Empirical Economic Modeling Public

Attila Gyetvai

Bank of Portugal & IZA
attilagyetvai.com

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Lecture plan

Central research questions in public: How to design tax systems?

- 1. How do various forms of taxation compare?
- 2. How does behavior impact taxation?


Guvenen, Fatih, Gueorgui Kambourov, Burhan Kuruscu, Sergio Ocampo and Daphne Chen (2023). Use It or Lose It: Efficiency and Redistributional Effects of Wealth Taxation. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 138(2), 835-894.











Guvenen, Kambourov, Kuruscu, Ocampo and Chen (2023 QJE). Use It or Lose It











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Research question: How does wealth taxation compare to capital taxation?

Example: Fredo is bad at business, Michael is good. Government needs to raise \$5M

	Capital I	ncome Tax	Wealth Tax			
	Fredo	Michael	Fredo	$\frac{\text{Michael}}{r_{M} = 20\%}$		
Rates of return	$r_F = 0\%$	$r_{M}=20\%$	$r_F = 0\%$			
Wealth	100M	100M	100M	100M		
Pre-tax income	0	20M	0	20M		
Tax liability	0	$20\tau_{\rm k}=\!\!5M$	$100\tau_\alpha=2.5M$	$100\tau_\alpha=2.5M$		
After-tax rate of return	0%	15%	-2.5%	17.5%		
After-tax wealth ratio	$\frac{W_{\mathrm{M}}}{W_{\mathrm{F}}} =$	$\frac{115}{100} = 1.15$	$\frac{W_{\rm M}}{W_{\rm F}} = \frac{117.5}{97.5} \approx 1.20$			

 \Rightarrow Under wealth taxation, you must use your wealth or you lose it If Fredo would be as good as Michael, form of taxation would not matter!

 \sim Taxing capital vs. wealth is the same with homogeneous rate of return

 \dots but we have empirical evidence that r is heterogeneous

HANK

Entrepreneurial productivity

Everyone is born with ability \bar{z}_i : $\log \bar{z}_i = \rho_z \log \bar{z}_i^{\mathsf{parent}} + \varepsilon_{\bar{z}_i}$, $\varepsilon_{\bar{z}_i} \sim \mathsf{N}(\mathsf{o}, \sigma_{\bar{z}_i}^2)$

⇒ Some high-ability children will start with low wealth and vice versa

⇒ Capital misallocation!

Productivity evolves: at age h,

$$z_{ih} = \begin{cases} \bar{z}_i^{\lambda} & \text{if high} \\ \bar{z}_i & \text{if low} \\ \text{O} & \text{if out} \end{cases} \quad \text{with } \Pi = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - p_1 - p_2 & p_1 & p_2 \\ \text{O} & 1 - p_2 & p_2 \\ \text{O} & \text{O} & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Labor productivity

Everyone is born with ability κ_i : $\kappa_i = \rho_{\kappa} \kappa_i^{\text{parent}} + \varepsilon_{\kappa_i}$, $\varepsilon_{\kappa_i} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\kappa_i}^2)$

Productivity evolves: at age h,

$$\log w_{ih} = \kappa_i + g(h) + e_{ih}, \qquad e_{ih} \sim AR(1)$$

 \Rightarrow Aggregate labor supply:

$$L = \int w_{i,h(i)} \ell_{i,h(i)} di$$

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Research question: How does wealth taxation compare to capital taxation?

Production

Entrepreneurs produce intermediate good $x_{ih} = z_{ih}k_{ih}$

Final good is produced by combining intermediate inputs and labor:

$$Y = Q^{\alpha}L^{1-\alpha} = \left(\int X_{i,h(i)}^{\mu} di\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\mu}} L^{1-\alpha}$$

Consumption, labor, bequests

Individuals maximize expected lifetime utility:

$$\max \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{h=1}^{H} \beta^{h-1}(\phi_h u(c_h, 1-\ell_h) + (1-\phi_h)v(b))\right]$$

Financial markets

Assets a_{ih} can be borrowed subject to some borrowing constraint

Government

Capital taxation: taxes on capital income, labor, consumption, bequests Wealth taxation: taxes on assets, labor, consumption, bequests (Also pensions)

Empirics

Calibrate model on benchmark US economy with capital taxation Compare aggregates under counterfactual wealth taxation

	Tax Reforms: Change from US Benchmark									
	Quantities (% Change)						Prices (Change)			
	K	Q	TFP_{Q}	L	Υ	С	\overline{w}	\overline{w} (net)	Δr^{\dagger}	$\Delta r^{\dagger} \ ({\rm net})$
RN reform	16.4	22.6	5.3	1.2	9.2	9.5	8.0	8.0	0.21	-0.36
BB reform	9.2	16.0	6.2	1.2	6.9	7.7	5.6	5.6	0.67	-0.38

Notes: RN and BB refer to the revenue-neutral and balanced-budget reforms, respectively. Percentage changes are computed with respect to Bb referentiate economy, which has $\tau_k = 25\%$, and $\tau_{\tau_k} = 0\%$. Tchange changes are computed in percentage points. The net was is defined as $(1 - \tau_k) w$, and the net interest rate is defined as $(1 - \tau_k) r$ or $r - \tau_a$, depending on the model. The TP variable is resulted in the intermediate cools market.

RN vs. BB: due to pensions

Lots more in paper: welfare, optimal taxation, progressive taxes, transition path, ...