

A Background Guide for the
*Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant*



Dalton Model United Nations III

Saturday, April 25, 2015

Table of Contents

Letter from the Chair:	3
History of the Issue:	4
Mission Accomplished: The Iraq War:	4
A History of Violence: Contemporary Sunni-Shia Relations:	4
Zero Hour: The Maliki Government Following the Iraq War:	5
A Dessert Thorn: Al-Qaeda and the Seeds of ISIL:	6
Imperial Designs: ISIL Expansion:	7
A Tentative Reply: The American Response:	9
The Arsenal of Jihad: ISIL Military Capabilities:	10
The March of Empire: A Summary of the Present Situation:	11
Committee Positions: A Meeting of Giants:	12
Committee Structure:	20
Structure of Debate:	20
Instructions on Research:	22

Dalton Model United Nations

A LETTER FROM THE CHAIR

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the ISIL High Command.

As Secretary General of the Dalton Model United Nations team, I have been privileged with significant prior experience in the intricacies of crisis committees. During the first session of DMUN, I served as moderator on a simulation of the Second Chechen War and last year I chaired a rendition of the White House Situation Room 2016. Currently, I have chosen to direct one of the most face paced and ambitious committees in Model United Nations history.

I strongly encourage all delegates to expand their research beyond the background guide. As key leaders of the Islamic State, you will be dealing with the world's most pressing crises from an incredibly unique perspective. Few political entities in history have risen to prominence as quickly and threatened the existing geopolitical balance as seriously as ISIL. Instead of analyzing the caliphate as Western onlookers, you will negotiate peace, war, life, and death from within this perplexing and powerful organization. Enthusiasm, preparation, and alacrity will govern the future of the global order.

As ISIL is a sensitive topic for many, it is important that all committee members approach the simulation with poise and respect. In depth research, rather than perceptions based on what you have heard about ISIL in more informal settings, should guide the flow of debate. In such a high energy setting it is easy for delegates to lose themselves in the heat of committee, but given the nature of the material it is imperative that members ensure their words and actions will constructively impact the evolution of the simulation. Furthermore, the committee will touch on all the challenges and obstacles faced by the Islamic State, whether they be related to economics, military strategy, jurisprudence, diplomacy, or ideology. Note that as you are each representing real individuals with political agendas of their own, you will be working to advance your own goals as well as those of the ISIL high command as a whole. Alliance, secret deals, intrigue, and betrayal are all on the table. Any delegates who does not come prepared may quickly find themselves in mortal danger.

Alex Kaplan and Robert Freitag, sophomores and veteran delegates on the DMUN team, join me on the dais as your Crisis Directors. I hope to make this the pinnacle of your experience on the High School Model UN Circuit.

Please feel free to contact me with any questions, inquiries, suggestions, or requests.

The date is September 1, 2014. أمتي قد لاح فج.

Sincerely,
Philip Clark
Chair, ISIL: The Caliphate of the 21st Century
philip_clark@dalton.org

History of the Issue

Mission Accomplished: The Iraq War

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States (US), President George W. Bush launched the “War on Terror” -- an effort to eliminate terrorist groups worldwide. The first stages of this operation were based in Afghanistan, the headquarters of the terrorist group allegedly responsible for the attacks, al-Qaeda. The United States invaded Afghanistan with a coalition of several countries and ousted the Taliban, an Islamic regime which had harbored al-Qaeda since 1998 as well as dismantled most of the terrorist training camps in the country. The next and arguably most fractious stage in “Operation Enduring Freedom” occurred when the US and its allies, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland invaded Iraq on the 20th of March, 2003 on dubious grounds. The invasion used a “shock and awe” tactic, with a surprise attack and the lack of an official declaration of war. Saddam Hussein, the leader of the Iraqi Ba’athist government, was

captured in December of 2003, an event that led to the collapse of the Ba’athist regime. One of the Bush administration’s main justifications for the invasion of Iraq rested on the assertion that Iraq had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), capable of annihilating western livelihoods. This was later discovered to be false.

The Iraq War largely resulted in two tangible outcomes: a significant lessening of the capabilities of al-Qaeda, and the installation of democracy. Neither of these results have had stabilizing impacts, as al-Qaeda quickly rose to power again through a renewed insurgency which bled coalition troops, and the Iraqi Shia majority (roughly 60% of Iraq’s population) elected a government which would alienate most of the country’s other ethno-religious groups.

A History of Violence: Contemporary Sunni-Shia Relations

The Sunni-Shia dichotomy is one of the bloodiest conflicts between two religious groups in history. Rising out of the dispute over the appointment of the caliph following the death of

the Prophet Mohammed in 632 CE, Sunnis and Shia have had a vested hatred for each other for many centuries. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni: scholars have estimated that 85-90% of the world's Muslims are Sunni, while 10-15% are Shia. Iraq is a prime example of the hostility between the two groups, as it is one of the only countries which contains both large Shia and Sunni populations. Iraq has the third largest concentration of Shia Muslims in the world, following Iran and Azerbaijan. ISIL has formed in the Western deserts of Iraq, uniting the Sunni Muslims discriminated by the coalition-backed government in a Shia led country. The Shia, in turn, have been united by their fear of Sunni Muslims acting as violent terrorists, a claim seemingly substantiated by the presence of many Sunni terrorist groups in the region, such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, among others.

Zero Hour: The Maliki Government Following the Iraq War

Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister of 2011, met with American

President Barack Obama to finalize the withdrawal of all American troops from Iraq in December of that year. The move had garnered vast amounts of public support from a Western public weary of the decade-long conflict as well as Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq. The Obama administration, however, was unaware of a plot against al-Maliki's Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, the most senior Sunni official in a largely Shia government. The plot accused Hashimi's bodyguards of organizing anti-Shia terrorist attacks, an accusation which Hashimi continues to deny, and was executed on the very day of Maliki's visit to Washington. Hashimi's bodyguards would later go on to admitting to the terrorist attack; however, they had previously been held in an Iraqi prison known for using inhumane methods to extract information.¹

Maliki was quick to imprison all of Hashimi's bodyguards and remove Hashimi from his role in the government. Maliki's plot against Hashimi was just the beginning of a much larger and more radical attempt to discriminate against Sunnis across all of Iraq and consolidate Shia power. Soon after Hashimi's

¹ "The Rise of ISIS." Frontline, PBS Studios (New York: 2014).

bodyguards were taken into prison, Sunnis in Iraq began to be politically marginalized to an unprecedented extent. Military action was taken by Maliki's government to silence and kill hundreds of Sunnis, a maneuver which won him great approval from Shia factions while irreparably alienating Sunni Iraqis. Indeed, Sunnis immediately began to label Maliki as a brutal dictator, whereas the Shia were pleased that a leader was finally taking steps against what they thought to be a hostile sect of Islam. The Sunni population began to face extremely difficult economic circumstances as well, with youth unemployment reaching 40% during the harshest parts of Maliki's governance.² Sunni protests erupted against Maliki in addition to the establishment of several Sunni news stations that reported against Maliki and his actions.

A Desert Thorn: Al-Qaeda and the Seeds of ISIL

Following the Iraq war, Al-Qaeda's command and operational structure was seriously damaged wiped out due to sustained American military strikes. Few capable terrorist cells

remained, but those which did were the core members of the group hardened by the war who believed in the most radical interpretations of the Quran. As the US scaled back its troop presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, these individuals' influence grew.

Many factors contributed to al-Qaeda's growing power in 2012 and 2013, but the most tangible of these was the breakdown of a stable Syrian state as a result of the Syrian civil war and losses sustained by President Bashar al-Assad. With Syrian rebel groups gaining territory once held by the Syrian government fighting intensifying, Syria provided a perfect environment for al-Qaeda to act upon. The branch of al-Qaeda in Syria, known as al-Nusra Front, quickly formed an alliance of all anti-Assad rebel groups in order to take down the Assad regime. ISIL only became the group that it is today only after al-Qaeda operatives from Iraq went into Syria because it was there that they are able to operate smoothly and recruit. Their message gained traction with the Sunni's of Syria who were looking for tools to wage war against Assad's Alawite (a Shia sect) government. This powerful

² *Ibid.*

militant alliance soon morphed into the al-Nusra, and became another branch of the growing terrorist organization. Although al-Qaeda initially relied on funding from wealthy supporters in Syria, conscientious actions such as seizing more territory by cutting off major Syrian transportation routes, robbing banks, and eventually Syrian oil fields allowed them to be more self sufficient.

Significant criticism of the Obama administration's foreign policy has flowed from the President's lackluster response to the rise of al-Nusra and his tentative employment military tactics against it. President Obama's reluctance to deploy troops in the Middle East stemmed from the failure of American military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan and, according to critics, his overly cautious posture, although several officials, including US Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, urged the US to support more moderate Syrian rebel groups to fend off the expanding terrorist organization. President Obama believed that if the US supplied arms to even moderate Syrian rebel groups they might end up in the hands of organizations carrying the black banner of Islam though both the US Ambassadors to

Iraq and Syria as well as Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta opposed his decision.

Imperial Designs: ISIL Expansion

Throughout 2012, the United States remained inactive in supporting Syrian opposition groups, and during this time moderate factions lost strength and manpower. Meanwhile, former Al-Qaeda in Iraq members continued to seize territory, acquire greater strength and funds, and prepared to move back into Iraq. In a campaign called "Breaking the Walls," they launched a series of attacks on Iraq prisons and their numbers swelled with newly freed inmates. Then, in March 2013, amidst protests in the Iraqi city of Ramadi, Al-Qaeda's black flags began to appear and this terrorist faction rebranded itself as the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Al-Maliki's government began to increasingly fear the Sunni demonstrators, and in April 2013, at a Sunni protest camp in the town of Hawija, a government police officer was killed, though the circumstances of this death remain unclear. Maliki's response was brazen. He deployed Iraqi army tanks, heavy, armored

vehicles, and security forces of the ministry of interior to attack the protesters who had peacefully demonstrated for their rights for months at a time. Hundreds of people were killed, and ISIL's appeal for violence gained traction.

Many of the young men who sat in the protest in Ramadi and Hawija decided to take up arms and join ISIL. Though they had voted Sunni politicians into office in 2010, these representatives were removed by al-Maliki, and every attempt to instate a Sunni political presence, by means of exercising civil disobedience or through existing political mechanisms was met with decisive violence. Now, they and Sunni community leaders determined that, though they were wary of ISIL's extremist stance, the militant organization was their only means of protection from the central government's oppressive rule.

Bolstered by this support, three months after Hawijah, ISIL launched a stunning attack on the outskirts of Baghdad, releasing more than 500 inmates from Abu Ghraib prison only 12-14 miles from the city center. Concurrently, ISIL seized control over most of Anbar province and continued to rally support from Iraq's

Sunni inhabitants. Further ISIL reinforcements were sent over the Syrian border into Iraq and in October 2013, prompting Maliki to turn to the United States for military aid, which was hardly supplied because the Obama Administration did not see Maliki as a trustworthy partner.

In the December of 2013, the situation in Iraq deteriorated as, in his desperation, Maliki ordered an attack on a Sunni politician's home and the year old Ramadi protest camp. ISIL responded immediately and they moved into Iraqi cities initiating the Iraq War of 2014. Ironically, by repressing the Sunni population, the Shia Iraqi government had created the very monster they feared from the start. After a few days of fighting, the poorly trained and undisciplined Iraqi army fell in the city against well armed ISIL troops, many of whom had served in Saddam's Ba'athist military forces. ISIL's intentions to take Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, became clear the US pledged to escalate their support against ISIL in response. Although the American government did deliver hellfire missiles and Apache helicopters to the Iraqi government, this material support was evidently too little too

late. ISIL soldiers infiltrated downtown Mosul, eventually securing the entire city of 1.8 million people with just 800 men. Swaths of American weapons and military instruments were now under the control of ISIL including M1-A1 tanks, 155-millimeter artillery, up-armored humvees and MRAPs. Accordingly, after the invasion of Mosul, ISIL's military capabilities increased exponentially. With this new artillery, ISIL captured Qayyarah, al Shirqat, Hawijah and Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam Hussein. Several hundred Iraqi soldiers were rounded up and mass executions were implemented both for government troops and Shia civilians. ISIL had gained enough land and control that on June 29th, its leader Abu Bakr was able to declared a caliphate, "an Islamic nation representing the world's Muslim faithful, an entity that recognizes no political borders."

ISIL continued their drive forward and set their sights on Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. 49 American military advisors were stationed there at the time as well as US consulate. Moreover, a trillion dollars' worth of global energy companies, such as Total, Chevron, Exxon, and Gazprom Neft, are

invested in Kurdistan. Should Erbil fall, the windfall ISIL would reap would allow it to consolidate its state building.

A Tentative Reply: The American Response

ISIL's threat against Erbil prompted the US administration to finally intervene, but required the resignation of Maliki as a precondition for support. Reluctantly, Maliki stepped down and the US initiated airstrikes against the Islamic State, dealing blows against ISIL camps near Erbil. In a display of its knowledge of the shock value of social media, ISIL responded by releasing a video of the execution of an American journalist.

ISIL currently poses a great threat to the US's interests in the Middle East and has engaged in substantial rhetoric against the "Great Satan". If ISIL is successful in realizing a fully functional Islamic State along the lines of the one they have already declared, they could even be positioned to launch attacks against the US homeland itself. The United States seems reluctant to deploy troops on the ground in Iraq or Syria given the fiascos of the Iraq and

Afghanistan Wars, instead opting to cobble together a coalition of states also threatened by ISIL to destroy Abu Bakr's caliphate economically, diplomatically, and militarily. The US hopes that the new prime minister of Iraq, a Shia Muslim named Haider al Abadi, will be able to win over Iraq's Sunni tribesmen in order to isolate ISIL. Iraqi Sunni leaders play an essential part in the narrative of the Islamic State and without their support it is unlikely that the Iraqi forces will prevail.

The Arsenal of Jihad: ISIL Military Capabilities

ISIL's military capabilities combine hardened veteran conventional forces and high tech weapons with troops trained in insurgency and terror tactics, making the entity both able to hold territory and evade complete annihilation by American air strikes. Unlike Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, ISIL fighters operate under the command of experienced military officers as several of the top leadership positions are now held by Ba'athists from Saddam's army. Their military strategy and expertise was exhibited in the ISIL invasion of Kurdish territory. The Kurdish Peshmerga, reported to be Iraq's

fiercest fighting force, were defeated by ISIL fighters armed with captured American weapons of a calibre unlike any terrorist organization has had access to before.

ISIL's military capabilities are vested in its vast ground forces: estimates from United States Officials state there are 10,000 ISIL infantry, although CNN analysts often quote up to 30,000. A large portion of ISIL's strike capacity comes from captured weapons. Saddam Hussein's weapons stockpiles in Iraq were quickly seized by ISIL which helped to facilitate rapid growth throughout the region. Another source of weapons for ISIL came from rebel groups in the Syrian Civil War, some of which were supported by western organizations.

The majority of terrorist plots conducted by ISIL utilize non-conventional weapons, such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), car bombs, suicide bombs, and even chemical weapons taken from Syria. Moreover, Abu Bakr's promise to create a worldwide caliphate has attracted the attention of Muslims worldwide, prompting an inflow of foreign volunteers. Even those who seemed to be assimilated to Western society have found power

in ISIL's message and have traveled to Syria to serve the Islamic State.

The March of Empire: A Summary of the Present Situation

Economic

Oil revenues from captured oil rigs in ISIL-held territory constitute the vast majority of ISIL's income at the present. Given the US's campaign to cut off this source of funding, new means of generating a stable economic system for the caliphate will soon become necessary.

Military

If the Islamic State is to truly attain the imperial dimensions of a worldwide caliphate, it will have to pursue aggressive expansion in areas both near and far. How it wishes to do so, through contiguous territorial aggrandizement, cooperation with other Islamist groups, or otherwise is for the High Command to decide. The committee must also find a way to respond to the US's growing military campaign against the caliphate as well as the threat posed by the coalition President Obama has formed.

Ideological

If it is to attain truly global dimensions, ISIL must clarify and disseminate its ideology. So far, critics have derided the Islamic State as simply an almost apocalyptic group which uses Islam to hide its naked desire to engage in horrific violence. If ISIL leadership wishes to create a counter-narrative to engender great inclusivity and global popularity it must act quickly. Moreover, domestically, the Islamic State's leadership must establish a definitive code of law to properly govern those territories. it holds.

Recruitment

One of the most pressing issues facing ISIL today is its need for continued recruitment. ISIL has only become the power that it is through enthusiastic volunteers who have fought ceaselessly for the caliphate. To what degree ISIL engages in regional versus international recruitment efforts must be decided by the committee.

Domestic Governance

Finally, one of the most interesting aspects of ISIL is the manner in

which it differs from traditional terrorist organizations. Unlike groups such as al-Qaeda, ISIL actually holds and administers contiguous swaths of territory in the Middle East. If Abu Bakr hopes to transform the Islamic State into a truly sustainable political entity, he must begin to actually administer services, infrastructure, regulate the activity of ISIL subjects, and garner mass support from civilians under his control.

Committee Positions: A Meeting of Giants

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Caliph of the Islamic State

Western analysts believe that al-Baghdadi was born in Samarra, Iraq in 1971. A peaceful, reclusive religious scholar for most of his life, he lived in a small room attached to a local mosque on the fringe of Baghdad in an area inhabited by both Shia and Sunnis muslims. If a biography posted on jihadist internet forums in 2013 is to be believed, he obtained a doctorate in Islamic studies from the Islamic University of Baghdad around this time. Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, al-Baghdadi co-founded the militant group Jamaat Jaysh Ahl al-Sunnah wa-I-Jamaah and joined the Mujahideen Shura Council (MRC) in 2006 where he served on the organization's sharia committee. The ISIL leader was arrested by US coalition forces in early 2004, though he was released later that year. Soon, the MRC rebranded itself as the Islamic State of Iraq which al-Baghdadi managed to take control of in August 2010. Upon merging with the al-Nursa Front on April 8, 2013,

al-Baghdadi announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. When declaring ISIL as a worldwide caliphate in June 2014, Al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself caliph and announced his intention to march on Europe to establish a universal Islamic state. The caliph will be represented by the chair on this committee and, though he will heed the advice of his council, retains final decision making power as he is the ultimate interpreter of divine will in the Islamic State.

Abu Muslim al-Turkmani: Governor of Iraqi Territories

Like many ISIL militants, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani served a prominent role in Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Army as a Colonel. He was also an Iraqi Special Forces officer under the Special Republican Guard until the 2003 United States Invasion. In ISIL, al-Turkmani serves as Baghdadi's Second-in-Command along with al-Anbari, his counterpart in Syria. He has unilateral control over all ISIL troops and resources throughout Iraq, although several other individuals have the ability to command smaller regiments and the

high command as a whole can override his decisions. Al-Turkmani is especially skilled in delegating roles; he has designated some of the most important governors and leaders of smaller territories throughout Iraq, and his appointments have led to economic success in several regions.

Abu Ali al-Anbari: Governor of Syrian Territories

Abu Ali al-Anbari, as the Governor of Syrian territories, is in charge of managing operations and territory in the ISIL controlled regions of Syria. Al-Anbari, under the expelled dictator Saddam Hussein, was a major general in the Iraqi military and is said to hail from Mosul, the northern Iraqi province.³ He is one of the key people among ISIL officials that are tasked with keeping Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in power and expanding the frontiers of the caliphate. Al-Anbari duties lie in several spheres, ranging from a military strategizing to ensuring the Islamic State's economic viability to executing Islamic jurisprudence in these areas. All operations pertaining to Syria must run through al-Anbari before they can be carried out.

³ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10956280/Inside-the-leadership-of-Islamic-State-how-the-new-caliphate-is-run.html>

Aaleya ibn Hassan: Chief Oil Minister

As the Chief Oil Minister for ISIL, Aleya ibn Hassan has unique access to diplomatic and economic relations around the world. After taking over several oil wells during the Syrian Civil War, Hassan earned himself an invaluable spot in the ranks of ISIL. Hassan's connections to the oil market afford him a luxurious lifestyle with immense economic resources which he often utilizes to take advantage of trade opportunities. Hassan also has connections to key energy representatives in some of the most powerful nations, allowing him extensive travel options as well as the ability to communicate with several of the world's most powerful petroleum governments.

Abu Ahmad al-Alwani: Commander of ISIL Vanguard Forces

Abu Ahmad al-Alwani fought under Saddam Hussein during the 2003 Iraq War and, disillusioned with the post war regime under Maliki, assimilated into ISIL as a chief commander for the Islamic State's military. His success as a commander

earned Al-Alwani a position on the Islamic State Military Council. He will be responsible for innovation in the recruitment process both near and abroad as well as the development of new military tactics. Al-Alwani also exercises authority over the ISIL vanguard.

Abu Abdulrahmn al-Bilawi: Head of ISIL Police Force

Al-Bilawi belongs to the Al-bu Bali clan of the Dulaim - the largest tribe in Anbar. It was his tribe that was the epicenter of resistance and insurgency against US forces in Iraq. Al-Bilawi was trained at the Iraqi Military Academy and went on to achieve the rank of captain in the Iraqi military. After the US lead invasion of Iraq in 2003, al-Bilawi joined al-Qaeda, but was soon imprisoned. He was one of the 500 prisoners that were released and joined ISIL after the attack on the Abu Ghraib prison. He earned his position as head of the ISIL Police Force on the military council in ISIL after his proven dedication in multiple bloody battles. Al-Bilawi is charged with maintaining domestic order in the caliphate and root out the state's internal enemies. Soldiers under his command currently number only 1,000 but creative and

determined unilateral action can certainly result in the enlargement of this force.

Sheikh Abu Muhammed al-Talawi: Local Jihadist Group Leader

As ISIL's influence wrests control of more and more local rebel and jihadist Muslim militant groups, it draws like-minded Islamist groups from across the Middle East. Sheikh Abu Muhammed al-Talawi, the leader of the Jordanian Sons of the Call for Tawhid and Jihad, has key insight as to how ISIL can better incorporate small-scale jihadist groups into its larger agenda, thereby increasing its global influence. Al-Talawi will have the capabilities to contact several leaders of local groups and full command over the Jordanian militant movement. Currently, he seems to have positioned himself into an alliance with ISIL after pledging to incorporate the Sons of the Call for Tawhid into the Islamic State as well as consolidate other local jihadist groups under Abu Bakr. Accordingly, al-Talawi is considered a member of the ISIL high command and holds voting power.

Haji Bakr: Commander of Weapons Development and Armed Divisions

Samir al-Khlifawi, better known as his *nom de guerre* Haji Bakr, is one of the most senior members of ISIL, commanding weapons development and armed divisions. From his beginnings as an Iraqi Army Colonel and a leader of the Iraqi Insurgency with al-Qaeda, Bakr has established key connections in the underground world of the illegal arms trade. His precise and well-executed military tactics have also contributed to his appointment as arguably the second-in-command for general operations of ISIL. Bakr will have the power to command large portions of troops and negotiate weapons deals throughout the duration of our committee. Given his Ba'athist origins, he is deeply suspicious of ISIL members who do not hail from a military background.

Abu Fatima al-Jaheishi: Director of Operations in Southern Iraq

Southern Iraq has long been one of the focuses for the military efforts of ISIL, so appointing a suitable and capable commander for such operations is absolutely vital for Abu Bakr. Al-Jaheishi has proven to be

just that, providing essential military operational support and advice for the thousands of troops under his command. Since the forces of the Iraqi government in Baghdad have continued to grow and advance, al-Jaheishi has had difficult decisions to make regarding the withdrawal and/or advancement of troops. Al-Jaheishi must also consider the best defence to the continual airstrikes by western forces for troops in afflicted regions.

Abu Ayman al-Iraqi: Co-head of the ISIL Military Council

After serving for the Ba'athist regime under Saddam Hussein, Abu Ayman al-Iraqi went on to head the Iraqi Air Defense Intelligence. As Maliki's discrimination of Sunni Muslims continued, however, al-Iraqi quickly pledged allegiance to ISIL, offering invaluable expertise on Iraqi intelligence and troop movements. His detainment at Camp Bucca, a United States detention facility, festered hatred for the west and has helped him focus on bringing ISIL to power. In ISIL, al-Iraqi has continually plotted defense strategies

to outsmart Iraqi forces. Despite his major position in the hierarchy of ISIL, very little is known about al-Iraqi, and he is often referred to as a "shadowy persona."⁴ On the committee he will act as the chief official on military intelligence given his background and existing dark assets in the Iraqi government. Covert operations, espionage, and counter-intelligence all fall under his purview.

Abu Mohammad al-Adnani: Emir of ISIL in Syria

Abu Mohammed al-Adnani is one of the most articulate members of ISIL, helping to spread the cause of the Islamic State and draw support from disparate groups across the Middle East. For this purpose, he has recently been appointed the official spokesman for ISIL, in addition to his already intensive job as ISIL Emir in Syria. Al-Adnani is well known globally; in August of 2014 he was listed as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" by the United States State Department.⁵ His work with al-Qaeda provided him invaluable experience with regards to

⁴ "ABU AYMAN AL-IRAQI DIRECTS ISIS OPERATIONS IN EASTERN SYRIA". Jamestown Foundation. 31 March 2014.

⁵ "Terrorist Designation of Abu Mohammed al-Adnani". US State Department. 18 August 2014.

terrorist operations in Syria and individual armament. His public speaking has inspired many to take up arms against the West, either as a part of ISIL or individually. During our committee, he will have partial control over troops in Syria in conjunction with al-Shishini though his most important function will be as ISIL's foremost minister of propaganda and media. He has direct access to media networks, command over ISIL's use of social media unless overruled by the high command, and the ability to disseminate information within the caliphate to ISIL's subjects.

Abu Omar al-Shishani: Commander of operations in Syria

Originally serving as a Sergeant of the Georgian army, Abu Omar al-Shishani has a unique perspective on the Middle East. Also known as "Abu Omar the Chechen," Omar was in control of the Emirates Brigade and the rebel group Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar prior to his involvement in ISIL. Al-Shishani's military advances speak for themselves: his takeover of Syrian military bases in Aleppo and the capture of the Menagh Airbase have provided crucial tactical outposts for ISIL. His hard work has also earned

him a spot on the US State Department's "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" list. During the committee, Omar the Chechen will ruthlessly control the Syrian rebel groups that have joined ISIL and have special access to hostage control centers in central Syria.

Ayman al-Zawahiri: Leader of al-Qaeda

Ayman al-Zawahiri is perhaps the most experienced jihadist in this historic meeting, having carried out attacks throughout much of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. He has organized countless assassination plots in Egypt, Pakistan, Sudan, and several other countries. Al-Zawahiri has been the chief commander of al-Qaeda since the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and more or less exercises direct control over what is arguably the world's most notorious terrorist organization. Al-Zawahiri will have communications with political leaders in every one of the world's corrupt countries as well as terrorist cells throughout the developed and developing world. Zawahiri argued against the merging of the al-Nursa Front into the Islamic State, but given ISIL's ability to realize the goals al-Qaeda has trumpeted for two decades he may

reconsider his position. The incorporation of al-Qaeda into ISIL would cause the Western to tremble before the power of Abu Bakr. So long as Zawahiri chooses not to do so, however, he holds an observer status in the ISIL High Command, that is, he has no voting power on substantive matters regarding the Islamic State.

Arwa Damon: CNN Journalist

Arwa Damon was born in Boston, but spent her early childhood years in Wayland, Massachusetts. She is the daughter of Dr. George H. Damon, Jr, an American, and her mother, Joumana, a Syrian who grew up in Damascus. Damon's grandfather, Muhsin al-Barazi, was the former Syrian Kurd prime minister of Syria and was executed in the 1949 military coup. Damon majored in Journalism at Skidmore College and from 2003, she covered the Middle East as a freelance journalist, before joining CNN in 2006 where her career won her the Courage in Journalism Award in 2014.⁶ Arwa Damon became a CNN Senior International Correspondent, who was based in Beirut before being captured by ISIL in the August of

2015. As of now, no sources are known to say whether or not the US has made contact with her through any means. Intelligence indicates that Arwa Damon, although a prisoner is also an Islamic convert and could be acting to assist her captors. She retains extensive skills in news reporting and persuasion as well as her connections to Western newspapers through which she can publish information. What Damon elects to do with these skills is up to her. Damon holds an observer status on the committee.

Abu Muhammad al-Amriki: Representative of al-Shabaab

Abu Muhammad al Amriki, is acting as the representative of al-Shabaab, a Jihadist militant group based in Somalia, which has allied with ISIL. Al-Amriki claimed to have lived in the United States for ten years before joining ISIL, but information is scarce and not much else is known. As a prominent commander in al-Shabaab, al-Amriki has access to armed soldiers when needed, but not weaponry to the extent that ISIL possesses. Currently, al-Amriki will play a key role for ISIL in providing manpower for future attacks and

⁶ <http://www.acs.edu.lb/page.asp?id=/about-ac34>

potential strategies to seize more of Iraq and the Middle East.⁷ Should ISIL wish to expand into Northern Africa, al-Amriki's forces are essential. Unless a new agreement or alliance is worked out between ISIL and al-Shabab, al-Amriki will hold an observer status on the committee.

-

Mohammed Deif: Commander of the Hamas Military Wing

Mohammed Deif was born in Khan Younis, Egypt and was raised in Gaza, Palestine. The Palestinians career in Hamas began after the assassination of Yahya Ayyash, and he assumed his role in the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.⁸ He is held responsible by Israel for the murder of dozens of civilians in numerous suicide bombings since 1996 for possibly making the bombs that were used. He has been considered at the top of Israel's most wanted list for several years; he is, in other words, a very dangerous man. Deif has served in the military wing of Hamas since he joined and remains a key role in the military advancement of Hamas today. Of course, Hamas is not a part

of ISIL. However, ISIL and Hamas share many of the same enemies. Deif will want to guide ISIL towards using its military might against Hamas' regional enemies. As with al-Qaeda, there have been whispers of the possibility of collaboration and even merging between ISIL and Hamas. Whether Hamas assumes a hostile position towards, collaborates with, or becomes a part of ISIL is in the hands of Deif. Unless Hamas conjoins with ISIL, however, Deif will not have voting power on matters pertaining to the administration of the caliphate as he is an observer.

Abdi Nur: American fighter for ISIL

Abid Nur, an American from Minnesota, left the US to fight with ISIL at age 20. His whereabouts are unknown to any intelligence outside of ISIL, but Nur, along with many other recruits, were involved in several attacks including one on the Syrian air base in Tabqa on August 24, in which more than 500 people were killed. Nur has created and maintained several connections to

⁷ <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/alleged-american-isis-commander-abu-muhammad-al-amriki-killed-reports-n295051>

⁸ <http://archive.wltx.com/news/story.aspx?storyid=39802>

terror cells in Western countries, which can be used to potentially recruit fellow ISIL fighters or act as a vessel for future terrorist attacks.⁹ (Nur should exercise creativity in regards to portfolio actions due to the lack of *de jure* authority he holds in ISIL.)

Abu Muntaqim Jalil: European fighter of ISIL from the UK

Abu Muntagim Jalil was recruited from the United Kingdom in early July of 2014. After converting to Islam, Jalil shortly traveled to Turkey and then to Syria to join the ranks of the Islamic State as a soldier. In the ISIL High Command, Jalil is tasked with maintaining the trust of fellow ISIL soldiers and has ties with potential recruits in the UK. As with Nur, creativity in portfolio actions is encouraged.

Committee Structure

Structure of Debate

The ISIL High Command will proceed, for the most part, in a modified form of parliamentary procedure called continual crisis mode. Delegates will speak in a perpetual moderated caucus. The speaking time for the caucus can be set at the beginning of the debate and adjusted by delegates. Moderated and unmoderated caucuses can be proposed by delegates on specific topics or for specific amounts of time; the chair may encourage delegates to stay on topic during these debates.

Throughout committee, delegates will be updated as often as possible on the consequences of actions taken by the committee or any pertinent news updates.

Personal Action Orders, Portfolio Powers, Press Releases, and Communiques

⁹ <http://www.myfoxtwincities.com/story/27478751/2-minnesota-men-arrested-on-isis-related-terror-charges>

Personal Action Orders can be sent to the dais by individual delegates. They include specific Portfolio Actions taken by members of the committee on an individual basis. Personal Action Orders can be sent unilaterally and are not voted (or seen) by the rest of the committee, however delegates must keep in mind potential consequences of Portfolio Actions in changing. Examples of Personal Action Orders could include selling oil to foreign countries for the Minister of oil, ordering a military offensive in Iraq for the Commander of the ISIL vanguard, or requesting a meeting with a foreign representative. The more creative and detailed you are, the more likely your action is to succeed.

Press Releases are written individually by members of the committee and voted on to be released to either a specific person or the rest of the world. For example, delegates may want to include a short press release with important directives or in response to a particularly momentous crisis.

Communiqués are also voted and passed by a simple majority. They are written as a request for a separate body or individual to come address the committee; delegates can also

request specific information through a communiqué.

Directives

Directives will serve as the main legislative function of the ISIL High Command. They can be submitted by any delegate at any time during committee, however a minimum of three signatories are suggested per directive. Delegates can motion to introduce a directive (identified by a name “Divine Will” or number “Directive 1.3”). Creative titles are encouraged!

Upon introduction, directives will be read aloud to the committee; delegates can motion for a question-and-answer period or a moderated caucus to discuss the directive. A delegate can also motion to move into voting procedure on a directive; the chair will accept one speaker for and one against. The directive can be passed by a simple majority on the committee.

Special Voting Procedures

Members of the ISIL High Command must remember that they are serving the caliphate and, as such, their actions are, to a certain degree, limited. As a result, there are a few

qualifications to what the committee can pass.

Treaties/Alliances

These require a supermajority (two-thirds) of the committee and must be approved by the caliph before enactment.

Declarations of War/Jihad

This too requires a supermajority (two-thirds) of the committee and must be approved by the caliph before enactment.

Election of a New Caliph

Should the ISIL High Command wish to replace the current caliph (Abu Bakr) every member would need to vote for a replacement unanimously. Though this procedure is technically permissible, delegates should be extremely wary of the consequences of undermining the caliph.

good starting point, but greater information concerning policy, past actions, and portfolio powers can be found through further research.

- Search for more information concerning the function of the ISIL High Command, possible actions, and your policy concerning the developments outlined in the background guide.
- As you find relevant information, begin to compile notes and research into a binder. The length of the binder and amount of information is far less important than finding a small amount of useful information that will be helpful in the event of a crisis.
- Feel free to email any of your dais members (see emails above) about any questions you encounter during the course of your research!

Instructions on Research

- Delegates should begin research by looking for information concerning their position on the committee. The biographies provided in this document are a