



Generating Information-Flow Control Mechanisms from Programming Language Specifications

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Motivation

Modern operating systems rely on access-control mechanisms to protect users information. However, these mechanisms are insufficient as they cannot regulate the propagation of information once it has been released.

To address this issue, a new research trend called **language-based information-flow security** has emerged. The idea is to use techniques from programming languages, such as program analysis and type checking, to enforce information-flow policies. Mechanisms that enforce such policies are called **information-flow control mechanisms**.

Problem

Developing sound information-flow control mechanisms can be a laborious and error-prone task due to the numerous ways through which information may flow in a program.

Background

Most information-flow control mechanisms seek to enforce a policy called **non-interference**, which states that private information may not interfere with the publicly observable behavior of a program. More formally:

A program p satisfies non-interference if for any $\ell \in \mathcal{L}$, and for any two memories m and m' that are ℓ -equivalent, and for any trace o such that $\langle p, m, \epsilon \rangle \downarrow o$, then there is some trace o' , such that $\langle p, m', \epsilon \rangle \downarrow o'$ and $o \upharpoonright \ell$ is a prefix of $o' \upharpoonright \ell$ (or vice versa).

To enforce non-interference, two types of information flows must be taken into account:

- 1 **Explicit flows** occur when private information flows directly into public information.

```
public := private
```

- 2 **Implicit flows** occur when private information influences public information through the control-flow of the application.

```
if (private > 0) then
  public := 0
else
  public := 1
end
```

Approach and Uniqueness

We have created a tool called **Ott-IFC** that takes as input a programming language's specification (i.e., syntax and semantics, written in **Ott**) and produces a mechanism's specification.

Example

```
a ::= x | n | a1 + a2 | a1 * a2 b ::= true | false | a1 < a2 c ::= skip | x := a | c1 ; c2 | if b then c1 else c2 end | while b do c end
```

Input

```
<a, m> || <n, m>
-----
<x := a, m> || <skip, m[x |-> n]>
```

Input

```
<b, m> || <true, m>
<c1, m> || <skip, m1>
-----
<if b then c1 else c2 end, m> || <skip, m1>

<b, m> || <false, m>
<c2, m> || <skip, m2>
-----
<if b then c1 else c2 end, m> || <skip, m2>
```

Output

```
<a, m> || <n, m>
E |- a : ta
E |- x : tx
ta <= tx
-----
<x:=a, m, E, pc> || <skip, m[x |-> n], E[
x |-> ta], pc>
```

Output

```
E |- b : l_b
<cmd1, m, o, pc | l_b, E> || <stop, m1,
o1, pc | l_b, E>
<b, m, o, pc, E> || <true, m, o, pc, E>
-----
<if b then cmd1 else cmd2 end, m, o, pc, E>
|| <stop, m1, o1, pc, E>

E |- b : l_b
<b, m, o, pc, E> || <false, m, o, pc, E>
<cmd2, m, o, pc | l_b, E> || <stop, m2,
o2, pc | l_b, E>
-----
<if b then cmd1 else cmd2 end, m, o, pc, E>
|| <stop, m2, o2, pc, E>
```

Current Status

We have implemented a prototype of our algorithm and validated that it works on two imperative languages. It currently supports languages whose specification:

- 1 is composed of expressions, which may only read the memory, and commands, which may read or write the memory
- 2 program configurations are of the form $\langle command, memory \rangle$.

We have also begun to draft a soundness proof, that is, a proof showing that the generated mechanisms enforce non-interference.

Future Work

- Add support for a greater variety of languages
- Parametrize Ott-IFC so that it can generate multiple types of mechanisms
- Automatically generate
- Use Ott-IFC's rewriting rules to verify existing mechanisms