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03ROME4746 | ||
GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN | ||
Fri Oct 17 00:00:00 +0200 2003 | ||
CONFIDENTIAL | ||
Embassy Rome | ||
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 004746 | ||
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SIPDIS | ||
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2013 | ||
TAGS: ECPS ETRD IT TSPA TSPL PREL EUN | ||
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SUBJECT: GALILEO/M-CODE: INCREASED HIGH-LEVEL ITALIAN | ||
ATTENTION -- BUT NO ANSWERS | ||
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CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MEL SEMBLER FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D) | ||
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¶1. (C) AT THE END OF AN OCTOBER 9 MEETING ON ANOTHER SUBJECT | ||
WITH PM BERLUSCONI'S CLOSEST ADVISOR, PRIME MINISTRY | ||
UNDERSECRETARY GIANNI LETTA, AMBASSADOR SEMBLER TOOK THE | ||
OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THE USG'S CONTINUED GREAT CONCERN OVER | ||
LACK OF PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THE GALILEO/M-CODE OVERLAY | ||
DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EU. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD LETTA BLUNTLY | ||
THAT THE DISPUTE RISKS BECOMING A TRAIN WRECK ON ITALY'S EU | ||
WATCH UNLESS MORE CONCERTED POLITICAL-LEVEL ATTENTION IS | ||
GIVEN TO THE ISSUE. THE USG FELT THAT THAT AMERICAN | ||
TECHNICAL EXPERTS HAD PROVIDED COMMISSION EXPERTS WITH | ||
EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL BRIEFINGS, WHICH HAD | ||
DEMONSTRATED PERSUASIVELY THAT NON-OVERLAY SPECTRAL OPTIONS | ||
EXIST, WHICH WILL NOT DEGRADE GALILEO CAPABILITIES. | ||
NEVERTHELESS, THE COMMISSION AND EU GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN | ||
UNWILLING TO TAKE THE POLITICAL STEP TO DRAW THE OBVIOUS | ||
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS. | ||
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¶2. (C) LETTA RESPONDED THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ITALIAN | ||
GOVERNMENT WERE IN FACT PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO GALILEO. | ||
IN THE PRIME MINISTRY, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR GIOVANNI | ||
CASTELANETTA HAD BEEN BRIEFING PM BERLUSCONI REGULARLY. | ||
LETTA ALSO NOTED THAT DURING CABINET MEETINGS DEFENSE | ||
MINISTER MARTINO HAD SPOKEN OPENLY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. | ||
POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, LETTA OFFERED NO CLEAR INDICATION OF | ||
WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE GOI PLANNED TO TAKE WITHIN | ||
THE EU. | ||
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¶3. (C) IN A SEPARATE MEETING OCTOBER 14 WITH ECMIN, AGAIN ON | ||
ANOTHER SUBJECT, GENERAL LEONARDO TRICARICO (THE PRIME | ||
MINISTER'S MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISOR) TOOK THE INITIATIVE | ||
TO RAISE THE MATTER OF GALILEO. ECMIN REVIEWED USG CONCERNS | ||
FOR TRICARICO, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH | ||
LETTA. ALTHOUGH HE ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RECENT | ||
MEETINGS IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON, AND WAS CLEARLY ANXIOUS | ||
ABOUT THE LACK OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN U.S.-EU DISCUSSIONS, | ||
TRICARICO WAS AT A LOSS TO SUGGEST WHAT ACTIONS ITALY SHOULD | ||
OR COULD TAKE. | ||
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¶4. (C) COMMENT: LETTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION | ||
ITALIAN MINISTERS -- INCLUDING THE PM -- ARE GIVING THE | ||
GALILEO/M-CODE DISPUTE IS WELCOME NEWS. REPORTS OF DEFMIN | ||
MARTINO'S UNAMBIGUOUS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. POSITION IS | ||
WELCOME, AND CONFIRMS WHAT HE HAS TOLD US. (BUT MARTINO HAS | ||
ALSO BEEN QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT HE NEEDS KEY ALLIES, SUCH | ||
AS LETTA, IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN THE INTERMINISTERIAL | ||
PROCESS.) NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT THE | ||
GOI HAS ANY GAME PLAN ON HOW TO PREVENT THE WRONG OUTCOME AT | ||
THE IMPORTANT DECEMBER MEETING OF EU TRANSPORT MINISTERS. | ||
EMBASSY STANDS READY TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE GOI AT THE | ||
HIGHEST LEVELS ON GALILEO AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES WORK OUT THE | ||
NEXT STEPS IN OUR STRATEGY. END COMMENT. | ||
SEMBLER | ||
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NNNN | ||
2003ROME04746 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL | ||
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" |
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06MONTEVIDEO418 | ||
VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED | ||
Thu May 11 00:00:00 +0200 2006 | ||
CONFIDENTIAL | ||
Embassy Montevideo | ||
VZCZCXYZ0000 | ||
RR RUEHWEB | ||
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DE RUEHMN #0418/01 1311501 | ||
ZNY CCCCC ZZH | ||
R 111501Z MAY 06 | ||
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO | ||
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5754 | ||
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE | ||
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY SANTIAGO 2848 | ||
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL | ||
RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC | ||
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC | ||
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC | ||
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC,C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000418 | ||
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SIPDIS | ||
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SIPDIS | ||
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DEPT FOR WHA/AS SHANNON AND EB/AS WAYNE | ||
DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, CROFT AND MURRAY | ||
DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR | ||
TREASURY FOR OASIA FOR DOUGLAS | ||
COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC BASTIAN | ||
NSC FOR FISK AND CRONIN | ||
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD | ||
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 | ||
TAGS: ETRD ECON PREL UY | ||
SUBJECT: VAZQUEZ LOBBIES HARD FOR TRADE TALKS WITH U.S. WORKING GROUPS FORMED | ||
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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James D. Nealon | ||
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). | ||
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¶1. (C) Summary: President Vazquez appears to have wasted no | ||
time in pushing his trade agenda. At the May 8 Cabinet | ||
meeting, he recounted the results of his ten-day trip to the | ||
U.S. and Mexico, and of his meeting with POTUS on May 4. He | ||
advocated for expanded trade talks with the U.S., which he | ||
said could eventually lead to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). | ||
His Cabinet strongly supported Vazquez in this endeavor, with | ||
11 ministers in favor and only two against (ForMin Gargano | ||
and Communist Minister for Social Development Arismendi). | ||
Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra, who had | ||
accompanied Vazquez on the trip, to get a first-hand account | ||
of the GOU's next steps. Lepra confirmed the overwhelming | ||
Cabinet support and requested that we provide some | ||
information on specific benefits of trade agreements for | ||
public consumption. He confirmed that the GOU was looking at | ||
its FTA with Mexico as a model to start talks (Note: Post is | ||
translating this agreement for USTR. End Note.) He added | ||
that he would lead a committee of five ministers to oversee | ||
the trade talks, and he provided the names of the members of | ||
the technical negotiating team. When reminded of the | ||
importance of a clear leader to head this technical team, | ||
Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call Economy | ||
Minister Astori. After the conversation with Astori, he told | ||
Charge that they had decided upon EconMin Director of Trade | ||
Sarachaga as the team leader. This would be confirmed after | ||
discussing the issue with Vazquez at the next Cabinet meeting | ||
on May 15. It appears that Vazquez and his economic team | ||
have found more support for an FTA than they may have thought | ||
possible so early after their return and are capitalizing on | ||
the momentum. End Summary. | ||
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¶2. (C) On Monday May 8, shortly after his return, President | ||
Vazquez called a Cabinet meeting to inform his ministers | ||
about his ten-day trip to the U.S. and Mexico. Vazquez is | ||
reported to have explained his vision of an increased trade | ||
relationship with the U.S., leading to a possible FTA by | ||
October. According to Vice-President Novoa and Industry | ||
Minister Lepra, 11 out of 13 ministers expressed their | ||
support for Vazquez's vision, with only Foreign Minister | ||
Gargano (Socialist) and Social Development Minister Arismendi | ||
(Communist) dissenting. According to the reports, Astori led | ||
a strong, well-founded defense of the advantages of an FTA, | ||
while Gargano threatened to resign if an FTA was ever signed | ||
with the U.S. It appears that the level of support that | ||
Vazquez garnered in this first Cabinet meeting was stronger | ||
than expected. On the public front, the left-leaning daily | ||
La Republica was unusually supportive, with overall favorable | ||
reporting under a headline claiming that "The Government | ||
pressed on the accelerator to make good on commercial | ||
agreement with the U.S." A poll conducted by El Pais | ||
indicated a strong majority of public support for a trade | ||
agreement with the U.S. | ||
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¶3. (C) Charge met on May 10 with Industry Minister Lepra to | ||
get a better understanding of the GOU's plans and to | ||
coordinate actions. Lepra was very upbeat about the trip and | ||
about the prospects for an FTA. He relished in the increased | ||
isolation in which ForMin Gargano was finding himself. Lepra | ||
and Charge agreed to coordinate public stance regarding the | ||
ongoing negotiations, to ensure that the Embassy not move | ||
ahead of President Vazquez. Lepra confirmed that the model | ||
FTA that the GOU favored was the Uruguay-Mexico FTA, ""for | ||
political reasons"". This agreement was supported by the | ||
entire political spectrum, he explained, and by Uruguay's | ||
Mercosur partners. In addition, Lepra noted that the | ||
Uruguay-Mexico FTA, signed in 2004, is a third-generation | ||
agreement based on an improved NAFTA model. Charge confirmed | ||
that post was in the process of translating this document so | ||
that USTR may compare it with our latest FTA. Lepra then | ||
requested our assistance in providing him with information | ||
about our FTA with Vietnam, not because it is a particularly | ||
good FTA, he noted, but rather to counter opposition from the | ||
Communist Party. "If Communist Vietnam, after fighting a | ||
brutal war against the U.S., can turn around and sign an | ||
FTA," he explained, "how can our Communists be against it?" | ||
Lepra also requested information on job creation, investment | ||
and poverty reduction brought about by FTAs, again for the | ||
GOU's campaign to build up public support. Charge pledged to | ||
provide the information. Post would appreciate any and all | ||
such information to be shared with the GOU. | ||
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¶4. (C) Lepra said he would lead a political committee of five | ||
ministers (Industry, Economy, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs | ||
and Tourism), responsible for the trade talks. He also had a | ||
technical negotiating team in mind, but was still unclear as | ||
to who would lead this team. Charge noted the importance of | ||
a solid negotiating team, with clear lines of authority, | ||
given the short time frame in which negotiations were to be | ||
conducted. Lepra immediately picked up the phone to call | ||
EconMin Astori, with whom he agreed to have EconMin Trade | ||
Director Sarachaga lead the negotiating team. He and Astori | ||
would confirm their choice after the next Cabinet meeting on | ||
May 15, he said. | ||
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¶5. (C) Comment: Clearly, Vazquez has returned from the U.S. | ||
in a strengthened position to initiate trade talks and is | ||
making the best out of the momentum he has encountered. The | ||
GOU appears to be keenly aware of the tight timeframe to | ||
negotiate an agreement and determined to make the most of | ||
this opportunity. Embassy will continue to be the | ||
interagency coordinator" for the GOU to ensure that no time | ||
is lost due to lack of focus on organizational details. End | ||
Comment. | ||
Nealon |
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