

# NuSMV Seminar 2: Advanced Topics

INIT & TRANS, BMC, Paxos, Code Generation


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
May 8th, 2023

ASSIGN

# Peterson's Mutual Exclusion Algorithm



# Peterson's Mutual Exclusion Algorithm



# NuSMV code

```
MODULE main
VAR
    x : 1 .. 2;
    pg1 : peterson(1, x, pg2.b);
    pg2 : peterson(2, x, pg1.b);
ASSIGN
    next(x) := case
        (pg1.state = wait) : 2;
        (pg2.state = wait) : 1;
        TRUE                : x;
    esac;
FAIRNESS
    pg1.state = crit
FAIRNESS
    pg2.state = crit
LTLSPEC G !(pg1.state = crit & pg2.state = crit)
```

```
MODULE peterson(id, x, other_b)
VAR
    state : { noncrit, wait, crit };
ASSIGN
    init(state) := noncrit;
    next(state) := case
        (state = noncrit)
            : { noncrit, wait };
        (state = wait) & ((id = x)
            | !(other_b)) : {
            wait, crit };
        (state = crit)
            : { crit, noncrit };
        TRUE
            : state;
    esac;
DEFINE
    b := (state = wait) | (state = crit);
```

# Counterexample

- specification  $G \neg (pg1.state = crit \ \& \ pg2.state = crit)$  is false
- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence

Trace Description: LTL Counterexample

Trace Type: Counterexample

```
→ State: 1.1 <←  
  x = 1  
  pg1.state = noncrit  
  pg2.state = noncrit  
  pg1.b = FALSE  
  pg2.b = FALSE  
→ State: 1.2 <←  
  pg1.state = wait
```

```
  pg2.state = wait  
  pg1.b = TRUE  
  pg2.b = TRUE  
→ State: 1.3 <←  
  x = 2  
  pg1.state = crit  
→ State: 1.4 <←  
  x = 1  
  pg2.state = crit  
  pg1.b = FALSE  
— Loop starts here  
...
```

## INIT & TRANS

# INIT & TRANS

To be able to perform multiple variable updates in a single step even when nondeterminism is at play we will need to use the INIT and TRANS statements.

Given an arbitrarily complex *propositional formula*, the statements will define the set of **initial** states and **successor** states as all the states that at a certain step, and at a certain assignment of the variables, **satisfy said formulas**.



# Peterson fixed

```
MODULE peterson(id, x, other_b)
VAR
  state : { noncrit, wait, crit };
INIT
  state = noncrit;
TRANS
  ( (state = noncrit
    & id = 1) =>
    (next(state) = noncrit | (
      next(state) = wait &
      next(x) = 2)) )

  & ( (state = noncrit
    & id = 2) =>
    (next(state) = noncrit | (
      next(state) = wait &
      next(x) = 1)) )

  & ( ((state = wait & (id=x | !other_b))
```

```
    ) =>
    (next(state) = wait | next
      (state) = crit) )

  & ( (state = crit
    ) =>
    (next(state) = crit | next
      (state) = noncrit) )

  & ( ( !(state = noncrit)
    & !((state = wait & (id=x | !
      other_b)))
    & !(state = crit) ) =>
    (next(state) = state &
      next(x) = x) );

DEFINE
  b := (state = wait) | (state = crit);
```

Differently from the case statement, if multiple different assignments for the same variable are implied by our formulas, **NuSMV will not warn us**.

It is also possible to write **contradicting formulas** that will never be *TRUE*, resulting in states with no outgoing transitions.

The simplest and *most readable* way to use the TRANS statement is to specify a transition as an **implication**

$$state_i \longrightarrow next(state_i)$$

This way we can define transition systems as conjunctions of said implications.

$$\begin{aligned} & state_1 \longrightarrow next(state_1) \\ \wedge \quad & state_2 \longrightarrow next(state_2) \\ & \quad \quad \quad \wedge \quad \dots \\ \wedge \quad & state_n \longrightarrow next(state_n) \\ \wedge \quad & ( \neg state_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \neg state_n ) \longrightarrow ( \textit{keep current assignment} ) \end{aligned}$$

# Bounded Model Checking

# Bounded Model Checking (BMC)

Biere et al. 1999: *Symbolic model checking without BDDs*

NuSMV uses BDDs for LTL model checking

Bad ordering of variables can lead to storage space explosion

But: no simple way of finding optimal, or even good orderings for all cases

Idea: Use *propositional logic* SAT solver

- No canonical form, no space explosion, thousands of variables
- Nowadays heavily used in other areas  $\implies$  mature
- Little space use, fast depth-first approach

# Bounded Model Checking (BMC)

Biere et al. 1999: *Symbolic model checking without BDDs*

Bounded Model Checking: construct prop. logic formulas  $\phi_k$  with  $k \leq n$  s.t.

$$\phi_k \text{ holds} \iff \exists \text{ counterexample of length } k$$

Then use SAT solver to check each formula starting with  $k = 0$ .

$\implies$  Finds *minimal* counterexamples, very quickly

BMC can be done in polynomial time

# Bounded Model Checking (BMC)

## Usage in NuSMV

Non-interactive mode: `NuSMV -bmc [-bmc_length n] <model>`

If no length is given,  $n = 10$  is used as default.

Interactive mode: `go_bmc, check_ltlspec_bmc -p "formula" -k <bound>`

Can control shape of loop of counterexample (if applicable) with further parameters.



# Bounded Model Checking (BMC)

## Invariant Checking

NuSMV can check invariants using SAT solvers

INVARSPEC <formula> instead of LTLSPEC in files

Then use `-bmc` CLI flag as before to apply *2-step induction*.

Interactive mode: `check_invar_bmc -p "formula"`.

To use *complete* invariant checking (more powerful): `check_invar_bmc -a  
een-sorensson`


## Case Study: Paxos

# What is Paxos?


Paxos is a protocol that aims to achieve consensus on a value among a multitude of values proposed by three types of nodes:

- **Proposers** ( $\bigcirc$ ): propose a value on which they want the system to reach consensus. Every proposer has a *uniquely assigned set of rounds* during which they can send their proposals.
- **Acceptors** ( $\square$ ): they receive the values from the proposers and based on the rounds of the received messages they *deterministically* decide for which *value and round* to vote for, relaying the message to the learners.
- **Learners** ( $\triangle$ ): They receive the couple messages of  $\langle \text{vote}, \text{round} \rangle$  and count them, if one couple has been voted *enough times* by the acceptors they will choose that value and spread it to the system.


# Prepare




# Promise




# Accept





# Paxos





# Pseudocode

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**Algorithm 1** Paxos — Proposer  $p$ 

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```
1: Constants:
2:  $A, n$ , and  $f$ .            $\{A \text{ is the set of acceptors. } n = |A| \text{ and } f = \lfloor (n-1)/2 \rfloor.\}$ 
3: Init:
4:  $crnd \leftarrow -1$             $\{\text{Current round number}\}$ 
5: on  $\langle \text{PROPOSE}, val \rangle$ 
6:    $crnd \leftarrow \text{pickNextRound}(crnd)$ 
7:    $cval \leftarrow val$ 
8:    $P \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
9:   send  $\langle \text{PREPARE}, crnd \rangle$  to  $A$ 
10: on  $\langle \text{PROMISE}, rnd, vrnd, vval \rangle$  with  $rnd = crnd$  from acceptor  $a$ 
11:    $P \leftarrow P \cup (vrnd, vval)$ 
12: on event  $|P| \geq n - f$ 
13:    $j = \max\{vrnd : (vrnd, vval) \in P\}$ 
14:   if  $j \geq 0$  then
15:      $V = \{vval : (j, vval) \in P\}$ 
16:      $cval \leftarrow \text{pick}(V)$             $\{\text{Pick proposed value } vval \text{ with largest } vrnd\}$ 
17:   send  $\langle \text{ACCEPT}, crnd, cval \rangle$  to  $A$ 
```

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**Algorithm 2** Paxos — Acceptor  $a$ 

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```
1: Constants:
2:  $L$             $\{\text{Set of learners}\}$ 
3: Init:
4:  $rnd \leftarrow -1$ 
5:  $vrnd \leftarrow -1$ 
6:  $vval \leftarrow -1$ 
7: on  $\langle \text{PREPARE}, prnd \rangle$  with  $prnd > rnd$  from proposer  $p$ 
8:    $rnd \leftarrow prnd$ 
9:   send  $\langle \text{PROMISE}, rnd, vrnd, vval \rangle$  to proposer  $p$ 
10: on  $\langle \text{ACCEPT}, i, v \rangle$  with  $i \geq rnd$  from proposer  $p$ 
11:    $rnd \leftarrow i$ 
12:    $vrnd \leftarrow i$ 
13:    $vval \leftarrow v$ 
14:   send  $\langle \text{LEARN}, i, v \rangle$  to  $L$ 
```

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**Algorithm 3** Paxos — Learner  $l$ 

---

```
1: Init:
2:  $V \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
3: on  $\langle \text{LEARN}, (i, v) \rangle$  from acceptor  $a$ 
4:    $V \leftarrow V \uplus (i, v)$ 
5: on event  $\exists i, v : |\{(i, v) : (i, v) \in V\}| \geq n - f$ 
6:    $v$  is chosen
```

---

# Properties of Paxos

The Paxos Protocol has been formally proven to have the following properties:

- **CS1:** Only a proposed value may be chosen.
- **CS2:** Only a single value is chosen.
- **CS3:** Only a chosen value may be learned by a correct learner.
- **CS4:** If an acceptor has voted for value  $v$  at round  $i$ , then no value  $v' \neq v$  can be chosen in any previous round.

# The Properties are Verified

```
*** Copyright (c) 2010-2014, Fondazione Bruno Kessler

*** This version of NuSMV is linked to the CUDD library version 2.4.1
*** Copyright (c) 1995-2004, Regents of the University of Colorado

*** This version of NuSMV is linked to the MiniSat SAT solver.
*** See http://minisat.se/MiniSat.html
*** Copyright (c) 2003-2006, Niklas Een, Niklas Sorensson
*** Copyright (c) 2007-2010, Niklas Sorensson

NuSMV > go
NuSMV > print_reachable_states
#####
system diameter: 51
reachable states: 31028 (2^14.9213) out of 1.26214e+25 (2^83.3841)
#####
NuSMV > process_model
The computation of reachable states has been completed.
The diameter of the FSM is 51.
-- specification F ( G l1.decided ) is true
-- specification G (((l1.decided & l1.chosen_value = 1) -> ( H p1.val = 1 | H p2.val = 1)) & ((l1.decided & l1.chosen_value = 2) -> ( H p1.val = 2 | H p2.val = 2))) is true
-- specification G (((l1.v1_consensus -> ((l1.vote2 = l1.votel | !l1.v2_consensus) & (l1.vote3 = l1.votel | !l1.v3_consensus))) & (l1.v2_consensus -> ((l1.vote2 = l1.votel | !l1.v1_consensus) & (l1.vote3 = l1.vote2 | !l1.v3_consensus))) & (l1.v3_consensus -> ((l1.vote2 = l1.vote3 | !l1.v2_consensus) & (l1.vote3 = l1.votel | !l1.v1_consensus)))) is true
-- specification G (l1.decided -> ( O p1.quorum | O p2.quorum)) is true
-- specification G (((((((l1.decided & l1.chosen_value = l1.votel) & l1.votel = 1) -> H (a1.last_voted_v = 1 | a1.last_voted_v = -1)) & (((l1.decided & l1.chosen_value = l1.votel) & l1.votel = 2) -> H (a1.last_voted_v = 2 | a1.last_voted_v = -1))) & (((l1.decided & l1.chosen_value = l1.vote2) & l1.vote2 = 1) -> H (a2.last_voted_v = 1 | a2.last_voted_v = -1))) & (((l1.decided & l1.chosen_value = l1.vote2) & l1.vote2 = 2) -> H (a2.last_voted_v = 2 | a2.last_voted_v = -1))) & (((l1.decided & l1.chosen_value = l1.vote3) & l1.vote3 = 1) -> H (a3.last_voted_v = 1 | a3.last_voted_v = -1))) & (((l1.decided & l1.chosen_value = l1.vote3) & l1.vote3 = 2) -> H (a3.last_voted_v = 2 | a3.last_voted_v = -1)))) is true
NuSMV > █
```

## Code Generation

# Code Generation for NuSMV

## Translating Regular Expressions into Models

NuSMV language abstraction level awkward for large programs

Often repetitive structures

Can express complex semantics, however!

$\implies$  Translate higher-level language to NuSMV

**Toy Example:** Regular Expressions

# Code Generation for NuSMV

## Regular Expressions: Syntax

Standard Unix Syntax

Bracketss:

$$regex \rightarrow (regex)$$

Alternation:

$$regex \rightarrow regex_1 | regex_2$$

Concatenation:

$$regex \rightarrow regex_1 regex_2$$

Kleene Star:

$$regex \rightarrow regex^*$$

# Code Generation for NuSMV

## Thompson's Construction: Alternation

$regex \rightarrow s \mid t$




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# Code Generation for NuSMV

## Thompson's Construction: Concatenation

$regexp \rightarrow s t$




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# Code Generation for NuSMV

## Thompson's Construction: Kleene Star

$regex \rightarrow s^*$




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*Fin.*