Merge pull request #1185 from organik1/patch-8

complete translation p02_ch01_ethical_categories.md

pcm/Universally Preferable Behaviour/p02_ch01_ethical_categories.md

@@ -1,39 +1,39 @@
-## Ethical Categories
+## Ethical Category dem
 
-With the UPB framework in place, we can now turn to an examination of how UPB validates or invalidates our most common moral propositions. If our “theory of physics” can explain how a man can catch a baseball, we have at least passed the first – and most important – hurdle, and struck our first and deepest blow against the beast.
+As we don put UPB framework for im place, we fit conduct examination of how UPB dey validate or invalidate our most common moral proposition dem.  if de theory of physics wey we get fit explain how man fit catch baseball, we don at least pass de first – and de most important – hurdle, and we don throw de beast our first and deepest punch.
 
-### The Seven Categories
+### De Seven Category dem
 
-As mentioned above, propositions regarding universally preferable behaviour fall into three general categories – positive, negative and neutral. To help us separate aesthetics from ethics, let us start by widening these categories to encompass *any* behaviour that can be subjected to an ethical analysis. These seven categories are:
+As we don talk before, proposition wey regard universally preferable behaviour fall inside three general category – wey be positive, negative and neutral. for make we fit separate aesthetics from ethics, we go begin to expand de category dem make e encompass any behaviour wey we fit subject to ethical analysis. de seven category dem be:
 
-1. It is good (universally preferable and enforceable through violence, such as “don’t murder”).
-2. It is aesthetically positive (universally preferable but not enforceable through violence, such as “politeness” and “being on time”).
-3. It is personally positive (neither universally preferable nor enforceable, such a predilection for eating ice cream).
-4. It is neutral, or has no ethical or aesthetic content, such as running for a bus.
-5. It is personally negative (predilection for not eating ice cream).
-6. It is aesthetically negative (“rudeness” and “being late”).
-7. It is evil (universally proscribed) (“rape”).
+1. Na gud thing (universally preferable and e dem fit enforce am through violence, such as "No kill anybody")
+2. E dey aesthetically positive (universally preferable but dem nor fit use violence enforce am, such as " politeness" and "to dey on time").
+3. E dey personally positive ( e nor dey universally preferable and dem nor fit enforce am such as wen love to eat ice cream)
+4. E dey neutral, or e nor get ethical or aesthetic content for inside, such as to run go meet bus for park.
+5. E dey personally negative (wen person nor like to chop ice cream)
+6. E dey aesthetically negative (to dey rude or lateness)
+7. na evil thing (universally dem nor like am) 
 
-Ideally, we should be able to whittle these down to only two categories – universally preferable and aesthetically positive – by defining our ethical propositions so that what is universally banned is simply a mirror image of what is universally preferable, and ditching merely personal preferences and neutral actions as irrelevant to a discussion of ethics.
+With de idea, we go fit break dis one down to only two category dem – as we define our ethical proposition dem so dat anytin wey dem ban universally  go just be  mirror image of wetin be universally preferable, and to throw personal preferences and neutral actions one corner cos dem nor dey relevant for ethics mata.
 
-For instance, the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP) states that the initiation of the use of force is immoral – thus the non-initiation of the use of force is universally preferable, while the initiation of the use of force is universally banned. If what is banned is simply the opposite of what is preferable, there is really no need for an additional category.
+For instance, de Non-Agression principle (NAP) talk say to use force  nor dey moral, – so to nor use force na wetin everybody prefer, while e be say to use force dey universally banned.  If wetin dem don ban na just de opposite of wetin everybody prefer, den we nor need to bring one more  category.
 
-Furthermore, as moral philosophers, we must prioritise our examination of rational ethics by focussing on the most egregious violations. Clearly, the most immoral actions must be the violent enforcement of unjust preferences upon others. If actions such as “theft” or “murder” are defined as UPB, the examination of such definitions must be our very highest priority.
+As de tori dey go, as moral philosophers wey we be, we must make our examination of ethics wey make sense priority as we dey focus on top de most egregious violation dem. e clear say de most  immoral action dem na de unjust preference wey dem use violent enforce  ontop oda people. If action dem like theft or murder dey defined just like UPB, den de examination of dis definition dem suppose be we very high priority.
 
-Thus we shall focus our efforts primarily on universally preferable and enforceable actions.
+So we go focus our effort on top universally preferable and enforceable action dem.
 
-### Virtue And Its Opposite
+### Virtue And Im Opposite
 
-The opposite of “virtue” must be “vice” – the opposite of “good” must be “evil.” If I propose the moral rule, “thou shalt not steal,” then stealing must be evil, and *not* stealing must be good. This does not mean that “refraining from theft” is the sole definition of moral excellence, of course, since a man may be a murderer, but not a thief. We can think of it as a “necessary but not sufficient” requirement for virtue.
+de opposite of "Virtue" go be "Vice" de opposite of "gud" go be "evil". If I propose de moral rule wey say " thou shalt not steal", den em mean say 'stealing go be evil thing' nor be  'stealing go be gud thing'. Dis one nore mean say to refrain from theft na de main meaning of moral excellence, na true, since man go fit murder murderer, but im nor fit murder thief. We  fit think am as wetin necessary but e nor dey enough for requirement of virtue.
 
-Each morally preferable action must by its very nature have an opposite action – because if it does not, then there is no capacity for choice, no possibility of avoidance, and therefore no capacity for virtue or vice. If I propose the moral rule: “thou shalt defy gravity,” then clearly morality becomes impossible, immorality cannot be avoided, and therefore the moral rule must be invalid.
+Every morally preferable action must get opposite action dey dey de same nature – cos if e nor get, den person nor go get choice, no way to avoid am, and so capacity for virtue or vice nor go dey. If I come propose moral rule say "Thou shall not defy gravity", den e clearly say morality nor go dey possible, we nor fit avoid immorality and so my moral rule go be invalid one.
 
-If I propose the moral rule: “thou shalt not go to San Francisco,” this can be logically rephrased as: “thou shalt go anywhere but San Francisco.” In this way, the moral rule “thou shalt not steal” can be equally proposed in the positive form – “thou shalt respect property rights.” Since respecting property rights is a virtue, violating property rights must be a vice.
+If I propose de moral rule: " thou shall not go to San Francisco", we fit talk dis one anoda way like " thou shall go anywhere except  San Francisco". Na like dis  wey we go fit propose de moral rule "thou shall not steal"  for positive form – "thou shall respect property rights". Since to respect property rights na virtue, den to violate property rights na vice.
 
-### What Is Missing
+### Wetin dey Miss
 
-Conspicuously absent from the above list are traditional virtues such as courage, honesty, integrity and so on – as well as their opposites: cowardice, falsehood and corruption.
+De virtue wey nor dey for our list na traditional virtue dem like Courage, honesty, integrity and so on – even deir opposite too, cowardice, falsehood and corruption.
 
-It may seem that these virtues should fall into the realm of aesthetically positive behaviour, such as being on time, but I for one have far too much respect for the traditional virtues to place them in the same category as social niceties. The reason that they cannot be placed into the category of universally preferable is that, as we mentioned above, the framework of UPB only deals with *behaviours*, not with attitudes, thoughts, states of mind or emotions. The scientific method can process a logical proposition; it cannot process “anger” or “foolhardiness.” These states of mind are not unimportant, of course – in fact, they are essential – but they cannot be part of any objective system for evaluating ethical propositions, since they are essentially subjective – and therefore unprovable – states of being.
+E go look like say dis virtue dem suppose dey among aesthetically positive behaviour like to dey on time. personally, but I get too much respect for traditional virtue dem to put dem for de same category with social behaviour dem. Dey wey dem nor fit dey inside de category of universally preferable, na cos as we don talk before, de UPB framework dey only deal with behaviour, e nor dey deal with attitude, thoughts, state of mind, or emotion dem. De scientific method fit process proposition wey make sense. E nor got fit process "anger" or "strong head." Na true say de state of mind nor dey less important – infact dem dey essential – but dem nor fit be part of any objective system wey dem dey use evaluate ethical proposition, since dem dey essentially subjective – and na state of being –wey we nor fit prove.
 
-Thus UPB can only deal with objectively verifiable actions such as murder, assault and so on.
+So UPB go only fit deal with objectively verifiable actions like murder, assault and so on.