. Ladd has brought to my attention your memorandum to him dated April 1, 1948, inviting him to nominate two representatives of this Bureau to attend a small conference being called at the Office of Naval Intelligence to explore the counterintelligence phases of bacteriological warfare.

The subject of this contemplated meeting is of great importance, and I feel that representatives of this Bureau should participate in this conference.

I have designated Special Agent [redacted] and [redacted] Scientific Chief of the FBI Laboratory, to participate in this conference scheduled for a period of one week beginning April 19, 1948.

Sincerely yours,


J. Edgar Hoover

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NM/bp/PAtm
ON 7-21-2004

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G. I. R. -9



Folcon
J. A. Tamm
Dlegg
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Urso
M. J. O'Donnell
Goss
Harrington
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Aldo
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: April 22, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONFERENCE AT THE
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DURING THE WEEK
OF April 19, 1948.

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the more technical information supplied by [redacted] as given by him to the captioned conference, which was attended by Special Agents [redacted]

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As pointed out in previous memoranda concerning this matter, [redacted] purpose in talking to the conference was to present Bacteriological Warfare as an instrument of sabotage and psychological warfare which, in his opinion, could far surpass in serious effects on the security of the country the normal type of sabotage. [redacted] qualified himself by stating that BW as an instrumentality of sabotage is, in his estimation, the most serious in time of peace since the use of BW in actual warfare is an entirely different matter.

It is observed that it is believed [redacted] concern over the use of BW as a sabotage instrumentality is brought about by virtue of the experiments he has conducted at [redacted] as well as the developments accomplished there in this field. While it cannot be stated as a fact, it is believed beyond a reasonable doubt, that [redacted] is being subsidized by the Navy to develop BW.

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Recent Developments in BW Described by [redacted]

[redacted] prior to outlining a hypothetical master plan of sabotage through the use of BW, gave a brief talk on what he has developed at [redacted] and what in turn are the potential uses of these developments.

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APPENDIX
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Observations

As stated previously, it is believed that [redacted] concern in this matter is the result of what his experiments have shown and his thinking as to the potential use of BW as a sabotage instrument. With this in mind, [redacted] has pointed out that he feels it to be of the utmost necessity that representatives of the various intelligence agencies are acquainted with the subject matter (not to a great scientific degree, however), and that they in turn coordinate and correlate information developed by them. In this regard it is to be noted that, of course, when the Bureau develops information of an intelligence character in this field it is made available to the interested intelligence agencies. However, it is to be observed that the armed forces in their program of the use of BW as an offensive measure, have not seen fit to advise the Bureau. This may be because of the character of the classification given to information, or it may be that the intelligence agencies of the armed forces feel that it is strictly a matter of offensive warfare.

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The next meeting, and that will presumably be the last, will be, as you know, on Friday, April 23, 1948. At this time the report [redacted] was requested to write for the conference will be obtained together with the consensus of observations and suggestions made by the conference with respect to the possible setting up of a coordinating committee or board in this matter.

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Director, FBI

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE AS A SABOTAGE MEDIUM

100-93-16-145

During the week of April 19, 1948, at the invitation of the Office of Naval Intelligence, representatives of this Bureau attended a series of conferences at which the potential use of bacteriological warfare as a sabotage medium was discussed. Present at this conference were representatives from the Office of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence Division of the Army, Army Air Force Intelligence, as well as medical doctors attached to the Intelligence Department of the Army and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The conference was instigated by [redacted] of the Office of Naval Intelligence, who enlisted the services, as a sort of advisor and lecturer, of [redacted]

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[redacted] has emphatically requested that his name not be identified with the conference outside of the agencies or departments represented. Consequently, I am obliged to point out to you the extremely confidential character of [redacted] appear in Washington, D. C., for this purpose.

It was the purpose of [redacted] to [redacted]

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[redacted] Representatives of this Bureau made no commitments in this regard.

The preventive, educational aspect of the proposed coordinating board or committee, it was observed at the conference, would undoubtedly involve such civilian agencies as the Public Health Service, the

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Clegg
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Ladd
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Tracy
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Harbo
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Wise
DeLoach

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MAY 19 1948
APR 28 1948

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44-28-48-82

APR 28 3:56 PM '48

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 7:25 PM
DATE 4-28-48
BY [Signature]

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Department of Agriculture, United States Customs, and possibly other agencies which might have an indirect interest. Over and above this, it is conceivable that such a committee would have to take steps to educate certain persons within these agencies in bacteriological warfare and possibly at some ultimate time draw upon them for assistance or advice. This aspect in turn raises the question of the declassification of bacteriological warfare which is regarded in the Department of Defense as "top secret." Such a declassification would, of course, be strictly within the purview of the Department of Defense or within the hands of the President and his Cabinet.

In addition to the foregoing considerations there is the matter of appropriations to assist such a committee in carrying out its functions. This aspect too would require action on a higher policy-making plane than the level represented at the conference. In a similar vein, the power or authority to make requests of such civilian agencies as are described above is an aspect which would of necessity have to be granted on at least a Cabinet level.

The foregoing information and observations have been outlined for your consideration. I wanted to advise you of this as well as of the fact that this Bureau is not planning to take any action looking toward either the recommending of the establishment of such a planning committee or the actual establishment of it. This position is being taken since it is not felt that the FBI has the authority to initiate such action and further because the Office of Naval Intelligence having initiated the series of conferences could in turn take the initiative to carry the matter to a higher policy-making level. In this regard, it should be pointed out that while no commitments were made by representatives of the Naval Intelligence, it was indicated that they might possibly bring up these considerations at a future meeting of the National Security Council. The Army Air Force Intelligence representative in turn indicated that he felt that the problem should be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This Bureau will, of course, use to its best advantage the information obtained at the series of conferences which pertains to the intelligence and counterintelligence aspect of bacteriological warfare as a sabotage medium.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: April 24, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: *ph*
BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONFERENCE AT THE
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DURING THE
WEEK OF APRIL 19, 1948

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. E. A. Tamm
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Marbo
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Pennington
 Mr. Quinn Team
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Nease
 Miss Holmes
 Miss Gandy

On April 23, 1948, Special Agents [redacted]

[redacted] attended the third meeting of the captioned conference.

Also present were [redacted] Army Air
Force Intelligence; [redacted] ONI; [redacted] ONI; Dr.b6 b7C b7D It is believed that this will be the
last of the conferences in this matter.

b6 b7C b7D The original purpose in having the report prepared was that it be used to acquaint the superiors of the representatives of the various intelligence agencies present with the potentialities of BW. A question, however, arose as to the dissemination to various branches of the Army and Navy of the material in [redacted] report as it stands inasmuch as some of the material concerns ~~Top Secret~~ classified data. This, however, has no effect on the Bureau's transmittal of it to the field. However, it was decided that [redacted] of ONI would have the statement changed to eliminate certain ~~Top Secret~~ material and to lower the classification to ~~Secret~~. It was requested by [redacted] that the material which is attached not be disseminated by the Bureau and that it only be brought to your attention at this time and until such time as the new draft is made available to the Bureau.

*END**RECORDED 31 110-12114 TR 22 MAY 1948*

b6 b7C b7D It will be recalled that the second purpose of the April 23, 1948 conference was to obtain the observations and possible suggestions of the Intelligence Agency representatives present with regard to this matter. At the outset in these conferences, it was suggested by [redacted] with the implied agreement of ONI, that there be a coordinating board or committee set up to not only study intelligence and counterintelligence involving BW, but also to handle a preventive and educational type program. This original suggestion, however, has now taken a back seat since, as it was observed, representatives from ONI, G-2, and the Air Force soon admitted that the conference had no power to recommend the establishment of such a board and, furthermore, that the ramifications in setting up such a board were those to be handled on a top policy-making level. Of course, the FBI was at no time

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committed in these suggestions or in the matter of making recommendations.

- b6 It might be noted that the representative of CIA who attended the initial meeting, [redacted] did not attend the two succeeding conferences.
b7C No explanation was given for his absence. It is observed that although CIA apparently has an interest in the intelligence and counterintelligence aspect of BW, they have not seen fit to be represented at all sessions.
b7D

It seemed to be the unanimous opinion of the Armed Forces Intelligence representatives that there is an important question of declassifying information concerning BW in the event a preventive or educational program should be undertaken since it would involve the supplying of certain information to such civilian agencies as the Public Health Service, Department of Agriculture, Customs, and possibly other agencies which might have an indirect interest. It was further recognized that none of the Intelligence agencies present would have the authority or could establish policy to request such civilian agencies to perform functions in this field.

Originally, [redacted] stated that he intended to present this problem to the National Security Council at its next meeting. He then changed his position and said that he thought he would present the problem in an attempt to obtain discussion on it. He was asked if he planned to refer to the preventive and educational aspect of the problem and he said he could not commit himself on that at the present. It was stated by [redacted] that he felt this problem should be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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It was generally agreed that the representatives present would present [redacted] paper to their superiors for information purposes and for such action as would be considered desirable. It was agreed that BW used as a sabotage medium is a potential threat and that it, of course, warranted investigative attention by the various Intelligence Agencies within their respective jurisdictions. It might be noted that [redacted] of ONI made the suggestion that the respective agencies prepare monographs of information appearing in their files for the use of one another. It was observed by the FBI representatives, with the agreement of [redacted] that [redacted] paper represents merely a hypothetical situation and that a monograph centered around it might fall short of the desired purpose. This observation was made since there are conceivably other aspects which have not been considered by [redacted] and it was then agreed that monographs would not be prepared.

It is to be noted that [redacted] has promised to submit to ONI a detailed report or summary which will serve to fill out and document his attached report. ONI agreed to furnish a copy of this report to the Bureau, which, in all probability, will be of informative value to its Laboratory. It might also be noted that [redacted] talked privately with Special Agents [redacted] at which time he supplied information concerning [redacted] [redacted] both of whom are identified with the left-wing American Association of Scientific Workers. Generally, this

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b6 data concerns the activity of these two in furthering what [redacted] thinks

b7C [redacted] It will be noted that this is one of the steps
outlined in the hypothetical master plan of attack, as prepared by [redacted]
b7D The information concerning [redacted] is being made the subject of
a separate memorandum for possible investigative use.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is not believed the Bureau should institute any program looking toward prevention or even education with regard to this problem of BW. Furthermore, it is recommended that the Bureau not initiate any attempt to take the matter to a higher policy-making level. This recommendation is made since the Navy itself has initiated these series of conferences and, consequently, it can take the initiative to carry the matter of establishing a coordinating board or committee to a higher policy-making level.

b6 [redacted] 2. It is recommended that after the revised draft of [redacted]
b7C report is received from ONI, that an SAC letter be directed to
the field advising them generally of the potentialities in the use of BW
b7D as a sabotage instrument. Such a letter could also outline broadly the
hypothetical plan to use BW as a sabotage medium. It could also point
out that Communist Scientists and Soviet or satellite Nationals who could
possibly engage in this activity, be considered for immediate apprehension
in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.

Enclosure



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts
Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM : GUY HOTTEL, SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD
 SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (s) b1
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: April 15, 1949

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 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Re Bureau letter dated March 14, 1949.

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 b7D In connection with the above captioned matter, it is desired
 to bring to your attention information received from confidential informant
 [REDACTED] whose identity is known to the Bureau.

Informant advised that [REDACTED]

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It is felt that the above information will be of interest to
 the Bureau at this time.

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44-93216-1

10 MAY 6 1949

INDEXED - 119

10 MAY 6 1949



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Memorandum
 File No. 44-93216-1
 Date 10 MAY 6 1949

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 10 MAY 17 1949

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11/30/04
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 DECLASSIFY ON 25 MAY 11 30 2029

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Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/18/49

SAC, Louisville

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INTERNAL SECURITY - R - CZ

① Biological Warfare

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By letter dated March 1, 1949 in the case entitled "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Activities in the United States, Internal Security R & CZ", Washington Field Office furnished information from confidential source [redacted] concerning [redacted]

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[redacted] being "non political", but out of sympathy with the communist regime in Czechoslovakia.

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ORIGINAL FILE IN 100-361036-1

100-3335 GWH:bl cc-Newark (enc) Washington Field

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71 MAY 9 1949

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100-3336

[redacted] wrote several articles on Czechoslovakia for a Louisville newspaper, and has several other articles on Czechoslovakia in proof.

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A photograph was obtained and is being furnished to the Newark Office.

[redacted] was primarily a scientist and as such is not deeply interested in politics.

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This information is being furnished to the Bureau, Newark and Washington Field Offices for possible future reference or use in case [redacted] name again appears.

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Chas

¹⁰⁰⁻⁹³²¹⁶⁻¹⁸³
"CHANGED TO"

65-58698-19

U.S. Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
422 Federal Office Building, Civic Center
San Francisco 2, California

April 15, 1949

11/30/04
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25^{(1), (4)} 11/30/2029

AMSD ~~SECRET~~

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~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

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RE:

(S)

(BIOLOGICAL WARFARE)

b2 Dear Sir:

b6 Remylet 3/30/49, and specifically to that section which
b7C contains information pertaining to former [redacted]

b7D [redacted]

b6 On 4/13/49, [redacted] was contacted at which time he
b7C advised that [redacted]

b6 [redacted]

b7C [redacted]

b7D [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6 [redacted]

b7C [redacted]

b7D [redacted]

In view of the fact that [redacted] will undoubtedly accept a position in the very near future, it is requested that the Bureau advise immediately if it desires that any action be taken by this office with regard to the Biological Warfare Program and specifically if an approach should be made to [redacted]

Very truly yours,

102-93215
NOT RECORDED
146 MAY 5 1949

REGISTERED MAIL:
Return Receipt Requested

52 JUN 9 1949

~~HARRY M. KIMBALL~~
HARRY M. KIMBALL
Special Agent in Charge

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65-58698-22, 21,

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR
 FROM : MR. D. M. IADD
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: May 16, 1949

PURPOSE:

To inform you of the results of the fourth conference held by the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to biological warfare in an unconventional attack by enemies of this country. This meeting was held at the Pentagon Building on April 30, 1949, and was attended by the regular committee and by [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency, and [redacted]

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[redacted] Department of the Army, who were described in the minutes of the meeting as observers. (The files are presently being reviewed on these two persons and you will be furnished with any pertinent information concerning them.) To also inform you of the results of a contact with [redacted] by Bureau liaison representative.

BACKGROUND:

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You will note that this is the Committee which was set up by [redacted] with the approval of [redacted] of the National Military Establishment to study various methods of unconventional methods of warfare. In connection with this program [redacted] has reportedly secured the assistance of [redacted]. I have previously furnished you with memoranda in this matter reflecting that certain members of the Committee are at least questionable from a loyalty standpoint.

RESULTS OF FOURTH CONFERENCE (April 30, 1949)100-93216-187
65-58678-23

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau on May 11, 1949, the minutes of the fourth Committee meeting. From a review of these minutes prepared by [redacted] Executive Secretary of the Committee, which are attached hereto for your information, the following activity was noted:

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Dr. Hans Speier outlined the report of the Panel on the Public Relations Aspects of Biological Warfare. Four points of particular interest were discussed at length. First it was pointed out that sooner or later some nation is likely to discover how to start an epidemic in man and when that time comes, BW will become a unique weapon, namely a form of warfare over which, in our present stage of knowledge, we might have little, if any, control. Secondly, [redacted] remarked that with the exception of epidemic producing agents, the same principles

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JBF EHM

~~SECRET~~
regarding the public relations aspects or the national policy with respect to the use of chemical warfare would seem to apply in the case of BW. [redacted]

[redacted] reminded the Committee that three important characteristics of BW placed it in a different category from chemical warfare, namely, the lack of any practicable method of detecting the presence of BW, the time delay involved between exposure to a BW agent and its actual casualty producing effect, and the importance of the psychological impact of BW. Thirdly, [redacted] emphasized that in current troubled times the moral leadership which the United States has assumed is one of the strongest weapons against the spread of totalitarianism in Europe. Tuve felt strongly that to maintain this moral leadership, this country should state publicly that we were prepared to consider the use of BW as a "limited" weapon but we would never resort to the use of epidemic forms of BW.

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[redacted] took exception to the present stated policy of our Government to consider BW as a weapon of mass destruction. He emphasized that the Research and Development Board Committee on BW had, for various carefully considered reasons, already recommended that this position be reconsidered. General Waitt strongly urged this Committee to include a positive recommendation to this effect in its final report.

[redacted] presented a report to the Committee on possible BW applications of certain violations of the Food and Drug Act, with particular reference to the dissemination of BW agents through the medium of food, drugs, cosmetics and other intimately used items which are marketed on a national scale.

Mr. Robert P. Joyce, State Department representative, inquired what progress had been made with respect to having a representative of the FBI brief the Committee. [redacted] reported that the FBI liaison contact for matters relating to the Committee's activities, had indicated that the FBI would prefer to submit answers to a list of questions rather than to send a representative to brief the Committee. The reason for this was that it was unlikely that any single individual within the FBI would have a sufficiently broad and detailed background to answer all the Committee's questions.

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The Committee appointed a panel consisting of [redacted] and Mr. Joyce, as Chairman, to prepare a list of questions to be submitted to the FBI.

(The above statements are not entirely factually correct. Black was advised that you desired to continue to maintain a liaison

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

arrangement with the Committee until such time as the liaison arrangement had proven unsatisfactory. He was further informed that any specific questions he desired the Bureau to consider should be forwarded through our present liaison arrangement for consideration by the Bureau. It was explained to Black that the Committee's questions would be given full study and consideration by the Bureau and that some questions might entail considerable research. It was pointed out that the Committee might pose questions to which on-the-spot answers would not be nearly as complete from the Committee's standpoint as when the questions had been thoroughly analyzed and answered through our liaison arrangement. In addition, he was informed that probably in order to give thorough details and current answers to some questions which might be asked by the Committee it would be necessary that the questions be studied by various Bureau representatives handling the particular matter involved in the question.)

Mr. Joyce made available to the Committee an excerpt from a CIA report [redacted]

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[redacted] b(s)

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The next meeting of this Committee was scheduled to be held on May 14, 1949, [redacted]

CONTACT WITH [redacted] May 9, 1949

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On May 9, 1949, Special Agents [redacted] contacted [redacted] at which time he was advised that in the Bureau's opinion the twelve questions which had been informally propounded to the Bureau, were not calculated to obtain data from which logical conclusions concerning Biological Warfare potential could be drawn. It was pointed out to [redacted] by Special Agent [redacted] that if and when his Committee is considering anything within its jurisdiction the Bureau could be furnished with specific information as to how a plan could be carried through by enemy agents, how much material would be needed and the specific time needed, technical knowledge needed, etc. The Bureau would then be in a position to determine whether there are known enemy agents who would be capable of executing such a plan. This discussion followed the lines suggested in the recommendations of your memorandum to the Director dated April 29, 1949.

[redacted] expressed his appreciation of the Bureau's frank discussion of this matter and advised that in the future his Committee, when considering any possible plan of attack, would analyze the problem and boil

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

it down to the point where specific information could be furnished to the Bureau upon which the Bureau could determine whether there are any known agents capable of perpetrating such a plan of attack. He was well pleased with the Bureau's answer and stated that the Bureau's suggestion of pin pointing specific types of information which his Committee should furnish the Bureau would help his Committee in further contacts with the Bureau.

ACTION:

Upon receipt of any questions from this Committee in connection with the captioned matter they will be carefully analyzed and an appropriate reply prepared for your approval.

We certainly can't waste
too much time on it.

X.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. JADDO *JAD*

FROM : MR. FLETCHER *KBF*

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: May 13, 1949

PURPOSE:

To inform you of the results of contact of [redacted]
 [redacted] by Special Agents [redacted]

BACKGROUND:

b6 You will recall that [redacted] in connection with his duties on the

b7C Committee dealing with Biological Warfare, informally requested the Bureau's reaction to twelve questions which were referred to in your memorandum to the Director dated April 15, 1949, and which questions would have called for the furnishing of detailed intelligence information to [redacted]

b6 On May 9, 1949, Special Agents [redacted] contacted [redacted] at which time he was advised that in the Bureau's opinion [redacted] the twelve questions which had been informally propounded to the Bureau, were not calculated to obtain data from which logical conclusions concerning Biological Warfare potential could be drawn. It was pointed out to [redacted] by Special Agent [redacted] that if and when his Committee is considering anything within its jurisdiction the Bureau could be furnished with specific information as to how a plan could be carried through by enemy agents, how much material would be needed and the specific time needed, technical knowledge needed, etc. The Bureau would then be in a position to determine whether there are known enemy agents who would be capable of executing such a plan.

b7C This discussion followed the lines suggested in the recommendations of your memorandum to the Director dated April 29, 1949.

[redacted] expressed his appreciation of the Bureau's frank discussion of this matter and advised that in the future his Committee, when considering any possible plan of attack, would analyze the problem and boil it down to the point where specific information could be furnished to the Bureau upon which the Bureau could determine whether there are any known agents capable of perpetrating such a plan of attack. He was well pleased with the Bureau's answer and stated that the Bureau's suggestion of pin pointing specific types of information which his Committee should furnish the Bureau would help his Committee in further contacts with the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

The foregoing is for your information.

ESS:clh

16 MAY 24 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267UC/NLS/BJA/cb

*MFK**Five-EMM*

100-93216-14

22 MAY 20 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR
FROM : MR. D. M. LADDALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: April 29, 1949

SUBJECT: ~~① BIOLOGICAL WARFARE~~ *12/1/49*PURPOSE:CLASSIFIED BY *uc/hls/bja/cb627 Derivative*
DECLASSIFY ON: *25X 12/1/2029**Ap-1,244,63,064 12/1/49 6-327 uc/hls/bja/cb6*

To inform you of the results of a telephonic communication with [redacted] made at his request and to inform you of the results of a review of the Bureau's files for additional information concerning Robert P. Joyce, State Department, and for information concerning [redacted] Department of Economics, University of Chicago; and [redacted] members of the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of National Defense on matters relating to the use of biological warfare in an unconventional attack by enemies of this country. To also inform you of the results of the Third Conference held by the Committee on April 16, 1949 in the apartment of [redacted].

RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH [redacted]

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[redacted] was telephonically contacted by Supervisor [redacted] of the Espionage Section on the morning of April 20, 1949, pursuant to his request. [redacted] was advised that in connection with the Committee's desire that a member of this Bureau brief the Committee on matters relating to biological warfare, that it was still the Director's decision that any questions logically coming within the purview of matters under the jurisdiction of this Bureau be handled through our already existing liaison arrangement.

[redacted] advised that no effort had been made by the Chairman of the Committee to arrange through the Secretary of Defense for a Bureau representative to brief the Committee inasmuch as the Chairman was presently out of the country and would not return for approximately two weeks. [redacted] indicated that some other arrangement could probably be worked out rather than making such a request of the Secretary of Defense.

[redacted] inquired whether he could secure the Bureau's reaction to the list of questions referred to in my attached memorandum dated April 15, 1949, the answers to which are attached to my attached memorandum dated January 10, 1949.

RECORDED - 37 *100-9526-*

He also stated that the Committee did not know whether these questions were the pertinent ones to ask the Bureau in regard to this matter. He posed the question whether these questions were sufficiently pertinent to the matter to justify the amount of research involved in answering them. [redacted] also desired to know whether Supervisor [redacted] would meet with [redacted] and himself to draw up a set of questions which would be pertinent to the problem and which the Bureau would consider. He indicated that the Committee did not feel it was in a position to really know what questions to ask.

Will the committee demand know what it wants

[redacted] was advised that this entire matter would be re-presented to you for your consideration.

Attachment

CC: [redacted]

Loyalty Section

CC:

CIA Applicants

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

b6

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b6

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*Ran
EHM*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RESULTS OF FILE REVIEW

ROBERT P. JOYCE

During an investigation by this Bureau of [redacted] captioned [redacted] an Agent of this Bureau attended an Italian "anti-Fascisti" meeting at [redacted]. b6 was reportedly prevented from entering this meeting by the police at Waterbury, Connecticut. The Bureau Agent covering this meeting determined that Robert P. Joyce was one of the eight members of the Yale Liberal Club, New Haven, Connecticut, who attended this meeting. (It has been determined that Robert P. Joyce attended Yale University from 1923 to 1926.) (61-1335-92 p.3) b7C

In 1943 Robert P. Joyce was Coordinator of Intelligence and Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba. Joyce worked closely in his official position with intelligence representatives of the Armed Forces and Bureau representatives in Cuba. Our representative there in 1943 advised that [redacted] as an informant [redacted] at that time and that Joyce was on a friendly basis with [redacted]. b6 Our files do not reflect any additional information concerning Joyce other than that set forth on pages four and five of my attached memorandum. (64-4461-197X and 200X1; 64-23312-X2 and X; 100-16825-3) b7C

It should be noted that we have not received a loyalty form on Robert Prather Joyce although he is employed at the Department of State.

[redacted] b6

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The Bureau files do not reflect any derogatory information on these individuals.

RESULTS OF THIRD CONFERENCE (4/16/49)

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau on April 22, 1949, the minutes of the Third Committee meeting. It was noted that [redacted] Chief of the Scientific Branch of CIA and [redacted] of the Committee on Biological Warfare of the Research and Development Board, National Military Establishment were new members of the Committee. (Bureau files are presently being reviewed on [redacted] and you will be advised of any pertinent information concerning these persons.) b6 b7C

From a review of the minutes of the meeting prepared by [redacted] [redacted] of the Committee, which are attached hereto for your information, the following activity was noted.

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~~Classified - Confidential~~
[redacted] of the Committee, advised that arrangements had been made for him to proceed to London, England, on April 17, 1949, to study progress and plans in the field of Biological Warfare.

[redacted]
presented a summary of Biological Warfare as it appeared to him today with an appraisal of the U. S. offensive - defensive position with respect to this weapon.

In summary, [redacted] stated as follows. [redacted]

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Negotiations are currently underway between various Government agencies to coordinate civil defense in the BW field. There is no rapid detection device for BW available. In regard to protection from BW agents, [redacted] named three general categories: [redacted]

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According to [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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In conclusion, [redacted]

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It was noted in the minutes that [redacted] CIA's representative (c) to the Committee, furnished the Committee with intelligence information concerning [redacted]. A copy of [redacted] (c) b1 statement to the Committee was not furnished to the Bureau because of a lack of availability of such copies. [redacted] advised Supervisor [redacted] that a copy was available in his office for review. In addition, the minutes reflected that [redacted] of the State Department presented a preliminary report concerning Public Relations Aspects of BW. No details concerning Joyce's report to the Committee were contained in the minutes and [redacted] also advised that this information was available in his office for review. (It is contemplated that the information contained in the reports by [redacted] and Joyce will be obtained from [redacted] at the time he is advised of the information contained in the recommendations of this memorandum.)

*obtained 5/14/49
by [redacted]
J. attached
Ehr*

STATUS:

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The next meeting of the Committee is planned for April 30, 1949, at the Pentagon Building.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

b6

It is recommended that [redacted] b7C revised:

1. The 12 questions under consideration are not calculated to obtain data from which logical conclusions concerning biological warfare potential can be drawn.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. Since biological warfare can be used as a morale weapon against the general public, as well as a means of sabotaging production, the following questions would be more to the point.

- (a) Is there any known biological warfare agent which could be successfully used against select groups such as the individuals in the Pentagon Building which was referred to in the minutes of the Committee meeting of April 16, 1949.
- (b) How could it be distributed?
- (c) Would any degree of technical know-how be necessary for distribution?
- (d) How bulky a parcel would it make before distributing?
- (e) What type and size laboratory would be necessary to prepare it?

With further reference to the minutes of the Committee meeting on April 16, 1949, what are the types of BW agents which could be used on a large scale against crops and animals and specifically how could such BW agents be distributed.

- (a) Would any degree of technical know-how be necessary for distribution?
- (b) How bulky a parcel would it make before distributing?
- (c) What type and size laboratory would be necessary to prepare it?

These are questions best answered by scientists. The questions of who might wage biological warfare and what steps could be taken to frustrate their plans are moot until the foregoing questions are answered.

EHN:mcn:eew

I will go along with this. I do want to indy & agree
I do not want to take up
valuable time from more
important things "coddling"
this project. The purpose of
the committee is somewhat question-
able as to security & practical use
K.

b6

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

F-19a

b7C

Supervisor

1738

Subj: Robert P. Joyce

~~SECRET~~

Exact Spelling Researchers

All References Initial *ayd*

Subversive Ref

Date *4-15-49*

Main File

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FILE NUMBER

~~SERIALS~~

~~105-8611~~ 7, 9, 8, X

~~64-21981~~ 3, X

~~100-16825~~ 3, X

~~64-3208-E-18~~ X *check?*

~~64-49633-36~~ X

~~100-346298~~ 27 X

~~64-1807~~ 539, X

~~64-29833-210~~ - 210, X

~~64-23312~~ X, X2, X

~~64-14461-199~~ X, X

~~100-347629-#71~~ #71, X

~~64-3252~~ 92, 23, X

~~64-19711-136~~ 136, X

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25Y (1) 113012024

Initialed *①*

b6

SERVICE UNIT

F-19a

b7C

SEARCHED

Supervisor

om. 1938

Subj:

Robert P. George

~~SECRET~~
Exact Spelling Searchers
All References Initial *mgd*
Subversive Ref Date 4-15-49
Main File
Restricted to Locality of

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

62-70543-116, X

64-22900-2, X

Robert Prather George

(S)

100-346296-29

b1

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Initialed *2*

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SERVICE UNIT

F-19a

b7C

SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor _____

Room 1738

Subj: ROBERT JOYCE

~~SECRET~~

- Exact Spelling
 All References
 Subversive Ref
 Main File
 Restricted to Locality of

Searchers

Initials gj

Date 003-31

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

<u>67-77420 (part)</u>	?	X
<u>47-30452</u>	?	X
<u>26-64723</u>	X	
<u>26-77440</u>	X	
<u>26-88927</u>	X	
<u>116-38050</u>	X	
<u>116-125305</u>	X	
<u>62-83167</u>	X	
<u>94-2</u>	<u>244295</u>	X 3
<u>56-35249</u>	X	
<u>900-345044</u>	3	X
<u>105-3387</u>	174	X
<u>12-26912</u>	318	X ✓ ?
<u>62-54186</u>	2	X

~~SECRET~~

Initialed (3)

b6

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

F-19a

b7C

Supervisor _____ Room 173

Subj: Robert L. Berger

- Exact Spelling ~~SEARCHERS~~ Searchers
 All References ~~SEARCHERS~~ Initial _____
 Subversive Ref Date 7-11
 Main File
 Restricted to Locality of _____

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

<u>65-31206</u>	<u>36X</u>
<u>64-29446</u>	<u>60, 61 X</u>
<u>105-5773</u>	<u>3 X</u>
<u>61-18359</u>	<u>2 X</u>
<u>100-811855</u>	<u>5221, X</u>
<u>100-25300</u>	<u>10 X</u>
<u>65-30750</u>	<u>84, X</u>
<u>65-44610</u>	<u>163 X</u>
<u>100-350613</u>	<u>10 X 3</u>
<u>100-348044</u>	<u>7 X</u>
<u>63-15147-11</u>	<u>17043, 27, 105, 150, X</u>
<u>52-30805</u>	<u>8 X</u>
<u>36-28140</u>	<u>7 X</u>
<u>91-2616</u>	<u>32 X</u>



Initialed (4)

b6

SERVICE UNIT
SEARCH SLIP

F-19a

b7C

Supervisor

Room 1738

Subj: Robert Joyce

- Exact Spelling ~~SEARCHERS~~ Searchers
 All References ~~SEARCHERS~~ Initial
 Subversive Ref Date 3-22-71
 Main File
 Restricted to Locality of

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

file section adv. That these serials have been destroyed

91-2616 25, 24 X

100-167120 2101, 2449 X

100-346290 19020; X

98-24425 1 X

100-2298 34 X

100-188-61 51039 X

b6

b7C

R.

62-81093-34 1XP101; X

87-447-3 12 X

61-9182- 1XP3; X

62-81093-11 59-316 X



Initialed 5

THE DIRECTOR

April 15, 1949

MR. D. H. LADD

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

PURPOSE:

To inform you of the results of the second conference held by the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of National Defense on April 4, 1949, at [redacted] Office in New York City relating to biological warfare from the standpoint of an unconventional attack by enemies of this country.

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BACKGROUND:

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You will recall that pursuant to your instructions a liaison arrangement was entered into with [redacted] (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon Building), [redacted] of this Committee, in order that the Bureau could be kept advised of the results of these meetings.

RESULTS OF SECOND CONFERENCE (APRIL 4, 1949)

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau on April 13, 1949, the minutes of the second Committee meeting. [redacted] suggested that Supervisor [redacted] might desire to discuss these minutes with him at a future date. A review of the names of the individuals attending this meeting reflected that Mr. Robert P. Joyce of the State Department; [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] not further identified, were new members of this committee.

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From a review of the minutes of the meeting prepared by [redacted] which are attached hereto for your information, the following activity was noted:

[redacted] pointed out that the Committee was responsible to the Secretary of Defense and, therefore, would have the full support and aid of the National Military Establishment in securing information deemed essential to its studies. [redacted] urged that the Committee, in defining its area of activities, do nothing which would exclude it from all necessary fields of investigation. The Committee agreed.

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The Committee appointed a Subcommittee headed by Robert P. Joyce, and whose other members are [redacted] to prepare a preliminary study of the public relations aspects of biological warfare.

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. Clegg _____

Mr. Glavin _____

Mr. Ladd _____

Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Hodson _____

Mr. Tracy _____

Mr. Egan _____

Mr. Durkee _____

Mr. Harbo _____

Mr. Mohr _____

Mr. Pennington _____

Mr. Quinn _____

Tels. Room _____

Mr. Nease _____

Miss Randy _____

Attachment.

EHM:mer

100-93216-189

5, S/H

EHM:mer

100-93216-189

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The Committee agreed that information concerning the strength, capabilities and probable intentions of the "underground" within the U. S. was essential to the study of its problems. The Committee then instructed [redacted] to make the necessary arrangements through the Secretary of Defense to have a representative of the FBI brief the Committee on this general subject. The Committee tabled a list of questions attached as Exhibit 3 which had been prepared in connection with this matter for this meeting. (It is noted that many of these questions are the same questions previously drawn up by [redacted], the answers to which were submitted to you in my memorandum dated January 10, 1949. The original memorandum and the answers thereto are attached for your further information.)

[redacted] suggested that a study of the violations of the Pure Food and Drug Act might reveal unusual possibilities for biological warfare. [redacted] was appointed to review the violations of the Pure Food and Drug Act for the next meeting.

The psychological aspects of biological warfare were discussed by the Committee. It was noted that the "moral hazard" of biological warfare was considerable and that if biological warfare were used against the U. S. the Committee felt that serious consideration should be given to whether greater moral and military advantage would be gained by retaliation in kind or by abstaining from using biological warfare. It was also pointed out that in regard to our own psychology, the possibility exists that absolute proof of the clandestine employment of biological warfare against us by a foreign power might precipitate a demand for a preventive war.

The minutes reflected that the next meeting of this committee would be held in NYC on April 16, 1949.

There is set forth below a review of the Bureau's files concerning members of this Committee.

DR. HANS SPEIER

Hans Speier was born in Berlin, Germany, on February 3, 1905. He entered the U.S. at New York in 1933 and became a naturalized citizen in April of 1940 at New York City. He is a scientist. In 1942 Speier was an applicant for the position of Senior Political Analyst at the Federal Communications Commission. During this investigation it was determined that Speier had been employed since his entry into the U.S. as a professor of sociology at the New School for Social Research, NYC.

The New School for Social Research was established in 1919, the purpose being to provide a medium in which adults might continue their

education under qualified instructors. European professors have been induced to teach at this School since 1930, the apparent purpose being to save for the United States the culture of Europe as reflected in the experiences of outstanding European scholars who were ousted from their professions in other countries due to the racial and ideological differences. Investigation conducted by the New York Office has indicated that the School is not considered to be Communist controlled or dominated and that the faculty is predominantly non-Communist. It has been determined from various sources, however, that the premises of the School at 66 West 12th Street, New York City, have been used on various occasions by alleged Communist front organizations. The Carnegie Foundation and Rockefeller Institute have in the past provided funds for teaching fellowships at this School. No other derogatory information concerning Speier was obtained during this investigation. (77-19940, 65-664673, 105-10309-6 p.3)

You may recall that in 1942 [redacted]

b6 [redacted] addressed a communication to [redacted] in connection with our investigation of b7C Speier, at which time he alleged that he had learned that our investigation reflected that the New School for Social Research was Communistic. He also alleged that "Coughlinites" were well represented in this Bureau. (77-19940-10)

Former confidential informant [redacted] of doubtful reliability advised in January of 1943 that Speier was either a German Communist, a fellow traveler or a Communist stooge. (116-103262-7 p.4) b2
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Through a highly delicate and reliable source having access to [redacted] it was determined in March of 1946 b7D that Hans Speier appeared in [redacted] telephone reference book. [redacted] has been reliably reported as a CP member. (116-103262-7 p.4)

b6 In May of 1947 through a highly reliable and delicate source the personal effects of [redacted] were made available to Agents of the b7C Washington Field Office. The name of Dr. Hans Speier was found [redacted]
b7D [redacted] (116-103262-10)

In 1948 Speier was an Atomic Energy Act applicant for employment as a research scientist at Douglas Aircraft, Inc. During this investigation it was determined that Speier was employed from 1933 to 1942 by the New School for Social Research in NYC; from May of 1942 to May of 1944 as an analyst by the FCC, Washington, D. C.; from May of 1944 to December of 1946, as a propaganda policy adviser to the Office of War Information, Washington, D. C.; until September, 1947, as Associate Division Chief, State Department; September, 1947, to July, 1948, as a State Department Consultant; and from

September, 1947 to July, 1948, as a Professor at the New School for Social Research in NYC. Persons interviewed recommended Speier as being intelligent, loyal and patriotic. No derogatory information was determined from the individuals interviewed. (116-103262)

It is noted that we are presently instituting an investigation of Dr. Hans Speier, who is an applicant for a position with the Department of State in connection with the Voice of America Program.

ROBERT PRATHER JOYCE

This Bureau on April 6, 1949, instituted an applicant investigation on Robert Prather Joyce at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency. The application furnished by Joyce reflects that he was born on October 17, 1912, at Los Angeles, California. He is married and his wife's name is Jane Chase Joyce. His employment record reflects that he is presently employed by the Department of State as a member of the Policy Planning Staff, salary \$10,300 per annum. It was further noted that Joyce was previously employed by the Central Intelligence Group, 1946-1947; Office of Strategic Services, 1943-1946 (in this position he was stationed for a time at Bern, Switzerland); from 1928 to 1943 he was a Foreign Service Officer, Department of State. (It is noted that in 1943 he was Second Secretary of the U. S. Embassy in Cuba.)

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One of the five character references given by Joyce in his application was [redacted] who is a member of the Committee in the captioned case. Joyce listed the names of Joseph Alsop and Stewart J. O. Alsop of Washington, D. C., who are well known to this Bureau, as social acquaintance and neighbor, respectively. (118-)

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During the investigation of Frederick Vanderbilt Field in July and August of 1943, it was determined that he visited Havana, Cuba, to attend the Congress of the Latin American Confederation of Workers, a Communist infiltrated labor organization. It was reported that Field covered this Congress for the magazine "New Masses." The Cuban Police covered the subject's activities while he was in Havana and it was determined that while there, Field, accompanied by Martha Gellhorn Hemingway, wife of Ernest Hemingway, visited the residence of Robert Joyce, Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy, and his wife, [redacted]. This source reported that [redacted] You may recall that Frederick Vanderbilt Field has been reported to the Bureau as a Soviet espionage agent. (100-2270-34)

A highly reliable and delicate source made available the personal effects of [redacted] with aliases, on July 13 and August 13, 1948.

Included among these effects was a letter of recommendation dated November 26, 1945, To Whom It May Concern, written by Robert Prather Joyce, Special Assistant to the Minister of the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland. Joyce described Lieberman as an American resident of Zurich, Switzerland, a newspaperwoman of excellent standing. In addition, it was stated that "During the war Mrs. Lieberman rendered significant service to this mission. She showed great ability and resourcefulness and gave us frequent proof of her loyalty and personal integrity." In Lieberman's application for employment in March of 1946 with the United Nations Organization she listed as a reference Robert Joyce, American Legation, Bern, Switzerland. You may recall that [redacted]

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Additional file references are being reviewed on Joyce and you will be advised of the results of this review.

DR. FRANKLIN S. COOPER

[redacted] Haskins Laboratories, NYC, was listed as a personal reference by [redacted] at the time [redacted] applied for a position with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. You may recall that [redacted] was mentioned by [redacted] and from whom she received information relating to [redacted] activities in Yugoslavia. (65-56402-234 p.113)

The Bureau files fail to reflect any derogatory information concerning [redacted] Haskins Laboratories, NYC, Chairman of the Committee; [redacted] of the University of Wisconsin; [redacted] of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; [redacted] Carnegie Institute of Washington; Major General [redacted] of the Chemical Corps; [redacted] and [redacted]

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A review of the Bureau's files is presently being made for information concerning the two new members of this Committee, [redacted] and [redacted] You will be advised of the results of this review.

STATUS:

No known request has been received by the Bureau from the Secretary of Defense that a representative of this Bureau be appointed to brief the Committee as noted above.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of our knowledge of [redacted] contact with Jay Lovestone and the presence of [redacted] and other questionable persons referred to in this memorandum as members of this Committee, I strongly recommend against a representative of this Bureau meeting with this Committee to brief them on information vital to our internal security.

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I recommend that Black be advised that any specific questions before the Committee which he desires this Bureau to consider be forwarded through our present liaison arrangement for appropriate handling.

b6

SERVICE UNIT

F-194

b7C

SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor _____ Room 1238

Subj: HANS SPEIER

- Exact Spelling
 All References
 Subversive Ref
 Main File
 Restricted to Locality of

Searchers

Initial AS

Date 4-1

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

77-19940

X

116-183963

X

45-6656

31 X

61-7558

399X1 X

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DATE 4/20/2002 BY LSB/bja/kb

62-17810

60104100 X

100-4399

4-X

65-29567

66 X

65-6656

20,22,15 X

100-34099

197 X

65-56143

24781100 1060,22 X

110-200123

4 X

62-80335

3597, X

105-10303

4 X

123-918

2 X

100-20

558 X

65-66772

24779111 X

N.
10.

Initialed

OFFICE OF THE

OF DEFENSE

22 April 1949

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/30/04 BY 602674C/NCS/BjA/cB

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Memo. for _____

Rm 113 FBI

Attached is a copy of the Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the Secretary of Defense's ad hoc Committee on BW which is being distributed without Appendices B, C, and D because of the lack of availability of such copies.

File copies of these appendices are available in my office.

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b7C

RECORDED - 31

100-93216

32 MAY 20 1949

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51 MAY 24 1949

A-2857

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TO

OFFICIAL INDICATED BELOW BY CHECK MARK

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

I think it
would be well
I summarize
the pertinent facts
to each of the
members of the
H.B.W Committee
operating under

See Me b6
Note and Return
For Your Recommendation b7C
What are the facts?

Remarks:

may get a bird's eye picture
of this outfit.

K.

memo Director
5/9/49
FBI

FNC-54

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/30/01 BY 60217 ac/mas/cj/afcb

100 - 93216 - 191

~~SECRET~~

Office M

im • UNITED

STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR
 FROM : D. M. LADD
 SUBJECT: Ø BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: May 9, 1949

11130/01
 CLASSIFIED BY uclues/BIA/CB 60267 Derivative
 DECLASSIFY ON: 20/11/11/2029

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Mr. Tolson
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Tamm
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Pennington
 Mr. Quinn Team
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Nease
 Miss Holmes
 Miss Gandy

Reference is made to the attached routing slip relating to the captioned matter on which you noted "I think it would be well to summarize the pertinent facts re each of the members of the BW Committee operating under Colonel [redacted] tutelage so we may get a bird's eye picture of this outfit."

Pursuant to your instructions there is set forth below a summary of pertinent facts appearing in the Bureau's files concerning the various members of the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of National Defense on Biological Warfare.

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[redacted] o Haskins Laboratory, New York City. This Laboratory has received grants from various philanthropic institutions to engage in biological research. Bureau files fail to reflect any derogatory information regarding this individual.

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You will recall that Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] first came to the Bureau's attention in December of 1948 in connection with the above Committee when Secretary Forrestal advised you by letter dated December 20, 1948, that [redacted] had prepared at the Secretary's direction a preliminary report on unconventional methods of warfare which included biological warfare, fissionable materials and other techniques. This report recommended that a permanent unit be set up in the office of the Secretary of Defense to study this general problem and that the unit negotiate directly with other agencies on a cooperative basis. [redacted] report insinuated that the Bureau operated on a case basis and not on a counter intelligence basis. [redacted] confidentially advised the Bureau in December, 1948, that [redacted]

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A.R.C. [redacted] 100-93216-14
 5-EMR

[redacted] Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army, advised the Bureau's liaison representative [redacted] at [redacted] request he had furnished to [redacted] a list of questions, classified [redacted] of information which was not available to the Intelligence Division but which might be obtained from this Bureau. It was indicated that [redacted] needed certain information relating to Communism and espionage for a thorough analysis of unconventional methods of warfare. According to [redacted] subsequently endeavored to use [redacted] for the purpose of securing the answers to these questions and [redacted] also furnished a copy of the questions to [redacted]. A review of these questions has reflected that a complete detailed factual answer to each question would have entailed exhaustive research and, in addition, because of the nebulous quality of some of the questions, a detailed answer was impossible. Many of the questions were propounded on an obvious inaccurate concept of the organization and activities of the Communist Party and Soviet espionage.

EHM:ew

The Director 5-31-49 EHM

SECRET HBRK

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

[redacted] subsequently
confidentially advised the Bureau's liaison representative that [redacted]
[redacted]

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In March of 1949 [redacted] submitted to the Bureau a memorandum relating to the clandestine delivery of a dummy atomic bomb into the United States in order to protect the vulnerability of the United States in this respect. An analysis was made of this memorandum and it was not felt that such a test would be feasible or wise because of the impossibility of simulating actual conditions under which such a bomb would be brought into this country by an enemy; it would be necessary that a live bomb be used for this test to actually test existing detection facilities and finally we already know that the United States is vulnerable in this respect.

As you will recall, [redacted] is presently furnishing to the Bureau the minutes of the meetings of the Advisory Committee for the Secretary of National Defense on Biological Warfare. (62-89223)

[redacted]
This individual is well known to the Bureau as the wartime head of OSS.

Dr. Hans Speier

Hans Speier was born in Berlin, Germany, on February 3, 1905. He entered the U. S. at New York in 1933 and became a naturalized citizen in April of 1940 at New York City. He is a scientist. In 1942 Speier was an applicant for the position of Senior Political Analyst at the Federal Communications Commission. During this investigation it was determined that Speier had been employed since his entry into the U. S. as a professor of sociology at the New School for Social Research, NYC.

The New School for Social Research was established in 1919, the purpose being to provide a medium in which adults might continue their education under qualified instructors. European professors have been induced to teach at this School since 1930, the apparent purpose being to save for the United States the culture of Europe as reflected in the experiences of outstanding European scholars who were ousted from their professions in other countries due to racial and ideological differences. Investigation conducted by the New York Office has indicated that the School is not considered to be Communist controlled or dominated and that the faculty is predominantly non-Communist. It has been determined from various sources, however, that the premises of the School at 66 West 12th Street, New York City, have been used on various occasions by alleged Communist front organizations. The Carnegie Foundation and Rockefeller Institute have in the past provided funds for teaching fellowships at this school. No other derogatory

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

information concerning Speier was obtained during this investigation. (77-19940, 65-664673, 105-10303-4 pg.3)

b6 You may recall that in 1942 [redacted] of the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, addressed a communication to [redacted] in connection with our investigation of Speier, at b7C which time he alleged that he had learned that our investigation reflected that the New School for Social Research was Communistic. He also alleged that "Coughlinites" were well represented in this Bureau. (77-19940-10)

Former confidential informant [redacted] of doubtful reliability advised in January of 1943 that Speier was either a German Communist, a fellow traveler or a Communist stooge. (116-103262-7 p.4) b2

Through a highly delicate and reliable source having access to the [redacted] that Hans b6 Speier [redacted] has been reliably b7C reported as a CP member. (116-103262-7 p.4) b7D

In May of 1947 through a highly reliable and delicate source the personal effects of Ursula Wasserman were made available to Agents of the Washington Field Office. The name of Dr. Hans Speier was found in her effects. Ursula Wasserman is a suspected Soviet Agent who has been in contact with some of the subjects in the Gregory Case. (116-103262-10)

In 1948 Speier was an Atomic Energy Act applicant for employment as a research scientist at Douglas Aircraft, Inc. During this investigation it was determined that Speier was employed from 1933 to 1942 by the New School for Social Research in NYC; from May of 1942 to May of 1944 as an analyst by the FCC, Washington, D. C.; from May of 1944 to December of 1946, as a propaganda policy adviser to the Office of War Information, Washington, D. C.; until September, 1947, as Associate Division Chief, State Department; September, 1947, to July, 1948, as a State Department Consultant; and from September, 1947, to July, 1948, as a Professor at the New School for Social Research in NYC. Persons interviewed recommended Speier as being intelligent, loyal and patriotic. No derogatory information was determined from the individuals interviewed. (116-103262)

[redacted] Haskins Laboratories, NYC.

b6 was listed as a personal reference by [redacted]
b7C applied for a position with [redacted]

b7D You may recall that [redacted] was mentioned by [redacted]

[redacted] (65-56402-234 p.113)

MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

Robert P. Joyce

During an investigation by this Bureau of Carlo Tresca captioned "Italian Anarchist Activities," an Agent of this Bureau attended an Italian "anti-Fascisti" meeting at Waterbury, Connecticut, on March 25, 1923. Tresca was reportedly prevented from entering this meeting by the police at Waterbury, Connecticut. The Bureau Agent covering this meeting determined that Robert P. Joyce was one of the eight members of the Yale Liberal Club, New Haven, Connecticut, who attended this meeting. (It has been determined that Robert P. Joyce attended Yale University from 1923 to 1926.) (61-1335-92 p.3)

In 1943 Robert P. Joyce was Coordinator of Intelligence and Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba. Joyce worked closely in his official position with intelligence representatives of the Armed Forces and Bureau representatives in Cuba. Our representative there in 1943 advised that Spruille Braden, Ambassador to Cuba, employed Ernest Hemingway as an informant of the Embassy at that time and that Joyce was on a friendly basis with Hemingway. (64-4461-197X and 200KL; 64-23312-X2 and X; 100-16825-3)

During the investigation of [redacted] in July and August of 1943, it was determined that he visited Havana, Cuba, to attend the Congress of the Latin American Confederation of Workers, a Communist infiltrated labor organization. It was reported that [redacted] covered this Congress for the magazine "New Masses."

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[redacted] This source reported that [redacted] was a good friend of [redacted]. You may recall that [redacted] has been reported to the Bureau as a Soviet espionage agent. (100-2278-34)

A highly reliable and delicate source made available [redacted]

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

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This Bureau on April 6, 1949, instituted an applicant investigation on Robert Prather Joyce at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency. The application furnished by Joyce reflects that he was born on October 17, 1902, at Los Angeles, California. He is married and his wife's name is [redacted] Joyce. His employment record reflects that he is presently employed by the Department of State as a member of the Policy Planning Staff, salary \$10,300 per annum. It was further noted that Joyce was previously employed by the Central Intelligence Group, 1946-1947; Office of Strategic Services, 1943-1946 (in this position he was stationed for a time at Bern, Switzerland); from 1928 to 1943 he was a Foreign Service Officer, Department of State. (It is noted that in 1943 he was Second Secretary of the U. S. Embassy in Cuba.) (S)(u)

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One of the five character references given by Joyce in his application was [redacted] who is a member of the Committee in the captioned case.

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Joyce listed the names of [redacted]

[redacted] who are well known to this Bureau, [redacted]

(118-15)(u)

During this applicant investigation it has been determined from a review of the State Department files that the following comments concerning Joyce were made by [redacted]

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MEMO FOR THE DIRECTOR

[redacted] was interviewed by an Agent of the Washington Field Office at which time he stated that he did not care to make any comment on the record concerning Mr. Joyce but stated that he was willing to give information concerning [redacted]

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He also remarked that [redacted]
[redacted]

The Bureau's files fail to reflect any derogatory information concerning [redacted] of the University of Wisconsin; [redacted]

b6 [redacted] of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; [redacted] Carnegie
b7C Institute of Washington; Major General Alden H. Waitt, Chief of the Chemical Corps;
[redacted] of the Department of Economics, University of Chicago; [redacted]
[redacted] of the Scientific Branch, CIA; and [redacted]
[redacted] of the Research and Development Boards, Committee on
Biological Warfare.

ACTION: None. This is for your information.

Attachment

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5-20-49
with summaries
RW
per 8th
Wouldn't it be well to
make available to [redacted]
[redacted] the pertinent facts
re these individuals.

~~SECRET~~

11/30/04
CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] b7A/CB 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFICATION: 11/30/2020

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SE

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In December of 1948 [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] had prepared at [REDACTED] direction a preliminary report on
unconventional methods of warfare which included biological warfare, fissionable
materials and other techniques. This report recommended that a permanent unit
be set up in the office of the Secretary of Defense to study this general problem
and that the unit negotiate directly with other agencies on a cooperative basis.

It was learned that [REDACTED] had requested a list of questions,
classified ~~secret~~, of information which might be obtained from the FBI. It was
indicated that [REDACTED] needed certain information relating to Communism and
espionage for a thorough analysis of unconventional methods of warfare. [REDACTED]
subsequently endeavored to use [REDACTED] for the purpose of securing the
answers to these questions and [REDACTED] also furnished a copy of the questions to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] A review of these questions reflected that a complete
detailed factual answer to each question would have entailed exhaustive research
and, in addition, because of the nebulous quality of some of the questions, a
detailed answer was impossible. Many of the questions were propounded on an
obvious inaccurate concept of the organization and activities of the Communist
Party and Soviet espionage.

It was subsequently learned from a confidential source that, at [REDACTED]

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In March of 1949 [REDACTED] submitted a memorandum relating to the [REDACTED]

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b7E

Dr. Hans Speier

INDEXED - 98

100-93216-172

34 JUN 1 1949

Hans Speier was born in Berlin, Germany, on February 3, 1905,
He entered the U. S. at New York in 1932 ~~RECORDED~~ became a naturalized citizen in
April of 1940 at New York City. He is a scientist. In 1942 Speier was an
applicant for the position of Senior Political Analyst at the Federal Communications
Commission. During this investigation it was determined that Speier had been
employed since his entry into the U. S. as a professor of sociology at the New
School for Social Research, New York City.

2 JUN 2 1949
Attn. Director 5/20/49
R.W.L.

REC - Paddington

5/25/49

File - 5-
FBI - NEW YORK

~~SECRET~~

The New School for Social Research was established in 1919, the purpose being to provide a medium in which adults might continue their education under qualified instructors. European professors have been induced to teach at this School since 1930, the apparent purpose being to save for the United States the Culture of Europe as reflected in the experiences of outstanding European scholars who were ousted from their professions in other countries due to racial and ideological differences. Investigation has indicated that the School is not considered to be Communist controlled or dominated and that the faculty is predominantly non-Communist. It has been determined from various sources, however, that the premises of the School at 66 West 12th Street, New York City, have been used on various occasions by alleged Communist front organizations. The Carnegie-Foundation and Rockefeller Institute have in the past provided funds for teaching fellowships at this school. No other derogatory information concerning Speier was obtained during this investigation.

In 1942 [redacted] of the
New School for Social Research, addressed a communication to [redacted]
[redacted] in connection with the investigation of Speier, at which time he
alleged that he had learned that the investigation reflected that the New School
for Social Research was Communistic.

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Through a highly delicate and reliable source having access to the
[redacted] that Hans
Speier [redacted] has been
reliably reported as a CP member.

b6

In May of 1947 through a highly reliable and delicate source the
[redacted] were made available. The name of Dr. Hans

b7C

Speier was found in [redacted]

b7D

In 1948 Speier was an applicant under the atomic energy program for employment as a research scientist at Douglas Aircraft, Inc. During this investigation it was determined that Speier was employed from 1933 to 1942 by the New School for Social Research in New York City; from May of 1942 to May of 1944 as an analyst by the FCC, Washington, D. C.; from May of 1944 to December 1946, as a propaganda policy adviser to the Office of War Information, Washington, D. C.; until September, 1947, as Associate Division Chief, State Department; September, 1947 to July, 1948, as a State Department Consultant; and from September, 1947, to July, 1948, as a Professor at the New School for Social Research in New York City. Persons interviewed recommended Speier as being intelligent, loyal and patriotic. No derogatory information was determined from the individuals interviewed.

Exhibit 1
10326

b6

[redacted]
[redacted] was listed as a personal reference by [redacted]

b7C

[redacted] applied for a position with [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] was mentioned by [redacted]

Robert P. Joyce

During an investigation of Carlo Tresca in connection with Italian Anarchist Activities, an Agent attended an Italian "anti-Fascisti" meeting at Waterbury, Connecticut, on March 25, 1923. Tresca was reportedly prevented from entering this meeting by the police at Waterbury, Connecticut. The Agent covering this meeting determined that Robert P. Joyce was one of the eight members of the Yale Liberal Club, New Haven, Connecticut, who attended this meeting. (It has been determined that Robert P. Joyce attended Yale University from 1923 to 1926.)

In 1943 Robert P. Joyce was Coordinator of Intelligence and Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba. Joyce worked closely in his official position with intelligence representatives of the Armed Forces in Cuba. It was learned that Spruille Braden, Ambassador to Cuba, employed Ernest Hemingway as an informant of the Embassy at that time and that Joyce was on a friendly basis with Hemingway.

During the investigation of [redacted] in July and August of 1943, it was determined that he visited Havana, Cuba, to attend the Congress of the Latin American Confederation of Workers, a Communist infiltrated labor organization. It was reported that [redacted] covered this Congress for the magazine "New Masses."

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[redacted] was reported that [redacted] was a good friend of [redacted]

[redacted] This

A highly reliable and delicate source made available [redacted]

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b7D

Exhibit 1
100-93216-192

10327

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On April 6, 1949, an applicant investigation on Robert Prather Joyce was instituted at the request of governmental Agency. The application furnished by Joyce reflected that he was born on October 17, 1902, at Los Angeles, California. He is married and his wife's name is [redacted]. His

employment record reflects that he is presently employed by the Department of State as a member of the Policy Planning Staff, salary \$10,300 per annum. It was further noted that Joyce was previously employed by the Central Intelligence Group, 1946-1947; Office of Strategic Services, 1945-1946 (in this position he was stationed for a time at Bern, Switzerland); from 1928 to 1943 he was a Foreign Service Officer, Department of State. (It is noted that in 1943 he was Second Secretary of the U. S. Embassy in Cuba.) (S)(u)

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One of the five character references given by Joyce in his application was [redacted] who is a member of the Committee. Joyce listed the names [redacted]
[redacted]

During this applicant investigation it has been determined from a few of the State Department files that the following comments concerning Joyce made by [redacted]

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[redacted] when interviewed, commented briefly on the Belgrade incident stating it was the influence of Mr. Joyce's wife which made the difficulty. [redacted] stated that by reason of her influence on Mr. Joyce and his lack of discretion,

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information, which [redacted] considered highly confidential, [redacted]

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(S)(u)

June 7, 1949

12:20

88

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. LADD
MR. NICHOLS

of the National Security Council, called to bring me up-to-date on a session he had with [redacted]. He stated that [redacted] had indicated that they were going to brief [redacted] Under-Secretary of National Defense, on this matter tomorrow, but that he [redacted] had very confidentially con-

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[redacted]
[redacted] was behind this. I thanked the [redacted] commented that he believed me on this matter.

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

100-93216-17
RECORDED - 16
INDEXED - 16
TO 100-93216

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnee _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 7:00 PM
DATE 6-7-49
BY J.E.H.

cc-Mr. Nease

24
60 JUN 14 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/30/07 BY 60247 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 8, 1949

FROM : D. M. Ladd

5:25 p.m.

SUBJECT: B. W. COMMITTEE

[redacted] called me tonight and advised that [redacted]
 he had learned extremely confidentially that [redacted]

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[redacted] further stated that [redacted]

✓
 Mr. Tolson
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Mohr
 Mr. Pennington
 Mr. Quinn Tamm
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Nease
 Miss. Holmes
 Miss. Gandy

b6

b7C

DML:FA

Well at least someone
 in Pentagon is acting
 with regard to common
 sense.

d.

RECORDED SE 1
59100-93216-1165
JUN 14 1949 10:00 AM

Five-Echo

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/30/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

63 JUN 16 1949

FBI

mem

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

File on Biological Warfare

27 May

End

from [redacted] office per
your request.

b6
b7C

*add
6/3
PK-9*

filed EHR

48-6108

for

RECORDED - 63
~~RECORDED - 63~~

1100 - 93216- 196
~~EX-B~~ I
23 JUN 14 1949

EX-9

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/30/04 BY 60207/wf/des/BjACB

6/22/08

dm
100-93216-not recorded 5/26/49

CHANGED TO

65-58698-not recorded

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/30/04 BY b0267 uc/pas/Bja/cb

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 uc/pls/bj/11/03

100-93216-^{A¹}198, 199

CHANGED TO

65-58698- 23X

100-354290- 14X

100-334289- 19X

C

SECURITY DIVISION - FBI

1949

TO:

 Director

<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tolson	Mr. H. B. Fletcher
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Clegg	Mr. Baumgardner
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Glavin	M
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Harbo	M
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nichols	Mr. Laughlin
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Rosen	Mr. Wall
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tracy	Mr. Keay
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Q. Fahill	Mr. Whitson
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Mohr	M
<input type="checkbox"/> Miss Gandy	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nease	Mr. Ferris
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Winterrowd	Foreign Service Desk
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. J. A. McClellan	Mr. Callan
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. E. J. McGabe	See Me
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Mohr	Call Me
<input type="checkbox"/> Miss Artley Pennington	Appropriate action
<input type="checkbox"/> Mrs. Metcalf Quinn Tamm	Note & return
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nease	Send file
<input type="checkbox"/> Mrs. Payson	Bring up-to-date
<input type="checkbox"/> Chief Clerk's Off.	Correct
<input type="checkbox"/> Records Section	Re-date
<input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Files	Please initial & return
<input type="checkbox"/> Mechanical Sec.	Place on record & return
<input type="checkbox"/> Ident. Division	Place on record
<input type="checkbox"/> Technical Lab.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Reading Room	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/30/04 BY 60207 UC/jws/gak

D. M. Ladd - Rm. 5736
Telephone Ext. 555

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR
 FROM : MR. D. M. LADD
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: May 31, 1949

W

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Lead	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnee	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn	
Tels. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

PURPOSE:

To inform you of the results of the fifth conference held by the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to biological warfare in an unconventional attack by enemies of this country. This meeting was held in the apartment of [redacted] on May 14, 1949, and was attended by the regular members of the committee and by [redacted] CIA representative; [redacted] Johns Hopkins University; and [redacted] Yale University. (The files are presently being reviewed on these three persons and you will be furnished with any pertinent information concerning them.)

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BACKGROUND:

You will note that this is the Committee which was set up by [redacted] with the approval of former Secretary James Forrestal of the National Military Establishment to study various methods of unconventional methods of warfare. In connection with this program [redacted] has reportedly secured the assistance of Jay Lovestone. I have previously furnished you with memoranda in this matter reflecting that certain members of the Committee are at least questionable from a loyalty standpoint.

b6

You will also recall that originally [redacted] requested that a Bureau representative sit as a member of this Committee. Pursuant to your instructions arrangements were made for our participation in these conferences to be solely through a liaison arrangement. Recently [redacted] attached a list of questions relating to Communism and espionage in the United States to the minutes of the third meeting of this Committee. The minutes reflected the questions had been tabled; nevertheless, [redacted] requested the Bureau liaison representative to secure an unofficial opinion from the Bureau as to the relevancy of his questions to the subject of BW. He was subsequently advised that his questions were not believed to be pertinent to BW and he was again advised that any problems which we could be of assistance to his Committee should be reduced to writing and referred to the Bureau for appropriate analysis. [redacted] has been advised time and time again that this is the way the Bureau desires to render any possible assistance to this Committee.

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Attachment
EM:mer

RECORDED
INDEXED
SERIALIZED
FILED
FBI - WASH. D. C.
37-140-20 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

32 AUG 15 1949
138

CONTINUED
ON BACK

DATE 14/30/04 BY 6027 uc/mrs/bjx/cb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
RESULTS OF FIFTH CONFERENCE (MAY 14, 1949)

[redacted] furnished to the Bureau on May 24, 1949, the minutes of the fifth meeting of this committee which are attached for your information. From a review of these minutes prepared by [redacted] the following activity was noted.

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[redacted] (S) CIA, and [redacted]
[redacted] CIA, presented [redacted] (S)
[redacted] (S)

b1

Security implications concerning this research subject were mentioned due to the possibility that lack of proper precaution might cause any present user to refine his techniques, might stimulate interest in non-users, might prove unsafe for public consumption and that knowledge of the existence of such a project might bring forth ridicule from mis-informed groups.

Possible applications of such a technique by an unfriendly element were discussed. Examples were given concerning the suspected use of this technique by unfriendly countries. These examples included [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] Reference was made to several newspaper and magazine articles.

Several possible uses of such techniques by unfriendly parties were covered. These uses included the extraction of classified information from an individual through subconscious isolation and detailed interrogation through regression. A simple means for the reproduction of the subconscious state was explained and the process of subconscious assignment covered, pointing out the possibilities of espionage and sabotage guidance of U. S. personnel through domination by foreign technicians. The possibilities of the instilling of false information into, and the eradication of information from the conscious memory were cited. Details were given concerning negative visual hallucinations and the surveillance possibility involved. The possible destruction and the re-creation of personality and character traits were explained.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Committee expressed considerable interest in the various methods of isolation of the subconscious mind which were discussed, particularly in the use of drugs as an aid to hypnotic techniques.

[redacted] indicated that:

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[redacted] of the Committee, presented a written report concerning [redacted] on behalf of the Committee, which reflected that [redacted]

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
b7D

[redacted] from the Federal Bureau of Investigation,¹⁰ the minutes reflected that Mr. Robert P. Joyce (State Department representative to the Committee, [redacted])

[redacted] reported that the overriding consideration in any request for information from the FBI must be

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL
SUGGESTION~~



b7D

It was recognized that the information received at this briefing would be treated in the strictest confidence. Under no circumstances would the material made available by the FBI appear [redacted] Whereupon the Committee instructed [redacted] to pass this suggestion on to the FBI through his established liaison contact.

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b6

The Bureau liaison representative has advised that [redacted] is officially presenting this request by letter through Bureau liaison. *recd b7C l and attached.*

b6
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~~CONFIDENTIAL
SUGGESTION~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] presented a letter from [redacted]
[redacted] which he
had prepared for the Committee's approval.

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b7D

[redacted] Department of the Army, advised the Committee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not yet undertaken an active study of the military applications of BW for five principal reasons:

1. The Chemical Corps has yet to offer the Joint Staff what it considers a really satisfactory BW weapon. Although plans are available for the large scale production of a BW cluster-type aerial bomb within 6 - 8 months of the decision to go into full production, this method of employment has never been evaluated either by field test or by actual combat. Despite the fact that this bomb is believed to be more effective than its orthodox chemical counterpart, it is not yet an efficient bomb from the standpoint of obtaining the maximum effective use of the BW filler.
2. BW, although possessing great potentialities, is essentially a weapon of the future which at best might become of primary importance only after a period of 2 - 4 years further intensive development.
3. The present military policy is to use BW and CW only as retaliatory weapons in the event an enemy uses them first against us.
4. During the current period of investigation and research in the field of BW, the Joint Staff relies primarily on the Chemical Corps to recommend appropriate military applications for this weapon.
5. Although the Research and Development Board, in October, 1948, forwarded to the Joint Staff without comment a copy of the Noyes Committee's comparative study of biological, radiological and chemical weapons, the Joint Staff still does not feel it has the proper technical evaluations of these weapons to warrant at this time firm determinations as to their military usefulness or application.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATUS:

The next meeting of the Committee was scheduled for May 25, 1949, at the Pentagon Building.

RECOMMENDATION:

In spite of our repeated efforts to point out that we desire a liaison relationship with this Committee, we are once again back to [redacted] original request that an FBI representative brief the Committee orally on "pertinent information along general lines concerning the strength, capabilities and probable intentions of the underground within the United States."

It is recommended that [redacted] and a representative from the Laboratory familiar with Biological Warfare agents meet with [redacted] of this Committee respectively, and Robert P. Joyce, State Department representative to the Committee, to find out what they want to know and to discuss the possible approaches to the Committee's problem in order to settle this matter.

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b7C

Finally, it is recommended that [redacted] be advised that we do not desire to designate a Bureau representative to orally brief the Committee, other than the contact above proposed, on "pertinent information along general lines concerning the strength, capabilities, and probable intentions of the underground within the United States" but that we will still consider answering any reasonable and pertinent questions concerning problems which come before the Committee after they are reduced to writing and furnished to the Bureau by liaison.

I agree


6-1



Joyce JH

JH

Office Memo



• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. B. Fletcher
 FROM : V. P. Keay
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

DATE: June 10, 1949

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnee _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Holmes _____
 Miss Gandy _____

[redacted] You will recall that [redacted]
 [redacted] of the BW Committee, addressed a letter to the Bureau
 recently requesting [redacted] Bureau [redacted] brief certain members of the Committee in
 connection with Communist information.

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b7C

At 4:45 p.m. today [redacted] telephonically [redacted]
 inquired of SA [redacted] as to the status of the reply and as to
 whether a reply could be expected by tomorrow. SA [redacted] advised her
 that he would check into this situation and call her back. She was
 subsequently advised that it would be impossible to determine the status
 of the reply at this late hour but that probably they would not receive a
 reply by tomorrow.

b6

b7C

RWL:hke

RWL
 106-13216-260X
 RUEOKD/JW
 F B K
 4 JUN 1949
 250
 260

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 UC/MS/CJ/MCB

Memorandum
 6/10/49
 250
 260

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. B. Fletcher *1/18/49*
 FROM : V. P. Keay *RW*
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: June 13, 1949

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Durfee _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Holmes _____
 Miss Gandy _____

In accordance with the Director's instructions, [redacted] National Security Council, was orally advised by SA [redacted] of the activities and latest developments in connection with the "Committee" on matters relating to biological warfare. [redacted] advised he is already familiar with the Committee's activities and is following the matter closely.

b6

b6

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He commented that in his opinion the Committee will be more or less inoperative when its final report is submitted to the Secretary of Defense in the near future. He mentioned the fact that [redacted] had cautioned the Committee to confine its activities to bacteriological warfare and related subjects and not to expand into the internal security field.

[redacted] said probably the Committee will soon be "out of the Bureau's hair." [redacted] indicated that he will keep the Director and the Bureau advised of any information concerning the [redacted] Committee which comes to his attention.

RWL:hke

Rew

RECORDED

*1/13/49 - 260X9-HM
13*

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260

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/cb

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR
 FROM : MR. D. M. LADD
 SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

DATE: June 20, 1949

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to bring up to date most recent developments concerning the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to biological warfare [redacted]

D
 Johnson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clapp _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Harbo _____
 Mohr _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mease _____
 Spangler _____

b6

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BACKGROUND:

[redacted] You will recall that you have discussed the activities of [redacted] committee with [redacted] of the National Security Council.

[redacted] had addressed a letter to the Bureau requesting that certain members of his committee be briefed regarding Communist activities.

In this regard you will recall that you suggested that [redacted] be briefed.

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A meeting of the committee was scheduled to be held in New York City on June 11, 1949. On June 10, 1949, [redacted] was advised that a reply to their inquiry would not be forthcoming for use in the June 11 meeting in New York.

STATUS:

b6
b7C

By memorandum of June 13, 1949, Special Agent [redacted] of the Liaison Section advised that, in accordance with your instructions, [redacted] of the National Security Council was orally advised of the activities and latest developments of [redacted] committee. [redacted] stated that he was familiar with the committee's activities and was following the matter closely. It was [redacted] opinion that the committee will become more or less operative when its final report is submitted to the Secretary of Defense in the near future. He mentioned the fact that [redacted] had cautioned the committee not to expand into the internal security field.

[redacted] in the office of [redacted] advised on June 14, 1949, that the June 11 meeting of the committee was held as scheduled, in New York City and that only one more meeting of the committee was scheduled. This will be held on June 25, 1949, at the Pentagon.

A special memorandum dealing with Communist Party organization and activities, including the underground organization of the Communist Party, is

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DW:arm

25 AUG 11 1949
26

WPS

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briefing should be delayed until after the June 25 meeting

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b6
b7C

now being prepared for distribution to the members of the National Security Council. This distribution will occur prior to the June 25 meeting of [redacted] committee. The contents of this memorandum will answer, for all practical purposes, the general inquiries made by [redacted] concerning the Communist Party underground in the United States.

No further requests from [redacted] have been received.

ACTION:

Since the above mentioned memorandum on Communist Party organization and activities will cover the material requested by [redacted] and will be distributed prior to the next and last scheduled meeting of his committee, it is recommended that no additional oral briefing be considered for [redacted] and his committee members.

I agree

right

✓

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Director, FBI

SAC, New York

June 20, 1949

b1

11/30/04
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted] 60267 UC/NIS/BjA/cb
DECLASSIFY ON: 2029 (1)(b) U/30/2029

(S) (b1) (b7D)
(BIOLOGICAL WARFARE)

Rebulet of May 13, 1949, in which the New York Office was requested to carefully study and consider the complete [redacted] (S) b1 [redacted] and to submit to the Bureau any helpful suggestions or information relating thereto.

With the thought in mind that the Bureau desires to place an intelligent Communist Party informant, who can be trusted by the Bureau and who has the complete confidence of [redacted] b7D

[redacted] b7E the following names are being suggested as possible informants:

b6
b7C
b7D

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN [redacted]

cc NY 62-9428
NY 62-9941

REGISTERED MAIL
JRM:MEM
100-93980

100-93980-1
NOT RECORDED

76 JUL 25 1949

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

Letter to Director
NY 100-93980

In view of the above, it is felt that [redacted]

[redacted]

b6

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b7D

[redacted]
b1

(S)

[redacted]
b1

(S)

[redacted]
b1

(S)

[redacted]
b1

(S)

Letter to Director
NY 100-93980

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b1

(S)

[redacted]

b1

(S)

The New York Office will continue to be alert for other possible informants in instant matter and the Bureau will be promptly advised of any future suggestions. The Bureau is requested to advise the New York Office whether [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] and no approach to either of them will be made until the Bureau so instructs.

~~SECRET~~

100-12345678
DECLASSIFIED BY 60247mc/jws/gakb
ON 01/30/09

RECORDED - 113

Date: August 8, 1949

To: Director of Intelligence
General Staff
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE;
DR. THEODORE ROSEBURY
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Attention: Chief
Security and Training Group

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~BY REGISTERED MAIL~~

b7D

Information has been furnished to this Bureau by a confidential source believed to be reliable that [redacted]

[redacted] recently purchased the book entitled, "Experimental Air Borne Infection Warfare" written by Theodore Rosebury and published by Williams and Wilkins Company. It is noted that you have previously advised this Bureau that Rosebury's book, referred to above, does not contain classified information of the United States Government.

The above data is being furnished to you for your confidential information.

cc - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy -
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~BY REGISTERED MAIL~~

cc - Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General -
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~BY REGISTERED MAIL~~

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Durkee _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED BY

AUG 8 1949 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EHM:jpa

600-12345678
FBI - WASH. D. C.
AUG 8 1949
FBI - WASH. D. C.
fpa

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM : GUY HOTTEL, SAC
 SUBJECT: WASHINGTON FIELD.

DATE: July 5, 1949

(b) - 1
 ① BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE,
 aka ② Biological Warfare, "BW"
 INTERNAL SECURITY - R
 Refer 5-IS
 (Bureau File 100-2199)

On June 6, 1949, [redacted] telephonically [redacted]
Hand and telephone file 100-2199
 advised that [redacted] had recently purchased the book entitled, "Experimental Air Borne Infection Warfare" by THEODORE ROSEBURY, and published by Williams and Wilkins Company.

b6
 b7C
 b7D

This information is submitted for the advice of the Bureau and the Boston Office.

GED:LEB
 100-20142
 cc - Boston (100-2199)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 UC/JMS/BJA/CB

*get to DDCI
 8/18/49
 air 1-8-49
 EAM*

RECORDED - 56

100-93216 -
 F B T
 3 JUL 6 1949

INDEXED - 56

*Ether
 FIVE*

EX-94

cc [redacted]

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b7C

RECORDED - 100

EX-23

[Handwritten signature]

Date : August 8, 1949

To : Director of Intelligence
General Staff
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60247 UC/NLS/CIA/cb
ON 11/30/04

II 977600

From : Director, FBI

Re : BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

There is attached hereto for your information one copy of a "Confidential" report dated April 20, 1949, which was furnished to this Bureau by a confidential source believed to be reliable.

The Federation of American Scientists referred to in this report was organized in November 1945 for the purpose of actively campaigning for international control of atomic energy and has approximately twenty organizations affiliated with it. Information previously furnished to this Bureau has failed to reveal any Communist control of the organization on a national scale, although there have been indications of Communist infiltration and influence in some of the local organizations.

Following your review of the attached report it is requested that you advise this Bureau whether the report contains any classified information of your service.

Attachment

cc : Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
~~Washington 25, D. C.~~

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 15

AUG 9 1949 P.M.

Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AUG 10 1949

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

July 21

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, Boston
 SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE
 INTERNAL SECURITY - R
 REFER 5 IS
 Bureau File [redacted]

DATE: 7-21-49

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11/30/04 BY 60267 UC/NCS/BIA/ES

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent [redacted] in
 the instant case dated at Boston, December 9, 1948.

Recently, the principal source of information in the latter report, [redacted] b7C
 made the enclosures b7D
 available to the Boston Division.

Said enclosures consist of [redacted]

[redacted]
 b6
 b7C
 b7D

The enclosures are furnished the Bureau and Washington Field for informative purposes.

It is noted that [redacted]
 [redacted] will promptly advise the Boston Division.

[redacted]
 b6
 b7C
 b7D

The Bureau and Washington Field are advised that [redacted] is considered a reliable and valuable confidential source of information by this division. In the event any of the enclosures are disseminated, care should be taken not to disclose his identity or make identification possible of him through a release of the text [redacted]

BSG/arm
 100-21199 *Enclosure* ENCL
 Enclosure
 cc Washington Field Enc.
 cc 100-19119

RECORDED - 105

INDEXED - 105

100-93216-202
 F B II

31 JUL 25 1949

At top
 of cover
 EAM 8/6/49

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON ENCL.
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/30/09 BY 60267 UC/DCS/BJA

100-93216-202

TDB: MJ

100-93216-XS
February 25, 1942

RECORDED 100-93216-XS

Honorable Paul V. McNutt
Administrator
Federal Security Agency
Social Security Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Dr. Thomas Parran
Surgeon General
U. S. Public Health Service

Dear Mr. McNutt:

Thank you for your letter of February 10, 1942 and for your kind offer to furnish this Bureau verbally information relative to diseases considered important in warfare and sabotage by the Surgeon General, Dr. Thomas Parran.

I have designated [redacted] of the Technical Laboratory of this Bureau to receive this information from Dr. Parran. [redacted] will arrange to meet with Dr. Parran in Dr. Parran's office at his convenience.



b6

b7C

Trusting that the above arrangements will meet with your approval, I am

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Glaspie _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____
6 MAR 1942



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-00 BY 60267 uc/nmf/bja/pam

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



DML:WGR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

February 17, 1942

b6

b7C

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey *65* _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Keasey _____
Miss Bookm _____
Miss Gandy _____

b6
b7C

In connection with the attached letter, it is suggested that it be acknowledged by you and that [REDACTED] or someone from the Laboratory be designated to contact the Surgeon General for the purpose of securing the confidential information referred to herein.

Very truly yours,

D. M. Ladd
D. M. Ladd

b6

b7C

Attachment

2 ENCL 13
6 7 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-03-03 BY 60267 UC/NUG/Bja/Pas

RECORDED

100-93216-X3

100-93216-*7*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

13 FEB 28 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

C
Q - 24
P
X -
Done.

January 1942

Sent to Paul V. McNutt,

~~Director of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.~~

Dear Sir:

A confidential informant [redacted]
[redacted] recently advised this
Bureau [redacted]
that a Japanese-American war was inevitable. During an interview had
with this individual by a representative of the press, on April 5, 1925,
he forecast that Japanese would make war on the United States within
fifteen years.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] German doctors in Japan were
there for the sole purpose of teaching Japanese the art of bacterial
warfare and some day Germany would get its revenge over the United
States through the Japanese use of that mode of warfare.
[redacted] anthrax
bacilli dysentery and typhus germs as some of the methods to be em-
ployed in the bacterial warfare.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

cc - Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-03-03 BY 60067 UCW/MWS/bja/PLM

ENCLOSURE

100-93216-X3

100-93216-X3

THE FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY

WASHINGTON

Office of :
THE ADMINISTRATOR

February 10, 1942

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER~~

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I wish to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of January 30 concerning Japanese and German plans for bacterial warfare.

The whole subject is being studied by the Public Health Service and also by a special secret committee which has been appointed for that purpose. The Public Health Service is represented on this secret committee.

The matter has been discussed with the British and Canadian authorities and contact is maintained with organizations set up by them for this purpose. I request that any information which your agents may obtain concerning this subject be forwarded directly through me to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, who will be charged with presenting the information to the secret committee.

With particular reference to the three diseases mentioned in your letter, the following statements may be made:

It is almost certain that typhus cannot be established here under any conditions now existing.

Small outbreaks of dysentery could be considered as acts of sabotage, but should be controlled without much difficulty.

The possibility of producing human cases of anthrax is negligible. However, it might be built up in a few years to a higher incidence in stock animals.

RECORDEL

Information concerning the diseases considered of real importance will be communicated verbally to you by the

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uc/mw/b

b6

b7C

John Edgar Hoover

-2-

2/10/42

Surgeon General, if you consider such information necessary.

Very sincerely yours,



Paul V. McNutt

Mr. John Edgar Hoover,
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Director
1-14-42

b6

Pg. 2

b7C

In conclusion [redacted] stated that through his close association with the Japanese people and a study of their character and methods he was of the opinion that they would stop at absolutely nothing to win the war. He said that the human mind is incapable of visualising the means to which the Japanese would resort to achieve their ends.

Very truly yours,

H. T. O'Connor
Special Agent in Charge

FBI File
Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/02 BY [Signature]



IN REPLYING ADDRESS
DIRECTOR
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH

FEDERAL SECURITY
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH

BETHESDA, MARYLAND

March 4, 1942.

b6
b7C
[REDACTED]
Technical Laboratory
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear [REDACTED]

The Public Health Service has been informed
that you have been designated by Mr. Hoover to re-
ceive from the Surgeon General, information relative
to diseases considered important in warfare and
sabotage.

I wish to inform you that Dr. ~~X~~ Dyer, Director
of the National Institute of Health, who is now out
of the city, is interested in this matter and will
confer with you upon his return. Dr. Dyer is expected
to return on the sixteenth of this month.

Very truly yours,

LFB:CDW

L. F. ~~X~~ Badger, Acting Director
National Institute of Health

LFB:CDW

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 NC&B/jpa/mw

RECORDED

&

INDEXED

sara

100-93216-X4

100-93216-X4
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
15 MAR 7 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
<i>RECEIVED</i>

EX-18

7 MAR 24 1942
318 124
318 124

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH
BETHESDA, MARYLAND
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO A
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300



b6
b7C

[Redacted]
Technical Laboratory
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-3-05 BY [Signature]

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
San Francisco, California
March 21, 1942

ad
+ 11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY *UC/NAC/la/PAH 60267 derivative*
DECLASSIFY ON: 25Y *11-13-2028*

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~DATE 3/2/90 BY SP/AGS/SC~~

~~307009~~

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Re: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE

Dear Sir:

b1

~~SECRET (C)~~

b1

Please advise what steps, if any, should be taken by
this office under the premises.

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

Very truly yours,

N. J. E. Pieper
N. J. E. PIEPER
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

~~RECORDED~~

~~INDEXED~~

100-*123456*

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
18 MAR 23 1942	
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE	
<i>[Signature]</i>	

1 ENCL. 18
RE
TBE:GG
Encl.

307009
37840-INITIALS
37840-
EAST ARMY
TBE:GG
Encl.

*Crossed out stamp: Classified by SP/AGS/SC
Declassify on 11-13-2028
3/2/90
307009*

PDB:RMB

April 1, 1942

RECORDED
Special Agent in Charge
San Francisco, California

Re: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter dated March 21, 1942, in the above-entitled matter, requesting advice as to what action should be taken by your Office in this matter. You are instructed to immediately conduct investigation in order to determine whether typhoid vaccine has been sold in unusually large amounts by any of the commercial pharmaceutical concerns or other organizations in the San Francisco Bay area. In addition investigation should be conducted to determine whether there has been an increase in the sales of vaccine in the vicinity of Salinas, California. Based upon the findings of the above investigations, such further investigation should be conducted as is warranted.

b6

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[redacted] should be thoroughly interviewed concerning the basis for his statement that there has been a large increase in the sale of typhoid vaccine used by the Japanese Colony near Salinas, California.

The Bureau desires to be immediately advised as to the results of the investigation conducted by you in this matter.

With reference to the rumor concerning commercial rice which is alleged to have been poisoned in Alameda, California, you are instructed to bring this matter to the attention of the Food and Drug Administration Office in your territory for such further action as they may deem appropriate.

Very truly yours,


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

John Edgar Hoover 3/7/90
Director 1620B
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SP1AGSC
307009

RECEIVED APR 15 1942
HBB

258



RECEIVED APR 15 1942
HBB

PDB:RMB

98-8332 -1

April 3, 1942

cc: "POSSIBILITY OF
BACTERIAL WARFARE, SALE OF
TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE"

Special Agent in Charge
Seattle, Washington

b6 Ret: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS
b7C [redacted]
b7D SABOTAGE

CONFIRMED

3/7/90 DISPLACED
307009

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the closing report of Special Agent [redacted] dated March 14, 1942 at Seattle, Washington, in the above-en-titled matter relating to the spreading of germs by Japanese persons.

b6

b7C

The San Francisco Office presently has under investigation the case entitled "POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE, SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE" in which it is alleged that there has been an increase in the sale of typhoid vaccine to the Japanese Colony near Salinas, California, although this has not yet been verified. The report in this matter was originally furnished by the Military Intelligence Service. It is suggested that the Japanese may intend to use typhoid bacteria against citizen populations of this country.

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Mr. Tamm

Mr. E. A. Tamm Because of the possible effects of knowledge of this information
Mr. Clegg and the rumors which might start from it, extreme discretion should be
Mr. Glavin used in mentioning it to any outside persons.

Mr. Ladd

Mr. Nichols

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Carson

Mr. Coffey

Mr. Hendon

Mr. Holloman

Mr. McGuire cc - San Francisco

Mr. Quinn Tamm

Mr. Nease

Miss Gandy

APR 24 '42

RECORDED
Very truly yours,

INDEXED

al.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

100-9325-2
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
APR 16 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EX-12

APR 17 1942
FBI SAN FRANCISCO
PDB

ORIGINAL EDITION APR 1942

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


March 20, 1942

TDB:AL

MR. TRACY

Re: The possible use of disease
organisms in Sabotage



A representative of this Bureau was invited to receive orally from [redacted] information concerning [redacted]

b6
b7C



[redacted] of the laboratory was designated as the Bureau's representative and he called upon [redacted] on March 18, 1942 to receive this information.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 98-0-1656-G

Respectfully,

E. P. Coffey

SEARCHED
INDEXED
JAN 27 1942

100-93216-31
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

APR 22 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uc/nwo/gj/paw

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Glaspie _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Mr. Quinn Faxon _____
Mr. Quinn _____
Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED

100-93216 -4
PDB:wmc

June 19, 1942

Special Agent in Charge
San Francisco, California

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/7/90 BY SP1 ABS (C)
307009

RE: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
Sale of Typhoid Vaccine to Japanese

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter dated June 3, 1942, in the above-entitled matter requesting copies of Bureau letter to your Office dated April 1, 1942, inasmuch as a search of the files of your Office has failed to reflect any information relating to this letter.

In accordance with your request there are attached hereto copies of the Bureau's letter dated April 1, 1942.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosures

r. Telsen _____
r. E. A. Tamm _____
r. Clegg _____
r. Glavin _____
r. Ladd _____
r. Nichols _____
r. Rosen _____
r. Tracy _____
r. Carson _____
r. Coffey _____
r. Hendon _____
r. Holloman _____
r. McGuire _____
r. Quinn Tamm _____
r. Nease _____
as Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 11 JUN 20 1942 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WMC 21 JUN 20 1942

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21 JUN 20 1942

RECEIVED 21 JUN 1942
FBI SAN FRANCISCO
JUN 20 1942

JUN 20 1942
FBI SAN FRANCISCO
JUN 20 1942

S. A. /
JUN 20 1942
FBI SAN FRANCISCO

JUN 20 1942
FBI SAN FRANCISCO

(B)

San Francisco, California
June 3, 1942

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

RE: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
Sale of Typhoid Vaccine to Japanese

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated May 19, 1942,
Bureau file No. 100-93216, wherein reference was made to Bureau
letter dated April 1, 1942.

Please be advised that a search of the San Francisco
files fails to reflect any information concerning Bureau letter
dated April 1, 1942. It is respectfully requested that the Bureau
supply this office with copies thereof in order that this investi-
gation may be conducted.

Very truly yours,

H.J.L. PIEPER
Special Agent In Charge

HLM:MK
100-9518

SEARCHED
INDEXED
SERIALIZED
FILED
317190-1 SPAGNO
307009

172
FILE COPY

100-93216-1

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

San Francisco, California
June 3, 1942

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

RE: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
Sale of Typhoid Vaccine to Japanese

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated May 19, 1942,
Bureau file No. 100-93216, wherein reference was made to Bureau
letter dated April 1, 1942.

Please be advised that a search of the San Francisco
files fails to reflect any information concerning Bureau letter
dated April 1, 1942. It is respectfully requested that the Bureau
supply this office with copies thereof in order that this investi-
gation may be conducted.

Very truly yours,

N.J.L. Pieper
N.J.L. PIEPER
Special Agent In Charge

HLM:NK
100-9518

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-7-90 BY SP10450
307009

RECORDED

100-93216-4
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
15 JUN 8 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[Signature]

b6
b7C



COPY IN FILE

100-93216

August 18, 1942

pdb;pf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-10-03 BY 60267ucl/mmc/bja/Prad.

Special Agent in Charge
San Francisco, California

Re: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated June 19, 1942, in the above entitled matter, transmitting copies of a letter to your office dated April 1, 1942, in which you were instructed to immediately advise the Bureau as to the results of the investigation conducted by your office in this matter.

To date no information concerning this case has been forthcoming from your office as requested, and you are instructed to submit a report to the Bureau within seven days after this letter is received by your office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 3
★ AUG 19 1942 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

REC'D
FBI - SAN FRANCISCO
RECEIVED - MAIL ROOM
AUG 18 1942 PM 115
RECORDED

100-93216-5
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AUG 21 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

354 22 AUG 22 1942

80-939

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA**

FILE NO. **100-9618**

REPORT MADE AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.	DATE WHEN MADE 8/24/42	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 5/8, 9, 10, 15; 6/11/42	REPORT MADE BY [redacted] b6 JSS
TITLE POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE		CHARACTER OF CASE INTERNAL SECURITY J	

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

307009
3/23/42
3/29/42
St. Henry
 It was reported that there had been an increase in the sale of typhoid vaccine to Japanese Colony near Salinas, California. Investigation with wholesale drug houses in San Francisco, California failed to reflect any increased demand for their vaccine.

- P -

C. I. A. by SP1 AGO 3/7/90
307009

DETAILS : This report is predicated upon information obtained from [redacted] that Japanese were buying large quantities of typhoid serums.

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AT SALINAS, CALIFORNIA

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [redacted]

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[redacted] advised that a salesman for the McKesson and Robbins, druggists supply house, had been in Salinas on 2/28/42 and had remarked that the Japanese druggists were buying large quantities of typhoid serums, and that he had received an order for 50 vials at one drug store. [redacted] did not know the salesman's name, but that the salesman indicated that he did not want to discuss the situation, as he was interested in selling supplies and receiving a commission, rather than reporting unusual activities to the authorities.

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APPROVED AND
FORWARDED:*M. G. L. P. R. S. S.*SPECIAL AGENT
IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

 5 BUREAU COPIES OF THIS REPORT HELD AT:
 2 ONI, San Francisco
 1 G-2, " "
 2 Seattle (infor.)
 2 SAN FRANCISCO

CONFIDENTIAL
plus

3 SEP 5 1942

11-13-03

CLASSIFIED BY *600-9326-100* DECLASSIFY BY *(1) 11-13-2028*

RECORDED

&

INDEXED

11-13-03

In view of the fact that such large purchases of typhoid serum would indicate either that the Japanese were preparing themselves for the evacuation from this area or that there was some contemplated contaminating of the water supply, it was believed that a check of drug supply houses should be made.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] a check be made at the following drug supply houses for the sale of typhoid serums - McKesson and Robbins, Cutter Laboratories in Berkeley, and the Eli Lilly Company, San Francisco.

[redacted] advised that he had not personally noticed any large sale of the serum, but that he was contacted by all drug houses, as he ran the Salinas Laboratories. [redacted]

[redacted] a drug salesman, was in Salinas at that time, and that he would have the salesman contact the Salinas Japanese Drug Stores in an effort to locate the typhoid serum supplies and see if the Japanese were buying much of the serum.

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Accordingly, [redacted]

[redacted] was contacted and offered to check at each of the Japanese Drug Stores in Salinas.

[redacted] was again contacted later in the day and the following information was received from him relative to his contacting the Japanese operated drug stores.

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The Edno Pharmacy, 107 Lake Street, Salinas, was contacted and there were four or five Japanese in the store discussing something in Japanese, later [redacted] were discussing what they should do about their children, in case they should be evacuated from Salinas. They were discussing the value of immunising their children against various diseases, such as, whooping cough, diphtheria and typhoid.

[redacted] called at the drug store in a routine manner to check up on the catalogs and dating of the stock they had with the Cutter Company. He talked with [redacted] who advised that they owned the [redacted] Salinas.

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Both of the above mentioned Japanese were interested in obtaining some Pertussis Vaccine and Tetanus Toxoid. They did not show any great interest in Typhoid Vaccine; but when it was mentioned, they indicated that they had recently purchased a large quantity of typhoid vaccine, [redacted] was unable to determine from whom it was purchased.

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[redacted] discussed frankly the problem that faced the Japanese evacuating this area, and stated that they had certain items in their two stores that they would like to turn back into the Cutter laboratories in exchange for some items which they wanted, namely;

Diphtheria Toxoid, Typhoid Vaccine and Tetanus Vaccine. [redacted]
b6
that the Cutter products were exchangeable and that the men would have to
list the products to be exchanged. [redacted] then went to the other store, the
b7C
[redacted] and left some catalogs, meanwhile
b7D talking with the drug clerk at that store, who advised that they had re-
cently purchased a large quantity of typhoid vaccines, but refusing to say
who from. [redacted] the vaccines were purchased to
immunize Japanese families.

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[redacted] then called at the FUJI Drug Store, 23 Lake Street, where the
druggist accepted some catalogs but would not discuss his stock [redacted]
[redacted] was not contemplating any purchases at present as the
Japanese affairs were too unsettled. [redacted] the operator of
the Fuji Drug Store acted in a hostile manner, and would not engage in
conversation, simply advising that he was not interested in any drugs and
that he didn't wish to discuss any of them.

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[redacted] was unable to obtain any accurate information
as to the exact quantity of the stock of typhoid vaccine the druggists
had on hand, but did determine that they were interested in immunizing
their families against certain diseases.

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[redacted] was again
contacted on 3/4/42 and advised that the following drug supply houses would
be able to furnish information as to the amounts of vaccines sold to Japan-
ese druggists:

Lederle Anti-Tox Laboratories, San Francisco, California(274 Brannan)
Parke-Davis Company, San Francisco, California(350 Mission)
E. R. Squib and Company, San Francisco, California(608 Folsom St.)
Eli Lilly Company, San Francisco, California(450 Mission)
Coffin and Robbins, Jobbers, San Francisco(801 Folsom)
Sharpe and Donahue, Mfgr. Co., San Francisco(132 2nd St)
McKesson Langley and Michael Co., Jobbers, San Francisco(50 1st St.)
Guth Brothers, San Francisco, California(811 Flood Bldg.)

*Confidential Informant [redacted] advised the following -

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[redacted] reports that there has been a large increase in the sale
of Typhoid Vaccine used by mouth or injection in the Japanese Colony
around Salinas, California. [redacted] advised, in a letter quoted in portion
below, that particular attention should be given paragraph 8; in that re-
gard, suggesting that a check be made on Japanese research doctors and
workers employed in state, municipal and university laboratories, as it
would be possible for these people to obtain Shiga Dysentery cultures and
cholera cultures.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

In this connection the following is supplied upon reliable information reveals a subversive rumor is circulating in Alameda, California, that commercial rice has been poisoned. In consequence of this rumor civilians are refusing to purchase rice.

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AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA(Following investigation conducted by the writer)

[redacted] C. Rodolph Guth Company, Flood Building, advised that this company deals in wholesale drugs, and sells to the general retail stores and stated that the company has only two Japanese drug stores on their books, and they are NIPPON DRUG COMPANY, Stockton, California, and the MISAWA DRUG COMPANY, in San Francisco, California.

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He further stated that this company handles typhoid serums, and have not had anything other than normal amount of orders for typhoid serum, and that he has had no orders from any Japanese drug companies for some time.

He further advised that he would notify the San Francisco Field Office in the event that at anytime there is an unusual amount of activities in connection with the sale of any drugs which would tend to show, an unusual amount of sales.

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b7D [redacted] E. R. Squib Company, 608 Folsom Street, advised this company is in the business of manufacturing drugs and selling their products to wholesale druggists and hospitals, and that there has been no unusual sales of typhoid serum to anyone to whom they have been dealing with, and advised that the following is a list of the Japanese customers that have in the past purchased drugs :

~~ICHIOKA DRUG STORE~~
~~OKONOGI SANITARIUM~~
~~STANDARD DRUG COMPANY~~
~~PIRST & SOTO PHARMACY~~
~~SHOWA DRUG COMPANY~~
~~KYOSAI DRUG COMPANY~~
~~TENSHAW DRUG COMPANY~~
~~RAFUSHOYU COMPANY~~
~~ICHOKIA CLINIC~~
~~THE OKA COMPANY~~
~~NIPPON DRUG COMPANY~~

WEST

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
FRESNO, CALIFORNIA
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
" " "
" " "
" " "
" " "
" " "
" " "
" " "
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

He further stated that none of these companies have made any unusual amount of purchasing of drugs, but stated that he would cooperate and notify the San Francisco Field Office in the event that there is an unusual amount of purchasing by anyone.

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[redacted] Lederle Anti-Tox Laboratories, 274 Bran-nan Street, advised that this company does such a small amount of business with any Japanese druggists, that it can be considered negligible, and has never sold any typhoid serum to any Japanese, but deals in the serum.

They have shipped a great deal of the serum to Honolulu on U. S. Government order. He advised that he would cooperate with the Bureau and notify the San Francisco Field Office in the event he has, or he learns of any unusual amount of traffic in drugs and more particularly the typhoid serum.

[redacted] Sharp and Dohme Manufacturing Company, 132 2nd Street, advised that this company does not have any Japanese customers in San Francisco except the Nippon Drug Company and they have not purchased any of the typhoid serum.

He advised that this company is a manufacturer of drugs and is in the general business of selling their products to wholesale and retail druggists. He further stated that the company manufactures typhoid serum and have sold some serum to the ~~SAVEMORE DRUG COMPANY~~ in Salinas, California, [redacted]

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[redacted] in the following amounts -

2 vials on 3/2/42
3 " " "
5 " " 3/15/42
4 " " 2/26/42

He stated that this is not an unusual amount of sales for this time of the year, that, he would cooperate in anyway that he could with the Bureau.

[redacted] McKesson, Langley and Michaels Drug Company, 50 1st Street, advised that this company is in the business of wholesale drugs, and sell their products to retail druggists. They handle

typhoid serum and that most of the sale is now to the United States Government.

The company sells to almost every Japanese druggist, and as far as he knows there has been no unusual amount of the serum having been sold to the Japanese. He further stated that this company has not sold any of the serum to any drug stores in Salinas, California, except the SAVEMORE DRUG COMPANY, and that was a very small amount of the serum. He further stated that all Japanese drug stores are now on a C.O.D. basis and do very little buying. He advised that he will cooperate in anyway he can with the Bureau, and will notify the San Francisco Field Office if there is any unusual amount of buying of drugs.

[redacted] Parke-Davis Company, 350 Mission Street, advised that this company manufactures and distributes all types of drugs to retail merchants and jobbers, among which are several Japanese druggists, most of whom are in San Francisco and in other towns throughout California. None of the stores however, have made any purchases for over a year of typhoid serum.

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This company has no unusual amount of typhoid serum sales so as to suspect that anyone could be securing large quantities of the serum.

He further advised that he would be willing to cooperate with the FBI and would report anything suspicious to the San Francisco Field Office.

[redacted] Coffin, Redington Company, 301 Polson Street, advised that this company is in the business of wholesale jobbers and purchase their supplies from the Eli Lilley Company and the Cutter Laboratories, and that in his opinion there has been no unusual amount of sales of typhoid serum, and advised that the following are the sales to SAVEMORE DRUG COMPANY, in Salinas, California -

2/25/42	2	vials,	sufficient for 20 immunizations
3/5/42	1	"	" 10 "
3/6/42	1	"	" 10 "
3/9/42	2	"	" 20 "
3/10/42	1	"	" 10 "
3/11/42	5	"	" 50 "

He further stated that he would cooperate in all matters with the Bureau, and would notify the San Francisco Field Office in the event that he learns of any unusual amount of sales in the drug market.

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[redacted] Eli Lilley Company, 450 Mission Street, advised that this company is in the business of manufacturing drugs and distributing drugs to wholesalers, and does not sell to any retailers. [redacted] are their largest buyers of drugs and have purchased a large amount of vaccine, 407 cc of the serum; he further advised

that 2 cc are sufficient for one immunization, otherwise there has not been large purchases from any other organizations, except to Coffin Redington Company, who have purchased recently about 6 20 cc packages of typhoid serum and 5 1 cc packages of typhoid serum.

He was very cooperative and advised that he would be available to assist the Bureau at any time.

P E N D I N G

UNDEVELOPED LEAD

THE SAN FRANCISCO FIELD DIVISION
AT SALINAS, CALIFORNIA

WILL interview [redacted] concerning the basis for his statement that there has been a large increase in the sale of typhoid vaccine by the Japanese Colony.

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Office Memorandum

• UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd
 FROM : A. H. Belmont
 SUBJECT : BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
 ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
 Bureau File #100-93216

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: June 19, 1950

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Mohr _____ b6
 Tele. Room _____
 Name _____ b7C

PURPOSE:

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[Redacted]

(C)

[Redacted]

BACKGROUND:

You may recall that during a Liaison contact at Camp Detrick, Maryland (The Army's Biological Warfare Research Center) by the Baltimore Office, [Redacted] suggested to the Liaison Agent that this Bureau should alert Public Health Agencies throughout the United States to the possibilities of an enemy Biological Warfare attack and that these Agencies should be furnished with information concerning the most likely BW Agents to be used by an enemy.

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The Baltimore Office was subsequently instructed to inform [Redacted] the alerting of such Agencies was not within the jurisdiction of this Bureau and that this matter had been referred to the ICIS. By memorandum dated March 31, 1950, the suggestion made by [Redacted] was furnished to [Redacted] with the observation that the alerting of such Agencies and the furnishing of BW data to them was not within the jurisdiction of this Bureau.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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

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 [Redacted]

Referral/Direct

D. M. Ladd

~~Urgent~~

June 19, 1950



J(C)



Referral/Direct

~~Urgent~~

11-13-03

CLASSIFIED BY
L.C. ADDS & C

60267 UC/NCS/BJA/PAM

(b) 11-13-2628

JUL 16 1962

September 17, 1942

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TELSON

MR. TELSON
MR. LADD

11-13-2628-100-100-100
11-13-2628
11-13-2628

b1

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

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[Redacted]

bl (S)

SP1 GSK/100

3/17/90 very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

52 SEP 21 1962 35

SENT FROM D O
TIME 5:50 PM
DATE 9-17-42
BY [Signature]

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& INDEXED

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100-93216-7

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~~SECRET~~

DUPLICATED COPY FILED IN 62-64178-45

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Op-16-F-2/152

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300.

195

J. Edgar Hoover, Esquire,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D. C.

ATTENTION: ~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~DATE 11/20/09 BY 6057/esp/jpm~~

VIA COURIER SERVICE

EPC:EGK

September 17, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60207/uglund/jmw

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. TAMM
MR. TRACY
MR. CLEGG
MR. GLAVIN
MR. NICHOLS
MR. LADD
MR. ROSEN

Dear Sir:

It is desired that the Bureau assemble all possible information concerning the known uses and possibilities of bacterial warfare. All information concerning the use of bacteria for warfare or sabotage purposes which comes to your attention should be routed to Mr. Coffey in the Laboratory who will coordinate the same. You should also advise Mr. Coffey of any contacts which you may have which might be productive of information of this sort.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAIL ROOM
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED SEP 19 1942 PM
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

2 DEPT. OF JUSTICE
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COMM-FBI ROOM
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100-93216-8
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEP 22 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

37 SEP 26 1942
203

JEH: DAJ

10:50 A.M.

September 17, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-10-02 BY 60267 UC/NAD/JG/PAM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. TAMM
MR. TRACY
MR. LADD
MR. COFFEY

[redacted] who was referred to me by Mr. Paul McNutt, called at my office today to speak with me in regard to his work under a Presidential directive with Mr. McNutt's office, which job is to coordinate and make effective defensive and offensive bacteriological warfare. In this connection one of their problems would be the detection of bacteria in American materials, food supplies, water supplies, and other things which are subject to contamination. He stated that it is definitely known the Germans have a branch of their armed services for bacterial warfare and that they are making large quantities of a highly virile strain of anthrax, but that to his knowledge they have not used this form of warfare as yet against the United States, Canada, or Great Britain.

b6
b7C

C *Bacterial Warfare*
[redacted] indicated that to counteract this a scheme was adopted to [redacted] of the Federal Security Agency; that this was his official title and this would be his front in all matters involving finance, politics, etc. In addition, the FSA has the job of coordinating the activities of the Public Health Service and the Food and Drug Administration. He will be the Director of the Branch of the Far Research in Chemistry (BNRC) which intellec to the British and certain other persons on the inside means the ~~bacterial~~ Bacterial Warfare Research Coordination. His duties will be to administer and carry out the program outlined and to be prepared to carry out any form of bacteriological warfare against Mr. Tolson enemy that may be necessary.

b6
b7C

Mr. E.A. Tamm

INDEXED

100-93216-9

Mr. Clegg _____ He stated that he was coming to me to ask the Bureau's help on several things. He first wanted to be advised of any information which might have come to us pointing to the use of bacteriological warfare of any type by the enemy. I told him that in this connection Mr. Rosen would have a check made of our records to see if we had up to this time heard of any contamination by bacteria, and further that we would get anything the British Intelligence may have on this. I also explained to him the cooperation which the FBI, OSI and CID were having and indicated that the British Intelligence and the FBI were closely cooperating. In addition I outlined to him the procedure we followed at present in disseminating war information to the ENT FEDERAL D. C.

59 OCT 13 1942

TIME 11:34 PM
DATE 9-24-42
DV

25
None for Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd & Coffey - 2 -

interested agencies of the Government. I also explained to him the various intelligence conferences, regional conferences, in Washington and in each of the 50 different field divisions of the Bureau, and other activities of the Bureau which were utilized to more effectively cooperate with the Army and the Navy as well as with the local law enforcement officers throughout the United States. In addition I explained our complete FBI setup and the duties it performed.

He asked if he might use the organization of the Bureau to distribute and gather certain information, and I told him that I thought this would be an excellent idea. He indicated that in addition to the things our SIS agents were now on the lookout for, he would appreciate it if they were also instructed to be on the lookout for any evidences of bacterial warfare in the countries of South America, Central America and the Caribbean. I told him this could be done.

[] stated that he had already contacted FBI and C-2 and they were going to route him the information he needed also.

In FBI a [] (phonetic) and in C-2 a [] have been designated to work with him. I told him that I would designate

[] in the FBI to be the liaison man with the BBC. I told him that Mr. Coffey would be available at any time and that if there was anything he wanted from the FBI he should let us know about it. I also suggested that somebody who was thoroughly familiar with this subject might give a lecture to our training school on the work of this division that I thought it would be of great benefit to our Agents and it would give them information on to whom to turn to get certain analyses and checks made for the purpose of determining whether different places were being properly sanitized, etc. Mr. Kerck said that the active work would be to nominate one or two of the best men from the Technical Laboratory to act ^{as} special instructors to instruct, demonstrate and make special checks. He mentioned that Mr. Tolson has a list of about 25 different diseases and plagues which spread easily among people and animals which would seriously affect and handicap the Nation's war effort, and that although they were not yet equipped to effectively deal with all these, they were working on Mr. Ladd the most important problems first. He said that they were cooperating with Mr. Nichols the Canadians on this program and were trying to develop certain Mr. Ross ^{and} other preventatives, and in addition were keeping in mind Mr. Tracy the fact that we might be able in return to direct these same bacteria back against the enemy to his detriment. Mr. Carson

Mr. Coffey [] also wants to find the public standpoint toward bacterial warfare. He stated that this was equally as important to Mr. Kramm as the research work they are conducting and the production of Mr. McGinnis' given materials. He said it was the Administration's wish that Mr. Quinn Tamm

Mr. Nease _____

Miss Gandy _____

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7
Name for Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd & Coffey - 3 -

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b7C

this work not be attached to the Army officially so that it would not be publicly known it was being conducted, and for this reason he was attached to Mr. McNutt's agency, but that in reality [redacted] (phonetic) in the office of the Secretary of War is his superior and directs his activities. The activities of the BWRC are not to be made public until it is quite clear the United States should go the maximum in its defensive and offensive in bacterial warfare. He said that anything that is done by them now, however, would have to fit in with the work of the Army and Navy.

[redacted] Thirdly, [redacted] will have a division of Documentation of Records, which is a description to cover public relations, publicity, and having ready for the President certain things to say should certain things happen, down to having people begin to write stories along certain lines in the Saturday Evening Post, Readers' Digest and other widely read periodicals. In charge of this division he has placed [redacted] (phonetic), who was a combat officer in the last war, a chemist, later becoming interested in advertising and publicity, and lastly being a writer. [redacted] asked me to meet him and discuss with him the public psychology angle. I told him I would be very glad to do this; that I thought this was particularly important. I said that in general I thought the public would be in favor of his organization, but that there would probably be a small group, organized very strongly, who would say this should not be done. I told him that I thought his work should be known publicly and should be known soon. [redacted] said that he had to have someone who knows Washington, who knows the country, who knows the administration, to help him shape the ball and then help to carry it. I told him that I would be glad to help him and that the best way I thought was in due time to have certain magazine articles published from the viewpoint of the outside looking in to assure the people that this program is being put into effect.

[redacted] asked me to have my secretary let him know when Mr. Tolson was going to be in New York. I told him that I was making about Mr. E. [redacted] trips each month to New York, and that I would be very glad to let him know when I would be there. He said that while he might not want to talk with me while I was there, he had a feeling that there would be many instances when he felt he should talk over certain things with me, and that he would be in Washington only Mr. Nichols [redacted] occasionally.

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Mr. Tracy _____ I introduced [redacted] and instructed Mr. Coffey to give all the cooperation possible in regard to the bacteriological warfare program. [redacted] explained to Mr. Coffey that he was under cover working with Mr. McNutt and was the director of Mr. Kraske-BWRC. The duties of the BWRC were explained to Mr. Coffey, and Mr. McGuire gave instructions to have the FBI files checked for any information that bacterial warfare had been used by the enemy; that Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

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b7C

Name for Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd & Coffey - 4 -

b6

b7C

we should contact the British to see if they have any information, but that we should not give the British any idea as to what we wanted this information for, however. I told him that I also wanted arrangements made for any additional information to be routed to [redacted] and that he should arrange with Mr. Tamm and Mr. Ladd for all of this material to be routed to him so he might assemble it. I told him that generally the Bureau would not know of this operation except that instructions would be given that information of this type should be forwarded to him personally. I also told him that he was to be designated as the liaison man between the activities here and Mr. Beresford's organization, and explained to him the other cooperation the Bureau desired from the Bureau through its field offices, conferences, training school, etc., and I further stressed that there should be no bottlenecks and the program should be streamlined.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E.A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

CPB:MP

Date: October 1, 1942

To: SAC, Baltimore

RECORDED

100-93216-9X
en N.Y.
From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Subject:

The following quoted advertisement appeared in the September 20, 1942, edition of The Sun, Baltimore, Maryland:

" WANTED WILD RATS

Will buy any number of live uninjured wild rats for 25¢, per rat. Hunterian Bldg., Madison & Wolfe Sts., 4th floor. Deliver between 8:30 A. M. & 5 P. M.

The Bureau desires that you conduct such discreet inquiry as is necessary to determine the identity of the party or parties responsible for the insertion of this advertisement and the purpose thereof.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-19-09 BY 60267 uc/pws/bja/mar

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Coffey _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Holloman _____
 Mr. McGuire _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____

REF ID: A6510001

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION	
MAIL EXP 3	
OCT 1 1942 P.M.	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE	

F 51 OCT 20 1942

for R
for C
for C
PB

Sp 5c
Sp

Bacterial warfare

The following ad appeared in The Sun, Baltimore, Sunday Morning,
September 20, 1942.

September 21, 1942

b6

b7C

MEMO FOR MR. GLAVIN

I am submitting this ad for your consideration because I feel there
is a possibility that some persons may be planning to use these animals as
disease carriers or to destroy stores of food products vital to our war effort.

See Mr. Glavin

Respectfully,

b6

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 UC/NW/BG/PLR

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

11/6/9

11/6/9

100-93216-9X

6 OCT 5 1942

11/6/9

11/6/9

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

9/25 1942

The Director Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Tolson Mr. Pennington
 Mr. E. A. Tamm Mr. Nease
 Mr. Clegg Miss Gandy
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd TO:
 Mr. Nichols

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/03 BY 60267 UC/NW/HJF
PAM

Mr. Bellino Mr. Horton
 Mr. Bernard Mr. Lawrence
 Mr. Breese Mr. Martin
 Mr. Clements Mr. Nugent
 Mr. Courtney Mr. R. E. Smith
 Mr. Grill Mr. VanLandingham
 Mr. Hair Mr. West
 Mr. Hayes Mr. White

Mrs. Irwin Note and return
 See me Search, serialize &
 Send File route
 Call me Prepare tickler
for

*Furnish to
Baltimore - have
them check it out*

A. Rosen - 5706
Branch 572

HMC: LKH

September 26, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR POUCH

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT [redacted]

b2

b7D

You are requested to report to the Bureau immediately any indications which come to your attention pointing to the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy. Any information which you have at the present time that [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] should be forwarded at an early date.

This request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly. You are instructed to discuss this matter with our other representatives in the country to which you are assigned and to call to their attention the necessity of maintaining secrecy on this entire project.

Very truly yours,

RECORDED

John Edgar Hoover
Director OCT 1 1942

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

Source: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Memo from the Director to
Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd and Coffey dated 9/17/42 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

374086 1942

SEARCHED BY 66267 UC/MS/BP/PAC
11-13-03

Copy filed in file.

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b7D

HMC:LKH

September 26, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR POUCH

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT [redacted]

b2

b7D

You are requested to report to the Bureau immediately any indications which come to your attention pointing to the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy. Any information which you have at the present time that [redacted]

b6

b7C

[redacted] should be forwarded at an early date.

This request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly. You are instructed to discuss this matter with our other representatives in the country to which you are assigned and to call to their attention the necessity of maintaining secrecy on this entire project.

Very truly yours,

RECORDED

John Edgar Hoover

Director, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

OCT 1 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

b6

b7C

SEARCHED BY 601
11-13-03

INDEXED REC'D. 10-22-42

RECEIVED MAIL ROOM

2EB 50 5 20 BM 43

Mr. Tolson

Mr. E. A. Tamm

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Glavin Source:

Mr. Ladd Memo from the Director to
Mr. Nichols Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd and Coffey
Mr. Rosen dated 9/17/42.

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Carson

Mr. Coffey

Mr. Hendon COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Mr. Kramer MAILED 11

Mr. McGuire SEP 20 1942 P.M.

Mr. Quinn Tamm

Mr. Nease

Miss Gandy FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

37 OCT 6 1942

HMC:LKH

September 26, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA DIPLOMATIC POUCH

CONF. INFT.

b2

b7D

You are requested to report to the Bureau immediately any indications which come to your attention pointing to the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy. Any information which you have at that present time that [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] should be forwarded at an early date.

This request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly. You are instructed to discuss this matter with our other representatives in the country to which you are assigned and to call to their attention the necessity of maintaining secrecy on this entire project.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NUE/bj/PM
ON 11-13-03

Very truly yours,

RECORDED

100-9321b-12

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

John Edgar Hoover
Director

OCT 1 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Source: Memo from the Dir. 10 d3:
to Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd and Coffey

Mr. Rosen	COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Mr. Egan	MAILED 11
Mr. Carson	SEP 26 1942 P.M.
Mr. Coffey	44-3-1942
Mr. Hendon	3 OCT 5 1942
Mr. Kramer	EST. ON 10-21-42
Mr. McGuire	RECEIVED MAIL 601
Mr. Quinn Tamm	NOV 10 1942
Mr. Nease	5 23 11 1942

RECEIVED MAIL 601
NOV 10 1942



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

September 28, 1942

b6
CHC:LL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Reference is made to the Director's memorandum dated September 17, 1942, with regard to the Director's conversation with [redacted] relative to bacterial warfare, etc.

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b7C

Please be advised that instructions have been forwarded to all FBI attaches to be alert for any information pertaining to the use of bacterial warfare, by way of sabotage or otherwise, in order that they can transmit any such information of any kind whatsoever to the Bureau immediately. The attaches have been instructed to immediately inform other Bureau personnel, undercover and otherwise, concerning the importance of being on the alert for this type of information and immediately advising the Bureau relative thereto. They have been cautioned to treat this as strictly confidential and to be most discreet with regard to any efforts or action that they might take.

All Supervisors in the SIS Division have been instructed to be on the alert for any information of any kind whatsoever pertaining in any way to bacterial warfare and to immediately route such information to Mr. Coffey in the Laboratory.

In the latter connection, Supervisors in the SIS Division are now reviewing files with respect to some past material believed to possibly pertain in some ways to bacterial warfare and related matters. This material is being prepared to be sent to Mr. Coffey for his attention.

You will be kept advised of any additional information received in this connection.

Respectfully,

CH
C. H. Carson

RECORDED

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b7C

100-93216-16

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-03 BY 60267 wjw/jbm/jm



DOCTA
COPY IN FILE

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HMC:LKH

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T

September 26, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA CLIPPER

Bacterial Warfare
CONF. INFT.

b2

b7D

You are requested to report to the Bureau immediately any indications which come to your attention pointing to the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy. Any information which you have at the present time that the enemy has used or is planning to use bacterial warfare through materials, food supplies, water supplies or other articles subject to contamination, should be forwarded at an early date.

This request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____ Info. from:
Mr. Glavin _____ Memo from the Director
Mr. Ladd _____ to Tolson, Tamm, Tracy,
Mr. Nichols _____ Ladd and _____
Mr. Rosen _____ dated 9/17/42
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED

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REC'D U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

100-93216 14

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

OCT 1 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION 22 b6 413
H M A I L R D 3
SEP 28 1942 P.M.
Ladd BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 U.S. DEP/BJR/DM
ON 11-13-03

58 OCT 23 1942

hax
HMC: LKH

September 26, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL *K*

CONF. INFT.

b2

b7D *CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NUS/bja/Phone*
CC ON 11-13-03

Bacterial Warfare
You are requested to report to the Bureau immediately any indications which come to your attention pointing to the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy. Any information which you have at the present time that the enemy has used or is planning to use bacterial warfare through materials, food supplies, water supplies, or other articles subject to contamination, should be forwarded at an early date.

This request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____ *Source:*
Mr. Tracy _____ Memo from the Director
Mr. Carson _____ to Tolson, Tamm, Tracy
Mr. Coffey _____ Ladd, and _____ dictated
Mr. Hendon _____ 9/17/42
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED

100-93216-15 *Dust*
dict

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

OCT. 1 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MAILED 9/17/42

SEP 28 1942 RHM

2000 SECTION 644-1

STAR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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RECORDED

EPCMGWH
100-93216-16

October 14, 1942

b1

(S)

I want to thank you for the detailed information furnished in your letter of October 10, 1942, your number 150, concerning bacterial warfare. I will indeed appreciate receiving any additional information which you may obtain from time to time concerning this subject.

Sincerely yours,

b1

(S)

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Landry _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 6
OCT 15 1942
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

443

11/13/03
CLASSIFIED BY 102674C/MES/Bja/AGM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (6) 11/13/2028

SECRET

RECEIVED
30 UNK

11/13/03

11/13/03

OPAGS
3/18/90
508900

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

AIR MAIL & SPECIAL DELIVERY

Ottawa, Ontario.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Kramer
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy
Files

~~PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Sir:

October 10, 1942.

~~Classified by S21 AGS~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 3/18/90~~
~~307009~~

Reference is made to the Bureau's letter dated September 26, 1942, requesting that I transmit to the Bureau any information that the enemy has used or is planning to use bacterial warfare through materials, food supplies or other articles subject to contamination ~~(X)(U)~~

11/3/03
CLASSIFIED BY 40367 URGENT/EMM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6/11/13/2028

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
IN THE SPECIFIC
INSTRUCTIONS

b6

b7C



J. Edgar Hoover, Esq.,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
U. S. Department of Justice,

WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S.

~~COPY IN FILE~~ ~~SECRET~~

RECORDED

100-93216

B

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1942

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b7C

McGraw

1394

~~SECRET~~

JBL:ECR

October 9, 1942

(S) [REDACTED]

b1

A reply to our memorandum dated September 21, 1942, requesting information available with reference to Japanese plans for pursuing bacterial warfare, as well as any similar plans on the part of the Germans, will be appreciated.

b1

~~SECRET~~ SPRAGUE
RECORDED 3/8/40
307009

(S)

OPTIONAL FORM FILED IF

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

From San Francisco
11-3-42
pdt/mrh

11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UCBAW/bjpc
DECLASSIFY ON 11-13-2028
(b) 11-13-2028

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RECORDED	100-93216-17
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
OCT 12 1942	
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE	

PBB:ER
100-93216 -15

October 26, 1942

143 Roseville Avenue
Newark, New Jersey

b6

b7C

Dear [redacted]

I have received the signed copy of your letter of October 7, 1942, addressed to [redacted] Editorial Rooms, Jersey Journal, Jersey City, New Jersey.

Your interest in bringing this information to my attention is sincerely appreciated and you may be assured that it will be given appropriate consideration.

b6

b7D

Enclosed with this communication was a letter dated October 9, 1942, directed to [redacted] Editorial Rooms, Jersey Journal, Jersey City, New Jersey, and it is believed that this letter, which is enclosed, was transmitted to this Bureau in error.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____ Enclosure

Mr. E. A. Tamm _____

Mr. Clegg _____ 202

Mr. Glavin _____

Mr. Ladd _____

Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Rosen _____

Mr. Tracy _____

Mr. Carson _____

Mr. Coffey _____

Mr. Hendon _____

Mr. Kramer _____


Mr. McGuire _____

Mr. Quinn Tamm _____

Mr. Nease _____

Miss Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 6000740/njc/bj/fmw



b6
b7C

C O P Y

October 7th, 1942

Editorial Rooms,
Jersey Journal,
Jersey City, N. J.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-03 BY 60267 uc/nus/bj/ptm

b6
b7C

Dear [redacted]

Many prominent men of Washington, D. C., lecture over the radio. Some of them claim we are not winning the war and some of them claim we are losing the war.

The American Medical Association is forcing the inoculation of all kinds of serums on our soldiers and WAACS and recently it has been quoted in the daily press that there have been 28,585 cases of yellow jaundice and 62 deaths in the armed forces following the use of serums for the prevention of yellow fever and just recently a Wilkensburg army nurse, Lieut. Emma Mae Amend, died a victim of yellow jaundice, reported to have followed inoculations of anti-yellow fever serum.

Is it possible that these inoculations are part of an extended program of the Nazi conspirators? Only last January 8 drug firm officials were fired as Nazi conspirators. Have the Nazi agents gained control of Morris Fishbein and his army of medical doctors who force our soldiers, the pick of the land, to submit to these filthy inoculations or be court martialed and put in the guard-house?

Are the American people going to stand for this inside invasion by the Nazi regime?

I should like to hear the pro and con of the forced inoculation program from the readers of the Jersey Journal.

Always at your service, I am

Vigorously yours,

OCT 12 1942

I ENCL. 15

m 34

FWD:MW

RECORDED

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SEARCHED

INDEXED

b7C

ENCLOSURE

100-91116-18
One page retained by company

only ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED *per envelope*
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
DATE 11-17-03 BY 60267 uc/nmc/bja/PMS

[Redacted]

b6

b7C

October 9, 1942.

b6

b7C

[Redacted]
Editorial Rooms,
Jersey Journal,
Jersey City, N. J.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-17-03 BY b6b7c/jwg/jmw

Dear Mr. Grunow:

On page 12 of the Jersey Journal of Wednesday, October 7th, 1942, in the 3 column, you have a picture of Dr. T. McG. Brannock and in black, bold type it says, "DOCTORS" - continued.

Will you kindly inform me what page of this paper the article is continued from? I have gone over the paper two or three times but somehow or another I must have missed it. I should like to get the beginning of this article. Please send it.

Always at your service, I am

Vigorously yours,

[Redacted]
FWC:MW

COPY

b6

b7C

Original returned to [Redacted]

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



CC-287

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. E. A. Tamm _____

Mr. Clegg _____

Mr. Glavin _____

Mr. Ladd _____

Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Rosen _____

Mr. Tracy _____

Mr. Carson _____

Mr. Coffey _____

Mr. Nease _____

Mr. Kramer _____

Mr. McGuire _____

Mr. Harbo _____

Mr. Quinn Tamm _____

Tele. Room _____

Miss Reahm _____

Miss Gandy _____

EPC:EGK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 1, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRACY

b6

b7C

The Director requested that a summary of the information in the Bureau's files on Bacterial Warfare be prepared and delivered to [redacted]. I have completed that summary and it is attached hereto in the form of a blind memorandum. If the Bureau approves the contents thereof I shall telephone [redacted] and ask him in what manner he wants this delivered to him.

b6

b7C

b7D

As additional information is received in the Bureau and as soon as a reply is obtained to our inquiries made of [redacted] any additional information will be transmitted to [redacted]

5 OCT 24 1942

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NUS/6A/PW
ON 11-13-03

b6
b7C

RECORDED

Respectfully,

[redacted]

100-93216-30

7 OCT 19 1942
1015
summary given
summarized
WJ



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Port au Prince, Haiti.
October 13, 1942

b7C
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D. C.

b7C
Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated September 26, 1942, directing the writer to forward to the Bureau any and all information concerning the enemy's use or contemplated use of bacterial warfare through materials, food supplies, etc.,

This matter has been discussed with other agencies of the United States Government in Haiti, who have agreed to cooperate in this matter by furnishing the writer with any information which might come to their attention, which will be immediately forwarded to the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

C.I. S.I.S. # 250

Copy filed in 515 file.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/03 BY 60267 UC/ALCS/BjA/PAW

C.I. S.I.S. # 250

Outgoing retained
in [redacted] files
11/20/42
em

55-46822 1943
Communication #169

347

b2

b7D

RECORDED

100-93216-
3 OCT 19 1942
R. H. [Signature]
RECORDED

cc - Bacterial Warfare

EPC:GWH

October 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM

b1

Reference is made to my memorandum of September 18 concerning information on the use of bacteria in sabotage and warfare. I should greatly appreciate receiving these data if you can provide them. This matter is an urgent one at the present time. We should also appreciate such additional information on the subject as may subsequently come to your attention.

480

cc - Mr. Ladd

b1

11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY UC/NIS/bja/PAM 60267 AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25) 6 11-15-2020

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

COMM. STAMP
IN ORIGINAL

100-93216-22
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 19 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

6


100-93216-22

11-13-03

CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON

60267 ue/nms/bjg/pam

(b) 11-13-2028



b6
b7c

EPC:AF

b1

October 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM

Classified by SP1AG SC
Declassify on 04/08/90
Series 9
V 113 b6 b7c

Office of Strategic Warfare

Mr. T
Mr. E
Mr. C
Mr. G
Mr. L
Mr. N
Mr. R
Mr. T
Mr. C
Mr. C
Mr. H
Mr. Kramer
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

RECEIVED
10/20/42 JS WMS

RECEIVED

276
1003 112

10/20/42
EX-23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

b1



b6
b7C

NOTE: The original of this memorandum was furnished to
[redacted] National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

RECEIVED
FEB 14 1968
FBI - WASHINGTON, D.C.

FEB 10 1968 BY [initials]

RECEIVED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 10-21 1942

<input type="checkbox"/> Director	Mr. Tracy
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tolson	Mr. Q. Tamm
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mr. E. A. Tamm	Mr. Coffey
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mr. Clegg	Mr. Anderson
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mr. Ladd	Mr. Bowles
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Glavin	Mr. Buckley
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nichols	Mr. Engert
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Rosen	Mr. Hallett
<input type="checkbox"/> Miss Gandy	Mr. Keyser
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bellino	Mr. Larmoyeux
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Carson	Mr. Martin
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Clements	Mr. O'Melia
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Collier	Mr. Potter
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Cunningham	Mr. Quinn
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Deane	Mr. Trotter
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Fletcher	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Gearty	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Grill	Miss Teller
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hair	Mrs. Mann
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Harbo	Mrs. Cox
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hayes	Mrs. Davis
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hendon	Miss Bullock, 6632
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hince	Mr. Caldwell
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hodges	Miss Dawson
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kimball	Mr. Fallon
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kramer	Mr. Miller
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. L. L. Laughlin	Mr. Simpson
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. R. H. Laughlin	Mrs. Sisson
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Little	Mr. Mertz
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. McGuire	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Mumford	Note and-return
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nease	Please distribute
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. R. E. Smith	Please handle
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Traynor	Please have
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Van Landingham	employee initial
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. A. E. White	Please initial
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr.	Please sign
<input type="checkbox"/> Civil Service Desk	Re-date
<input type="checkbox"/> Chief Clerk's Off.	Rewrite
<input type="checkbox"/> Leave Clerk	Send file
<input type="checkbox"/> Files Section	See me
<input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Files,	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uc/nue/bja/phm

S. J. TRACY
Rm. 7639, Br. 777

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

October 17, 1942

SJT:BT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267.00/lnj/bj/pew

RE: [redacted]

Telephone Inquiry

b6

b7C

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
Mr. Clegg ✓
Mr. Glavin
Mr. [redacted]
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Kramer
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy
[redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D [redacted] desired to make a request of the Bureau for
some data with regard to the activities of [redacted]
[redacted] is getting this information for him.

He also wanted to advise Mr. Hoover that he, [redacted]
considers the failure to check laboratories throughout the United States
which may be capable of making bacteria is bad and the situation should
be corrected. [redacted] is taking this up through channels.

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[redacted] is also interested in dealing with the Baker Drug
Company of Broadway, New York City, which company he desires to utilize
in connection with experiments in his project. He understands some of
the employees in this company are not satisfactory to the FBI and have
not been cleared by the FBI and he inquires if a new and subsequent check
or inquiry into the company can be made.

The files will be checked to see what information if any is
in the possession of the Bureau concerning this company and Mr. Merck
will be appropriately advised.

b6
of [redacted] There is transmitted herewith a memorandum covering the visit
b7C [redacted] on October 15 at which time he was accompanied by [redacted]

Respectfully,

b6

b7C

RECORDED

SEARCHED

100-93216-26

B

OCT 26 1942

FOR DEFENSE



Director advised briefly.

EX-34



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

EPC:EGK

October 15, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-18-08 BY 6026710/mus/bjpaer

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

[redacted] called on [redacted]
[redacted] this morning. [redacted] was handed the forty-page summary from the Bureau's files on the subject of bacterial warfare, also a copy of a letter from [redacted] and an abstract of a report from Honolulu concerning a recent outbreak of blackleg among cattle in Hawaii. [redacted] advised [redacted] that a new unit had been set up to handle the project entitled War Research Service and it was under the FSA. This service is to consider all items and weapons of warfare beyond the pale of the Geneva Convention, and this goes a bit farther than bacterial warfare in that it includes poisons and drugs and other biological items. [redacted] has divided the service into four divisions dealing with (1) humans, (2) animals, (3) plant life, and (4) water and food supplies. [redacted] is the head of the service with the title of Special Assistant to the Administrator of FSA. [redacted] is Director of Research for the project. [redacted] has been retained as public relations expert. Offices have been opened in the National Academy of Science Building, Executive 8100, Branch 129.

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b6 [redacted] showed [redacted] through the Laboratory but their time was cut short before the tour could be completed. [redacted] to join him at a luncheon meeting at the Metropolitan Club.

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED

Except for [redacted] the luncheon meeting was made up entirely of Army and Navy officers representing agencies as follows: [redacted] all representing the United States Public Health, [redacted] of the United States Navy Medical Division, [redacted] Colonel Mortenborg, and [redacted] all of the Surgeon General's Office of the United States Army.

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised the group that the purpose of calling them together was to make an effort to obtain from them a list of vital cities and points in the war effort which might be seriously affected if their water supplies were contaminated and also to prepare a code of recommendations for the safeguarding of the water supplies from contamination in these vital points. This code of recommendation was to be all-inclusive, consisting of such things as investigation of the personnel having access to the water supply systems, inspection of the physical plants, a study of the operations, the methods of treating with chlorine or other preventive means, recommendations to safeguard against acts of omission and carelessness, and the prevention of sabotage. One specific instance was cited as a typical example, this involved an epidemic outbreak at Newton, Kansas, which was caused by carelessness in handling the water supply system at that point and which had a serious effect on the war effort in the area.



COPY IN FILE

Memorandum for the Director
Page Two

[redacted] then related at considerable length the background of this subject matter insofar as the Public Health Service was concerned. He indicated that a year or more ago an anti-sabotage board was created to study the problem, this board being made up of representatives of G2, ONI, FBI, OCD, Public Health, and several other Federal agencies. The board sought to build up a "Facility Security Program."

[redacted] intimated that during these studies it was the impression of most of the experts on the board that the work would be undertaken by the Provost Marshal of the United States Army. However, a Presidential Directive was issued on May 19, 1942, delegating the Facility Security Program to the OCD under [redacted] hinted b6

that the OCD had pulled a fast one. The whole program then lagged for a while while [redacted] sent a budget request up to Congress. [redacted] personally appeared before the Appropriations Committees and they knocked the whole thing out and didn't give them anything at all. [redacted] was a bit bitter because the water supply protection program, which he deemed of outstanding importance, was thus lost in the shuffle. Following Talbot's recitation, several of the officers let loose a tirade at the OCD and also at the red tape within their own organizations, the Army and the Navy. Particularly bitter were [redacted]

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[redacted] intimated that the thing perhaps to do now would be rescue the water supply protection part from the rest of the program for the reason that he felt that if all the frills were cut away and those things of vital necessity presented to Congress, that they could be made to provide the necessary funds.

[redacted] then stated that the Public Health Service had already prepared a list of between eight and nine hundred cities and other vital points with water supplies which, if injured, would be a detriment to the war effort. [redacted] stated that G2 also had a list which contains two to three hundred such cities, and it was further understood that the WPB has its own list of cities, number unknown. The Public Health Service has gone so far as to send out a questionnaire on the water supplies to these eight or nine hundred cities. At least ten pages of this questionnaire deal with the reliability and loyalty of the personnel who have access to the water systems, and it was mentioned by [redacted] that the FBI could be a big help in checking on this personnel. Many of the questionnaires have been returned to the Public Health Service by the State water supply engineers, but the Public Health has no funds to study the questionnaires or inspect the water supply systems or send out recommendations.

[redacted] summarized that it would be necessary to immediately begin to work the three lists into a combined list of cities and vital points and then to make up the recommended code of standards for the safety of the water supplies. [redacted] b6
b7C

[redacted] of the Surgeon General's Office of the Army volunteered that they had already drawn up standards which might be quite suitable and that these would be delivered to [redacted]

Respectfully,

[redacted]

b6
b7C

TEB:LVO
11/4/42

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

SEARCHED 1/20-3 22-16-77

EX-31

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DECLASSIFIED BY ~~60267 UC/NUS/bjw/paw~~
ON 11-13-03

National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear [redacted]

b6
b7C

There is attached hereto a summary of the pertinent information in the files of this Bureau regarding the company on which you requested information in your telephone conversation with [redacted] of this Bureau on October 19, 1942.

You are advised that our files fail to reflect that any investigation has been conducted of this company in connection with alleged subversive tendencies. However, in 1928 and 1930 some inquiry was made relative to an Anti-Trust matter, but no information was developed which would be pertinent to your inquiry.

With regard to the personnel of this company no check of our records has been made, inasmuch as we are not in possession of the names and other identifying data with regard to same.


In regard to your request of the same date to the effect that certain information be obtained from the [redacted] please be advised that this information is being secured and will be forwarded to you promptly upon receipt thereof.

b6D

I sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director



440
58NUV

Nov 5 1942 4 PM '42
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

76 C

113

RE: [redacted]

b7D

A reliable source has advised that on March 17, 1942, [redacted]

[redacted] sent a letter to an individual in Brasil stating that, inasmuch as [redacted]
[redacted] could not mention the names of boats in its cables the following code names would be employed to represent the names of [redacted]

b6

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(62-62736-1116)

It was also reported that on April 4, 1941, a check in the amount of [redacted] was drawn on the account of [redacted] bank payable to [redacted] It should be noted that [redacted] allegedly [redacted]

[redacted] (65-7267-1333)

Further, a source whose reliability is unknown has advised that [redacted]

b6

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(100-769-2231X, 36)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-05 BY 60267.POL/MIC/bja/PRA

RECORDED
100-93216-27
F B I
10 NOV 9 1942
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100-93216-27

EX-31

100-93216-27		
F	B	I
10	NOV	9 1942

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



EPC:AF

C-287

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

b6

October 19, 1942

b7C

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRACY

Re: [redacted]

Bacterial Warfare

[redacted] telephoned stating he had three items:

1 - He was very appreciative of the information furnished him by the Bureau the other day. He inquired whether we could ascertain from [redacted]

b6

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2 - He has conferred with [redacted] concerning the deplorable lack of control in this country over laboratories capable of producing bacteria. They both agree that it is a dangerous situation but have not yet worked out any plan or recommendation for its correction. [redacted] would like Mr. Hoover to know for his general information that they do consider this a dangerous situation and he will advise Mr. Hoover later of any steps which they may be able to work out to correct it.

b7C

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3 - [redacted] organization is planning to have [redacted]

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b7C

b7D

b6

b7C

b7D

I told [redacted] I would bring these matters to Mr. Hoover's attention.

I am writing to [redacted] for the information sought. I shall ask the Security Division to prepare a reply to Merck for ^{RECORDED} the Director's signature on [redacted] situation.

(U)


INDEXED
N 152
Respectfully,



F 100-93216-27
B
T
NOV 9 1942
JES
[Signature]

b6

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COPY IN FILE

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY UC/NIS/BJA/PAM 60267 AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 20A (b) 11-13-2028

No. W-360

October 19th, 1942

R

(5)

In reply to your memorandum No. 1480 of October 13th, we wish to advise you that information on the subject of bacteriological warfare was sent direct to Mr. Edgar Hoover, Director, on October 16th. A copy of this letter is attached herewith.

Letter to [unclear]
11/21/42 [unclear]

52 NOV 1 7 1942

pe
ENCLOSURE
INITIALS ON ORIGINALS
M 155
D 69

RECORDED

INDEXED

100 - 93216 - 1

7155 OCT 23 1942

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EX-44

~~SECRET~~

mrw
Habana, Cuba
November 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM

Re: Poliomielitis epidemic in Cuba

For the past several months, there has been raging an epidemic of Poliomielitis in Cuba and it became so great that the primary schools were closed to prevent the spread of the disease. The epidemic seems to be subsiding now after a high mark of 107 reported cases during the middle of October in all of the Island. A request was made of the writer to determine if there was any possibility of this epidemic being the result of bacterial warfare.

[redacted] a fifth year medical student at the University of Habana, [redacted]
[redacted] was questioned along this line. [redacted]

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[redacted] scouted the idea that the epidemic might have been the result of bacterial warfare saying that too little is known of the disease to make it a suitable subject for this type of warfare. According to him, although many theories have been advanced about the transmission and treatment of the disease, it is not yet known if the disease is caused by a filterable virus. The means of transmission are not definitely known and [redacted]

[redacted] that it was a startling fact that no cases of Poliomielitis had been found in the slums of Cuba but that the victims were from middle class families where (REDACTED) the sanitary conditions were, for the most part, good.

From the above, it is apparent that, unless the Axis scientists have made some revolutionary discoveries about the disease, one possibility of the Poliomielitis epidemic being the introduction of bacterial warfare may be dismissed. There are so many other more deadly diseases which might be easily introduced that it doesn't seem logical that "Polio" would be selected for the job.

Respectfully submitted,

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100-93216-29
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 161303 BY 60267 UC/MAR/bja/PMS
NO STOTLMT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 161303 BY 60267 UC/MAR/bja/PMS
NO STOTLMT

EPC:AF:MJC

November 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR [redacted]

b6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7C

The following statement was made by a proved German saboteur in connection with his description of the training which he received in a sabotage school in Germany:

"I might mention at this time that during the course I specifically asked a question as to whether there was any bacterial or poison warfare planned. I was told quite definitely that no plans had been made for any warfare of this type; also that we were not to approach anyone or attempt to buy anything of that kind in the United States as they were sure the United States did not intend to engage in any of that type of warfare."

Quoted from the statement of Ernst Peter Burger.

O
File under "Bacteria".

11/11/42
Warfare sent by messenger (W)

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/mw/bja/prca
CJ 11-13-03

ORDED

XED

D57

100-93216-3

NOV 14 1942
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WMT

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EPC:EGK
10/30/42

100-92216-21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED SAC, New York

Dear Sir:

The Bureau's Laboratory is presently interested in the chemical product bearing the trade name "Ricin." This is listed in the Eimer and Amend catalog. This is a wholesale chemical house located at 633 Greenwich Street, New York City. The Bureau desires that you have an immediate inquiry made at Eimer and Amend's to determine the current price of this substance. It is also desired that you ascertain the presently available supply of the same and whether it is produced, to the knowledge of Eimer and Amend, by other chemical houses.

The inquiry is confidential and the information obtained should be telegraphed to the Bureau.

Yours truly,

DECLASSIFIED BY *locab7 uc/nme/bja/pmc*
ON 11-13-03

John Edgar Hoover
Director

NOV 1 3 05 PM '42

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy *INVESTIGATIONS SECTION* NOV 27 1942
Mr. Carson _____ MAILED 8
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon *NOV 2 1942 P.M.*
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm *FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION*
Mr. Nease *U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE*
Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
NOV 2 1942 P.M.
100-92216-21

65

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



EPC:EGK

CC-287

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

October 30, 1942

Mr. Tolson

Mr. E. A. Tamm

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Glavin

Mr. Ladd

Mr. Nichols

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Carson

Mr. Coffey

Mr. Hendon

Mr. Kramer

Mr. McGuire

Mr. Harbo

Mr. Quinn Tamm

Tele. Room

Mr. Nease

Miss Beahm

Miss Gandy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11-13-03

CLASSIFIED 60267 AC/NLS/0ja/PRM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 years (11-13-2028)

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRACY

RE: BACTERIA

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I talked to [redacted] subsequently on the telephone about this. He stated that the Chemical Warfare Service was afraid to negotiate with Eimer and Amend and buy this substance because it would probably cause a lot of curiosity and commotion and might leak out. He said that it was his plan to attempt to buy it "under cover." I pointed out to him that if the FBI went in to purchase the entire supply of the product it would probably cause as much or more curiosity than the Chemical Warfare. He agreed and stated that he had not given that angle enough consideration, and since I mentioned it he now thought it would be best to try to get some small chemical house to attempt to buy it. He stated that he would be very appreciative, however, if, through our New York office, we could find out if they had the substance in stock and how much was on hand. He stated that they were coding the word "Ricin" and would refer to it in telephone conversations and otherwise as "Product W."

The drug Ricin is listed in Eimer and Amend's catalog as chemically pure and packed in one-gram vials, selling at \$3.00 per gram. I am informed that it is the basic ingredient of castor oil. The authorities relate the following: "... A very toxic poison....usually acts after several hours causing intense diarrhea, urine suppression, jaundice pain, and other marked symptoms of acute inflammation." No figures were available in the laboratory as to what would constitute a toxic dosage for the human, but it was noted that .000002 grams would kill a rabbit. Apparently Merck is considering its use in connection with his special project.

RECOMMENDATION: I would be inclined to recommend against the Bureau's purchasing the supply of this material for ~~Merck~~. On the other hand, I see no harm in accommodating him by having the ~~New York~~ office contact Eimer and Amend to determine how much they have on hand. If the Director concurs there [redacted] attached a letter to the New York office issuing instructions.



COPY IN FILE

EX-3
Respectfully,

I ENCL. 6

5 JAN 1 1943
Attachments

b6

b7C

~~SECRET~~

EPC:MJC

100-93216-22
Oct 31, 1942

[REDACTED]
Sanitary Engineer Director
U. S. Public Health Service
Washington, D. C.

b6

b7C

Dear [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 user/jm/jmw


I am in receipt of your letter of October 16 transmitting a copy of "Facility Security Program Public Water Supply Survey Instructions, No. 158" as well as the tentative list of public water supplies considered essential to the war effort. This is a very interesting report and should serve as a valuable reference in the Bureau's files. I wish to thank you for furnishing it.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire 58 DEC 4
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____



JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



CC-287

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

October 31, 1942

EPC:MJC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRACY

Re: Bacteria Research

In my memorandum of October 15, I described a luncheon given by [redacted] in which the protection of the Nation's water supply systems from bacteria was discussed. The Bureau has since received a copy of the Facility Security Program Public Water Supply Survey Instructions, No. 158" and a tentative list prepared by the Public Health Service of public water supplies that are considered essential and important to the war effort. These were submitted by [redacted] and a letter of acknowledgment has been prepared.

Respectfully,

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DATE 11/13/03 BY 60267 UC/NME/bja/mar

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PDB:cmc

100-93216-28

Date: November 21, 1942
 To: SAC, San Francisco

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-18-03 BY 60207 uc/nms/bja/mar

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Subject: D POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE; SALE OF
 TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. E. A. Tamm _____ Reference is made to Bureau letter dated November 3, 1942,

Mr. Clegg _____ requesting that the Bureau be advised as to the status of this case.

Mr. Glavin _____ A reply has not been received by the Bureau.

Mr. Ladd _____

Mr. Nichols _____ You are instructed to afford the instant case continuous and
 preferred attention until all logical leads have been concluded in order
 Mr. Rosen _____ that the full facts of this case may be made available to the Bureau in
 Mr. Tracy _____ the shortest possible time. Further delay in the investigation of this
 Mr. Carson _____ case will not be countenanced.

Mr. Coffey _____

Mr. Hendon _____ COMMUNICATIONS SECTION 100-93216-28



Mr. Kramer _____

Mr. McGuire _____

Mr. Quinn Tamm _____

Mr. Nesse _____

Miss Gandy _____



RECORDED

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EPC:AF

November 27, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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O X [redacted]
of the Federal Security Agencies
327 National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

b6

b7C

Dear [redacted]

Reference is made to your recent inquiry concerning "Ricin".
For your very confidential information, the following data have been
obtained:

"Information obtained from confidential sources
reflects that [redacted]"

b7D


I trust this information will be useful in your project, I t.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 us/ma/bj/psw
ON 11-13-03

58 DEC 1942



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Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Rose.....
~~Mr. Tracy~~
Mr. Carson.....
Mr. Coffey.....
Mr. Hendon.....
Mr. Kramer.....
Mr. McGuire.....
Mr. Quinn Tamam.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....

NOV 25 1942

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-2003 BY 60267 UC/NM/bjt/jmw

FBI NYC

11-25-42

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DIRECTOR

ATTENTION TECHNICAL LABORATORY.

RE LETTER DATED NOV SECOND FORTYTWO. QUOTE RLCIN UNQUOTE EIMER AND AMEND CATALOG. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM NY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT

b7D

REFLECTS THAT [redacted]

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HOLD WA R 4 ON

O To be Delivered personally

11/27/42
Letter to [redacted]

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Called Laboratory

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Office

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COPY IN FILE

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



CC-287

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E.A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

EPC:GWH:EGK

~~SECRET~~

October 13, 1942

~~CLASSIFIED~~ SPLASH 3181989
~~Occasionally~~ SADR 307009

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

RE: ~~SECRET~~ Bacteria Warfare

b6

b7C

Mr. Carson
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Kramer
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

w-y
X 11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UOJ/mus/bjfan
DECLASSIFY QN: 25X (b) 11-13-2028

[redacted] advises me that the following has been accomplished on this project since [redacted] visit to you on September 17, 1942:

b6 b7C 1. A 40-page summarization of information on the subject appearing in the Bureau's files has been completed. [redacted] has been notified telephonically that this is ready, and he has advised that he will personally pick it up Thursday or Friday of this week. One copy of this was routed to your office, and the original is being held on [redacted] desk for [redacted]

2. A 3-page summarization on the subject [redacted]

[redacted] A copy of this will be furnished to [redacted] (S)

b1

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b7C

3. [redacted]

(S)

b1

4. All Bureau Division heads were advised of the Bureau's interest in this project and were instructed to route all material pertaining to bacterial warfare coming to their attention to [redacted] in the Laboratory.

5. In a telephone conversation, [redacted] indicated to [redacted] that he was desirous of having [redacted] meet with [redacted] of ONI on this subject, and that he would endeavor to have the meeting Thursday or Friday of this week. [redacted] will meet with them at their convenience.

b6

b7C

1 KNOWN BY [redacted] Items which [redacted] has not yet gone into but which were discussed with the Director include the possibility of giving our Agents in training certain instructions about problems of defensive bacteria warfare and the possibility of utilizing our field forces to gather special information which might be needed, such as data on vulnerable spots and the like.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-2028 BY SP/MS



81 DEC 5 1942

Respectfully,
S. J. Tracy
RECORDED INDEXED

~~SECRET~~ (S)

EX-24

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BACTERIAL WARFARE AND SABOTAGE

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3/18/90 SPAGS
307009

I. Bacterial Warfare

The following is from Helmut Klotz' The New German War:

In order to anticipate the author's point of view and in order to mark out the terrain from the first, we declare in complete consciousness of our political, military and scientific responsibility:

We affirm on the basis of years of careful studies and tests, in principle the possibility of bacteriological warfare. These studies and tests have been extended and are being extended to the purely bacteriological and to the practical and military side.

Whether this weapon, serviceable in theory, will be used in the individual case and the often changing practice of war, or whether special circumstances will cause its application to appear unsuitable or dangerous for one's own troops and own people, is essentially a question of tactics.

Bacteriological warfare in this respect differs in nothing from a great many other kinds of warfare. There are military situations in which the use of this or that weapon is to be rejected; this special rejection does not in the least mean the general rejection of the weapon, rather it results exclusively from tactical considerations. Tactical considerations cannot be generalized.

In trench warfare, when the trenches run only a few meters one from the other, one will forego the shelling of the enemy trenches with heavy artillery, in order not to endanger his own trenches; furthermore, in trench warfare one will renounce a bombardment with gas grenades, if within a short distance between one's own lines and the enemy lines, the wind is blowing in the direction of one's own troops. These precautionary measures, taken for the protection of one's own troops, by no means pronounce a death sentence against heavy artillery or gas grenades.

For, in other situations, heavy artillery and the gas grenade have shown themselves to be serviceable and suitable, often the only effective weapons. There are, at times, circumstances in war in which the application of a definite weapon is just as wrong as it is right and necessary at other times.

100-93216-3
ENCLOSURE

We repeat and sum up: whether in a concrete case the conditions are fulfilled for the use of a definite method of warfare, for example bacteriological warfare is decided by tactics on the basis of the special circumstances of the situation, like wind direction, wind intensity, meteorological conditions, condition of the ground and terrain, proximity of one's own troops and the populace.

The answer may be unconditionally affirmative in one case, unconditionally negative in another case, and in a third case, doubtful. In no case, however, does this question touch the problem as to whether the conduct of bacteriological war is fundamentally possible. That is to say, whether it is scientifically, technically and militarily possible.

That, however, depends on us. We have to test whether bacteriological warfare belongs to the region of Utopias and false alarms, or whether it is a reality of today.

We affirm this reality of bacteriological warfare. At the time, however, we deny - again on the basis of careful studies and tests - that bacteriological warfare is able to or tends to supplant or to replace the other methods of warfare. This is true at least for the present state of science and engineering, which can alone be the standard for our judgment.

And, at least provisionally, bacteriological warfare is a chance weapon in a disproportionately higher degree than infantry fire, artillery and hand grenades, one of which the possibility of use and success depends on the fulfillment of a whole series of conditions. If these conditions are not fulfilled or not completely fulfilled, then the bacteriological weapons - if they are used anyhow - will be wasted without any effect and will bring the danger of being fatal to one's own troops and people.

Some critics of the bacteriological principle have emphasized energetically this last mentioned danger of repercussion against one's own troops and people. This emphasis was right; it was wrong, however, if the conclusion was drawn from this - that people would, because of this danger, absolutely renounce the use of bacteriological warfare.

This inference contradicts the entire contents of military history.

Mr. Tolson _____ The question as to whether a definite weapon or method of warfare can have harmful or even deadly retroactive effects on one's own troops was and is never decisive; Mr. E. A. Tamm _____ rather what was and is decisive is only whether the disadvantage caused to the Mr. Clegg _____ enemy by the weapon is in the right proportion to the possibilities of these Mr. Glavin _____ reactions. Besides, for ages it has belonged to the special tasks of war technique Mr. Ladd _____ to weaken and reduce just these possible reactions.
Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Rosen _____ Things are precisely this way with bacteriological warfare. If the Mr. Tracy _____ weapon is applied without any plan or reflection, then it can result equally Mr. Carr _____ destructive for friend and foe. If it, however, is used only when the geographical Mr. Coff _____ conditions and meteorological conditions, which are prevailing, exclude this Mr. Hendon _____ repercussion, then only the foe is hit, and indeed struck a destructive blow. If Mr. Krasner _____, however, wants to be completely safe, then there can be found many measures Mr. McGowen _____ the protection of one's own troops and populace, since the time and type of Mr. Quinn _____ are known; the foe, however, is surprised. Here the tenet that "he who Mr. Neastrikes _____ first, strikes the hardest" is valid.

Miss Gandy _____

It is possible to imagine situations in which the danger of a repercussion of the weapon is exactly zero. For example in the case of a German bacteriological attack on England. If relatively calm weather prevails, if moreover weak wind currents blow over England from the northeast toward the southwest, then there does not exist in human judgment the slightest danger for the European continent. And even if the wind should change around after one or two days and blow from England over the Channel and North Sea toward the East, the bacteria would have lost their vitality even before they landed on the continent.

Things would be similar in a German bacteriological attack on Italy. In this case the weapon would be put into use with a calm and constant north-south wind. There exists no danger for Germany; and if the wind changed its course, even in the opposite direction, the high mountains enclosing Italy in the north, northeast and northwest would stop the flight and virulence of the bacteria.

The situation in case of a German bacteriological attack on central and southern France would not be so completely simple, but still simple enough. Here also it is possible to think of situations which exclude the danger of the rebound of the wave.

And in differently laid out cases, in which one's own troops and people are endangered by a bacteriological offensive! Here, in the rough reality of war of which we speak, it will always only be a matter of weighing carefully whether the possibility of endangering one's own nation is sufficiently justified, compared with the damage that can be expected to be inflicted on the enemy. Moreover, the military-bacteriological science does not work only on the development of the offensive powers of bacteria, but also - and more the less - on methods of defense and protection. These methods are to insure one against enemy bacteriological offensives; they are, however, also to reduce to a minimum the danger of the rebound of one's own offensive.

Fear of new and perhaps incomprehensible things is no good counselor. The problem of the conduct of a bacteriological war requires calm and objective examination. The peculiar practice of certain military and semi-military officials of concealing or denying the dangers of the weapon does not speak for calmness or objectivity. It would indeed be better and as a result more useful to confess that there does not exist or scarcely exists an effective defense against bacteriological offensives of the opponent in the present state of science and scientific technique.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____

Mr. Ladd _____ A word about the moral criterium which one usually prefers to glorify Mr. Nicklas - the idea of a bacteriological war. The tremendous significance of this Mr. Rosenthal offensive is not unrecognized by us; on the contrary, we wish that the Mr. Trautmann offensive were carried on even more passionately and decisively. And yet the Mr. Carr military reality of the coming war will violate this criterium just as naturally Mr. Colley happened in the case of poison gas warfare. The frightful tenet, that the war Mr. Hendrikx carried on with the strongest weapons that destroys the enemy, is the most humane Mr. Krause because it is the shortest war, can easily be misused for the justification of Mr. McNaughton bacteriological warfare.

Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

Next we give the interpretation of a high French military and medical expert again of the fundamental question of the possibilities of bacteriological war. Dr. Romieu declared (*) under the strong impression of the publications of the English politician and writer, Wickham Steed, about the bacteriological experiments made by the German military authorities in the installations of the subways in Paris and London:

"The designation 'bacteriological warfare' appears phantastic; it, however, corresponds to reality. The 'bacteriological troops' consist of living beings, which are indeed infinitely small, but compensate for their small size through their numbers. The number is astronomical.

"The production (culture) of bacteria in great volume is in the majority of cases not difficult and only requires a small amount of time. Certain species can be produced in one single laboratory up to 100 billion specimens per thousandth of a second. Moreover their mass production requires neither complicated installations nor large factories. Their production on a large scale can be hidden without the slightest trouble, so that even the slyest examining committee is not in a position to establish anything. The production cost of the bacteria is insignificant.

"Certain bacteria groups cannot be used for military purposes. It is different with that group, which we in military speech designate as the 'armed service group.' To this group there belongs on one side the plague, and on the other side cholera, dysentery, and typhus. The plague bacillus can be cultivated without any trouble; contagion is accomplished extremely easily ('avec une extreme facilite' meaning, with extreme ease).....The legendary fear of the plague is explained by the enormous mortality rate in pestilence sicknesses; in the case of the bubonic plague on an average 80 out of 100 cases result fatal, in the case of the rarer lung plague up to 100 out of 100 cases....."

Thereby, in complete agreement with us, the French expert unequivocally and positively affirms the possibility of employing the plague bacillus for military purposes. Just as unequivocally positive is his opinion regarding dysentery. In the case of the cholera bacillus he makes certain restrictions, likewise, although in another direction, in the case of the typhus bacillus.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
The problem of a use of the anthrax spore, the favorite of the German military bacteriologist, is not examined by Romieu.

Mr. Clegg _____

Mr. Clavin _____

Mr. Ladd _____

A series of negative critics of bacteriological warfare have believed Mr. Nichols to be able to dispose of the possibilities of the waging of a bacteriological war with the primitive explanation that the allegedly highly sensitive bacteria could Mr. Ross not resist the afflictions of pressure and temperature; that the bacteria would, Mr. Tracy at the latest, be destroyed at the time of the bursting of the shell to which they Mr. Collier joined. This cheap objection is without weight, even if it were scientifically Mr. Henfounded - which is by no means the case. It is not the purpose of bacteriological Mr. Krawarfare, as it has been prepared by Germany, to "shoot" bacteria as a charge for Mr. McGrenades and shells. The bacteria are rather to be thrown out of airplanes in Mr. Quisquidybreakable containers (with or without parachutes), or, mixed with liquids, Mr. Neatly be rained down.

Miss Gandy _____

* In the newspaper "Le Petit Journal", of September 13, 1934

The widespread assertion of the alleged inability of bacteria to stand high pressure and temperature strain is moreover scientifically false. We recall that two French scholars, physicians Piedelievre and Guy, have undertaken interesting experiments, precisely in this field, and in this have arrived at completely positive results. These experiments (*) had the following as subject matter:

From three different firearms, introduced into the French army, and from an ordinary Browning pistol there was fired the (very sensitive) bacillus prodigiosus. (**) This happened in such a way, that first an ordinary shot was fired in order to sterilise the barrel. Then a cartridge was loaded, the shell of which was previously besmeared with a solution containing the bacillus prodigiosus. The shot was fired at a packet of wadding that had previously been carefully sterilized. From the wadding the bacillus prodigiosus cultures could be developed without any trouble.

A second, disproportionately important experiment followed: The striking bacteria were exposed to the considerably higher temperatures - in comparison with the barrel pressure - which arise when they strike on a steel plate. A layer of wadding was set up before the steel plate and in close contact with it, and the shot, prepared as before, was shot at this plate. The result was no less positive. That part of the wadding that had been in direct contact with the steel plate was merely examined; in this case too the bacteria had resisted the (momentary) high temperatures, without losing virulence.

That the strains, which arose through the rapid transport through the air, and which the unprotected bacteria met with, have not exercised the slightest harmful influence is self-evident.

Moreover in these experiments it was a question of the bacillus prodigiosus, a relatively sensitive spore. The resistance of the plague bacillus is essentially higher than that of this bacillus, that of the anthrax spore is even higher.

It can therefore pass for scientifically proved that even with the bacillus prodigiosus firing from a gun is possible. This method is, however, not at all intended; and the strains which may affect the bacteria, if they - sealed in light glass balls - are thrown down (or rained down), are so small, that theoretically they can scarcely be comprehended, practically, not at all.

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. E. A. Tamm _____

Mr. Clegg _____ Already in 1924, accordingly 13 years ago now, the League of Nations Mr. Glavieux itself induced to deal with the question of bacteriological warfare. A Mr. Ladd ~~commission~~ of experts was appointed, to which, besides other experts, Professor Mr. Nic ~~Bordet~~, Director of the Pasteur Institute in Brussels and holder of the Nobel Mr. Rus ~~Prize~~ of 1919 (Bordet discovered the whooping cough germ), and the Italian Mr. Tracy ~~bacteriologist~~, Professor Angelini, Florence, belonged.

Mr. Carson _____

Mr. Coffey _____ presented in the "Journal of the American Medical Association," 1931, Mr. Hender ^(*) VOLUME 96, page 959.

Mr. Kramer _____

Mr. McGuire ^(**) The bacillus prodigiosus, the so-called bacillus of the "bleeding host," Mr. Quinn Tamm ^(**) It is very rarely appearing, completely harmless spore. It is used with preference Mr. Nease ^(**) for bacteriological experiments because of these properties and because it Miss Gandy ^(**) develops a red coloring material (hence its name).

The results of the labors of this commission were published by the League of Nations, in extract according to the importance of the question (Document of the League of Nations A 16 1924 IX.) In the second part of this document, entitled "Bacteriological warfare," it is declared that bacteria would lose power if they are too old or if they are used as an addition to the load of a shell.

The first objection regarding the harmful effects of age is refuted by science, refuted at least in regards to the anthrax spore. According to the "Annales de l'Institut Pasteur" (*) anthrax spores in a dry state can be preserved for several years without thus losing vitality. The (German) bacteriologist, Professor Robert Koch, has proved (**) that anthrax spores which have been placed in carbolic acid for 40 days have lost nothing of their capacity. And in order to climax the proof: in the "Medical Research Council" (***) it is confirmed that anthrax spores in the ground for 15 years preserve their complete vitality and virulence.

That was the first objection that was put forward in the judgment of the League of Nations. The second objection, that bacteria would lose virulence if they are used as a load for shells, has in the meantime been refuted with reference to the bacillus prodigiosus by the experiments of the two afore-named French physicians.

Moreover, this objection would not have needed any refutation, since it is not at all intended to "shoot" the bacteria.

Back to the League of Nations document from 1924: after the apparently negative, but positively demonstrable and positively demonstrated explanation, the judgment continues verbatim: "The only method that could mean a certain danger, would be to throw out of an airplane glass balls that are filled with bacteria."

And Dr. Hugo Stolzenberg in Hamburg, who was during the World War the German expert for gas warfare, has worked in this direction. In 1929 he had (and this procedure is also symptomatic) entered in the Reichs Patent Office in Berlin under number 485,574 (class 45 1 3) the following patent:

"Process for the obtaining of drop dispersion from great heights." In the patent papers Dr. Stolzenberg carefully describes his method. He comes to the result, that the objections that had been raised against the raining down of liquide from great heights, "can be considered refuted, if the drops are enclosed by a protective shell." As protective shells Stolzenberg proposes glass, celluloid, metal foils, etc.

Dr. Stolzenberg designated this patent as "designed for the control of pests." Yet a few years later he takes up the idea anew: in the "Deutsche Chemiker-Zeitung" (meaning German Chemists' Magazine) 1932, page 751-753 he speaks of the possibilities of defending a troop which is bombed, perhaps with "yellow cross" (mustard gas, etc.), according to the method of his patent number 485,574. The agricultural patent has become a military one.

(*) Paris, 1894. Cited in the book by Zinsser, "A Textbook of Bacteriology," London, 1928, Page 657.

(**) Likewise in Zinsser, page 658.

(***) London, September 19, 1931. Volume V, page 460.

Yet even before Dr. Stolzenberg, Professor Hugo Junkers, the deceased airplane manufacturer in Dessau, had invented a process, which can be used just as well for dropping virus as bacteria. This process also is represented as being destined for pest control.

Under the number 467,659 Professor Junkers registered a process "for the division and decomposition of remedies for pest control" (Reich Patent Office, Berlin, 1928); in 1929, he had a supplementary patent follow under the number 477,164.

In what a rapid tempo the military and scientific investigation of bacteriology and the technique of bacteriological warfare have been developed is forcefully shown by two documents of the League of Nations. The first one dates from 1924; the second one, from 1932.

The first one (A 16 1924 IX) says: "The majority of the experts are of the opinion that bacteriology in its present state (1924) is not capable of destroying the total food stores and cattle resources of a country. Professor Cannon (Boston), however, does not completely share this latter opinion; he affirms the possibility that from an airplane extensive regions can become infected and the cattle resources destroyed."

The second document (Conf. D. 152, of December 13, 1932) declares with resignation: "It is not possible to prevent preparations for bacteriological warfare."

And one of the experts of the League of Nations, Bacteriology Professor Madsen (Copenhagen), sees himself forced to confirm the following: (*) "I agree completely with the views advocated by Professor Pfeiffer (Germany) in his memorandum. The possibilities which bacteriological science possesses at its present stage are, without doubt, sufficient to produce epidemics of greater or lesser extent."

In the summer of 1934, occasioned by the courageous impulse of Wickham Steed, the question of bacteriological warfare came abruptly into the foreground of public interest. The most eager attention of conscientious women and men of all countries began to concentrate on this element in the great chain of German war preparations, an element which seemed to be directly predestined for the purposes of an invasion-war.

Also the circles in Berlin around Generals Goering and von Reichenau were very deeply concerned, although in another direction and in another sense. They seriously reckoned with the danger of calamitous consequences.

(*) Cited in Victor Lefebure's book, "Scientific Disarmament" (London, 1931, page 217-218). Major Victor Lefebure was during the World War the expert of the British Army for questions of gas warfare.

Yet, after only a few days, the atmosphere cleared again: in Paris, in London and elsewhere members of the League came forward, experts and laymen, some from the scientific milieu, some from the military milieu. Members of the League without wanting to be such, but League members *de facto*, they declared with strange unanimity that the dangers and possibilities of bacteriological warfare were presented in an exaggerated manner; there were natural and more or less outlined boundaries over which no one could step without being punished.

This exoneration offensive, which had to cripple the impetus of action of those who were demanding clarity and enlightenment, has a good purpose; it however fought with poor arms. It miscarried because of that and had to miscarry.

This was the good purpose; one wished to prevent the threatening danger of a future panicky frame of mind among the masses of the population of the large cities. One did not wish to admit - in thoroughly correct knowledge of things - that there did not exist any effective defense against the Third Reich's plans for a bacteriological attack, at least in the present state of bacteriological science and technique.

This was, on the other hand, the poor weapon: in order to avoid the natural consequence of an admission of the relative defenselessness against the German bacteriological war plans, one tried to reduce the threatening dangers, then on the whole to attack them, and finally to turn them into ridicule. And this happened and was able to happen partially with the assistance of real and false military authorities.

Nothing could be more fatal than these tactics. They have not been able to secure calm in one's own land. And they were correctly recognized in Berlin, correctly evaluated and correctly supplemented.

Let the most naive argument, which used to be mobilized during that exoneration offensive, be anticipated. It is the childish self deception that there existed - in the age of the Third Reich - unwritten, but effective laws of ethical humanitarianism which forbids the belligerent opponent to make use of a serviceable and destructive weapon.

How foreign to reality and dangerous this Utopian dreaming is, is proved by the evidence of certain chapters of the World War. We remember now only the experiments of a former military attaché of the Central Powers in Washington, who gave himself all the trouble imaginable in the first phase of the war in order to infect the feed of the horses destined for the French and English troops in Europe. The experiment failed, of course, as really everything that the gentleman in question had undertaken up until then in his motley life. In the second place we remember the Rumanian experiment of the German war leadership in August, 1916; the German Professor Niemeyer, full of disgust and shame, reports concerning this experiment in his "Manual of the Disarmament Problem" (second volume, page 442):

"We recapitulate: The scholars, whose opinions we have collected, are of the opinion that our present knowledge of hygiene and bacteriology enables us to limit the extension of an epidemic that was artificially created on the front

and at home. In the present state of the things, they (the scholars) are of the belief that bacteriological warfare is not able to break the defenses of a country; they believe that this "double-edged method of warfare" does not signify any special danger today. Other scholars have, however, opposite views; these men obliged us to follow the development of bacteriology with the greatest interest. Moreover, Professor Bordet (Director of the Pasteur Institute in Brussels) reminds us that (in 1917) glanders cultures were found in the German Embassy in Bucharest, provided with exact directions for use for the infection of the Romanian supply of horses."

We remember in the third place the attempt undertaken on the western front by the army of the former German Crown Prince. This experiment, the consequences of which would have become incalculable, was interrupted November 10, 1918. The armistice put an end to the hideous deed.

We admit that the bacteriological experiments of that time were undertaken with insufficient means and that they were not directly aimed at people, but only at the horses and the cattle of the enemy. Yet this restriction was (unfortunately) less the product of any moral restraint or humanitarian impulse than the accompanying phenomenon of the then still undeveloped state of bacteriological research, which was felt to be deplorable. This lack, has in the meantime, been compensated for by tireless labor.

We have already occupied ourselves with the often heard objection that bacteria are highly sensitive to the influences of weather, to pressure and to fluctuating and high temperatures. This objection is scientifically false; it is doubly false when it is a question of the anthrax spore.

This spore (it is, as we repeat, the favorite one of the German military bacteriologists) is in a dry condition extraordinarily resistant to heat, cold and sun beams; it bears without difficulty temperatures of a second's duration of 200 to 250 degrees centigrade; a pressure strain of 50 to 80 atmospheres does not affect the spore in a demonstrably hurtful manner. If the spore is fixed to the culture medium then its power of resistance is indeed smaller; it, however, still exceeds the practical requirements in many ways. (-)

No one will dare seriously to contest the special appropriateness of this anthrax spore for military purposes. And also the extraordinary dangerousness of the spore is beyond all doubt.

The anthrax spore, the virulence of which can be increased to a maximum by suitable methods of culture, works directly and indirectly; directly through respiration, indirectly through the taking in of spore infected food or liquids. Through the breathing in of a slight quantity of spores (**) there arises within a very short while and with almost absolute certainty pulmonary anthrax (rag-sorers' disease), which is almost always fatal. And through the taking in of spore infected food or liquids there arises the intestinal anthrax which is likewise mostly fatal.

(*) Compare, for example: "Medical Research Council," London 1929/31, Volume V, page 460.

(**) The weight of the anthrax spore (in a dry state) amounts to 10 to the minus 12th power grams; therefore there are 1000 trillion spores in a gram.

Remedies against anthrax and the anthrax spores? Even just a somewhat effective defense does not exist. The dangerousness of the anthrax spore, the extraordinarily high coefficient of contagion, and the lack of suitable defensive measures, all of these facts are emphasized by the legal prescriptions that have been issued in all civilised countries in case animals die of anthrax. In general such animals' bodies must be buried under police supervision in a grave that is at least three meters under surface of the earth; the body must be surrounded by a layer of unslaked lime. Then there comes packed earth. The grave must have a fence around it; for the duration of two years the spot is closed to all access.

What practical possibilities are given of using bacteria (especially the anthrax spore) as implements of war? What possibilities are being prepared in the Third Reich?

We disregard the relative improbability (not impossibility) that bacteria cultures be used as loads for shells; we concentrate rather on those three methods which are practically proved in Germany and which will find application in the next war.

(a) The method of sealing the bacteria cultures or spores in glass capsules. These glass capsules are available in two sizes of a net weight of 5 and 20 grams. These capsules are thrown out (dispersed) from airplanes. The altitude of the airplane, in this as elsewhere in the case of dropping bombs, plays a role only as regards the accuracy of aim. Experiments have shown that in normal weather conditions, in spite of the slight weight of the capsules, a sufficient accuracy of aim is obtained even from an altitude of from 5 to 6 thousand meters.

The thin glass ball flies into fragments when it hits the ground or the roof of a house, and the contents are scattered out. The air currents existing in cities - even in a calm - effect the dispersion of the bacteria or of the spores.

Only medium and larger cities come into consideration as objects for this method, occasionally troop concentrations also.

(b) The so-called "non-explosive bomb." With the non-explosive bombs a bacteria field of greater intensity is obtained in contrast with the method of the glass capsules.

This bomb consists of a solid container filled with bacteria culture, which is thrown from almost unlimited heights by means of a parachute. The parachute opens automatically at a height that may be controlled at will; in another, likewise controllable height (generally 10, 20 or 50 meters above the ground), the container opens automatically and slowly blows out the contents which are under low pressure. The bacteria which are in solution with a liquid sink to earth with slight velocity and are propagated.

As contents for the non-explosive bomb there is provided in the first place anthrax spores, in the second place plague bacilli, exactly as in the case of the glass capsule method.

As a variant of the non-explosive bomb, the so-called "Himmler cannon" must be named, the construction and method of operating of which have been thoroughly described in the author's book "The Berlin Diaries," volume II. (London, Jarrolds, 1935, page 156 ff.).

(e) The method of "drop dispersion". This method finds application not only for bacteriological war materials, but also for liquid poison substances used for military purposes.

The idea of having bacteriological and toxicological materials rain down on the enemy is the logical consequence of striving for the greatest useful effect. Through the "drop dispersion" method there are avoided all the bad effects which could arise through explosion, pressure and temperature; and this is not the least decisive factor - the so-called "dead weight" is reduced to a minimum.

In the case of the usual gas grenades (artillery shells) this dead weight (tare) amounts to approximately eight times the gas content; and even in the case of airplane bombs the dead weight is still approximately twice as high. In the case of the "drop dispersion" method, on the other hand, when no container is dropped, but the gas is rained down in the form of drops, there is only one part of dead weight for about nine parts of lethal agents (poison gas or bacteria).

Formerly and today also partially, people are of the opinion that the method of raining down can only be used from relatively small heights, if the drops are not to evaporate during the time of falling or if the aiming is not to be illusory. These misgivings could be refuted by exact experiments and calculations. The technical arrangements available now permit raining down without difficulty from heights of 4000 meters and even more.

The free fall and falling velocity of liquid drops are not subjected to the normal laws of gravitation, as they exist for solid bodies. The falling velocity of drops of liquids is rather, to speak in the language of the physicists, terminal and maximal. Differently expressed: the liquid drop reaches its maximal falling velocity after a relatively short time in the fall; this maximum cannot be exceeded, not even by extended duration of the fall.

This "maximal final velocity" depends essentially on the volume of the drop, or, since indeed the spherical form of the drop may be practically assumed, on its radius; in the second place on the density of the drop and on the density of the air, on the coefficient of resistance and other factors.

A second view point requires consideration: if at any height a drop of distilled water of the weight of one gram is rained down, then this drop does not fall to earth with just any velocity, but immediately splits up in several drops, of which each one, in an extreme case, weighs 0.3 grams and possesses a maximum radius of 7 millimeters.

This drop of water with the greatest possible radius, however, by no means reaches the maximum velocity which can be reached by drops of water and which must be reached in order to diminish the danger of evaporation and to increase the accuracy of aim. The experiments set up in German laboratories have proved rather that the highest falling velocity of a drop of water is reached with a constant radius of 3.5 millimeters. With this radius, a division of the drop is excluded.

In the case of other fluids with other density conditions other radii are to be chosen. Thus in the case of lewisite, the specific gravity of which amounts to 1.12: here the favorable radius is 2.3 millimeters; thus in the case of technically pure mustard gas, the specific gravity of which is 1.19 (at a temperature of 20 degrees centigrade): here the most favorable radius is 2.1 millimeters. Thus finally in the case of the so-called "bacilli water" (bacteriological liquid), of which the specific gravity amounts to 1.1: here the most advantageous radius is 2.35 millimeters.

With the choice of these radii the maximal falling velocity of the drops is on an average 8.4 meters per second. In other words: a drop that is rained out from a height of 4000 meters reaches the earth in about 8 minutes.

The danger that these drops will be driven away by the wind exists; without doubt this danger is greater than it, likewise, is for airplane bombs. It is shown here that "drop dispersion" is not any universal weapon, but an occasional one -- exactly as this is the case for other weapons.

The German experiments have finally proved that the losses which arise during the fall due to evaporation do not have any decisive significance, but are completely held within normal limits.

It is self-evident that the raining down of liquids with a radius of 2.1 to 2.3 millimeters requires in itself considerable time. During this time the airplane changes its position greatly. In order to obtain the desirable concentration, nozzles are provided in large numbers, and the raining down is carried out under carefully calculated pressure. The intervals between the individual drops is reduced to a minimum without the drops coming into collision one with the other.

Special care is used in German constructions so that the stationary waves, which arise in the containers in the process of emptying because of the shaking of the airplane, are caught up and made harmless. The danger of the containers being exploded by these stationary waves and endangering the crew of one's own airplane can be considered overcome.

By means of this "drop dispersion method" there may be rained out, besides poison gas, especially anthrax spores. The production of these spores offers no difficulty. In from 24 to 48 hours they can be cultivated in lots of many tons; special installations are not required, and large expenditures of money are not necessary. The storing of the spores can be carried out easily and without danger; if the most elementary measures of precaution are observed, the spore does not lose its virulence even in the case of rather long storage.

There is set forth below an article entitled "Germ Warfare Wanes: Infection May Be Threat in Third World War, Southland Doctors Say," by William S. Barton. The origin of this article is not clear, but it apparently appeared as a newspaper article, probably early in 1942.

Super-germs may supplant bombers as the major weapon in any World War No. 3. But when someone whispers that Hitler already is prepared to conquer America with germ warfare, laugh up your sleeve or report the whisperer as a fifth columnist!

Local physicians and California Institute of Technology scientists who were questioned about the rumor agree that germ warfare is more a future bogey than a present menace. The threat of using deadly infectious agents, however, dates back to 1410 when the French, led by the Duke of Burgundy, attempted to recapture Calais from the English.

DREADFUL PROSPECT

Holinshed's Chronicle reported that the Duke "had gathered together serpents, scorpions, todes and other kinds of venomous things which he had closed and shut up in little barrels, that when the flesh or substance of these noisome creatures was dissolved into filthie matter, he might lay siege to Calais and cast the said barrels let out of engines into the town; which with the violence of the throw being dasht to peaces, might choke them that were within, poison the harnessed men touched therewith and with their scattered venom infect all the streets, lanes and passages of the town."

The plot was discovered and the English bribed an early fifth columnist to burn up, not only the lethal matter, but also the entire French village in which it was stored.

BETTER SANITATION

Germ warfare, authorities agree, might have worked in 1410 because of lack of the necessary sanitary knowledge required to prevent spread of epidemics. It may work in the year 2000, but the informed consensus is that in 1940 too much is known about how to halt epidemics and too little is known about how Nature starts them to make it possible for men to create great artificial plagues.

A recent attempt to get rid of Australia's millions of rabbits by infecting them with disease germs was a complete failure despite the fact that the thousands of animals used in initial tests were enclosed within a fence. Almost as soon as a rabbit was inoculated and contracted the disease, it isolated itself as far as possible by lying down in the most remote clump of weeds it could find.

BUBONIC PLAGUE

Human plague victims may lack the hermit instinct that causes a sick rabbit to avoid infecting its fellows, but our alert health officials go the rabbit one better by not only isolating contagious patients, but also saving many lives by modern medicine.

Bubonic plague and typhus are transmitted by the bites of fleas and body lice, the fleas usually having been spread about by infected rats, ground squirrels, and other rodents. It would seem a simple matter to spread bubonic plague. Cages filled with rats and dropped by small parachutes could be so arranged that they would open upon reaching city roofs or pavements. Physicians point out, however, that, for some incompletely explained reason, bubonic plague invariably is halted when it enters a modern country in which standards of cleanliness are high.

And chances for decimating an enemy population with organisms that must be taken into the mouth, such as those of cholera, typhoid, and dysentery, are little better, say bacteriologists. All outbreaks of these diseases, it is held, can be stopped wherever the populace is intelligent enough to obey orders to boil all food and water and bury all waste in the sterilizing earth.

WOULD TEST FOODS

What about food poisoning resulting from the deadly bacillus botulinus? The poison from this bacillus is so potent that enough could be carried in one automobile to kill all the 2,000,000,000 inhabitants of the world. But how could an enemy be dosed with it? In this case, also, any outbreak probably could be halted by food tests and extended boiling.

A French scientist voiced the fear that the Germans might use flies to spread food poisoning. But flies can travel only a short distance and kitchen windows can be screened.

No local authority can be found who believes the popular fiction that the Germans wilfully started the influenza epidemic that caused the deaths of 500,000 persons in this country alone in 1918. At one of the last international medical conferences it was agreed that once bacteria are released, they cannot be confined to a particular locality, and that an artificially created plague would be as dangerous to those who produced it as to their foes.

MOVE TOO FAST

In the last war, in which opposing troops occupied virtually the same positions for years at a time, there might have been some chance to infect enemy territory, they reasoned. But in this war of lightning thrusts and mass movement, troops which infected an enemy trench today would likely have to occupy it tomorrow.

Imaginative terrorists have circulated rumors that Germany is about to produce epidemics of respiratory air-borne diseases such as "flu," pneumonia, and even common colds by dropping tons of infected dust from airplanes. Even though it were possible to obtain billions upon billions of the most deadly flu virus of the type that killed 20,000,000 persons and attacked every continent and every inhabited island in the world in 1918, the attempt would be certain to fail in part. Because, according to a nationally known scientist who refuses to be quoted directly on such a "sensational" thing as germ warfare, virtually all those who were alive in 1918 are still immune to that particular breed of the 125 known strains of flu virus.

NEED SUPER-VIRUS

"To wipe out an enemy successfully with influenza," he said, "would require the propagation of a super-virus against which only the enemy had not been immunized."

Nature has done little to protect men from dive bombing planes, but she has done much to afford protection against "diving germs." For germs strewn from planes might be blown right back again by vagrant air currents. And most germs, being sensitive to light, cold, or heat, would dry and shrivel up even if they didn't become too scattered to cause infection upon dropping down into the abodes of men.

HEAT WOULD KILL

The most likely success in waging war with germs, physicians say, would result from the release of disease organisms in crowded air-raid shelters by fifth columnists. But that threat also, it is predicted, could be obviated with the aid of special masks and germ-killing ultra-violet lamps.

Suggestions that armies could be routed by bombardment with shells containing spore-forming organisms like those of tetanus, gangrene, and anthrax are branded as "fantastic." Heat and sound waves resulting from the impact of such shells would kill the organisms, two Los Angeles physicians are certain. Not only that, but all British soldiers, for example, are now immunized against not only smallpox and typhoid, but against tetanus as well. Also, a new kind of vaccination against wound lockjaw has been perfected and already has been given all United States Naval Academy midshipmen.

What about the use of malaria and yellow fever mosquitoes? It wouldn't work in places like Southern California where nights are so cool that these mosquitoes can't thrive.

Fortunately for the survival of the race, scientists cannot grow disease germs outside their laboratories as fast as they can inside.

If they could, it would be possible with a germ that reproduces itself once every 20 minutes to fill the lakes and oceans so full of deadly bacteria within a few months that there would be no room for the water. But thus far Nature has made any such attempts impossible by making the outdoors too hot, too cold, too windy, or even by sending rain at the wrong time.

MATHEMATICIANS BUSY

The mathematicians have conjured up a comforting argument. They say that successful germ warfare will be impossible as long as the first 100 persons infected fail to give the disease to more than 99 other persons. In that case, the epidemic soon would wane.

But it is the progress made in fighting diseases accompanying wars that makes the successful use of germs in the present conflict unlikely. In the Thirty Years War 8,000,000 Germans succumbed to flea-borne bubonic plague and louse-borne typhus. During his retreat from Moscow, Napoleon lost 450,000 of his 500,000 men from dysentery and pneumonia.

In the first World War 8,000,000 men were killed on the battlefield and less than 3,000,000 succumbed to disease, most of the latter deaths occurring near the close of the four-year conflict. In short, in the 18th century loss by disease was six times the battle losses. In the war of 1914-1918 the ratio was only three disease deaths to eight battle deaths. And in this war less than one disease death has occurred for over 10 deaths caused by bullets!

The following is a confidential report which has been evaluated as fairly reliable and is concerned with the possible experimentation by the Japanese of the use of disease-producing organisms for civilian population:

For many years bubonic plague in China has been more or less a local problem in a few semi-isolated areas. In 1940 and 1941 it showed a tendency of migrating toward the hinterland. From Fukien it spread to Chekiang and Kiangsi. In November, 1941, an outbreak occurred in Hunan.

Since the beginning of Sino-Japanese hostilities there have been reports and rumors that Japan was practicing bacteriological warfare. These reports have not been too well authenticated. However, the following circumstances connected with the outbreak at Changteh, Hunan, where 6 cases developed between November 11 and 25 and where a 7th case was reported on December 14, are sufficiently well authenticated to be worthy of notice:

1. On November 4, a single Japanese plane appeared over Changteh. It flew just over the roof tops, circled about for twenty minutes, then departed without dropping a bomb.

2. Returning residents were puzzled when they observed scattered rice grains mixed with wisps of cotton rags, most of them near the 2 main gates. Samples of these materials, on analysis, were found to be contaminated with bubonic plague bacilli.

3. Several bubonic plague cases were reported on November 11. All died within 36 hours.

4. No bubonic plague had been reported in Changteh for more than 10 generations. The nearest epidemic region is more than 500 miles distant. The victims were not transients or refugees who might have brought in the disease, but residents who had never travelled more than a few miles from Changteh. All lived near the 2 main gates.

5. The plague is usually transmitted by bites from fleas which have lived on infected rats, which soon die. No dead rats were found in Changteh on November 11th lending to the belief that the plague was directly transmitted by the infected fleas.

6. A reliable foreigner, Dr. R. Politzer, former League of Nations epidemiologist, stationed now in Changteh, who dissected 5 infected rats, stated that in his opinion Japan is experimenting with bacteriological warfare.

The evidence is thus strong that a Japanese plane dropped cotton cloth bags containing rice and plague-infected fleas, the rice presumably being to attract rats.

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The circumstances at Changteh check with previous stories, particularly with reports of the outbreaks in Chekiang province during 1940. Of interest in this connection is a report that about a year ago fishing operations in a certain section near Otaru, on the island of Hokkaido, were suspended by order of the Japanese government, due to large cultures of bubonic plague bacilli having been inadvertently dropped into the sea as a result of flood damage to the laboratories situated at the city of Otaru.

The following article appeared in the Washington Evening Star, May 16, 1942, and was written by one Stephen J. McDonough. It is entitled, "Army Medical Expert Brands Bacteria Warfare as Fantastic, Germs Difficult to Handle and Might Infect Wrong Side, Doctor Says":

The use of bacteria as a weapon of war to carry death to an enemy was described today as fantastic.

An Army Medical Corps expert, Major Leon A. Fox, declared that the dangers in using bacteria against an enemy more than offset any advantages. Most bacteria are difficult to handle and cannot survive long under adverse conditions.

No germ known could survive the immense heat generated when a shell is fired from a gun or explodes on striking an objective.

Writing in the Military Surgeon, official journal of the Association of Military Surgeons, Major Fox declared:

"That the effects of bacterial injury cannot be limited or localized to any area; modern water purification methods protect most areas against typhoid and cholera; plague is a disease that would be as dangerous for the force using the organisms as for those attacked; the danger from typhus has been grossly exaggerated and modern sanitary precautions are effective in controlling most communicable diseases.

"Any consideration of the deliberate use of disease organisms as a means of warfare will have to consider the question of how to produce a destructive epidemic in the forces of an opponent and at the same time protect one's own forces from invasion by the virulent organisms in question," he declared.

"Certainly at the present time we know of no disease-producing micro-organisms that will respect uniform or insignia."

Taking the various diseases in order, Dr. Fox pointed out that while typhoid, cholera and dysentery have been familiar scourges of both armies and civilian populations in the past, modern sanitation measures and immunisation have practically wiped them out as weapons of warfare.

It might be possible to contaminate a civilian water reservoir, he added, but the effect would be purely local, and it would be almost impossible to contaminate the water or milk supply of any large army unit.

The germs of these diseases are with us all the time, and the only reason we do not have epidemics is that we are either vaccinated against them or are protected by such public health measures as pasturized milk and filtered or chlorinated water.

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Infection of military units with these diseases "would probably prove entirely ineffective because modern water purification methods and the close supervision of the water supply will absolutely preclude the successful employment of this means of combat," Dr. Fox declared.

Smallpox is no problem in the bacterial warfare picture since every man in the armed forces not previously immunized is vaccinated on induction, just as he is immunized against typhoid fever.

Epidemics of influenza, the common cold, pneumonia and meningitis have been mentioned in "scare stories" of the dangers of bacteria in wartime, he added, but again these are germs and viruses which are always with us.

"I do not know of a bacteriologist or an epidemiologist who can tell you how to start a respiratory epidemic," he said, "unless the stage is especially set" by poor hygienic conditions, overcrowding, poor ventilation and exposure to unfavorable climatic conditions or other factors which decrease resistance.

When such conditions exist, as they do now on the Russian-German front, disease outbreaks are certain to occur and kill or incapacitate more men on both sides than bullets.

Not enough is known about the viruses of the common cold or influenza to handle them as a war weapon, Dr. Fox declared, and the tiny organism which causes epidemic meningitis is so small and delicate that it must be handled carefully under carefully controlled conditions and then must be introduced directly to the mucous membranes of the nose or throat.

Bubonic plague has often been mentioned as a war pestilence, which it has often been in the past, but it is a weapon with a reverse spin since infected rats set loose on an enemy would quickly infect the army which started it in motion.

Likewise typhus, transmitted from rats to men by the body louse, would promptly bounce back on the army which used it when the first prisoner carrying the disease-infected body louse mingled with his captors.

The tough spore-forming germs such as those which cause tetanus, gas gangrene and anthrax are the greatest problem in warfare, Dr. Fox declared, "but they do not produce epidemic diseases and they are not communicable."

Tetanus germs are present in the soil in incalculable numbers, he added, but today serum is available to combat it before infection occurs.

In the case of infection with the bacillus welchii, which causes gas gangrene, new drugs and treatments have removed the dread of this disease, and even if a retiring army sowed the battlefield with these germs it would have little effect on an invading army.

Infection of wounds with anthrax is practically unknown, and human epidemic anthrax is unknown since the days of Louis Pasteur, who first investigated the disease, Dr. Fox declared.

It is of course possible, he added, to use such materials as the toxin of the bacillus botulinus, the most deadly substance known to man, one drop of which would be enough to kill an entire company within a few hours if taken in food, injected, or even dropped into the nose or throat.

However, it is difficult to make, difficult to handle, and its use against troops is almost an impossibility with the strict regulations and inspections imposed.

"Such statements as an airplane destroying an entire city with toxine is ridiculous," Dr. Fox said.

"I consider that it is highly questionable if biologic agents are suited for warfare. Certainly at the present time practically insurmountable technical difficulties prevent the use of biologic agents as effective weapons of warfare."

On November 20, 1940, a suggestion was received from a confidential informant who is a civilian engineer that the water supply of any city of fair size could be contaminated by disease-producing organisms through the installation of suitably located back pressure pumping systems which would be distributed at certain points in the city and suitably synchronized. He further suggested that these back pressure pumps would not have to be of large size and could be located in almost any house or building that had a water supply and was in a fair proximity to a large water main.

It is generally considered that, should great quantities of disease-producing germs be introduced in the above manner or otherwise placed in water used for drinking purposes, the superabundance of germs would override the water purification measures resulting in sporadic cases appearing and probably an epidemic of the disease from the organisms which were reproduced. Some of the more important and most likely germs considered are those which cause typhoid, paratyphoid, bacillary dysentery, and cholera. It would appear that the same purpose might be served by the introduction of these same types of organisms into a milk supply prior to distribution, and likewise the introduction of these germs on raw vegetables and fruits which are eaten raw.

The Bureau has been advised confidentially by an authoritative source that one of the greatest dangers in civilian sabotage by disease organisms is the disease of yellow fever. It is to be noted that there are no cases of yellow fever in this country, nor have there been for many years. The introduction of yellow fever into this country by accidental means was considered by at least one of the foremost bacteriologists several years ago. He lost his life in the disappearance of a clipper on his way into the tropics to make a study of this topic which he considered of vital importance.

Yellow fever is caused by a filterable virus and is transmitted by a species of mosquito commonly known as the yellow fever mosquito, which is a common inhabitant of this country particularly in the southern sections bordering on the Gulf.

Two other potentially dangerous diseases which, according to confidential authorities, might lend themselves to sabotage against the war effort are rinderpest, a disease of animals which has never been introduced in this country and which is confined to tropical Africa, and a plant disease which affects potatoes and is known as potato blight.

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A review of the book entitled "Sabotage" by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, which was published in September of 1942, discloses the following data:

The complete record of sabotage carried out by Chernov, supposedly of the German Intelligence Service, in Russia during 1930 to 1936 is too long to put into the book according to the authors, but includes—Killing off pedigree breed-stock and raising cattle mortality by artificially infecting cattle with various kinds of bacteria—Effecting a shortage of serum to counteract epidemics of anthrax so that, in one instance, 25,000 horses perished as a result of Chernov's sabotage—Infecting tens of thousands of pigs with erysipelas and with certain plagues by having virulent bacteria placed in medicinal sera.

In another point, the authors have asked the question: "Could such wholesale sabotage of agriculture as took place in the Soviet Union take place in the United States of America?" They then answer the question that, regardless of how fantastic it might sound, such diabolical sabotage was actually practiced by German saboteurs in 1915 in the United States of America.

Anton Dilger, a German-American medical graduate from Johns Hopkins University, was in Germany when the First World War broke out. He offered his services to the Kaiser, and was promptly detailed by Colonel Nicolai to do secret service work in the United States. Dilger returned to America with a supply of cultures of glanders and anthrax germs. Financed by von Papen, he set up a laboratory in Chevy Chase, near Washington, and started breeding germs on a large scale for infecting mules, horses, and cattle awaiting shipment to the Allies.

This man then organized a band of some twelve assistants to travel around the country, carrying Dilger's germs in small glass phials stoppered with corks through which a needle extended. This roving band jabbed their deadly needles into the livestock.

They also spread germs by placing them in fodder and drink. Thousands of soldiers, as well as horses and cattle, died as a result of Dilger's germs. At last Dilger revolted against his mission of silent death. He was murdered by German spies a few months before the end of the war.

"Could it happen here? It did happen here!"

The authors do not give their source of information on this story.

In Chapter IV, entitled "Tokyo Terrorists," the authors go into the Black Dragon Society and the efforts of Japan to obtain information in various ways. They reproduce a copy of the letter dated June 28, 1934, from the Japanese Consulate, K. Kagayama, to Mr. H. A. Van Norman, the chief

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engineer and general manager of the Los Angeles Bureau of Water Works and Supply, which was nothing more than a polite request from the Japanese Consulate for information concerning the Los Angeles water supply, number of consumers, filtering process, etc. A copy of this letter was turned over to the FBI by Mr. Norman, who also consulted the military authorities at that time. (The reviewer has seen sometime in years past a copy of this letter in the Files of the FBI.)

Dr. Martin Gumpert, reported to be the former head of the Berlin City Dispensary, is credited with certain statements in a book on sabotage published by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In this, it is reported that Hitler was experimenting with the use of disease-producing organisms such as tularaemia which, it was contemplated, would be refrigerated and thrown from airplanes on civilian populations in the prosecution of the war. He has apparently quoted extracts from an official German army journal published in September, 1939, which discussed the possibilities of unleashing disease-laden germs upon the civilian populations in France and Great Britain. The irreconcilable statement that tularaemia, for which there is no possibility of treatment or vaccination, could be spread by dropping refrigerated flies and lice by airplane is also reported to be Dr. Gumpert's. He is further credited with stating that Hitler's secret weapon may be "horrible bacteria warfare that Hitler might not hesitate to unleash when he finds himself at bay."

Dr. Gumpert has made the statement that his information on the subject was derived from material which he has read since arriving in the United States in 1936; that he never heard the subject discussed while in Germany, nor did he know of any instances in which Hitler had actually employed bacteria in waging war or experimented with their use.

Dr. Gumpert has been in this country since 1936 and is reported to be seeking citizenship and to be practicing medicine in New York City. His last reported residence was 315 E. 63th Street and his office, 3 E. 74th Street. He has previously cooperated with the FBI.

See also "The Bacteriological War" by Von O. Hartmann, Norwegian Medical Journal "Med. 42, 45" (1938 Norwegian), also reported to have been published in "Der Deutsche Militärarzt" for September, 1939. See also "Der Deutsche Militärarzt", p. 434 of the September, 1939, issue, Volume 9. See also "The Voice of Destruction" by Hermann Rauschning.

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DATE 10-3-2018 BY SP/AS/JSC

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ENCLOSURE

There is set out below an article written by Dr. Martin Gumpert entitled "Is a War of Bacteria Possible?" It is to be noted that the article consists largely of Dr. Gumpert's thoughts and comments regarding the article, "The Bacteriological War," which was summarized in "Der Deutsche Militärarzt." It is to be noted that even though Dr. Martin Gumpert was reportedly the former head of the Berlin City Dispensary, nothing is known of his ability in the field of bacteriology and public health. In the consideration of some of the statements made by Dr. Gumpert in his article, the amount of weight which should be applied is highly speculative.

IS A WAR OF BACTERIA POSSIBLE

Hitler makes mysterious insinuations about new frightful weapons with which he intends to annihilate his opponents. In making these statements has he in mind the war of bacteria, is this awful possibility, to which reference is made again and again, more than a devilish Utopia, is such a war of bacteria actually thinkable and feasible?

There were times during which pestilence and cholera devastated the world. These epidemics ravaged more momentously and more cruelly, than wars with large casualty lists. Old people, women, children fell victims to them indiscriminately. By tremendous efforts and at great pains humanity has conquered these enemies. We owe it to measures of hygiene and the findings of medical research that the most dangerous epidemics today hardly constitute a threat to the civilized parts of the world.

Only a diseased brain could evolve the thought of misusing the progress of science and its heroic discoveries: not to prevent epidemics but to engender their outbreak.

Undoubtedly everyone has heard or read of the "war of bacteria" now and then, the fewest among us have been able to form any definite conception of it. Only a small minority divines that the "war of bacteria" is the most horrible, the most criminal weapon that the urge to destroy on the part of man has ever conceived. No imagination suffices to visualize the reality of this threat. That this threat is to be taken seriously, that it can be carried out and that forces are

now at work to convert it into actuality, we learn unequivocally from the work of Captain O. Hartmann, reported in the magazine "Der Deutsche Militärarzt" (The German Army Physician) (Year IV, Vol. 9, page 434, September 1939).

It is a shaking experience to read this work, that considers the possibilities of the use of bacteria as a weapon in warfare, in the manner of objective and sober scientific report. At first you believe that you are learning something new about a new medical treatment in combatting epidemics and only gradually do you realize, that it is not the meaning of this work to describe a new manner of healing, but a new manner of merciless annihilation.

At first the significance of epidemics in former wars is referred to. Undoubtedly the idea of the war of bacteria is traceable to a circumstance almost totally unknown, namely that the fate of a war is decided far more by the amount of disease than by the number of wounded. That at least has been the case in all the wars fought up to the present. In the American Civil War the ratio of wounded to diseased was 1:3.7 and in the last World War it was 1:3.8. The thought is therefore obvious, in this "total" war of the present, to augment the number of diseased on the enemy's side by means of artificial interference to such an extent that his activity and his fitness as a combatant is decisively impaired.

Captain Hartmann warns against depreciation of the bacteriological attack, since future wars would renounce no manner of attack whatsoever and since the further development of bacteriology has created the best possibilities for this manner of attack.

The attack by means of bacteria will in all probability be directed principally against the civilian population. Application at the front would only be expedient, if their own troops had previously been protected by inoculation from contagion by the same bacteria used in the attack.

With the most minute detail the various groups of germs are discussed that may be considered for mass dissemination. Bacteria that necessitate direct contact between the carrier and the object of attack or which must be transferred directly to wound surfaces, are unsuitable for the war of bacteria, because the likelihood of infection is not great or because the technical difficulties are too great. For these reasons wound infection by means of bullets infected with pus germs, spleen gangrene, tetanus and gas gangrene is not practicable. Likewise, the transfer of the germs of venereal diseases might not be practicable.

Great difficulties are also foreseen in the case of infectious diseases, where infection takes place via the air route through the respiratory organs. Among these are grippe, pneumonia, meningitis, diphtheria, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, small pox, and poliomyelitis. On the one hand the technical to be overcome in the breeding of the germs of these diseases are too great; on the other hand, it will not be possible to manufacture bacteria cultures whose virulence is strong enough to accomplish their work of destruction surely.

Gradually it becomes clear to us what demands bacteria must fulfill in order to function properly in warfare: it must be possible to breed them easily in huge masses, the bacteria cultures must possess a high and durable virulence, it must be possible to transfer them readily and unnoticed, and they must breed diseases against which there is no protection and for which there are practically no remedial possibilities.

Seen from these viewpoints, the germs through which infection is effected by way of the gastric channel already behave in a far more military manner. Among them are typhoid, paratyphoid, cholera, amoeba- and bacillus dysentery. The germs of dysentery are considered as particularly valuable. Why? Protective vaccinations may be employed against the other members of this group. Dysentery, however, enjoys the privilege that so far it has been impossible to immunize against it; besides, it can easily be caught through infected flies and other insects.

In the war of bacteria diseases will rise to honor, that thus far have only been encountered rarely on the European continent. Obviously it is advantageous to the strategy of bacteria, if the diseases that are bred have so far been little known to the population; the panic is increased, the possibilities of protection and defense dwindle. Thus malta fever is recommended, also known as undulant fever or Brucellensis, that is somewhat prevalent in some parts of the United States, in Texas and New Mexico. It is carried through animals and the specific medical treatment has so far shown visible successes only in chronic cases. The Weil disease may be placed in the same category, which latter disease has appeared in New York so far only in three cases. It is carried through rats. In this instance treatment also is almost powerless.

Particular military significance in the war of bacteria is attributed to rabbit fever: "It is particularly adapted because of its extraordinary infectious qualities with a lack of specific therapy."

Rabbit fever has been almost unknown in Europe up to the present, while in the United States and in Japan it plays an important part. It is carried from diseased rabbits, squirrels, rats, and mice by means of flies and insects to human beings and is an extremely lingering, painful and dangerous disease. Spreading it in epidemic form in densely populated residential districts would be a capital crime against humanity. "The spreading of malaria must be reckoned with," the paper continues. Malaria has already increased during and after the world war in Central Europe because it was continually being carried in from the south-eastern fronts and because the Anophelis-fly, the intermediate-carrier of malaria, has its hotbeds in Central Europe also. It would indeed be easy to accomplish an epidemic-like spreading of malaria in Europe by means of a bacteriological attack. "The infection of spotted fever is absolutely possible, because the breeding of infected lice is controlled." So the report in the magazine "Deutscher Militärarzt" sets forth. Spotted fever, as it is well known, is only carried through lice. During the last war thousands were the victims of this terrible disease. Since lice may be counted among the greatest winners of a war, and since the fact that the civilian population is more affected in this war will lead to a far quicker failure of all hygienic precautions than in 1914-1918, it will hardly be necessary to call upon artificial help to experience the outbreak of an epidemic of spotted fever. The contemplation, however, that the fliers of bombers in this new war will shower millions of infected lice on the suffering countries instead of explosives is more horrible and more grotesque than the visions of Dante's Inferno.

"The infection with pestilence through rats seems less likely; on the other hand the danger of dissemination of pestilence cultures which are easily manufactured is considerably greater." During the entire duration of the last war, pestilence did not break out in a single spot, not even on the Asiatic fronts. If the enemies of humanity should succeed in letting loose a new epidemic of pestilence all over the earth, this would be the most atrocious crime in world history.

As far as the technical procedure in the spreading of epidemics in the war of bacteria is concerned, we learn that the plane would in all probability be the medium of attack and that infection would be brought about by throwing off and dispersing of bacteria cultures. In order to insure the "safe" landing of these devilish substances, they would be mixed with indifferent and specifically heavy substances. Still another ingenious method is mentioned. Flies become rigid at a temperature of 10° Celsius. Thus a tremendous quantity of infected flies may be placed in a plane. The "cooled" flies are thrown off like ballast and upon landing in a warmer temperature again become capable of moving - and attacking. Dissemination via the espionage route is also referred to.

"The attack is primarily to be expected against thickly populated cities." Thus the article closes. It seems like a bad dream and if one had not seen it black on white before one's very eyes, one would consider this objective presentation of an insane and infamous plan impossible. There is still the hope that none of the belligerent powers has put it into effect or ever will. For bacteria knows no nations, no boundaries, no political phantoms. They know only one enemy: humanity, the inhabitants of our earth. In the most frightful manner this barbaric weapon should strike back at him who dares to put it to use.

Since no madness is impossible in these wretched times, when the fate of millions is subject to the fancies and notions of a few, it is imperative that steps be taken to safeguard mankind from this extreme madness. Anyone who knowingly and notoriously becomes an accomplice in this war of bacteria should be punished as a marauder and murderer and should not enjoy the protection of a legitimate combatant. Acquiescence in this or a similar agreement should be demanded of every nation simultaneously with a solemn obligation to renounce the war of bacteria in every form. The Red Cross or any other neutral organization could accept these declarations.

It is a far cry from the alleged poisoning of wells of the middle ages to the throwing off of bacteria from planes of this day and age. Civilization must be spared the disgrace that the great deeds of her progress have led to nothing more than back to the road of the most sinister and inhuman barbarism.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/2/90 BY SPINOSO
307009

THE BACTERIOLOGICAL WAR by O. Hartmann.

Norse Journal of Military Medicine (Vol.) 42,
(Page) 45 and German Synopsis (page) 52 (1938)
(In Norwegian)

After a reference to the importance of epidemics in former wars (there is given a) warning against underestimation of bacteriological attack, since in a war of the future every manner of attack will probably be seized upon and the further development of bacteriology could furnish better possibilities herefor than those of that time. The attack will apparently be directed chiefly against the civil population, insofar as one's own troops cannot be protected against contagion by immunization - during use at the front. Of the various possibilities for infection the direct infection of wounds by means of pus excitors, anthrax, tetanus and gas burns through infected projectiles is considered to be infeasible in practice; likewise a transmission of the causes of sexual diseases is out of question.

There are difficulties as to breeding or intensification of virulence against the use of diseases transmissible by air such as grippe, pneumonia, meningitis, diphtheria, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, smallpox and poliomyelitis. On the other hand the infections occurring by way of the stomach-intestinal-canal such as typhus, paratyphus, amoebic and bacillary dysentery and cholera are very usable, especially however dysentery as up to the present immunization against it (has been) impossible. In connection with this attention is called to the possibility of transmission by means of infected flies and other insects. Also Malta fever and Bang's disease, which are transmitted from animal to man, can be used under (certain) conditions, likewise Weil's Disease by means of infected rats. More importance is to be attributed to tularemia however, as it is especially suitable, (having) exceptional contagiousness together with a lack of a specific therapy. A spread of malaria must also be considered, also the transmission of spotted typhus is completely possible, as the production of infected lice in great numbers has been mastered.

Infection with pestilence by means of rats seems less apparent, on the other hand the danger of dissemination of pestilence-cultures, which can be easily produced, is in reality larger. Also virus infections are possible, the transmission of parrot fever (being) especially easy. As means of attack the airplane will apparently be used and the infection result from the throwing down or strewing of cultures (which will be) probably mixed with indifferent substances of heavier specific gravity or from infected flies which are kept immovable at 10° centigrade. The distribution by espionage practices is also alluded to. Attack is to be expected soonest against thickly populated cities.

100-93216-337
ENCLOSURE

AJT:mc

100-93216-36

December 30, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR MAIL

Conf. Inf.

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Re:

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b7D

Reference is made to the report of [redacted] dated November 18, 1942, your communication [redacted] relative to the above captioned matter.

A review of this report reveals [redacted]

b6
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b7D

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. T. _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____ **APR 2**
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon **HAN** **1:10 P.M.**
Mr. Kehoe _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Case originated at

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

File No. 100-9518

Report made at SAN FRANCISCO	Date 11-27-42	Period 11-20-42	Report made by [redacted]
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b7C

Title POSSIBILITY OF <u>BACTERIAL WARFARE SALE</u> OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE	Character INTERNAL SECURITY (J)
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SYNOPSIS:

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-c ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3/8/00 BY B621AGSC

REFERENCES: Bureau File 100-93216.
 Letter from Bureau dated September 24, 1942.
 Report of Special Agent [redacted] dated August 24, 1942
 at San Francisco.

b6

b7C

DETAILS: AT SALINAS, CALIF.

b6 The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent
 [redacted]

b7C

Approved &
Forwarded

- 1 - Bureau
 2 - ONI, San Francisco
 3 - G-2, San Francisco
 4 - Seattle, Inf.
 5 - San Francisco

SAC [Signature]	Do not write in this space RECORDED
100-93216-37 b INDEXED D	
10 DEC 5 1942	

typed

50 JAN 14 1943

512-221

COPY IN FILE ek
 50 JAN 14 1943

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[REDACTED] attempted to contact the original informant [REDACTED]. He ascertained at that address that [REDACTED] had recently [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not at home at the time of

the Agent's call at the latter address but [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] supplied the information that [REDACTED] could be reached at [REDACTED]

Inquiry at the [REDACTED] brought the information that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

AT OAKLAND, CALIF.:

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In view of the fact that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] have been

set out in reference report, further investigation is being discontinued upon authority of the Special Agent in Charge.

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- CLOSED -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-03 BY 60267 uc/nuc/bja/prm

100-93216-38

CANCEL

216

M.V.P.B.

363

EPO:EGK

November 30, 1942

THE DIRECTOR

Re: November Committee Meetings -
Radio Intelligence Committee
Joint Cryptanalysis Committee
Bacteriological Warfare Committee
Committee VIII of the Board of
War Communications
Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee
Special Committee on Truth Serum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 ugm/dlp/jpm

b6

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[redacted] who serves on the committees listed, reports the following activities for November, 1942:

Radio Intelligence Committee: An informal committee consisting of British Security, Federal Communications Commission, Army, Coast Guard, Navy, and FBI representatives met every Tuesday during November for routine exchange of technical information.

Joint Cryptanalysis Committee: A committee consisting of FBI, Army, and Navy representatives, serving under the Joint Intelligence Conference, held no meetings during November. This is the second successive month in which no meetings have been held by this committee. A recent conversation with [redacted] was had in which he indicated that he is going to look into the committee to see why this committee, of which he is chairman by right of rank, is not functioning. There seems to be a reluctance on the part of the Navy exists for some unknown reason.

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ORIGINAL FILE

b6

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Bacteriological Warfare Committee: This is [redacted] committee to which [redacted] has been invited to attend. No meetings were held in November.

Committee VIII of the Board of War Communications: [redacted] serves on this committee and no meetings were held in November.

Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee: [redacted] serves as a technical advisor.

Mr. Tracy meeting was held in November. This was not attended by [redacted] inasmuch as

Mr. Riddle was no pressing FBI business before the Board.

Mr. Nichols [redacted]

Special Committee on Truth Serum: Two meetings were held during November at the National Academy of Sciences. Detailed reports have been prepared. Additional meetings will be held to formulate a program. This committee work was started under Mr. Carson [redacted] at the instigation of WIB of the Army.

Mr. Coffey [redacted]

Mr. Hendon [redacted]

Mr. Kramer [redacted]

Mr. McGuire [redacted]

Mr. Quinn Tamm [redacted]

Mr. Nease [redacted] DEC 23 1942 352

Miss Gandy [redacted]

E. J. Tracy

INITIALS

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECORDED

SEARCHED

INDEXED

FILED

Second Copy

KPG:EGK

November 30, 1942

THE DIRECTOR

Re: November Committee Meetings -
Radio Intelligence Committee
Joint Cryptanalysis Committee
Bacterial Warfare Committee
Committee VIII of the Board of
War Communications
Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee
Special Committee on Truth Serum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uc/mle/jpmu

Mr. Coffey, who serves on the committees listed, reports the following activities for November, 1942:

Radio Intelligence Committee: An informal committee consisting of British Security, Federal Communications Commission, Army, Coast Guard, Navy, and FBI representatives met every Tuesday during November for routine exchange of technical information.

Joint Cryptanalysis Committee: A committee consisting of FBI, Army, and Navy representatives, serving under the Joint Intelligence Conference, held no meetings during November. This is the second successive month in which no meetings have been held by this committee. A recent conversation with Colonel Carter Clarke was had in which he indicated that he is going to look into the committee to see why this committee, of which he is chairman by right of rank, is not functioning. There seems to be a possibility that a reluctance on the part of the Navy exists for some unknown reason.

Bacterial Warfare Committee: This is George Merck's committee to which Mr. Coffey has been invited to attend. No meetings were held in November.

Mr. Committee VIII of the Board of War Communications: Mr. Coffey serves on this committee and no meetings were held in November.

Mr. Glass Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee: Mr. Coffey serves as a technical advisor. One meeting was held in November. This was not attended by Mr. Coffey inasmuch as there was no pressing FBI business before the Board.

Mr. Nichols Special Committee on Truth Serum: Two meetings were held during November at the National Academy of Sciences. Detailed reports have been prepared. Additional meetings will be held to formulate a program. This committee work was started under Mr. Coffey at the National Academy of Sciences at the instigation of MIB of the Army.

Mr. Hendon _____

Mr. Kramer _____

Mr. McGuire _____

Mr. Quinn Tamm _____

Mr. Nease _____

Miss Gandy _____

Respectfully,

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FILE

S. J. Tracy

INFO-AF

November 10, 1942

THE DIRECTOR

Re: October Committee Meetings -
Radio Intelligence Committee
Joint Cryptanalysis Committee
Bacteriological Warfare Committee
Committee VIII of the Board of
War Communications
Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60247/ichus/bp/jpm

b6

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[redacted] who serves on the committees listed, reports the following activities for October, 1942:

Radio Intelligence Committee: An informal committee consisting of British Security, Federal Communications Commission, Army, Coast Guard, Navy and FBI representatives met every Tuesday during October for routine exchange of technical information.

Joint Cryptanalysis Committee: A committee consisting of FBI, Army and Navy representatives, serving under the Joint Intelligence Conference, held no meetings during October. The acting chairman of the committee, Commander Wanger of the Navy, has indicated that the committee feels that a further directive from the Joint Intelligence Conference, setting forth explicitly the duties of the committee, is necessary before additional meetings are held. He states he is attempting to obtain this directive.

Bacteriological Warfare Committee: This is [redacted] committee to which [redacted] has been invited. One luncheon meeting was held during October.

The protection of municipal water supplies of the nation was discussed.

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. E. A. Tamm _____

Mr. Glass _____

Mr. Glavin _____

Mr. Ladd _____

Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Rosen _____

Mr. Tracy _____

Mr. Carson _____

Mr. Coffey _____

Mr. Hendon _____

Mr. Kramer _____

Mr. McGuire _____

Mr. Quinn Tamm _____

Mr. Nease _____

Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED

100-73216-40

Respectfully, DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION

11/16/42

S. J. Tracy, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 1

FILE

ORIGINAL SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION

KCH:SB
1600390002
12-1-42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL AGENT EDGAR

b6
b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY *60267 uc/nue/bja/Phar*
ON 11-13-03

Brigadier General [redacted]
General Staff
Chief, Military Intelligence Service
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Kronert:

There are transmitted herewith for your information
and whatever consideration deemed appropriate, copies of a
communication addressed to this Bureau by [redacted]

[redacted]
b6
b7C

The correspondent has been advised of this reference.

Very truly yours,

RECORDED *Hoover* FILED
&
INDEXED *D. E. H.*
John Edgar Hoover
DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEC 5 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Enclosure

b6

cc - Rear Admiral [redacted] b7C
Director of Naval Intelligence
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION Navy Department
MAILED Washington, D. C.
★ DEC 1 1942 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SAC

RECORDEE

TDB:GWH

100-93216-42

Transcribed January 6, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

b6

b7C

[REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the Administrator
Federal Security Agencies
327 National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C.

Dear [REDACTED]

In line with our previous conversation, I am transmitting to you herewith a photostatic copy of an article, the authorship and name of the publication of which are not known. The original of this article consisted of a clipping and was submitted to this Bureau anonymously.

No investigation of any kind is being undertaken on this matter by this Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson Enclosure

Mr. E. A. Tamm

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Glavin

Mr. Ladd

Mr. Nichols

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Carson

Mr. Coffey

Mr. Hendon

Mr. Kramer

Mr. McGuire

Mr. Harbo

Mr. Quinn Tamm

Mr. [REDACTED] JAN 20 1943

Miss Gandy

DECLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED]
ON 11-3-03


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
F B I

RECEIVED READING ROOM
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 13 JAN 8 AM '43 8 JAN 8 PM

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

00596

5
ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
KEEP ENVELOPE ATTACHED



RECORDED
&
INDEXED

172

60-93515-42

DEC 1 1942 E.C.

FIVE CENTS

A rectangular stamp with handwritten text. At the top is "60-93515-42". In the center is "DEC 1 1942 E.C.". At the bottom is "FIVE CENTS". A signature is written across the bottom of the stamp.

1 ENCL.
231
232
233

ONE

There is a new professorship at the University of Berlin, and the new professor, Dr. Ewald Banse, teaches military science. He is the author of a book on that subject. Wishing to check up on him, a Saarbrück editor opened it the other day and read, "Inasmuch as England believes in starving an enemy and inasmuch as gas and the horrible effects of modern artillery have robbed war of all its chivalry, biology will be justified in enabling it to exterminate entire nations.

"We shall have recourse to the poisoning of drinking water with typhus germs, to the introduction and spreading of typhus by means of fleas, and to the spreading of cholera by artificially contaminated rats."

Reading on, the Saarbrück editor found Dr. Banse saying, "By landing in an enemy country, aviators can disseminate the deadly germs, and the results will be particularly favorable," while another passage, now reprinted like the foregoing in the Saarbrück *Freiheit*, asseverates, "Certainly, biological warfare is the kind appropriate for disarmed nations. When a race is driven to desperation, its only way out is to attempt the seemingly impossible and, without the smallest regard for international law, consider good all the means—yes, all—by which it may defend itself."

As was sure to happen, these paragraphs caught the attention of a French journalist, who translated them, so Dr. Banse got front-page publicity, with liberal italics, in *Le Figaro*. Then it is questioned whether universities should have professorships of military science and whether, in case they do, a more dangerous professor than Dr. Banse could be found.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uo/mw/bja/jmc

100-43216-42

ENCLOSURE

TDB:BF
65-3304

January 9, 1943

MEMORANDUM

A laboratory operated by a Japanese national, supposedly for the preparation of quinine, was searched, after the necessary papers were secured, by authorities together with an expert bacteriologist.

The laboratory was found to be much better equipped than one used solely for the manufacture of quinine. Much of the material was not at all necessary for the manufacture of quinine. A considerable amount of equipment had not, at the time of the search, been removed from its original wrappings consisting of Japanese newspapers. It was the bacteriologist's belief, from an examination of the equipment in the laboratory, that it had been used, illegally and without the necessary Government permission, in the manufacture of vaccines and medicines. Although there was material present for bacteriological research, the particular equipment used for research on yellow fever virus was not found. It appears that a peculiar type of test tube is used in connection with yellow fever research, which was not found present, and it was, therefore, assumed that no work was done in the laboratory on yellow fever cultures.

The laboratory and surroundings gave no indication of recent use. In one corner, some solutions were soaking, but they had probably been there for some time, according to the report. In a back room, there was found a stock of cascara bark for the making of quinine.

In all, nothing was found that would indicate that yellow fever cultures had been produced, but there was every indication that the laboratory was complete enough to be used for other types of bacteriological work. However, it was made quite certain that the laboratory was not being used, at the time it was searched, for any purpose whatsoever.

The laboratory in question was located in Ecuador and the Japanese operator is named Fermín Matukuru Masura.

42-12-43

TDB:BF

January 11, 1943

65-3304
754/43

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

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b7C

[REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the Administrator
of the Federal Security Agencies
327 National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C.

Dear [REDACTED]

As a result of our previous conversation, I am pleased to transmit herewith confidential information received from a South American informant.

The Bureau is endeavoring to obtain additional information in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

600885

Enclosure

Source of Information:

b6

b7C

Ecuador

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

M A E O 2

* JAN 12 1943 P.M.

RECORDED AND INDEXED
FEB 12 1943

RECEIVED MAIL ROOM
FEB 12 1943
E.H. H.
JAN 11 1943

Port au Prince, Haiti.
December 11, 1942.

b6
b7C

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/23/05 BY SP/MS

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated November 18, 1942, relative to any information coming to the writer's attention concerning the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy, and advising that "this request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly." This letter further advised "you are instructed to discuss this matter with our other representatives in the country to which you are assigned....."

By letter of October 13, 1942, the writer advised that this matter had been discussed with the Naval Attaché and the American Minister. However, it was not indicated at that time that the Bureau was interested in the matter, and it was thought more adviseable to discuss the matter with them than with any local officials under the same conditions, inasmuch as even a hint that the writer was interested would have caused rumors to fly thick and fast. Therefor, proceeding more cautiously, it was believed that the former procedure was adviseable, thus putting two other individuals on guard for any information available.

Another reason for this discussion was due to the second quotation above. At this time there were no other Bureau representatives in Haiti, and the use of the words "our other representatives" was interpreted as meaning representatives of the United States Government.

If the interpretation was badly taken, the writer assures the Bureau that it was taken in good faith, and not in order to violate instructions. C.I. S.I.S. #250

Very truly yours,

CC JAN 1 1943
127
Communication #231



JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



EPC:EGK

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CC-287

✓ Mr. Tolson
✓ Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
✓ Mr. Nichols _____
✓ Mr. Rosen _____
✓ Mr. Tracy _____
✓ Mr. Carson _____
✓ Mr. Coffee _____
✓ Mr. Hendon _____
✓ Mr. Kramer _____
✓ Mr. McGuire _____
✓ Mr. Harbo _____
✓ Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
✓ Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

December 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

RE: [redacted]

b6

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-15-05 BY 60267 UC/NME/bja/pbw

b6

[redacted] called at my office at three o'clock. He had intended to come over with [redacted] was tied up and could not come.

b7C

[redacted] of [redacted] special project on bacterial warfare.

[redacted] stated the principal purpose of his call was to get acquainted. He expressed appreciation for the information which has already been furnished to their organization by the FBI. He stated he was anxious to see it continued and he wanted us to know that they were interested in receiving every scrap of information on the subject, no matter how trivial it might appear to be.

b6

b7C

I told [redacted] that Mr. Hoover had reached such an agreement with [redacted] and had issued instructions that all material which we get of that nature be routed to [redacted]. I outlined to [redacted] the coverage of our agents in intelligence work.

I told [redacted] that I did think he should have a thorough understanding of the Bureau's jurisdiction responsibility and the method in which the FBI conducted investigations so that he could better evaluate the material furnished to him. I then outlined the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction in espionage and sabotage matters and pointed out to him that if the bacteria incident was one which would in any sense be suspected sabotage the FBI would immediately institute a full investigation and handle it as a sabotage matter unless, of course, it was on a military installation. I pointed out to him that for this reason [redacted] or himself need never wonder if the matter is being properly handled from the investigative standpoint. I then told him that we sometimes get crank letters and non-specific complaints which required no investigation and were retained for future reference purposes.. I also pointed out to him that there would be instances where the FBI would have to protect the source of its information for the reason that the information was obtained with the express understanding that the source be maintained confidential.

b6

b7C



55 DEC 28 1942

RECORDED
INDEXED
I tried to get [redacted]
Friday but he was
tied up.

100-93216-45
B.
18 DEC 24 1942

Memorandum for Mr. E. A. Tamm
Page Two

b6

b7C [redacted] expressed full accord and understanding in all these matters. He stated that he was hopeful of meeting the Director sometime in the near future and having a personal talk with him on the matter. He indicated that one of his biggest jobs was to "build up the case for the American people" so that if it became necessary to release an argument either for or against bacterial warfare, he would be prepared to do so.

Respectfully,

[redacted]

b6

b7C

EPCoffey/af
100-93216

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 UC/NWC/bja/mar

December 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM

Following is a copy of a letter dated November 1, 1942, received from [redacted] Copies have been furnished to the War and Navy Departments.

b6
b7C

"I have just finished reading a condensation of the book *Sabotage* by Michael Sayers & Albert Khan, in the October number of The Reader's Digest. From my many years of study of medical practice, and working with the microscope, I am wondering if your investigators have ever thought of the great opportunity of trying to wreck the health of our armed forces by sabotage laboratory workers? I know that many scientific medical workers are Germans.

"The recent report of Secretary Stimson, that 28,585 service men had been given jaundice, and 62 had DIED of it, resulting from the inoculation 'against' yellow fever, caused me to wonder! There is a chance for the greatest danger to health in all such inoculations, and it is impossible for the Army doctor to KNOW exactly what he is putting into the BLOOD of his victims! To begin with, it is FOOLISH to inoculate healthy men with such dangerous laboratory preparations to protect them from such a disease as yellow fever when there is no chance in one of many thousands ever getting it.

"Then they are given anti-tetanus inoculations--more stupidity! Healthy BLOOD does NOT develop lockjaw! I have had several typical tetanus wounds and have been carrying a bullet for over 40 years, but no tetanus.

"All these inoculations are foreign to the blood, and MUST be cast out, but medical fanaticism knows no limits, and so our service men are being 'vaccinated'—with God knows what, inoculated against typhoid, Mr. Tolsteanus, pneumonia and yellow-fever! All these by-products of disease are Mr. E. Aenough to wreck the health of any set of men!

Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Hore-Belisha, War Minister of England, had all these inoculations abolished in the British Army, Navy and Marine Corps in 1939, so
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Harboe _____
Mr. Quinn _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

b6
b7C

JAN 13 1943

Memorandum

"With the most careful microscopic inspection by two of our largest vaccine manufacturers, their product was contaminated with foot-and-mouth disease in 1908, and doctors were *vaccinating* children with it!

"A very little laboratory carelessness, deliberate, or not, could cause the deaths of many thousands of soldiers! This is the most vital spot I know of to start mischief!

"It was vigorous HEALTH that protected our race down through the past ages, when 'germs' were free for everybody, otherwise there would not be a human being alive upon this earth today!

"Army doctors can, unintentionally, wreck our war effort!"

Original of this memorandum forwarded to [redacted]
Special Asst to the Administrator of the Federal Security Agencies
327 Natl Academy of Sciences Bldg., 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington DC

b6

b7C

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

1945-3-10 2:00 P.M.
S. D. A.

1945-3-10 2:00 P.M.

S. D. A. 3-10 2:00 P.M.

MESSAGE

100-93216

December 26, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-03 BY 60267/alpha/bj/prm

WAR:wct

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC - San Francisco

RE: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE;
SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent [redacted] at San Francisco, California, August 24, 1942, in the above-entitled matter. Reference is also made to Bureau letters to your office dated September 24, 1942, November 3, 1942 and November 21, 1942.

b6

b7C

A check of the files of the Bureau indicates that you have not submitted a report covering the investigation requested in the undeveloped leads set out for your office in the report of Special Agent [redacted]. The files also indicate that you have failed to reply to any one of the Bureau letters to your office mentioned above.

If you have submitted a report in this matter subsequent to the report of Special Agent [redacted] or if you have replied to the Bureau letters mentioned above, I desire that you advise immediately the dates and captions of the reports or letters submitted so that they can be located in the Bureau files.

b6

b7C

If you have not submitted a subsequent report in this matter in accordance with previous Bureau instructions and if you have not furnished an explanation for your failure to do so, I desire that you immediately advise me of the reasons for your failure to act in this matter. I desire to know the name of the Agent to whom this case has been assigned, the date on which it was assigned to him and I further desire that a detailed explanation be submitted immediately of the reasons why this matter has been handled in such a hazardous and dilatory manner.

Mr. Tolson [redacted] 1 M 1 A 103 E D 6

Mr. E. A. Tamm [redacted] RECORD

Mr. Clegg [redacted]

Mr. Glavin [redacted]

Mr. Ladd [redacted]

Mr. Nichols [redacted]

Mr. Rosen [redacted]

Mr. Tracy [redacted]

Mr. Carson [redacted]

Mr. Coffey [redacted]

Mr. Hendon [redacted]

Mr. Kramer [redacted]


Mr. McGuire [redacted]

Mr. Quinn Tamm [redacted]

Mr. Nease [redacted]

Miss Gandy [redacted]

John Edgar Hoover
Director



LHP:tlc

December 21, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SIS#98

76 - 30-04-243

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated September 28, 1942, directing you to submit any information in your possession relative to bacteria warfare. Your attention was called to the light report dated May 10, 1942, which deals extensively with the matter of possible preparations on the part of the Axis Powers for bacteria warfare in Brazil. You were instructed to conduct investigation of the persons and places mentioned in the said report for the purpose of ascertaining the development of operations and the present activities of the persons mentioned therein in furtherance of the alleged plan to use bacteria as an instrument of war, and to submit a report.

A review of our files reflects that to date no report has been received from you in this matter. You are, therefore, instructed to complete your investigation and to submit an immediate report.

Very truly yours,

76 - 30-04-243
John Edgar Hoover, Director

76 - 30-04-243
DIAVIA DIPLOMATIC AIR POUCH
1942

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mrs. Carson _____
Mrs. Coffey _____
Mrs. Hendon _____
Mrs. Kramer _____
Mrs. McGuire _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Quisen Tamm _____
Mrs. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

76 - 30-04-243
cc

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Suite 1729 - 111 Sutter
San Francisco, Cal.
Jan. 2, 1943

CC 4347

JL
Director
FBI

Re: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE;
~~SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE~~

2

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated December 26, 1942, Bureau File 100-93216, wherein it was requested that the San Francisco office advise Bureau immediately whether a report had been submitted in this investigation subsequent to that of Special Agent [redacted] dated August 24, 1942. Please be advised that a closing report was submitted under date of 11/23/42 by Special Agent [redacted] under the title of the Bureau letter, making reference to the file number reflected on reference Bureau letter.

b6
b7C

In the event the Bureau is unable to locate the copies of that report, please be advised that four copies were retained in the files of the San Francisco Field office, and upon receipt of instructions to do so, the San Francisco office will forward appropriate copies thereof.

Very truly yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-08 BY 60267 uc/nmw/bja/pmc

N. J. L. PIEPER
SAC

b6
1/20 Tg

HLMc/fb
100-9518



COPY IN FILE

54 JAN 28 1943

RECORDED & INDEXED

100-93216-47
F B I
22 JAN 6 1943
831
FBI-LA

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Baltimore, Maryland
January 6, 1943

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 UC/MW/bja/pnw

Director, FBI

RE: ADVERTISEMENT IN BALTIMORE
"SUN", SEPTEMBER 20, 1942.

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter to the Baltimore Field Division dated October 1, 1942, requesting investigation be made as to the parties who were responsible for the insertion and reasons for the insertion in the newspaper, The Sun, Baltimore, Maryland, for September 20, 1942. ~~X~~ "WANTED WILD RATS. Will buy any number of live uninjured wild rats for 25¢, per rat. Hunterian Bldg., Madison & Wolfe Sts., 4th floor. Deliver between 8:30 A. M. & 5 P. M."

You are advised that contact was made with [redacted] of The Sun, Baltimore, Maryland, who revealed that this advertisement was placed by a [redacted] Johns Hopkins Hospital, this city. It was probably placed on the 19th of September, last and ran from September 20, 1942 to September 26, 1942. The advertisement was telephoned to that paper.

[redacted] Johns Hopkins Hospital, [redacted] Fourth Floor, Hunterian Building, Baltimore, Maryland advised that [redacted] was engaged in a study of rat poisons under a grant from the United States Government, and that the animals advertised for were necessary to carry on experiments in this work. She further stated that the advertisement proved fruitless.

In view of the above information, no further investigation is being conducted by this office.

Very truly yours,

E. A. SOUCY
Special Agent in Charge

55 MAR 5 1943

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

TSD:MCR
100-6827

FILE

b6

b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

DRM/trb
67-380

510 Industrial Trust Building
Providence, Rhode Island

November 25, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-03 BY 60267 UC/NCS/BJA/PAM

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

b6

b7C

Re: [REDACTED] Special Agent
Investigative Suggestion

I am transmitting herewith an original memorandum prepared by Special Agent [REDACTED] in which he suggests certain contacts and investigation in connection with a possible use of bacteria in the commission of sabotage.

It is suggested that the Bureau direct a letter of appreciation to Special Agent [REDACTED] for his suggestion.

b6

b7C

Yours truly,

Enc.

Dean R. Morley
Special Agent in Charge

100-93216-51

FILE COPY
216

FEDERAL BUREAU OF

Labor

Date

1/11

SEARCHED

307009

SERIALIZED

307009

	Room		Room
Mr. Tracy	31710	Mr. Nichols	5640
Mr. Carson	2266	Mr. Renneberger	-
Mr. Clegg	5256		114-B
Mr. Fitch	1262	Mr. Rosen	5734
Mr. Gatins	5252	Mr. E. Tamm	5734
Mr. Ladd	1742	Mr. Q. Tamm	7639
Single Finger-			7639
print	1420	6th Floor Files	
Mr. Little	1645	Personnel Files	4513
Mr. McGuire	4238	Chief Clerk	5519
		Mr.	

b6

b7C

Very interesting -
 note item 15 on last
 page - if this is for possible
 publication - should they
 not refrain from identifying
 persons not yet investigated
 or charged with crime?

[redacted] ROOM 7326

b6

b7C

Very interesting -
 Note item 15 on last page - if this is for
 possible publication - should they not refrain
 from identifying persons not yet investigated
 or charged with crime?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/7/90 BY SP/AS/CS

307009

EPC:EGK

RECORDED

700-93216-52

January 19, 1943

EX-4

b
bx

b6

b7C

Block 308

National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Dear [redacted]

I have reviewed the very interesting summary which you sent to Mr. Coffey under cover of January 8, 1943. This should make a useful item in your files for possible future use in the manner in which you indicate it.

I would like to offer the suggestion that the names of specific individuals under investigation but not yet prosecuted not be set forth in any data released. I notice on page ten of your summary the name of one individual who is the subject of an investigation by this Bureau.

Assuring you of my continued interest in this valuable piece of work and hopeful that the future will permit us to talk it over sometime, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Tolson

Mr. E. A. Tamm

Mr. Clegg

Mr. Glavin

Mr. Ladd

Mr. Nichols

Mr. Rosen

Mr. Tracy

Mr. Carson

Mr. Coffey

Mr. Hendon

Mr. Kramer

Mr. McGuire

Mr. Harbo

Mr. Quinn Tamm

Mr. Nease

Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 5

★ JAN 20 1943 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

54 FEB 5 1943

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS

DATE 3/7/90 BY SP1AG50

307009

JAN 26 1943

RECEIVED-MAILING ROOM

RECEIVED-READING ROOM

JAN 20 1943

RECEIVED-READING ROOM

CH. 60: 30

EW

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

January 20, 1943

TDB:MJC

b6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

b7C

Re: [redacted] Bacterial Warfare Project.
A Summary.

b6

1. b7C [redacted] was referred to you by [redacted] and met with your office on September 17, 1942 to explain the Bacterial Warfare Project and to request assistance in the form of information on the subject in the Bureau's files, from our Agents in this country and South America [redacted] and requested (S) the use of the Bureau to distribute and gather information on this subject.

b1

2. Subsequent to this meeting the following suggestions of yours and [redacted] were carried out:

A. A forty page summary of information on the project of Bacterial Warfare from the Bureau's files was placed in [redacted] hands.

b6

b7C

B. A three page summary on the subject [redacted] was furnished [redacted] (S)

b1

C. Information [redacted] (S) b1
was turned over to [redacted]

D. All information on the subject received throughout the Bureau was and is being routed to me for summarization and transmittal to [redacted] The proposed instructional program to our Agents discussed by you and [redacted] has received no further attention by [redacted] as yet. (I will follow him on this).

b6

E. [redacted] request of possibly utilizing the Bureau's field forces to collect and gather special information has not as yet been the subject of any special request by [redacted]

b6

b7C

3.

[redacted] called on me on October 15, 1942 and advised me that [redacted]

b6

b7C

[redacted] had been retained as Public Relations expert. We left here after a brief tour of the Bureau and met at luncheon with representatives

56 JAN 27 1943

11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted] b6 b7C AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 11-13-2020

RECORDED BY [redacted]
11-13-2020

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Page two
Memorandum for the Director

~~SECRET~~

of the Army, Navy, Public Health, and Surgeon General's Office of the U. S. Army. The purpose of that meeting was to discuss the safeguarding of water supplies to vital cities.

4. [redacted] has since been over and talked with me and has several times requested to see the Director.

b6

- b7C 5. Under cover of January 8, 1943 [redacted] sent over a ten page summary for review of an article to be presented for publication in the event it becomes necessary to explain to the people the necessity for the Bacterial Warfare Research Committee. It has been suggested to [redacted] that the names of specific individuals under investigation by the Bureau not be set out before prosecutive action has been completed.

6. On January 14, 1943 the Bacterial Warfare Committee met in [redacted] office. Representatives of the Surgeon General's Office, Chemical Warfare Service, Navy, U. S. Public Health Service, Office of Strategic Services, Warfare Diseases Laboratory of Canada and the Office of Scientific Research and Development were represented. [redacted] represented the FBI. The meeting was devoted to a discussion of the use of disease germs in offensive warfare and sabotage. An outline of the progress thus far was given and several problems for practical consideration were discussed.

b6

7. All this time a number of current abstracts of reports received in the FBI on this general subject have been forwarded to [redacted]

b7C

During the period [redacted] has also made several minor requests for information which has been furnished him. About the only one of significance concerned his desire to learn the available quantity of a little used drug ricin, from Eimer and Amend in New York, the basic substance of castor oil and is very poisonous. The information has been furnished.

Respectfully,

[redacted]

b6

b7C

~~SECRET~~

TDB:MJC:EGK

100-93216-37

January 16, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/NAC/BPA/PAW
ON 11-13-03

[REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the Administrator
of the Federal Security Agencies
327 National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

b6

b7C

Dear [REDACTED]

I am transmitting to you herewith a memorandum
containing highly confidential information which I believe
will be of interest to you.

An investigation of this matter is being
undertaken by Special Agents of this Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

RECORDED
INDEXED
D149

John Edgar Hoover
Director

100-93216-54


2	JAN 20 1943	1943
1226	1943	1943
FBI - SAN FRANCISCO		

ENCLOSURE

100-93216-54

100-93216-54

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Kramer
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy



Source of Information:
Report from San Francisco Field Office

6 w
TDB from
hyp m

January 15, 1943

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-19-03 BY 60269 uc/mcc/bja/mar

MEMORANDUM

Confidential informant advised [redacted]

b7D

Another confidential informant, [redacted]

During the investigation of this matter the Endo pharmacy, 107 Lake Street, Salinas, was contacted and at the time of the contact there were four or five Japanese in the store discussing some matter in the Japanese language. Later [redacted] advised they had been discussing [redacted]

b6

b7C

b7D

[redacted] showed no great interest in typhoid vaccine. [redacted] had recently purchased a large quantity of typhoid vaccine. [redacted]

[redacted] the Savemore Drug Store, 104 Market Street, Salinas, it was learned that there had been a recent purchase of a large quantity of typhoid vaccines reportedly for the purpose of immunizing families.

b6

b7C

b7D

Information obtained from wholesale drug firms in San Francisco revealed that not any had sold any unusually large amount of typhoid serum to Japanese drug stores as indicated by an examination of their books.

b6

b7C

b7D

[redacted] bought enough oral vaccine to immunize two to three hundred persons.

b6

b7C

b7D

ENCLOSURE

100 - 93216-54

JBL:ECR

January 16, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR POUCH

Mr. Arthur M. Thurston
c/o American Embassy
London, England

Dear Sir:


Your attention is invited to my letter dated December 12, 1942, requesting that you endeavor to obtain the separate memorandum being prepared by [redacted] with regard to bacterial sabotage. It is desirable that this information be forwarded at the earliest practicable date.

Very truly yours,

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nme/bpc/prm
ON 11-13-03

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Mr. Hendon MAILLED 86
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire JAN 18 1943 P.M.
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Nease U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Miss Gandy _____



U. S. GOVERNMENT RECEIVED RECORDED
RECEIVED 17-13157-1
6th MAILING ROOM
JAN 18 1943

53 FEB 8 1943

Page two
Memo for the Director

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] of the Surgeon General's Office made a startling statement that they could go into Europe in June and devastate it with yellow fever, but the fact that the occupied countries would also suffer to the same extent precluded placing the plan in operation.

b6
b7C At the conclusion [redacted] to remain in order to show him a file containing all aspects of all diseases of man, animal, and plants applicable to bacterial warfare and sabotage contributed by 120 specialists. This file contains lists of disease organisms affecting plants and animals arranged in columns with pertinent information relating to the resistance of the germs, method of culturing, ease of culturing, method of dispersal, name of plant or animal affected, extent of injury to plant or animal, et cetera. [redacted] wanted to make sure the Bureau knew of the existence of this information and its accessibility to the Bureau.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

b6
b7C

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

JRR:ELL

Savannah, Georgia
February 3, 1943

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-2003 BY 60267 UC/NL/bp/PACW

RE: PLAN TO PLANT BOMBS CONTAINING
GERMS OR TO ENDEAVOR TO CREATE
AN EPIDEMIC SUCH AS HOOF AND MOUTH
DISEASE AMONG CATTLE AND OTHER
LIVE STOCK; SABOTAGE

Dear Sir:

This office has received a copy of a communication from JOHN T. BISSELL, Colonel, General Staff, Assistant Executive Officer, Military Intelligence Service, Washington, D. C., dated December 29, 1942, to directors of intelligence in all Service Commands, which is as follows:

"1.. It has been brought to the attention of this Division the possibility in the immediate future of an attempt on the part of the enemy to plant bombs containing germs or to endeavor to create an epidemic, such as hoof and mouth disease, among cattle and other livestock.

"2. It is requested that should any information concerning the above come to the attention of the Directors of Intelligence of the Service Commands or the A. C. of S., G-2, Western Defense Command, that the same be transmitted by the most expeditious means to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department."

This is furnished to the Bureau for its information and such action as is deemed appropriate.

Very truly yours,

J. R. Ruggles
J. R. RUGGLES
Special Agent in Charge

RECORDED & INDEXED

N168

EX-42

100-93216-
8 1
9 FEB 8 1943
MOC



51 FEB 12 1943

247

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY

WASHINGTON

b6

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

b7C

National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue

January 22, 1943

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-03 BY 602679/c/wel/bja/pmc

Dear Mr. Hoover:

This will acknowledge the receipt of your confidential memoranda of January 16th and 18th, which I am very interested in having.

In regard to the memorandum of the 16th, I note that your Bureau is undertaking an investigation of the matter. I shall look forward to seeing further reports on this case. I presume that when you deem it of value your agent on the West Coast will acquaint the proper official in the Ninth Service Command with the matter. We are doing nothing from this end.

In regard to the memorandum of the 18th, I note that no investigation is being instituted by your Bureau. However, this office is bringing the substance of your report to the attention of the Surgeon General's Office of the Army and of the U. S. Public Health Service.

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~


Sincerely yours,

George W. Merck
George W. Merck, Director
War Research Service

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64-1120-90
Date:

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To:

64-1120-90

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Franklin B. Atwood, Acting Chief
Subject: Trade Intelligence Division
Office of Exports

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As of possible interest to you, the Bureau is in receipt of recent information to the effect that [redacted]

This report, however, contained no criticism of [redacted]

This information is being furnished to you for such distribution as deemed necessary.

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DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 US/AM/bj/PAM
977600

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. E. A. Tamm _____

Mr. Clegg _____

Mr. Glavin _____

Mr. Ladd _____

Mr. Nichols _____

Mr. Rosen _____

Mr. Tracy _____

MAILED
DECEMBER 1943
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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