feat($compile): lower the xlink:href security context for SVG's a…

… and `image` elements

Previously, `xlink:href` on SVG's `<a>` and `</svg>')($rootScope);
+
+        //both of these fail the RESOURCE_URL test, that shouldn't be run
+        $rootScope.testUrl = 'https://bad.example.org';
+        $$sanitizeUri.and.returnValue('https://clean.example.org');
+
+        $rootScope.$apply();
+        expect(elementA.find('a').attr('xlink:href')).toBe('https://clean.example.org');
+        expect(elementImage.find('image').attr('xlink:href')).toBe('https://clean.example.org');
+        // <a> is navigational, so the second argument should be false to reach the aHref whitelist
+        expect($$sanitizeUri).toHaveBeenCalledWith($rootScope.testUrl + 'aTag' , false);
+        // <image> is media inclusion, it should use the imgSrc whitelist
+        expect($$sanitizeUri).toHaveBeenCalledWith($rootScope.testUrl + 'imageTag', true);
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('should use $$sanitizeUri when working with svg and xlink:href through ng-href', function() {
       var $$sanitizeUri = jasmine.createSpy('$$sanitizeUri');
       module(function($provide) {
         $provide.value('$$sanitizeUri', $$sanitizeUri);
       });
       inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
         element = $compile('<svg><a xlink:href="" ng-href="{{ testUrl }}"></a></svg>')($rootScope);
-        $rootScope.testUrl = 'evilUrl';
+        //both of these fail the RESOURCE_URL test, that shouldn't be run
+        $rootScope.testUrl = 'https://bad.example.org';
+        $$sanitizeUri.and.returnValue('https://clean.example.org');
 
-        $$sanitizeUri.and.returnValue('someSanitizedUrl');
         $rootScope.$apply();
-        expect(element.find('a').prop('href').baseVal).toBe('someSanitizedUrl');
+        expect(element.find('a').prop('href').baseVal).toBe('https://clean.example.org');
         expect($$sanitizeUri).toHaveBeenCalledWith($rootScope.testUrl, false);
       });
     });
 
 
-    it('should use $$sanitizeUri when working with svg and xlink:href', function() {
+    it('should use $$sanitizeUri when working with svg and xlink:href through ng-href', function() {
       var $$sanitizeUri = jasmine.createSpy('$$sanitizeUri');
       module(function($provide) {
         $provide.value('$$sanitizeUri', $$sanitizeUri);
@@ -11153,6 +11177,17 @@ describe('$compile', function() {
         expect($$sanitizeUri).toHaveBeenCalledWith($rootScope.testUrl, false);
       });
     });
+
+    it('should have a RESOURCE_URL context for xlink:href by default', function() {
+      inject(function($compile, $rootScope) {
+        element = $compile('<svg><whatever xlink:href="{{ testUrl }}"></whatever></svg>')($rootScope);
+        $rootScope.testUrl = 'https://bad.example.org';
+
+        expect(function() {
+          $rootScope.$apply();
+        }).toThrowError(/\$sce:insecurl/);
+      });
+    });
   });
 
   describe('interpolation on HTML DOM event handler attributes onclick, onXYZ, formaction', function() {