

# Title goes in report.tex

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## Abstract

This paper looks at the security concerns and potential vulnerabilities in Software Defined Networking (SDN). In particular, we examine additional attack vector of remotely introducing a switch into the networking path, something not possible without physical access to the switching site in a traditional network. We also look at the increased risk to the entire network from a single, compromised risk due to the centralized nature of SDN . We first provide an overview of SDN, the current status of security in SDN controllers, and discuss the threat models for our attack. We then introduce our rogue switch and present several attacks on various controller. We also discuss additional attacks possible by a rogue switch and examine additional vulnerabilities to a SDN from a single compromised switch. Finally, we conclude with some recommendations for hardening SDN controllers and limiting the area of attack.

## 1 Introduction

Paragraph about SDN - the various meanings of SDN and that we are discussing the traditional controller switch networking.

Not sure of difference between intro / background.

Things to discuss – Controllers —Various Controller. That we are doing testing on Ryu and Pox (possibly OpenDaylight but its more complicated) —Switches - In this context, a switch means either an OpenFlow capable hardware switch or a completely software defined switch (OpenVSwitch)

In section 2, we will.... In Section 3, etc. In Section 4, etc. Finally

We probably want to introduce things, right now that's in report.tex. We might want to cite something in the introduction, we can do that using

`{\cite{refname}}`

where the *refname* is defined in bibliogra-

phy.tex in the

`{\bibitem}`

command. For example citing dpkt looks like this: [4].

## 2 Background

### 2.1 Software Defined Networking

### 2.2 Security in SDN

## 3 Creating a Software Defined Switch

### 3.1 OpenFlow Protocol

### 3.2 Initiating a Connection to a Controller

### 3.3 Push verses Pull Connections

I'm making up sections and order... there's a file called fake.tex where we can write about faking a switch. The verbatim environment

is useful for preformatted text - there's an example in the introduction! In this section, we present our rogue switch and

### 3.4 OpenFlow Protocol

OpenFlow is the protocol used to communicate between the controller and its switches. An OpenFlow packet header is simply an 8 byte packet with the first byte used to communicate version, the second byte for type, third and fourth byte for message length followed by a four byte Transaction ID (see Figure 1). The type is of a subset of 19 possible types, most of which are of type request (e.g. 5 = Features Request) with the subsequent reply (e.g. 6 = Feature Reply). There are couple key point to note when dealing with the OpenFlow protocol. First, the transaction ID is used to correlate incoming OpenFlow messages with their appropriate responses much in the same way TCP uses SYN and ACK flags. A features reply will (generally) not be accepted by the controller unless it contains the corresponding transaction ID from the features request. This protocol is also a two-way communication scheme and not simply switch replies to controller request. Several message types, to include packet input events, are switch initiated communications to the controller.

### 3.5 Initiating a Controller Connection

While the initiation sequence varies by controller, there are several required command to initiate a switch to controller connection.

## 4 Disrupting an SDN with a Fake Switch

There's a file called attacks.tex for describing our various attacks; we could combine the results of the attacks we implemented here, or put them separately. This is attacks.tex and the below is copied from the google doc:

### 4.1 Dropping traffic

A compromised switch could simply drop packets sent to it, thus creating a service interrup-

tion. However, a controller would probably notice this quickly – it would appear as though the switch had failed, and automated recovery mechanisms would be initiated.

### 4.2 Cloning or diverting traffic

A compromised switch could ensure that traffic would be routed through an adversarys middlebox, or could clone traffic and send the cloned stream to the adversary. This would be more difficult for the controller to detect, unless it caused considerable slowdown. This attack could conceivably be used for purposes such as the NSAs MUSCULAR program, which intercepts traffic as it flows between private data centers [5].

### 4.3 DoS other switches

By injecting traffic, a switch could deliberately attempt to overload neighboring switches TCAMs or otherwise DoS them.

### 4.4 DoS the controller / the control channel

By sending requests to the controller, the switch could attempt to overload it. One could fine-tune the control messages to maximize churn or CPU consumption in the controller.

However, our results show that a TCP congestion control successfully prevents a single switch from denying service to the controller; instead the extra packets from the switch are dropped.

### 4.5 DDoS the controller by spoofing many switches

What happens if in a network with  $n$  actual switches, the controller receives hello messages from  $n^2$  switches, for example? This works around the throttling problem where a controller may simple rate-limit each switch.

### 4.6 Advertising false host attachments

A compromised switch can send the controller packet-in events with false packets, which falsely claim to have a particular MAC address

attached to them. This could lead the controller to believe that the compromised switch should receive traffic intended for the host. While this would soon lead to packet loss and a noticeable disruption, it would nevertheless allow a switch to eavesdrop when it would not normally be in a position to do so.

#### 4.7 Falsify measurement reports

A switch may return false results in response to a read-state measurement message, thus causing the controller to behave irrationally. For example, a switch could falsify or hide a DoS attack, elephant flows, etc.

#### 4.8 Ignoring rules

A switch could simply ignore flow-table modification requests. For example, dropping packets will be noticed quickly; but a switch could allow packets to pass through that should have been dropped. Because of the difficulty of querying flow table state, the controller may not become aware of this. A compromised switch could thus operate in stealth mode and the inconsistent flow table might only be noticed once the switch allows a DoS attack to pass through, for example.

#### 4.9 Modifying VLAN tags

#### 4.10 Reporting flow mods to an adversary

An adversary could hope to learn about network traffic by observing flow mods. Certain flow mods might indicate that the controller has, for example, detected an intrusion, or that a specific host has connected to the network in a certain location. Thus, just knowing what flow mods are being issued by the controller could be a source of interesting information for an adversary.

#### 4.11 Even more...

### 5 Related Work

The related work might be long, so let's put it in a separate file, `related.tex`. This is `related.tex` - I've already added all the links from the email thread to the bibliography, we can remove the

ones we won't plan to use. TODO for Anna... look up the two security papers we read in class, add them to the bibliography and talk about them here.

### 6 Conclusion

The conclusion might be short enough to be in `report.tex` - we can add other sections before it as necessary, and the bibliography (in `bibliography.tex`) will follow.

### References

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- [3] Constantin, Lucian. "Cisco patches vulnerabilities in some security applications, switches, and routers." *InfoWorld* 10 October 2013, <http://www.infoworld.com/d/security/cisco-patches-vulnerabilities-in-some-security-appliances-switches-and-routers-228551>
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