134. Is happiness having what you want, wanting what you have, or both?.txt

PS YC HOLOGICA L SC IENCE

Research Article

Is Happiness Having What You
Want, Wanting What You Have,
or Both?
Jeff T. Larsen1 and Amie R. McKibban2
1

Texas Tech University and 2Wichita State University

ABSTRACT—Rabbi

Hyman Schachtel (1954) proposed that
‘‘happiness is not having what you want, but wanting what
you have’’ (p. 37). In two studies, we tested Schachtel’s
maxim by asking participants whether or not they had and
the extent to which they wanted each of 52 material items.
To quantify how much people wanted what they had, we
identified what they had and the extent to which they
wanted those things. To quantify how much people had
what they wanted, we identified how much they wanted
and whether or not they had each item. Both variables
accounted for unique variance in happiness. Moreover, the
extent to which people wanted what they had partially
mediated effects of gratitude and maximization on happiness, and the extent to which they had what they wanted
partially mediated the effect of maximization. Results indicate that happiness is both wanting what you have and
having what you want.
Happiness is not having what you want, but wanting what you
have.
—Rabbi Hyman Schachtel (1954, p. 37)

Discrepancy theories of well-being contend that happiness
depends on the extent to which people have what they want (e.g.,
Michalos, 1985). For instance, most people presumably want
money, and those who make more money tend to be slightly
happier (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). Moreover, the
effect of income on happiness is strongest among those who are
particularly interested in acquiring wealth (Nickerson, Schwarz,
Diener, & Kahneman, 2003). Such findings are consistent with
the hypothesis that people who have what they want are happier
Address correspondence to Jeff T. Larsen, Department of Psychology,
Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409-2051, e-mail: jeff.larsen@
ttu.edu.

Volume 19—Number 4

than others. From Schachtel’s (1954) perspective, however, individuals who acquire the wealth they seek may be happy not
because they have what they want, but because they want what
they have.
For Schachtel’s maxim to constitute a testable hypothesis, the
extent to which people want what they have and the extent to
which they have what they want must be both distinct and
quantifiable. However wise the maxim sounds, it may not even
be clear what it means for people to want what they have as
opposed to have what they want. Fortunately, probability theory
clarifies what it means for people to want what they have and
have what they want, and it provides a framework for measuring
these variables. Let us first quantify the extent to which people
want what they have. Let Have represent the set of material items
that an individual has (e.g., bed, stereo, car; see the shaded area
in Fig. 1) and Want represent the material items that the individual wants (see the dotted area in Fig. 1). The extent to which
the individual wants what he or she has is provided by the following conditional probability:
pðWantjHaveÞ ¼ pðHave \ WantÞ=pðHaveÞ;
where \ refers to the intersection of Have and Want (as depicted by the area in Fig. 1 that is both shaded and dotted).
Replacing p(Have) with p(Want) provides the extent to which the
individual has what he or she wants:
pðHavejWantÞ ¼ pðHave \ WantÞ=pðWantÞ:
In sum, the extent to which people want what they have and
the extent to which they have what they want are quantifiable
and distinct in that they represent conditional probabilities with
common numerators but different denominators. As a result,
Schachtel’s maxim is testable. In this article, we report two
studies investigating the relationships among wanting what one
has, having what one wants, and happiness. Schachtel’s either/or
approach to the sources of happiness is remarkably parsimonious, but happiness is known to be multiply determined (Diener

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Having, Wanting, and Happiness

6 items dealing with relationships (e.g., ‘‘boyfriend/girlfriend’’).
These 8 items were also excluded from all analyses. In sum, the
survey contained a total of 62 items, but analyses were based on
data from only 52 of those items.
STUDY 1

Fig. 1. A hypothetical individual’s haves and wants. The shaded area,
Have, represents the set of material items that the individual has, and the
dotted area, Want, represents the set of items that the individual wants.
The dotted and shaded area represents the items that the individual both
has and wants.

et al., 1999). Thus, we held out the possibility that happiness
may be associated with wanting what one has, having what one
wants, neither, or both.
PILOT STUDY

We conducted a pilot study to identify a representative sample of
material items that members of our participant population have
and want. Fifty Texas Tech University students (36 women, 14
men) participated for course credit. They were asked to list
‘‘items that you have in your life, as well as items that you want.’’
A page labeled ‘‘Items that I have’’ contained five categories:
‘‘material possessions,’’ ‘‘interpersonal relationships,’’ ‘‘abilities
and/or traits,’’ ‘‘accomplishments and/or work,’’ and ‘‘other.’’
Each category had eight blank lines. Another page was identical
except it was labeled ‘‘Items that I want.’’ The order of the two
pages was counterbalanced. Participants were asked to list
things that it was feasible to have at ‘‘this stage in your life.’’ On
average, participants generated 6.76 (SD 5 1.66) material items
that they had and 4.31 (SD 5 2.59) material items that they
wanted.
In order to create the Have/Want Survey for Studies 1 and 2,
we culled 62 items that were listed by at least 2 participants,
without regard for whether they were listed as haves or wants.1
The 54 material items in this list loosely fell into various categories, including vehicles (e.g., ‘‘car’’), housing (e.g., ‘‘apartment’’), appliances (e.g., ‘‘microwave’’), electronics (e.g., ‘‘cell
phone’’), apparel (e.g., ‘‘athletic shoes’’), and furniture (e.g.,
‘‘bed’’). Two of these items were excluded from all analyses:
‘‘iPod’’ (because we later learned that this was redundant with
‘‘MP3 player’’) and ‘‘eyeglasses’’ (because, in hindsight, it is
unclear why individuals with 20/20 vision would want corrective
eyeglasses). Other categories yielded little serviceable data, but
interspersed among the material items were ‘‘job,’’ ‘‘major,’’ and
1
Several material items that had been listed by at least 2 pilot participants
were omitted from the survey because they were overly general (e.g., ‘‘shelter’’),
overly specific (e.g., ‘‘tennis shoes’’), or overly gender-specific (e.g., ‘‘purse’’).

372

To examine whether wanting what one has or having what one
wants predicts happiness, we asked participants in Study 1 to
indicate whether they had and wanted the items identified in the
pilot study and to complete a measure of happiness. Wanting
what you have and having what you want may also help explain
why other variables predict happiness. One possibility is that
grateful people tend to be happier than others (McCullough,
Emmons, & Tsang, 2002) because they want what they have
more than less grateful people do. To test this hypothesis, we
included the gratitude measure developed by McCullough et al.
(2002).
Method
Participants
Participants were 126 Texas Tech undergraduates (70 women,
56 men).
Materials
For each item included in the Have/Want Survey, participants
answered two questions, beginning with the dichotomous (i.e.,
yes/no) question, ‘‘Do you have a __?’’ This question was followed by ‘‘If YES: To what extent do you want the __ that you
have?’’ and ‘‘If NO: To what extent do you want a __?’’ Participants answered the latter two questions on 9-point scales
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (a lot). Wants were rescaled to
range from 0 to 8 for all analyses. Participants also completed
several individual difference measures, including the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985;
a 5 .85), a five-item measure of subjective well-being, and the
six-item Gratitude Questionnaire (McCullough et al., 2002; a 5
.83).
Quantifying the Extent to Which People Want What They Have
Figure 2 depicts two hypothetical profiles of haves and wants.
Shaded areas represent items the individuals have, and numbers
ranging from 0 to 8 represent the extent to which the individuals
want each item. If wants are dichotomized (i.e., 0 5 does not
want; 1–8 5 want, indicated by the dotted area in Fig. 2), the
proportion of individuals’ possessions that they want represents
the extent to which they want what they have. For both hypothetical individuals in Figure 2, this value is provided by the
following conditional probability:
pðWantjHaveÞ ¼ pðHave \ WantÞ=pðHaveÞ ¼ 2=6 ¼ :33:
Schachtel would presumably recommend that people greatly,
as opposed to scarcely, want each of the things they have. To

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Jeff T. Larsen and Amie R. McKibban

and
1þ2
3
¼
¼ :08;
1 þ 2 þ 3 þ 4 þ 4 þ 5 þ 6 þ 7 þ 8 40

Fig. 2. Two hypothetical individuals’ profiles of haves and wants for 36
items. In each illustration, the items with a shaded background are those
that the individual has, and the items with a dotted background are those
that the individual wants. The numbers represent the extent to which the
individual wants each item.

weight the conditional probability accordingly, we simply averaged the extent to which participants wanted each of their
possessions and divided this average by the maximum want
rating, 8. For the hypothetical individuals represented by the
left and right panels of Figure 2, these scores, which can range
from 0 to 1, are
ð0 þ 0 þ 0 þ 0 þ 7 þ 8Þ=6 15=6
¼
¼ :31
8
8
and
ð0 þ 0 þ 0 þ 0 þ 1 þ 2Þ=6 3=6
¼
¼ :06;
8
8
respectively. Thus, participants who greatly wanted the things
they had (like the person represented by the left panel in Fig. 2)
received higher scores than those who only scarcely wanted the
things they had (like the person represented by the right panel in
Fig. 2). These scores resemble conditional probabilities in that
they reflect how many items individuals want conditional on
their having those items. However, these scores are also affected
by how much individuals want each of the items they have. Thus,
these scores can be termed weighted conditional probability
scores.
Quantifying the Extent to Which People Have What They Want
We also computed weighted conditional probability scores
representing the extent to which participants had what they
wanted. If wants are dichotomized, the proportion of individuals’
desired items that they have represents the extent to which they
have what they want. For both hypothetical individuals depicted
in Figure 2,
pðHavejWantÞ ¼ pðHave \ WantÞ=pðWantÞ ¼ 2=9 ¼ :22:
To weight the scores by how much individuals wanted each
item, we divided the sum of the extent to which they wanted each
of their possessions by the sum of the extent to which they want
all 52 items. This calculation yielded weighted conditional
probability scores that could range from 0 to 1. For the hypothetical individuals represented by the left and right panels of
Figure 2, these scores are
7þ8
15
¼
¼ :38
1 þ 2 þ 3 þ 4 þ 4 þ 5 þ 6 þ 7 þ 8 40

Volume 19—Number 4

respectively. Thus, participants who had only what they greatly
desired (like the person represented by the left panel in Fig. 2)
received higher scores than those who had only the things they
scarcely desired (like the person represented by the right panel
in Fig. 2).
Caveat
One potential limitation of our weighted conditional probability
scores is that they weight each item equally even though people’s
construals of some items (e.g., cars) are presumably more consequential than their construals of other items (e.g., rollerblades). In that we took care to construct a large, representative
set of items, these scores should nonetheless provide reasonable
estimates of the extent to which participants generally wanted
what they had and had what they wanted.

Results
Participants tended to be quite happy (M 5 25.2 out of 35.0,
SD 5 6.3), to have slightly more than half the items in the Have/
Want Survey (M 5 58%, SD 5 8%), and to want the items listed
on the survey to a fairly large degree (M 5 5.09 out of 8.00, SD 5
0.77). In addition, they generally wanted what they had (M 5
.78, SD 5 .11) and had what they wanted (M 5 .72, SD 5 .12).
The extent to which people were happy, wanted what they had,
and had what they wanted were negatively skewed, so we applied square-root transformations to these variables for all correlational analyses. The extent to which people wanted what
they had and the extent to which they had what they wanted were
positively, but not perfectly, correlated, r 5 .42, prep > .99.2
Thus, wanting what you have and having what you want, though
clearly related, are conceptually and empirically distinct.
As suggested by Schachtel’s maxim, participants who wanted
what they had more than others did tended to be happier, r 5 .36,
prep > .99 (see Fig. 3, left panel). In addition, however, those who
had more of what they wanted tended to be happier, r 5 .41, prep
> .99 (see Fig. 3, right panel), as did those who simply had more
things, r 5 .25, prep 5 .97. In contrast, the extent to which people
simply wanted things was uncorrelated with happiness, r 5 .11.3
2
Unless noted, all reported effects were significant at the .05 level. Isolated
gender effects were obtained, but none were replicated across both studies.
Moreover, Fisher z tests revealed no effects of gender on the magnitude of any
simple or partial correlations reported.
3
It is possible that simply wanting things is uncorrelated with happiness
because the positive effect of wanting what one has is nullified by a negative
effect of wanting what one does not have. To examine this possibility, we
computed weighted conditional probability scores reflecting the extent to which
participants wanted things they did not have. As expected, the extent to which
people wanted what they did not have was negatively correlated with happiness,
r 5 .30, prep 5 .99. This effect was replicated in Study 2, r 5 .23, prep 5 .94.

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Satisfaction With Life

Having, Wanting, and Happiness

35

35

30

30

25

25

20

20

15

15

10

10

5

Study 1
Study 2

5
.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9 1.0

.3

Wanting What You Have

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

1.0

Having What You Want

Fig. 3. Satisfaction With Life scores as a function of the extent to which participants wanted what they had (left panel)
and had what they wanted (right panel). Untransformed values from both studies are plotted.

We computed several partial correlations to examine which of
the three significant predictors of happiness accounted for
unique variance. The number of things people had did not
predict happiness after we controlled for the extent to which they
wanted what they had, pr 5 .16; had what they wanted, pr 5
.09; or both, pr 5 .09 (all ps  .08). In contrast, people who
wanted what they had more than others did tended to be happier
even after we controlled for the number of things they had and
the extent to which they had what they wanted, pr 5 .23, prep 5
.95. Similarly, those who had what they wanted more than others
did tended to be happier even after we controlled for the number
of things they had and the extent to which they wanted what they
had, pr 5 .27, prep 5 .98. Thus, both participants’ wanting what
they had and having what they wanted accounted for unique
variance. In other words, the results indicate that happiness is,
in part, both wanting what you have and having what you want.
The distribution of scores on the Gratitude Questionnaire was
J-shaped, so these data were submitted to an arcsine transformation. As in the study by McCullough et al. (2002), more
grateful individuals tended to be happier, r 5 .42, prep > .99.
They also tended to want what they had more, r 5 .40, prep > .99.
To investigate whether the extent to which people wanted what
they had mediated gratitude’s effect on happiness, we conducted
a Sobel test (Sobel, 1982, cited in Baron & Kenny, 1986) using
Preacher and Hayes’s (2004, 2006) bootstrapping procedure.
The analysis, which comprised 5,000 bootstrap samples, revealed an indirect effect of the extent to which people want what
they have on happiness, z 5 2.37, prep 5 .93, as well as a direct
effect of gratitude on happiness, t(123) 5 3.79, prep > .99.
Additional regression analyses indicated that gratitude accounted for 18% of the variance in happiness before, but only
10% after, controlling for the extent to which people wanted
what they had. These findings indicate that more grateful people
tend to be happier in part because they want what they have
more.

374

STUDY 2

Schwartz et al. (2002) found that maximizers, people who accept
nothing less than the best, tend to be less happy than satisficers,
people who are content with suboptimal but acceptable outcomes. Perhaps maximizers are less happy because they are less
satisfied with what they have. It is also possible that they are less
happy because they do not have as much of what they want. To
test these hypotheses, in Study 2 we included the maximization
scale developed by Schwartz et al.
Schachtel viewed wanting what you have as a virtue. An alternative view is that wanting what you have is a state of complacency that results in a type of empty happiness. If individuals
who want what they have are complacent, they should be less
likely than others to have a sense of purpose in life and to desire
personal growth. To test these hypotheses, in Study 2 we examined the relationship between wanting what one has and
scores on the Purpose in Life Subscale of Ryff ’s (1989) Multidimensional Measure of Psychological Well-Being. We also
examined the relationship between wanting what one has and
scores on two measures of the desire for personal growth, Ryff ’s
Personal Growth Subscale from the Multidimensional Measure
of Psychological Well-Being and Robitschek’s (1998) Personal
Growth Initiative Scale.
Method
Participants
Participants were 119 Texas Tech undergraduates (54 women,
65 men).
Materials
As in Study 1, participants completed the Have/Want Survey,
the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985; a 5 .84),
and the Gratitude Questionnaire (McCullough et al., 2002;

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Jeff T. Larsen and Amie R. McKibban

a 5 .82). In addition, they completed the Maximization Scale
(Schwartz et al., 2002; a 5 .60), the Purpose in Life (a 5 .89)
and Personal Growth (a 5 .92) subscales of Ryff ’s (1989)
measure of psychological well-being, and the Personal Growth
Initiative Scale (Robitschek, 1998; a 5 .89). Surveys were
presented in five different random orders.

Results
We first examined whether the findings of Study 2 replicated
those of Study 1.4 Participants tended to be quite happy (M 5
25.6, SD 5 5.8), to have more than half the items on the Have/
Want Survey (M 5 57%, SD 5 8%), and to want the items listed
on the survey to a fairly large degree (M 5 6.26, SD 5 0.73).
Moreover, they generally wanted what they had (M 5 .78, SD 5
.09) and had what they wanted (M 5 .72, SD 5 .11). As in Study
1, the extent to which participants wanted what they had and the
extent to which they had what they wanted were correlated, r 5
.34, prep > .99. Participants who wanted what they had more than
others did tended to be happier, r 5 .40, prep > .99 (see Fig. 3,
left panel), as did those who had more of what they wanted, r 5
.36, prep > .99 (see Fig. 3, right panel), and those who simply had
more things, r 5 .22, prep 5 .93. Simply wanting things, however,
was uncorrelated with happiness, r 5 .13.
Analyses designed to identify whether having things, wanting
what one has, and having what one wants accounted for unique
variance in happiness also replicated those of Study 1. The
number of things people had did not predict happiness after we
controlled for the extent to which they wanted what they had,
pr 5 .15; had what they wanted, pr 5 .03; or both, pr 5 .02. In
contrast, people who wanted what they had more than others did
tended to be happier even after we controlled for the number of
things they had and the extent to which they had what they
wanted, pr 5 .32, prep > .99. Similarly, people who had what they
wanted more than others did tended to be happier even after we
controlled for the number of things they had and the extent to
which they wanted what they had, pr 5 .21, prep 5 .92. As in
Study 1, more grateful individuals tended to be happier, r 5 .54,
prep > .99, and to want what they had more, r 5 .21, prep 5 .92.
Moreover, a Sobel test calculated with Preacher and Hayes’s
(2004, 2006) bootstrapping procedure revealed that the extent to
which participants wanted what they had partially mediated
gratitude’s effect on happiness, z 5 1.99, prep 5 .88. In sum, both
Study 1 and Study 2 indicate that wanting what you have and
having what you want both account for unique variance in
happiness and that more grateful individuals are happier in part
because they tend to want what they have more.
As demonstrated by Schwartz et al. (2002), maximizers tended
to be less happy than satisficers, r 5 .24, prep 5 .95. Moreover,
maximizers tended to want what they had less than satisficers
did, r 5 .24, prep 5 .96, and to have less of what they wanted,
4

All transformations applied in Study 1 were also applied in Study 2.

Volume 19—Number 4

r 5 .23, prep 5 .95. Preacher and Hayes’s (2006) bootstrapping
procedure allows for tests of whether relationships are mediated
by multiple variables. Thus, we used their procedure to examine
whether the effect of maximization on happiness was mediated
by the extent to which people had what they wanted, wanted
what they had, or both. The analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of the extent to which participants wanted what they
had, z 5 2.11, prep 5 .90, and a marginally significant indirect
effect of the extent to which they had what they wanted, z 5
1.85, p 5 .06, prep 5 .86. Thus, maximizers tended to be less
happy in part because they wanted what they had less and,
perhaps, because they had less of what they wanted.5
We also investigated the relationships between wanting
what one has and measures of purpose in life and the desire for
personal growth (scores on these measures were submitted
to square-root transformations to correct for negative skew).
Wanting what one has was positively correlated with Ryff ’s
(1989) Purpose in Life and Personal Growth subscales and with
Robitschek’s (1998) Personal Growth Initiative Scale, rs 5 .36,
.19, and .26, respectively, all preps  .88. Thus, people who want
what they have do not appear to be complacent. To the contrary,
it appears that they seek purpose and growth in their lives even
as they appreciate what they have.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Two studies tested Rabbi Schachtel’s maxim that happiness is
not having what you want, but wanting what you have. Results
indicate that Schachtel was both right and wrong. He was right in
that people who want what they have more than others do tend to
be happier; he was wrong in that people who have more of what
they want than others do also tend to be happier. Indeed, both
the extent to which participants wanted what they had and the
extent to which they had what they wanted accounted for
unique variance in happiness. In contrast, simply wanting things
was uncorrelated with happiness, and simply having things
accounted for no additional variance in happiness after we
controlled for the extent to which people wanted what they had
or had what they wanted. Thus, the effect of possessions on wellbeing depends on how people value those possessions, a finding
that speaks to the subjectivity of well-being.
Our results also indicate that the extent to which people want
what they have and the extent to which they have what they want
help explain why other individual differences are associated
with happiness. By asking people whether they had and wanted
various material items, we had an opportunity to investigate
whether individuals who think they are grateful are indeed
grateful. Our finding that individuals who score high on the
gratitude measure of McCullough et al. (2002) also tend to want
5
In that maximizers wanted what they had less than satisficers did and grateful
individuals wanted what they had more than nongrateful people did, we expected
maximizers to be less grateful than satisficers. This was not the case, r 5
.06.

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Having, Wanting, and Happiness

what they have suggests that people’s subjective sense of their
gratefulness is objectively accurate. We also found that people
who perceive themselves as being satisfied with nothing less
than the best (i.e., maximizers; Schwartz et al., 2002) are, for
instance, less content than others with what they have. Moreover, our findings that the effect of gratitude on happiness is
partially mediated by wanting what one has and that the effect of
maximization on happiness is partially mediated by both
wanting what one has and having what one wants help delineate
the mechanisms by which happiness is attained by grateful
people but eluded by maximizers.
Potential Moderators
Future research should investigate the extent to which our results generalize beyond North American undergraduates. Income has a stronger effect on happiness among the poor than
among the wealthy (Diener & Suh, 1997). Thus, simply having
things and having what one wants may emerge as more important
predictors of happiness among the poor. Cultural variables may
also moderate the effects of wanting what one has and having
what one wants on well-being. In a book titled How to Want
What You Have, Miller (1995), a psychotherapist, argued that all
major religions admonish their followers to want what they have.
Indeed, the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists, reiterated Rabbi Schachtel’s maxim by suggesting that
the key to happiness ‘‘is not to have what we want but rather to
want and appreciate what we have’’ (Dalai Lama & Cutler, 1998;
p. 29). Srivastava and Misra (2003), however, contended that
one of Hinduism’s basic precepts is that happiness can be obtained only by abandoning wants. If so, simply wanting things
may be negatively associated with happiness among Hindus,
and the effects of having what one wants and wanting what one
has may be attenuated or even reversed in that population.
Maintaining Happiness
Increases in happiness elicited by favorable life events (e.g.,
winning the lottery) tend to diminish over time (Brickman,
Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978). This tendency has been attributed to a hedonic treadmill (Brickman & Campbell, 1971),
such that people tend to stop wanting the desirable possessions
they have acquired. Kahneman (1999) suggested that people
might also succumb to a satisfaction treadmill. By this account,
even if individuals with newfound wealth continue to want their
newly acquired possessions, they may adopt a higher aspiration
level for hedonic experiences and, as a result, find new things
that they want but do not have. Our results suggest that people
may be able to avoid the hedonic treadmill by continuing to want
what they have and to avoid the satisfaction treadmill by continuing to have what they want.6 Stronger tests of these hypotheses would require having individuals complete the Have/
6

We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the latter possibility.

376

Want Survey on several occasions over time. Though most
people may become happier as they accumulate the things they
want, those who continue to want those things and avoid discovering new things to want may experience sustained increases
in happiness. Implicit in this analysis is that people should want
what they have. This was certainly the spirit of Schachtel’s
prescription for happiness, and it might make sense for most
individuals in developed countries. We would find it absurd,
however, to encourage individuals struggling with poverty to be
content with their lot in life.
Conclusion
Some years ago, a popular bumper sticker in the United States
declared, ‘‘He who dies with the most toys wins.’’ Whatever
rewards await those who die with the most toys, our results indicate that the American undergraduates who are happiest in
this life are not necessarily those who amass great numbers of
things. Rather, they are those who both have the things they want
and want the things they have.
Acknowledgments—The authors thank Erin Hardin, Jonathan
Levav, Peter McGraw, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts and Erin Hardin and Kristopher Preacher
for statistical advice.
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