Privacy Preserving Machine Learning with Analytics-Zoo & Intel SGX

August 2020

Analytics-Zoo Team

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Outlines

Part 1 (背景 & 现状)

- Data Privacy & GDPR
- PPML (Privacy Preserving Machine Learning)

Part 2 (技术干货)


- Intel SGX & Graphene-SGX
- Analytics-Zoo
- PPML with Analytics-Zoo & Intel SGX

What is Data Privacy?

Data Privacy

Information privacy is the relationship between the collection and dissemination of <u>data</u>, <u>technology</u>, the public <u>expectation of privacy</u>, <u>legal</u> and <u>political</u> issues surrounding them.

- Privacy & Security
 - No Security, then there is no privacy
 - Secured doesn't always means private
 - Win-Win: Secured & Privacy






https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_privacy

Data Privacy & Data Utility

It's a tradeoff



Max Data Utilty (no privacy)

- All data is accessable
- Better analytics & machine learning with these data

Max Privacy (no utility)

- Not data sharing any more
- Analytics & machine learning maybe in trouble

A balanced status (Win-Win)

- Share some insenstive data
- Analytics & machine learning is good enough

Data privacy is challenging since it attempts to use data while protecting an individual's privacy preferences and personally identifiable information. The fields of computer security, data security, and information security all design and use software, hardware, and human resources to address this issue.


https://www.clipartmax.com/middle/m2H7G6Z5N4G6H7H7_plourde-jean-b-silhouette-libra-drawing-measuring-scales-balance-clip-art/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_privacy



Data Privacy in Big Data era

- Lots of personal data are collected
 - Personal data: id, phone number etc
 - Photo & Video
 - Health data: movement, heart rate
- Indirectly personal information is everywhere
 - Input pattern, search log, click streaming etc
 - Music/Movie your liked/rated

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_privacy https://myphonefactor.in/2012/04/sensors-used-in-a-smartphone/ https://getsafeandsound.com/2018/09/cctv/










How Target Figured Or



What is GDPR?



Increase penalty

Up to €20 million or 2~4% turnover

Extend coverage

- Directly personal inform, e.g., location
- Indirectly personal inform, e.g., IP

Give users more control/rights

- Be informed
- Erasure
- Access
- Rectification
- Automated decision making & profiling
- •


https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/gdpr-coming-sentinelone-can-help/

https://blogs.gartner.com/richard-watson/stop-agonising-gdrp-opt-emails-start-thinking-cloud-providers/

https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-gdpr-uk-eu-legislation-compliance-summary-fines-2018

Why GDPR matters?

Privacy laws & Regulations Trends



https://www.clipartmax.com/middle/m2H7G6Z5N4G6H7H7_plourde-jean-b-silhouette-libra-drawing-measuring-scales-balance-clip-art/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_privacy

What is happening after GDPR took effect?

Cost a lot of memory for adoption

Huge Penalty: GDPR Top 3/381 cases

204,600,000 British Airways

Date Fine [€]


2019-

07-08

Country

0

UNITED



organisational KINGDOM measures to ensure information security \circ 2019-110,390,200 Marriott International, Art. 32 Insufficient 07-09 **GDPR** technical and Inc UNITED organisational KINGDOM measures to ensure information security 50,000,000 2019-Google Inc. Art. 13 Insufficient 01-21 GDPR, legal basis for FRANCE Art. 14 data GDPR, processing Art. 6 GDPR, Art. 5 **GDPR**

Controller/Processor Art.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliversmith/2018/05/02/the-gdpr-racket-whos-making-money-from-this-9bn-business-shakedown/#696bf80a34a2

https://www.enforcementtracker.com/

Quoted

Art. 32


GDPR

Type

Insufficient

technical and

PPML (Privacy Preserving Machine Learning)




Using data to XXX without compromising privacy!

A brief hisory (from 1998 to ~):


PPDS (Privacy Preserving Data Sharing)
PPDP (Privacy Preserving Data Publish)
PPDM (Privacy Preserving Data Mining)

PPML (Privacy Preserving Machine Learning)
PPDL (Privacy Preserving Deep Learning)
Privacy Al

Machine Learning




Machine Learning Yearning, Andrew Ng, 2016



https://intellipaat.com/blog/tutorial/data-science-tutorial/modeling-the-data/

PPML Attack Surface

Training Data & input data



https://www.ahrq.gov/ncepcr/tools/pf-handbook/mod8-app-b-monica-latte.html



Photos & Face

https://pythonawesome.com/vggface2-dataset-for-face-recognition/

PPML Attack Surface

Attack on models





Figure 1: An image recovered using a new model inversion attack (left) and a training set image of the victim (right). The attacker is given only the person's name and access to a facial recognition system that returns a class confidence score.









Figure 7: Reconstruction without using Process-DAE (Algorithm 2) (left), with it (center), and the training set image (right).

Model Inversion Attacks that Exploit Confidence Information and Basic Countermeasures, CCS 2015

PPML Attack Surface

Attack on Gradient






Deep Leakage from Gradients, 2019, NIPS

PPML related Techniques & Hot topic

- PPML Related Techniques
 - TEE (Trusted Execution Environment)
 - HE (Homomorphic Encryption)
 - DP (Differential Privacy)
 - SMPC/MPC (Secure Multi-Party Computation)
- PPML Hot Topic
 - Secured Model Inference
 - FL (Federated Learning)



TEE (Trusted Execution Environment)

Hardware Security Implementation

Main solutions


- ARM TrustZone
- Intel SGX

Using secured API, need to redesign your app


Now, we have a solution in Part 2

https://source.android.com/security/authentication/fingerprint-halhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Touch_ID










HE (homomorphic encryption) 同态加密

Compute with encrypted Data



First proposed in 1978, first FHE 2009

HE (homomorphic encryption) 同态加密

- Full Homomorphic Encryption (任意计算)
- Partial Homomorphic Encryption (限定计算)


Performance is not good enough Some operations are not supported



https://www.leiphone.com/news/202006/SbATMUxnVFkGtcSj.html

HE (homomorphic encryption) 同态加密

Bright future for HE




Kristin Lauter's TED Talk on Private Al at Congreso Futuro during Panel 11 / SOLVE https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/microsoft-seal/

Differential Privacy (DP) 差分隐私

Noise based






https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/Differential Privacy Overview.pdf https://github.com/google/differential-privacy

Proposed in 2006-2008 by Dwork from MSR

Privacy/Noise budge is hard to define Impact Accuracy



The Count Mean Sketch technique allows Apple to determine the most popular emoji to help design better ways to find and use our favorite emoji. The top emoji for US English speakers contained some surprising favorites.

Already used in











Differential Privacy (DP) 差分隐私

With DP you can make your model learning common patterns in a dataset without memorizing individual examples

- Add noise in train data
- Add Nosie in SGD






http://www.cleverhans.io/privacy/2018/04/29/privacy-and-machine-learning.html

Learning Differentially Private Recurrent Language Models. ICLR 2018

Comparison of PPML Technologies



Note that DP is a little special because of budget

A Simple example with TEE, HE & DP

- 部门同事一起点外卖,但是要投票决定,让其中一个人取外卖
 - 被投最高票的人去取外卖
 - 大家都不想被他知道我投了他/她(因为他可能是你老板)

• 怎么做呢?

A Simple example with TEE, HE & DP

- TEE (加密数据送进TEE,解开后计算)
 - 大家把投票折叠(加密)起来,放到小黑屋里面,让一个可信的同事计票, 例如HR或者产品经理
- HE (加密数据直接计算)
 - 大家把投票结果用HE加密,让任意同事(甚至老板)去计票,然后把计票结果解密
- DP (计算加了噪声的数据)
 - 给每一票增加噪声扰动,每一票都无法解读,但统计结果是基本正确

无论哪种方法,大家都无法获取投票的真实内容,投票人的隐私被保护


Address Information silo




https://www.enterpriseirregulars.com/10802/information-silos-and-it-governance-failure/

Distributed Training in Deep Learning

Parameter Server




BigDL Allreduce



Accelerating Training with more resource/nodes

https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//people/jeff/BayLearn2015.pdf




Google 2016-2018 on mobile device (in production)

Motivation

- More/better data in user device
- Better model based on these data

TensorFlow Federated

TensorFlow Privacy




Webank (Yang Qiang etc)

Extend scope of Google's Federated Learning (https://www.fedai.org/ & FATE)

Federated Learning White Paper and RFC

Motivation


- More/better data across different Crops
- Better model based on these data
- Federated Data Union (long term)



Horizontally Federated Learning







reatures



Features

Vertically Federated Learning

Location Time

4 3 2 5 Georgia 2018.5

5 4 4 Florida 2019.1

Hawaii 2017.3


Kansas 2018.5

Georgia 2018.10

Florida 2019.9

Party A


Federated Transfer Learning



Party B


https://www.infoq.cn/article/gtvvYvcWecNKURxeYapD

Federated Learning with TEE



https://github.com/intel-analytics/analytics-zoo All Analytics-Zoo examples & models are supported


Federated Learning with HE




https://github.com/FederatedAI/FATE

Federated Learning with DP

Federated Learning with Secure Aggregation





Secured aggregate with DP

Applied Federated Learning: Improving Google Keyboard Query Suggestions



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
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
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
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Secure Multi-party computations (SMPC) 安全多方计算







Secure Multiparty Computation: Introduction

Yao's Garbled Circuit Protocol (Andrew Yao, 1980s)