Trust

What it is and how to get it

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Defining Trust

Trust

"An entity can be trusted if it always behaves in the exptected manner for the intended purpose [?]"



Defining Trust

Properties

- ► Unambiguous identification
- ► Unimpeded operation
- ► First-hand observation of good behavior *or* indirect experience of good behavior by a trusted third party



Necessary Capabilities for Trust

- ► Strong Identification An unambiguous, immutable identifier associated with the platform. The identifier is a protected encryption key in the TXT implementation.
- ► Reporting Configuration An unambiguous identification mechanism for software and hardware running on the platform. The mechanism is hashing in the TXT implementation



Trust is a Preorder

 $T^{x}[y]$ is an homogeneous relation over actors that is true when x trusts y. $T^{x}[y]$ is a preorer:

- ► Reflexive $\forall x \cdot T^x[x]$
- ► Transitive $\forall x, y, z \cdot T^{y}[x] \wedge T^{z}[y] \Rightarrow T^{z}[x]$

The transitive property defines chains of trust.



Trusted Platform Module

The *Trusted Platform Module (TPM)* is a cryptographic coprocessor for trust.

- ► Endorsement Key (EK) factory generated asymmetric key that uniquely identifies the TPM
- ► Attestation Instance Key (AIK) TPM_CreateIdentity generated asymmetric key alias for the EK
- Storage Root Key (SRK) TPM_TakeOwnership generated asymmetric key that encrypts data associated with the TPM
- Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) protected registers for storing and extending hashes
- ► NVRAM Non-volatile storage associated with the TPM



Endorsement Key

- Asymmetric key generated at TPM fabrication
- $ightharpoonup EK^{-1}$ is protected by the TPM
- ► EK by convention is managed by a Certificate Authority
 - ▶ Binds *EK* with a platform
 - Classic trusted third party
- Only used for encryption
- Attestation Instance Keys (AIK) are aliases for the EK
 - Used for signing
 - Authorized by the EK



Storage Root Key

- ► Asymmetric key generated by TPM_TakeOwnership
- ► *SRK*⁻¹ is protected by the TPM
- ► *SRK* is available for encryption
- ► Used as the root for chaining keys by wrapping
 - A wrapped key is an asymmetric key pair with it's private key sealed
 - Safe to share the entire key
 - Only usable in the presence of the wrapping key with expected PCRs



Platform Configuration Registers

Operations on PCRs

- Extension Hash a new value juxtaposed with the existing PCR value
- ► Reset Set to 0
- Set Set to a known value

Operations using PCRs

- Sealing data PCR state dependent encryption
- Wrapping keys PCR state dependent encryption of a private key
- Quote Reporting PCR values to a third party

Properties

- ► Locality Access control
- ▶ Resettable Can a PCR be reset
- Many others that we don't need yet



Roots of Trust

A *root of trust* provides a basis for transitively building trust. Roots of trust are trusted implicitly.

There are three important Roots of Trust:

- ► Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM)
- ► Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR)
- Root of Trust for Storage (RTS)



Root of Trust for Measurement

A *Root of Trust for Measurement* is trusted to take the base system measurement.

- ► A hash function called on an initial code base from a protected execution environment
- Starts the measurement process during boot
- ► In the Intel TXT process the RTM is SENTER implemented on the processor



Root of Trust for Reporting

A *Root of Trust for Reporting* is trusted to guarantee the integrity of the base system report or quote

- ► A protected key used for authenticating reports
- In the Intel TXT processes this is the TPM's Endorsement Key (EK)
- Created and bound to its platform by the TPM foundry
- ► EK⁻¹ is stored in the TPM and cannot be accessed by any entity other than the TPM
- ► EK is available for encrypting data for the TPM
- $ightharpoonup EK^{-1}$ is used for decrypting data inside the TPM
- ► Linking *EK* to its platform is done by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA)




Root of Trust for Storage


A Root of Trust for Storage is trusted to protect stored data

- ► A key stored in a protected location
- ► In the Intel TXT boot process this is the TPM's Storage Root Key (SRK)
- Created by TPM_TakeOwnership
- ► SRK⁻¹ is stored in the TPM and cannot be accessed by any entity other than the TPM
- SRK is available for encrypting data for the TPM
- SRK is used for protecting other keys




- Power-on reset, resettable
 PCRs set to -1
- SENTER called
- SENTER resets resettable PCRs to 0
- ► SENTER measures SINIT policy into PCR 18









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







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What We Know From Good PCR 18

A good value in PCR 18 tells us:

- ► SENTER was called Resetting PCR 18 starts measurements at 0 rather than -1
- ► SINIT was measured by SENTER Only SENTER can extend PCR 18
- SINIT uses the correct policy PCR 18 is extended with SINIT measurement policy
- ▶ SENTER ran before SINIT was measured $A \mid B \neq B \mid A$


Measurement \neq Trust

Measurements must be appraised to determine trust.



Two Steps from Roots of Trust


- SINIT measures the Secure Launch Environment (SLE) using measured policy
- ► SINIT returns control to SENTER
- ► SENTER invokes the SLE





Two Steps from Roots of Trust

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What We Know From Good PCRs

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- ► SINIT policy was measured by SENTER Only SENTER can extend PCR 18
- SINIT uses the correct policy PCR 18 is extended with SINIT measurement policy
- ▶ SENTER ran before SINIT $0 \mid SINIT \neq -1 \mid SINIT$
- ► SLE is good Measured by good SINIT into PCR
- ► Initial OS is good Measured by good SLE into PCR



Chaining Trust

► Trust is transitive

- $ightharpoonup T^{x}[y] \wedge T^{y}[z] \Rightarrow T^{x}[z]$
- Construct chains of trust
- Remember "directly observed or indirectly observed by a trusted third party"
- Roots of Trust define the "root" for trust
 - Use Roots of Trust to establish base for chain
 - RTM generates a trusted first measurement
 - RTS protects first measurement
 - ► RTR signs base quote for appraiser (eventually)
- ► Extend chains of trust by measuring before executing



Presentation Outline

Review access control modeling objectives

- modeling platform MAC
- modeling local access control

► Overview access control policy definition

- design and modeling assumptions
- platform boot policy definition
- local policy definitions

Overview models

- domain and system models
- communication model
- theorems and status

Identify next steps

- runtime and moving beyond the SVP line
- adding M&A detail



Access Control Modeling Objectives

What we're about here

Reporting joint work with Geoffrey Brown, Indiana University (submitted) in which we verify two physical layer protocols.

- ► Biphase Mark Protocol (BMP)
- ► 8N1 Protocol

These protocols are used in data transmission for CDs, Ethernet, and Tokenring, etc. as well as UARTs.

- Correctness is reasonably difficult to prove due to many real-time constraints.
- Many previous formal modeling/verification efforts for these protocols.



Columns and Blocks

Trying figures next to lists

Some normal text goes here just for introduction


- ► Appraisal
- ▶ Measurement
- ▶ Attestation
- ▶ vTPM

Why is this column getting higher?

Maybe it's not Center alignment seems best. I like this for two column test and graphics

Getting higher???







Big Picture

Armor Architecture

Simple Block

Introduction to LATEX

Beamer is a LaTeX class for creating presentations that are held using a projector..."

This is a definition



Proofs

Not really a proof.

1. This is a step



Proofs

Not really a proof.

- 1. This is a step
- 2. This is another step



Proofs

Not really a proof.

- 1. This is a step
- 2. This is another step
- 3. This is a third step
- 4. This is a third step
- 5. This is a third step
- 6. This is a third step



List with Overlays

▶ Item 1 followed by a pause



List with Overlays

- ▶ Item 1 followed by a pause
- ► Item 3 followed by a pause



List with Overlays

- ▶ Item 1 followed by a pause
- ▶ Item 2 followed by a pause
- ► Item 3 followed by a pause



Previous Efforts

▶ BMP has been verified in PVS twice and required

- 37 invariants and 4000 individual proof directives (initially) in the one effort
- ▶ 5 hours just to *check* the proofs in the other effort
- A formal specification and verification of an independent real-time model in both efforts

▶ BMP has been verified in (the precursor to) ACL2 by J. Moore and required

- ► A significant conceptual effort to fit the problem in the logic, arguably omitting some salient features of the model
- The statement and proof of many antecedent results
- J. Moore reports this as one of his "best ideas" in his career



Not Your Father's Theorem-Prover

The verifications are carried out in the SAL infinite-state bounded model-checker that combines SAT-solving and SMT decision procedures to *prove* safety properties about infinite-state models.

- ► Theorem-proving efforts took multiple engineer-months if not years to complete.
- ► Our initial effort in SAL consumed about *two engineer-days*. ...and we found a significant bug in a UART application note.



Parameterized Timing Constraints

SMT allows for *parameterized* proofs of correctness. The following are example constaints from the BMP verification:

```
TIME: TYPE = REAL;
TPERIOD: TIME = 16:
TSAMPLE: INTEGER = 23;
TSETTLE: \{x: TIME \mid 0 \le x\}
                    AND (x + TPERIOD < TSAMPLE)
                    AND (x + TSAMPLE + 1 < 2 * TPERIOD);
TSTABLE: TIME = TPERIOD - TSETTLE;
ERROR: \{x: TIME \mid (0 \le x)\}
                  AND (TPERIOD + TSETTLE < TSAMPLE*(1-x))
                  AND (TSAMPLE*(1+x) + (1+x) + TSETTLE < 2 * TPERIOD)};
RSAMPMAX: TIME = TSAMPLE * (1 + ERROR);
RSAMPMIN: TIME = TSAMPLE * (1 - ERROR);
RSCANMAX: TIME = 1 + ERROR;
RSCANMIN: TIME = 1 - ERROR:
```

SRI's SAL Toolset

- ▶ Parser
- Simulator
- Symbolic model-checker (BDDs)
- ► Witness symbolic model-checker
- Bounded model-checker
- Infinite-state bounded model-checker
- ► Future releases include:
 - Explicit-state model-checker
 - MDD-based symbolic model-checking

All of which are "state-of-the-art"



k-Induction

Please direct your attention to the whiteboard.



Timeout Automata¹ (Semantics)

An explicit real-time model.

- ▶ Vocabulary:
 - A set of state variables.
 - ▶ A global clock, $c \in \mathbb{R}^{0 \le 1}$.
 - ▶ A set of *timeout* variables T such that for $t \in T$, $t \in \mathbb{R}^{0 \le}$.
- ► Construct a transition system $\langle S, S^0, \rightarrow \rangle$:
 - States are mappings of all variables to values.
 - ▶ Transitions are either time transitions or discrete transitions.
 - Time transitions are enabled if the clock is less than all timeouts. Updates clock to least timeout.
 - Discrete transitions are enabled if the clock equals some timeout. Updates state variables and timeouts.



Disjunctive Invariants

Even with *k*-induction, getting a sufficiently strong invariant is still hard! *Disjunctive invariants* help. A disjunctive invariant can be built iteratively from the counterexamples returned for the hypothesized invariant being verified.

```
t0: THEOREM system |-

G( (phase = Settle)

AND (rstate = tstate + 1)

AND (rclk - tclk - TPERIOD > 0)

AND (tclk + TPERIOD + TSTABLE - rclk > 0))

OR

( (phase = Stable)

AND (rstate = tstate + 1)

AND (rclk - tclk - TSETTLE > 0)

AND (tclk + TPERIOD - rclk > 0)

AND (rdata = tdata)
```

