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Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies
2022-7-12
game
thoery
competitive-games
security-strategies
false
Introduction to Competitive Games and Security Strategies

Strictly competitive game

  • A two-player game is strictly competitive if, for any two strategy profiles $s$ and $s'$, $u_1(s) \geq u_1(s')$ if and only if $u_2(s) \leq u_2(s')$.
  • $s_i$ is a security strategy for player $i$ if it solves:
$$\max_{s_i \in S_i} \min_{s_j \in S_j} u_i(s)$$
  • Note that a secure strategy might not be rationalizable.
  • Player i's security level is the corresponding payoff.

Result

  • If $s^$ is a nash equilibrium of a strictly competitive game, then $s^_1$ and $s^*_2$ are security strategies for player 1 and player 2.

Example

F C B
F 0, 5 2, 3 2, 3
C 2, 3 0, 5 3, 2
B 5, 0 3, 2 2, 3
  • We first find the security strategies for player 1 and player 2. For player 1, playing B would be the security strategy and for player 2, playing C or B will be the secure strategy. (Why?) Thus, the secure startegy set is, ${(B, C), (B, B)}$

'''mermaid graph TD; A-->B; A-->C; B-->D; C-->D; '''