title | date | tags | draft | summary | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies |
2022-7-12 |
|
false |
Introduction to Competitive Games and Security Strategies |
- A two-player game is strictly competitive if, for any two strategy profiles
$s$ and$s'$ ,$u_1(s) \geq u_1(s')$ if and only if$u_2(s) \leq u_2(s')$ . -
$s_i$ is a security strategy for player$i$ if it solves:
- Note that a secure strategy might not be rationalizable.
- Player i's security level is the corresponding payoff.
- If $s^$ is a nash equilibrium of a strictly competitive game, then $s^_1$ and
$s^*_2$ are security strategies for player 1 and player 2.
F | C | B | |
---|---|---|---|
F | 0, 5 | 2, 3 | 2, 3 |
C | 2, 3 | 0, 5 | 3, 2 |
B | 5, 0 | 3, 2 | 2, 3 |
- We first find the security strategies for player 1 and player 2. For player 1, playing B would be the security strategy and
for player 2, playing C or B will be the secure strategy. (Why?) Thus, the secure startegy set is,
${(B, C), (B, B)}$
'''mermaid graph TD; A-->B; A-->C; B-->D; C-->D; '''