

Why does preregistration increase the persuasiveness of evidence? A Bayesian rationalization.

Abstract

In response to the replication crisis, many researchers detail their analysis plans before acquiring data. So-called preregistrations hold the promise to produce more robust research results. However, many researchers find preregistration challenging to apply in practice because they struggle to translate their theories into precise predictions. We argue that much of this difficulty stems from the belief that researchers must preregister results when, in fact, they can preregister procedures. While the former is only possible for the small subset of strictly confirmatory studies, the latter is applicable even amid the considerable uncertainties present in many areas of empirical sciences. Drawing from Bayesian philosophy of science, we provide a principled justification of preregistration that extends its utility beyond confirmatory studies and is more closely aligned with researchers' needs and intuition about evidential support. Such justification provides researchers with a formal objective that allows them to evaluate their own and others' preregistrations and weigh the cost and benefits of deviating from the analysis plan after data collection. This objective rests on the concept of *theoretical risk* (Meehl, 1978), a generalization of the type-I error rate that allows researchers to judge the evidential support for their theories. We argue that the purpose of preregistration is to reduce the uncertainty in judging the theoretical risk of a given study. The more we know about how researchers arrived at their findings, the smaller the uncertainty about the theoretical risk they accepted and the more persuasive the researchers' evidence.

A theory able to generate successful prediction should be more credible than a theory build around the facts afterwards. The scientific community has long pondered the vital distinction between exploration and confirmation, discovery and justification, hypothesis-generating and hypothesis-testing and so forth (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006; Shmueli, 2010). Confusing exploratory findings with confirmed theories has led to a crisis of confidence in the results of empirical sciences (Ioannidis, 2005), and psychology in particular (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). As a response, more and more researchers preregister their studies (Nosek et al., 2018) to honor this distinction and produce results that are considered confirmatory.

Indeed, rigorous application of preregistration prevents researchers from reporting a set of results produced by an arduous process of trial and error as a simple confirmatory story (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). However, while many researchers intuitively recognize this as an advantage of preregistration, some remain unconvinced. These skeptics question why a study should be preregistered at all. Even researchers convinced of the advantages of preregistration face difficult problems when they exclusively rely on an intuitive appeal. Specifically, an intuitive conviction is unable to address pragmatic questions, such as what to include in the preregistration and how detailed this information should be, or about the conditions that warrant deviations. If the research community remains con-

fused about the purpose of preregistration, it is bound to misapply it and waste resources on writing preregistrations that do not address the underlying problem. We thus propose a principled justification for preregistration with a formal objective against which researchers can evaluate several pragmatic trade-offs.

The scientific community asserts that the objective of preregistration is to distinguish confirmatory from exploratory research (Mellor & Nosek, 2018; Nosek et al., 2018; Wagenmakers et al., 2012). However, it is not principally warranted to suggest a close coupling of the categories preregistered vs. non-preregistered and confirmatory vs. exploratory research. In fact, researchers can conduct confirmatory research without preregistration (though it might be difficult to convince other researchers of the confirmatory nature of their research). The exact opposite, preregistered but not strictly confirmatory studies, are also commonplace (Chan et al., 2004; Dwan et al., 2008; Silagy et al., 2002). Researchers may apply two strategies to evade the self-imposed restrictions of preregistrations: writing a loose preregistration to begin with (Stefan & Schönbrodt, 2022) or deviating from the preregistration afterwards. Both strategies may be used for sensible scientific reasons or with the self-serving intent of generating desirable results. Thus, insisting on equating preregistration and confirmation has led to criticism that, all things considered, preregistration is actually harmful, and neither sufficient nor necessary to establish confirmation (Pham & Oh, 2021; Szollosi et al., 2020)

These issues arise from a fundamental misunderstanding about the objective of preregistration. Researchers are bound to be misled when they delegate an important scientific judgment to a simple decision rule, that only takes into account the existence of a preregistration. Preregistering an inherently exploratory analysis (like testing dozens of relations) does not make it confirmatory, nor will a carefully conducted confirmatory study become exploratory if the researcher deviates from the preregistration in minor details. To force preregistrations to generate results that are rightfully considered confirmatory additional restrictions on the types of analyses allowed have to be imposed. First, the analysis must have a low type-I error rate. second, Equating confirmatory research with preregistered research is only possible for studies that expect a low type-I error rate and will run/be analyzed without in any case (Bakker et al., 2020; Simmons et al., 2021). Under these conditions, the rule holds, but such restricted use makes preregistration a niche solution unable to match the greater problem of lacking replicability in psychology and elsewhere.

We show that the simple decision rule is just a special case of a more general conceptualization under Bayesian reasoning. To that end, we first introduce some tools of Bayesian philosophy of science and map the exploration/confirmation distinction onto a dimensional quantity we call “theoretical risk” (a term borrowed from Meehl, 1978, but formalized as the probability of proving a hypothesis wrong, if it does not hold), which is inversely related to the type-I error rate.

We then outline two interpretations of how theoretical risk is impacted by preregistra-

tion. The first interpretation corresponds to the traditional application of preregistration to research paradigms that focus on confirmation by maximizing the theoretical risk or equivalently by limiting type-I error. The second interpretation is our main contribution and demonstrates the broad applicability of preregistration to both exploratory and confirmatory studies that are implemented as preregistered or have undergone changes after preregistration. Following this interpretation, the theoretical risk is not necessarily directly maximized by preregistration, but rather the uncertainty in judging the theoretical risk is minimized.

To arrive at this interpretation, we rely on three arguments. The first is that theoretical risk is vital for judging evidential support for theories. The second argument is that the theoretical risk for a given study is generally uncertain. The third and last argument is that this uncertainty is reduced by applying preregistration. We conclude that because preregistration decreases uncertainty about the theoretical risk, which in turn increases our expectation to gain evidence for or against a theory, preregistration is warranted for any study.

Epistemic value and the Bayesian rationale

Let us start by defining what we call expected epistemic value. If researchers plan to conduct a study, they usually hope it will change their assessment of some theory's verisimilitude. In other words, they hope to learn something from conducting the study. The amount of knowledge researchers gain from a particular study concerning the verisimilitude of a specific theory (which itself is an ontological concept) is what we call epistemic value. Researchers cannot know what exactly they will learn from a study before they have run it. However, they can develop, they can form an expectation that helps them decide which study to conduct in what manner. This expectation is what we term expected epistemic value. To make our three arguments, we must assume three things about this estimation process and how it relates to what studies (preregistered vs not preregistered) to conduct.

1. Researchers judge the evidence for or against a hypothesis rationally.
2. They expect other researchers to apply the same rational process.
3. All else being equal, researchers try to maximize the expected epistemic value for other researchers.

The assumption of rationality can be connected to Bayesian reasoning and leads to our adoption of the framework. Our rationale is as follows. Researchers who decide to conduct a certain study are actually choosing a study to bet on. They have to "place the bet" by conducting the study, therefore, invest resources and stand to gain epistemic value with some probability. This conceptualization of choosing a study as a betting problem allows us to apply a "Dutch Book" argument (Christensen, 1991). This argument states that any better must follow the axioms of probability to avoid being "irrational," i.e., accepting bets that lead to sure losses. Fully developing a Dutch book argument for this

problem requires careful consideration of what kind of studies to include as possible bets, defining a conversion rate from the stakes to the reward, and modelling what liberties researchers have in what studies to conduct. Without deliberating these concepts further, we find it persuasive that researchers should not violate the axioms of probability if they have some expectation about what they stand to gain with some likelihood from conducting a study. The axioms of probability are sufficient to derive the Bayes formula, on which we will heavily rely for our further arguments. The argument is not sufficient, however, to warrant conceptualizing the kind of epistemic value we reason about in terms of probability; that remains a leap of faith. Please note that our decision to adopt this aspect of the Bayesian philosophy of science does not imply anything about the statistical methods researchers use. In fact, this conceptualization is intentionally reductionistic to be compatible with a wide range of philosophies of science and statistical methods researchers might subscribe to.

Epistemic value and theoretical risk

Our first argument is that theoretical risk is crucial for judging evidential support for theories. Put simply, risky predictions create persuasive evidence if they turn out to be correct. This point is crucial because we attribute much of the appeal of preregistration to this fact.

Let us make some simplifying assumptions and define notation. We restrict ourselves to evidence of a binary nature (either it was observed or not) since continuous evidence would lead to some quite involved derivations. We denote the probability of a hypothesis before observing evidence as $P(H)$ and its complement as $P(\neg H) = 1 - P(H)$. The probability of observing evidence under some hypothesis is $P(E|H)$. We can calculate the probability of the hypothesis after observing the evidence with the help of the Bayes formula:

$$P(H|E) = \frac{P(H)P(E|H)}{P(E)} \quad (1)$$

The posterior probability ($P(H|E)$) is of great relevance since it is often used directly or indirectly as a measure of corroboration of a hypothesis. In the tradition of Carnap (XXX), in its direct use, it is called corroboration as firmness; in its relation to the a priori probability ($P(H)$), it is called increase in firmness. We refrain from discussing specific measures of corroboration since no measure shows universally better properties than others. However, it is generally expected that any measure of corroboration increases monotonically with an increase in posterior probability ($P(H|E)$).

In short, we want to increase posterior probability ($P(H|E)$). Increases in posterior probability ($P(H|E)$) are associated with increased epistemic value, for which we want to maximize the expectation. So how can we increase posterior probability? The Bayes formula yields three components that influence corroboration, namely $P(H)$, $P(E|H)$

and $P(E)$. The first option leads us to the unsurprising conclusion that higher a priori probability ($P(H)$) leads to higher posterior probability ($P(H|E)$). If a hypothesis is more probable to begin with, the same increase in corroboration will lead to a higher probability than if the study was less probable to begin with. However, the prior probability of a hypothesis is nothing our study design can change. The second option is similarly commonsensical; that is, an increase in $P(E|H)$ leads to higher posterior probability ($P(H|E)$). $P(E|H)$ is the probability of obtaining evidence for a theory, when the theory holds. We call this probability of detecting evidence given that the theory holds “detectability.” Consequently, researchers should ensure that their study design allows them to find evidence for their hypothesis, in case it is true. When applied strictly within the bounds of null hypothesis testing, detectability is equivalent to power (or the inverse of type-II error rate). However, while detectability is of great importance for study design, it is not directly relevant to the objective of preregistration. Thus, $P(E)$ remains to be considered. Since $P(E)$ is the denominator, increasing it will decrease the posterior probability: The more unlikely it is to observe evidence, the more it increases the probability of the hypothesis if we do observe it. In other words, high risk, high reward.

If we equate riskiness with a low probability of obtaining evidence, the Bayesian rationale perfectly aligns with the observation that risky predictions lead to persuasive evidence. This tension between high risk leading to high reward is central to our consideration of preregistration. A high-risk, high-reward strategy is bound to result in many losses that are eventually absorbed by the high gains. Sustaining many “failed” studies is not exactly aligned with the incentive structure under which many, if not most, researchers operate. Consequently, researchers have an incentive to appear to take more risks than they actually do, which misleads their readers to give their claims more credence than they deserve. It is at this juncture that the practice and mispractice of preregistration comes into play. We argue that the main function of preregistration is to enable proper judgment of the riskiness of a study.

To better understand how preregistrations can achieve that, let us take a closer look at what factors contribute to $P(E)$. Using the law of total probability, we can split $P(E)$ into two terms:

$$P(E) = P(H)P(E|H) + P(\neg H)P(E|\neg H) \quad (2)$$

We already have noted that there is not much to do about prior probability ($P(H)$), and hence its counter probability $P(\neg H)$, and that it is common sense to increase detectability ($P(E|H)$). The real lever to pull is, therefore, $P(E|\neg H)$. This probability tells us how likely it is that we find evidence in favor of the theory when in fact, the theory is not true. Its counter probability $P(\neg E|\neg H) = 1 - P(E|\neg H)$ is what we call “theoretical risk”, because it is the risk a theory takes on in predicting the occurrence of particular evidence in its favour. We “borrow” the term from Meehl (1978), though he has not assigned it to the probability $P(\neg E|\neg H)$. In a response to the original paper, Kukla (1990) argued that

the arguments layed out in Meehl (1978) can be reconstructed in purely Bayesian framework. However, while he did not name $P(\neg E|\neg H)$ but did suggest that Meehl (1978) used the term “very strange coincidence” for a small $P(E|\neg H)$ which would imply that $P(\neg E|\neg H)$ can be related to or even equated to theoretical risk.

Let us note some interesting properties of theoretical risk ($P(\neg E|\neg H)$). First, increasing theoretical risk leads to higher posterior probability ($P(H|E)$, our objective). Second, if the theoretical risk is smaller than detectability ($P(E|H)$) it follows that the posterior probability must decrease when observing the evidence. If detectability exceeds theoretical risk, the evidence is less likely under the theory than it is when the theory does not hold. Third, if the theoretical risk equals zero, then posterior probability is at best equal to prior probability but only if detectability is perfect ($P(H|E) = 1$). In other words, observing a sure fact does not lend credence to a hypothesis.

The last statement sounds like a truism but is directly related to Popper’s seminal criterion of demarcation. He stated that if it is impossible to prove that a hypothesis is false ($P(\neg E|\neg H) = 0$, theoretical risk is zero), it cannot be considered a scientific hypothesis (Popper, 2002, p. 18). We note these relations to underline that the Bayesian rational we apply here is able to reconstruct many commonly held views on riskiness and epistemic value.

Both theoretical risk ($P(\neg E|\neg H)$) and detectability ($P(E|H)$) aggregate uncountable influences, otherwise they could not model the process of evidential support for theories. To illustrate the concepts we introduced up to here, consider the following example of a single theory and three experiments that may test it. The experiments were created to illustrate how they may differ in their theoretical risk and detectability. Suppose the primary theory is about the cognitive phenomenon of “insight.” For the purpose of illustration, we define it, with quite some hand-waving, as a cognitive abstraction that allows agents to consistently solve a well-defined class of problems. We present the hypothesis that the following problem belongs to such a class of insight problems:

Use five matches (I I I I I) to form the number eight.

We propose three experiments that differ in theoretical risk and detectability. All experiments take a sample of ten psychology students. We present the students with the problem for a brief span of time. After that, the three experiments differ as follows:

1. The experimenter gives a hint that the problem is easy to solve when using Roman numerals; if all students come up with the solution, she records it as evidence for the hypothesis.
2. The experimenter shows the solution “VIII” and explains it; if all students come up with the solution, she records it as evidence for the hypothesis.
3. The experimenter does nothing; if all students come up with the solution, she records it as evidence for the hypothesis.

We argue that experiment 1 has high theoretical risk ($P(\neg E_1|\neg H)$) and high detectability

($P(E_1|H)$). If “insight” has nothing to do with solving the problem ($\neg H$), then presenting the insight that Roman numerals could be used, should not lead to all students solving the problem ($\neg E_1$); the experiment therefore has high theoretical risk ($P(\neg E_1|\neg H)$). Conversely, if insight is required to solve the problem (H), then it is likely to help all students to solve the problem (E_1), the experiment therefore has high detectability ($P(E_1|H)$). The second experiment, on the other hand, has low theoretical risk ($P(\neg E_2|\neg H)$). Even if “insight” has nothing to do with solving the problem ($\neg H$), there are other plausible reasons for observing the evidence (E_2), because the students could simply copy the solution, without having any insight. With regard to detectability, experiments 1 and 2 differ in no obvious way. Experiment 3, however, also has low detectability. It is unlikely that all students come up with the correct solution in a short time (E_3), even if insight is required (H) experiment 3 therefore has low detectability ($P(E_3|H)$). The theoretical risk, however, is also low in absolute terms, but high compared to the detectability. In the unlikely event that all 10 students place their matches to form the Roman numeral VIII (E_3), it is probably due to insight (H) and not by chance ($P(\neg E_2|\neg H)$). Of course, in practice, we would allow the evidence to be probabilistic, e.g., relax the requirement of “all students” to nine out of ten students, more than eight, and so forth.

As argued earlier, the remainder of the paper will focus on binary, non-probabilistic evidence to keep the mathematical notation as simple as possible. We discuss the relation between statistical methods and theoretical risk in the Statistical Methods section.

Preregistration as a means to increase theoretical risk?

Having discussed that increasing the theoretical risk will increase the epistemic value, it is intuitive to task preregistration with maximizing theoretical risk. Indeed, limiting the type-I error rate is commonly stated as a goal of preregistration. We argue that while such a conclusion is plausible, we must first consider at least two constraints that place an upper bound on the theoretical risk.

First, the theory itself limits theoretical risk: Some theories simply do not make risky predictions, and preregistration will not change that. Consider the case of a researcher contemplating the relation between two sets of variables. Suppose each set is separately well studied, and strong theories tell the researcher how the variables within the set relate. However, our imaginary researcher now considers the relation between these two sets. For lack of a better theory, they assume that some relation between any variables of the two sets exists. This is not a risky prediction to make in psychology, even without statistical issues like alpha inflation (Orben & Lakens, 2020). However, we would consider it a success if the researcher would use the evidence to develop a more precise (and therefore risky) theory, e.g., by specifying which variables from one set relate to which variables from the other set, to what extent, in which direction, with which functional shape, etc. We will later show that preregistration increases the degree of belief in the further specified theory, though it remains low till being substantiated by testing it again.

The point, however, is that we want to show that preregistration increases the expected epistemic value regardless of the theory being tested.

Second, available resources limit theoretical risk. Increasing theoretical risk ($P(\neg E|\neg H)$) will usually decrease detectability ($P(E|H)$) unless more resources are invested. In other words, one cannot increase power while maintaining the same type-I error rate without increasing the invested resources. Tasking preregistration with an increase in theoretical risk makes it difficult to balance this trade-off. Mindlessly maximizing theoretical risk would either never produce evidence or require huge amounts of resources.

Uncertainty about theoretical risk

We have established that higher theoretical risk leads to more persuasive evidence. In other words, we have reconstructed the interpretation that preregistrations supposedly work by restricting the researchers, which in turn increases the theoretical risk (or equivalently limits the type-I error rate) and thereby creates more compelling evidence. Nevertheless, there are trade-offs for increasing theoretical risk. Employing a mathematical framework allows us to navigate the trade-offs more effectively and move towards a second, more favorable interpretation. To that end, we incorporate uncertainty into our framework.

Statistical methods

Theoretical risk is deeply connected with statistical methods, because it is the inverse of $P(E|\neg H)$. $P(E|\neg H)$ is equivalent to the type-I error rate, if you consider the overly simplistic case where the research hypothesis is equal to the statistical alternative hypothesis, because then the null hypothesis is $\neg H$. Because many researchers are familiar with the type-I error rate, it can be helpful to remember this connection to theoretical risk. Researchers who choose a smaller type-I error rate can be more sure of their results, if significant, because the theoretical risk is higher. However, the research hypothesis seldomly equals the statistical null hypothesis, and therefore, the relation between statistical type-I error rate and theoretical risk should not be overinterpreted. We argue that theoretical risk (and hence its inverse, $P(E|\neg H)$) also encompasses factors outside the statistical realm, most notably the study design and broader analytical strategies.

Statistical methods stand out among these factors because we have a large toolbox for assessing and controlling their contribution to theoretical risk. Examples of our ability to exert this control are the setting of type-I error rate, the use of corrected fit measures (i.e., adjusted R^2), information criteria, or cross-validation in machine learning. These tools help us account for biases in statistical methods that increase the likelihood of signifying results even when there are none ($P(E|\neg H)$).

The point is that the contribution of statistical methods to theoretical risk can be formally assessed. For many statistical models it can be analytically computed under some

assumptions. For those models or assumptions where this is impossible, one can employ Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the contribution to theoretical risk. The precision with which statisticians can discuss contributions to theoretical risk has lured the community concerned with research methods into ignoring other factors that are much more uncertain. We cannot hope to resolve this uncertainty; but we have to be aware of its implications. These are presented in the following.

Sources of Uncertainty

As we noted, it is possible to quantify how statistical models affect the theoretical risk based on mathematical considerations and simulation. However, other factors in the broader context of the study are much harder to quantify. If one chooses to focus only on the contribution of statistical methods to theoretical risk, one is bound to overestimate it. Take, for example, a t-test of mean differences in two samples. Under ideal circumstances (assumption of independence, normality of residuals, equal variance), it stays true to its type-I error rate. However, researchers might do many very reasonable things in the broader context of the study that affect theoretical risk: They might exclude outliers, choose to drop an item before computing a sum score, broaden, enlarge their definition of the population to be sampled, translate their questionnaires into a different language, impute missing values, or any number of other things. All of these decisions carry a small risk that they increase the likelihood of obtaining evidence despite the underlying research hypothesis being false. Even if the t-test itself perfectly maintains its type I error rate, these factors influence $P(E|\neg H)$. While, in theory, these factors may leave $P(E|\neg H)$ unaffected or even decrease it, we argue that this is not the case in practice. Whether researchers want to or not, they continuously process information about how the study is going, except under strict blinding. While one can hope that processing this information does not affect their decision making either way, this cannot be secured. We, therefore, conclude that statistical properties only guarantee a lower bound to the quantity we seek to minimize. The only thing we can conclude with some certainty is that theoretical risk is not higher than what the statistical model guarantees without knowledge about the other factors at play.

The effects of uncertainty

Before we ask how preregistration influences this uncertainty, we must consider the implications of being uncertain about the theoretical risk. Within the Bayesian framework, this is both straightforward and insightful. To get an expectation, we express uncertainty as a probability distribution and then integrate over it:

$$\mathbb{E}(p(H|E)) = \int \frac{p(H)p(E|H)}{p(H)p(E|H) + p(\neg H)p(E|\neg H)} d\mathbb{P}(p(E|\neg H)) \quad (3)$$

To illustrate the effect of uncertainty, let $p(E|H) = 0.8$ (e.g., power of 80%) and $p(H) = 0.1$ and assume a uniform distribution for $p(E|\neg H)$ of the form:

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{\tau} & \text{for } 0 \leq x \leq \tau, \\ 0 & \text{for } x < 0 \text{ or } x > \tau \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

Where τ is the upper bound of theoretical risk (e.g., 0.95 for a statistical model with a nominal type-I error rate of 5%).

We chose this uniform distribution to capture our statement that a statistical model only guarantees an upper bound to theoretical risk (and since it is a probability the lower bound is 0) as it is the maximum entropy distribution under this assumption and conforms therefore to our Bayesian framework (Giffin & Caticha, 2007).

Posterior Probability




Figure 1: Posterior Probability (corroboration as firmness) as a function of τ , where τ is either certain (solid line) or maximally uncertain (dotted line).

Neither absolute certainty nor uncertainty are realistic scenarios but represent the boundary conditions into which all realistic conditions fall. Depending on how uncertain we are about the theoretical risk a study took on, our expectation the gained epistemic value varies considerably. Mathematically, uncertainty about theoretical risk is expressed through the variance (or rather entropy) of the distribution. Generally, we expect that increases in uncertainty (expressed as more entropic distributions) lead to a decreased expected epistemic value.




Figure 2: Several measures for corroboration as increase in firmness as a function of τ , where τ is either certain (solid line) or maximally uncertain (dotted line).

Preregistration as a means to decrease uncertainty about the theoretical risk

We hope to have persuaded the reader to accept two arguments: First, the theoretical risk is important for judging evidential support for theories. Second, the theoretical risk is inherently uncertain and the degree of uncertainty diminishes the persuasiveness of the gathered evidence. The third and last argument is that preregistrations reduce this uncertainty.

Recollect, our three assumptions:

1. Researchers judge the evidence for or against a hypothesis rationally.
2. They expect other researchers to apply the same rational process.
3. All else being equal, researchers try to increase the expected epistemic value for other researchers.

The point we make with these assumptions is that researchers aim to persuade other researchers, the readers of their articles. We have to remember that the process of weighing evidence for or against a theory extends beyond the original authors to all the people they hope to persuade. Unfortunately, the case for lack of insight into the myriad of factors that influence theoretical risk is particularly strong for the reader of a resulting article (or, more generally, the consumer of the research product). While the authors may have deep insight into what they did and how it might influence the theoretical risk they took, their readers have much greater uncertainty about these factors. In particular, they

never know which relevant factors the authors of a given article failed to disclose, intentionally or not. From the perspective of an ultimate sceptic, they may claim maximum uncertainty.

Communicating clearly how the authors gathered the data and consequently analyzed it to arrive at the evidence they present is crucial for judging the theoretical risk they took. Preregistrations are ideal to communicate just that, because any description after the fact is suspect to be incomplete. For instance, the authors could have decided to exclude a number of analytic strategies they tried out. That is not to say that every study that was not-preregistered was subjected to practices of p hacking. The point is, that we cannot exclude this and innumerable possibilities and, hence, are left uncertain. This uncertainty is drastically reduced, if the researchers have described what they intended to do beforehand, and then report that they did exactly that. In that case, the readers can be certain, that they have received a complete account of the situation. They still might be uncertain about the actual theoretical risk the authors took, but to a much smaller extend than if the study would not have been preregistered. Remaining sources of uncertainty might be unfamiliarity with statistical methods or experimental paradigms used, the probability of an implementation error in the statistical analyses, a bug in the software used for analyses, etc. In any case a well written preregistration should aim to reduce the uncertainty about the theoretical risk and hence increase the persuasiveness of evidence.

Discussion

We started out with the observation that preregistrations do not always cleanly divide preregistration from confirmation. Enforcing this distinction would mean using preregistrations as a means to increase the theoretical risk researchers take on. No doubt this results in more trustworthy evidence and may even increase the effectiveness of scientific undertakings in general. However, as argued earlier, directly maximizing theoretical risk increases the likelihood that a study fails to deliver results favoring the theory (a special instance of this problem is the well-known trade-off of statistical power and type-I error rate). As we further argued, minimizing the uncertainty about theoretical risk (without necessarily increasing the theoretical risk itself) has benefits for the epistemic value, too, but without increasing the likelihood of producing a “failed” study. Note that any single study that does not produce evidence in favor of a research hypothesis is still precious for the scientific process. Under the current incentive structure, however, many researchers have reason to avoid such outcomes and few, if any, have the privilege to operate outside of these incentives.

In our view, the advantage of uncertainty reduction about theoretical risk front and center is two-fold. First, aiming to reduce uncertainty is beneficial across a wide range of potential theoretical risks. That is, researchers benefit from preregistering their study, regardless of whether or not the study is “exploratory”. If researchers conduct a more

exploratory study they can clearly communicate how exploratory they aim to be and their results can be judged accordingly. Second, if researchers realize after the fact that it would be unwise to follow their preregistration in certain details, they may change their strategy. Allowing researchers to deviate from the preregistration is controversial (XXX) because the authors might sift through all the possibilities and then select the most beneficial for their theory. In its fullest consequence, this argument might result in the same uncertainty that we argued plagues for not-preregistered studies. However, if the authors offer a convincing argument for their deviation, their readers might judge it to be a reasonable explanation for the deviation. In fact, using the here presented framework, we can distinguish reasonable from unreasonable deviations. If a change increases detectability enough to offset the increase in uncertainty in theoretical risk, it is worthwhile.

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