1 Assignment 2.5n

1.1 Exercises 1n

Consider the program C and pre- and postconditions F and H as follows:nl

• Program C: x = 2;nl

• Precondition F: x > 0nl

• Postcondition H: x > 1nl

A counterexample for Rule A:nl

Let G: x > 2, using Rule A, if we apply it to the triple $\vdash \{\{F\}\}\}$ C $\{\{H\}\}$, we get:nl

$$\frac{\vdash \{\{ \ x > 0 \ \}\} \ x = 2 \ \{\{ \ x > 1 \ \}\}}{\vdash \{\{ \ x > 0 \land x > 2 \ \}\} \ x = 2 \ \{\{ \ x > 1 \land x > 2 \ \}\}} \text{ ruleAnl}$$

We have: $\models \{\{ x > 0 \}\} \ x = 2 \{\{ x > 1 \}\}$, which is true. However, simplifying the conditions,nl we have $\vdash \{\{ x > 2 \}\} \ x = 2 \{\{ x > 2 \}\}$, the postcondition x > 2 is not satisfied by the program,nl since after execution, we have x = 2 which doesn't satisfy the condition.nl

A Counterexample for Rule B:nl

Let a = x+1, using Rule B, if we apply it to the triple $\vdash \{\{F\}\}\}$ C $\{\{H\}\}$, we get:nl

$$\frac{\vdash \{\{ \ x > 0 \ \}\} \ x = 2 \ \{\{ \ x > 1 \ \}\}}{\vdash \{\{ \ x > 1 \ \}\} \ x = 2 \ \{\{ \ x > 2 \ \}\}}$$
ruleAnl

We have: \models {{ x > 0 }} x = 2 {{ x > 1 }}, which is true. However, simplifying the conditions,nl we have \vdash {{ x > 1 }} x = 2 {{ x > 2 }}, the postcondition x > 2 is not satisfied by the program,nl since after execution, we have x = 2 which doesn't satisfy the condition.nl

In both cases, we have shown that applying the proposed rules can lead to incorrect conclu-nl sions, which demonstrates their unsoundness.nl

1.2 Exercises 2n

To show that we can verify all triples $\{\{F\}\}\$ C $\{\{H\}\}$ if we know how to verify triples of thenl form $\{\{true\}\}\}$ C' $\{\{true\}\}\}$, we'll construct a command C'.nl

Let's consider the verification conditions:nl

- 1. For $\{\{ \text{true } \}\}\ C' \ \{\{ \text{true } \}\}\$, we have $\text{true} \rightarrow \text{wp}[C'](\text{true})$, which simplifies to $\text{true} \rightarrow \text{true}$, nl which is trivially true.nl
- 2. For $\{\{F\}\}\ C\ \{\{H\}\}\}$, we have $F \to \mathsf{wp}[C](H)$.nl

Now, we want to construct C' such that:nl

$$\vdash \{\{ \texttt{true} \}\} \ C' \ \{\{ \texttt{true} \}\} \iff \vdash \{\{ F \}\} \ C \ \{\{ H \}\}\}$$

The idea is to make C' a sequential composition of two commands:nl

$$C' =$$
assume $F; C;$ assert H

Now, let's justify why this construction is correct:nl

1. \Rightarrow (Forward direction)nl

```
Assume \vdash \{\{ \text{ true } \}\}\ C' \{\{ \text{ true } \}\}. This means \text{true} \to \text{wp}[C'](\text{true}).nl
```

By definition of weakest precondition, wp[C'](true) is the weakest formula that holds beforenl the execution of C' and guarantees that true holds after the execution of C'.nl

Since true always holds, this means that wp[C'](true) must also always hold.nl

Therefore, $F \to \mathsf{wp}[C](H)$, as required.nl

2. \Leftarrow (Backward direction)nl

```
Assume \vdash \{\{F\}\}\ C \{\{H\}\}\}. This means F \to \mathsf{wp}[C](H).\mathsf{nl}
```

```
We want to show that \vdash \{\{ \text{ true } \}\}\ C' \ \{\{ \text{ true } \}\}, \text{ i.e., } \text{true} \rightarrow \mathsf{wp}[C'](\text{true}).nl
```

By definition of weakest precondition, wp[C'](true) is the weakest formula that holds beforenl the execution of C' and guarantees that true holds after the execution of C'.nl

The command C' is constructed such that it first assumes F, then executes C, and finally lasserts H.nl

This means that the weakest formula that holds before the execution of C' is F. And sincenl true always holds, the condition true holds after the execution of C'.nl

Therefore, true $\rightarrow wp[C'](true)$, as required.nl

In conclusion, by constructing C' as assume F; C; assert H, we have shown that we can verifynl all triples $\{\{F\}\}\}$ C $\{\{H\}\}\}$ if we know how to verify triples of the form $\{\{true\}\}\}$ C' $\{\{true\}\}\}$.nl

1.3 Exercises 3n

```
method Example1() {nl
  var x: Intnl
  var y: Intnl

assume x == ynl
  x := y + 1nl
  assert x > ynl
}nl
```

In this example, the program assumes that x and y are equal, assigns x the value y + 1, and nl asserts that x is greater than y. The program is functional, partial and total correct.nl

```
method Example2() {nl
  var x: Intnl
  assert x > Onl
}nl
```

In this example, the program asserts that x is greater than 0. The program is functionalnl correct, but not partial and total correct.nl

```
method Example3() {nl
  var x: Intnl

while (true) {nl
```

```
x := 1nl
}nl
assert x == 0nl
}nl
```

In this example, the program starts with an while loop, finally asserts that x equals to 0. Thenl program is functional and partial correct, but not total correct.nl

Example 1 and 3 pass Viper verification, while the second one failed, which means Vipernl verifies programs with respect to partial correct.nl

1.4 Exercises 4n

Now, we can define the safe transformer as follows if our command contains assert F:nl safe $[C](F) = \operatorname{sp}[C](\operatorname{safe}[C'](F))$ where C' is the remaining portion of the commandnl if C = C1; C2; C3...nl

The key idea is to recursively apply the strongest postcondition transformer to calculate thenl logical formula safe[C](F) that represents the safety condition for running command C within precondition F.nl