# ArmoredSoftware Architecture

Perry Alexander Andy Gill Prasad Kuklarni Leon Searl Information and Telecommunication Technology Center The University of Kansas

November 21, 2013

 $\mathbf{2}$ 

{palexand,andygill,prasadk,lsearl}@ku.edu

### Contents

1 Introduction

$\mathbf{S}\mathbf{y}$	stem Architecture
2.1	Measurement
2.2	Attestation
	2.2.1 TPM and vTPM
2.3	Appraisal
	2.3.1 Migration
2.4	Access Control
Co	omponent Interaction
	omponent Interaction of Figures
ist	of Figures  ArmoredSoftware component architecture showing major com-
$oldsymbol{ist}_1$	of Figures  Armored Software component architecture showing major components of the remote attestation process
ist 1 2	of Figures  Armored Software component architecture showing major components of the remote attestation process

### List of Tables

#### Abstract

This document describes the evolving ArmoredSoftware architecture.

#### 1 Introduction

The objective of Armored Software is to provide a portable trusted computing capsule for applications executing in the cloud. This capsule, referred to as armor, provides three major functions:

**Appraisal** – Request and assess measurement information from the operational environment and other armored components.

**Measurement** – Gather run-time measurement information from its application

**Attestation** – Assemble and deliver evidence to appraisers in a manner that assures measurement integrity

and is based on concepts from Coker et al. [2011].

Figure 1 graphically depicts the major architectural components of a protected application. The application is the application to be protected by the infrastructure. The measurement component performs measurement operations on the running application while the attestation component gathers measurements and delivers them with cryptographic assurance of integrity and confidentiality. The appraisal component requests information from the environment and other components to assess the overall operational environment. Access control governs access to all critical resources in the protected application to assure secrets are preserved and enforce information flow restrictions.

Figure 2 graphically represents the interaction among protected components while Figure 3 shows the sequencing of interactions during appraisal. A component's appraisal module will request information from a second component's attestation module. The attestation model will select an attestation protocol that instructs the measurer what information to gather and in what sequence. The measurer executes that protocol that in turn gathers information from the running process, accesses the module's virtual TPM (vTPM) and makes appraisal requests of other Armored Software instances. The attestation module assembles measurement results into a evidence package that is returned to the requesting appraiser with cryptographic assurances of integrity and confidentiality as required. Upon receiving the package, the appraiser assesses cryptographic signatures and encryption to determine the trustworthiness of the




Figure 1: Armored Software component architecture showing major components of the remote attestation process.

measurements, then assesses measurements to determine the trustworthiness of the component being appraised.  $^1$ 

# 2 System Architecture

#### 2.1 Measurement

Figure ?? graphically shows the processing of requests for measurements by the measurement component.

### 2.2 Attestation

Figure 4 graphically shows the processing of an attestation request by an ArmoredSoftware attestation component. The attestation request specifies information requested by an appraiser. Upon receipt, the Attestation Protocol Selector or AP Selector identifies one or more Attestation Protocols that could satisfy the appraisers request. The protocol is passed to the AP Instantiation process that selects specific mechanisms for achieving individual requests in the AP. The resulting protocol instance is passed to AP Execution where it is executed by: (i) making requests to the component's vTPM; making requests to another components attestation service; or (iii) invoking the measurer on the component's associated application.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Note that the same process occurs when appraising the component's operational environment with either the appraiser or target replaced by operational infrastructure.




Figure 2: System Architecture




Figure 3: Architecture component interaction




Figure 4: Attestation request processing

The results of request to the vTPM, another attestation component, and the local measurer are returned as vTPM quotes, evidence packages, and measurements respectively. The AP Execution component monitors execution and collects various results for processing by the AP Instantiation component. AP Instantiation assembles individual measurement, vTPM and appraisal results into a package representing information requested in the attestation request. The AP Selection component uses cryptographic techniques to provide assurances to the appraiser requesting information that evidence can be trusted. Finally, the evidence package is returned to the requesting appraiser where it is evaluated.




Figure 5: Attestation evidence processing

- 2.2.1 TPM and vTPM
- 2.3 Appraisal
- 2.3.1 Migration
- 2.4 Access Control

## 3 Component Interaction

### References

G. Coker, J. Guttman, P. Loscocco, A. Herzog, J. Millen, B. O'Hanlon, J. Ramsdell, A. Segall, J. Sheehy, and B. Sniffen. Principles of remote attestation. International Journal of Information Security, 10(2):63–81, June 2011.