


---

# Jepsen

# 5

WHAT  
EVEN  
ARE  
COMPUTERS





[Computer-  
sicherheits-  
forscher]

Public  
API {




} API code

Ruby {




DBs

Every →  
is →  
← Thing  
fine !




Databases! /  
Queues! /  
Discovery! /  
**THE HORROR**




# Split Brain

# Broken Foreign Keys




write ok      read       $\emptyset$       read ok



Anomalies

How do you  
know if a  
system is safe?


Measure  
your  
Systems



Jepsen

[github.com/aphyr/jepsen](https://github.com/aphyr/jepsen)


# Environment





— INVARIANTS —





client:  $w-w'$   $r-r'$   $w-w'$

The diagram illustrates three client requests to a central database system. Each request is shown as a horizontal line segment with arrows at both ends, indicating a transaction or query. The first request is labeled  $w-w'$ , the second  $r-r'$ , and the third  $w-w'$ . All three requests converge on a central, blurred area representing the database.

DB :

client :  $w$  —  $w'$   $w$  — ... -

The diagram shows the internal state of the database after the client requests have been processed. The database is represented by a central cloud-like shape. Inside, there are two nodes labeled  $w$  and  $w'$ . A horizontal line connects them. A vertical arrow points downwards from the center of this line to a dashed line below, representing a log or history of operations.

Clients Generate  
random operations ( $w$ )  
and apply them  
to the system ( $w'$ )



invoke

ok

invoke

fail

invoke ?

? info

?

?

?


invoke ok

invoke fail

invoke ok

invoke info

1. Generate ops
2. Record history
3. Verify history is  
consistent w/ model



Partitions!

So, what  
have you  
found?



# Riak

LWW  $\rightarrow$  lost writes

CRDTs  $\rightarrow$  safe

5/13

# Mongo

Data loss at all

Write Concerns

# Redis Sentinel

5/13

Split brain,  
massive write loss

# Cassandra

9/13

- LWW write loss
- Row isolation broken
- Transaction deadlock  
data loss

# NuoDB

Beat CAP by buffering all requests in IRAM during partition

9/13

# Kafka

## In-sync Replica Set

Could shrink to 0

nodes, causing msg

loss.

9/13

Zookeeper

Works.

# etcd / Consul

6/14

Stale reads

# Elastic search

Loses documents in  
every class of partition  
tested.

6/14

# RabbitMQ

Split brain, massive  
message loss

# Aerospike

---

Claims "ACID", was  
really LWW.

# Elasticsearch 1.5.0

---

5/15

Still loses data  
in every test case

# MongoDB 2.6.7

---

5/15

stale reads


dirty reads

As an industry, we are

woefully underprepared


to handle distributed


systems failure modes



Chronos

Like Cran, but  
DISTRIBUTED






Valid



invalid




Chronos & Mesos


processes will crash  
on losing zk conn.


(By design)

(Except when they don't)

with no partitions







Partition

time

- 1: Partition occurs
- 2: Chronos loses ZK
- 3: Chronos pauses
- 4: Partition ends
- 5: Re-election

Why can't the  
new Chronos leader  
run any tasks?

Bug #520

Chronos registers with  
a new framework ID

Old Chronas


a c o Q a o o e e Q  
c c a a a Q Q Q e e Q Q

New Chronas

--offer\_timeout=30s


with offer timeout

part



with offer\_timeout

Part



Mesos - 3280

Race condition in  
node recovery

Recovering nodes

silently ignore promise

↳ write ops — Paxos

rounds can stall

forever

Now fixed in

Mesos, pending

in Chronos

# Chronos

# Recommendations

Colacate quora!

ZK

MM

Chrina

ZK

MM

Chronas

ZK

MM

Chmnas

- Wrappers for Chronos +

Mesos daemons

- schedule\_horizon

- offer\_timeout

- Monitor your jobs

- Monitor daemon restarts




Symmetric replication

for MySQL,

MariaDB,

Percona XtraDB, ...




Between nodes,



claims to provide

Snapshot Isolation


write




Commit



write



commit



“SI level occurs  
between Repeatable  
Read and Serializable”

(so, use 1SR, get SI)

serializability

1SR

snapshot isolation

SI

(wrong!)

repeatable read


RR

read committed

RC


read uncommitted

RU




OK...So how  
do we test it?



Can't use our  
linearizability  
checker...




*stale read*


Consider 2 bank accounts...








Transfers must serialize



consistent  
reads



→ Sum of accs





is always a


CONSTANT

ORTS

TIT?

# Inconsistent Reads





A5A

READ

SKREW


Read Skew


breaks SI

invariants

IT GETS

WORSE






Galera engineers:

"first committer wins  
rule is not honored by  
galera certification"

InnoDB's Serializable  
isolation relies on shared  
read locks which Galera  
doesn't enforce.

→ first-committer-wins



Docs are lying


Not all is

LOST

Galera does

not allow

Dirty Read



If your app  
works with RC,  
it might be ok.

RC is a pretty  
weak property.

Allows those  
inconsistent reads!

still waiting

on a

fix

RethinkDB

- Document Store
- Like MongoDB
- Linearizable on 1 Key
- No multi-doc txns

Now uses  
to offer  
consensus!



	reads	single	outdated
majority	Linear	Dirty Reads	Stale Reads
single	LOST UPDATES		

# During Partitions,

- brief latency spike
- brief downtime
- Recovery in  $\sim 10$  s

Outdated reads  
always available

---

All other ops require  
a majority connected

Majority/Majority


PASSED

We have to go



Deeper

What if... we  
rebalanced the  
cluster?



Still passes. Ok.

Let's rebalance  
during partitions

lost update!

3

write 0

17

CAS 3 → 0

time →


"Guarantee failed:

[index  $\leq$  get\_latest\_index]

the log doesn't go

forward this far"

Leader: "please apply this range to your SM"



no ops here!

"Guarantee failed:  
[current\_term\_leader\_id  
== request\_leader\_id]"

$L_1$

I lead

$L_2$

I also

term 5"



I lead term 5"

$f_3$

"Augh!"

seq #

raft ID





**START** | 1 | foo

dup

**STOP** | 2 | foo

**START** | 1 | foo



...mostly.

#4668

In version 2.1.0,


seq #s set to

MAX\_INT.

Workaround:

Always process

ACTIVE messages




Patches in  
2.2.4 &

2.1.6



# Recap




Read the docs!



Then test it

— for —

YOURSELF



"Strict"

"ACID"

"Strong"

Be Formal

Be Specific.

*Figure out the  
invariants  
your system needs*

How much



can you tolerate?

Consider  
your  
failure modes

# Process Crash

#Kill -9 1234

# Node failure

- AWS terminate
- Physical power switch

# Clock Skew

# date 1028000

# fake time ...

# GC/TQ Pause

# killall -s STOP foo

# killall -s CONT foo

# Network Partition


# iptables -j DROP

# tc qdisc ... delay...  
drop...

Test your

Systems

end-to-end



- Property testing
- High-level / invariants
- With distsys failure  
modes

# Thanks

---

Sjaakala

Siddarth Chandrasekaran

Brendan Taylor

Cosmin Nicolaeescu

Thanks

---

Brenden Matthews

Timothy Chen

Aarch Bell

Kyle Conroy

Thanks!

Daniel Mewes

Michael Lucy

Slava Alchmechet

Thanks!

---

Codership

Mesos (sphere)?

# Thanks!

---

Stripe

RethinkDB



funded  
work

<http://jepsen.io>