

1 Assignmentst 2.5

1.1 Exercises 1

Consider the program C and pre- and postconditions F and H as follows:

- Program C : $x = 2$;
- Precondition F : $x > 0$
- Postcondition H : $x > 1$

A counterexample for Rule A:

Let G : $x > 2$, using Rule A, if we apply it to the triple $\vdash \{F\} C \{H\}$, we get:

$$\frac{\vdash \{x > 0\} C \{x > 1\}}{\vdash \{x > 0 \wedge x > 2\} C \{x > 1 \wedge x > 2\}} \text{ruleA}$$

We have: $\not\models \{x > 0\} C \{x > 1\}$, which is true. However, simplifying the conditions, we have $\vdash \{x > 2\} C \{x > 2\}$, the postcondition $x > 2$ is not satisfied by the program, since after execution, we have $x = 2$ which doesn't satisfy the condition.

A Counterexample for Rule B:

Let $a = x+1$, using Rule B, if we apply it to the triple $\vdash \{F\} C \{H\}$, we get:

$$\frac{\vdash \{x > 0\} C \{x > 1\}}{\vdash \{x > 1\} C \{x > 2\}} \text{ruleA}$$

We have: $\not\models \{x > 0\} C \{x > 1\}$, which is true. However, simplifying the conditions, we have $\vdash \{x > 1\} C \{x > 2\}$, the postcondition $x > 2$ is not satisfied by the program, since after execution, we have $x = 2$ which doesn't satisfy the condition.

In both cases, we have shown that applying the proposed rules can lead to incorrect conclusions, which demonstrates their unsoundness.

1.2 Exercises 2

To show that we can verify all triples $\{F\} C \{H\}$ if we know how to verify triples of the form $\{true\} C^0 \{true\}$, we'll construct a command C^0 .

Let's consider the verification conditions:

1. For $\{true\} C^0 \{true\}$, we have $true \models wp[C^0](true)$, which simplifies to $true \models true$, which is trivially true.
2. For $\{F\} C \{H\}$, we have $F \models wp[C](H)$.

Now, we want to construct C^0 such that:

$$\vdash \{true\} C^0 \{true\} \quad \vdash \{F\} C \{H\}$$

The idea is to make C^0 a sequential composition of two commands:

$$C^0 = \text{assume } F; C; \text{assert } H$$

Now, let's justify why this construction is correct:

1. \rightarrow (Forward direction)

Assume $\neg \text{true} \vee C^0 \neg \text{true}$. This means $\text{true} \not\models \text{wp}[C^0](\text{true})$.

By definition of weakest precondition, $\text{wp}[C^0](\text{true})$ is the weakest formula that holds before the execution of C^0 and guarantees that true holds after the execution of C^0 .

Since true always holds, this means that $\text{wp}[C^0](\text{true})$ must also always hold.

Therefore, $\text{true} \models \text{wp}[C^0](\text{true})$, as required.

2. \leftarrow (Backward direction)

Assume $\neg F \vee C \neg H$. This means $F \not\models \text{wp}[C](H)$.

We want to show that $\neg \text{true} \vee C^0 \neg \text{true}$, i.e., $\text{true} \not\models \text{wp}[C^0](\text{true})$.

By definition of weakest precondition, $\text{wp}[C^0](\text{true})$ is the weakest formula that holds before the execution of C^0 and guarantees that true holds after the execution of C^0 .

The command C^0 is constructed such that it first assumes F , then executes C , and finally asserts H .

This means that the weakest formula that holds before the execution of C^0 is F . And since true always holds, the condition true holds after the execution of C^0 .

Therefore, $\text{true} \not\models \text{wp}[C^0](\text{true})$, as required.

In conclusion, by constructing C^0 as `assume F ; C ; assert H` , we have shown that we can verify all triples $\neg F \vee C \neg H$ if we know how to verify triples of the form $\neg \text{true} \vee C^0 \neg \text{true}$.

1.3 Exercises 3

```
method Example1() {
  var x: Int
  var y: Int

  assume x == y
  x := y + 1
  assert x > y
}
```

In this example, the program assumes that x and y are equal, assigns x the value $y + 1$, and asserts that x is greater than y . The program is functional, partial and total correct.

```
method Example2() {
  var x: Int
  assert x > 0
}
```

In this example, the program asserts that x is greater than 0. The program is functional correct, but not partial and total correct.

```
method Example3() {
  var x: Int

  while (true) {
```

```

    x := 1
  }
  assert x == 0
}

```

In this example, the program starts with an while loop, finally asserts that x equals to 0. The program is functional and partial correct, but not total correct.

Example 1 and 3 pass Viper verification, while the second one failed, which means Viper verifies programs with respect to partial correct.

1.4 Exercises 4

Now, we can define the safe transformer as follows if our command contains assert F:

$\text{safe}[C](F) = \text{sp}[C](\text{safe}[C^i](F))$ where C^i is the remaining portion of the command
if $C = C1;C2;C3...$

The key idea is to recursively apply the strongest postcondition transformer to calculate the logical formula $\text{safe}[C](F)$ that represents the safety condition for running command C with precondition F .