

Trust

What it is and how to get it

Dr. Perry Alexander

Information and Telecommunication Technology Center
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
The University of Kansas
palexand@ku.edu

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Trust

“An entity can be trusted if it always behaves in the expected manner for the intended purpose [?]”

Properties

- ▶ Unambiguous identification
- ▶ Unimpeded operation
- ▶ First-hand observation of good behavior *or* indirect experience of good behavior by a trusted third party

Necessary Capabilities for Trust

- ▶ *Strong Identification* — An unambiguous, immutable identifier associated with the platform. The identifier is a protected encryption key in the TXT implementation.
- ▶ *Reporting Configuration* — An unambiguous identification mechanism for software and hardware running on the platform. The mechanism is hashing in the TXT implementation

$T^x[y]$ is an homogeneous relation over actors that is true when x *trusts* y . $T^x[y]$ is a preorer:

- ▶ Reflexive - $\forall x \cdot T^x[x]$
- ▶ Transitive - $\forall x, y, z \cdot T^y[x] \wedge T^z[y] \Rightarrow T^z[x]$

The transitive property defines *chains of trust*.

The *Trusted Platform Module (TPM)* is a cryptographic coprocessor for trust.

- ▶ Endorsement Key (EK) — factory generated asymmetric key that uniquely identifies the TPM
- ▶ Attestation Instance Key (AIK) — TPM_CreateIdentity generated asymmetric key alias for the EK
- ▶ Storage Root Key (SRK) — TPM_TakeOwnership generated asymmetric key that encrypts data associated with the TPM
- ▶ Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) — protected registers for storing and extending hashes
- ▶ NVRAM — Non-volatile storage associated with the TPM

- ▶ Asymmetric key generated at TPM fabrication
- ▶ EK^{-1} is protected by the TPM
- ▶ EK by convention is managed by a Certificate Authority
 - ▶ Binds EK with a platform
 - ▶ Classic trusted third party
- ▶ Only used for encryption
- ▶ Attestation Instance Keys (AIK) are aliases for the EK
 - ▶ Used for signing
 - ▶ Authorized by the EK

- ▶ Asymmetric key generated by TPM_TakeOwnership
- ▶ SRK^{-1} is protected by the TPM
- ▶ SRK is available for encryption
- ▶ Used as the root for chaining keys by *wrapping*
 - ▶ A wrapped key is an asymmetric key pair with its private key sealed
 - ▶ Safe to share the entire key
 - ▶ Only usable in the presence of the wrapping key with expected PCRs

Platform Configuration Registers

- ▶ **Operations on PCRs**
 - ▶ Extension — Hash a new value juxtaposed with the existing PCR value
 - ▶ Reset — Set to 0
 - ▶ Set — Set to a known value
- ▶ **Operations using PCRs**
 - ▶ Sealing data — PCR state dependent encryption
 - ▶ Wrapping keys — PCR state dependent encryption of a private key
 - ▶ Quote — Reporting PCR values to a third party
- ▶ **Properties**
 - ▶ Locality — Access control
 - ▶ Resettable — Can a PCR be reset
 - ▶ Many others that we don't need yet

A *root of trust* provides a basis for transitively building trust. Roots of trust are trusted implicitly.

There are three important Roots of Trust:

- ▶ Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM)
- ▶ Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR)
- ▶ Root of Trust for Storage (RTS)

Root of Trust for Measurement

A *Root of Trust for Measurement* is trusted to take the base system measurement.

- ▶ A hash function called on an initial code base from a protected execution environment
- ▶ Starts the measurement process during boot
- ▶ In the Intel TXT process the RTM is SENTER implemented on the processor

A *Root of Trust for Reporting* is trusted to guarantee the integrity of the base system report or quote

- ▶ A protected key used for authenticating reports
- ▶ In the Intel TXT processes this is the TPM's Endorsement Key (EK)
- ▶ Created and bound to its platform by the TPM foundry
- ▶ EK^{-1} is stored in the TPM and cannot be accessed by any entity other than the TPM
- ▶ EK is available for encrypting data for the TPM
- ▶ EK^{-1} is used for decrypting data inside the TPM
- ▶ Linking EK to its platform is done by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA)


A *Root of Trust for Storage* is trusted to protect stored data

- ▶ A key stored in a protected location
- ▶ In the Intel TXT boot process this is the TPM's Storage Root Key (SRK)
- ▶ Created by TPM_TakeOwnership
- ▶ SRK^{-1} is stored in the TPM and cannot be accessed by any entity other than the TPM
- ▶ SRK is available for encrypting data for the TPM
- ▶ SRK is used for protecting other keys

One Step from Roots of Trust

Roots of trust are used to build a trusted system from boot.


- ▶ Power-on reset, resettable PCR_s set to -1
- ▶ SENTER called
- ▶ SENTER resets resettable PCR_s to 0
- ▶ SENTER measures SINIT policy into PCR 18



One Step from Roots of Trust

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
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
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- ▶ Power-on reset, resettable PCRs set to -1
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What We Know From Good PCR 18

A good value in PCR 18 tells us:


- ▶ SENTER was called — Resetting PCR 18 starts measurements at 0 rather than -1
- ▶ SINIT was measured by SENTER — Only SENTER can extend PCR 18
- ▶ SINIT uses the correct policy — PCR 18 is extended with SINIT measurement policy
- ▶ SENTER ran before SINIT was measured — $A \mid B \neq B \mid A$

Measurement \neq Trust

Measurements must be appraised to determine trust.


Two Steps from Roots of Trust

- ▶ SINIT measures the Secure Launch Environment (SLE) using measured policy
- ▶ SINIT returns control to SENTER
- ▶ SENTER invokes the SLE



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What We Know From Good PCRs

- ▶ SENTER was called — Resetting PCR 18 starts measurement sequence at 0 rather than -1
- ▶ SINIT policy was measured by SENTER — Only SENTER can extend PCR 18
- ▶ SINIT uses the correct policy — PCR 18 is extended with SINIT measurement policy
- ▶ SENTER ran before SINIT — $0 \mid SINIT \neq -1 \mid SINIT$
- ▶ SLE is good — Measured by good SINIT into PCR
- ▶ Initial OS is good — Measured by good SLE into PCR

- ▶ Trust is transitive
 - ▶ $T^x[y] \wedge T^y[z] \Rightarrow T^x[z]$
 - ▶ Construct chains of trust
 - ▶ Remember “directly observed or indirectly observed by a trusted third party”
- ▶ Roots of Trust define the “root” for trust
 - ▶ Use Roots of Trust to establish base for chain
 - ▶ RTM generates a trusted first measurement
 - ▶ RTS protects first measurement
 - ▶ RTR signs base quote for appraiser (eventually)
- ▶ Extend chains of trust by measuring before executing

- ▶ Review access control modeling objectives
 - ▶ modeling platform MAC
 - ▶ modeling local access control
- ▶ Overview access control policy definition
 - ▶ design and modeling assumptions
 - ▶ platform boot policy definition
 - ▶ local policy definitions
- ▶ Overview models
 - ▶ domain and system models
 - ▶ communication model
 - ▶ theorems and status
- ▶ Identify next steps
 - ▶ runtime and moving beyond the SVP line
 - ▶ adding M&A detail

Access Control Modeling Objectives

What we're about here

Reporting joint work with Geoffrey Brown, Indiana University (submitted) in which we verify two physical layer protocols.

- ▶ Biphase Mark Protocol (BMP)
- ▶ 8N1 Protocol

These protocols are used in data transmission for CDs, Ethernet, and Tokenring, etc. as well as UARTs.

- ▶ Correctness is reasonably difficult to prove due to many real-time constraints.
- ▶ Many previous formal modeling/verification efforts for these protocols.

Columns and Blocks

Trying figures next to lists

Some normal text goes here
just for introduction

- ▶ Appraisal
- ▶ Measurement
- ▶ Attestation
- ▶ vTPM


Why is this column getting
higher?

Maybe it's not
Center alignment seems best.


I like this for two column test
and graphics

Getting higher???

CPU



TPM



Big Picture

Armor Architecture

Introduction to \LaTeX

Beamer is a \LaTeX class for creating presentations that are held using a projector...”

This is a definition

Not really a proof.

1. This is a step



Not really a proof.

1. This is a step
2. This is another step



Not really a proof.

1. This is a step
2. This is another step
3. This is a third step
4. This is a third step
5. This is a third step
6. This is a third step



- ▶ Item 1 followed by a pause

- ▶ Item 1 followed by a pause
- ▶ Item 3 followed by a pause

- ▶ Item 1 followed by a pause
- ▶ Item 2 followed by a pause
- ▶ Item 3 followed by a pause

- ▶ BMP has been verified in PVS twice and required
 - ▶ 37 invariants and 4000 individual proof directives (initially) in the one effort
 - ▶ 5 hours just to *check* the proofs in the other effort
 - ▶ A formal specification and verification of an independent real-time model in both efforts
- ▶ BMP has been verified in (the precursor to) ACL2 by J. Moore and required
 - ▶ A significant conceptual effort to fit the problem in the logic, arguably omitting some salient features of the model
 - ▶ The statement and proof of many antecedent results
 - ▶ J. Moore reports this as one of his “best ideas” in his career

Not Your Father's Theorem-Prover

The verifications are carried out in the SAL infinite-state bounded model-checker that combines SAT-solving and SMT decision procedures to *prove* safety properties about infinite-state models.

- ▶ Theorem-proving efforts took multiple engineer-months if not years to complete.
- ▶ Our initial effort in SAL consumed about *two engineer-days*.
...and we found a significant bug in a UART application note.

Parameterized Timing Constraints

SMT allows for *parameterized* proofs of correctness. The following are example constraints from the BMP verification:

TIME: TYPE = REAL;

TPERIOD: TIME = 16;

TSAMPLE: INTEGER = 23;

TSETTLE: {x: TIME |
 0 ≤ x
 AND (x + TPERIOD < TSAMPLE)
 AND (x + TSAMPLE + 1 < 2 * TPERIOD)};

TSTABLE: TIME = TPERIOD - TSETTLE;

ERROR: {x: TIME |
 (0 ≤ x)
 AND (TPERIOD + TSETTLE < TSAMPLE*(1-x))
 AND (TSAMPLE*(1+x) + (1+x) + TSETTLE < 2 * TPERIOD)};

RSAMPMAX: TIME = TSAMPLE * (1 + ERROR);

RSAMPMIN: TIME = TSAMPLE * (1 - ERROR);

RSCANMAX: TIME = 1 + ERROR;

RSCANMIN: TIME = 1 - ERROR;

- ▶ Parser
- ▶ Simulator
- ▶ Symbolic model-checker (BDDs)
- ▶ Witness symbolic model-checker
- ▶ Bounded model-checker
- ▶ Infinite-state bounded model-checker
- ▶ Future releases include:
 - ▶ Explicit-state model-checker
 - ▶ MDD-based symbolic model-checking

All of which are “state-of-the-art”

Please direct your attention to the whiteboard.

Timeout Automata¹ (Semantics)

An *explicit* real-time model.

- ▶ Vocabulary:
 - ▶ A set of state variables.
 - ▶ A *global clock*, $c \in \mathbb{R}^{0\leq}$.
 - ▶ A set of *timeout* variables T such that for $t \in T$, $t \in \mathbb{R}^{0\leq}$.
- ▶ Construct a transition system $\langle S, S^0, \rightarrow \rangle$:
 - ▶ States are mappings of all variables to values.
 - ▶ Transitions are either *time transitions* or *discrete transitions*.
 - ▶ Time transitions are enabled if the clock is less than all timeouts. Updates clock to least timeout.
 - ▶ Discrete transitions are enabled if the clock equals some timeout. Updates state variables and timeouts.

¹B. Dutertre and M. Sorea. Timed systems in SAL. *SRI TR*, 2004.

Disjunctive Invariants

Even with k -induction, getting a sufficiently strong invariant is still hard! *Disjunctive invariants* help. A disjunctive invariant can be built iteratively from the counterexamples returned for the hypothesized invariant being verified.

```
t0: THEOREM system |-  
  G( ( (phase = Settle)  
      AND (rstate = tstate + 1)  
      AND (rclk - tclk - TPERIOD > 0)  
      AND (tclk + TPERIOD + TSTABLE - rclk > 0))  
    OR  
    ( (phase = Stable)  
      AND (rstate = tstate + 1)  
      AND (rclk - tclk - TSETTLE > 0)  
      AND (tclk + TPERIOD - rclk > 0)  
      AND (rdata = tdata))  
      .  
      .  
      .
```