NV: Nessus Vulnerability Visualization for the Web

ABSTRACT

Network vulnerability is a critical component of network security. Yet vulnerability analysis has received relatively little attention from the security visualization community.

1. INTRODUCTION

In order to assess the security posture of the servers and workstations on their network, system administrators and security analysts use vulnerability assessment tools such as Nessus. Such tools probe machines to determine which network ports are open, what services are running on the ports, and, most importantly, what versions of those services are running. Identifying the services and the versions enables these tools to match them with known vulnerabilities. Nessus and similar tools can produce an overwhelming amount of data for large networks. Traditional reporting tools present the data tabularly, often with color coding to attempt to provide an overview of each vulnerability's severity. But this data can be very large with little support for comparing individual or logical groupings of machines. Further, it can be difficult to determine whether the overall vulnerability state of a network has increased or gotten worse between scans from different points in time.

Nessus Vulnerability Visualization (nv) was developed by us at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. It is completely javascript-based and, using a few helpful javascript libraries, conveys usefully intuitive information to a system administrator about the current and past states of their network. We use visuals such as treemaps and histograms to represent large amounts of data that would otherwise have to be viewed in large lists. To add multiple dimensions to these visuals, different colors and sizes as well as clicking and hovering over the visuals displays even more useful information to the administrator as they manage large, security-vulnerability-prone networks.

Nv also allows analysts to specify logical groupings that reflect analyst's situated knowledge [8]. Additionally, nv enables analysts to capture criticality scores for individual and groups of machines in their network. This information is then used by to affect size and other visual features in the treemap, which helps ensure that high-value machines receive the most attention.

Specifically, our contributions to the field of security visualization are as follows:

- A visualization tool that supports security vulnerability awareness, analysis, and tracking; and

- A framework for building web-based visualizations that do not send sensitive data to servers

In the following section, we discuss related work in vulnerability visualization and analysis. Afterwards, we discuss the design of nv. We then present several case studies involving Nessus scans from multiple systems. We conclude with a brief discussion on web-based security visualization tools and on our future plans for nv.

2. RELATED WORK

Currently, most computer vulnerability analysis is done using graph-based techniques to model the state of the system. One such technique is known as Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA). TVA uses the network state and attack vectors between machines to create an attack graph that will model all possible attack paths in a network. To generate these attack graphs TVA uses information from scanning tools such as Nessus and Retina. These graphs generated by TVA tend to be large, so it introduces an aggregation and visual analysis element to make the models easier to comprehend by an analyst. One aggregation method used by the TVA visualization is to aggregate machines based on their ability to access other machines. A group of machines will be aggregated if each node in the group has access to every other node in that group. These groupings are then aggregated into a single node in the visualization [9].

Researchers have also used model checking tools like NuSMV to manipulate graph representations of a network where each node is a state of the network and each transition represents an exploit. This type of attack graph allows an analyst to focus efforts on patching exploits (edges) that create the largest disconnects in the graph. This type of analysis is convenient because we already have graph algorithms that can efficiently perform such analysis [3].

Figure 1: Nv runs on the client side and does not require Nessus data to be sent to an outside server.

Ou, Govindavajhala and Appel take a different approach to security analysis in their MulVAL project. They attempt to model the interactions between known vulnerabilities and software bugs, configurations and permission policies. In their approach an analyst will specify the system and policies in a logic language that is a subset of the Prolog logic programming language and vulnerabilities in the Open Vulnerability Assessment Language. After the systems, policies, and vulnerabilities are defined the MulVAL system uses a two-phase algorithm to simulate both attacks and policy checking. The system generates all possible attacks based on the vulnerabilities and then compares those with the defined policies to detect violations [10].

Few visualization systems have been developed to support vulnerability data analysis. The most similar to nv in terms of data is NAVIGATOR, by Chu et al; the backend for which incorporates Nessus data [6]. While NAVIGATOR also uses treemaps in part of its visualization, it uses them as part of a node-link diagram. In contrast, we use treemaps directly and leverage brushing and linking via histograms to explore the Nessus data space. Additionally, one limitation mentioned by Chu et al is the need for a tool that compares scans (what has changed, what has been fixed, etcetera). We address this directly in nv by allowing users to specify two scans, which are then processed to detect various changes.

A similar approach to nv in terms of visualization is found in [7], which addresses the problem of code vulnerability analysis. Code vulnerability analysis has several similarities with network vulnerability analysis, the most notable of which is a severity score which can be propogated through functions, classes, and other programming constructus. Similarly, attributes of Nessus scans can be aggregated from vulnerability identification number to port, IP, and any number of higher groups. As such, nv is similar to this work in that it uses hierarchical techniques to visualize data, as well as multiple coordinated views to navigate the data space.

Rasmussen et al explicitly visualize the criticality of systems in a network in [11]. Nv is similar in that it allows the administrator to define groups in the hierarchy and assign either groups or machines a criticality score. This score is

then used in the visualization.

While these approaches provide a detailed assessment of the accessibility of vulnerable targets, our goal was to create a more widely applicable system. Nessus is the de facto standard for vulnerability assessment. Rather than build an entire system, we wanted to leverage data that is already commonly used in the security community. This approach increases the potential adoption and value to the security community. In addition to leveraging data that analysts already use to encourage adoption and use, we wanted our system to be usable without installing any software, so our approach is web-based, but does all processing of potentially sensitive data on the client within the browser.

3. SYSTEM DESIGN

The goal of nv is to support the sysadmin's understanding of vulnerabilities in their network by combining the results of a Nessus scan in raw format and (optionally) a list of critial machines in their network into an interactive visualization. This visualization is designed to support common workflows in vulnerability discovery, analysis, and mitigation. Some of these are described in the Case Studies sections. This section covers the visualization and interaction design.

3.1 Data
Nessus data in detail

The Nessus scan results provide significant detail about the state of all machines on the specified network. (TODO talk about how the scan actually works?) This information includes the port the vulnerable service is running on, what service and what version is running, what other versions of this software share this vulnerability, and a general description of the vulnerability. These results also indicate whether this is an actual vulnerability or just a general security notice, and it also provides a severity score and several unique identifiers related to this vulnerability, which can be used to find additional information. The results also often give information about how this vulnerability can be patched or otherwise mitigated. The following shows an example; this particular example is from the VAST Challenge 2011 data set.

```
results|192.168.2|192.168.2.175|cifs
(445/tcp)|46844|Security Hole|

Synopsis :
The remote Windows host contains a
font driver that is affected by
a privilege escalation vulnerability.

Description :
The remote Windows host contains a
version of the OpenType Compact
Font Format (CFF)
Font Driver that fails to properly validate
certain
data passed from user mode to kernel mode.
By viewing content rendered in a specially crafted
CFF font, a local
attacker may be able to exploit
this vulnerability to execute
arbitrary code in
kernel mode and take complete control of the
affected system.

Solution :
Microsoft has released a set of patches
for Windows 2000, XP, 2003,
Vista, 2008, 7, and 2008 R2 :
http://www.microsoft.com/
technet/security/Bulletin/MS10-037.mspx

Risk factor :
High / CVSS Base Score : 9.3

(CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)

Plugin output :
- C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\Atmfd.dll has not been patched
Remote version : 5.1.2.226
Should be : 5.1.2.228

CVE : CVE-2010-0819
BID : 40572
Other references : OSVDB:65217,MSFT:MS10-037
```

3.2   Use Case

The primary goal of nv is to support system administrators in understanding the vulnerabilities within their network in order to support their decision-making in determining how to allocate and prioritize their limited resources in order to reduce the security vulnerability of high-value targets within their network.

Specifically, the main tasks that nv seeks to support are:

- Identifying the individual machines that have the most severe vulnerabilities.

- Discovering the services that have the most vulnerabilities within their network.

- Identifying the exposure to vulnerabilities within groups of machines, where those groupings reflect the analyst's mental model of their network.

- Determining the high-value machines that are vulnerable to exploitation.

- Comparing point-in-time snapshots of the security state of the machines in the network, and understanding the differences between these two points.

3.3   Visualization and Interaction

Nv consists of multiple coordinated views including a treemap, several histograms, and a detail-information area showing information on the selected Nessus id. Each of these are designed to support a specific aspect of the vulnerability analysis workflow

Our primary visualization is a zoomable treemap[12]. We chose to use a treemap over other hierarchical visualization methods such as network/tree-layouts for several reasons. First, our goal with nv is to support the analysis of Nessus scans on large networks. While information on the network topology is useful for vulnerability analysis, it is important to note that in large dynamic networks, a complete network topology is often either unavailable or too large to be visualized directly. The space-filling aspects of treemaps make them more scalable in this regard.

The treemap allows us to easily identify machines with the most severe vulnerabilities. The administrator's eye will be naturally drawn to the darkest-colored node in the treemap, revealing the machines with the largest amount of these severe vulnerabilites. The treemap allows the system administrator to group machines together in a way that makes sense to them personally. Often times the system administrator has a mental picture of how their network is laid out and benefit from using a flexible environment that lets them customize it as they see fit. Again, using custom grouping, the system administrator can easily group high-value machines into a single group and can be monitored closely for vulnerabilities. Allowing the administrators to compare two different points in time of their network is also crucial. They can use these snapshots to not only monitor how efficient the network is being patched but also see how many times the network has been receiving vulnerabilites over a period of time. If there are more "new" nodes than "fixed" nodes, then they can assume that either attention to that group of machines as been depleted or that the group has become more suseptible to vulneratibilies over time. All of these analyses are important to administrators and can help them to monitor and protect their network more efficiently and effectively.

Another reason we used treemaps was for their ability to effectively make use of both size and color for encoding data attributes. Since Nessus data is not stored in a hierarchical form by default, it could be visualized using many multi-dimensional visualization techniques, such as parallel coordinates or scatterplot matrices. However, because the scalability of the visualization was a primary concern, we opted to nest the data from individual vulnerabilities and ports up to IPs and groups of IPs.

We also use data-accumulation and coloring methods to ensure that data is not obscured by the hierarchy. For instance, when comparing two Nessus scans, nodes are colored by the

Figure 2: Nesting on different values gives different results. Top: splitting by issue-state before splitting by IP. Bottom: splitting by IP before issue-state..

Figure 3: Top: Colorblind safe version in normal vision. Bottom: Colorblind safe in simulated Deuteranopia, which affects 5% of all males.

maximum count of issue states (fixed, open, or new issues) in their child nodes. A potential disadvantage of this approach is that a node could contain sligthly more fixed issues than open issues, and yet will still be colored green. To alleviate this problem, we add the option to split the nodes by issue-state higher in the hierarchy. Both options are shown in figure (TODO make figure).

The advantage to separating issue-states higher is that the analyst can explore only the fixed issues or only the open issues. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that the IPs are then separated since they can appear in any branch of the hierarchy (fixed, open, and new). To our knowledge, there exists no widely accepted visual technique that can effectively represent multiple attributes at every level in a treemap. However, we plan to explore other common approaches such as glyphs and combined color scales in future versions of nv.

Since analysts can specify the criticality of both individual machines and groups of machines in nv, the treemap includes sizing by criticality as an option. The most critical machines therefore appear as larger nodes, while still being colored by severity. Other sizing options include severity (the default) and by issue counts. Dual encoding severity with both color and size can be useful, as the darkest colored and largest nodes appear at the top left in each level of the histogram.

The color scales in the treemap were created using Color-Brewer2 [5]. While the primary color scales shown in the paper are designed to have semantic meanings (green for fixed, red for new, orange for open), we also include a colorblind-safe version, which is shown in figure (TODO figure).

Nv includes several histograms, including issue-type (note, hole, or open port), severity (CVSS score), top Nessus note ids, and top Nessus hole ids. These histograms serve dual purposes, as both overviews of the data and as filters by which sysadmins may guide their analysis. For instance, by

brushing over the highest values in the severity histogram, the appropriate nodes in the treemap are highlighted. This works by examining each child of each element in the current level of the hierarchy. Another use of the histograms is to easily highlight the most commonly occuring issues in the network. A possible drawback of this approach is that sometimes the least common issues can be the most damaging. However, this issue is mitigated by the fact that the treemap can be be sized and colored by severity, which makes the most damaging issues easy to find. The histograms also operate in as conjunction (AND), meaning that the sysadmin can specify queries such as all issues of type hole with severity of 5 or greater.

The Nessus information area is updated when the sysadmin drills down to the level at which Nessus issue-identification numbers are shown. The area then updates with detailed information about the currently selected Nessus id, including a synopsis, detailed description, vulnerability family, and solution (when available). Based on this information, the sysadmin has the option to mark the vulnerability as either fixed or as a non-issue, which re-colors the node in the treemap. This functionality is intended to serve as a way for analysts to avoid revisiting issues that have been addressed.

3.4   Implementation

One significant requirement for this project was to not unnecessarily disclose the Nessus scan results to any third parties; because this information would be very valuable to any attacker, the users of this tool would have an obvious concern to prevent its disclosure. To address this concern, the NV tool runs entirely in the browser client, without relying on any server-side functionality, and without loading any non-local resources. We were able to achieve this in a highly scalable implementation by combining several existing components, including the crossfilter data model library and the d3 library for data-driven DOM manipulation. We also developed a custom parser for the .nbe files, and related code to compare and merge these results. We were also able to handle these tasks in the browser with good performance. For additional peace-of-mind to any users, the entire tech-

nology stack is open source, and the NV tool itself will also soon be open sourced.(TODO make less 'meh')

One difficulty caused by the requirement of not leaking scan results was how to look up additional details about the results. Nessus provides an interface to access significant additional information about any specific vulnerability ID, including useful details such as related CVE and Bugrtaq IDs, and information about how to patch or otherwise address each issue. However, using this directly could still give an adversary significant information; if they could observe any of this traffic, then they could still learn which vulnerabilities are present. To address this, we build a local cache of this information, which the client can access offline.

The main treemap and the histograms were created using the d3 library [4], which is decigned for "apply[ing] data-driven transformations" to the Document Object Model (DOM). D3 is fast, flexible, and supports large datasets, which were our main requirements.

The crossfilter library [2], designed for accessing "large multivariate datasets in the browser", was used to store and access our Nessus scan results and all related information about the machines and subnets on the network. This handles the data entirely in memory, and handles storage and access in an efficient manner.

4. CASE STUDIES

We envision our system being useful for two types of use cases: The first is to analyze the current vulnerabilities associated with all machines on a network. This use case is to allow a system administrator to prioritize maintenance based on the value of the machines and the criticality of the vulnerabilities found on those machines using data from Nessus scans. The second use case is visualizing the changes to the vulnerability states of machines on a network after a system administrator performs maintenance.

4.1 Case Study 1: Dynamic Vulnerability State Network

The first use case for our system is to make it easier for administrators to visualize the state of all machines on a network before and after maintenance. The grouping functionality allows the administrator to group together related machines by subnet, purpose, or functionality. In this example, virtual system machines are grouped into three different categories: One group is a set of twenty-two workstations split between ten Fedora workstations and twelve Ubuntu workstations. The second group is a set of five servers that serve the Wordpress blogging software. The last grouping is a set of five Linux Apache PostgreSQL PHP (LAPP) servers. Initially all of these groupings contain serious vulnerabilities. The LAPP servers are running a poorly configured file transfer protocol (FTP) server and both the LAPP and Wordpress servers have simple root passwords which Nessus shows as a security hole. The majority of the workstations are properly configured save for two that contain multiple security holes. Both of these workstations are running outdated versions of the Ubuntu operating system and have vulnerabilities such as an FTP server that allows a remote user to execute arbitrary code, an incorrectly config-


Figure 4: Top level view showing the user's IP address groupings.

ured Windows file sharing software, weak secure shell (SSH) keys and a Samba server that is vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks.

While in the top level visualization mode the administrator's attention is drawn to the large LAPP server node. The size is an indication of the importance of the situation based on the number of security holes discovered, the severity of the security holes discovered, and the assigned criticality of the machines in the group, see Figure 4 The administrator can also use the histograms at the bottom of the visualization to quickly get an overview of the network's current issues. The histograms show the majority of the vulnerabilities have a low score and are unlikely to be particularly dangerous. When the administrator zooms into the LAPP Server node of the treemap they see that all five of the machines seem to be equally at risk. To gain further insight, the administrator zooms into the node for a specific machine where each node represents a port with an associated vulnerability. At this specific port node the administrator can click on a vulnerability ID and the tool will display information about the vulnerability and potential solutions in the right-most panel of the tool. In this situation the LAPP servers all have the same weak root password security hole. The system administrator will also find that the Wordpress servers suffer from the same weak password vulnerability as the LAPP servers.

When the administrator zooms back out to the group view and switches the visualization to severity mode, as in figure 5, the workstation's node grows bringing it into greater prominence. When the administrator zooms into the workstation group, they can see that two IP addresses have much larger and darker nodes than any of the other workstations. If they zoom into one of these IP addresses, they see that the most severe of the vulnerabilities are associated with ports 445 and 80. The administrator can examine each port node's child, seeing information about the specific vulnerabilities in the right-most panel, discovering that the machine is running a poorly configured Apache Web Server and that a Windows share that can be accessed through the network.

After further exploring their network, the administrator patches the most critical vulnerabilities in the system. The Nessus Vulnerability Visualization system provides functionality to

Figure 5: View showing vulnerabilities distributed across a LAPP Server's ports.

Figure 6: Top level view showing vulnerability differences between two points in time.

compare two nbe files to show changes between two vulnerability states, such as before and after applying patches. After patching their system the administrator can rescan the network and explore and see the differences between the previous state and the newly patched system. The Nessus Visualization System shows corrected vulnerabilities in green, the remaining vulnerabilities in orange, and any new vulnerabilities in purple. The system administrator can easily see that the major workstations vulnerabilities have been patched. Zooming into the workstation node the system administrator sees that while they were patching the most severe vulnerabilities they inadvertently opened new vulnerabilities on the two machines and did not address some of the vulnerabilities seen earlier.

After further exploring their network, the administrator patches the most critical vulnerabilities in the system. Table 1 shows the number of security notes and holes before and after maintenance. The Nessus Vulnerability Visualization system provides functionality to compare two nbe files to show changes between two vulnerability states, such as before and after applying patches. After patching their system the administrator can rescan the network, then explore and see the differences between the previous state and the newly patched system.

The Nessus Visualization System shows corrected vulnerabilities in green, the remaining vulnerabilities in orange, and any new vulnerabilities in pink, as in figure 6. The system administrator can easily see that the major workstations vulnerabilities have been patched. Zooming into the workstation node the system administrator sees that while they were patching the most severe vulnerabilities they inadvertently opened new vulnerabilities on the two machines and did not address some of the vulnerabilities seen earlier.

We simulated this use case using virtual machines (VM) communicating through a host-only network. Using a host-only network allowed us to use Nessus from the host to scan the VMs. We used one grouping of two different types of work station and two groupings of similar servers. Both

groups of servers were using Ubuntu 10.10 LTS. Ten of the Ubuntu workstations were using Ubuntu 11.10 while the two workstations with the massive number of vulnerabilities were using Ubuntu 8.04 with purposely unpatched and misconfigured software. The Fedora workstations were running Fedora 15. We used the Metasploitable virtual machine image to simulate the two vulnerable workstations before they were upgraded to 11.10.

In this use case we did not patch all security notes that Nessus mentioned because this would not be realistic for an actual system administrator. Instead, the system administrator would only handle the most important vulnerabilities and system updates. In this simulated use case we improved the weak root passwords and corrected the poorly configured FTP server seen on the servers. We focused on updating and correcting the two most vulnerable workstations by updating them to be at the same vulnerability level as the other ten Ubuntu workstations.

4.2 Case Study 2: Static Vulnerability State Network

To test visualizing a large static vulnerability state we use Nessus scan data from the VAST Challenge 2011 [1]. This data is from a simulated network for the fictitious All Freight Corporation. The VAST Challenge gives us a large network dataset to test how the Nessus Vulnerability Visualization scales to a large data set that contains many vulnerabilities spread across a variety of machines and groups. This data set has more than one hundred-fifty unique IP addresses associated with various workstations in the scan. The Nessus scan shows that numerous machines on the network have some sort of security hole such as incorrectly configured telnet client, a font driver that allows privilege escalation, and a vulnerability in an outdated version of Microsoft Excel. The All Freight Corporation has other machines and servers but they were not included in the Nessus scan data.

We split the workstations into six groups with criticality scores ranging from two to nine. The major security holes in the group are concentrated in group four with a criticality score of nine and in group five with a criticality score of two.

Name:Criticality	IP Addresses	Time Period	Security Notes	Security Holes	Security Holes
Workstations:2	192.168.56.x	Before Maintenance	680	18	18
		After Maintenance	507	0	0
LAPP Servers:9	192.168.57.x	Before Maintenance	205	5	5
		After Maintenance	200	0	0
Wordpress Servers:5	192.168.58.x	Before Maintenance	195	5	5
		After Maintenance	195	0	0

Table 1: The number of security notes and security holes by grouping before and after maintenance.

Figure 7: Top level view of the large VAST Challenge 2011 dataset.

Figure 8: Port level view of an All Freight Corporation workstation.

When the system administrator looks at the groups level on the tree map it is immediately obvious where their attention is needed most. The administrator can see in figure 7 that there are many high-scoring vulnerabilities that will require attention right away. Groups four and five dominate the treemap in all three visualization modes. When the system administrator zooms into group four, they see that most of the vulnerabilities are located on two IP addresses. When they select IP address 192.168.2.172, they see that nearly all of the vulnerabilities are associated with port 445 and a Windows file sharing program. The Nessus Vulnerability Visualization system makes the most critical and severe vulnerabilities most prominent in the visualization.

The system administrator can also explore the other dominate IP address 192.168.2.171 and see that this machines vulnerabilities come from port 139 and NetBIOS. The Nessus Vulnerability Visualization system makes the most critical and most severe vulnerabilities most prominent in the visualization. This exploration allows the system administrator to easily discover vulnerabilities in the system and prioritize repair accordingly. It also makes it easier to view large networks because the IP addresses are aggregated into nodes that can be expanded to view the individual IP addresses contained in that group. The system administrator can also explore the other dominate IP address 192.168.2.171 and see that this machines vulnerabilities come from port 139 and NetBIOS. This exploration allows the system administrator to easily discover vulnerabilities in the system and prioritize repair accordingly.

5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have introduced nv, a Nessus vulnerability visualization system.

Nv is designed to support sysadmins in the tasks of vulnerability discovery, analysis, and management through an interactive visualization.

6. REFERENCES
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