Merge pull request #2103 from foxy-zagec/patch-8

1248 words translated.

sl/Universally Preferable Behaviour/p01_ch03_ethics.md

@@ -1,55 +1,60 @@
-## Ethics
+## Etika
 
-Since ethics is a subject that we all have opinions about already, it is important to outline the relationship between *instinctual* ethics and *rational* ethics.
+Ker je etika tema, o kateri že imamo svoje mnenje, je pomembno, da opišemo odnos med * instinktivno * etiko in * racionalno * etiko.
 
-A baseball player can catch a fly ball even if he knows nothing about physics. Similarly, we can correctly perceive an action as immoral even if we know nothing about ethical theories.
+Igralec bajzbola lahko ujame žogico, tudi če ne ve nič o fiziki. Podobno lahko pravilno dojemamo akcijo kot nemoralno, tudi če ne poznamo ničesar o etičnih teorijah.
 
-If I can catch a fly ball, then I have an instinctual *feel* for the behaviour of a baseball in flight. My instinctual understanding, however, does not give me the capacity to accurately launch a spaceship to orbit Jupiter. I have an immediate “little truth” – how the ball will move – but that does not give me a universal “great truth” – how matter behaves.
 
-In the same way, our common moral revulsion towards actions such as rape and murder are not necessarily inaccurate, but they do not give us the capacity to create or validate consistent and empirical moral theories.
+Če lahko ujamem letečo žogo, potem imam instinktivni * občutek * za vedenje bejzbola v letu. Vendar moje instinktivno razumevanje mi ne daje sposobnosti, da natančno sprožim vesoljsko ladjo v orbito Jupitra. Imam trenutno "malo resnico" - kako se bo žoga premaknila - to pa mi ne daje univerzalne "velike resnice" - kako se obnaša.
 
-If I propose a scientific theory that completely invalidates a baseball player’s ability to catch a fly ball, then I have the insurmountable challenge of explaining how the baseball player actually *does* catch the ball. Also, if my grand theory cannot accurately predict the arc of a fly ball, then I have a “great truth” which directly contradicts a “little truth”, which cannot be valid. Since the necessity of logical consistency directly arises from the “little truths” of perceptual experience, any theory that directly contradicts such experience cannot be valid.
+Na enak način, naša skupna moralna odvračanja od dejanj, kot so posilstvo in umor, niso nujno netočna, vendar nam ne dajejo sposobnosti ustvarjanja ali potrditve doslednih in empiričnih moralnih teorij.
 
-In other words, the senses give rise to logic – therefore logic cannot contradict the evidence of the senses. Evidence always trumps explanation.
+Če predlagam znanstveno teorijo, ki popolnoma izniči zmožnost bajzbolovega igralca, da ujame žogico, potem imam nepremostljiv izziv razložiti, kako baseball igralec * dejansko * ujame žogo. Tudi, če moja velika teorija ne more natančno napovedati loka letenja, potem imam "veliko resnico", ki neposredno nasprotuje "mali resnici", ki ne more biti veljavna. Ker nujnost logične konsistence neposredno izhaja iz "malih resnic" perceptualne izkušnje, vsaka teorija, ki neposredno nasprotuje takim izkušnjam, ne more biti veljavna.
 
-In a similar manner, any valid ethical theory should be able to explain and justify our common revulsion towards crimes such as murder and rape. It cannot reasonably contradict the universal prohibitions of mankind, but must accurately incorporate and explain them.
+Z drugimi besedami, čuti povzročajo logiko - zato logika ne more biti v nasprotju z dokazi čutil. Dokazi vedno utrpijo razlago.
 
-However, just as Einsteinian physics provided surprising truths – in fact, it would have been of little value if those truths were *not* surprising – ethical theories provide the most value when they also reveal surprising truths – shocking, even. In fact, ethical theories that did not provide surprising truths would be a mere confirmation of existing instinctual preferences, and thus be of little value.
+Na podoben način bi morala biti vsaka veljavna etična teorija zmožna razložiti in utemeljiti naše skupno odvračanje od zločinov, kot so umori in posilstva. Ne more razumno nasprotovati splošnim prepovedim človeštva, ampak jih mora natančno vključiti in razložiti.
 
-### The Discipline Of Theoretical Ethics
+Toda, kot je Einsteinska fizika zagotovila presenetljive resnice - v resnici bi bilo malo vredno, če te resnice * ne bi bile * presenetljive - etične teorije zagotavljajo največjo vrednost, ko tudi razkrivajo presenetljive resnice - celo šokantne. Dejstvo je, da etične teorije, ki niso dale presenetljivih resnic, bi bile zgolj potrditev obstoječih instinktnih preferenc in zato majhne vrednosti.
 
-If I say that something is “morally good” – in other words, if I propose an ethical theory – then clearly I am arguing that human beings *should* act in a particular manner, or *avoid* acting in a particular manner.
+### Disciplina teoretične etike
 
-If I tell my son that he *should* become a baseball player just because I want him to, I am not stating a universal moral premise, but rather a personal preference. He is not *moral* if he becomes a baseball player, and neither is he *immoral* if he does not.
+Če rečem, da je nekaj "moralno dobro" - z drugimi besedami, če predlagam etično teorijo - potem očitno trdim, da * morajo * ljudje  delati na poseben način ali se * izogibati * delati na določen način.
 
-However, if I tell him that it is *moral* for sons to obey their fathers, and *immoral* for them to disobey their fathers, then I am proposing a preference that is universal, rather than merely personal – I am trying to turn a “little truth” (*I want you to become a baseball player*) into a “great truth” (*It is immoral for sons to disobey fathers*). *If* he wishes to be moral, he *must* become a baseball player – not because becoming a baseball player is moral, but rather because obeying his father is moral.
+Če rečem svojemu sinu, da * mora * postati baseball igralec, samo zato, ker to želim, ne navajam univerzalne moralne predpostavke, temveč osebno voljo. On ni * moralen *, če postane igralec baseballa, in tudi ni * nemoralen *, če ne.
 
-When I speak of a universal preference, I am really defining what is *objectively required*, or *necessary*, assuming a particular goal. *If* I want to live, I do not have to like jazz, but I *must* eat. “Eating” remains a preference – I do not *have* to eat, in the same way that I have to obey gravity – but “eating” is a universal, objective, and *binding* requirement for staying alive, since it relies on biological facts that cannot be wished away.
+Če pa mu rečem, da je za sinove * moralno *, da poslušajo svoje očete in da je * nemoralno *, da bi neupoštevali svoje očete, potem predlagam prednost, ki je univerzalna in ne le osebna - poskušam obrniti "majhno resnico" (* hočem, da postaneš igralec brez baseballa *) v "veliko resnico" (* nemoralno je, da sinovi neupoštevajo očetov *).Če želi biti moralno, mora postati igralec brez baseballa, ne zato, ker je postati baseball igralec moralno, temveč zato, ker je spoštovanje očeta moralno.
 
-Ethics as a discipline can be defined as any theory regarding preferable human behaviour that is universal, objective, consistent – and binding. Naturally, preferential behaviour can only be binding if the goal is desired. If I say that it is *preferable* for human beings to exercise and eat well, I am not saying that human beings *must not* sit on the couch and eat potato chips. What I am saying is that *if* you want to be healthy, you *should* exercise and eat well.
+Ko govorim o univerzalnem preference, v resnici opredeljujem, kaj je * objektivno zahtevano *, ali * potrebno *, ob predpostavki posebnega cilja. * Če * želim živeti, mi ni treba imeti rad jazza, vendar moram * jesti *. "Jesti" ostaja prednost - jaz ne rabim jesti, tako kot se moram, držati gravitacije - vendar je "jesti"  univerzalna, objektivna in * zavezujoča * zahteva, da ostanem živ, saj se opira na bioloških dejstev, ki jih ni mogoče prezreti.
 
-As Hume famously pointed out, it is impossible to derive an “ought” from an “is”. What he meant by that was that *preference* in no way can be axiomatically derived from *existence*. It is true that a man who never exercises and eats poorly will be unhealthy. Does that mean that he “ought” to exercise and eat well? No. The “ought” is conditional upon the *preference*. If he wants to be healthy, he *ought* to exercise and eat well. It is true that if a man does not eat, he will die – we cannot logically derive from that fact a binding principle that he *ought* to eat. *If* he wants to live, then he *must* eat. However, his choice to live or not remains his own.
+Etiko kot disciplino lahko opredelimo kot katero koli teorijo glede boljšega človeškega vedenja, ki je univerzalna, objektivna, dosledna in zavezujoča. Seveda je preferencialno vedenje lahko le zavezujoče, če je cilj želen. Če rečem, da je * bolje * , da ljudje telovadijo in jedo dobro, ne rečem, da ljudje * ne smejo * sedeti na kavču in jesti krompirjev čips. Kar pravim je, da * če * želite, da ste zdravi, * morate * telovaditi in jesti dobro.
 
-Similarly, there is no such thing as a universally “better” direction – it all depends upon the preferred destination. If I want to drive to New York from San Francisco, I “ought” to drive east. If I want to drive into the ocean from San Francisco, I “ought” to drive west. Neither “east” nor “west” can be considered universally “better”.
+Kot je Hum znano poudaril, je nemogoče izpeljati "morati" iz "je". Kaj je mislil s tem je bilo, da * prednost * nikakor ne more biti aksiomatsko izpeljana iz * obstoja *. Res je, da bo moški, ki nikoli ne telovadi in nezdravo je, nezdrav. Ali to pomeni, da bi “moral”  telovaditi in jesti dobro? Ne. "Treba" je pogojena z * prednostjo *. Če hoče biti zdrav, * mora * telovaditi in dobro jesti. Res je, da če človek ne je, bo umrl - od tega dejstva ne moremo logično izhajati iz zavezujočega načela, da bi * moral * jesti. * Če hoče živeti, potem * mora * jesti. Vendar pa njegova odločitev, da živi ali ne, ostaja njegova.
 
-It is true that very few people *do* drive into the ocean, but that does not mean that it is universally true that nobody *ought* to drive into the ocean. Principles are not democratic – or, if they are, we once more face the problem of rank subjectivism, and must throw the entire concept of ethics out the window.
+Podobno tudi ni nobene splošne "boljše" smeri - vse je odvisno od prednostnega cilja. Če hočem voziti v New York iz San Francisca, bi moral "voziti" na vzhod. Če hočem voziti v ocean iz San Francisca, bi moral "voziti" na zahod. Niti "vzhod" niti "zahod" ne moremo šteti za splošno "boljše".
 
-“Behaviour” exists in objective reality, outside our minds – the concepts “ought”, “should”, and “preference”, do not exist outside our minds. However, the fact that “ought” does not exist within objective reality does not mean that “ought” is completely subjective. Neither the scientific method nor numbers themselves exist within reality either, yet science and mathematics remain objective disciplines.
+Res je, da zelo malo ljudi * vozi * v ocean, vendar to ne pomeni, da je splošno res, da nihče  ne bi * moral * voziti v ocean. Načela niso demokratična - ali če so, se še enkrat srečujemo s problemom rangiranja subjektivizma in moramo skozi okno vrniti celoten etični koncept.
 
-### Self-Defeating Arguments
+"Obnašanje" obstaja v objektivni realnosti, zunaj našega uma - koncepti "morati", "bi" in "prednost" ne obstajajo zunaj naših misli. Vendar pa dejstvo, da "morati"  ne obstaja v objektivni realnosti, ne pomeni, da je "morati" popolnoma subjektivno. Niti znanstvena metoda niti številke same ne obstajajo, vendar znanost in matematika ostajata objektivna disciplina.
 
-In order to begin our discussion of ethics, it is essential that we understand the nature of *self-defeating arguments*.
 
-In economics, a theory cannot be valid if it requires that prices go up and down at the same time. In physics, a theory cannot be valid if it requires that gases expand and contract simultaneously. In mathematics, a theory cannot be valid if it requires that two plus two equals five, since “five” is just another way of describing two plus three, not two plus two, and so to say that two plus two equals five is to say that five equals four, which is self-contradictory.
+### Samo-uničujoči Argumenti
 
-In general, any theory that contradicts itself in the utterance cannot be valid. It does not require external disproof, since it disproves itself. We do not need to examine every nook and cranny in the universe to determine that a “square circle” does not exist. The very concept is self-contradictory, and thus disproves itself in the utterance.
+Za začetek naše razprave o etiki je bistveno, da razumemo naravo * samo-uničujočih argumentov *.
 
-If I submit a complex mathematical proof to you, and you notice that, at the very beginning, I state that my proof relies on the fact that two plus two make both four and five at the same time, you do not need to read any further to know that my proof is invalid.
+V ekonomiji teorija ne more biti veljavna, če hkrati zahteva, da se cene dvignejo in padejo. V fiziki teorija ne more biti veljavna, če zahteva, da se plini širijo in hkrati krčijo simultano. V matematiki teorija ne more biti veljavna, če zahteva, da sta dva plus dva enaka pet, saj je "pet" le še en način opisovanja dva plus tri, in ne dva plus dva, in tako reči, da sta dva plus dva enaka pet, da je pet enako štiri, kar je samoumevno.
 
-Similarly, as mentioned before, if I come up to you and say: “I do not exist”, my thesis automatically self-destructs. If I can communicate to you that I do not exist, then clearly I exist.
 
-If I come up to you and say: “There is no such thing as truth”, then I am making a statement that I consider to be true claiming that truth does not exist. Again, my argument self-destructs.
+Na splošno se vsaka teorija, ki je kontradiktorna sama sebi v izjavi, ne more biti veljavna. Ne zahteva zunanjega odklona, saj se samega sebe izogiba. V vesolju ni treba pregledati vsakega kotička in gošče, da bi ugotovili, da "kvadratni krog" ne obstaja. Sam koncept je samoumeven, zato se v izgovoru izogne sami.
 
-If I tell you that “Language is meaningless”, then I have also contradicted myself. In order for me to verbally communicate that language is meaningless, language must have at least some meaning.
+Če vam predložim zapleten matematični dokaz in opazite, da že na samem začetku navedem, da se moj dokaz opira na dejstvo, da je dve plus dve hkrati štiri in pet , vam ni treba brati naprej, da bi vedeli, da je moj dokaz neveljaven.
+
+Podobno, kot sem omenil prej, če sem prišel k vam in rekel: "Ne obstaja", se moja teza avtomatično samouniči. Če lahko komuniciram z vami, da ne obstaja, potem jasno obstaja.
+
+Če pridem k vam in rečem: "Resnica ni resnična", potem podam izjavo, za katero menim, da je resnična, da resnica ne obstaja. Še enkrat, moj argument je samouničujoč.
+
+
+Če vam povem, da je "Jezik brez pomena", sem se tudi sam protislovenl. Če želim verbalno sporočiti, da je ta jezik brez pomena, mora imeti jezik vsaj nekaj pomena.
+
+Če vam povem, da so “vaši čuti neveljavni”, potem se moj argument samouniči, ker uporabljam vaš občutek sluha, da vam sporočim, da je vaš občutek sluha neveljaven.Da lahko uspešno predstavim svojo tezo, mora biti vaš občutek sluha veljaven. Zato moram domnevati, da so vaša čutila veljavna, da bi vas prepričal, da vaši čuti niso veljavni, kar ne more zdržati.
 
-If I tell you that “Your senses are invalid”, then my argument also self-destructs, since I am using your sense of hearing to communicate to you that your sense of hearing is invalid. If I can successfully communicate my thesis to you, then your sense of hearing must be valid. Thus I must assume that your senses are valid in order to convince you that your senses are not valid, which cannot stand.