March 12, 2016. Very early draft for ISA 2016. Please do not cite without permission.

The Effect of Target-Country Restrictions and Authoritarian Politics on International NGO Programming

Andrew Heiss
Duke University
andrew.heiss@duke.edu

> *To work around restrictions NGOs can work on less sensitive topics, with friendly government officials, partner with local organisations and try to funding sources that aren't considered "sensitive". All of that is being done very creatively by many on the ground. But, we have to ask ourselves whether doing so might compromise one's original intentions. Helping the government maintain the status quo in some ways undermines long-term prospects, as ultimately civil society does need a free press, a democratic government and freedom of association.*
>
> *—Maya Wang, Human Rights Watch*[1]

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), foreign foundations, private donors, and scholars of international affairs flooded the country with aid and technical assistance. Among the most prominent early foreign entrants into the country's nascent civil society and political sectors were the Open Society Foundations (OSF), a philanthropic advocacy organization funded by American billionaire George Soros, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—America's "oldest international affairs think tank"[2]—which created the Carnegie Moscow Center as a regional research hub. Throughout

1. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/aug/12/china-ngo-government-civil-society
2. http://carnegieendowment.org/about/?fa=centennial

Russia's tumultuous post-Soviet history, OSF and the Carnegie Center were influential proponents of political liberalization and democratization. The two organizations pursued different strategies—OSF funded and supported domestic NGOs working on issues of education, freedom of expression, and human rights, while the Carnegie Center supported scholars and foreign policy experts in Russia and abroad, funding and disseminating white papers, reports, and general research and advocacy for Eastern European liberalization—but the two shared the same fundamental goal of improving human rights and the rule of law in Russia and the region.

In December 2015, after more than two decades of advocacy in the country, OSF ceased all operations in Russia, terminated all its ongoing programs, and stopped funding local Russian NGOs. The Carnegie Center, meanwhile, continues its research in Moscow today. OSF had been forced to leave after being deemed an "undesirable organization" earlier that year—a new legal status created by a 2015 law passed by the Putin administration that allowed the government to blacklist and expel any organization it felt was too dangerous and threatening.

OSF's expulsion in 2015 followed three years of heavy legal restrictions. After Vladimir Putin was inaugurated as president for a second time in 2012, he almost immediately turned the regulatory environment against INGOs and foreign-backed NGOs. The administration passed a 2012 law designating a subset of foreign-connected NGOs as "foreign agents," recycling a Cold War-era term reserved for anti-Soviet spies and collaborators,[3] and more than 100 domestic NGOs have been labeled as such.[4] The 2015 Undesirable Organizations law expanded this 2012 legislation and specifically targeted international human rights NGOs. The government's initial list of undesirable organizations included just five INGOs: Human Rights Watch, Memorial, Amnesty International, OSF, and the Carnegie Moscow Center,[5] but by the second draft of the list, the Carnegie Center had been removed and spared the chopping block.[6]

For decades, the OSF and the Carnegie Center had shared similar experiences with harsh legal restrictions in Russia, but in 2015, the two organizations diverged dramatically. Why did one continue to work in the country while the other withdrew?

According to a high-level OSF program officer, a crucial factor for deciding to support NGOs in a country is the safety of the activists and organizations they support. If the Foundations' support of an organization leads to jail time, harassment, or otherwise impairs or imperils those they support, they withdraw or halt that support. OSF does have a clear, calculated, and rational vision for how it operates. The decision to

3. See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/26/harassed-and-shunned-the-russians-labelled-foreign-agents-by-kremlin
4. See https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle
5. https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/05/25/human-rights-watch-and-amnesty-international-among-5-organizations-in-proposed-un
6. https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/07/08/soros-and-macarthur-foundations-among-12-ngos-in-patriotic-stop-list

stay or leave a country is based primarily on how well the organization's work promotes change. If OSF can no longer make satisfactory change, whether because of the legal environment, local political developments, cultural shifts, wars, revolutions, or any other external factor that influences their ability to affect change and reform, the organization reaches a tipping point where "the jig is up" and they withdraw and move their resources elsewhere. OSF is motivated by cost-benefit utility function that determines how they allocate their programming and funding. Through their "judicious calculus," the foundation works to balance the need to affect satisfactory change against the injunction to "do no harm" and need to guarantee the safety of their partners. Pragmatism drives their organizational decisions.[7]

In contrast, the Carnegie Center was motivated by a different set of core principles and values. Because the organization has historically produced detailed research on international and regional political affairs, it has long prized its cozy access to Russian government officials. As Putin's regime began to crack down on INGOs starting in 2012, the Center adjusted its strategy and programming to remain in the country. Three of its most outspoken liberal researchers and activists were let go between 2012–2014, replaced with research fellows more friendly to Putin. Few of the Center's public events since 2012 have discussed internal Russian politics or Putin's push to become a stronger regional—as Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014, the Center generally remained silent (Kirchick 2015). The Carnegie Center's desire to remain in the country drove its organizational decisions, but at the cost of potentially compromising its reputation and reducing the value of its programming.

This sharp divergence between OSF and the Carnegie Center illustrates a broader trend occurring on a global scale. Since the 1990s, INGOs have emerged as a cornerstone of global governance (Lipschutz 1992; Ahmed and Potter 2006) and have become increasingly active in authoritarian regimes (Heiss 2016). Autocrats, in turn, work to regulate and restrict the activities and programming of international and foreign-funded NGOs working their countries, and often force INGOs to make difficult organizational decisions. What determines when INGOs adhere to authoritarian legal restrictions (like the Carnegie Center), resist government intrusions into organizational practices, or pull out of the country entirely (like OSF)? Why do INGOs work in these regimes if their services and advocacy can potentially help the regime? More generally, how do INGOs adapt to their institutional context and what tactics do they use to stay in engaged in the countries they target?

In this paper, I argue that the political, legal, and regulatory institutions of the countries that INGOs target and work in have a substantial influence on these organizations' strategies and programming. I present an original theoretical model to explain and predict how INGOs respond to authoritarian regulations and restrictions,

7. Interview 1034, February 10, 2015.

given an organization's core principles, its instrumental concerns, and its power relative to the regime. I test this theory by conducting a global survey of 40,000 NGOs. Unfortunately, due to technical delays, the survey is not yet completed at this stage of the project.

What influences INGO behavior?

INGOs have long been treated as a "black box" in much of the existing academic work on international institutions, and have often been assumed to act as altruistic bulwarks against the state, filling policy and issue gaps in the international system, and run by managers with only the best intentions (Corry 2010; Skjelsbaek 1971; Nye and Keohane 1971; Bartelson 2006). In the past decade, however, scholars have worked to move beyond this simplistic view and uncover the determinants of INGO behavior. Prakash and Gugerty (2010b) helped spearhead a new theoretical trend, arguing that advocacy INGOs should be seen as firms working in policy markets, driven by normative and instrumental concerns, and motivated organizational survival and growth. Seen in this more nuanced light, it became clear that, like firms, INGOs are subject to interagency conflicts, face issues with accountability, compete for scarce resources, and struggle to get their issues on the global agenda. Heiss and Johnson (2016) provide a useful typology for this newer body of work (summarized in Figure 1), which organizes these emerging structural determinants of INGO behavior into three related and interlocking categories: (1) the internal structure of the INGO, (2) the external dynamics and relationships faced by the INGO, and (3) the institutional context that defines the boundaries of INGO action.

Internal traits

A significant portion of INGO behavior is shaped by the preferences and ideals of its managers, employees, and volunteers, who in turn shape the organization's stated mission, vision, and values. For example, an organization's managerial structure can influence the success of its programming. Wong (2012) shows that INGOs can centralize or decentralize different forms of managerial power: the power to propose new goals and missions, the power to enforce those goals, and the power to actually implement those proposals. Organizations that successfully centralize proposal power while decentralizing implementation power are better able to pursue a central agenda without stifling local creativity, thus leading to better success (Wong 2012).

Interactions with other actors

INGOs do not operate in isolation—even if an organization perfectly balances and refines its internal managerial structure, it still must interact with third-party actors



Figure 1: A unified framework for analyzing INGO behavior (Heiss and Johnson 2016)

as it pursues its policy agenda. An INGO's interactions with these other external actors shape its behavior. Early work on opening the INGO black box focused on many of these external factors. For example, Cooley and Ron (2002) argues that competition among INGOs actually leads to perverse outcomes and sectoral insecurity, as organizations will often undermine their competitors, withhold information, act unilaterally, and seek government rents. Additionally, Bob (2002) shows that INGOs compete in a "harsh, Darwinian marketplace where legions of desperate groups vie for scarce attention, sympathy, and money" (37). Organizations that are experts at emotive marketing, employ native English speakers, use charismatic spokespeople, and craft their messages to fit Western sensibilities are far more effective in the global community than their competitors.

The relationships that form as organizations interact also have a direct impact on INGO power and influence. Carpenter (2014) demonstrates the importance of the

shape and nature of INGO networks. INGOs are most able to push new normative ideas onto the global agenda if they are connected to key nodes—or gatekeepers—in a network, who then vet the proposals and give (or deny) them credibility and legitimacy. In general, the more connected or centralized an INGO is in relation to other organizations, the more influential it will be. Murdie (2014) provides additional evidence of the power of INGO networks, finding that human rights INGOs that network and collaborate together increase their advocacy output. The nature of these network relationships influences the quality of this work, though—as more organizations free ride and rely on larger, more prominent INGOs, advocacy output decreases.

Institutional environment

Beyond the influence of internal and external actors, INGOs are also shaped by more elusive actors—the political structures and institutions they interact with (Heiss and Johnson 2016; Gugerty and Prakash 2010; Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, and Prakash 2014). INGOs are products of the legal regulations, historical precedents, political trends, and cultural norms of both their home countries and they countries they target, all help define the boundaries for INGO operations.

In contrast with internal NGO traits and interactions with other actors, the effect of the institutional environment on international NGOs is relatively understudied (Bloodgood, Tremblay-Boire, and Prakash 2014). Stroup (2012) shows that the organizational structures and missions of INGOs are deeply tied to the cultural and legal environments of their home countries. For example, she argues that CARE USA's mission reflects American norms of efficiency and results-oriented pragmatism by using a professional staff, securing large amounts of government funding, and avoiding anti-American advocacy. In contrast, Amnesty International, based in the United Kingdom, eschews many of the stricter norms of business-like efficiency and professionalization to focus more on advocacy work. Additionally, because Amnesty International refuses government funding (in part because of the historical absence of government funding for charities), it focuses much of its advocacy work on British and American human rights abuses.

Emerging research on domestic nonprofit organizations in the United States can inform future research into INGO behavior, revealing how NGOs both (1) are adversely affected by the rules, regulations, and institutional structures governing NGO activities, and (2) manipulate those structures for their own benefit and organizational survival.

First, institutional rules and norms can create inefficiencies in nonprofit programming. For instance, NGOs often change their behavior to obtain external government funding. Government grants (both domestic and foreign) limit the flexibility of nonprofits by imposing strict reporting requirements that can shift these organizations'

missions (Suárez 2011), and by crowding out private donations (Kim and Van Ryzin 2014). Government grant requirements often insist that applicant organizations pursue specific behaviors, such as collaboration with other organizations, even if collaboration is not the optimal strategy for the organization. In fact, because of this push for collaboration, regardless of its consequences, one of the best predictors of a nonprofit organization receiving government funding is whether or not it collaborates with other nonprofits (Suárez and Hwang 2008; Suárez 2011). As these organizations create inefficient collaborative networks, organizational objectives and missions are often dropped or discarded in pursuit of additional funding, resulting in a market failure (Witesman and Heiss 2016). These inefficiencies are directly tied to the structural incentives to collaborate, pushing organizations to adopt suboptimal strategies in the interest of securing funding. Foreign NGOs suffer similar inefficiencies and crowding out effects (Gugerty and Kremer 2008), but work remains for research on international NGOs.

Second, rather than shift and adjust their organizational missions and values to fit the legal environment, many American nonprofits maneuver *within* that environment and find workarounds for their preferred strategies. That is, nonprofits in the United States generally do not change their missions—they change their legal and organizational structures to make their missions happen.[8] In the United States, nonprofits typically incorporate initially as 501(c)(3) organizations. While this designation provides significant tax benefits (i.e. full tax exemption), IRS regulations restrict some of the activities and income generation strategies these organizations can pursue. In order to become more politically engaged, nonprofits will often create a 501(c)(4) or (c)(6) subsidiary, which offers fewer tax benefits but allows for direct political advocacy. Similarly, IRS regulations impose an operational test on nonprofits' business activities. If an organization generates significant unrelated business income (UBI) it can fail this test and lose its exempt status. To prevent this from happening, 501(c)(3)s will often spin off a for-profit subsidiary that feeds its income into the main organization (Daniel 2014; Sloan, Grizzle, and Kim 2015). Ultimately, US nonprofits learn to deftly maneuver the legal regulatory environment to maximize their revenue and carry out their preferred programs.[9]

International NGOs working in dictatorships likely also try to bend the legal environment of the countries they work in, but are more limited in their influence on the domestic politics. Pushing the envelope with organizational and legal innovations in these countries also carries significant risk—if an INGO gets too creative in spinning off subsidiaries or partnering with domestic NGOs, the regime or ruling party can expel it.

8. Interview 1002, February 25, 2016.
9. Interview 1002, February 25, 2016.

Explaining INGO responses to authoritarian regulations

Theoretical framework

International and transnational NGOs do not operate in a vacuum. As described previously, INGOs are influenced by a host of factors beyond their stated mission vision, values, and strategies. In addition to these well established behavioral determinants, the regulatory environment for foreign-based advocacy and service provision in autocratic nations plays a critical role in shaping the behavior of international NGOs that work in those countries.

An INGO's mission and menu of programs will often conflict with the preferences of the regime. Accordingly, an organization must decide how to adapt its programming to fit the requirements and needs of its host country. This decision can be difficult, pitting conflicting organizational values against each other. If the organization is too antagonistic, contentious, or principled, it runs the risk of expulsion, potentially leaving the INGO unable to continue its work in the country. However if the organization is too cooperative, its selection of programs may not be credible or effective as the NGO kowtows to the dictator's demands.

I offer a novel theoretical framework to conceptualize this dynamic relationship between dictators and INGOs.[10] Using an adaptation of negotiation theory (Raiffa 1982; Mayer 2010), I argue that the interaction between authoritarian regimes and INGOs in any given issue area (human rights, development, advocacy, etc.) can be modeled in simple two-dimensional policy space (see Figure 2). Each actor has a preference for a certain level of advocacy or service provision, marked as solid circles in the figure ($\text{Regime}_{\text{ideal}}$ and $\text{INGO}_{\text{ideal}}$). Regimes set and implement *de jure* policies to prevent INGO programming from going beyond their ideal point (the reserve value or "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" (BATNA) in negotiation theoretic terms), while INGOs will engage in programming that (when possible) fits within the bounds set by the regime. In addition to these ideal points, each actor has a range of flexibility in the implementation of their regulations or programming, shown in the horizontal lines flanking the ideal points (negotiation space in negotiation theory terms). The space where the two preference ranges overlap (the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) in negotiation theory) determines both the regime's *de facto* level of restrictions and the INGO's actual mix of programming in that country.

An authoritarian regime's INGO regulatory environment comprises two components: (1) formal *de jure* legislation and policies (represented by the ideal point) and (2) *de facto* implementation of those policies (represented by the negotiation space around the ideal point). Regimes will establish a regulatory environment for inter-

10. The *best* way to understand the theory is to visit an online interactive simulation at ingorestrictions.org/theory/ and see the different outcomes dynamically.

Figure 2: Programming preferences in two-dimensional policy space

national civil society that falls along a continuum of restrictiveness, ranging from *tolerance*, or very few legal or actual restrictions on INGO programs, to *expulsion*, or a complete ban of all INGO activities. The larger the ZOPA, the more tolerant the regime will be about international NGOs working in their regimes, and vice versa—when there is no overlap, an INGO will face expulsion.

In turn, and analogous to the regime's regulatory environment, an INGO's response to authoritarian restrictions comprises three components: (1) the organization's normative principles and ideals, represented by the ideal point, (2) the organization's instrumental flexibility in actually implementing those principles, represented by the space around the ideal point, and (3) the alignment of an INGOs programming with regime preferences, represented by the distance between the two parties' ideal points. Parallel to the regime's initial imposition of the regulatory environment, NGOs will respond along a continuum of cooperation, ranging from *compliance*, or tolerance and cooperation with the legal limits imposed by the regime, to *antagonism*, or blatantly and openly resisting those restrictions. INGOs that engage in programming close to the authoritarian regime's preferences will be more compliant with the regulatory environment, while organizations that pursue more contentious programming will be more antagonistic.

The relationship between INGOs and authoritarian regimes is dynamic, as ideal points shift along the spectrum and negotiation spaces expand or contract. Figure 3 demonstrates a mix of possible regulatory environments and INGO responses. The Carnegie Moscow Center is an excellent example of compliance and tolerance. In response to the 2012 and 2015 anti-INGO laws, the Center shifted its ideal preferences, "sacrificing its intellectual independence and analytical rigor," to realign itself more closely with the regime and maintain its presence in the country (Kirchick 2015). OSF, on the other hand, is an example of antagonism and expulsion. Rather than soften its stance toward the regime or shift its resources to other less contentious programs within the country, OSF withdrew and has remained a vocal critic of the regime.

INGOs can also be antagonistic in a tolerant environment. For example, tight networks of development NGOs and INGOs in countries with weak national governments can marginalize the state: in South Asia and Eastern and Southern Africa,



Figure 3: Possible authoritarian regulatory environments and corresponding INGO responses

nations are far more dependent on aid than trade in part because of the activities of development INGOs (Stiles 2002), while some INGOs in countries like Haiti and Afghanistan vie for control over territorial "fiefdoms" and rival the central government in power and influence (Schuller 2012). Likewise, INGOs can be compliant in an expulsive environment. Though China is currently in the midst of an unprecedented expansion of civil society and has cooperated with dozens of international NGOs, the regime has shuttered several small INGOs that work with seemingly innocuous issues like advocacy for disabled people.[11]

Framework mechanisms

As noted earlier, three mechanisms factor in to an INGO's decision-making calculus and programming choices, each corresponding to an element of the theoretical model. The first two mechanisms—the ideal point and the region extending from that point—represent a tension peculiar to third sector organizations. INGOs must balance their normative principles against the instrumental need of organizational survival. Unlike states or firms that generally face singular goals, like maximizing national security or maximizing profits, INGOs face a tradeoff between mission and money and must pursue both simultaneously—they must "instrumentally pursue their principled objectives within the economic constraints and political opportunity structures imposed by their external environments" (Mitchell and Schmitz 2014, 489).

When their institutional environments are limited and restricted, INGOs face a strain on their stated mission, vision, and values. An organization whose programming and preferences do not overlap with the regime's established regulatory environment will encounter pressure from any of the three mechanisms as it seeks to remain in the country. Initially, the INGO will feel pressure to change its deeply held principles (or shift its ideal point) and reframe its mission and vision to be more friendly with the regime. An INGO can resist this pressure to comply, however, by behaving more instrumentally and increasing its operational flexibility (expanding the space around the ideal point).

I define flexibility as the INGO's ability to protect its principled ideals through a range of instrumental strategies. If an INGO is able to marshal new resources, work with more partner organizations, request the support of powerful external actors, or pursue other strategies to circumvent, mitigate, or otherwise reduce the impact of government restrictions on their ideals, the organization will be able to find common ground with the regime and continue working in the country.

Finally, rather than shifting its ideals or expanding its flexibility, an INGO can attempt to gain more power relative to the government and induce the expansion of

11. Josh Chin, "China Cracks Down on Foreign Nonprofits," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 6, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-cracks-down-on-foreign-nonprofits-1425694223.

government preferences for their programming (i.e. pull the space around the regime's ideal point toward the INGO's range), often by offering critical services and expertise that the regime cannot provide to its own citizens, thus becoming indispensable to the state they work in (similar to the empires of NGOs in Haiti and Afghanistan, discussed earlier).

If an INGO does not make one of these three adjustments—shifting its ideal point, increasing its operational flexibility, or becoming essential for the regime—it runs a high risk of expulsion.

Global survey of international NGOs

Studying INGOs that work in authoritarian regimes poses a difficult methodological challenge. There is extensive cross-country research on the relationship between authoritarian regimes and *domestic* institutions like civil society (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014; Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2014; Frantz and Ezrow 2011), as well as detailed case studies of individual authoritarian regimes (Blaydes 2011; Chen 2012; Weiss 2013; Teets 2014; Hildebrandt 2013; Brownlee 2007), and autocracies in general (Levitsky and Way 2010). However, beyond newer case study work (Teets 2014), little research has looked at how authoritarian regimes and *international* nongovernmental institutions interact.

Additionally, there is a death of structured data on INGO activities or behavior. These organizations publish a wealth of unstructured data, such as annual reports, budgets, press releases, or calls to advocacy, but few have systematically compiled these data sources into usable datasets. Existing research either relies on event data parsed from large corpora of news reports or highly specific in-depth case studies based on interviews and other unstructured data. Each of these approaches, however, pose methodological challenges. Event data often yields weak or uninteresting results since event data algorithms were originally developed to track wars and interactions between global elites—not NGOs—while case studies tend to be too focused on a handful of prominent organizations, resulting in findings and theories that are likely not very generalizable (Bloodgood and Schmitz 2013; Mitchell and Schmitz 2014). For example, human rights INGO research has thus far been primarily concerned with Amnesty International and other similar organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), CARE International, or Oxfam (Stroup 2012; Wong 2012). While there is utility in amassing thick descriptions of INGO activities, more must be done. Mitchell and Schmitz (2014) argue that INGO case studies need to be combined with large, more representative analyses to better understand the organizations that work on specific issue areas as a whole.

To this end, I will test my theory of INGO behavior by conducting an online global survey of international NGOs that work in authoritarian regimes.[12] I have collected a large database of more than 40,000 organization e-mail addresses from several online NGO directories, including the Yearbook of International Organizations,[13] the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs's Integrated Civil Society Organizations System,[14] the Director of Development Organizations,[15] the Arab Institute of Human Rights directory,[16] and a list of anti-human trafficking NGOs compiled by Kelley (2016) and the Polaris Project.[17]

Instead of selecting a random sample from this large list, I will send each organization two invitations to complete the survey, spaced a week apart. I do not sample the list because I have designed the survey to be fairly open ended, using several of free response questions to get details of these organizations' experiences. That is, I am less interested in using the results in rigorous statistical analysis requiring sufficient inferential power—rather, I plan to analyze the results with more qualitative methods, using computer-assisted methods to identify themes and trends in the responses. I also do not sample the list because it is impossible to distinguish between domestic and international NGOs. While the Yearbook of International Organizations follows a strict definition of international NGO, many of the other directors I used do not, resulting in hundreds (and possibly thousands) of NGOs that only work within their home country. I filter these organizations out using the survey—if a respondent indicates they work primarily in the country they are based in, the survey ends early.

The survey includes a series of questions designed to identify the aspects of an INGO's organizational culture that correspond to my theory. In general, I ask respondents to (1) define their organization's core mission, vision, and values, and discuss how their programming reflects those principles, (2) explain the organization's flexibility (i.e. how it raises funds, how it collaborates with other organizations, etc.), and (3) describe and discuss the government restrictions they have faced while working abroad. Ultimately, I will be able to use these results to test each of the three mechanisms and determine how, why, and when INGOs shift their core values, become more flexible and instrumental, or attempt to induce the government to change its preferences.

12. A static version of the survey is available at ingodata.org/survey.
13. http://www.uia.org/ybio/
14. http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/
15. http://www.devdir.org
16. http://www.aihr-resourcescenter.org/
17. http://globalmodernslavery.org

References

Ahmed, Shamima, and David Potter. 2006. *NGOs in International Politics.* Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Bartelson, Jens. 2006. "Making Sense of Global Civil Society." *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (September): 371–95.

Blaydes, Lisa. 2011. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bloodgood, Elizabeth A., Joannie Tremblay-Boire, and Aseem Prakash. 2014. "National Styles of NGO Regulation." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 43 (4): 716–36.

Bloodgood, Elizabeth, and Hans Peter Schmitz. 2013. "The INGO Research Agenda: A Community Approach to Challenges in Method and Theory." Chap. 5 in *The Routledge Handbook of International Organization,* 67–79. London: Routledge.

Bob, Clifford. 2002. "Merchants of Morality." *Foreign Policy,* no. 129 (March): 36–45.

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carpenter, R. Charli. 2014. *Lost Causes: Agenda-Setting and Agenda-Vetting in Global Issue Networks.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Chen, Xi. 2012. *Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. 2002. "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action." *International Security* 27, no. 1 (Summer): 5–39.

Corry, Olaf. 2010. "Defining and Theorizing the Third Sector." Chap. 2 in *Third Sector Research,* edited by Rupert Taylor, 11–20. New York: Springer.

Daniel, Jamie Levine. 2014. "Mission-Based Objectives, Market-Based Funding: The Relationship between Earned Revenue and Charitable Mission." PhD diss., The Ohio State University.

Frantz, Erica, and Natasha Ezrow. 2011. *The Politics of Dictatorship: Institutions and Outcomes in Authoritarian Regimes.* Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Frantz, Erica, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. 2014. "A Dictator's Toolkit: Understanding How Co-optation Affects Repression in Autocracies." *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 3 (May): 332–46.

Gugerty, Mary Kay, and Michael Kremer. 2008. "Outside Funding and the Dynamics of Participation in Community Associations." *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 3 (July): 585–602.

Gugerty, Mary Kay, and Aseem Prakash. 2010. "Conclusions and Future Research: Rethinking Advocacy Organizations." In Prakash and Gugerty 2010a, chap. 12.

Heiss, Andrew. 2016. "Amicable Contempt: The Strategic Balance between Dictators and International NGOs." Working paper.

Heiss, Andrew, and Tana Johnson. 2016. "Internal, Interactive, and Institutional Factors: Towards a Unified Theory of INGO Behavior." *International Studies Review* Forthcoming.

Hildebrandt, Timothy. 2013. *Social Organizations and the Authoritarian State in China.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kelley, Judith G. 2016. "The Power of Scorecard Diplomacy: How Appealing to Reputation Can Influence State Behavior." Working paper.

Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Mimicking Democracy to Prolong Autocracies." *The Washington Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (Winter): 71–84.

Kim, Mirae, and Gregg G. Van Ryzin. 2014. "Impact of Government Funding on Donations to Arts Organizations: A Survey Experiment." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 43, no. 5 (October): 910–25. doi:10.1177/0899764013487800.

Kirchick, James. 2015. "How a U.S. Think Tank Fell for Putin." *The Daily Beast* (July 27). http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/27/how-a-u-s-think-tank-fell-for-putin.html.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. 1992. "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 21, no. 3 (December): 389–420.

Mayer, Frederick. 2010. "Multi-level Games." Chap. 3 in *Handbook on Multi-Level Governance,* edited by Henrik Enderlein, Sonja Wälti, and Michael Zürn, 47–65. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Mitchell, George E., and Hans Peter Schmitz. 2014. "Principled Instrumentalism: A Theory of Transnational NGO Behaviour." *Review of International Studies* 40, no. 3 (July): 487–504.

Murdie, Amanda. 2014. "The Ties that Bind: A Network Analysis of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations." *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (January): 1–27. doi:10.1017/S0007123412000683.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr., and Robert O. Keohane. 1971. "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction." *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (Summer): 329–49.

Prakash, Aseem, and Mary Kay Gugerty, eds. 2010a. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2010b. "Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action: An Introduction." In Prakash and Gugerty 2010a, chap. 1.

Raiffa, Howard. 1982. *The Art and Science of Negotiation.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

Schuller, Mark. 2012. *Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs.* New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

Skjelsbaek, Kjell. 1971. "The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century." *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (Summer): 420–42.

Sloan, Margaret F., Cleopatra Grizzle, and Mirae Kim. 2015. "What Happens on a Rainy Day? How Nonprofit Human Service Leaders Create, Maintain, and Utilize Operating Reserves." *Journal of Nonprofit Education and Leadership* 5 (3): 190–202.

Stiles, Kendall W. 2002. *Civil Society by Design: Donors, NGOs, and the Intermestic Development Circle in Bangladesh.* Westport, CT: Praeger.

Stroup, Sarah S. 2012. *Borders among Activists: International NGOs in the United States, Britain, and France.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Suárez, David F. 2011. "Collaboration and Professionalization: The Contours of Public Sector Funding for Nonprofit Organizations." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 21, no. 2 (April): 307–26.

Suárez, David F., and Hokyu Hwang. 2008. "Find a Partner: Nonprofit Organizations and the Culture of Collaboration." Consortium on Collaborative Governance Mini Conference, Santa Monica, CA.

Teets, Jessica C. 2014. *Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The China Model.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Weiss, Jessica Chen. 2013. "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China." *International Organization* 67, no. 1 (Winter): 1–35.

Witesman, Eva, and Andrew Heiss. 2016. "Nonprofit Collaboration and the Resurrection of Market Failure: How a Resource-Sharing Environment Can Suppress Social Objectives." *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations:* 1–29. doi:10.1007/s11266-016-9684-5.

Wong, Wendy H. 2012. *Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.