

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN FOUR VOLUMES

III

AGAINST THE PHYSICISTS
AGAINST THE ETHICISTS



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PREFATORY NOTE

THIS volume contains the two books "Against the Physicists" (commonly cited as *Adversus Dogmaticos* iii., iv., or *Adversus Mathematicos* ix., x.) and the single book "Against the Ethicists" (cited as *Adv. Dogm.* v., or *Adv. Math.* xi.). The authorities for the text are the same as those for "Against the Logicians," viz. the manuscripts L, E, and N (see Vol. I. Introd. p. xliii, and Vol. II. Prefatory Note).

The Glossary is designed to include Greek words, phrases, and usages which are technical or rare or otherwise noteworthy.

In this, as in the previous volumes, the text is based on that of Bekker, the chief deviations being indicated in the footnotes.

AGAINST THE ETHICISTS

VOL. III

N 2

ΠΡΟΣ ΗΘΙΚΟΤΣ

1 Τὰς μὲν κομιζομένας ὑπὸ τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀπορίας εἰς τέ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν τῆς φιλοσοφίας μέρος πρότερον ἐπεληλύθαμεν, ὑπόλοιπον δέ ἔστι καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ ἡθικὸν φέρεσθαι δυναμένας προσ-υποτάττειν οὕτω γὰρ ἔκαστος ἡμῶν τὴν τελείαν καὶ σκεπτικὴν ἀπολαβών διάθεσιν κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα βιώσεται

ρῆστα μεθ' ἡσυχίης
αἱὲν ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ ταῦτα,
μὴ προσέχων αἴνοις¹ ἡδυλόγου σοφίης.

2 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν θεωρίαν συμφώνως σχεδὸν ἄπαντες ὑπειλήφασι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν διάκρισιν γίνεσθαι, καθὸ καὶ ὁ πρῶτος αὐτὴν δόξας κεκινηκέναι Σωκράτης παρήγγειλεν ὡς ἀναγκαιότατον ζητεῖν

ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυ-
κται,

δεήσει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐν ἀρχαῖς εὐθὺς περὶ τῆς ἐν τούτοις
διαφορᾶς σκοπεῖν.

¹ αἴνοις: δειλοῖς mss., Bekk.: δίνοις Nauck (λήροις c.j. Bekk.).

AGAINST THE ETHICISTS

We have already discussed the difficulties brought forward by the Sceptics with regard to the Logical and Physical divisions of philosophy, and now it remains for us to subjoin further those which can be brought against the Ethical division; for in this way, by acquiring the perfect and sceptical frame of mind, each of us will (in the words of Timon^a) pass his life—

In great comfort and calm,
Ever devoid of care, uniformly free from distraction,
Quite regardless of all Sweet-voiced Science's tales.

But since almost all have with one accord supposed² that the study of Ethics is concerned with the distinction between things good and evil,^b—even as Socrates, who is thought to be the first who introduced it, proclaimed as the most necessary subject of inquiry—

Whatso of evil and good within these homes is enacted,^c
we too shall have to begin at once by considering
the difference which exists between them.

^a Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxi.

^b With §§ 2, 3 cf. P.H. iii. 168.

^c Homer, Odyss. iv. 392; cf. Adv. Log. i. 21.

A'.—ΤΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΟΛΟΣΧΕΡΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ
ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ

- 3 Πάντες μὲν οἱ κατὰ [τὸν] τρόπον στοιχειοῦν δοκοῦντες τῶν φιλοσόφων, καὶ ἐπιφανέστατα παρὰ πάντας οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαίας Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ τῆς στοᾶς, εἰώθασι διαιρούμενοι λέγειν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακὰ τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων, ἀπέρ καὶ ἀδιά-
4 φορά λέγουσιν· ἴδιατέρον δὲ παρὰ τούς ἄλλους ὁ Ξενοκράτης καὶ ταῖς ἑνικαῖς πτώσεσι χρώμενος ἔφασκε “πᾶν τὸ δὲ η̄ ἀγαθόν ἔστιν η̄ κακόν ἔστιν
5 η̄ οὐτε ἀγαθόν ἔστιν οὐτε κακόν ἔστιν.” καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν φιλοσόφων χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως τὴν τοιαύτην διαιρέσιν προσιεμένων αὐτὸς ἐδόκει καὶ ἀπόδειξιν συμπαραλαμβάνειν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι κεχωρισμένον πρᾶγμα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ τῶν μήτε ἀγαθῶν μήτε κακῶν, ἐκείνῳ η̄τοι ἀγαθόν ἔστιν η̄ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀγαθόν ἔστιν, ἐν τῶν τριών γενήσεται· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, η̄τοι κακόν ἔστιν η̄ οὐτε κακόν ἔστιν οὐτε ἀγαθόν ἔστιν. εἴτε δὲ κακόν ἔστιν, ἐν τῶν τριών ὑπάρχει, εἴτε οὐτε ἀγαθόν ἔστιν οὐτε κακόν ἔστι, πάλιν ἐν τῶν τριών καταστήσεται. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ δὲ η̄τοι ἀγαθόν ἔστιν η̄ κακόν ἔστιν η̄ οὐτε ἀγαθόν ἔστιν οὐτε κακόν ἔστιν.
6 δυνάμει δὲ καὶ οὗτος χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως προσήκατο τὴν διαιρέσιν, ἐπείπερ δὲ εἰς κατασκευὴν αὐτῆς παραληφθεὶς λόγος οὐχ ἔτερος ἔστιν αὐτῆς· δῆλον εἰ
ἐν ἑαυτῇ περιέσχηκε τὴν πίστιν η̄ ἀπόδειξις, ἔσται καὶ η̄ διαιρεσις ἐξ ἑαυτῆς πιστὴ μὴ διαφέρουσα τῆς ἀποδείξεως.
7 Ἄλλ’ ὅμως, καίπερ συμφώνου δοκοῦντος ὑπάρχειν κατὰ πάντας τοῦ διτι τρισσή ἔστιν η̄ τῶν ὄντων

CHAPTER I.—WHAT IS THE MAIN DIFFERENCE IN
THE THINGS WHICH CONCERN LIFE?

All the philosophers who seem to teach systematic- 3 ally the principles (of Ethics), and, most notably of all, those of the Old Academy and the Peripatetics, and the Stoics also, are accustomed to make a distinction by saying that “of existing things some are good, some evil, some between these two,” and these last they term “indifferent”; but Xenocrates,^a in 4 phrases peculiar to himself and using the singular case, declared that “Everything which exists either is good or is evil or neither is good nor is evil.” And 5 whereas the rest of the philosophers adopted this division without a proof, he thought it right to introduce a proof as well. “If,” he argued, “anything exists which is apart from things good and evil and things neither good nor evil, that thing either is good or is not good. And if it is good, it will be one of the three; but if it is not good, it is either evil or neither evil nor good; and if it is evil, it will be one of the three, and if it is neither evil nor good, again it will be one of the three. Therefore everything which exists either is good or is evil or neither is good nor is evil.” But he, too, virtually accepted the 6 division without proof, since the argument adopted to establish it is nothing else than the division itself; hence, if the proof contains in itself the confirmation, the division, too, will be its own confirmation as it does not differ from the proof.

But yet, although it seems to be agreed by all that 7 the distinction between existing things is threefold,

^a Head of the Platonic “Academy,” 339–314 B.C.

διαφορά, τινὲς οὐδὲν ἥττον εὑρεσιλογοῦσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες μὲν τὴν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι διαφορὰν ὅτι τοιαύτη τίς ἔστι, σοφιστικῶς δὲ προσειλούμενοι τῇ ἐκτεθεὶσῃ διαιρέσει. καὶ τοῦτο εἰσόμεθα μικρὸν ἄνωθεν προλαβόντες.

8 Τὸν γὰρ ὄρον φασὶν οἱ τεχνογράφοι ψιλῆ τῇ συντάξει διαφέρειν τοῦ καθολικοῦ, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα. καὶ εἰκότως ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν “ ἀνθρωπός ἔστι ζῶν λογικὸν θνητόν ” τῷ εἰπόντι “ εἴ τι ἔστιν ἀνθρωπός, ἐκεῖνο ζῶόν ἔστι λογικὸν θνητόν ” τῇ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ αὐτὸν λέγει τῇ δὲ φωνῇ διάφορον.
 9 καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο, συμφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μόνον τὸ καθολικὸν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους εἶναι περιληπτικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ὄρον ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ εἰδῆ τοῦ ἀποδιδομένου πράγματος διήκειν, οἷον τὸν μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κατ’ εἶδος ἀνθρώπους, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἵππου ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς ἵππους. ἐνός τε ὑποταχθέντος ψεύδους ἔκατερον γίνεται μοχθηρόν, τό τε
 10 καθολικὸν καὶ ὁ ὄρος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὡς ταῦτα φωνᾶς ἔξηλλαγμένα κατὰ δύναμιν ἔστι τὰ αὐτά, ὥδε καὶ ἡ τέλειος φασὶ διαιρέσις, δύναμιν ἔχουσα καθολικήν, συντάξει τοῦ καθολικοῦ διενήροχεν. ὁ γὰρ τρόπῳ τῷδε διαιρούμενος “ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μέν εἰσιν “Ἐλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ” ἵσον τι λέγει τῷ “εἴ τινὲς εἰσιν ἀνθρωποι, ἐκεῖνοι η̄ “Ἐλληνές εἰσιν η̄ βάρβαροι.” ἐὰν γάρ τις ἀνθρωπὸς εὑρίσκηται μήτε “Ἐλλην μήτε βάρβαρος, ἀνάγκη μοχθηρὸν μὲν εἶναι τὴν διαιρέσιν, ψεύδος δὲ γίνεσθαι τὸ καθολικόν.
 11 διόπερ καὶ τὸ οὔτω λεγόμενον “ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν

none the less some people invent captious objections, and while allowing that the distinction between things is of this kind, yet attack the division as set forth in sophistical fashion. And this we shall learn when we have first gone back a little.

The professional Logicians assert that the definition 8 differs merely in its verbal construction from the universal, being identical in meaning. And rightly; for he who says “ Man is a rational, mortal animal ” says what is identical in meaning, though different in wording from him who says “ Whatever thing is man, that thing is a rational, mortal animal.” And that this is 9 so is plain from the fact that not only is the universal inclusive of the particulars but the definition also extends to all the particular instances of the thing in question,—that of Man, for example, to all the particular men, and that of Horse to all the horses. Also, if one false instance is classed under it each of them is vitiated, both the universal and the definition. Well 10 then, just as these, which vary in wording, are identical in meaning, so also, they declare, the perfect division, which has a universal meaning, differs from the universal in verbal construction.^a For he who divides in this fashion—“ Of men some are Greeks, others barbarians ”—says what is equivalent to “ Whosoever are men, they are either Greeks or barbarians.” For if any man is found who is neither a Greek nor a barbarian, the division must necessarily be vicious and the universal false. Hence, too, a 11 statement in the form “ Of existing things some are

Greeks); as thus inclusive of all possible instances (*i.e.* “ exhaustive”) it is “ universal in meaning ” and differs only in form from a regular “ universal proposition ” (*e.g.* “ All men are either Greeks or non-Greeks ”).

^a In a “ perfect division ” the two *species* into which the genus is divided are contradictories (*e.g.* Men = Greeks + non-Greeks)

ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακὰ τὰ δὲ τούτων μεταξύ”
 δυνάμει κατὰ τὸν Χρύσιππον τοιοῦτον ἔστι καθ-
 ολικόν “εἴ τινά ἔστιν ὄντα, ἐκένα ἡτοί ἀγαθά ἔστιν
 ἢ κακά ἔστιν ἢ ἀδιάφορα.” τὸ μέντοι γε τοιοῦτον
 καθολικὸν ψεῦδος ἔστιν ὑποτασσομένου τινὸς αὐτῷ
 12 ψεῦδον. δυοῖν γάρ φασιν ὑποκειμένων πραγ-
 μάτων, τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ, ἢ τοῦ μὲν
 ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ δὲ ἀδιαφόρου, ἢ κακοῦ καὶ ἀδιαφόρου,
 τὸ μὲν “τοῦτ’ ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἀγαθόν” ἀληθές
 ἔστι, τὸ δὲ “ταῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀγαθά” ψεῦδος· οὐ γάρ
 ἔστιν ἀγαθά, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ κακόν.
 13 καὶ τὸ “ταῦτ’ ἔστι κακά” πάλιν ψεῦδος· οὐ γάρ
 ἔστι κακά, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔτερον αὐτῶν. ὥσαντας δὲ καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ψεῦδος γάρ τὸ “ταῦτ’ ἔστιν
 ἀδιάφορα,” ὕσπερ καὶ τὸ “ταῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀγαθά ἢ
 κακά.” ἢ μὲν οὖν ἔνστασις τοιαύτη πως καθέστη-
 14 κεν, φαίνεται δὲ μὴ καθάπτεσθαι τοῦ Ξενοκράτους
 διὰ τὸ μὴ τὰς πληθυντικαῖς πτώσεις κεχρήσθαι,
 ὅστ’ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ἐτερογενῶν δείξεως ψευδοποιη-
 θῆναι τὴν διάρεσιν.
 15 “Ἄλλοι δὲ κάκεινας ἐνέστησαν. πᾶσα γάρ,
 φασίν, ὑγιῆς διαιρέσις γένους ἔστι τομὴ εἰς τὰ
 προσεχῆ εἶδῃ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μοχθηρὰ καθέστηκεν ἡ
 τοιαύτη διαιρεσίς “τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μέν εἰσιν
 “Ἐλληνες οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοί.”
 τῷ γάρ ἐτέρῳ τῶν προσεχῶν εἶδῶν οὐ τὸ συζυγοῦν
 καὶ προσεχὲς εἶδος ἀντιδείξευκται, ἀλλὰ τὰ τούτου
 εἶδη, δέον οὖτας εἴπειν “τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μέν
 εἰσιν “Ἐλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι,” καὶ καθ’ ὑποδι-
 αίρεσιν λοιπὸν “τῶν βαρβάρων οἱ μέν εἰσιν Αἰγύ-
 16 πτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοί.” ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
 τῶν ὄντων διαιρέσεως, ἐπεὶ ὅσα μέν ἔστιν ἀγαθά

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good, others evil, others between these two,” is virtually, according to Chrysippus, a universal such as this—“ Whatsoever things are existent, they either are good or are evil or indifferent.” Such a universal, however, is false if a false instance is classed under it. For, they say, when two things subsist, the one good and the other evil, or the one good and the other indifferent, or an evil and an indifferent, the statement “ This one of existing things is good ” is true, but “ These things are good ” false ; for they are not *(both)* good, but the one is good and the other evil. And again the statement “ These things are evil ” is 13 false ; for they are not *(both)* evil but only the one of them. And so likewise in the case of the things indifferent ; for “ These things are indifferent ” is false, just as is “ These things are good, or evil.” Something like this, then, is the objection, but it 14 appears not to affect Xenocrates because he does not employ plural cases, which would result in the falsification of his division when things of different kinds are to be indicated.

And others have raised the following objection : 15 Every sound division, they say, is the cutting up of a genus into its proximate species, and for this reason a division such as this is unsound—“ Of men some are Greeks, others Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians.” For the first proximate species has matched against it not its correlative proximate species but the sub-species of this, the correct statement being, “ Of men some are Greeks, others barbarians,” and next, by subdivision, “ And of barbarians some are Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians.” And this applies also to the 16 division of existing things, since all such as are good

καὶ κακά, διαφέροντά ἔστιν ἡμῖν, ὅσα δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἀδιάφορα. ἔχρην οὖν μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν τὴν διαιρέσιν ὡς ἔχει, μᾶλλον δ' ἐκείνως "τῶν ὄντων ἂ μέν ἔστιν ἀδιάφορα ἂ δὲ διαφέροντα, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἂ 17 μὲν ἀγαθὰ ἂ δὲ κακά." ἐώκει γάρ η μὲν τοιαύτη διαιρέσις τῇ λεγούσῃ "τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μέν εἰσιν Ἑλληνες οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων οἱ μὲν Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοί". η δὲ ἐκκειμένη ὡμοίωτο τῇ τοιουτορόπῳ "τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μέν εἰσιν Ἑλληνες οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι οἱ δὲ Ἰνδοί."

'Αλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων τῶν ἐνστάσεων οὐκ 18 ἀνάγκη νῦν μηκύνειν, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἵστις ἀρμόσσει προδιαρθρώσαι ὅτι τὸ ἔστι δύο σημαίνει, καὶ ἐν μὲν τὸ οἷον ὑπάρχει, καθό φαμεν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ ὅτι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡμέρα ὑπάρχει, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ οἷον φαίνεται, καθό τινες τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἰώθασι λέγειν πολλάκις ὅτι τὸ μεταξὺ δυοῦν τινῶν ἀστέρων διάστημα πηχυαῖνόν ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ λέγοντες τῷ φαίνεται καὶ οὐ πάντως ὑπάρχει· τάχα γάρ ὑπάρχει μὲν σταδίων ἑκατόν, φαίνεται δὲ πηχυαῖν παρὰ τὸ ὑψος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τῆς ὅψεως ἀπόστασιν. 19 διττοῦ δὴ τυγχάνοντος τοῦ ἔστι μορίου, ὅταν λέγωμεν σκεπτικῶς "τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακὰ τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων," τὸ ἔστιν ἐντάπτομεν οὐχ ὡς ὑπάρξεως ἀλλ' ὡς τοῦ φαίνεσθαι δηλωτικόν. περὶ μὲν γάρ τῆς πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑποστάσεως τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων ἴκανοι πάσι εἰσιν ἡμῖν ἀγῶνες πρὸς τοὺς

and evil are "different" ^a to us, but all that lie between the good things and the evil are "indifferent" to us. The division, then, ought not to have been stated in its present form but rather in this form—"Of existing things some are indifferent, others different; and of the different some are good, others evil." For this form of division resembles that which 17 runs—"Of men some are Greeks, others barbarians; and of the barbarians some are Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians"; but the division put forward resembled one of this type—"Of men some are Greeks, others Egyptians, others Persians, others Indians."

However, there is no necessity now to speak at length about these objections; but it will, perhaps, 18 be fitting to explain first that the word "is" has two meanings, one of these being "really exists" (as, at the present moment, we say "it is day" for "day really exists"); and the other "appears" ^b (as some of the mathematicians are frequently in the habit of saying that the distance between two stars "is" a cubit's length, this being equivalent to "appears to be but is not really"); for perhaps it is really "one hundred stades" but appears to be a cubit owing to its height and owing to the distance from the eye). When, then, as Sceptics, we say that 19 "Of existing things some are good, others evil, others between these two," as the element "are" is twofold in meaning, we insert the "are" as indicative not of real existence but of appearance. For concerning the real and substantial existence of things good and evil and neither we have contests enough with the

^a i.e. such as to "make a difference" to us, important.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 135, 198.

20 δογματικούς· κατὰ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἔκαστον ἔχομεν ἔθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον προσαγορεύειν, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς ὥνδαλμοῖς ἔσικε δηλοῦν, ὅταν φῆ

ἥ γάρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὡς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι,
μῦθον ἀληθείης ὄρθον ἔχων κανόνα,
ὡς ζῆ¹ τοῦ θείου τε φύσις καὶ τάγαθοῦ αἰεί,
ἔξ οὖν ἵστατος γίνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

Κειμένης οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὑποδεδειγμένον τρόπον τῆς προειρημένης διαιρέσεως, ἴδωμεν ἂν χρὴ φρονεῦν περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λόγων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννοίας ποιησάμενοι.

B'.—ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΝ

- 21 Τῆς κατὰ τὸν τόπον χειριζομένης ἡμῖν πρὸς τοὺς δογματικούς ἀντιρρήσεως τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος ἔχούσης ἐν τῇ διαγνώσει τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, πρὸ παντὸς ἀρμόσει τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τούτων στήσαι· κατὰ γάρ τὸν σοφὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὔτε ζῆτεῦν ἔστιν 22 οὔτε ἀπορεῦν ἄνευ προλήψεως. οἱ μὲν οὖν στωικοὶ τῶν κοιωῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐννοῶν ἔχόμενοι ὅρίζονται τάγαθὸν τρόπῳ τῷδε “ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ὡφέλεια ἢ οὐχ ἔτερον ὡφελεῖας,” ὡφέλειαν μὲν λέγοντες τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σπουδαίαν πρᾶξιν, οὐχ ἔτερον δὲ ὡφελείας τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν φίλον. 23 ἡ μὲν γάρ ἀρετὴ πως ἔχον ἡγεμονικὸν καθεστηκύνα, καὶ ἡ σπουδαία πρᾶξις ἐνέργειά τις οὖσα κατ’ ἀρετὴν, ἄντικρύς ἔστιν ὡφέλεια· ὃ δὲ σπουδαῖος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος, πάλιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντες καὶ

¹ ζῆ: ἡ MSS., Bekk.

Dogmatists; but as regards the appearance of each 20 of these things we are in the habit of designating it good or evil or indifferent, even as Timon seems to make plain in his "Images," when he says—

Verily I will relate each fact as to me it appeareth,
Standard exact of truth having in this my speech,
How that the nature of God and of Goodness abideth for
ever,
Whence proceedeth for man Life that is equal and just.

So then, the division mentioned above having been laid down in the form described, let us see what view we should take of the terms contained in it, beginning our discussion with the conception (implied by those terms).

CHAPTER II.—THE ESSENCE OF GOOD AND EVIL AND INDIFFERENT

Since the controversy which we wage on this 21 subject with the Dogmatists has for its most important point the differentiation of things good and evil, it will be fitting first of all to formulate a conception of these; for, according to the sapient Epicurus, "It is not possible either to seek or to doubt without a preconception." Now the Stoics, holding fast to the 22 common notions (so to call them), define the good in this way—"Good is utility or not other than utility," meaning by "utility" virtue and right action, and by "not other than utility" the good man and the friend. For virtue, being a certain state 23 of the regent part, and right action, being an activity in accordance with virtue, are exactly utility; and the good man, again, and the friend, belonging also themselves to the class of "good things," cannot be

• With §§ 22-27 cf. P.H. iii. 169-171.

αὐτοί, οὔτε ὡφέλεια λεχθεῖν ἀν ὑπάρχειν οὕθ' 24 ἔτεροι ὡφελεῖας δι' αὐτίαν τουαύτην. τὰ γάρ μέρη, στωικῶν φασὶ παιδεῖς, οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἔτεροια τῶν ὅλων, οἷον ἡ χεὶρ οὔτε ἡ αὐτή ἐστιν ὅλω ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐ γάρ ὅλος ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἡ χεὶρ, οὔτε ἔτέρα τοῦ ὅλου, σὺν γάρ τῇ [ὅλῃ]¹ χειρὶ ὅλος ὁ ἀνθρωπός νοεῖται ἀνθρωπός. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ φίλου μέρος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, τὰ δὲ μέρη οὔτε ταῦτα τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἔτέρα τῶν ὅλων, εἴρηται ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνθρωπός καὶ ὁ φίλος οὐχ ἔτερος ὡφελεῖας. ὥστε πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τῷ δρῷ ἐμπειριεլῆθθαι, ἐάν τε ἔξ εὐθείας ὡφέλεια τυγχάνῃ ἔάν τε μὴ ἡ ἔτερον ὡφελεῖα. ἔνθεν καὶ κατὰ ἀκολούθιαν τριχῶς εἰπόντες ἀγαθὸν προσαγορεύεσθαι, ἔκαστον τῶν σημανομένων κατ' ἴδιαν πάλιν ἐπιβολὴν ὑπογράφουσιν. λέγεται γάρ ἀγαθόν, φασί, καθ' ἓν μὲν τρόπον τὸ ὑφ' οὐδὲ ἡ ἀφ' οὐδὲ ἐστιν ὡφελεῖσθαι, ὁ δὴ ἀρχικώτατον ὑπῆρχε καὶ ἀρετή· ἀπὸ γάρ ταύτης ὥσπερ 25 τινὸς πηγῆς πᾶσα πέφυκεν ἀνίσχειν ὡφέλεια. καθ' ἔτερον δὲ τὸ καθ' ὁ συμβαίνει ὡφελεῖσθαι οὕτως οὐ μόνον αἱ ἀρεταὶ λεχθήσονται ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς πράξεις, εἴπερ καὶ κατὰ ταύτας συμβαίνει ὡφελεῖσθαι. κατὰ δὲ τὸν τρίτον καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον λέγεται ἀγαθὸν τὸ οἷόν τε ὡφελεῖν, ἐμπειριλαμβανόντος τῆς ἀποδόσεως ταύτης τὰς τε ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐναρέτους πράξεις καὶ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους ἀνθρώπους, θεούς τε καὶ 26 σπουδαίους δαίμονας. παρ' ἣν αὐτίαν οὐκ ἐν ἵσῳ λέγεται παρά τε τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Σενοκράτη πολλαχῶς ὄνομαζεσθαι τάγαθὸν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς στωικοῦς. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γάρ ὅταν φῶσιν 27 28

said either to be utility or to be other than utility, for the following reason : The parts, say the sons of the 24 Stoics, are neither the same as their wholes nor of a different kind from their wholes, even as the hand (for instance) is neither the same as the whole man (for the hand is not the whole man), nor other than the whole (for the whole man is conceived as man when including the hand). Since, then, virtue is a part both of the good man and of the friend, and the parts are neither the same as their wholes nor other than their wholes, the good man and the friend are called "not other than utility." So that every good thing is comprehended in the definition, whether it be directly "utility" or whether it be "not other than utility." Next, and by way of corollary, they 25 state that "good" has three senses, and in each of its significations, again, they portray it by a separate description. In one sense "good," they say, means that by which or from which "utility" may be gained, this being the most principal good and virtue ; for from virtue, as from a fountain, all utility naturally springs. And in another sense, good is that of which 26 utility is an accidental result ; thus not only will the virtues be called "good," but also the actions in accordance therewith, inasmuch as utility results also from them. And in the third and last sense, "that 27 which is capable of being useful" is termed "good," this description comprehending the virtues and the virtuous actions and the friends and the good men, and both gods and good daemons.—And because of 28 this Plato and Xenocrates do not mean the same as the Stoics when they say that "good" has several senses. For when the former declare that the Idea

¹ [ὅλῃ] sedl. Arnim.

έτέρως λέγεσθαι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ὁδέαν καὶ ἔτέρως τὸ
μετέχον τῆς ὁδέας, σημαινόμενα ἐκτίθενται καὶ κατὰ
πολὺ ἀλλήλων διεστῶτα καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχοντα
κοινωνίαν, οἷόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κύνων φωνῆς θεω-
29 ροῦμεν. ὡς γάρ ἐκ ταύτης σημαίνεται μὲν πτῶσις
ὑφ' ἦν τὸ ὑλακτικὸν πέπτωκε ζῶον, καὶ ἔτι ὑφ' ἦν
τὸ ἔνυγρον, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὑφ' ἦν ὁ φιλόσοφος,
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑφ' ἦν τὸ ἀστρον, οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν
ἔχουσιν αἱ τοιαῦται πτώσεις, οὐδὲν ἐμπειρέχεται τῇ
δευτέρᾳ ἡ πρώτη καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ ἡ δευτέρα, οὕτω καν
τῷ φάναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ὁδέαν καὶ τὸ μετέχον τῆς
ὁδέας ἔκθεσις μέν ἔστι σημαινομένων, κεχωρι-
σμένων δὲ καὶ οὐδεμίαν περιληψιν ἐμφαινόντων.
30 ἄλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοτεροι, ὡς προεῖπον, τοιοῦτοι τινες
ἥσαν· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς θέλουσιν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ προσηγορίας τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον
ἐμπειριληπτικὸν εἴναι τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τὸ τρίτον
περιληπτικὸν τῶν δυοῦν. ἥσαν δὲ οἱ φάσκοντες
ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν τὸ δὶ’ αὐτὸν οἰρετόν. οἱ δ' οὕτως
“ἀγαθὸν ἔστι τὸ συλλαμβανόμενον πρὸς εὐδαι-
μονίαν,” τινὲς δὲ “τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν εὐδαιμονίας.”
εὐδαιμονία δέ ἔστιν, ὡς οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα καὶ
Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιππον ἀπέδοσαν, εὔροια βίου.

Πλὴν τὸ μὲν γένος τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀποδόσεώς
31 ἔστι τοιοῦτον εἰώθασι δ' ἔνιοι, τριχῶς λεγομένουν
τάγαθοῦ, πρὸς τὸν τοῦ πρώτου σημαινομένου ὅρον
εὐθὺς ἐπιζητεῖν, [καθὸ λέγει “τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔστι τὸ
ὑφ' οὐδὲν ἄφ' οὐδὲν ὕστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι,”]¹ ὡς εἰ ταῦς

¹ [καθὸ . . . ὠφελεῖσθαι] secl. Heintz (? λέγεται pro λέγει).

is termed “good” in one sense and that which partakes of the Idea in another sense, they propose significations which differ greatly from one another and have no connexion, as we see in the case of the word “dog.” For just as by this is signified a 29 meaning “under which falls the barking animal, and also the marine animal, and besides them the philosopher, and moreover the star as well; but these meanings have nothing in common, and the first is not included in the second nor the second in the third,—so also in the statement that the Idea is good, and also that which partakes of the Idea, we have a declaration of significations, but of such as are separate and display no mutual connexion. Such then, as I 30 said before, were the views of the earlier thinkers; but the Stoics hold that, in the case of the term “good,” the second signification should be inclusive of the first and the third inclusive of the other two. And there have been some who have asserted that “good” is “that which is desirable for its own sake.”^b And others put it thus: “Good is that which contributes to happiness”; and some—“that which helps to fulfil happiness.” And happiness, as Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus have defined it, is “an equable flow of life.”^c

Such, in fine, is the general form of the definition of “the good.” But as “the good” is used in three 31 senses,^d with regard to the definition of the first signification [which says “The good is that by which or from which utility can result”] some are wont to

^b Literally, “case” (falling), as a grammatical term “Dog” is variously applied to “dogs,” “dog-fish,” “Dog-men” (Cynics), “Dog-star.”

^c Cf. P.H. iii. 172; Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 1.

^d Cf. § 110 *infra*.

^d See § 25 *supra*.

- ἀληθείας ἀγαθὸν ἔστι τὸ ἀφ' οὐ ἔστω ὡφελεῖσθαι, μόνην ρήγτεον τὴν γενικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχειν (ἀπὸ μόνης γὰρ τούτης συμβαίνει τὸ ὡφελεῖσθαι), ἐκπίπτειν δὲ τοῦ ὄρου ἔκάστην τῶν εἰδικῶν, οἷον τὴν φρόνησον καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὰς λοιπάς.
- 32 ἀπ' οὐδεμάς γὰρ αὐτῶν συμβαίνει [τὸ]¹ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὡφελεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐ κοωπέρον τὸ ὡφελεῖν (εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνοι, τὸ ὡφελεῖν, οὐκ ἔσται ὠρισμένως φρόνησις, γενικὴ δ' ἀρετῇ), καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν κατηγόρημα, σωφρονεῖν, οὐ τὸ κοινόν,
- 33 ὡφελεῖν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τὸ ἀνάλογον. οἱ δ' ἀντικαθιστάμενοι πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ ἔγκλημα τοῦτο φασιν· ὅταν λέγωμεν “ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἀφ' οὐ συμβαίνει τὸ ὡφελεῖσθαι,” ἐν ἵσῳ τοῦτο λέγομεν τῷ “ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἀφ' οὐ συμβαίνει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὡφελεῖσθαι.” οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἔκάστη τῶν ἐπ' εἴδους ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὸν γενήσεται, κοινῶς μὲν τὸ ὡφελεῖν μὴ ἐπιφέρουσα, τὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὡφελεῖσθαι παρεχομένη, οἷον ἡ μὲν φρονεῖν, καθάπερ ἡ φρόνησις, η δὲ [τὸ] σωφρονεῖν, ὡς ἡ σωφροσύνη. θελήσαντες δὲ οὗτοι ὡς ἀπολογούμενοι τὸ πρότερον ἔγκλημα φυγεῖν, εἰς ἔτερον ἀπεκυλίσθησαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτο “ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἀφ' οὐ συμβαίνει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὡφελεῖσθαι,” η γενικὴ ἀρετὴ ἀγαθὸν οὖσα οὐχ ὑποπεσεῖται τῷ ὄρῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς συμβαίνει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὡφελεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ μία τῶν ἐπ' εἴδους γενήσεται, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ὡφελεῖσθαι.
- 35 Καὶ ἔτερα δὲ εἴωθε λέγεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους ὄρους, δογματικῆς ἔχόμενα περιεργίας. ήμū δὲ

¹ [τὸ] secl. Mutsch.

argue further that if in very truth good is “that from which utility can result,” we must declare that generic virtue alone is good (for it is from this alone that utility results), and that each of the particulars—such as wisdom, temperance, and the rest—fall outside the definition. For the precise fact of being useful does 32 not result from any of these, but from wisdom “being wise” results and not “being useful” more generally, (for if just this—namely, being useful—were its result it would not be wisdom in particular but generic virtue), and from temperance results what is named after it (namely, “being temperate”) and not the general result (namely, “being useful”), and similarly with the rest.—But those who resist this 33 indictment say this: When we state that “good is that from which utility results,” this is equivalent to saying “good is that from which results one of the things useful in life.” For thus each of the particular virtues also will be a good, not as procuring utility in general but as providing some one of the things useful in life—one of them (namely, wisdom) providing the state of being wise, and another (namely, temperance) the temperate state. But these men, in attempting 34 by this defence to escape the previous charge, have involved themselves in another one. For if the statement is this—“Good is that from which results one of the things useful in life,” then generic virtue, which is a good, will not fall under the definition; for none of the things useful in life results from it (since otherwise it will become one of the particulars), but simply utility.

“And other objections, which partake of Dogmatic 35 over-subtlety, are customarily made against these

• With §§ 35-39 cf. P.H. iii. 173-174.

ἀπόχρη ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ὁ λέγων ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὡφελοῦν
 ἦ τὸ δὶ' αὐτὸν αἴρετὸν ἦ τὸ συνεργοῦν πρὸς εὐδαι-
 μονίαν, ἢ οὕτω πως ἀποδιδούς, οὐχ ὁ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν
 διδάσκει, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός αὐτῷ παρίστησιν.
 ὁ δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός τάγαθῷ παριστὰς οὐκ αὐτὸν
 δείκνυσι τάγαθόν. εὐθέως γοῦν τὸ μὲν ὅτι ὡφελεῖ
 τάγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ὅτι αἴρετόν ἐστι, παρὸ ἀγαθὸν
 εἴρηται τὸ οἷον ἀγαστόν, ὅτι τε εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶ

36 ποιητικόν, πάντες συγχωροῦσιν· ἀλλ' ἐὰν προ-
 εξετάζηται τί ποτε ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὡφελοῦν καὶ δὶ'
 αὐτὸν αἴρετον καὶ εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν, οὐκέτι
 ὁμοφρογίσουσι, καίπερ συμφώνως πρότερον αὐτὸν
 λέγοντες τὸ ὡφελοῦν καὶ τὸ αἴρετόν, ἀλλ' εἰς
 ἀσπειστον ἐξενεχθήσονται πόλεμον, τοῦ μὲν ἀρετὴν
 λέγοντος τοῦ δ' ἡδονὴν τοῦ δ' ἀλυπίαν τοῦ δ' ἀλλο

37 τι τῶν διαφερόντων. εἰ δέ γε ἐκ τῶν προειρη-
 μένων δρῶν ἐδείκνυτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἄν
 ἐπεστασίαζον ὡς ἀγνοουμένης τῆς τάγαθοῦ φύσεως.
 τοίνυν οὐχ ὁ ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν οἱ ἐκκείμενοι δροὶ^a
 διδάσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός τάγαθῷ. διόπερ
 οὐδὲ κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον εἰσὶ μοχθηροί, ἀλλὰ καὶ

38 καθόσον ἀδυνάτου τιώς ἐφίενται πράγματος· ὁ γάρ
 ἀγνοῶν τι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτος οὐδὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός
 ἐκείνῳ γνώσκειν δύναται. οἷον ὁ πρὸς τὸν ἀγ-
 νοοῦντα τί ἐστιν ἵππος λέγων “ἵππος ἐστὶ ζῶον
 χρεμετιστικόν” οὐ διδάσκει δὲ ἐστιν ἵππος· τῷ γάρ
 μὴ γνώσκοντι τὸν ἵππον καὶ τὸ χρεμετίζειν ἀγ-
 νοεῖται, ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ ἵππου συμβεβηκός. καὶ ὁ
 πρὸς τὸν μὴ κατειληφότα τί ἐστι βοῦς προφερό-

* Deriving ἀγαθὸν from ἀγαστόν, cf. § 85 *infra*; P.H. iii.
 175; Plato, *Cratyl.* 412 c.

definitions. But for us it is sufficient to show that he who asserts that the good is “the useful,” or “what is choiceworthy for its own sake,” or “that which contributes to happiness,” or gives some such description of it, does not teach us what good is but states its accidental property. But he who states the property of the good does not show us the good itself. For certainly all agree that the good is useful and that it is choiceworthy (and for this reason it is called “good” as being “delightful”^a), and that it is productive of happiness; but if one inquires further what this thing is which is useful and choiceworthy for its own sake and productive of happiness, they will no longer be of one mind, although they previously agreed in calling it the useful and the choiceworthy, but will be swept away into a truceless war, one man calling it virtue, another pleasure, another painlessness, another something else quite different. But if it had in fact been shown by the definitions mentioned above what the good is, they would not have been at strife as though the real nature of the good were unknown. So then, the definitions set forth do not teach us what the good is but the accidental property of the good. Consequently, they are unsound not only in this respect but also inasmuch as they aim at something which is impossible; for he who is ignorant of an existing object cannot get to know the property of that object either. For example, the man who says to one who is ignorant of what a horse is, “A horse is an animal capable of neighing,” does not teach him what a horse is; for “neighing,” too, is unknown to the person who does not know the horse, as it is a property of the horse. And he who to the man who has not grasped

- μενος "βοῦς ἔστι ζῶν μυκητικόν" οὐ παρίστησι τὸν βοῦν· τῷ γὰρ μὴ γινώσκοντι τοῦτον συνακαταληπτεῖται καὶ τὸ μυκᾶσθαι, συμβεβήκὸς ὑπάρχον τοῦ βούς. οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀνενόητον ὅπτα τάγαθοῦ μάτην καὶ ἀνωφέλως λέγεται ὅτι ἀγαθόν ἔστι τὸ αἰρετὸν ἢ τὸ ὀφελοῦν. πρῶτον γὰρ δὲ μαθεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἴτα τότε συνιέναι ὅτι ὀφελεῖ καὶ ὅτι αἰρετόν ἔστι καὶ εὐδαιμονίας ποιητικόν. ἐπ' ἀγνοουμένῃ δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν ὄρων οὐ διδάσκουσι τὸ ζητούμενον.
- 40 Δείγματος μὲν οὖν χάριν ἀπαρκέσει ταῦτ' εἰρῆσθαι περὶ τῆς τάγαθοῦ νοήσεως. ἐξ ᾧ, ὡς οἶμαι, σαφῇ τυγχάνει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ τεχνολογούμενα παρὰ τοῖς ἑτεροδόξοις. κακὸν γάρ ἔστι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὅπερ βλάβη ἔστιν ἢ οὐχ ἑτερον βλάβης, καὶ βλάβη μὲν ὥσπερ κακία καὶ ἡ φαιλῆ πρᾶξις, οὐχ ἑτερον δὲ βλάβης καθάπερ ὁ φαῦλος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἔχθρος. μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, ὅπερ καὶ ἀδιάφορον ἀνομάζετο, ἔστι τὸ οὐδετέρως ἔχον. τις δ' ἦν ἡ τῶν ὄρων τούτων δύναμις καὶ τίνα ρήγτεον πρὸς τοὺς ὄρους, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τάγαθοῦ λεγομένων πάρεστι μαθεῖν. νῦν δ' ἐπὶ προκατασταθεῖσι τούτοις μετελθόντες σκεψάμεθα εἰ ὥσπερ ἐπωοεῖται τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὑπαρκτόν ἔστιν.
- 41 Γ'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΦΤΣΕΙ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΟΝ
- 42 "Οτι μὲν οὖν οὐ κεκρατημένως ὑπέγραψαν οἱ δογματικοὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῦ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ,

• With § 40 cf. P.H. iii. 176.

• Cf. §§ 21-39 supra.

what an ox is proounds the definition, "An ox is an animal capable of bellowing," does not explain the ox, for "bellowing" too is equally uncomprehended by the man who does not know the ox, it being a property of the ox. Therefore also it is vain and 39 useless to say to the man who is devoid of a conception of the good that the good is the choice-worthy or the useful. For one ought first to learn the real nature of the good itself, and then, in the next place, perceive that it is useful and that it is choiceworthy and productive of happiness. But if this is unknown such definitions as these do not inform us of what we seek.

It will be enough, then, to have said thus much, by 40 way of illustration, regarding the conception of the Good. And from this the logical subtleties which the Dogmatists devise regarding Evil will also be plain.^a For the evil is the contrary of the good; and it is harm or not other than harm; and it is "harm" as in the case of badness and wicked action, but "not other than 'harm'" as in the case of the wicked man and the enemy. And between these (I mean, between 41 the good and the evil, and termed the "indifferent") is that which is in neither state. And what the significance of these definitions is, and what is to be said against the definitions, one may learn from our discussion of the good.^b But now, on the assumption that these are already established, let us pass on and consider whether good and evil are really existent in the way in which they are conceived.

CHAPTER III.—DO GOOD AND EVIL REALLY EXIST?

Now that the Dogmatists have not described the 42 conception of Good and Evil convincingly we have

πρότερον ἐπελογισμάθεα· πρὸς δὲ τὸ εὐχερέστερον συμπεριφέρεσθαι τοὺς περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αὐτοῦ λόγοις αὐταρκές ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἄρα πάντες ἄνθρωποι, καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ Αἰνησίδημος, ἀγαθὸν ἥγονον τὸ αἴροντα αὐτούς, ὅποιον ὃν ποτ' ἦ, μαχομένας ἔχουσι τὰς ἐν εἴδει περὶ αὐτοῦ κρίσεις.

43 καὶ ὃν τρόπον συμφωνοῦντες, εἰ τύχοι, περὶ τοῦ εἶναι τινα σωματικὴν εὑμορφίαν περὶ τῆς εὐμόρφου καὶ καλῆς γυναικὸς στασιάζουσιν, τοῦ μὲν Αἰθίοπος τὴν σιμοτάτην καὶ μελαντάτην προκρίνοντος, τοῦ δὲ Πέρσου τὴν γρυποτάτην καὶ λευκοτάτην ἀποδεχομένου, ἄλλου δὲ τὴν μέσην κατά τε τὸν χαρακτήρα καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρόαν πασῶν καλλίονα

44 λέγοντος, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ κατὰ κοινὴν πρόληψιν δοξάζοντες εἶναι τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οἱ τε ἰδιῶται καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ἀγαθὸν μὲν τὸ αἴροντα αὐτοὺς καὶ ὠφελοῦν, κακὸν δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχον, κατ' εἶδος πρὸς ἄλλήλους πολεμοῦσιν·

ἄλλος γάρ τ' ἄλλοισιν ἀνὴρ ἐπιτέρπεται ἔργοις,
καὶ κατ' Ἀρχιλόχον

ἄλλος ἄλλῳ ἐπ' ἔργῳ καρδίην ἴαίνεται,
εἴγε ὁ μὲν δόξαν ἀσπάζεται ὁ δὲ πλοῦτον, ἄλλος
εὐεξίαν, τὸς δὲ ἡδονὴν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὁ
45 αὐτὸς λόγος. οἱ μὲν γάρ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ
τοῦ περιπάτου τρία γένη φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
καὶ ἂ μὲν περὶ ψυχῆς ὑπάρχειν ἂ δὲ περὶ σῶμα ἂ δὲ
ἐκτὸς ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος, περὶ μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς
τὰς ἀρετὰς, περὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὑγίειαν καὶ εὐεξίαν

^a With §§ 42-44 cf. P.H. iii. 175.
^b Homer, *Odys. xiv. 228*; cf. P.H. i. 86.

already argued ^a; but in order to become more easily familiar with the arguments about its existence it is quite sufficient to say that, after all (as Aenesidemus used to assert), whereas all men consider that the good is what attracts them, whatever that may be, the particular views they hold about it are conflicting. And just as, although men agree (shall we say?) ^b 43 that comeliness of body exists yet they are at variance about the comely and beautiful woman,—the Ethiopian preferring the blackest and most snub-nosed, and the Persian approving the whitest and most hook-nosed, and someone else declaring that she who is intermediate both in feature and in colouring is the most beautiful of all,—so in the same way both ^c 44 laymen and philosophers share the same pre-conception and believe that good and evil exist,—good being that which attracts them and is useful, and evil that which is of the opposite nature,—but as to particular instances they are at war with one another :—

One thing is pleasing to one man, another thing to another.^b
and, in the words of Archilochus,^c—

Men differ as to what things cheer their hearts,
seeing that this man welcomes glory, that man wealth,
another well-being, and another pleasure. And the
same account applies to the philosophers. ^d For the 45
Academics and the Peripatetics ^e assert that there are
three classes of goods, and that some belong to the
soul, some to the body, and others are external to
both soul and body,—the virtues belonging to the
soul, and to the body health and well-being and keen-

^a *Frag. 36 (Bergk).*

^b With §§ 45-47 cf. P.H. iii. 180-181.

^c Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* i. 8.

καὶ εὐαισθησίαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ πᾶν ὁ τῆς ὄμοιας ἐστὶν ἰδέας, ἔκτὸς δὲ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος πλοῦτον 46 πατρίδα γονεῖς τέκνα φίλους, τὰ παραπλήσια. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τρία μὲν γένη τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ τυγχάνειν ἔλεξαν, οὐχ ὡσαύτως δέ· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχῆν τὰ δὲ ἔκτὸς τὰ δὲ οὔτε περὶ ψυχῆν οὔτε ἔκτος, ἔξαιρούντες τὸ γένος τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθῶν ὡς μὴ ἀγαθῶν. καὶ δὴ περὶ μὲν ψυχῆν ἔναι φασὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας πράξεις, ἔκτὸς δὲ ἔναι τὸν τε φίλον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀνθρώπον καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς καὶ τὰ ὄμοια, οὔτε δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν οὔτε ἔκτὸς αὐτὸν τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀνθρώπον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτόν. οὔτε γὰρ ἔκτὸς ἑαυτοῦ δυνατὸν ἔναι αὐτὸν οὔτε περὶ ψυχῆν. 47 ἐκ γὰρ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνέστηκεν. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ τοσούτον ἀπέχοντες τοῦ ἔξαιρεν τὸ γένος τῶν περὶ σώματι ἀγαθῶν ὡς καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀρχικώτατον ἀπολιπεῖν ἀγαθόν· ὅποιοι εἰσὶν οἱ τὴν κατὰ σάρκα ἥδονὴν ἀσπαζόμενοι. καὶ ἵνα μὴ δοκῶμεν νῦν ἐπὶ πλειν ἐκτείνειν τὸν λόγον, παριστάντες ὅτι ἀσύμφωνός ἔστι καὶ μαχομένη ἡ περὶ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κρίσις, ἐπὶ ἐνὸς ὑποδείγματος¹ ποιησόμεθα τὴν ὑφῆγησιν, καθάπερ τῆς ὑγείας, ἐπεὶ καὶ συνηθέστερός ἔστιν ἡμῖν ὁ περὶ αὐτῆς λόγος.

48 Οὐκοῦν τὴν ὑγείαν οἱ μὲν νομίζουσιν ἀγαθὸν ἔναι οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαμβανόντων οἱ μὲν μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ταίτην ἔλεξαν οἱ δὲ οὐ μέγιστον, καὶ τῶν οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἰπόντων οἱ μὲν ἀδιάφορον προηγούμενον, οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφορον μέν, οὐ

ness of sense and beauty and everything which is of a similar character, and external to soul and body being wealth, country, parents, children, friends, and the like. But the Stoics, though they too declared that 46 there are three classes of good things, yet classed them differently, saying that some of them belong to the soul, that some are external, and that some are neither psychical nor external, and eliminating the class of bodily goods as not being goods. Thus those belonging to the soul are, they say, the virtues and right actions ; and external are the friend and the good man and good children and parents and the like ; and neither psychical nor external is the good man in his relation to himself, for it is impossible for him to be either external to himself or psychical ; for he is composed of soul and body. And there are some who 47 are so far from eliminating the class of bodily goods that they even assign to them the most principal good ; and of this sort are they who approve of carnal pleasure. But lest we may seem now to be unduly prolonging our argument in showing that the judgement of men regarding Good and Evil is discordant and conflicting, we shall base our exposition on one example only—namely health, since the discussion of this is specially familiar to us.^a

Health, then, is by some considered to be a good, by 48 others not a good ; and of those who suppose it to be a good some have declared it to be the greatest good, others not the greatest ; and of those who have said that it is not a good, some have counted it “a preferred indifferent,” others an indifferent but not

¹ ὑποδείγματος Heintz : ὑποδείγματικῶς MSS., Bekk.

• Since Sextus himself was a physician.

49 προηγούμενον δέ. ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὖν, καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον, εἰρήκασι τὴν ὑγείαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν τε ποιητῶν καὶ τῶν συγγραφέων καὶ καθόλου πάντες οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου. Συμωνίδης μὲν γάρ ὁ μελοποιός φησι μηδὲ καλᾶς σοφίας εἶναι χάριν, εἴ μή τις ἔχοι σεμνῆν ὑγείαν. Λικύμνιος δὲ προειπὼν ταῦτα

λιπαρόμματε, μάτερ ὑψίστα,¹ θρόνων
σεμνῶν Ἀπόλλωνος βασιλεια ποθενά,
πρανγέλως ὑγεία,
ποῖον ὑψηλὸν ἐπιφέρει.

τίς γάρ πλούτου χάρις η τοκήων
η τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώπου βασιληῖδος ἀρχᾶς;
σέθεν δὲ χωρὶς οὐ τις εὐδάίμων ἔφυ.

50 Ἡρόφιλος δὲ ἐν τῷ διαιτητικῷ καὶ σοφίαν φησὶν ἀνεπιδεικτον καὶ τέχνην ἀδηλον καὶ ισχὺν ἀναγώνιστον καὶ πλοῦτον ἀχρεῖον καὶ λόγον ἀδύνατον 51 ὑγείας ἀπούσης. ἀλλ' οὐτοὶ μὲν οὐτως· ἀγαθὸν δ' ἐπαν αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ πρῶτον, οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου. δεῖν γάρ ὑπέλαβον ἔκαστω τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν τε καὶ ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν. ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Κράντωρ εἰς ἔμφασιν τοῦ λεγομένου βουλόμενος ἡμᾶς ἄγειν 52 πάνυ χαρίεντι συνεχρήσατο παραδείγματι. εἰ γάρ νοήσαιμεν, φησί, κοινόν τι τῶν Πανελλήνων θέατρον, εἰς τοῦτό τε ἔκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παριὸν καὶ τῶν πρωτείων ἀντιποιούμενον ηκεω, εὐθὺς καὶ εἰς 53 ἔννοιαν ἀναχθησόμεθα τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς δια-

¹ ὑψίστα Wilamowitz: ὑψίστω mss., Bekk.

* For the two subdivisions of the "indifferent"—"preferred" and "rejected"—cf. §§ 59 ff. *infra*; P.H. iii. 191 f.; Vol. I. Introd. p. xxvii.

" preferred." ^a Now that health is a good, and the prime good, has been asserted by not a few of the poets and writers and generally by all ordinary folk. Thus Simonides the lyric poet declares ^b that " Even fair Wisdom lacks grace unless a man possesses august Health." And Licymnus, after first uttering this prelude ^c—

Mother sublime, with eyes bright-shining,
Lov'd queen of the holy throne of Apollo,
Gently-smiling Lady of Health—

adds this lofty strain—

Where is the joy of wealth or of kindred,
Or of kingly dominion that maketh man god-like?
Nay, parted from thee can no one be blessed.

And Herophilus ^d in his *Dietetics* affirms that wisdom cannot display itself and art is non-evident and strength unexerted and wealth useless and speech powerless in the absence of health.—Such then are the views of these men. But the Academics and Peripatetics ^e said that health is indeed a good, but not the prime good. For they held that one ought to assign to each of the goods its own proper rank and value. Hence Crantor,^f wishing to bring us to have a clear image of the object under discussion, made use of a very delightful illustration. If we were to imagine, he says, a general theatre, common to all the Greeks, and that each of the goods were to come and present itself in this and challenge for the first prize, we should be brought at once to a realization of the difference between the goods. For in the first

^a *Frag.* 70 (Bergk).

^b A physician of Cos, *circa* 300 B.C.; cf. P.H. ii. 245.

^c Cf. § 77 *infra*.

^d An Academic, disciple of Xenocrates, *circa* 300 B.C.

53 φορᾶς. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ ὁ πλούτος παραπηδήσας
έρει “ ἐγώ, ὁ ἄνδρες Πανέλληνες, κόσμον παρέχων
πάσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰς ἑσθῆτας καὶ τὰς ὑποδέσεις
καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀπόλαυσιν χρεώδης εἰμὶ νοσοῦντι καὶ
ὑγιαινοῦσι, καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ παρέχω τὰ τερπνά,
54 ἐν δὲ πολέμοις νεύρα τῶν πράξεων γύνομαι.” τού-
των γάρ δὴ τῶν λόγων ἀκούσαντες οἱ Πανέλληνες
δόμοθυμαδὸν κελεύσουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τὰ πρωτεῖα τῷ
πλούτῳ. ἀλλ’ ἔαν τούτου ἡδη ἀνακηρυττομένου
ἐπιστάσα ἡ ἡδονή,

τῇ ἔνι μὲν φιλότης, ἔνι δ’ ἵμερος, ἐν δ’ ὀδαριστύς,
πάρφασις, ἡ τ’ ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων,
55 λέγγη δὲ εἰς μέσον καταστᾶσα διτι αὐτὴν δίκαιον
ἐστιν ἀναγορεύειν

(ὅ γάρ ὅλβος οὐ βέβαιος, ἀλλ’ ἐφήμερος
ἔξιπτατ’ οἴκων, μικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον,
διώκεται τε πρὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ δι’ ἕαυτὸν ἀλλὰ
τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ περιγυμομένην ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ ἡδονήν),
πάντως οἱ Πανέλληνες, οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα
ἡ οὐτως ὑπολαβόντες, κεκράξονται δὲν τὴν ἡδονήν
56 στεφανοῦν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτης τὸ βραβεῖον φέρεσθαι
μελλούσης, ἐπὴν εἰσβάλῃ ἡ ὑγεία μετὰ τῶν συν-
έδρων αὐτῇ θέων, καὶ διδασκῃ ὡς οὐτε ἡδονῆς οὔτε
πλούτου ὄφελός τι ἐστιν ἀπούσης αὐτῆς

(πί γάρ με πλούτος ὥφελεῖ νοσοῦντά γε;
μίκρ’ ἄν θέλοιμι καὶ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἔχων
ἄλυπον οἰκεῖν βίοτον ἡ πλουτῶν νοσεῖν),
57 ἀκούσαντες πάλιν οἱ Πανέλληνες καὶ καταλαβόντες

¹ νοσοῦντά γε Fabr., Bekk.: νόσον mss. (? μεστὸν ὥφελει
νόσων).

place Wealth, springing to the front, will say—“ I,
O all ye Greeks, by providing adornment to all men
and garments and shoes and all other comforts am
indispensable both to the sick and to the whole, and
while I furnish delights in peace, in war I become the
sinews of action.” Then all the Greeks, on hearing 54
these words, will with one consent give orders that
the first prize be bestowed on Wealth. But if,
whilst he is already being proclaimed the victor,
Pleasure should present herself—

In whom love doth abide and longing and amorous converse,
Speech seductive which stealeth the wits, yea e'en of the
wisest,^a—

and taking her stand in the middle should declare 55
that it is right to proclaim her victor—

For unsure is Wealth: it lasteth but a day,
Then, after briefest flow'ring, takes to flight,^b
also it is pursued by men not for its own sake but
for the enjoyment and pleasure which accrue because
of it,—then certainly all the Greeks, conceiving that
this is in fact the case, will cry aloud that they must
crown Pleasure. But when she, too, is about to carry 56
off the palm, as soon as Health makes her entry in
company with her fellow-deities,^c and explains that
in her absence there is no profit either in pleasure or
in wealth—

What doth wealth profit me when I am sick?
Better a little portion day by day
With painless life than riches with disease.^d—

then, once again, when they have heard her and have 57

^a Homer, *Il.* xiv. 216.
^b Cf. Eurip. *Phoen.* 558, *Electra* 944.
^c Such as Asclepios, Panacea, Athenē (an altar to Athenē
Hygieia was set up in Athens by Pericles).
^d From Eurip. *Telephus* (*Frag.* 714 Nauck).

ώς οὐκ ἔνεστι κλινοπετῆ καὶ νοσοῦσαν ὑποστῆναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, φήσουσι νικᾶν τὴν ὑγείαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ἥδη νικώσης, ἐπὰν εἰσέλθῃ ἡ ἀνδρία πολὺ στῖφος ἀριστέων καὶ ἡρώων ἔχουσα περὶ 58 ἑαυτήν, καταστάσα τε λέγη “ἐμοῦ μὴ παρούσης, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἐλληνες, ἀλλοτρία γίνεται ἡ κτῆσις τῶν παρ’ ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν, εὕξαιντό τ’ ἂν οἱ πολέμοι περιουσιάζειν ὑμᾶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὡς μελλήσοντες ὑμῶν κρατεῖν,” καὶ τούτων οὖν ἀκούσαντες οἱ Ἐλληνες τὰ μὲν πρωτεῖα τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀποδώσουσι, τὰ δὲ δευτερεῖα τῇ ὑγείᾳ, τὰ δὲ τρίτα τῇ ἡδονῇ, τελευταῖον δὲ τάξουσι τὸν πλοῦτον.

59 Καὶ δὴ ὁ μὲν Κράντωρ τὴν ὑγείαν ἐν δευτέρᾳ μοίρᾳ ἐτίθετο, στοιχῶν τοῖς προειρημένοις φιλοσόφοις· οὐκ ἀγαθὸν δ’ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔλεξαν αὐτὴν ἀλλ’ ἀδιάφορον. τὸ ἀδιάφορον δ’ οἴονται λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, καθ’ ἔνα μὲν τρόπον πρὸς ὅ μήτε ὄρμὴ μήτε ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οἷον ἔστι τὸ περιπτούς ἢ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ τὰς ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ 60 τρίχας, καθ’ ἔτερον δὲ πρὸς ὅ ὄρμὴ μὲν καὶ ἀφορμὴ γίνεται, οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τόδε ἢ τόδε, οἷον ἐπὶ δυοῦν δραχμῶν ἀπαραλλάκτων τῷ τε χαρακτῆρι καὶ τῇ λαμπρότητι, ὅταν δέῃ τὸ ἔτερον αὐτῶν αἱρεῖσθαι· ὄρμὴ μὲν γάρ γίνεται πρὸς τὸ ἔτερον αὐτῶν 61 [αἱρεῖσθαι], οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τόδε ἢ τόδε. κατὰ δὲ τρίτον καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συλλαμβανόμενον, καθ’ ὃ σημαινόμενόν φασι τὴν τε ὑγείαν καὶ νόσον καὶ πάντα τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἔκτος ἀδιάφορα τυγχάνειν διὰ τὸ μήτε

come to realize that happiness cannot exist when bed-ridden and diseased, all the Greeks will declare that Health is the victor. But even while Health is already claiming the victory, as soon as Courage enters, surrounded by a great press of nobles and heroes, and taking her stand speaks thus—“ If I am 58 not present, O ye Greeks, the ownership of your goods falls into other hands, and your enemies would pray that you might abound in all things good since they intend to conquer you ”; then, on hearing this, the Greeks will assign the first prize to valour, and the second to health, and the third to pleasure, and they will rank wealth last.

Thus Crantor put health in the second place, 59 adopting the order of the philosophers previously mentioned ; but the Stoics affirmed that it is not a “good” but an “indifferent.”^a They suppose that the term “indifferent” has three senses : in one sense it is applied to that for which there exists neither inclination nor disinclination,—such as the fact that the stars or the hairs of the head are odd in number or even ; in another sense it applies to that 60 for which there exists inclination and disinclination but not more for this thing than for that—as in the case of two drachmae indistinguishable both in markings and in brightness, when one is required to choose one of them, for there exists an inclination for one of them but no more for this one than for that. And in the third and last sense the indifferent, they 61 say, is that which contributes neither to happiness nor to unhappiness ; and indifferent in this signification, they say, are health and disease and all things of the body and most external things because they

^a With §§ 59-61 cf. P.H. iii. 177.

πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συντείνειν. ὡς γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη ἀδιάφορον διὰ παντὸς δ' ἀρετῆ μὲν καλῶς, κακίᾳ δὲ κακῶς, ὑγείᾳ δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ σώματι ποτὲ μὲν εὖ ποτὲ δὲ κακῶς ἔστι χρῆσθαι, διὸ ταῦτ' ἀν εἴη ἀδιάφορα. οὗτοι δὲ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι προηγμένα τὰ δ' ἀποπροηγμένα τὰ δὲ μήτε προηγμένα μήτε ἀποπροηγμένα, καὶ προηγμένα μὲν εἶναι τὰ ἵκανην ὀξεῖαν ἔχοντα, ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἵκανην ἀποξεῖαν ἔχοντα, μήτε δὲ προῆχθαι μήτε ἀποπροῆχθαι οἷον τὸ ἐκτεῖναι ἢ συγκαμψία τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ πᾶν ὃ τούτῳ παραπλήσιόν ἔστιν. τάπτεσθαι δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς προηγμένοις τίν τε ὑγείαν καὶ τὴν ὕσχὺν καὶ τὸ καλλοπλούτον τε καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὰ ἔουκότα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀποπροηγμένοις νόσον καὶ πενίαν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα καὶ τὰ ἀνάλογα. ὅδε μὲν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς· μὴ εἶναι δὲ προηγμένον ἀδιάφορον τὴν ὑγείαν καὶ πᾶν τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν παραπλήσιον ἔφησεν Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος. Ἰσον γάρ ἔστι τὸ προηγμένον αὐτὴν λέγειν ἀδιάφορον τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀξιοῦν, καὶ σχεδὸν ὄνόματι μόνον διαφέρον. καθόλου γάρ τὰ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα μὴ ἔχειν μηδεμίαν παραλλαγῆν, μηδὲ τινὰ μὲν εἶναι φύσει προηγμένα τινὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις, *⟨ὡς⟩¹* μήτε τὰ λεγόμενα προῆχθαι πάντως γίνεσθαι προηγμένα μήτε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀποπροῆχθαι κατ' ἀνάγκην ὑπάρχειν ἀποπροηγμένα. ἐάν γοῦν δέῃ τοὺς μὲν ὑγιαίνοντας ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ τυράννῳ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀναιρεῖσθαι, τοὺς δὲ

¹ *⟨ὡς⟩* add. ej. Heintz.

tend neither towards happiness nor towards unhappiness. For that which it is possible to use either well or ill will be indifferent; and whereas one always uses virtue well and vice ill, one can use health and the things of the body at one time well and at another ill, and consequently they will be indifferent.—And they say too that of things 62 indifferent some are “preferred,” others “rejected,” others neither preferred nor rejected,^a and that the preferred are those which have considerable “worth,” and the rejected those which have considerable “unworthiness,” and that extending the finger, for example, or contracting it, and everything like that, is neither preferred nor rejected. And 63 amongst the things preferred are ranked health and strength and beauty, wealth and glory and the like; but amongst the things rejected, sickness and poverty and pain and suchlike.—So say the Stoics; but 64 Ariston of Chios ^b affirmed that health, and everything of a similar kind, is not a “preferred indifferent”; for to call it a “preferred indifferent” is equivalent to claiming it to be a “good,” and practically differs only in name. For, without exception, amongst the 65 indifferent things which lie between virtue and vice there is no distinction; nor are some of them preferred, others rejected naturally, but owing to the different circumstances of the various occasions; *(so that)* neither are those said to be preferred inevitably preferred, nor those said to be rejected necessarily rejected. Were it, for instance, obligatory that men 66 in sound health should serve under the tyrant and on this account be destroyed, but that the sick should

^a Cf. § 48 *supra*. With §§ 62-66 cf. P.H. iii. 191-192.

^b A Stoic, with Cynic tendencies, *circa* 260 B.C.

νοσοῦντας ἀπολυομένους τῆς ὑπηρεσίας συναπολύεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως, ἔλοιπ' ἄν μᾶλλον ὁ σοφὸς τὸ νοεῖν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἡ [στὶ]¹ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. καὶ ταύτῃ οὔτε ἡ ὑγεία προτυγμένον ἔστι 67 πάντας οὔτε ἡ νόσος ἀποπροτυγμένον. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν ταῖς ὀνοματογραφίαις ἄλλοτ' ἄλλα προτάττομεν στοιχεῖα, πρὸς τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ἀρτιζόμενοι, καὶ τὸ μὲν δέλτα ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Δίωνος ὄνομα γράφομεν, τὸ δὲ ἵωτα ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Ἰωνος, τὸ δὲ ω̄ ὅτε τὸ τοῦ Ὁρίωνος, οὐ τῇ φύσει ἔτέρων παρὰ τὰ ἔτερα γράμματα προκρινομένων, τῶν δὲ καιρῶν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, οὕτω κὰν τοῖς μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πράγμασιν οὐ φυσική τις γίνεται ἔτέρων παρ' ἔτερα πρόκρισις, κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ μᾶλλον.

68 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἀσυμφώνου δειχθείσης καὶ ὑποδειγματικώτερον τῆς περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν ἔτι δὲ ἀδιαφόρων προλήψεως, δεῖσει λοιπὸν καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς τὸ προκείμενον 69 λεγομένων ἐφάπτεσθαι. εἰ τοίνυν ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔστι τι φύσει κακόν, τοῦτο ὀφείλει κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων καὶ πᾶσι ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ πῦρ φύσει ἀλεαντικὸν καθεστὼς πάντας ἀλεάνει καὶ οὐχ οὐσί μὲν ἀλεάνει οὖς δὲ φύχει, καὶ οὐν τρόπον ἡ χῶν *(φύσει)*² φύχουσα οὐχὶ τοὺς μὲν φύχει τοὺς δὲ ἀλεάνει, πάντας δ' ὄμοιώς φύχει, οὕτω τὸ φύσει ἀγαθὸν πᾶσιν ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐχὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθὸν 70 τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθόν. παρὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων συνιστάς ὅτι φύσει ἀγαθόν ἔστιν ὁ θεός, ἀπὸ τῶν ὄμοιών ἐπικεχείρησκεν. ὡς γὰρ θερμοῦ, φησίν, ίδιον ἔστι

¹ [στὶ] secl. Arnim (? οὐτως). ² *(φύσει)* add. ej. Mutsch.
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be set free from that service and freed likewise from destruction, on such an occasion the wise man would choose sickness rather than health. And thus neither is health inevitably preferred nor sickness rejected. As, then, in the writing of names we place different 67 letters first at different times, adapting them to the varying circumstances,—Delta when we are writing the name of Dion, Iota when it is Ion, Omega when it is Orion,—no one letter being preferable to the others by nature, but the occasions compelling us to act thus,—so also in the things which lie between virtue and vice there exists no natural precedence of some before others, but rather a precedence due to circumstance.

But now that we have thus shown, mainly by means 68 of examples, that there is no agreement about the preconception regarding things good and evil, and the indifferent as well, it will be our next task to deal with the arguments of the Sceptics about the problem before us. If, then, there exists anything good by 69 nature or anything evil by nature, this thing ought to be common to all men and be good or evil for all.^a For just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not warm some but chill others,—and like as snow which chills *(by nature)* does not chill some and warm others, but chills all alike,—so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others. Wherefore also Plato,^b in establishing that God is 70 good by nature, argued on similar lines. For, he says, as it is the special property of heat to make hot

^a With § 69 cf. P.H. iii. 179.
^b Cf. Plato. Rep. ii. 379 a ff., and 335 D.

τὸν θερμαίνειν καὶ ψυχροῦ ἕδιόν ἔστι τὸ ψύχειν,
οὕτω καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἕδιόν ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθοποιεῖν· τὰ-
γαθὸν δέ γε ὁ θεός· ἕδιον ἄρα ἔστι θεού τὸ ἀγαθο-
ποιεῖν. ὥστε εἰ ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθὸν, τοῦτο πρὸς
71 ἅπαντάς ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ εἰ ἔστι τι φύσει κακόν,
τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντάς ἔστι κακόν. οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν
πάντων ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ὡς παραστήσομεν.
72 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν. ἡτοι γὰρ
πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τυνος δοξαζόμενον ἀγαθὸν ρήτεον ταῖς
ἀληθείαις ἀγαθόν, ἢ οὐ πᾶν. καὶ πᾶν μὲν οὐ ρή-
τεον· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τυνος δοξαζόμενον ἀγαθὸν
λέγουμεν ἀγαθόν, ἐπεὶ ταῦτὸν ὑπὸ ἔτέρου δοξάζεται
κακὸν καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλου ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπὸ διαφέροντος
[δοξάζεται] ἀδιάφορον, δώσομεν τὸ αὐτὸν ἄμα καὶ
73 κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον ὑπάρχειν. οἶνον
τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησιν,
ὅ δὲ εἰπὼν "μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην" κακόν, οἱ
δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον καὶ οὐ προηγμένον,
ἄλλα Κλεάνθης μὲν μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι
μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν [αὐτὴν] ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ
κάλλυντρον κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος
κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι ὡς τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας,
οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν, Παναίτιος δὲ τινὰ μὲν
74 κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν. εἰ δὴ
τοίνυν πᾶν τὸ τινι φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο πάντως
ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ἐπεὶ ἢ ἡδονὴ τῷ μὲν Ἐπικούρῳ
φαίνεται ἀγαθὸν τινὶ δὲ τῶν κυνικῶν κακὸν τῷ δ'
ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον, ἔσται ἢ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν

and the property of cold to chill, so also it is the special
property of good to do good ; but the Good is God ;
therefore it is the property of God to do good. So 71
that if there exists anything good by nature, this is
good in relation to all men, and if there exists anything
evil by nature, that is evil in relation to all. But
there is nothing good or evil which is common to all,
as we shall establish ; therefore there does not exist
anything good or evil by nature. For we must 72
declare either that everything which is supposed
by anyone to be good is in very truth good, or not
everything. But we must not declare that every-
thing is so ; for if we should call good everything
which is supposed by anyone to be good, then, since
the same thing is supposed by one man to be evil,
and by another good, and by yet another [is held
to be] indifferent, we shall be granting that the same
thing is at once both evil and good and indifferent.
Epicurus, for example, asserts that pleasure is a good, 73
but he who said "I would rather be mad than enjoy
pleasure" ^a counted it an evil, while the Stoics say it
is indifferent and not preferred ; but Cleanthes says
that neither is it natural nor does it possess value for
life, but, like a cosmetic, has no natural existence,
whereas Archedemus ^b says that it has a natural
existence, like the hairs in the armpit, but possesses
no value, and Panaetius that it exists partly by nature
and partly contrary to nature.—If, then, everything 74
that seems good to anyone is altogether good, then,
since pleasure seems good to Epicurus, and evil
to one of the Cynics, and indifferent to the Stoic,

^a Antisthenes, the Cynic : with this § 73 cf. *P.H.* iii.
180-181.

^b A Stoic, like Cleanthes and Panaetius.

άμα καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον. οὐχὶ δέ γε δύναται τῇ φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ τὰ ἐναντία τυγχάνειν, ἀγαθὸν ἄμα καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀδιάφορον· οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν τὸ τινι φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν η̄ κακόν, τοῦτο ὥρτέον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν η̄ κακόν. εἰ δὲ *⟨οὐ πᾶν⟩¹* τὸ τινι φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντῃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν, ὅφειλομεν καταληπτικοὶ εἴναι καὶ διακρίνειν δύνασθαι τὴν ἐν τοῖς δοξαζόμενοις ἀγαθοῖς διαφοράν, ώστε λέγειν τὸ μὲν τῷδε δοξαζόμενον ἀγαθὸν ταῦς ἀληθεῖας εἴναι ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ τῷδε δοξαζόμενον μὲν ἀγαθὸν, οὐκέτι δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν. ήτοι οὖν δι’ ἐναργείας ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν λαμβάνεσθαι συμβέβηκεν η̄ διὰ λόγου τινός. ἀλλὰ δι’ ἐναργείας ἀμήχανον. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δι’ ἐναργείας προσπίπτον κοινῶς τε καὶ συμφώνως λαμβάνεσθαι πέψικεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαραποδίστονς ἔχοντων τὰς ἀντιλήψεις, ὡς παρὸν ἰδεῖν ἐπὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν φαινομένων. οὐχὶ δέ γε συμφώνως τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν ἀγαθὸν εἴναι λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς, τοῖς δὲ ἡδονῆς, τοῖς δὲ ἀληπία, τισὶ δ’ ἀλλο τι. οὐκ ἄρα ἐναργῶς προσπίπτει πᾶσι τὸ ὄντως ἀγαθὸν.

εἰ δὲ λόγω λαμβάνεται, ἐπεὶ ἔκαστος πάντων τῶν κατὰ διαφόρους αἱρέσεις κοσμουμένων ἴδιον ἔχει λόγον, καὶ ἄλλον μὲν Ζήνων, δι’ οὐ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθὸν εἴναι δεδόξακεν, ἄλλον δ’ Ἐπίκουρος, δι’ οὐ τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης, δι’ οὐ τὴν ὑγείαν, ἴδιον πάλιν ἔκαστος εἰσηγήσεται ἀγαθὸν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν τῇ φύσει ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ κοινὸν πάντων. τοίνυν οὐδέν ἔστι φύσει ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἴδιον ἔκαστον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν πάντων οὐδὲ

¹ *⟨οὐ πᾶν⟩* add. Heintz.

• Cf. § 36 *supra*.

pleasure will be at once good and evil and indifferent; but it is impossible for the same thing to be by nature opposite things,—at once good and evil and indifferent therefore we must not declare that everything which seems good or evil to anyone is good or evil.—But if what seems good to anyone is not in all cases altogether good, we ought to be gifted with discernment and able to distinguish the difference between the supposed goods so as to declare that this thing which is supposed by this man to be good is in very truth good, whereas that thing which is supposed by that man to be good is not also good by nature. This difference, then, comes to be perceived either through sensible evidence or through a process of reasoning.—But it cannot be through sensible evidence. For everything which causes an impression through sensible experience is of such a nature as to be perceived with one accord by all in common who have their perceptions undistorted, as one may see in the case of nearly all appearances. But the same thing is not accounted good by all with one accord, but by some virtue and what partakes of virtue, by others pleasure, by others painlessness,^a by others something else. Therefore the really good does not impress all men through sense-evidence.—And if it is perceived by reasoning, then, since each of those persons who are held in honour in the different sects has his own peculiar reason—Zeno one by which he opined that virtue is the good, Epicurus another by which he chose pleasure, Aristotle a different one by which he chose health,—each of them likewise will introduce his own peculiar good, which is not a good by nature nor common to all. So then nothing is good by nature. For if the private good of each is not the good of all

φύσει, παρὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἑκάστου ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἔστι συμφώνως ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀγαθόν.

79 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστι τι ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον αἱρετὸν ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν, ἐπεὶ πᾶς ἀνθρωπος αἱρέται τούτου τυγχάνειν ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κακὸν φυγεῖν. οὐδὲν δέ γε αἱρετόν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον [ὡς αἱρετόν],¹ καθάπερ δεῖξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα 80 τι ἔστιν ἀγαθόν. εἰ γάρ ἔστι τι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον αἱρετόν, ἦτοι αὐτὸν τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι αἱρετόν ἔστιν ἡ ἔτερόν τι παρὰ τοῦτο, οἷον ἦτοι τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον αἱρετόν ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὸς ὁ πλοῦτος 81 αἱρετός ἔστιν. καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι οὐκ ἀν εἶη αἱρετόν. εἰ γὰρ αἱρετόν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐκ ὀφείλομεν σπουδάζειν τυχεῖν οὐπερ αἱρούμεθα, ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσωμεν τοῦ ἔτι αἱρεῖσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ *(φευκτέον)*² τὸ πίνειν ἡ ἔσθιειν, ἵνα μὴ πιόντες ἡ φαγόντες ἐκπέσωμεν τοῦ ἔτι θέλειν τὸ πίνειν ἡ ἔσθιειν, οὕτως εἰ τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι πλοῦτον ἡ ὑγείαν αἱρετόν ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔχρην ἡμᾶς διώκειν τὸν πλοῦτον ἡ τὴν ὑγείαν, ἵνα μητὶ τυχόντες αὐτῶν ἐκπέσωμεν τοῦ ἔτι αἱρεῖσθαι. 82 διώκομεν δέ γε τὴν τεῦξιν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄρα αἱρετόν ἔστι τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι, φευκτὸν δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ δῆ τρόπον ὁ ἔρων σπειδεῖ τυχεῖν τῆς ἐρωμένης, ἵνα φύγῃ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἔραν ὅχλησιν, καὶ ὡς ὁ δυψῶν ἐπείγεται πιεῖν, ἵνα φύγῃ τὴν ἐν τῷ δυψῆ βάσανον, ὁδε καὶ ὁ ἐν τῷ αἱρεῖσθαι πλοῦτον ὅχλούμενος [κατὰ τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι] ἐπείγεται τυχεῖν πλούτου, ἵνα 83 ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ ἔτι αἱρεῖσθαι. εἰ δ' ἔτερόν τι

¹ [ὡς αἱρετόν] secl. Heintz.

² *(φευκτέον)* addo: <εὑραδόνομεν τῷ> ej. Bekk.

³ [κατὰ τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι] secl. Heintz.

nor by nature, and besides the private good of each there exists no good upon which all are agreed, no good exists.

Moreover, if good exists, it ought to be desirable 79 on its own account, since every man desires to obtain it even as he desires to escape evil.^a But, as we shall show, nothing is desirable on its own account; therefore there does not exist any good. For if there is 80 anything desirable on its own account, either the desire itself is desirable or something other than this,—for example, either the desire for wealth is desirable or wealth itself is desirable. But the desire 81 itself will not be desirable. For if the desire is desirable on its own account, we ought not to be eager to obtain that which we desire lest we should cease from desiring any longer. For just as *(we ought to avoid)*^b drinking or eating lest by having eaten or drunk we should cease to wish any longer to drink or eat, so, if the desire for wealth or health is desirable, we ought not to pursue after wealth or health, lest by acquiring them we cease to desire them any longer. But we 82 do desire the acquisition of them; therefore the desire is not desirable but rather to be avoided. And just as the lover is eager to obtain his beloved that he may escape from the distress which love entails, and as the thirsty man hurries to drink that he may escape the torment of thirst, so also he who is distressed through his desire for wealth hurries to obtain wealth that he may be relieved from further desire.—

^a With §§ 79-84 cf. P.H. iii. 183-184.

^b Probably more words have been lost from the Greek, as we should rather expect “we ought to have avoided drinking or eating if the desire for them is desirable,” or the like.

έστι τὸ αἱρετὸν παρ' αὐτὸν τὸ αἱρεῖσθαι, ἥτοι τῶν κεχωρισμένων ἔστιν ἡμᾶν ἡ τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς. καὶ εἰ μὲν κεχώρισται ἡμᾶν καὶ ἔκτος ἔστιν, ἥτοι συμβαίνει τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐδὲν συμβαίνει· οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ φίλου ἡ τοῦ σπουδαίου ἀνθρώπου ἡ τέκνου ἡ ἄλλου τυνὸς τῶν ἔκτος εἶναι λεγομένων ἀγαθῶν ἡ συμβαίνει τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀστέον κύημα καὶ ἀποδεκτὸν κατάστημα καὶ ἀγαστὸν πάθος, ἡ οὐδὲν συμβαίνει τοιοῦτον οὐδὲ ἔσμεν ἐν διαφόρῳ κινήματι, ὅτε αἱρετὸν ἡγούμεθα τὸν φίλον 84 ἡ τὸ τέκνον. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπαξιπλῶς γίνεται τι τοιοῦτον περὶ ἡμᾶς, οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔσται τὸ ἔκτος αἱρετὸν ἡμῖν. πῶς γὰρ πρὸς ὁ ἀκινήτως διακείμεθα, 85 τούτου οἵον τε αἱρεσιν ποιεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς; καὶ γάρ ἄλλως, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν χαρτὸν νενόηται ἐκ τοῦ χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ἐκ τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγασθαι, ἀκολουθήσει, ἐξ οὐ μήτε χαρά τις ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται μήτε ἀγαστὴ διάθεσις μήτε ἀσμενιστὸν τι κίνημα, ἐκ 86 τούτου μηδὲ αἱρεσίν τινα ἐμφύεσθαι. εἰ δὲ γίνεται τι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔκτος, οἷον τοῦ φίλου ἡ τοῦ τέκνου, προσηγένες κατάστημα καὶ ἀσμενιστὸν πάθος, ἔσται οὐ δι' αὐτὸν αἱρετὸς ὁ φίλος ἡ τὸ τέκνον, διὰ δὲ τὸ προσηγένες τοῦτο κατάστημα καὶ ἀσμενιστὸν πάθος. ἀλλ' ἣν γε τὸ τοιοῦτο κατάστημα οὐκ ἔκτος ἀλλὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν ἔκτος δι' αὐτὸν αἱρετὸν ἔστιν ἡ ἀγαθόν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἔστι τὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. ἥτοι γὰρ σωματικὸν ἔστι τοῦτο μόνον ἡ ψυχικόν. ἀλλὰ σωματικὸν μὲν μόνον οὐκ ἄν εἴη· εἰ γὰρ σωματικὸν μόνον ὑποκέοιτο, οὐκέτι

AGAINST THE ETHICISTS, 83-87

But if the desirable is something other than the desire 83 itself, it is either a thing separate from ourselves or a thing belonging to ourselves. And if it is separate from us and external, either some effect is produced in us by means of it, or no effect ; as, for instance, by the friend or the good man or the child, or any other of the so-called external goods, either there is produced in us a pleasing motion and a welcome state and a delightful affection, or no such result occurs and we do not experience any different motion when we regard the friend or the child as desirable. And 84 if absolutely no such effect is produced in us, no external thing at all will be desirable in our eyes. For how can we possibly have a desire for a thing in regard to which we feel no emotion ? And besides, 85 if the enjoyable is so conceived because we get joy from it, and the painful because we get pain, and the good because we get delight,^a it will follow that no desire is implanted by that which produces in us no joy nor delightful feeling nor agreeable emotion. But if there is produced in us by an external object, 86 such as the friend or the child, a welcome state and an agreeable affection, the friend or the child will not be desirable for his own sake but for the sake of this welcome state and agreeable affection. But such a state is not an external thing but is personal to ourselves. Therefore none of the external things is desirable for its own sake or good.—Nor yet is the 87 desirable and good one of the things personal to ourselves.^b For it is either solely corporeal or psychical. But it will not be solely corporeal ; for if it really were solely corporeal, and no longer a psychical affection,

^a For the derivation of ἀγαθόν from ἀγασθαι cf. § 35 supra.

^b With §§ 87-89 cf. P.H. iii. 185-186.

δὲ καὶ ψυχικὸν πάθος, ἐκφεύγεται τὴν γνῶσιν ἡμῶν (ψυχῆς γάρ ἔστι πᾶσα γνῶσις) καὶ οὐσὸν ἔσται τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ μηδεμίᾳν ἔχουσι πρὸς 88 ἡμᾶς συμπάθειαν. εἰ δὲ διατείνουσαν ἔχει τὴν εὐαρέστησιν εἰς ψυχήν, ἔσται κατ' αὐτὴν αἴρετον καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὐ καθὸ φυλῶς σωματικὸν ἔστι κίνημα. πᾶν γὰρ αἴρετὸν κατὰ αἰσθησιν ἡ νόησιν κρίνεται, οὐ κατ' ἄλογον σῶμα. ἀλλ' ἦτις τὸ αἴρετὸν λαμβάνουσα αἰσθησιν ἡ διάνοια ψυχῆς ἔστι [κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον]¹. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν περὶ σῶμα συμβαίνοντων δι' αὐτὸν αἴρετόν ἔσται καὶ 89 ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἄρα, τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς, δι πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἀρχῆθεν κυλίεται ἀπορίαν. τῆς γὰρ ἐκάστου διανοίας ἀσυμφώνους ἔχοντος τὰς κρίσεις πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πέλας, ἀνάγκη ἔκαστον τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἥγεισθαι. οὐκ ἦν δὲ τὸ ἔκαστω φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν φύσει ἀγαθόν. οὐδὲ ταύτῃ τούνν τί ἔστιν ἀγαθόν.

90 “Ο δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ κακοῦ. δυνάμει γάρ συναποδέδοται² τῇ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ζητήσει, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι [ἐπει]³ τοῦ ἔτερου ἀναιρουμένου συναναρέται καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ἐκάτερον γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ὥς πρὸς τὸ ἔτερον σχέσιν νενόηται· εἴτα ἐπει καὶ προηγουμένως ἔνεστι τὸ τοιοῦτον (ἡμῖν παριστάν, πειρασόμεθα)⁴ πάλιν ἐπὶ ἐνδὸς ὑποδείγματος καταστήσασθαι τὸν λόγον, καθάπερ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, ἦν μόνην φασὶν εἶναι κακὸν οἱ ἀπὸ 91 τῆς στοᾶς. εἰ γὰρ φύσει κακόν ἔστιν ἡ ἀφροσύνη, δεήσει, διν τρόπον τὸ θερμὸν γνωρίζεται ὅτι

¹ [κατὰ . . . λόγον] secl. Heintz.
² συναποδέδοται Mutsch.: ἀποδέδοται MSS., Bekk.

it would elude our perception (for all perception is a property of the soul) and it would be on a par with the things which exist externally and have no fellow-feeling with us. But if the pleasure it contains 88 extends to the soul, it will be desirable and good on account of this but not on account of its being a merely corporeal motion. For every desirable thing is judged to be so by means of a sensation or perception and not by means of an irrational body. But the sense or intelligence which apprehends the desirable is of the soul; therefore none of the things which happen to the body is desirable for its own sake and good, but, if any, those which happen to the soul; 89 and this involves us once again in the original difficulty.^a For since the intelligence of each man disagrees with that of his neighbour in respect of its judgements, each must necessarily regard as good that which appears so to himself. But what appears good to each man is not good by nature. So in this way, too, nothing is good.

And the same argument applies also to evil. For 90 it virtually results from our investigation of the good that, in the first place, when one of these is abolished the other also is abolished along with it (for each of them is conceived in its relation to the other); and next, since it is possible (for us to establish) this directly, (we shall attempt) once more to base our argument upon a single example, namely folly, which alone, say the Stoics, is evil. For if folly is evil by nature, then, 91 just as the hot is known to be hot by nature from

^a See § 77 supra.

³ [ἐπει] secl. Mutsch.
⁴ <ἡμῖν . . . πειρασόμεθα> addo (sec. Mutsch.).

θερμόν ἔστι φύσει ἐκ τοῦ τοὺς προσπελάσαντας
αὐτῷ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ φύχε-
σθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην φύσει κακὸν ὑπ-
άρχουσαν γνωρίζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ κακοῦσθαι. ἦτοι οὖν
οἱ λεγόμενοι ἄφρονες κακοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφρο-
92 σύνης ἡ οἱ φρόνιμοι. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν φρόνιμοι οὐ
κακοῦται· ἐκτὸς γάρ εἰσι τῆς ἀφροσύνης, ὑπὸ δὲ
τοῦ μὴ παρόντος αὐτοῖς κακοῦ ἀλλὰ κεχωρισμένου
οὐκέ ἂν κακωθεῖεν. εἰ δὲ τοὺς ἄφρονας κακοῖ ή
ἀφροσύνη, ἦτοι πρόδηλος αὐτοῖς οὖσα κακοῖ αὐτοὺς
93 ἡ ἀδήλος. καὶ ἀδήλος μὲν οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γὰρ ἀδήλος
ἔστιν αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ κακὸν οὐδὲ φευκτόν ἔστιν αὐτοῖς,
ἀλλ' ὡς τὴν μὴ φανομένην λύπην καὶ ἀνεπαισθητον
ἀλγηδόνα οὔτε φεύγει τις οὔτε ταράσσεται, ὥδε
καὶ τὴν ἀνυπόπτωτον ἀφροσύνην καὶ τὴν ἀδήλου-
94 μένην οὐδεὶς ὡς κακὸν περιστῆσεται. εἰ δὲ προ-
δῆλος αὐτοῖς γνώσκεται καὶ ἔστι φύσει κακόν,
ἄφειλον οἱ ἄφρονες φεύγειν αὐτὴν ὡς φύσει κακόν.
οὐχὶ δέ γε οἱ ἄφρονες τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν
ἐκτὸς ἀφράνεων ὡς πρόδηλον κακὸν φεύγουσι,
ἀλλ' ἔκαστος τὴν μὲν ὕδιαν κρίσιν ἀποδέχεται
τὴν δὲ τοῦ τὸ ἐναντίον δοξάζοντος κακίει.
95 ὡστ' οὐδὲ πρόδηλός ἔστι τοῖς ἄφροσιν ὡς φύσει
κακὸν ἡ ἀφροσύνη. ὅθεν εἴπερ οὔτε οἱ φρόνιμοι
κακοῦται τι πρὸς τῆς ἀφροσύνης οὔτε τοῖς ἄφροσι
φευκτόν ἔστω ἡ ἀφροσύνη, ῥῆτέον μὴ εἶναι φύσει
κακὸν τὴν ἀφροσύνην. εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτην, οὐδὲ ἄλλο
τι τῶν λεγομένων κακῶν.
96 Ἀλλ' εἴναθασί τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐπικούρου
αἵρεσεως, πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἀπορίας ὑπαντῶντες,
λέγειν ὅτι φυσικῶς καὶ ἀδιδάκτως τὸ ζῶον φεύγει.

the fact that those who approach it are made hot,^a
and the cold from their being made cold, so also it
will be necessary for folly to be known as being evil
by nature from the fact that people are made evil.
Either, then, it is those who are called fools that are
made evil by folly, or the wise. But the wise are not 92
made evil; for they are outside of folly, and they will
not be made evil by an evil which is not present with
them but separated. And if folly makes evil the
fools, it makes them evil either when evident to them
or when non-evident. But certainly not when non- 93
evident; for if it is non-evident to them it is neither
evil for them nor to be avoided, but just as a man
neither avoids nor is perturbed by a non-apparent
pain and a non-perceptible pang, so also no one will
account as evil the folly which is unsuspected and
non-evident. But if it is quite plainly perceived by 94
them and is evil by nature, the fools ought to have
avoided it as evil by nature. But the fools do not
avoid as an evident evil that which is called by out-
siders "foolishness," but each one accepts his own
judgement and reckons that of the man who holds an
opposite opinion to be evil. So that it is not evident 95
to the fools that folly is evil by nature. Hence, if
neither are the wise made evil at all by folly nor is
folly a thing avoided by the fools, we must declare
that folly is not a thing evil by nature. And if it is
not, neither is any other of the so-called evils.

Butsome of those who belong to the sect of Epicurus, 96
in answer to these objections, are wont to argue that
the animal avoids pain and pursues pleasure naturally

• Cf. § 69 *supra*.

μὲν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα διώκει δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν· γεννηθὲν
γοῦν καὶ μηδέπω τοῦς κατὰ δόξαν δουλεύον ἄμα
τῷ ῥαπισθῆναι ἀσυνήθει ἀέρος φύξει ἔκλαυσέ τε
καὶ ἐκώκυσεν. εἰ δὲ φυσικῶς ὄρμᾶ μὲν πρὸς
ἡδονὴν ἐκκλίνει δὲ τὸν πόνον, φύσει φευκτὸν τέ
97 ἐστιν αὐτῷ δόπον καὶ αἴρετόν ἡ ἡδονή. οὐ
συνεῖδον δὲ οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες τὸ μὲν πρώτον ὅτι
καὶ τοῖς ἀτιμοτάτοις ζώοις μεταδιδόσαι τάγαθον,
πολλὴ γὰρ μετουσίᾳ κάκείνοις ἐστὶν ἡδονῆς, εἴθ'
ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ καβάποξ φευκτὸν ἐστιν δόπον· καὶ
γὰρ πόνω πραῦνεται πόνος, καὶ ὑγεία, ἕτι δὲ
ῥώσις καὶ θρέψις, γίνεται σωμάτων διὰ πόνων,
τέχνας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμας τὰς ἀκριβεστάτας
ἀναλαμβάνουσιν ἄνδρες οὐ χωρὶς πόνου, ὥστ' οὐ
98 πάντως φύσει φευκτὸν δόπον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ
δοκοῦν ἡδὺ φύσει πάντως αἴρετόν· πολλάκις γοῦν
τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐμπέλασιν ἡστικῶς ἡμᾶς
διατιθέντα, ταῦτα ἐκ δευτέρου, καίπερ ὅντα τὰ
αὐτά, ἀηδῆ νομίζεται ὡς ἂν τοῦ ἡδέος οὐ φύσει
ὄντος τοιούτου, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους περι-
στάσεις ὅτε μὲν οὐτως ὅτε δ' ἐκείνως κινοῦντος
ἡμᾶς.

99 Ναί, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν δοξάζον-
τες δείκνυσθαι νομίζουσιν ὅτι φύσει τοῦτο αἴρετόν
ἐστι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων. ὁρῶμεν γάρ,
φασίν, ὡς τινα γενναῖα ζῶα, καθάπερ ταῦροι καὶ
ἀλεκτρυόνες, καίπερ¹ μηδεμιᾶς αὐτοῖς ὑποκειμένης
τέρψιες καὶ ἡδονῆς διαγωνίζεται μέχρι θανάτου.
100 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δὲ οἱ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἡ γονέων
ἡ τέκνων εἰς ἀναίρεσιν ἔαντοὺς ἐπιδιδόντες οὐκ
ἄν ποτε τοῦτ' ἐποίουν, μηδεμιᾶς αὐτοῖς ἐλπι-

¹ καίπερ Apelt: ἀπερ̄ mss., Bekk.

and without teaching ; thus when it is born, and is not as yet a slave to opinions, it cries and screams as soon as it is smitten by the air's unwonted chill. But if it naturally has an inclination for pleasure and a disinclination for toil, toil is a thing naturally avoided by it and pleasure a thing desirable. But they who 97 argue thus have failed to notice, in the first place, that they are giving a share in the good even to the basest animals (for they too have a large share in pleasure) ; and, next, that toil is not a thing to be absolutely avoided ; for, in fact, pain is alleviated by toil, and health of body, as well as strength and growth, comes by means of toils, and men do not acquire the most exact arts and sciences without toil, so that toil is not a thing naturally to be avoided altogether. Moreover, what seems to be pleasant 98 is not in all cases naturally desirable ; thus it often happens that things which on their first occurrence affect us pleasurabley, on the second occasion, although they are the same, are deemed unpleasant, just as though the pleasant were not so by nature, but affected us now this way and now that according to the differing circumstances.

Yes, but even those who hold that only the fair is 99 good think that it is proved by the irrational animals that this is desirable by nature.^a For we see, they say, how certain noble animals, such as bulls and cocks, contend unto the death even when they have no feeling of delight and pleasure. And those men 100 who have given themselves over to destruction for the sake of country or parents or children would never have done so, when they had no hope of pleasure after

^a With §§ 99–100 cf. P.H. iii. 193.

ζομένης μετὰ θάνατον ἥδονῆς, εἰ μὴ φυσικῶς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τούτους τε καὶ πᾶν τὸ γενναιόν ἀεὶ ζῶν ἐπεσπάτο πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ αἵρεσιν.

101 λέληθε δὲ καὶ τούτους ὅτι τελέως ἔστιν εὑνθεῖς τὸ νομίζειν τὰ προειρημένα τῶν ζώων ἐνοίᾳ τάγαθοῦ μέχρι τῆς ὑστάτης ἀντνοής διαγωνίζεοθαί. αὐτῶν γάρ πάρεστιν ἀκούειν λεγόντων ὅτι ἡ φρονίμη διάθεσις μόνη βλέπει τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη τυφλώττει περὶ τὴν τούτου διάγνωσιν, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἀλεκτρυὼν καὶ ὁ ταῦρος μὴ μετέχοντα τῆς φρονίμης διαθέσεως οὐκ ἀν βλέποι τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν. ἄλλως τε, εἰ ἔστι τι περὶ οὐδιαγωνίζεται ταῦτα τὰ ζῶα μέχρι θανάτου, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἔστιν ἡ τὸ νικᾶν καὶ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι. ἔσθι ὅτε δὲ τὸ νικᾶσθαι καὶ τὸ ὑποτάσσεσθαι κάλλιον ἔστιν, ὅπου γε ἔκάτερον ἔστων ἄλλ' ἀδιάφορον. οὐ τούννυν φύσει ἀγαθόν ἔστιν ἄλλ' ἀδιάφορον τὸ 103 νικᾶν καὶ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι. ἄλλως τε¹ εἰ φαῖεν καὶ τὸν ἀλεκτρυόνα ἡ ταῦρον ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀλκιμῶν ζῶων τοῦ καλοῦ ἔφιεσθαι, πόθεν ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ αὐτοῦ στοχάζεται; οὐ γάρ ἐν τῷ ἔκεινα δεῖξαι τούτου προνοούμενα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοιοῦτος ὃν 104 δέδεικται, ἐπεὶ τοι εἰ ὅτι τινὰ τῶν ζώων ἀλκιμά ἔστι καὶ καταφρονητικὰ μὲν τοῦ ἥδος κατεξαναστατικὰ δέ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων, λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος προνοεῖσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ, ἐπεὶ τὰ πολλὰ λίχνα ἔστι καὶ γαστρὸς ἥπτοντα, τοῦμπαλιν ἐροῦμεν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ἥδος μᾶλλον ἀντιποιεῖσθαι.

105 εἰ δέ λέγοιεν εἶναι μέν τινα ζῶα φιλήδονα, τὸν δ' ἄνθρωπον μὴ πάντως τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχειν, ἀναστρέψαντες καὶ ἡμένις ἐροῦμεν, οὐκ εἴ τινα τῶν

¹ ἄλλως τε Apelt: ωστε MSS., Bekk.

death, unless the fair and good had naturally drawn them, and every noble animal, to desire it. But these 101 people, too, fail to notice that it is perfectly silly to suppose that the animals just mentioned contend to their last breath owing to a conception of the good. For one may hear them declaring themselves that it is only the wise state of mind which beholds the fair and good, while folly blinds men for discerning it; and hence the cock and the bull, as they have no share in the wise state of mind, will not behold the fair and good. And besides, if there is anything 102 about which these animals contend unto the death, it is nothing else than victory and leadership. But sometimes it is a fairer thing to be vanquished and subdued, at least where either result is indifferent.^a Therefore victory and leadership is not good by nature but indifferent. And besides, if they should assert 103 that the cock or the bull or any other of the valiant animals strives after the fair, whence comes it that man also aims at the same thing? For in proving that those animals have a preconception of this, it is not proved that man is of a like kind, since, to be sure, 104 if man too is said to have a preconception of the fair because some animals are valiant and contemptuous of pleasure and capable of resisting pains, then, since most of them are greedy and the slaves of their bellies, we shall declare also, conversely, that man is still more eager for pleasure. And if they should argue that, 105 though some animals are pleasure-loving, man is not wholly so, we too shall turn round and say that it does

^a i.e. when neither victory nor defeat is (strictly speaking) either "good" or "evil" the latter may be "fairer" (i.e. more "good") than the former.

ζώων κατὰ φυσικὸν λόγον μεταδιώκει τὸ καλόν, εὐθέως καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος τοῦ αὐτοῦ στοχάζεται 108 τέλους. ἀλλος δέ τις φήσει περιμάχητον εἶναι τὸ νικᾶν καὶ τὸ ἥγεισθαι τοὺς ζῶοις [δὶ' αὐτό, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ]¹ οὐ δὶ' αὐτό, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπακολουθοῦσαν αὐτῷ κατὰ φυχὴν τέρψιν καὶ γῆθος, προσηγένεις τι τυγχάνον κατάστημα. καὶ μᾶλλον γε τοῦτο ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν ὑπολαβὲν, εἴ τοι καὶ τιμὴ καὶ ἐπανος καὶ δωρεαὶ καὶ δόξαι ἵκανά ἔστιν ἥδειν καὶ διαχεῖν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ πάρ' αὐτὸ τούτῳ κατεξαναστατικὴν αὐτὴν τῶν ὄχληρῶν παρέχειν. 107 ὅθεν καὶ οἱ μέχρι τελευτῆς ἀριστεύοντες καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος εἰς ἀναίρεσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπιδιδόντες διὰ ταύτην ἵσως τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπάνδρως ἀγωνίζονται καὶ θυήσκουσιν· καὶ γάρ εἰ τελευτῶσι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν μεθίστανται, ἀλλά τοι γε ὅτε ζῶοις ἥδονται καὶ 108 γῆθονται πρὸς τοὺς ἐπαίνους. εἰκὸς δὲ ἔστιν ἐνίους αὐτῶν καὶ προσδοξάζοντας ὅτι μετὰ τελευτὴν ὅμοιος αὐτοὺς ἐπανος περιμένει, προῦπτον αἰρεῖσθαι θάνατον. οὐκ ἀπίθανον δὲ ἄλλους τοῦτο πάσχειν βλέποντας ὅτι δυσυπομένητα μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν, θεασαμένοις

νήλας τὸ δόλλυμένους ἐλκυσθείσας τε θύγατρας
καὶ θαλάμους κεραΐζομένους καὶ νήπια τέκνα
βαλλόμενα ποτὶ γαίῃ ἐν αἰνῇ δηιοτῆτι.

109 διὰ πολλοὺς οὖν τρόπους τὸν μετ' εὐκλείας τυὲς αἴρονται θάνατον, καὶ οὐ διὰ τὸ περισποῦδαστον ἥγεισθαι τὸ παρά τισι τῶν δογματικῶν θρυλούμενον καλόν. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἥπορήσθω.

¹ [δὶ' . . . δὲ] secl. Heintz.

not at once follow that, if some animals for a natural reason pursue after the fair, man also aims at the same goal.—But some other man will assert that 106 victory and leadership is a thing highly prized by the animals not for its own sake but for the sake of the delight and joy of soul which follow upon it, this being an agreeable state. And one may suppose that this is even more true of men, with whom reputation and praise and gifts and honours are sufficient to please and thrill the mind and because of this to render it capable of resisting hardships. Whence, too, it is 107 probably owing to this cause that those who prove valiant to the end and devote themselves to destruction for their country's sake struggle manfully and die. For even if they die and depart from life, yet to be sure while they are alive they take pleasure and joy in the praise. And it is likely also that some of them 108 believe further that similar praise awaits them after death, and thus they desire a conspicuous death. And it is not improbable that others endure death through seeing that the woes of life will be still harder for them to endure, when they behold—

Death overtaking their sons and ravishers seizing their daughters,
Plunderers wrecking their chambers, and even their infant children
Brutally dashed to the ground in the fearful fury of fighting.^a

It is for many reasons, then, that some desire death 109 with glory, and not because they regard "the fair" (so harped upon by certain of the Dogmatists) as a thing to be greatly sought after. But let this serve to conclude our discussion of these problems.

• Homer, *Il.* xxii. 62 ff.

Δ'.—ΕΙ ΤΠΟΤΕΘΕΝΤΩΝ ΦΤΣΕΙ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΩΝ
ΕΝΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ ΕΤΔΑΙΜΟΝΩΣ ΒΙΟΥΝ

110 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι φύσει ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακὸν αὐτάρκεια ἔσκεψάμεθα· νῦν δὲ ζητῶμεν καὶ εἰ συγχωρήσαντων αὐτῶν δυνατόν ἐστιν εὐρόσις ἄμα καὶ εὐδαιμόνιας βιοῦν. οἱ μὲν οὖν δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων οὐδέποτε ἄλλας φασὶν ἢ οὐτως ἔχειν· διὸ γὰρ τυχόν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐκκλίνων τὸ κακόν, οὐτός ἐστιν εὐδαιμων· παρὸ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι λέγουσι τὴν φρονησιν, διακριτικὴν μὲν οὖσαν τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν 111 καὶ κακῶν, περιποιητικὴν δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. οἱ δέ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως μηδὲν εἴκῃ τιθέντες ἢ ἀναιροῦντες, ἀπανθράποιον τὴν σκέψιν εἰσάγοντες, διδάσκουσιν ὡς τοῖς μὲν φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποστησαμένοις ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ κακοδαιμόνιας βιοῦν, τοῖς δέ ἀριστοῦσι καὶ ἐπέχουσι

ρήστη βιοτῇ πέλει ἀνθρώποισι.

112 καὶ τοῦτο μάθοιμεν ἀν μικρὸν ἄνωθεν προλαβόντες.
Πᾶσα τοινυν κακοδαιμονία γίνεται διά τινα ταραχήν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ταραχὴ παρέπεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἵτοι διὰ τὸ συντόνως τινὰ διώκειν 113 ἢ καὶ διὰ τὸ συντόνως τινὰ φεύγειν. διώκουσι δέ γε συντόνως πάντες ἀνθρώποι τὸ δοξαζόμενον αὐτοὺς ἀγαθὸν καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ύποσταθὲν κακόν. πᾶσα ἄρα κακοδαιμονία γίνεται παρὰ τὸ τάγαθὰ μὲν διώκειν ὡς ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ κακὰ φεύγειν ὡς κακά. ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ δογματικὸς πεπίστευκεν ὅτι

* Alluding to the Stoic definition of happiness as the "equable flow of life"; cf. § 31 supra.

CHAPTER IV.—ASSUMING THAT THINGS GOOD AND EVIL EXIST BY NATURE, IS IT POSSIBLE TO LIVE HAPPILY?

We have, then, sufficiently considered the question 110 of the non-existence of any thing good or evil by nature; and now let us inquire whether, if *(the existence of)* these be conceded, it is possible to live at once equably^a and happily. Now the dogmatic philosophers assert that this, and nothing else, is actually the case; for according to them the man who acquires the good and avoids the evil is happy. Wherefore also they allege that wisdom is a science of life, it being capable of distinguishing things good and evil^b and of securing happiness. But the Sceptics, 111 neither affirming nor denying anything rashly but subjecting all things to criticism, maintain that those who assume the existence of good and evil by nature have in consequence an unhappy life, whereas for those who refuse to define and suspend judgement—

Freest from care is the life they lead.^c

And this we may learn if we first go back a little. 112

Now every unhappy state occurs because of some perturbation. But every perturbation in men is a consequence due either to an eager pursuit of certain things or to an eager avoidance of certain things. And all men eagerly pursue what is believed by them 113 to be good and avoid what is supposed to be evil. Therefore every case of unhappiness occurs owing to the pursuit of the good things as good, and the avoidance of the evil things as evil. Since, then, the Dog-

^a Cf. P.H. iii. 240.
^b Homer, *Odyss.* iv. 565.

τόδε ἔστι φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τόδε ἔστι φύσει κακόν,
ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν διώκων τὸ δὲ φεύγων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
114 παραπόμενος, οὐδέποτε εὑδαιμονήσει. ἡτοι γὰρ
πᾶν ὃ διώκει τις, τοῦτ' εὐθὺς καὶ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν
ἔστι, καὶ πᾶν ὃ φεύγει τις ὡς φευκτόν, τοῦτο τῷ
ὄντι τοιοῦτόν ἔστιν. ἢ τὶ τῶν διωκομένων ἔστιν
αἴρετόν, καὶ οὐ πᾶν, καὶ τὶ τῶν φευγομένων
φευκτόν. ἢ ἐν τῷ πρός τι πως ἔχειν ἔστι ταῦτα,
καὶ ὡς μὲν πρὸς τόνδε τόδε ἔστιν αἴρετόν ἢ φευκτόν,
ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτε
αἴρετόν ἔστιν οὕτε φευκτόν, ἀλλὰ νυνὶ μὲν αἴρετόν
115 νυνὶ δὲ φευκτόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν πᾶν τὸ ὄπωσοῦν
ὑπό τινος διωκόμενον ὑπόθοιτό τις φύσει ἀγαθὸν
καὶ τὸ φευγόμενον φύσει φευκτόν, ἀβίωτον ἔξει
τὸν βίον, ἀναγκαζόμενος τὸ αὐτὸ διώκειν ἀμα καὶ
φεύγειν, καὶ διώκειν μὲν ἢ πρός τιναν αἴρετόν
ὑπεληπταί, φεύγειν δὲ παρόσον ἔτέροις φευκτόν
116 δεδόξασται. εἰ δὲ πᾶν μὲν τὸ διωκόμενον ἢ
φευγόμενον μὴ λέγοι αἴρετόν καὶ φευκτόν, τὶ δὲ
αὐτῶν αἴρετόν καὶ τὶ φευκτόν, βιώσεται μέν, οὐ
χωρὶς δὲ ταραχῆς βιώσεται· διὰ παντὸς γὰρ τὸ
δοξασθὲν αὐτῷ φύσει τυγχάνειν ἀγαθὸν διώκων
καὶ τὸ ὑποληφθὲν κακὸν περιστάμενος οὐδέποτε
ἀπαλλαγήσεται ταραχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μήπω δραξά-
μενος τάγαθοῦ διὰ τὴν τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐπιθυμίαν
σφοδρῶς ταραχθήσεται, καὶ τυχῶν διὰ τὴν ὑπερ-

matist firmly believes that this thing is good by nature and that thing is evil by nature, as he is always pursuing the one and avoiding the other and being, consequently, perturbed, he will never be happy. For either everything which anyone pursues is at 114 once and by nature good and everything which anyone avoids as a thing to be avoided is such in reality ; or else some one of the things pursued is desirable, but not every one, and some one of the things avoided is to be avoided ; or else these things belong to the relative class, and in relation to this man this thing is desirable or to be avoided, whereas in relation to the real nature of the things it is neither desirable nor to be avoided, but at one time desirable, at another to be avoided.—If, then, a man should assume that 115 everything which is in any way pursued by anyone is good by nature and that everything which is avoided is by nature to be avoided, he will have a life that is unlivable, through being compelled both to pursue and to avoid at the same time the same thing,—to pursue it, inasmuch as it is conceived by some to be desirable, but to avoid it, in so far as it is deemed by others a thing to be avoided.—But if he were to say 116 not that everything which is pursued or avoided is desirable and to be avoided, but that some one of them is desirable and some one to be avoided, he will have a life indeed, but not a life free from perturbation ; for through continually pursuing what he believes to be good by nature and shunning what he supposes to be evil he will never be clear of perturbation, but both when he has failed as yet to grasp the good he will be extremely perturbed because of his desire to gain it, and when he has gained it he will never be at rest owing to the excess

βολὴν τῆς χαρᾶς ἡ διὰ τὴν φρουρὰν τοῦ κτηθέντος
 117 οὐδέποτε ἡρεμήσει. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ¹
 κακοῦ οὔτε γάρ ὁ ἐκτὸς ὧν αὐτοῦ ἀμέριμνός ἔστιν,
 ἵκανῶς ποιητατούσης αὐτὸν τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ²
 φεύγεων καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ προφυλάττεσθαι ταραχῆς,
 οὔτε ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ καθεστὼς παῦλαν ἔχει τῶν βασάνων,
 σκεπτόμενος “πῶς ἀν φύγοι αἰπὺν δλεθρον.”

118 Εἰ δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον τις λέγοι τι φύσει αἴρετὸν ἡ
 φευκτὸν μηδὲ μᾶλλον φευκτὸν ἡ αἴρετόν, ἐκάστου
 τῶν ὑποπτητῶν πρός τι πῶς ἔχοντος καὶ κατὰ
 διαφέροντας καιρούς καὶ περιστάσεις νῦν μὲν
 αἴρετον καθεστώτως νῦν δὲ φευκτόν, βιώσται μὲν
 εὐδαιμόνως καὶ ἀταράχως, μήτε ἐπ’ ἄγαθῷ ὡς
 ἄγαθῷ ἐπαιρόμενος μήτε ἐπὶ κακῷ ταπεινούμενος,
 τὸ μὲν κατ’ ἀνάγκην συμβαίνον γεννικῶς δεχόμενος,
 τοῦ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν ὀχληροῦ, καθ’ ἣν κακόν τι παρ-
 εῖναι ἡ ἄγαθὸν δοξάζεται, ἐλευθερούμενος. τοῦτο
 μὴν αὐτῷ παρέσται ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲν φύσει ἄγαθὸν
 ἡ κακὸν δοξάζειν. οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν εὐδαιμόνως
 βιων̄ φύσει ἄγαθά τινα ἡ κακὰ ὑποστησάμενον.

119 Καὶ μὴν τό τινος κακοῦ ποιητικόν, τοῦτο πάντως
 ἔστι φευκτὸν ὡς καὶ *τὸ¹* κακόν. οἷον εἰ ἡ
 ἀλγηδών ἔστι κακόν, πάντως καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς
 ἀλγηδόνος ἐπισυστήσεται τῇ ἀλγηδόνι φευκτὸν ὄν.
 καὶ εἰ ὁ θάνατος τῶν κακῶν ἔστιν, ἔσται καὶ τὸ
 θανατοῦν τῶν κακῶν ἄμα καὶ φευκτῶν. τούννυν καὶ
 κοινῶς, εἰ τὸ κακὸν φευκτόν ἔστιν, ἔξ ἀνάγκης καὶ
 τὸ ποιητικὸν τοῦ κακοῦ φευκτὸν ἔσται καὶ κακόν.
 120 τὰ δὲ λεγόμενά τισι φύσει ἄγαθὰ καὶ κακῶν
 ἔστι ποιητικά, ὡς διδάξομεν. δυνάμει ἄρα κακά

¹ *τὸ* add. ej. Bekk.

of his joy or on account of keeping watch over his acquisition. And the same argument applies also to 117 evil; for neither he who is without it is care-free, as he is no little tormented by the perturbation caused both by avoiding it and by taking precautions; nor does he who is in an evil state have any cessation of his torments, through taking thought—

How to escape from the steep of destruction.^a

But if a man should declare that nothing is by 118 nature an object of desire any more than of avoidance, nor of avoidance more than of desire, each thing which occurs being relative, and, owing to differences of times and circumstances, being at one time desirable, at another to be avoided, he will live happily and unperturbed, being neither exalted at good, as good, nor depressed at evil, manfully accepting what befalls him of necessity, and being liberated from the distress due to the belief that something evil or good is present. This, in fact, will accrue to him from his belief that nothing is good by nature or evil. Therefore it is not possible to live happily if one posits any things good or evil by nature.

Moreover, that which is productive of any evil is 119 certainly to be avoided, just as is the evil. For instance, if pain is an evil, certainly also what is productive of the pain will take rank with the pain as a thing to be avoided; and if death is one of the evils, what causes death will also be at once both evil and a thing to be avoided. So then in general, if evil is to be avoided, what is productive of evil will of necessity be a thing to be avoided and an evil. But, as we shall 120 show, things which are said by some to be good are also productive of evils. Therefore the things which

^a Homer, *Il. xiv. 507.*

ἐστι τὰ ὑπό τινων λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
κακοδαιμονίας τυγχάνει αἴτια. διὰ γὰρ δὴ τὰ τοι-
αῦτα ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ κακά, φιλαργυρία τε
καὶ φιλοδοξία καὶ φιλονεκία καὶ φιληδονία καὶ
121 τάλλα ὅπόσα τούτους ἐμφερῆ ἐστίν. ἔκαστος γὰρ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ δοξασθὲν ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὸν
τε καὶ αἱρέτον συντόνως διώκων καὶ μετὰ σφρόδρου
πείσματος λεληθότως εἰς τὴν ἀγχίθυρον κακίαν
ἐμπίπτει. οὖν (ἔσται γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον σαφὲς
122 τῶν οἰκείων ἡμῖν τεθέντων ὑποδειγμάτων) ὁ μὲν
τὸν πλούτον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προειλήφως ὄφελει
πάντα ἐσπευσμένως ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ τυχέν του
πλούτου, καὶ ἔκαστοτε πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τὸ κωμικὸν
ἀναμελεῖται παράγγελμα,

κέρδαιν' ἔταιρε καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος,
καὶ τὸ τραγικὸν ἀποδέχεσθαι,
ὡ χρυσέ, δεξιώμα κάλλιστον βροτοῖς.

τὸ δέ γε πάντα ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ πλούτον τυχεῖν οὐκ
ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἡ φιλαργυρεῖν. ὁ ἄρα τὸν πλούτον
μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὑδαλλόμενος ἐν τῷ σπεύδειν ἐπὶ
123 τοῦτον γίνεται φιλάργυρος. πάλιν ὁ τὴν δόξαν
αἱρετὴν ὑποτιθέμενος συντόνως ἐφίεται τῆς δόξης,
τὸ δὲ συντόνως ἐφίεσθαι τῆς δόξης ἐστὶ φιλοδοξεῖν.
τὸ ἄρα τὴν δόξαν αἱρετὸν καὶ φύσει ἀγαθὸν ὑπο-
τίθεσθαι μεγάλου κακοῦ τινὸς γεννητικόν ἐστι,
124 τῆς φιλοδοξίας. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἥδονῆς δὲ ταῦτὸν
εὑρήσομεν· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν τεῦξιν αὐτῆς σπεύ-
δουσιν ἀνάγκη *(ἔξιν)*¹ τινὰ μοχθηρὰν² συνεξακο-
λουθεῖν, τὴν φιληδονίαν. ὕστε εἰ τὸ ποιητικὸν

¹ *ἔξιν* addo: *ταραχήν* cj. Bekk.

² μοχθηρὰν cj. Bekk.: *μοχθηρὰ* mss.

are said by some to be good are potentially evil, and
on account of this are causes of unhappiness. For,
in fact, it is owing to such goods that all these evils
exist,—love of money and love of fame and love of
strife and love of pleasure and all the other things
which resemble these. For it is by pursuing earnestly 121
and with extreme persistence what he himself believes
to be good and desirable that each man unwittingly
falls into the evil lying next-door.^a Thus for instance
(for our meaning will be clear if we take examples
familiar to us), the man who has already assumed that 122
wealth is a good must make every effort for the obtain-
ing of wealth, and keep always rehearsing to himself
the injunction of the Comedy ^b—

Winter and summer get thee gain, good sir :
and he must accept what the Tragedy says ^c—

Thou fairest of all boons to mortals, Gold !

But to make every effort for the gaining of wealth
is nothing else than to be a money-lover. Therefore
he who imagines wealth to be the greatest good, in
his zeal for this, becomes a money-lover. Again, the 123
man who supposes fame to be desirable earnestly
strives for fame, and the earnest striving for fame is
love of fame ; therefore the supposition that fame is
desirable and good by nature serves to generate a
great evil, love of fame. And in the case of pleasure 124
we shall find the same thing ; for to those who are
eager for its acquisition there results necessarily a
certain depraved condition, love of pleasure. So
that, if what is productive of evils is evil, and it has

^a Cf. Genesis iv. 7 " Sin lieth at the door."

^b Frag. Com. adesp. 1255 (Kock).

^c Eurip. Frag. 324 (Nauck).

τῶν κακῶν κακόν ἔστι, δέδεικται δὲ τὰ δοξασθέντα τισὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀγαθὰ πάντων τῶν κακῶν ποιητικά, ρῆτέον τά τισι δοξασθέντα ἀγαθὰ τῇ δυνάμει τυγχάνειν κακά.

- 125 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν τοῖς ἐξ ἐναντίας ὡς κατὰ μὲν τὴν δίωξιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτὰ ὄρμην πάρεστι τι τοῖς ὄρμασι καὶ διώκουσι κακόν, οἷον τῷ μὲν τὸν πλούτον μετιόντι ἡ φιλαργυρία, τῷ δὲ τὴν δόξαν ἡ φιλοδοξία, τῷ δ' ἄλλῳ τι ἄλλοια τις ταραχή, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τεῦξιν αὐτῶν ἀπαλλαγὴ γίνεται τῶν ταραχῶν καὶ ἀνάπτυλα τῆς πρότερον 126 ὄχλησεως· ὁ γάρ τυχών τοῦ πλούτου οὐκέτι συντόνως ἐπιζητεῖ τὸν πλούτον, καὶ ὁ λαβόμενος τῆς ἥδονῆς λύσει τὸ σύντονον τῆς περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδῆς. καθάπερ οὖν τὰ κρημνοβατοῦντα τῶν ζώων ὑπὲρ τοῦ πιεῖν δι' ἀλγηδόνος ἴεραι ἐπὶ τὴν ἥδονὴν καὶ ἅμα τῷ κορεσθῆναι παύεται τῶν πρὸν μόχθων, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐπείγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄχλεῖται, τυχών δὲ οὐ 127 ἐπόθει καὶ τῆς ὄχλησεως ἀπαλλάγεται. οὐ δὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι φαμεν ταῦτα λέγειν, οὐδὲ οὗτως ἔχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα. καν γάρ τύχωσι τῶν νομι-
ζομένων αὐτοῖς ἀγαθῶν, συνέχονται καὶ ἐπι-
λυποῦνται μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐ μόνοι ταῦτα ἔχουσιν·
οὖν τούτω γάρ ταγαθὰ τίμια καὶ περιμάχητα
νομίζουσι, σὺν τῷ μόνοι ταῦτα κεκτηθεῖσι, διὸ
καὶ ζῆλος αὐτοῖς ἐμφύεται πρὸς τοὺς πέλας καὶ
βασκανία καὶ φθόνος. ὥστε καὶ τὴν δίωξιν τῶν
λεγομένων ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀταλαίπωρον

been shown that the things which are believed by some philosophers to be good are productive of all the evils, one must declare that the things believed by some to be good are potentially evil.

Moreover, it is not possible for our opponents to 125 argue that although, through their pursuit of them and their impulse towards them, there accrues some evil to the subjects of the impulse and the pursuit (love of money, for example, to the man who goes after wealth, and love of fame to him who goes after fame, and some other kind of perturbation to him who is after something else), yet as a result of their acquisition there comes about a relief from the perturbations and a cessation of the previous distress ; for he who has acquired the wealth no longer seeks 126 earnestly after wealth, and he who has got the pleasure will relax the intensity of his zeal for it. For just as the animals which haunt the crags are driven for the sake of drinking through pain to pleasure and as soon as they are satisfied cease from their previous distress, so also man is necessarily distressed during his efforts after the good, but when he has gained what he yearned for he is also relieved from his distress.—But we assert that it is not possible to 127 argue thus, nor is this the truth of the matter. For even if men obtain what they regard as goods, they are still more oppressed and vexed that they are not alone in possessing them ; for it is when accompanied with this—with their being alone in possessing them—that they regard the goods as precious and highly to be prized, and hence they are infected with jealousy towards their neighbours and ill-will and envy. So that while the pursuit of the things said to be goods is not devoid of misery, the

είναι, καὶ τὴν περίκτησον πλειόνων κακῶν ὑπάρχειν
 128 ἐπισύνστασιν. πάλιν τε καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν
 κακῶν ὁ αὐτὸς ἔστι λόγος. προειληφὼς γάρ τις
 εἶναι τινα φύσει κακά, καθάπερ ἀδοξίαν πενίαν
 πήρωσιν ἀλγηδόνα νόσου, κοινώς ἀφροσύνην, οὐν
 μόνοις ὄχλεῖται τούτοις ἀλλὰ καὶ παμπληθέσιν
 129 ἄλλοις τοῖς δι' αὐτὰ κακοῖς. παρόντων μὲν γάρ
 αὐτῶν χειμάζεται οὐκ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ
 τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν δόξης, καθ' ἣν πεπίστευκεν ὅτι
 κακὸν αὐτῷ πάρεστιν, καὶ ὡς ὑπὸ μείζονος κακοῦ
 πορθεῖται τῆς τοιαύτης προλήψεως. μὴ παρόντων
 δὲ ὄμοιώς οὐκ ἀναπαύεται, ἀλλ' ἦτοι προφυλατ-
 τόμενος τὸ μέλλον ἢ δεδιώς σύνοικον ἔχει τὴν
 130 μέριμναν. λόγου δὲ παραστήσαντος ὅτι οὐδὲν
 τούτων φύσει ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φύσει κακόν, λύσις
 ἔσται τῆς ταραχῆς καὶ εἰρηναῖος ήμᾶς ἐκδέξεται
 βίος.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν διὰ τὰ δοξαζόμενά τισιν
 ἀγαθὰ πλήθος ἐπισυμβαίνει κακῶν καὶ διὰ τὰ κακὰ
 ἔτερα γίνεται κακά, ὡς χάριν αὐτῶν ἀνέφικτον
 γίνεσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
 131 συμφανές· ἀκολούθως δὲ ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι οὐδὲ
 βοηθείας ἐνδέχεται τυχεῖν διὰ τῆς δογματικῆς
 πορευομένους φιλοσοφίας. ὑποκειμένου γάρ τινος
 φύσει ἀγαθοῦ ἢ φύσει κακοῦ, ὁ παραμυθούμενος
 τὸν ταρασσόμενον ἐπὶ τῷ συντόνως διώκειν
 τάγαθον ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἢ σφοδρῶς φεύγειν τὸ κακὸν
 ὡς κακὸν καταστέλλει τὴν ταραχὴν ἦτοι τοῦτο
 λέγων, ὅτι καθῆκόν ἔστι μήτε τάγαθον διώκειν
 132 μήτε τὸ κακὸν φεύγειν, ἢ τοῦτο παριστάς ὅτι τόδε
 μὲν τὸ διωκόμενον ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ ἐλαχίστην ἔχει
 ἀξίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖον αὐτὸ διώκειν, τόδε δὲ

acquisition of them is the heaping up of more
 128 numerous evils.—And again, the same account holds good also of the evils themselves. For when a man has a preconception that certain things are by nature evil (such as ill-repute, poverty, lameness, pain, disease, folly in general), he is not distressed by these alone but also by hosts of other evils due to them. For when they are present he is tempest-tost not only 129 by them but also by his belief about them, through which he is convinced that evil is present with him; and by such a preconception he is devastated as by a greater evil. And he is equally devoid of rest when they are not present, and, either through taking precautions against the future or through fear, he has anxiety as his house-mate. But when reasoning has 130 established that none of these things is good by nature or evil by nature, we shall have a release from perturbation and there will await us a peaceful life.

Well then, it is plain from what has been said that a multitude of evils occur as the result of the things believed by some to be goods, and as a result of the evils other evils come about, so that owing to these happiness becomes unattainable. And, in the next 131 place, we must show that we cannot gain assistance either by taking the road of the dogmatic philosophy. For if anything good by nature or evil by nature is assumed to exist, he who is consoling the man who is perturbed owing to his strenuous pursuit of the good as good, or his excessive avoidance of the evil as evil, checks the perturbation either by declaring that it is a duty neither to pursue the good nor to avoid the evil, or by showing that the object which the man 132 pursues possesses very little value and that it is not proper to pursue it, whereas this other object has

μείζονα, καὶ ἀρμόζει αὐτὸ μετέρχεσθαι, οἷον ἐλάττονα μὲν ἔχει ἀξίαν ὁ πλοῦτος μείζονα δὲ ἡ ἀρετή, καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνον ἀλλὰ ταύτην διωκτέον, ἡ ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ὀλιγωφελές ὃν πολλὰς ἔχει τὰς ὄχλήσεις, τοῦτο δὲ πολυωφελές καθεστώς ὀλίγας ἔχει τὰς ὄχλήσεις. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν λέγειν ὅτι οὗτε τάγαθὸν οὐκείον ἔστι συντόνως διώκειν οὔτε τὸ κακὸν φεύγειν, παρὰ τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν ἀξίωσίν ἔστι, ἀεὶ ποτε τὴν ἐκλογὴν καὶ ἀπεκλογὴν τούτων τὰς 133 τε αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς θρυλούντων. τὸ δὲ φάναι τόδε μὲν μὴ δεῖν διώκειν ὡς ταπεινόν, ἐπὶ τόδε δ' ἐπείγεσθαι ὡς λαμπρότερον, ἀνδρῶν ἦν οὐκ ἀπολυόντων τὴν ταραχὴν ἀλλὰ μεταγωγὴν ταύτης ποιουμένων ὡς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον διώκων τις ὠχλεῖτο, οὕτω καὶ τὸ δεύτερον διώκων τις ὄχληθῆσεται, ὥστε νόσου ἀντὶ νόσου ποιεῖν τὸν τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγον, ἐπείπερ τὸν ἐπὶ πλοῦτον ἡ δόξαν ἡ ὑγείαν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὅρμῶντα ἀποστρέψθων εἰς τὸ μὴ ταῦτα διώκειν ἀλλὰ τὸ καλόν, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν, οὐκ ἐλευθεροὶ τῆς διώξεως ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἐτέραν 134 μετατίθησι δίωξιν. ὡς οὖν ὁ ἱατρὸς ἀναιρῶν μὲν πλευρῆτιν ποιῶν δὲ περιπνευμονίαν, ἡ ἀνασκευάζων μὲν φρενῖτιν ἀντεισάγων δὲ λήθαργον, οὐκ ἀπαλλάττει τὸν κίνδυνον ἀλλ' ἐναλλάττει, οὕτω καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐτέραν ταραχὴν ἀνθ' ἐτέρας 135 εἰσηγούμενος οὐ βοηθεῖ τῷ ταραττομένῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀντεισαγομένη ταραχὴ μέτριος ἔστω ἡ δὲ ἀναιρουμένη σφοδροτέρα. οὐαν γὰρ εἰχε δόξαν ὁ ταραττόμενος περὶ τοῦ πρότερον

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greater value and to follow after it is a fitting thing (wealth, for example, possesses less and virtue more value, and one ought not to pursue the former but the latter); or (by showing) that this object is of little use and entails many annoyances, whereas that object is of great use and entails few annoyances. But to declare that it is not proper either to pursue 133 the good or to avoid the evil strenuously is contrary to the view of the Dogmatists, who are always harping on the selection or rejection of these things and on desires and avoidances. And to say that one 134 ought not to pursue this object as being base, but to strive after that object as being more noble, is the action of men who are not getting rid of the perturbation but effecting a change in its position; for just as the man who pursued the first object was distressed, so also he who pursues the second will be distressed, so that the philosopher's discourse creates 135 a new disease in place of the old, since, by turning away the man who strives after wealth or fame or health, as being a good, towards the pursuit not of these things but of "the fair" (shall we say) and of virtue, he does not set him free from the pursuit but makes him change over to another pursuit.—As, 136 then, the physician, if he does away with a pleurisy but creates inflammation of the lungs, or removes brain-fever but in its place introduces lethargy, does not get rid of the danger but shifts it over, so also the philosopher, who introduces one perturbation in place of another, gives no succour to the person perturbed. For it is not possible to argue that the 137 perturbation introduced is a moderate one, whereas the one removed was more violent. For the perturbed person has the same sort of belief about the

διωκομένου, τοιαύτην ἔχει καὶ περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου·
ἔδόξαζε δὲ τό γε πρῶτον ὡς ἀγαθόν, καὶ διὰ
138 τοῦτο ἐσπευδεῖ ἐπ' αὐτό· τοίνυν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δοξάζων καὶ ἐπ' ἵστης ἐπ' αὐτὸν σπεύ-
δων τὴν ἴστην ἔχει ταραχήν, τάχα δὲ καὶ σφοδρο-
τέραν, ὅσῳ μεταπέπειται εἰς τὸ μείζονος ἀξίας
εἶναι τὸ νῦν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διωκόμενον. οὐκοῦν εἰ
ἔτερον ἀλλ' ἔτερον ὁ φιλόσοφος παρασκευάζοι τὸν
οὐχιούμενον διώκειν, οὐκ ἀπολύσει τῆς ὀχλήσεως.
139 εἰ δ' ἀπλῶς διδάσκει ὅτι τουτὶ μὲν ὀλιγωφέλες
ἐστι, πλείονας δ' ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις, *(τουτὶ δὲ*
πολιωφέλες καθεστώς ὀλίγας ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις)¹*,*
σύγκρισιν ἔσται ποιῶν αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς πρὸς
ἔτέραν αἱρεσιν καὶ φυγήν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς
ταραχῆς. ὅπερ ἄποτον ὁ γὰρ ὀχλούμενος οὐ
βούλεται μαθεῖν τί μᾶλλον ὀχλεῖ καὶ τί ἥπτον,
140 ἀλλ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῆς ὀχλήσεως πεπόθηκεν. μόνως
οὖν ἔσται φυγεῖν ταύτην, εἰ ύποδείξαιμεν τῷ
ταραττομένῳ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φυγὴν ἢ κατὰ
τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δίωξιν ὅτι οὕτε ἀγαθόν τι ἔστι
φύσει οὔτε κακόν,

ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόω κέκριται
κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα. τὸ δέ γε διδάσκειν τὸ τοιοῦτον
ἴδιον τῆς σκέψεως. ταύτης ἄρα ἦν τὸ εὐδαίμονα
βίον περιποιεῖν.

¹ *(τουτὶ . . . ὀχλήσεις)* add. ej. Bekk.

second object of pursuit as he had about the previous one; but he believed that the first object was good and because of this he went after it eagerly; so, as 138 he also believes that the second is good and goes after it with equal eagerness, he will be equally perturbed, or perhaps even more violently in so far as he has been converted to the belief that his present object of pursuit is of greater value. If, then, the philosopher should cause the distressed person to pursue one object in place of another, he will not rid him of his distress. And if he simply teaches that this object is 139 of little use but entails many annoyances, *(while that object is of great use and entails few annoyances,) he will be making a comparison between one desire and avoidance and another desire and avoidance, and will not be removing the perturbation.* But this is absurd; for the person in distress does not wish to learn which thing is more distressing and which less, but yearns to be rid of his distress. It will only be 140 possible, then, to avoid this by making it evident to the person who is in distress, owing to his avoidance of evil or his pursuit of good, that there does not exist anything which is either good or evil by nature,—

But by the judgement of men Sentence upon them is
pass'd,

as Timon says. And to teach this is, in fact, the peculiar task of Scepticism; therefore it belongs to it to secure a happy life.

Ε'.—ΕΙ Ο ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΩΝ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ
ΕΠΕΧΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΕΤΔΑΙΜΟΝ

141 Εύδαιμων μὲν ἔστιν ὁ ἀταράχως διεξάγων καὶ
ώς ἔλεγεν ὁ Τίμων, ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ γαληνότητι
καθεστώς.

πάντη γάρ ἐπεῖχε γαλήνη
καὶ

τὸν δ' ώς οὖν ἐνόησ' ἐν νημεμίσοι γαλήνης.

τῶν δὲ λεγομένων ὑπάρχειν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν
τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν εἰσῆκται τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀνάγκην.

142 ἄλλα κατὰ μὲν [λογικὴν]¹ δόξαν εἰσῆκται ὅσα κατὰ
κρίσιν διώκουσιν ἀνθρώποι η̄ φεύγονταν, οἷον ἐν
μὲν τοῖς ἐκτὸς αἵρετα λέγεται καὶ ἀγαθὰ πλοῦτος
καὶ δόξα καὶ εὐγένεια καὶ φιλία καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐοικός,
ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ σῶμα κάλλος ἵσχυς εὐεξία, ἐν
δὲ τοῖς περὶ ψυχὴν ἀνδρία δικαιοσύνη φρόνησις,
κοινῶς ἀρετή, καὶ φευκτὰ τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις.

143 κατ' ἀνάγκην δὲ παρῆλθεν ὅποσα κατ' ἄλογον
αἰσθήσεως πάθος συνίσταται περὶ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅσα
φυσική τις ἀνάγκη παρέχει, “ἐκὼν δ' οὐκ ἂν τις

144 ἔλοιπο” η̄ φύγοι, ώς ἀλγηδῶν καὶ ἡδονῆ. διόπερ
τοιαύτης οὐσῆς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι διαφορᾶς, περὶ
μὲν τοῦ μόνον ἀταράχως διεξάγειν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
δόξαν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς τὸν περὶ πάντων ἐπ-
έχοντα ἥδη παρεστήσαμεν καὶ πρότερον, ὅτε περὶ
τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τέλους διελεγόμεθα, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
παρόντος, ὅτε ἔδεικνυμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν εὐδαιμονεῖν

¹ [λογικὴν] secl. Heintz.

^a From Homer, *Il.* iii. 66.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 25 ff.

^c Cf. §§ 110 ff. *supra*.

CHAPTER V.—IS HE WHO SUSPENDS JUDGEMENT RE-
GARDING THE NATURE OF THINGS GOOD AND EVIL
IN ALL RESPECTS HAPPY?

He, then, is happy who lives to the end without 141
perturbation and, as Timon said, existing in a state
of quietness and calm—

For on all sides calm was prevailing,
and—

Him when thus I descried in a calm with no winds to disquiet.

And of the goods and evils which are said to exist
some are introduced by belief, others by necessity.
Thus by [rational] belief are introduced all those 142
which men pursue or avoid of their own judgement,—
as, for example, amongst things external, wealth and
fame and noble birth and friendship, and everything
of the kind, are called desirable and good; and,
amongst qualities of the body, beauty and strength
and sound condition; and, amongst qualities of the
soul, courage and justice and wisdom and virtue
in general; and the opposites of these are regarded as
things to be avoided. But by necessity are brought 143
about all such things as befall us because of an
irrational affection of sense, and all that some natural
necessity brings about, “but no one would willingly
choose them,”^a or avoid them,—such as pain and
pleasure. Hence, since there exists such a difference 144
as this in these things, the fact that it is only the man
who suspends judgement about all things who lives
to the end an unperturbed life in respect of the goods
and evils due to belief we have already established,
both in our previous discussion of the Sceptic “end,”^b
and also on the present occasion^c when we showed
that it is not possible to be happy if one assumes the

145 φύσει ἀγαθὸν τι καὶ κακὸν ὑποστησάμενον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο ποιῶν ἀνηνύτοις συμπεριεφέρετο ταραχᾶς, τὰ μὲν φεύγων τὰ δὲ διώκων, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτῷ ἐπισπώμενος κακὰ διὰ τάγαθά, ἐν πολλαπλασίοις δὲ τριβόμενος κακοῖς διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν κακῶν δόξαν. οἷον ὁ λέγων, εἰ τύχοι, ἀγαθὸν μὲν τὸν πλοῦτον κακὸν δὲ τὴν πενίαν, μὴ ἔχων μὲν τὸν πλοῦτον διχῶς ταράττεται, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι πραγματεύεται τὴν περίκτησιν αὐτοῦ, κτησάμενος δ’ αὐτὸν κατὰ τρεῖς τιμωρεῖται τρόπους, καὶ ὅτι πέραν τοῦ μετρίου γέγηθε, καὶ ὅτι πραγματεύεται εἰς τὸ παραμένειν αὐτῷ τὸν πλοῦτον, καὶ ὅτι ἀγωνιᾷ καὶ δέδιεν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀποβολήν. ὁ δὲ μήτε ἐν τοῖς φύσει ἀγαθοῖς τάττων τὸν πλοῦτον μήτε ἐν τοῖς φύσει κακοῖς, τὴν δὲ “οὐ μᾶλλον” προφερόμενος φωνήν, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τούτου ταράττεται οὔτε ἐπὶ τῇ παρουσίᾳ γέγηθεν, μένει δὲ καθ’ ἕκατερον ἀτάραχος. ὥστ’ ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν νομιζομένοις ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ κακοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς τούτων αἱρέσεσι καὶ 148 φυγαῖς τελέως ἐστὶν εὐδαιμῶν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατ’ αἰσθησιν καὶ ἀλόγοις κινήμασιν μετριάζει.¹ τὰ γὰρ μὴ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου διαστροφὴν συμβαίνοντα καὶ τὴν φαύλην δόξαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀκούσιον τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος, ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν σκέψιν λόγου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι· τῷ γὰρ διὰ λιμὸν ἢ δίψος ὄχλουμένῳ οὐ δυνατὸν ἐμποιεῦν πεῖσμα διὰ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν σκέψιν λόγου ὅτι οὐκ ὄχλεῖται, καὶ τῷ ἐν ταῖς τούτων παρηγορίαις

¹ μετριάζει cj. Bekk.: εἰκάζει mss. (? ἀναχάζει).

existence of anything good and evil by nature. For he who does this is tossed about with endless perturbations, through avoiding these things and pursuing those, and drawing upon himself many evils because of the goods, and being afflicted by many times more evils because of his belief about evils.— Thus the man who declares that wealth (shall we say?)¹⁴⁵ is a good and poverty an evil is perturbed in two ways if he has not wealth,—both because he has not the good and because he is toiling for the acquisition of it,—and when he has acquired it he is punished in three ways,—because he is immoderately overjoyed, and because he toils to ensure that his wealth stays with him, and because he is painfully anxious and dreads the loss of it. But he who ranks wealth neither amongst¹⁴⁶ the natural goods nor amongst the natural evils, but utters the formula “Not more,”^a is neither perturbed at its absence nor overjoyed at its presence, but in either case remains unperturbed. So that in respect of the things held, as a matter of belief, to be good and bad, and in respect of the desires and avoidances thereof, he is perfectly happy, while in respect of the¹⁴⁷ sensible and irrational affections he preserves a due mean. For the things which occur, not because of a distortion of the reason and foolish belief but, owing to an involuntary affection of the sense it is impossible to get rid of by means of the Sceptical argument^b; for in a man who is distressed because¹⁴⁹ of hunger or thirst, it is not feasible to implant, by means of the Sceptical argument, the conviction that he is not in distress, and in the man who is overjoyed

^a For this Sceptical formula (denoting suspense of judgement) see P.H. i. 187 ff.

^b Cf. P.H. i. 30, iii. 237.

διαχεομένω οὐκ ἐνδέχεται πειθὼ ἐμποιεῖν περὶ 150 τοῦ ὅτι οὐ διαχείται. τί οὖν, φασίν, ὄφελος ὑμῖν, οἱ δογματικοί, πρὸς εὐδαμονίαν ἐκ τῆς ἐποχῆς, εἰ ταράττεσθαι πάντως δὲ καὶ ταραττομένους κακοδαιμονεῦν; μέγα, φήσομεν, ὄφελος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταράττεται ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀλγύνοντος παρουσίαν, ἀλλ' εὐφορώτερον παρὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν δογμάτων φέρει τὴν ὅχλησιν, 151 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἵσον ἀπειρα τῷ πλήθει τάγαθὰ διώκοντα καὶ πειριστάμενον τὰ κακὰ ὡς ὑπὸ Ἐρινύών ἐλαύνεσθαι τῶν κατὰ τὰς διώξεις καὶ φυγὰς ταραχῶν, ἡ τοῦτο μὲν μὴ πάσχειν, ἐν δὲ μόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀποτεμνόμενον κακὸν τούτου 152 τὴν ἔκκλισιν καὶ φυλακὴν πραγματεύεσθαι. δεύτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὅπερ φεύγουσιν οἱ ἐφεκτικοὶ ὡς κακόν, οὐκ ἀγανάκτησι ταρακτικόν. ἡ γὰρ μικρός τις ὁ πόνος ἔστι, καθάπερ ὁ καθ' ἕκαστην ἡμέραν ἐγγωμένος ἡμῖν λιμὸς ἡ δίψος ἡ ψῦχος ἡ θάλπος 153 ἡ τι τῶν παραπλησίων, ἡ τούναντίον σφοδρότατος καὶ ἀκρότατος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνηκέστοις συνεχομένων βασάνωις, δι' ὧν πολλάκις οἱ ἱατροὶ ἀνωδύνους πορίζουσι δυνάμεις πρὸς τὸ βραχεῖάν τινα λαβεῖν ἀναστροφὴν εἰς βοηθειαν, ἡ μέσος καὶ 154 παρατείνων, καθάπερ ὁ ἐν τισι νόσοις. τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστην ἡμέραν συναντῶν εὐπορίστους ἔχων τὰς παρηγορίας, τροφὴν καὶ πόμα καὶ σκέπην, πρὸς ἐλάχιστον ταράττει· ὁ δὲ ἀκρότατος καὶ εἰς τὰ μάλιστα ταρακτικώτατος, ἀλλά τοι γε πρὸς ἀκαρές ἀστραπῆς τρόπον δειματώσας ἡ 155 ἀναιρεῖ ἡ ἀναιρεῖται. ὁ δὲ μέσος καὶ παρατείνων οὔτε παρ' ὅλον ἔστι τὸν βίον οὔτε συνεχῆς τὴν

at getting relief from these sufferings it is not in its power to implant the belief that he is not overjoyed. —What help, then, towards happiness (ask the Dogmatists) do we get from suspension of judgement if one has to be perturbed in any case and unhappy because perturbed? Great help, we shall reply. For even though he who suspends judgement about all things is perturbed owing to the presence of what causes pain, yet as compared with the Dogmatist he bears the distress more lightly, because, firstly, to pursue goods 151 and to shun evils which are endless in number and thus to be harassed by the perturbations due to these pursuits and avoidances as by Furies is much worse than not to suffer thus but merely to be engaged in avoiding and guarding against only one isolated form of evil. And, secondly, even the thing which the Ephectics^a 152 avoid as evil, is not excessively perturbing. For the suffering is either small, such as that which befalls us every day,—hunger or thirst or cold or heat or something similar ;—or, on the contrary, it is very violent 153 and intense, as in the case of those afflicted with incurable torments, during which the doctors often provide powerful anodynes to assist the patient in obtaining some relief; or else it is moderate and protracted, as in some diseases. And of these, that 154 which faces us every day perturbs us least as the remedies for it (food and drink and shelter) are easy to provide; and that which is most intense and in the highest degree perturbing terrifies us, after all, but for a moment, like a lightning-flash, and then either destroys us or is destroyed. And the moderate and 155 protracted kind neither remains all through life nor

^a i.e. the Sceptics (as “suspenders” of judgement), cf. P.H. i. 7, 196.

φύσιν ἀλλὰ πολλὰς διαναπαύσεις ἔχων καὶ ῥαστών
νας· διηγεκῆς γάρ ὧν οὐκ ἀν παρέτεινεν.
μέτριος οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ οὕτω φοβερὰ ἡ περὶ τὸν
156 σκεπτικὸν συμβαίνουσα ταραχή· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καν
μεγίστη τις ἦ, οὐχ ἡμᾶς αἰτιασθαι δεῖ τοὺς
ἀκουσίων καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην πάσχοντας, ἀλλὰ τὴν
φύσιν,

ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει,

καὶ τὸν δοξαστικῶς καὶ κατὰ κρίσιν ἐπισπώμενον
ἔαντῷ τὸ κακόν. ὕσπερ γάρ τὸν πυρέττοντα οὐκ
αἰτιατέον ὅτι πυρέττει, ἀκουσίως γάρ πυρέττει,
τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπεχόμενον τῶν ἀσυμφόρων αἰτιατέον,
ἐπ' αὐτῷ γάρ ἔκειτο τὸ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀσυμφόρων,
οὕτω τὸν μὲν ταραττόμενον ἐπὶ παροῦσι τοῖς
157 ἀλγευοῦσι οὐκ αἰτιατέον· οὐ γάρ παρ' αὐτὸν γίνεται
ἢ διὰ τὸν πόνον ταραχὴ ἀλλ', ἔάν τε θέλῃ ἔάν τε
καὶ μή, γίνεσθαι κατ' ἀνάγκην ὁφείλει· τὸν δὲ παρὰ
τὰς ὕδιας ὑπολήψεις ἀναπλάτοντα αὐτῷ αἰρετῶν
τε καὶ φευκτῶν πραγμάτων πλῆθος αἰτιατέον·
ἔαντῷ γάρ ἐγείρει κακῶν πλήμμυραν. καὶ
ταῦτο¹ πάρεστιν ἴδειν ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν λεγομένων
158 κακῶν. ὃ μὲν γάρ μηδὲν προσδοξάζων περὶ τοῦ
κακὸν εἶναι τὸν πόνον ἔχεται τῷ κατηγαικασμένῳ
τοῦ πόνου κινήματι· ὃ δέ γε προσαναπλάσσων ὅτι
μόνον ἀνοίκειον ἔστω ὁ πόνος, ὅτι μόνον κακόν,
διπλασιάζει τῇ δόξῃ ταύτη τὸ κατὰ παρουσίαν
159 αὐτοῦ συμβαίνον ὄχλημα. ἢ γάρ οὐ θεωροῦμεν
ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεμνομένων πολλάκις αὐτὸς μὲν
ὅ πάσχων καὶ τεμνόμενος ἀνδρικῶς ὑπομένει τὴν
ἐκ τῆς τομῆς βάσανον, μήτε

¹ ταῦτο Heintz: τοῦτο mss., Bekk.

is continuous in its nature but has many intervals of rest and periods of relief; for were it unceasing it would not have been protracted.—The perturbation, then, which befalls the Sceptic is moderate and not so very alarming. Notwithstanding, even if it be 156 very great, we ought not to blame those who suffer involuntarily and of necessity but Nature,

Who recks not aught of custom.^a

and the man who through his beliefs and owing to his own judgement draws upon himself the evil. For just as the man with a fever is not to be blamed because he has a fever (for he has the fever involuntarily), but the man who does not abstain from things inexpedient is to be blamed (for it lay in his own power to abstain from things inexpedient),—so the man who is perturbed at the presence of painful things is not to be blamed; for the perturbation caused by the pain is 157 not due to himself but is bound to occur of necessity whether he wishes it or not; but he who through his own imaginations invents for himself a host of things desirable and to be avoided is deserving of blame; for he stirs up for himself a flood of evils.^b—And one may see the same thing in the case of the so-called “evils” themselves. For he who has no additional belief 158 about pain being an evil is merely affected by the necessitated motion of the pain; but he who imagines in addition that the pain is objectionable only, that it is evil only, doubles by this belief the distress which results from its presence. For do we not observe 159 frequently how, in the case of those who are being cut, the patient who is being cut manfully endures the torture of the cutting—

^a Eurip. *Frag.* 920 (Nauck).

^b Cf. Hamlet's “Take arms against a sea of troubles.”

ώχρήσας χρόα κάλλιμον μήτε παρειῶν
δάκρυ' ὁμορξάμενος,

διὰ τὸ μόνω τῷ κατὰ τὴν τομὴν ὑποπίπτειν
κινήματι· ὃ δὲ παρεστὼς αὐτῷ, σύναμα τῷ βρα-
χεῖναι ἰδεῖν αἷματος ρύσιν, ὥχριδ̄ τρέμει περιυδροῦ
ἔκλυνεται, τὸ τελευταῖον ἄφωνος καταπίπτει, οὐ
διὰ τὸν πόνον, οὐδὲ γὰρ πάρεστιν αὐτῷ, διὰ δὲ
160 τὴν περὶ τοῦ κακὸν εἶναι τὸν πόνον δόξαν; οὕτω
μείζων ἐστὶν ἐνίστε ἡ διὰ τὴν περὶ τινος κακοῦ ὡς
κακοῦ δόξαν ταραχὴ τῆς δι᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ λεγόμενον
εἶναι κακὸν συμβανούσης. οὐκοῦν ὃ περὶ
πάντων [μὲν] ἐπέχων τῶν κατὰ δόξαν τελειοτάτην
161 καρποῦται τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις
καὶ ἀλόγοις κινήμασι ταράττεται μέν

(οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυός ἐστι παλαιφάτου, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ
πέτρης,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀνδρῶν γένος ἦν),

162 μετριοπαθῶς δὲ διατίθεται. ὅθεν καὶ καταφρονεῖν
ἀναγκαῖον τῶν εἰς ἀνενεργησίαν αὐτὸν περι-
163 κλείεσθαι νομιζόντων ἡ εἰς ἀπέμφασιν, καὶ εἰς
ἀνενεργησίαν μὲν ὅτι τοῦ βίου παντὸς ἐν αἰρέσεοι
καὶ φυγαῖς ὄντος ὁ μήτε αἴρονταινός τι μήτε
φεύγων δυνάμει τὸν βίον ἀρνεῖται καὶ τινος φυτοῦ
164 τρόπον ἐπείχειν, εἰς ἀπέμφασιν δὲ ὅτι ὑπὸ τυράννων
ποτὲ γενόμενος καὶ τῶν ἀρρήτων τι ποιεῦν ἀναγκα-
ζόμενος ἡ οὐχ ὑπομενεῖ τὸ προσταττόμενον ἀλλ᾽
έκουσιον ἐλένται θάνατον, ἡ φεύγων τὰς βασάνους
ποιήσει τὸ κελευόμενον, οὕτω τε οὐκέτι “ἀφυγής
καὶ ἀναίρετος ἐσται” κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα, ἀλλὰ τὸ
μὲν ἐλένται τοῦ δ’ ἀποστήσεται, ὅπερ ἦν τῶν μετὰ

His fair hue paling not, nor from his cheeks
Wiping the tears away.^a

because he is affected only by the motion due to the cutting ; whereas the man who stands beside him, as soon as he sees a small flow of blood, at once grows pale, trembles, gets in a great sweat, feels faint, and finally falls down speechless, not because of the pain (for it is not present with him), but because of the belief he has about pain being an evil ? Thus the 160 perturbation due to the belief about an evil as evil is sometimes greater than that which results from the so-called evil itself.—He, then, who suspends judgement about all things which depend on belief wins happiness most fully, and during involuntary and 161 irrational affections although he is perturbed—

Yea, for he is not sprung from a rock or an oak primeval
But of the race of men was he,^b

yet his state of feeling is moderate. Hence, too, one 162 must scorn those who fancy that he is confined to a state of inactivity or of inconsistency,—to inactivity, 163 because, as all life consists in desires and avoidances, he that neither desires nor avoids anything is virtually rejecting life and remaining like a vegetable ; and to 164 inconsistency because, should he ever be subject to a tyrant and compelled to do something unspeakable, either he will not submit to the order given him but will choose a voluntary death, or else to avoid torture he will do what is commanded, and thus he will no longer be (in Timon's phrase) “unmov'd by choice and avoidance,” but will choose the one and refuse the other, which is the action of those who confidently

^a Homer, *Odyss.* xi. 529 f.

^b The first line is from Homer, *Odyss.* xix. 163 ; the half-line is S.'s addition.

πείσματος κατειληφότων τὸ φευκτόν τι εἶναι καὶ
 165 αἴρετόν. ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντες οὐ συνιάσσου ὅτι
 κατὰ μὲν τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον οὐ βιοῦ ὁ σκεπτικός
 (ἀνενέργητος γάρ ἐστιν ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ), κατὰ δὲ
 τὴν ἀφιλόσοφον τήρησιν δύναται τὰ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι
 166 τὰ δὲ φεύγειν. ἀναγκαζόμενός τε ὑπὸ τυράννου
 τι τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων πράττειν, τῇ κατὰ τὸν
 πατρίους νόμους καὶ τὰ ἔθη προλήψει τυχὸν τὸ
 μὲν ἐλεῖται τὸ δὲ φεύξεται· καὶ ῥάσν γε οἵσει τὸ
 σκληρὸν παρὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν δογμάτων, ὅτι οὐδὲν
 ἔξωθεν τούτῳ προσδοξάζει καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος.
 167 εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀκριβέστερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ
 τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ τέλους σχολασθεῖσι, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγ-
 καῖον

αὐθις ἀριζῆλως εἰρημένα μυθολογεύειν.

“Οθεν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἀποδόντες, ἀφ' ὧν
 αἱ ἀπορίαι ἐπὶ πάντα σχεδὸν τὸν ἡθικὸν διατείνουσι
 τόπον, φέρε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἔστι τις
 περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη.

5'.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΤΕΧΝΗ

168 “Οτι μέν ἔστι δυνατὸν κατὰ τρόπον βιοῦν αἴρου-
 μένους τὴν περὶ πάντων ἐποχήν, ἀποχρώντως ἡμῖν
 δέδεικται· οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει ἐκ παραλλήλου δοκιμά-
 ζειν καὶ τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν στάσιν, καίπερ ἀπὸ
 μέρους ἡδη δοκιμασθεῖσαν. ἐπαγγέλλονται γάρ
 169 τέχνην τινὰ περὶ τὸν βίον παραδώσειν, καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο Ἐπίκουρος μὲν ἐλεγε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐνέρ-

* Cf. P.H. i. 23.

^o Homer, Odyss. xii. 453.

^b See P.H. i. 25-30.

hold that something to be avoided and desirable exists.—Now in arguing thus they do not comprehend 165 that the Sceptic does not conduct his life according to philosophical theory (for so far as regards this he is inactive), but as regards the non-philosophic regulation of life ^a he is capable of desiring some things and avoiding others. And when compelled by a tyrant to 166 commit any forbidden act he will perchance choose the one course and avoid the other owing to the pre-conception due to his ancestral laws and customs; and as compared with the Dogmatist he will certainly endure hardship more easily because he has not, like the other, any additional beliefs beyond the actual suffering.—But we have discussed these matters more 167 exactly in our discourse “On the Sceptic End,”^b and there is no necessity

Once again to repeat an account most plainly deliver'd.”

Hence, as we have completed our account of things good and evil, the difficulties raised by which extend over almost the whole sphere of Ethics, come and let us consider next whether there exists any art of life.^c

CHAPTER VI.—DOES THERE EXIST ANY ART OF LIFE?

We have proved sufficiently that it is possible to 168 live a satisfactory life by adopting suspension of judgement about all things; but nothing hinders us from examining also in a similar fashion the view of the Dogmatists, although it has been partially examined already. For they promise to present us with an “art of life,” and because of this Epicurus 169 declared that “philosophy is an activity which

^d For the “art of living” cf. P.H. iii. 239 ff.

γειαν εἶναι λόγοις καὶ διαλογισμοῖς τὸν εὐδαίμονα
 170 βίον περιποιοῦσαν, οἱ δὲ στωικοὶ καὶ ἀντικρύς φασι
 τὴν φρόνησιν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν
 καὶ οὐδετέρων, τέχνην ὑπάρχειν περὶ τὸν βίον, ἢν
 οἱ προσλαβόντες μόνοι γίνονται καλοί, μόνοι πλού-
 σιοι, σοφοὶ μόνοι. ὁ γὰρ πολλοῦ ἄξια κεκτημένος
 πλούσιος ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ ἀρέτῃ πολλοῦ ἔστιν ἄξια, καὶ
 μόνος ταύτην ὁ σοφὸς κέκτηται μόνος ἄρα ὁ σοφός
 ἔστι πλούσιος. καὶ ὁ ἀξιέραστος ἔστι καλός, μόνος
 δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἀξιέραστος· μόνος ἄρα ὁ σοφός ἔστι
 171 καλός. αἱ δὴ τοιαῦται ὑποσχέσεις θηρεύουσαι μὲν
 τοὺς νέους ἐλπίσι ψυχρᾶς, οὐκέτι δέ εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς.
 παρὸ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐπαγγελλομένους
 τὴν παράδοσιν αὐτῶν ἐπισκώπτει, λέγων

πολλῶν λακεδόνων λυμάντορες αἰπυδολωταί,¹

172 ὅτε δὲ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς μεταμελομένους ἐφ'
 οἵς μάτην ἐμόχθησαν παρεισάγει διὰ τούτων.

φῆ δέ τις αἰάζων, ολα βροτοὶ αἰάζουσιν,
 οἴμοι ἐγὼ τί πάθω; τί νυ μοι σοφὸν ἔνθα
 γένηται;
 πτωχὸς μὲν φρένας εἰμί, νόον δέ μοι οὐκ ἔνι
 κόκκος.

ἡ με μάτην φεύξεσθαι δίομαι αἰπὺν ὅλεθρον.
 τρις μάκαρες μέντοι καὶ τετράκις οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες

¹ αἰπυδολωταί Fabr., Bekk.: ἐπιδολωταί (or -οταί) MSS.: ἐλπιδοδῶται Usener (? ἀρχιδολωταί).

* For the Stoic " Wise Man," or " Sage," see Vol. I. Introd. p. xxviii. " Fair " (*καλός*), here, means " noble " or 466

secures the happy life by arguments and discussions"; while the Stoics assert outright that " wisdom, which 170 is the science of things good and evil and neither, is an art of life, and only those who attain this become fair, only they rich, as only they are wise. For he who possesses things of great value is rich, and virtue is of great value, and it only the Wise man^a possesses; therefore the wise man only is rich. And the lover of the valuable is fair, but the wise man only is a lover of the valuable; therefore the wise man only is fair." Now promises such as these capture the young with 171 fruitless expectations, but they are not also true. Wherefore also Timon in one place scoffs at those who promise us to provide us with these things, calling them—

Spoilers of many a doctrine and masters of knavish imposture^b;

and in another place he brings in the people who have 172 paid attention to them, repenting of the vain labours they have undergone, in these words—

One, then, lamenting did cry, as men are wont when lamenting,
 "Oh, what is to befall me! Where now shall I gain any wisdom?

Beggar'd in soul I am, and of sense not a grain is within me.
 Vainly methinks shall I try to escape from sheerest destruction.

Thrice, yea four times, blessed are those devoid of possessions,

"honourable" (*honestus*),—gifted with "the beauty of holiness."

* For λακεδόνων ("doctrines"), which can scarcely be right, I suggest βλακεδόνων ("wastrels"), which accords better with the next quotation (Heretus has *jucundum*); then λυμάντορες βλ. will mean "those who bring wastrels (or idlers) to ruin."

μήτε κατατρώξαντες ἐνὶ σχολῇ ὅσσον ἐπέπαντο.
νῦν δέ με λεγαλέαις ἔρισιν εἴμαρτο δαμῆναι
καὶ πενίη καὶ ὅσον ἄλλα βροτοὺς κηφῆνας ἐλαστρεῖ.

- 173 διότι δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, μάθοιμεν ἀνὴρ ἐντεῦθεν ἐπιστήσαντες. ή γάρ ἀξιούμενη περὶ τὸν βίον εἰναι τέχνη, καὶ καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπειλήφασιν, οὐ μία τις ἔστιν ἀλλὰ πολλαὶ καὶ διάφωνοι, οἷον ή μὲν κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, ή δὲ κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς, τὶς δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου. ἡτοι οὖν πάσαις ὁμοίως 174 ἀκολουθητέον η μᾶτις μόνη η οὐδεμιᾷ. καὶ πάσαις μὲν ἀκολουθεῖν τῶν ἀμηχάνων διὰ τὴν μάχην. δ γάρ ηδε προστάσσει ὡς αἱρετόν, τοῦτο ηδε ἀπαγορεύει ὡς φευκτόν, οὐκέτι ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ἄμα καὶ 175 διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν. εἰ δὲ μᾶτις κατακολουθητέον ἔστιν, ἡτοι τῇ ὅποιαδήποτε οὖν, διότε ἀδύνατον. *〈τὸ μία〉* ἀκολουθεῖν¹ γάρ ισον τῷ πάσαις θέλειν ἐπεσθαι· εἰ γάρ τῇδε προσεκτέον, τί μᾶλλον τῇδε η τῇδε; καὶ ἀναστρόφως. λείπεται δέρα τῇ προκρι-
176 θείσῃ λέγειν δεῖν ἐπεσθαι. ἡτοι οὖν τῇ ὑπὸ ἄλλης προκριθεῖσῃ κατακολουθήσομεν η τῇ ὑφ' ἔαυτῆς. καὶ εἰ μὲν τῇ ὑφ' ἔαυτῆς, ἀπιστος ἔσται, η δεήσει πάσας ἥγεισθαι πιστάς· εἰ γάρ ηδε καθόσον ὑφ' ἔαυτῆς κέκριται ἔστι πιστή, καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ γενήσονται πισταὶ· ἕκαστη γάρ αὐτῶν ὑφ' ἔαυτῆς 177 κέκριται. εἰ δὲ ὑπὸ ἄλλης, δεήσει πάλιν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ἀπιστεῖσθαι· ως γάρ αὐτὴ παρόσον διαφωνεῖ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐδεῖτο κρίσεως, οὕτω καὶ η κρίνουσα αὐτήν, η διαφωνεῖ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ἀγωγαῖς, δεήσεται

¹ *〈τὸ μία〉* ἀκολουθεῖν] ἀκολουθεῖ *mss.*, Bekk.: *〈τὸ ταῦτη〉* ἀκολουθεῖν *Heintz.*

² τῷ N, Heintz: τὸ *mss.*, Bekk. (*iowas ej. Bekk.*).

* With §§ 173-177 cf. P.H. iii. 239.

Those who never have wasted their goods in idle existence. But my fate it is now to be stricken by grievous contentions, Penury, too, and what else doth harry the drones amongst mortals."

And the reason why this is so we may learn if we 173 attend to the following point.^a The art of life which, it is claimed, exists and owing to which they suppose that men are happy, is not one art but many and dissimilar—that, for instance, of Epicurus, and that of the Stoics, and another of the Peripatetics. Either, then, one must follow all alike or one only or none. But to follow them all is impracticable because of 174 their conflicting character ; for what this one enjoins as desirable that one forbids as a thing to be avoided, and it is not feasible both to pursue and avoid simultaneously the same object. And if one ought closely 175 to follow one art, either this is anyone whatsoever, which is impossible ; for then, to follow one is equivalent to being willing to follow them all ; for if we should give heed to this one, why to this one rather than that other ? and conversely. It only remains, then, to say that we ought to follow that one art which has been judged best. Either, then, we shall 176 follow that which is judged best by another art or that which is judged best by itself. And if it is that judged best by itself, it will be distrusted or else we shall have to count them all trustworthy ; for if this one is trustworthy inasmuch as it is judged by itself, the rest also will be trustworthy ; for each of them is judged by itself. But if it is judged by another art, 177 even in this case, again, it will have to be distrusted ; for just as it, in so far as it differs from the rest, needed judgement, so also the art which judges it, in that it differs from the other doctrines, will need

τῆς κρινούσης καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται πιστὸν ἐκείνης κριτήριον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάσαις ἐνδέχεται ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον τέχναις ἀκολουθεῖν 178 μήτε μιᾶ, λείπεται μηδεμιᾶ ἔπειθαι. καὶ ἄλλως, ὡς προεῖπον, πολλῶν οὐσῶν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνῶν κατ' ἀνάγκην δεῖ τὸν μιᾶ τούτων προσ-αναπαυσάμενον κακοδαιμονεῖν, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου προϊόντος λεχθησομένην. ἔκαστος γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώ-πων ἔχεται πάθει τινί· ἥ γὰρ φιλόπλουτος ἔστιν ἥ φιλήδονος ἥ φιλόδοξος. τοιοῦτος δὲ ὁν ὑπ' οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν δογματικῶν ἀγωγῶν δύναται κατα-179 στέλλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν φιλόπλουτος ἥ φιλόδοξος ἐκπυρσεύεται μᾶλλον τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὑπὸ τῆς περι-πατητικῆς φιλοσοφίας, καθ' ἥν ὁ πλούτος καὶ ἡ δόξα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ φιλήδονος προσ-εκκαίεται ὑπὸ τῆς κατὰ Ἐπίκουρον ἀγωγῆς (τέλος γὰρ εὐδαιμονίας ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀποδείκνυται κατ' αὐτὸν), ὁ δὲ φιλόδοξος προσεκτραχηλίζεται εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος πρὸς τῶν στωικῶν λόγων, καθ' οὓς ἡ ἀρετὴ μόνον ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς γινόμενον. 180 πᾶσα οὖν ἡ λεγομένη περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιστήμη τοὺς δογματικοὺς φιλοσόφους ἐπιτείχισμά ἔστι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν ἀλλ' οὐ βοήθεια.

Καν μίαν δὲ δῶμεν εἶναι τέχνην περὶ τὸν βίον, καὶ ταῦτην σύμφωνον, οἷον τὴν στωικήν, οὐδ' οὗτως προσησόμεθα διὰ τὸ πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας 181 αὐτῇ συνεισάγεσθαι κῆρας. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη φρόνησις οὖσα ἔστιν ἀρετή, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν μόνος εἴχεν ὁ σοφός, οἱ στωικοὶ μὴ ὄντες σοφοί οὐχ ἔξουσι φρόνησιν οὐδὲ τέχνην τινὰ περὶ

^a See § 173 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 110 ff. *supra*.

one to judge it, and owing to this fact it will not be a trustworthy criterion of the other. If, then, it is not feasible to follow either all the arts of life or one, it only remains to follow none.—And again: since, as I 178 said above,^a there are many arts of life, he who abides by one of them must necessarily be unhappy, not only for the reasons previously stated^b but also for that which shall be stated as our argument proceeds. For each individual man is subject to a certain affection; for either he is a lover of wealth^c or a lover of pleasure or a lover of fame; and being such, he cannot be calmed down by any of the dogmatic doctrines; nay, the lover of wealth or the lover of 179 fame is further enkindled in his desire by the Peripatetic philosophy, according to which wealth and fame are among the goods^d; and the lover of pleasure is further inflamed by the doctrine of Epicurus (for on his showing pleasure is proved to be the perfection of happiness); and the lover of fame is also plunged headlong into this very affection by the Stoic arguments, according to which virtue alone is good and that which results from virtue. In every case, 180 then, what is called by the Dogmatic philosophers "the science of life" is a bulwark in defence of the evils of mankind rather than an aid against them.

And even if we grant that there is one art of life,^e and this an agreed one,—for instance, the Stoic,—not even so shall we accept it, since along with itself it brings many and diverse calamities. For if the art of 181 life, as consisting in wisdom, is a virtue, and only the Sage possesses virtue, the Stoics not being sages will not possess wisdom nor any art of life, and not possessing

^a Cf. § 120 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 51, 77 *supra*.
With §§ 180-183 cf. P.H. iii. 240-242.

τὸν βίον, μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ ταύτην οὐδὲ ἄλλους διδά-
ξουσιν. εἴπερ τε καὶ αὐτοὺς οὐδεμίᾳ δύναται
συστῆναι τέχνη, οὐδὲ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον συστήσεται.
182 ἀλλὰ μήν τὸ πρῶτον τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. τέχνη γάρ
ἔστι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων, καὶ καταληγθεῖσι
καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις. οὐδεμίᾳ δ’
ἡν̄ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία διὰ τὸ μήτε πᾶσαι ὑπ-
άρχειν φαντασίαν καταληπτικήν, μάχονται γάρ,
μήτε τινὰ διὰ τὴν ἀνεπικρισίαν. μὴ οὖσης δὲ
καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ συγκατάθεσίς της
αὐτῆς γενήσεται, οὐτωσὶ δὲ οὐδὲ κατάληψις. μὴ
οὖσης δὲ καταλήψεως οὐδὲ σύστημα ἐκ κατα-
λήψεων γενήσεται, τουτέστι τέχνη. Ὡς ἀκολουθεῖ
183 τὸ μηδὲ περὶ τὸν βίον εἶναι τινὰ τέχνην. πρὸς
τούτοις ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία κρίνεται κατὰ
τοὺς στωικούς, ὅτι καταληπτική ἔστι, τῷ ἀπὸ¹⁸³
ὑπάρχοντος γενέσθαι καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸ ὑπάρχον
ἐναπομεμαγμένως καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένως· τό δέ
ὑπάρχον δοκιμάζεται, ὅτι ὑπάρχον ἔστιν, ἐκ τοῦ
καταληπτικὴν κινεῖν φαντασίαν. εἰ δὲ ἵνα μὲν ἡ
καταληπτικὴ κρίνηται φαντασία, τὸ ὑπάρχον δεῖ
ἐπεγνώσθαι, ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο καταληφθῇ, τὴν κατα-
ληπτικὴν φαντασίαν βέβαιον εἶναι, ἐκάτερον δὲ διὰ
θάτερόν ἔστιν ἀπιστον, ἀγνωρίστου οὖσης τῆς
καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἀναιρεῖται καὶ ἡ τέχνη,
σύστημα οὖσα ἐκ καταλήψεων.

184 Εἴπερ τε ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιστήμη, τουτέστιν ἡ
φρόνησις, θεωρητικὴ τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ
οὐδετέρων ἔστιν, ἥτοι ἔτέρα καθέστηκε τῶν ἀγαθῶν

this neither will they teach it to others.—Also, if, on their showing, no art can be constructed, neither will the art of life be constructed ; but in fact the first (is true) ; therefore the second (is true). For an art is 182 “ a system constructed of apprehensions,” and apprehension is “ assent to an apprehensive presentation.” But no apprehensive presentation exists ^a because neither is every presentation apprehensive (owing to their conflicting character), nor yet any one of them (owing to their being unjudged). And if an apprehensive presentation does not exist, neither will there be any assent to it, and thus there will not be any apprehension either. And if there is no apprehension, neither will there be a system of apprehensions, that is to say, an art. Wherefrom it follows that there is no art of life either.—Furthermore, according to the Stoicks the apprehensive presentation is judged to be apprehensive by the fact that it proceeds from an existing object and in such a way as to bear the impress and stamp of that existing object ^b ; and the existing object is approved as existent because of its exciting an apprehensive presentation. But if the existent must be ascertained in order that the apprehensive presentation may be judged, and if the apprehensive presentation must be established in order that the existent may be apprehended, and each of these is untrustworthy because of the other,—then, as the apprehensive presentation is unknowable, art also is abolished, it being a system of apprehensions.

Also, if the science of life,—that is, wisdom,—is 184 cognisant of things good and evil and neither,^c either it is other than the goods whereof it is said to be the

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 388 ff.
^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 248, 402, ii. 86.

^c Cf. § 170 *supra*.

ων λέγεται ἐπιστήμη τυγχάνειν, ἡ αὐτῇ ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καθὸ καὶ ὄριζόμενοί τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν φασὶν
 185 “ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς,” καὶ
 εἰ μὲν ἔτέρᾳ ἔστι παρὰ τὰ γαθὰ ὧν λέγεται ἐπι-
 στήμη, οὐδὲ δύναται ἔσται ἐπιστήμη· πᾶσα γὰρ
 ἐπιστήμη ὑπαρκτῶν τινῶν ἔστι γνῶσις, τὰ δὲ
 ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ πρότερον ἐδείξαμεν ἀνύπαρκτα,
 ὥστ’ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη τις ἔσται ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.
 186 εἰ δὲ αὐτῇ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀξιοῦται τῶν ἀγαθῶν
 εἶναι ἐπιστήμη, ἕαντης ἔσται ἐπιστήμη. ὁ πάλιν
 ἄποπον. τὰ γὰρ ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ταῦτα προ-
 επινοεῖται τῆς ἐπιστήμης. οἷον ἰατρικὴ λέγεται
 ἐπιστήμη ὑγειῶν καὶ νοσερῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων·
 ἀλλὰ προφέστηκε τῆς ἰατρικῆς καὶ προηγεῖται τὰ
 ὑγειῶν καὶ νοσερῶν. πάλιν τε ἡ μουσικὴ ἐμμελῶν
 ἔστι καὶ ἐκμελῶν ἐνρύθμων τε καὶ ἐκρύθμων ἐπι-
 στήμη· ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὶν τούτων ἔστιν ἡ μουσικὴ. καὶ
 αὐτοὶ δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἔφασαν ἐπιστήμην ἀλη-
 θῶν τε καὶ φευδῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων· οὐκοῦν προ-
 φέστηκε τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάληθη καὶ φευδῆ καὶ
 οὐθέτερα. εἰ δὴ ἕαντης ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ φρόνησις,
 ὅφείλει προφέσταναι ἕαντης· οὐδὲν δὲ δύναται
 ἕαντον προφέστηκέναι· οὐδὲν ταῦτη τοίνυν ῥήγεον
 εἶναι τινα περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιστήμην.

188 Πᾶσά τε ὑπαρκτὴ τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐκ τῶν
 ἀποδιδομένων ὑπὸ αὐτῆς τεχνικῶν τε καὶ ἐπιστη-
 μονικῶν ἔργων καταλαμβάνεται, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μεν
 ἐκ τῶν ἰατρικῶν γινομένων, κιθαριστικὴ δὲ ἐκ τῶν
 κιθαριστικῶν καὶ ἡδη ζωγραφία καὶ ἀνδριαντοπλα-
 σικὴ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐμφερεῖς. ἡ δέ γε περὶ τὸν βίον

* Cf. § 22 supra.

• Cf. §§ 42-10

science, or it is itself the good, even as some of them assert in their definition—“ Good is virtue or what partakes of virtue.” ^a And if it is other than the goods whereof it is said to be the science, it will not be a science at all; for every science is the knowledge of certain existing things, but we have previously shown ^b that goods and evils are non-existent, so that neither will there exist any science of goods and evils. But if it is itself the good and claims to be the science of the goods, it will be the science of itself; and this again is absurd. For the things which form the object of a science are conceived before the science. Thus medicine is said to be the science of things healthy and morbid and neither; but the healthy and morbid things are in existence before medicine and precede it. And again: Music is the science of things in tune and out of tune, rhythmical and unrhythmical; but previous to these Music does not exist. The Stoics, too, have said that Dialectic ^c 187 is “ the science of things true and false and neither”; so, then, before Dialectic the true and false and neither pre-existed. If, then, wisdom is the science of itself, it must have existed before itself; but nothing can have existed before itself; so that neither in this way can it be asserted that any art of life exists.

Also, every existing art and science is apprehended 188 by means of the artistic and scientific effects which it produces,^d—medicine, for instance, by its medical results, and harp-playing by those of the harper, and painting and sculpture as well, and all arts of a like kind. But the art which is supposed to be conversant

^a Cf. P.H. ii. 94, 247.

^b With §§ 188-189 cf. P.H. iii. 243.

ἀξιούμενη στρέφεσθαι τέχνη οὐδὲν ἔχει συμβεβηκός
ἐνέργημα, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις περὶ¹⁸⁹
τὸν βίον τέχνη· οἰον πολλῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς
στωικοῖς περὶ τε τῆς τῶν παῖδων ἀγωγῆς καὶ περὶ¹⁹⁰
τῆς πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς τιμῆς καὶ ἔτι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς
κατοιχομένους δσιότητος, ὅληγα ἐξ ἑκάστου εἴδους
ἐπιλεξάμενοι δείγματος χάριν προοισόμεθα εἰς τὴν
τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως κατασκευήν.

190 Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν παῖδων ἀγωγῆς ἐν ταῖς δια-
τριβαῖς ὁ αἱρεσιάρχης Ζήνων τοιαῦτά τινα διέξεισν.
“διαμηρίζειν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἥσσον παιδικά
ἢ μὴ παιδικά, μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρρενα· οὐ γάρ ἀλλα
παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς, οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄρρεσιν,
ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντα ἔστιν.” καὶ
πάλιν “διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον; οὐκ ἔγωγε.
πότερον οὐκ ἐπεθύμησας αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ
μάλα. ἀλλὰ ἐπιθυμήσας¹ παρασχεῖν σοι αὐτὸν [ἢ]²
ἔφοβήθης κελεύσαι; μὰ Δί³. ἀλλ’ ἐκέλευσας; καὶ
μάλα. εἴθ⁴ οὐχ ὑπηρέτησε σοι; οὐ γάρ.”

191 περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς τοὺς γονεῖς τιμῆς παράθοιτο ἄν τις
τὰ τῆς μητρομιξίας ὑπ’ αὐτῶν θυλούμενα. καὶ γε
ὅ μὲν Ζήνων τὰ περὶ τῆς Ἰοκάστης καὶ Οἰδίποδος
θεὶς ἴστορούμενα φησὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἔνινὸν τρῆψαι τὴν
μητέρα. “καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀσθενοῦσαν τὸ σῶμα ταῖς
χεροὶ τρύψας ὠφέλει, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν· εἰ δὲ ἐτέρω
μέρει τρύψας, εὑφρανεν³ ὁδυνωμένην παύσας, καὶ
παῖδας ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς γενναίους ποιήσας, τί ἦν
192 αἰσχρόν;” ὁ δὲ Χρύστπος ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατὰ

¹ ἐπιθυμήσας cj. Bekk.: ἐπεθύμησας mss., Bekk.

² [ἢ] secl. Arnim (εἰτ' cj. Bekk.).

* εὑφρανεν Arnim: ἐφ' φενεν mss., Bekk.

with life has no resultant effect, as we shall establish ;
therefore, no art of life exists. Thus, since much is said¹⁸⁹
by the Stoics both about the education of children
and about the honouring of parents, and also about
piety towards the departed, we shall select a few
points under each of these heads by way of illustration
and bring them forward in support of our criticism.

Well then, as regards the education of children,¹⁹⁰
Zeno, the founder of the School, gives the following
exposition in his discourses^a: “Have carnal know-
ledge no less and no more of a favourite than of a
non-favourite child, nor of a female than of a male ;
favourite or non-favourite, males or females, no
different conduct, but the same, befits and is befitting
in respect of all alike.” And again,—“Have you
had intercourse with your beloved one ? I have not.
Did you not desire to have intercourse with him ?
Certainly. But, though desiring to win him for
yourself, were you afraid of inviting him ? Not at
all. But you invited him ? Certainly. Then he did
not yield to you ? He did not.”—And with regard¹⁹¹
to honouring one’s parents one might adduce the
cases of incest which they harp upon. Thus Zeno,
after stating the facts about Jocasta and Oedipus,
asserts that there was nothing dreadful in his rubbing
his mother. “If she had been ailing and he had done
her good by rubbing her body with his hands, it had
not been shameful ; what shame was it, then, if he
stopped her grief and gave her joy by rubbing her
with another member, and begat noble children by
his mother ?” And Chrysippus, in his *State* says¹⁹²

^a With §§ 190-196 cf. P.H. iii. 245-249. The Stoics seem to
have derived these ugly tenets from the Cynics ; cf. P.H.
200 n.

λέξιν φησὶν οὕτως· “δοκεῖ μοι καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως διεξάγειν¹ καθάπερ καὶ νῦν οὐ κακῶς παρὰ πολλοὺς εἴθισται, ὥστε καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ τεκνοποιεῖσθαι καὶ² τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τῆς θυγατρὸς καὶ τὸν δόμομήτριον ἐκ τῆς δόμομητρίας.” δεῖγμα δὲ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς κατοιχομένους αὐτῶν ὀσιότητος γένοιτ’ ἄν καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωποφαγίας παραγγελλόμενα· οὐ γάρ μόνον ἀξιούσι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἐσθίειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν σάρκας, εἰ ποτε 193 τύχοι τι μέρος τοῦ σώματος ἀποκοπέν. λέγεται δ’ ἐν τῷ περὶ δικαιούσης ὑπὸ Χρυσίππου ταῦτι· “καὶ ἄν τῶν μελῶν ἀποκοπῆ τι μέρος πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν χρήσιμον, μήτε κατορύπτειν αὐτὸν μήτε ἄλλως ρίπτειν, ἀναλίσκειν δὲ αὐτόν, ὅπως ἔκ³ τῶν ἡμετέρων 194 ἔτερον μέρος γένηται.” ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος περὶ τῆς τῶν γονέων ταφῆς διεξερχόμενος ῥῆτως φησὶν “ἀπογενομένων δὲ τῶν γονέων ταφᾶς χρηστέον τὰς ἀπλουστάτας, ὡς ἄν τοῦ σώματος καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν οὐδὲν ὄντος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐδ’ ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ πολυνωρίας προσδεομένων ἡμῶν τοιαύτης τινός. διὸ καὶ χρησίμων μὲν ὄντων τῶν κρεῶν τροφῆς χρήσονται αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἴδιων μερῶν, οἷον ποδὸς ἀποκοπέντος ἐπέβαλλε χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις ἀχρείων δὲ ὄντων αὐτῶν ἢ κατορύζαντες τὸ μυῆμα ἐποίσουσιν, ἢ κατακαύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἀφήσουσιν, ἢ μακρότερον ρίψαντες οὐδεμίαν ἐπιστροφῆν αὐτῶν ποιήσονται καθάπερ ὄνυχος ἢ τριχῶν.” 195 Ωδε μὲν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, ἐπακτέον δ’ αὐτοῖς τὸ

¹ διεξάγειν Fabr.: ἔξαγαγεν mss., Bekk.

² τὴν . . . καὶ add. Fabr.

³ ἔκ add. Mutsch.

expressly: “I approve of carrying out those practices—which, quite rightly, are customary even nowadays amongst many peoples—according to which *⟨the mother has children by her son, and⟩ the father by his daughter, and the brother by his full sister.*”—And their recommendations concerning cannibalism may serve as an example of their piety towards the departed; for they deem it right to eat not only the dead but even their own flesh, if ever any part of their body should happen to be cut off. This is what is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise *On Justice*:—“And if any part of the limbs be cut off that is good 193 for food, we should neither bury it nor otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from our parts a new part may arise.” And in his book *On Duty*, when 194 discoursing about the burial of parents, he says expressly: “When our parents decease we should use the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like nails or hair—were nothing to us, and we need bestow on it no care or attention of that kind. Hence, also, when their flesh is good for food, men shall make use of it, just as also of their own parts,—when, for instance, a foot is cut off it is proper for them to use it, and things like it; but when the flesh is not good, either they shall bury it and lay the mound upon it, or burn it up and scatter the ashes, or cast it far away and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”

Such is the Stoics’ doctrine; but against them we 195

ἀκόλουθον τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως. ἦτοι γὰρ οὕτω παραγγέλλουσι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὡς μελλόντων αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων ἡ ὡς μὴ χρησομένων. καὶ ὡς χρησομένων μὲν οὐδαμῶς· οἱ γὰρ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, εἴ μή τι παρὰ Λαιστρυγόσι καὶ Κύκλωψι δεήσει βιοῦν, παρ’ οὓς θεμιτόν ἔστιν

ἀνδρόμεα κρέας ἔδειν καὶ ἐπ’ ἄκρητον γάλα πίνειν.

196 εἰ δ’ ὡς μὴ χρησομένων, παρέλκουσα γίνεται ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη, ἥς ἡ χρῆσίς ἔστιν ἀδύνατος· ὡς γὰρ ἐν τυφλῶν δήμως ἄχρηστός ἔστι ζωγραφία, βλεπόντων γὰρ ἡ τέχνη, καὶ δὲ τρόπον ἐν πόλει κωφῶν ἀνόνητός ἔστι κιθαριστική, ἀκούοντας γὰρ τέρπει, οὕτω καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνη πρὸς μηδέν ἔστι τοῦς μὴ διναμένους αὐτῇ χρῆσθαι.

197 Καὶ μὴν πᾶσα τέχνη, ἔάν τε θεωρητικὴ καθεστήκη ὡς γεωμετρία καὶ ἀστρολογικὴ, ἔάν τε πρακτικὴ ὡς ὁπλομαχητική, ἔάν τε ἀποτελεσματικὴ ὡς ζωγραφία καὶ ἀνδριαντοπλαστική, ἕδιον ἔχει ἔργον φύσις διαφέρει τῶν ἀλλων διαβέσεων, *(τῆς δὲ φρονήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἕδιον ἔργον)*,¹ ὡς παραστῆσα· οὐκ ἄρα τέχνη τίς ἔστι περὶ τὸν βίον ἡ φρόνησις. ὡς γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν μουσικοῦν καὶ ἀμούσουν, τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστι μουσικόν, καὶ τὸ κοινὸν γραμματικοῦν καὶ ἀγραμμάτου, τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστι γραμματικόν, οὕτω καὶ συλληθῆδην τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ τεχνίτου καὶ ἀτέχνου, τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστι τεχνικόν. διόπερ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φρονίμου καὶ ἀφρονος κοινὸν οὐκ ἄν εἴη τῆς φρονήσεως 199 ἕδιον ἔργον. πᾶν δέ γε τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου γίνε-

¹ *(τῆς . . . ἔργον)* add. N.

must bring the next point in our criticism. Either they enjoin these actions with the idea that young people will perform them or with the idea that they will not perform them. But certainly not with the idea that they will perform them; for the laws forbid them, unless it shall be their lot to live amongst the Laestrygones and Cyclopes, where it is permissible—Human flesh to devour, and pure milk swallow thereafter.^a

And if they enjoin them with the idea that they will 196 not perform them, the art of life becomes redundant, as the practice of it is impossible. For just as painting is useless in a country of the blind (for this art is for men who have sight), and just as harp-playing is valueless in a city of the deaf (for it is those who have hearing that it delights), so also the art of life is of no benefit to those who are unable to make use of it.

Moreover, every art,^b whether it be theoretical, 197 like geometry and astronomy, or practical, like the military art, or creative, like painting and sculpture, possesses a special work of its own whereby it differs from the other states of mind, *(whereas there is no special work which belongs to wisdom)*, as I shall establish; therefore wisdom is not an art of life. For just as the work common to the musical 198 man and the unmusical is not music, and the work common to the literary and the non-literary is not literature, so too, in general, the work common to the artistic and the non-artistic is not artistry. Hence also the work common to the wise man and the unwise will not be the special work of wisdom. But in fact every work which seems to be done by 199

^a Homer, *Odyss.* ix. 297.

^b With §§ 197-199 cf. P.H. iii. 243.

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σθαι δοκοῦν ἔργον, τοῦτο κοινὸν εὑρίσκεται καὶ τοῦ μὴ φρονίμου ἔργον· οἷον ἐάν τε τιμᾶν γονεῖς θώμεθα τοῦ φρονίμου ἔργον, ἐάν τε τὸ παρακαταθήκην ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς πιστεύσασιν, ἐάν τ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τοὺς μὴ σπουδαίους εὑρήσομεν τούτων τι ποιοῦντας. ὥστε μηδὲν ἴδιον εἶναι τοῦ σοφοῦ ἔργον, φὰ διοίσει τῶν μὴ σοφῶν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ φρόνησις ἔσται τέχνη τις περὶ τὸν βίον, ἡς ἴδιον οὐδὲν τεχνικόν ἔστιν ἔργον.

200 Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦθ' ὑπαντῶντές φασι πάντα μὲν κοινὰ εἶναι καὶ πάντων τὰ ἔργα, διορίζεσθαι δὲ τῷ ἀπὸ τεχνικῆς διαθέσεως ἢ ἀπὸ ἀτέχνου γίνεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι γονέων καὶ ἄλλων τιμᾶν γονεῖς τοῦ σπουδαίου ἔστιν ἔργον, ἀλλὰ σπουδαίου

201 τὸ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως τοῦτο ποιεῖν· καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν ὑγιάζειν κοινὸν ἔστι τοῦ τε ἰατροῦ καὶ ἴδιωτου, τὸ δὲ ἰατρικῶς ὑγιάζειν τοῦ τεχνίτου ἴδιον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς γονεῖς κοινὸν τοῦ τε σπουδαίου καὶ μὴ σπουδαίου, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ φρονήσεως τιμᾶν τοὺς γονεῖς ἴδιον τοῦ σοφοῦ, ὥστε καὶ τέχνην αὐτὸν ἔχειν περὶ τὸν βίον, ἡς ἴδιόν ἔστιν ἔργον τὸ ἔκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἀπὸ ἀρίστης διαθέσεως πράγτειν.

202 Ἕοίκασι δ' οἱ ταῦτη χρώμενοι τῇ ὑπαντήσει ἐθελοκωφέιν καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιζητούμενόν τι λέγειν. ἡμῶν γὰρ ἀντικρυς δεικνύντων ὅτι οὐδὲν ἴδιόν ἔστι τοῦ φρονούντος ἔργον, φὰ διαφέρει τῶν μὴ φρονίμων, ἀλλὰ πάν τὸ γυνόμενον ὑπὸ αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ σπουδαίων γίνεσθαι, αὐτοὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἵσχυσαν ἀνέλειν, ἔξωθεν δέ φασιν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν ἔργον ὅτὲ μὲν ἀπὸ φρονίμης

the wise man is found to be a work common also to the unwise ; if, for example, we count honouring parents as a work of the wise man, or rendering back a deposit to those who have entrusted it, or any other thing of the kind, we shall also find men who are not virtuous doing any one of these things. So that there is no work peculiar to the wise man whereby he shall differ from the not wise. And if this is so, neither will wisdom be an art of life, as it has no artistic work peculiar to itself.

But in reply to this they say that although all the 200 works are common to all men, yet they are distinguished by their proceeding either from an artistic or from a non-artistic disposition. For the work of the virtuous man is not that of caring for his parents and generally honouring his parents, but doing this because of wisdom is the act of the virtuous ; and just 201 as procuring health is common both to the medical man and to the layman, but to procure health medically is peculiar to the man of art, so also honouring one's parents is common both to the virtuous man and the non-virtuous, but the honouring of his parents because of wisdom is peculiar to the wise man, so that he possesses also an art of life, of which the special work is the performance of each of his actions from the best disposition.—But those who make this 202 reply would seem to be wilfully deaf, and doing anything rather than answer the question before them. For when we were definitely proving that there is no work peculiar to the wise man whereby he differs from the not wise, but everything which is done by him is done also by those who are not virtuous, the Stoics were unable to disprove this ; but they assert irrelevantly that the work common to both proceeds in

203 γίνεται διαθέσεως ὅτὲ δὲ ἀπὸ φαύλης. ὅπερ ἀπόδειξις μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι κοινὸν ἔργον τῶν τε φρονίμων καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστιν, δεῖται δὲ <αὐτὸ>¹ ἀποδεῖξεως, ζητήσαντος ἂν των πόθεν γε διαγνώσομεθα πότε γίνεται ταῦτα ἀπὸ φρονίμης διαθέσεως καὶ πότε οὐ γίνεται· αὐτὰ γάρ τὰ κοινὰ ἔργα τοῦτον οὐκ ἐμφαίνει, παρόσον ἔστι κοινά.

204 ἐνθεν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ἰατρικῆς κομισθὲν ὑπόδειγμα κατ’ αὐτῶν μᾶλλον εὐρίσκεται. ὅταν γάρ φώσι τὸ ὑγιάζειν κοινὸν ἰατροῦ τε καὶ οὐκ ἰατροῦ καθεστηκὸς ἔξαίρετον γίνεσθαι τοῦ τεχνίτου, ἐπειδὴν ἰατρικῶς ὄποτε λεσθῆ, τότε ἥτοι ἵσασι τι διαφόρως γνωμένουν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ παρὰ τὸν ἴδιωτην, οἷον τὸ συντόμως καὶ ἀπόνως καὶ μετὰ τάξεως καὶ ποιότητος, ἡ οὐκ ἵσασιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα 205 κοινὰ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν ὑπελήφασιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἵσασιν, αὐτόθεν ἴδιον τι τοῦ ἰατροῦ φαινόμενον ἔργον ἀμολογήκασιν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἀκόλουθον ἦν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτου μετελθίσιν διδάσκειν καὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ τι ἴδιον ἔργον, φῶ διοίσει τοῦ μὴ σοφοῦ. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἵσασιν ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ γνωμένον, τοῦτο ἔροῦσι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἴδιωτου γίνεσθαι, ἀφελοῦνται τοῦ ἰατροῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον καὶ ἀπαραλλαξίας οὕσης κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐν τοῖς γνωμένοις ἔργοις οὐ διαγνώσονται τόν τε τεχνίτην καὶ τὸν ἀτέχνον, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τεχνικῆς διαθέσεως ἐνεργούμενον οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ ἀτέχνου, διὰ τὸ μηδὲ τὴν καθ’ ἔκαστον [ἀφανῆ]² διάθεσων ἐξ ἕαυτῆς δύνασθαι γνωρίζεσθαι οὖσαν

¹ <αὐτὸ> addo.

² [ἀφανῆ] scil. Heintz.

• Cf. § 201 supra.

the one case from a wise disposition and in the other from a foolish. But this is not a proof that there is no work common both to those who are wise and those who are not so, but itself needs proof, since one might inquire how we are to discern when these works proceed, and when they do not proceed, from a wise disposition; for the common works themselves do not make this clear, inasmuch as they are common.—Hence, too, the example brought forward from the art of medicine^a is found to tell rather against them. For when they assert that procuring health, which is a thing common both to the medical and the non-medical man, belongs specially to the man of art when it is effected medically, then either they know that there is some difference in what is done by the doctor as compared with the layman,—the work being, for instance, rapid and painless and done systematically and on a definite plan,—or else they do not know this, but conceive that all these things are also common to laymen. And if they know it, they are directly confessing that there is an apparent work which is peculiar to the doctor, and their next task is to pass on from this and to show that there is also a work peculiar to the wise man, wherein he will differ from the not wise. But if they do not know it, but shall declare that everything which is done by the doctor is also done by the layman, they will be robbing the doctor of his own peculiar work, and,—since there exists, apparently, exact similarity in the works executed,—they will not distinguish between the expert and the non-expert, nor between what is performed by an artistic disposition and by a non-artistic, because the disposition of the individual cannot be discerned of itself, as it is non-apparent.

206 ἀφανῆ. τοίνυν οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ αὐτοὺς τὸ ὁμολογεῖν
μὲν κοινὰ εἶναι τὰ ὑπό τε τοῦ σοφοῦ γνόμενα
ἔργα καὶ τὰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ, διαφέρειν δ' αὐτὰ
(φάναι)¹ τῷ νυνὶ μὲν ἀπὸ φρονίμης γίνεσθαι δια-
θέσεως νυνὶ δὲ ἀπὸ ἄφρονος.

"Ἄλλοι δέ εἰσιν οἱ τῷ διομαλισμῷ καὶ τάξει ταῦτα
207 διορίζεσθαι νομίζοντες. καθὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν μέσων
τεχνῶν ἴδιον ἔστι τοῦ τεχνίτου τό τε τεταγμένως
τι ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀποτελέσμασι διομαλίζειν
(ποιήσαι γὰρ ἄν ποτε καὶ ἰδιώτης τὸ τεχνικὸν
ἔργον, ἀλλὰ σπανίως καὶ οὐ πάντοτε, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ
αὐτὸν καὶ ὡσαύτως), ὥδε καὶ τοῦ μὲν φρονίμου
φασὶν ἔργον εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασι διομαλί-
208 ζειν, τοῦ δὲ ἄφρονος τούναντίον. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ
οὗτοι οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν περὶ τῆς
ἐν χερσὶ ζητήσεως διαταττόμενοι. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τίνα
βίου τάξιν κατὰ τεχνικὸν λόγον ὡρισμένως εἰρη-
μένην εὐχῇ μᾶλλον ἔσικεν. πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς
τὰς τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων πραγμάτων διαφορὰς καὶ
ποικιλίας ἀρτιζόμενος οὐδέποτε δύναται τὴν αὐτὴν
τάξιν φυλάπτειν, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔμφρων τό τε
ἀστατον τῆς τύχης καὶ τὸ ἀβέβαιον τῶν πραγμάτων
209 ἐννοούμενος. ἀλλως τε, εἴπερ μίαν καὶ ὡρισμένην
εἶχε βίου τάξιν ὁ φρόνιμος, κανὸν ἐκ ταύτης ἐναργῶς
κατείληπτο τοῖς μὴ φρονίμοις· οὐχὶ δέ γε κατα-
λαμβάνεται τούτοις· τοίνυν οὐδὲ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως τῶν
ἔργων ληπτός ἔστιν ὁ φρόνιμος. ὅθεν εἰ πᾶσα μὲν
τέχνη ἐκ τῶν ἴδιων ἔργων φαίνεται, τῆς δὲ φρονή-

¹ *φάναι* add. c.j. Heintz.

So then, it does not profit them at all to agree that the works performed by the wise man and by the not wise are common to both, while alleging that they differ by being done in the one case from a wise disposition, in the other from an unwise.

But there are others who think that these works are distinguished by *(the presence or absence of)* unvarying quality and order. For just as in the case of the intermediate arts^a it is the peculiarity of the artist to produce a thing in an orderly way and to be unvarying in his products (for the layman, too, may at times produce an artistic work, but rarely and not at all times, nor consistently and in the same way),—so also they say that the work of the wise man is to be unvarying in his right actions, and that of the unwise the opposite. But these men, 208 too, are evidently not dealing with the question in hand according to the real state of the facts. For that there exists some order of life definitely formulated by the artistic reason seems rather like an illusory hope. For no man, in preparing himself to meet the different and varied occurrences, is ever able to preserve the same order,^b and, least of all, the wise man who is aware both of the instability of fortune and the insecurity of events. And besides, if the 209 wise man had a single definite order of life, he would also have been plainly recognized through this by the not wise; but in fact he is not recognized by them; so then, the wise man cannot be discerned through the order of his works. Hence, if every art is apparent through its own special works, whereas

^a With §§ 207-209 cf. P.H. iii. 243-244. By "intermediate" is meant "common" or "vulgar" arts (cf. *ἐς μέσον*, "in public").

^b i.e. rule of life, programme of conduct.

σεως οὐδέν ἔστιν ὕδιον ἔργον ἐξ οὐδ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἀν
εἴη τις τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον ἡ φρόνησις.

210 Καὶ μὴν εἰ τέχνη τίς ἔστι περὶ τὸν βίον ἡ φρό-
νησις, οὐκ ἄλλον ἀν τινα μᾶλλον ὠφέλησεν ἢ τὸν
κεκτημένον αὐτὴν σοφὸν, ἐγκράτειαν αὐτῷ παρα-
σχομένη ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὸ κακὸν¹ ὅρμαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς
ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ¹ ἀφορμαῖς. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸν σοφὸν
ὠφελεῖ ἡ φρόνησις, ὡς παραστήσομεν οὐκ ἄρα
211 τέχνη τίς ἔστι περὶ τὸν βίον. ὁ γὰρ λεγόμενος
ἐγκρατῆς σοφὸς ἦτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται ἐγκρατής,
καθόσον ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ γίνεται ὅρμη τῇ πρὸς τὸ κακὸν
καὶ ἀφορμῇ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἢ καθόσον ἔχει μὲν
φαύλας ὅρμὰς περικρατεῖ δὲ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ
κατὰ μὲν τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσι οὐκ
ἄν λεχθείη ἐγκρατῆς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ κρατήσει οὐδ οὐκ
212 ἔχει. καὶ φτρόπω αὐκ ἀν εἴποι τις τὸν εὐνοῦχον
ἐγκρατῆ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων μῖξιν καὶ τὸν κακοστο-
μαχοῦντα πρὸς ἔδεσμάτων ἀπόλαυσιν (οὐδὲ ὅλως
γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπιζήτησις τις γίνεται τούτων, ἵνα
καὶ ἐγκρατῶς κατεξαναστώσι τῆς ἐπιζήτησεως), τῷ
αὐτῷ τρόπῳ οὐδὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἐγκρατῆ ρήτεον διὰ τὸ
213 μὴ φύεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ οὐδ ἔσται ἐγκρατής. εἰ δὲ
κατὰ τοῦτο ἀξιώσουσιν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἐγκρατῆ,
καθόσον γίνεται μὲν ἐν φαύλαις κρίσεσι περιγίνεται
δ' αὐτῶν τῷ λόγῳ, πρῶτον μὲν δώσουσι τὸ ὅπι
οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν αὐτὸν ἡ φρόνησις ἀκμὴν ἐν ταρα-
χαῖς ὄντα καὶ βοηθείας δεόμενον, εἴτα καὶ κακοδαι-
214 μονέστερον τῶν φαύλων εὑρίσκεσθαι. ή μὲν γὰρ
ὅρμῃ ἐπὶ τι, πάντως ταράσσεται, ή δὲ περικρατεῖ

¹ κακὸν . . . ἀγαθοῦ Heintz: ἀγαθὸν . . . κακοῦ MSS., Bekk.

of wisdom there is no special work through which it is apparent, then wisdom will not be an art of life.

Moreover, if wisdom is an art of life,^a it would have 210 benefited no one more than the wise man who possesses it, by furnishing him with self-control in his inclinations towards evil and in his disinclinations towards good. But wisdom does not in fact benefit the wise man, as we shall establish; therefore it is not an art of life. For the wise man who is termed 211 "self-controlled" is termed self-controlled either in respect of the fact that he has no inclination towards evil or disinclination towards good, or in respect of the fact that he has foolish inclinations but keeps them in control by his reason. But in respect of his not forming foolish judgements he will not be called self-controlled; for he will not control what he has not got. And just as one would not call the eunuch self- 212 controlled as regards sexual intercourse, nor the man with a bad stomach as regards the enjoyment of food (for they do not possess any appetite at all for these things, so that through self-control they might rise superior to the appetite),—in the same way one ought not to call the wise man self-controlled because the thing which he is to keep in control does not arise in him. And if they shall maintain that he is self- 213 controlled in respect of the fact that he forms foolish judgements but keeps them in control by his reason, they will be granting, firstly, that his wisdom has not benefited him at all, as he is still beset by perturbations and needing succour, and, secondly, that he is found to be even more unhappy than the foolish. For in that he has an inclination for something he 214 is certainly perturbed, and in that he controls it by

^a With §§ 210-215 cf. P.H. iii. 273-277.

τῷ λόγῳ, συνέχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ κακόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
μᾶλλον ταράττεται τοῦ φαύλου μηκέτι τοῦτο πά-
σχοντος· οὐ μὲν γὰρ ὄρμῃ, ταράττεται, ἢ δὲ τυγ-
χάνει τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων, ὑπεκλυομένην ἰσχει τὴν
215 ταραχήν. οὐ τοίνυν ἐγκρατής γίνεται ὅσον ἐπὶ²¹⁵
τῇ φρονήσει ὁ σοφός· η̄ εἴπερ γίνεται, πάντων
ἀνθρώπων κακοδαιμονέστερος γίνεται. ἀλλ' εἰ
ἐκάστη τέχνῃ τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτὴν ὡφελεῖ μᾶλλον,
δέδεικται δὲ η̄ περὶ τὸν βίον ἀξιομένη τυγχάνειν
τέχνη μηδὲ τὸν κεκτημένον ὡφελούσα, ρήτεον μὴ
εἶναι τινα περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην.

Z'.—ΕΙ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΤΕΧΝΗ

216 Δυνάμει μὲν οὖν συναποδέδεικται τῷ μὴ εἶναι
τινα περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην τὸ μηδὲ διδακτήν αὐτῆν
καθεστάναι· τῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων οὐ γίνεται μάθησις.
ὅμως δὲ ἐκ περιττοῦ συγχωρήσαντες αὐτῆς τὴν
217 ὑπαρξίαν διδάσκωμεν ὡς ἔστιν ἀδιδάκτος. πολὺς
μὲν οὖν καὶ ποικίλος ἔστι παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ
περὶ τῆς μαθήσεως λόγος· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς γε τὰ κυριώ-
τατα ἐπιλεξάμενοι θήσομεν, ὃν τὰ μὲν κοινότερον
ἐπιχειρεῖται παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς τὸ μηδὲν
εἶναι μάθησιν, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδιαίτερον λέγεται περὶ²¹⁷
αὐτῆς τῆς φρονήσεως. τάξει δὲ πρώτας σκοπῶμεν
τὰς κοινοτέρας ἐπιχειρήσεις.

218 Ἐπὶ πάσης τοίνυν μαθήσεως ὄμολογεῖσθαι δεῖ τὸ
τε διδασκόμενον πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸν διδάσκοντα καὶ
τὸν μανθάνοντα καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς μαθήσεως.
οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἔστιν ὄμολογον, ὡς δεῖξομεν· οὐκ
ἄρα ἔστι τις μάθησις. καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἐμνήσθημεν
τοῦ διδασκομένου πράγματος, περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον
219 ἀπορητέον. εἰ γὰρ διδάσκεται τι πρᾶγμα, η̄τοι τὸ

his reason he retains the evil within himself and is, on this account, more perturbed than the fool who is no longer affected in this way; for the latter is perturbed in that he feels inclination, but in that he obtains the things desired he has his perturbation gradually diminished. So then the wise man is not 215 self-controlled in virtue of his wisdom; or if he is so, he is of all men the most unhappy. But if every art especially benefits him who possesses it, and it has been shown that that which is, as they maintain, the art of life does not even benefit its possessor, one must declare that there does not exist any art of life.

CHAPTER VII.—CAN THE ART OF LIFE BE TAUGHT?

Now in the proof that no art of life exists there is 216 virtually involved the proof that it is incapable of being taught; for there is no learning of non-existent things. However, let us concede, gratuitously, that it exists, and let us teach that it cannot be taught. Now amongst the philosophers the arguments about 217 learning are many and varied; but we, for our part, shall select and state the most important points, of which some are the more general criticisms of the Sceptics which go to show that learning is nothing, and others the more special discussions of wisdom itself. And first in order let us consider the more general criticisms.

In every instance, then, of learning there ought to 218 be agreement regarding the subject taught and the teacher and the learner and the mode of learning; but, as we shall show, none of these things is agreed; therefore no learning exists. And since we have mentioned first the subject taught, we must raise questions about it first. Now if any subject is taught, 219

δὸν διδάσκεται ἡ τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται, ὡς δείξομεν, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς παραμυθησόμεθα· οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται τι πρᾶγμα. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὃν οὐδὲν διδάσκεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν, ὥστ' 220 οὐδὲ τὸ διδάσκεσθαι. καὶ ἀλλως, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν· τῶν γὰρ ἀληθῶν ἔστιν ἡ μάθησις. εἰ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ὄν, εὐθὺς καὶ ὑπαρκτὸν γενήσεται· ἀληθὲς γοῦν φασὶν οἱ στωικοὶ ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειται τινι. ἄποπον δέ γε τὸ μὴ ὄν ὑπάρχειν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ μὴ ὄν διδά-
221 σκεται. τό γε μὴν διδασκόμενον κινοῦν φαν-
τασίαν διδάσκεται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐ δύναται κινεῖν φαντασίαν· οὐκ ἄρα διδακτόν ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν. πρὸς
τούτοις, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς διδάσκεται· τῶν γὰρ ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων ἔστι τάληθες. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς διδάσκεται, πᾶν τὸ διδασκόμενόν ἔστι ψεῦδος. ἄποπον δέ γε πᾶν τὸ διδασκόμενον εἶναι ψεῦδος· οὐ τοίνυν τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται. ἐπεὶ τοι εἴπερ τὸ μὴ ὄν διδάσκεται, ηγοι καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι διδάσκεται, ἡ κατ' ἄλλο τι. καθὰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, οὐ διδάσκεται· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν καθὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν ὄν διδα-
χθῆσεται, ὅπερ ἄποπον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι· τὸ γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥστ' 222 οὐκ ἄν διδαχθείν τὸ μὴ ὄν. λείπεται οὖν λέγειν τὸ ὄν διδάσκεσθαι· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀδυνάτων δείξομεν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὄν διδάσκεται, ηγοι καθὸ ὄν

* With §§ 219-223 cf. P.H. iii. 256-258.

^b Cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 10.

either the existent is taught or the non-existent.^a But neither is the existent taught, as we shall show, nor the non-existent, as we shall argue; therefore no subject is taught. Now the non-existent is not taught; for it has no property, so that it has not that of being taught. And besides, if the non-existent is 220 taught, the non-existent will be true; for learning is of things true. And if the non-existent shall be true, it will straightway be real as well: for certainly the Stoics say that "the true is that which is real and is opposed to something."^b But it is absurd that the non-existent should be real. Therefore the non-existent is not taught. And, certainly, what is taught excites an impression when being taught, but the non-existent cannot excite an impression; therefore the non-existent is not capable of being taught. Furthermore, if the non-existent is taught, nothing 221 true is taught; for the true belongs to the class of things existent and real. And if nothing true is taught, everything which is taught is false. But it is, in fact, absurd that everything which is taught should be false; so then the non-existent is not taught. For, of course, if the non-existent is taught, it is taught either in virtue of its non-existence or in virtue of something else. Now it is not taught in virtue of its non-existence; for if the non-existent is taught in virtue of its non-existence, nothing existent will be taught; which is absurd. Nor yet in virtue of something else; for that "something else" exists, but the non-existent does not exist. So that the non-existent will not be taught.—It remains then to say that the existent is 222 taught; and this too we shall prove to be a thing impossible. For if the existent is taught, it is either

ἔστιν ἡ κατ' ἄλλο τι. καὶ εἰ μὲν καθὸ ὅν ἔστι διδάσκεται, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀδίδακτον· εἰ δὲ τῶν ὄντων οὐδέν ἔστιν ἀδίδακτον, οὐδέ γε ἔσται τὸ διδασκόμενον· δεῖ γάρ ἀδίδακτόν τι εἶναι, ὥν ἐκ τούτου μάθησις γένηται. ὥστε καθὸ μὲν ὅν ἔστιν, οὐκ ἄν 223 διδαχθείη τὸ ὅν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι· τὸ γάρ ὅν οὐκ ἔχει ἄλλο τι¹ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὅπερ μὴ ὅν ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ ὅν ἔστιν. ὥστ' εἰ τὸ ὅν καθὸ ὅν ἔστιν οὐ διδάσκεται, οὐδὲ κατ' ἄλλο τι διδαχθήσεται· ἐκεῖνο γάρ ὀτιποτέ ἔστιν ἄλλο συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῷ, ὅν ἔστιν. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ὅν διδάσκεται μήτε τὸ μὴ ὅν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων διδάσκεται.

224 Καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ τῶν τινῶν τὰ μέν ἔστι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα, εἰ διδάσκεται τι, ἦτοι τὸ σῶμα διδάσκεται ἡ τὸ ἀσώματον οὔτε δὲ τὸ σῶμα διδάσκεται οὔτε τὸ ἀσώματον οὐκ ἄρα διδάσκεται τι. τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα οὐ διδάσκεται, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λεκτὰ γάρ ἔστι τὰ 225 διδασκόμενα, σῶμα δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὰ λεκτά. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ σῶμα μήτε αἰσθητόν ἔστι μήτε νοητόν ἔστιν, οὐ διδάσκεται τὸ σῶμα. δεῖ γάρ τὸ διδασκόμενον ἡ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι ἡ νοητόν, μηθέτερον δὲ ὅν οὐ διδάσκεται. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὔτε αἰσθητόν ἔστιν οὔτε νοητόν ἔστι τὸ σῶμα, παρεστάκαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς 226 τοὺς φυσικούς. ἔάν τε γάρ ἀθροισμός τις ἡ τὸ σῶμα, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, μεγέθους καὶ σχή-

¹ < τὸ . . . τι> add. Heintz.

* With §§ 224-231 cf. P.H. iii. 255. "Something" was the highest category of the Stoics, cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxvi.

in virtue of its existence or in virtue of something else. But if it is taught in virtue of its existence, nothing will be untaught ; and if of existing things none is untaught, neither will there exist anything taught ; for something untaught must exist in order that from it learning may come about. So that the existent will not be taught in virtue of its existence. Nor yet in virtue of something else ; (for the existent has no other) property belonging to it which is non-existent, but every property which belongs to it is existent. So that if the existent is not taught in virtue of its existence, neither will it be taught in virtue of something else ; for that other property, whatsoever it be, which belongs to it is existent. If, then, neither the existent is taught nor the non-existent, and besides these there is no other alternative, no existing thing is taught.

And again^a : since of the "Somethings" some are 224 bodies, others incorporeal, if something is taught either it is a body that is taught or an incorporeal ; but neither is the body taught nor the incorporeal ; therefore nothing is taught. Now the body is not taught, according to the Stoics especially ; for the things taught are "expressions," and expressions are not bodies.^b And besides, if the body is neither 225 sensible nor intelligible, the body is not taught. For what is taught must be either sensible or intelligible, and if it is neither it is not taught. And the fact that body is neither sensible nor intelligible we have established in our treatise *Against the Physicists*.^c For whether body is, as Epicurus asserts, a combina- 226

^a For the incorporeality of "expressions" (*λεκτά*) cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 12; *P.H.* ii. 81.

^b See *Adv. Phys.* i. 437-439, 361 ff.; cf. *P.H.* ii. 47 ff.

ματος και ἀντιτυπίας, ἐάν τε τὸ τὰς τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ κατὰ σύνοδον πλειόνων λαμβανόμενον οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ λογικῆς τινὸς δυνάμεως, οὐκ ἔσται τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ εἰ αἰσθητὸν δὲ ὑπάρχοι, πάλιν ἀδίδακτον γενήσεται· τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν οὐδέν διδάσκεται, οἷον οὐδεὶς λευκὸν ὄρδινα μανθάνει, οὐδὲ γλυκέος γεύεσθαι, οὐδὲ ὑπό τινος εὐνωδίζεσθαι ψύχεσθαι ἀλειάνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδίδακτός ἔστιν ἡ πάντων τούτων ἀντίληψις. οὕτε τοίνυν αἰσθητὸν ἔστι τὸ σῶμα, οὐτ' εἰ αἰσθητὸν 228 ὑπάρχει, κατὰ τοῦτον ἔσται διδακτόν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὡς νοητὸν δύναται διδάσκεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ μήτε τὸ μῆκος κατ' ἴδιαν ἔστι σῶμα μήτε τὸ πλάτος μήτε τὸ βάθος, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων σύνθετον, δεῖται πάντων ἀσωμάτων ὄντων καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀθροισμα ἐννοεῖν ἀσώματον καὶ οὐ σῶμα· διὰ δὲ 229 τοῦτο καὶ ἀδίδακτον εἶναι τὸ σῶμα. τῶν τε σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἔστιν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά. διόπερ εἰ διδάσκεται τὸ σῶμα, ἥτοι τὸ αἰσθητὸν διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ νοητόν. οὕτε δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν διδάσκεται διὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πᾶσι πρόδηλον ὑπάρχειν, οὕτε τὸ νοητὸν διὰ τὴν ἀδηλότητα καὶ τὴν ἀνεπίκριτον μέχρι τοῦ νῦν περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφωνίαν, τῶν μὲν ἀτομον αὐτὸ διεγόντων τῶν δὲ τμητόν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀμερὲς καὶ ἐλάχιστον, τῶν δὲ μεριστόν καὶ εἰς ἀπειρον τέμνεσθαι δυνάμενον. οὐκ ἀρα διδακτόν 230 ἔστι τὸ σῶμα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀσώματον. ἢ γὰρ ἰδέα τίς ἔστι Πλατωνικὴ ἢ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς

* With §§ 227-228 cf. P.H. iii. 254.

† This last is the Stoic view, whereas the Epicureans believed in indivisibles ("atoms").

tion of size and form and solidity, or whether it is that which has the three dimensions plus solidity, since it is not the part of the irrational sense but of some rational faculty to perceive everything which is perceived owing to the concourse of several elements, body will not be an object of sense. And even if it should be 227 sensible, it will, once again, be incapable of being taught.^a For no sensible thing is taught,—as, for instance, no one learns to see the white, or to taste the sweet, to derive a sweet smell from something, to feel cold or heat, but the perception of all these things is untaught. So, then, neither is body sensible nor, should it be sensible, will it on that account be capable of being taught.—Moreover, even supposing 228 it to be intelligible it cannot be taught. For if neither length by itself is body, nor breadth nor depth, but the compound of them all, as they are all incorporeal we shall have to conceive of the combination of them as being incorporeal and not body ; and because of this body is also incapable of being taught. Also, some bodies are sensible, others intelligible. 229 Hence, if body is taught, either the sensible is taught or the intelligible. But neither is the sensible taught (because it appears and is of itself quite evident to all), nor the intelligible (because of its obscurity and the hitherto undecided controversy about it, some saying that it is indivisible, others divisible, and some that it is without parts and minimal, others that it has parts and can be divided *ad infinitum*^b). Body, therefore, is not capable of being taught.—Nor, indeed, is the incorporeal. For 230 it is either a Platonic Idea, or the "expression" of

στωικοῖς λεκτὸν ἡ κενὸν ἡ τόπος ἡ χρόνος ἡ ἄλλο
τι τῶν τοιούτων. ὅ τι δ' ἀνὴ τούτων, ἔτι ζητου-
μένην καὶ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνούμενην ἔχει τὴν
231 ὑπόστασιν· τὸ δὲ τὰ ἔτι ἀμφισβητούμενα ὡς ἀν-
αμφίλεκτα λέγειν διδάσκεσθαι τελέως ἔστιν ἄτοπον.
ἄλλ' εἰ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἔστι σώματα τὰ δὲ
ἀσώματα, δέδεικται δὲ μηθὲν τούτων διδασκόμενον,
οὐθένιν ἔστι τὸ διδασκόμενον.

232 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ διδάσκεται τι, ἤτοι ἀληθές ἔστιν ἡ
ψεῦδος. καὶ ψεῦδος μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς αὐτόθεν
φαίνεται· ἀληθές δ' εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἄπορόν ἔστιν, ὡς
ἐν τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίου ἐδείξαμεν, καὶ περὶ ἀπόρων
οὐκ ἔστι μάθησις· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ διδασκόμενον.

233 πρὸς τούτους τὸ διδασκόμενον ἡ τεχνικόν
ἔστιν ἡ ἀτεχνον. ἀλλ' ἀτεχνον μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ
οὐδὲ δεήσεται μαθῆσεως. εἰ δὲ τεχνικόν ἔστιν, ἤτοι
αὐτόθεν φαίνεται ἡ ἀδηλόν ἔστιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτό-
θεν φαίνεται, καὶ ἀτεχνόν ἔστι καὶ ἀδιδακτον· εἰ δὲ
ἀδηλόν ἔστιν, οὐ γίνεται δι' αὐτὸν τὸ ἀδηλεῖσθαι
διδακτόν.

234 Ἐκ τούτων μὲν οὖν ἄπορον παρίσταται τὸ δι-
δασκόμενον πρᾶγμα· συναναρέυται δ' αὐτῷ ὁ τε
διδάσκων διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν διδάξει, ὁ τε μανθάνων
διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν διδάξει. οὐθὲν δ' ἥττον ἔσται καὶ
235 ἐπ' αὐτῶν τούτων τὰς ὄμοιας κινεῖν ἀπορίας. εἰ
γάρ ἔστι τις ὁ διδάσκων καὶ ἔστι τις ὁ μανθάνων,
ἡτοι τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην διδάξει ἡ ἀτεχνος τὸν
ἀτεχνον ἡ ἐναλλὰξ διδάξει τὸν τεχνίτην τὸν ἀτεχνον
τὸν τεχνίτην. οὔτε δὲ ὁ ἀτεχνος τὸν ἀτεχνον

the Stoics, or void or place or time or something else
of the kind.^a But whichever of these it be, its
real existence is still a matter of doubt and of unsettled
controversy. But to say that things still in dispute 231
are taught as though they were uncontested is
perfectly absurd. But if of things existent some are
bodies, others incorporeal, and it has been shown
that none of these is taught, then what is taught is
nothing.

Yet again : if anything is taught, it is either true 232
or false.^b But it is not false, as is apparent at once ;
and if it is true it is doubtful, as we have shown
in our chapter "On the Criterion," and concerning
things doubtful no learning exists. Therefore what
is taught does not exist.—Furthermore, what is 233
taught is either technical or non-technical. But it is
not non-technical, since then it would not require
learning. And if it is technical, either it is apparent
of itself or it is non-evident. But if it is apparent of
itself, it is both non-technical and incapable of being
taught ; while if it is non-evident, because of the very
fact of its being non-evident it is not capable of being
taught.

By these arguments it is established that the thing 234
taught is open to doubt^c ; and along with it both the
teacher is abolished, because he will have nothing to
teach, and the learner, because he will have nothing
to learn. None the less, in their case also it will be
possible to raise similar difficulties. For if a teacher 235
exists and a learner exists, either the expert will
teach the expert, or the non-expert the non-expert, or
conversely the expert the non-expert, or the non-
expert the expert. But neither can the non-expert

• Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 258; *Adv. Log.* ii. 12.

^b With §§ 232-233 cf. *P.H.* iii. 253.

• With §§ 234-238 cf. *P.H.* iii. 259-260.

διδάσκειν δύναται, ώς οὐδὲ ὁ τυφλὸς τὸν τυφλὸν
όδηγειν, οὕθ' ὁ τεχνίτης τὸν τεχνίτην· οὐ γὰρ
ἔχει πάντως ὁ διδάξει. οὔτε μὴν ὁ ἄτεχνος τὸν
τεχνίτην, ώς οὐδὲ ὁ τυφλὸς ὀδηγεῖν ποτὲ δύναται
τὸν βλέποντα· πεπήρωται γὰρ ὁ ἴδιωτης εἰς τὰ τῆς
τέχνης θεωρήματα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνεπιτήδειος προς
236 τὸ διδάσκειν. ἀπολείπεται οὖν λέγεων ὅτι ὁ
τεχνίτης τὸν ἴδιωτην διδάσκει, ὃ πάλιν τῶν ἀμη-
χάνων· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης συνηπόρηται ἡμῖν τοὺς
237 τῆς τέχνης θεωρήμασιν, καὶ ὁ ἄτεχνος εἰς διδάσκεται
καὶ γίνεται τεχνίτης, ἥτοι ὅτε ἄτεχνός ἐστι γίνεται
τεχνίτης ἢ ὅτε τεχνίτης ἐστίν, οὔτε δὲ ὅτε ἄτεχνός
ἐστι δύναται γίνεσθαι τεχνίτης, οὔτε ὅτε τεχνίτης
238 ἐστίν ἔτι γίνεται τεχνίτης, ἀλλ' ἐστιν. καὶ κατὰ
λόγουν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἄτεχνος ἔοικε τῷ ἐκ γενετῆς
τυφλῷ ἢ κωφῷ, καὶ διν τρόπον οὔτε ὃ ἐκ γενετῆς
τυφλὸς εἰς ἔνοιαν ἔρχεται χρωμάτων οὔτε ὃ ἐκ
γενετῆς κωφὸς εἰς ἔνοιαν ἔρχεται φωνῶν, οὕτω καὶ
ὁ ἄτεχνος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ἄτεχνος, πεπτρωμένος
πρὸς τὴν τῶν τεχνικῶν θεωρημάτων ἀντίληψιν οὐ
δύναται τούτων αὐτῶν ἔχειν τὴν γνῶσιν. ὃ δὲ
τεχνίτης οὐκέτι διδάσκεται ἀλλὰ δεδιδάκται.

239 Καὶ μήν ως ταῦτ' ἐστιν ἄπορα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ
τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως ἐστιν ἄπορος. ἢ γὰρ ἐναρ-
γελα γίνεται ἢ λόγῳ οὔτε δὲ ἐναργείᾳ οὔτε λόγῳ
γίνεται, ώς παραστήσομεν, ὥστε οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς
240 μαθήσεως ἐστιν εὑπόρος. ἐναργείᾳ μὲν οὖν οὐ
γίνεται μάθησις, ἐπείπερ τῶν δεικνυμένων ἐστὶν ἢ
ἐνάργεια, τὸ δὲ δεικτόν ἐστι φαινόμενον· τὸ δὲ

^a Cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 55.^b Cf. *P.H.* iii. 264.• With §§ 239-242 cf. *P.H.* iii. 266-268.

teach the non-expert (just as the blind cannot lead the blind ^a) nor the expert the expert, for certainly he has nothing to teach him. Nor yet the non-expert the expert, just as the blind man can never lead the man who sees; for the layman is incapacitated for grasping the theorems of the art, and on this account is unfitted for teaching.—It remains, then, to say that the 236 expert teaches the layman, which again is a thing impracticable; for together with the theorems of the art the expert was doubted by us; and the non-expert 237 too, if he is taught and becomes an expert, becomes an expert either when he is non-expert or when he is expert; but he cannot become an expert when he is non-expert, and when he is expert he no longer becomes an expert but is one. And reasonably so; 238 for the non-expert resembles the man who is blind or deaf from birth, and just as he who is blind from birth ^b does not attain to a conception of colours, nor does he who is deaf from birth attain to a conception of sounds, so also the non-expert, in so far as he is non-expert, seeing that he is incapacitated for grasping the technical theorems cannot possess knowledge of them. And the expert is no longer being taught but has been taught.

Moreover, just as these things are doubtful, so also 239 is the method of learning doubtful.^c For learning takes place either by the evidence of the senses or by speech. But, as we shall establish, it takes place neither by evidence nor by speech, so that the method of learning is not free from doubt either. Now 240 learning is not by means of evidence, since evidence is of things pointed out. But what can be pointed out is apparent; and the apparent, in so far as it is

φαινόμενον, ἢ φαίνεται, κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτόν ἔστι, τὸ δὲ κοινῶς πᾶσι ληπτὸν ἀδιδάκτον. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ 241 ἐναργείᾳ δεικτὸν διδακτόν ἔστιν. καὶ μήν οὐδὲ λόγω τι διδάσκεται. ἢ γὰρ σημαίνει τι ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐδὲ ἐν σημαίνει. ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἐν σημαίνων οὐδὲ ἔσται τινὸς διδάσκαλος. εἰ δὲ σημαίνει τι, ἤτοι φύσει σημαίνει ἢ θέσει. καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐ σημαίνει διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀκούειν, *(οἷον)*¹ Ἐλληνας 242 βαρβάρων καὶ βαρβάρους Ἐλλήνων, θέσει δὲ εἰπερ σημαίνει, δῆλον ὡς οἱ μὲν προκατειληφότες καθ' ὧν αἱ λέξεις εἰσὶ τεταγμέναι ἀντιλήφονται τούτων, οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν διδασκόμενοι ἀπερ ἥγνούσιν, ἀλλ' ἀναμιμητσκόμενοι καὶ ἀνανεούμενοι ταῦθ' ἀπερ ἥδεσαν, οἱ δὲ χρῆζοντες τῆς τῶν ἀγνοούμενών μαθήσεως, καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες καθ' ὧν εἰσὶ τεταγμέναι 243 αἱ λέξεις, οὐδένος ἀντιληψιν ἔχουσιν. διόπερ εἰ μήτε τὸ διδασκόμενον ἔστι πρᾶγμα μήτε ὁ διδάσκων μήτε ὁ μανθάνων μήτε ὁ τρόπος τῆς μαθήσεως, οὐδέν ἔστι μάθησις.

Κοινότερον μὲν οὖν τοῖς σκεπτικοῦς εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι μάθησιν ἐνέσται δὲ μεταφέρειν τὰς ἀπορίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν λεγομένην περὶ 244 τὸν βίον τέχνην. ἤτοι γὰρ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν φρόνιμον ταύτην διδάσξει ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν ἄφρονα ἢ ὁ ἄφρων τὸν φρόνιμον ἢ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἄφρονα. οὗτε δὲ ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν φρόνιμον λέγοιτ' ἀν ταύτην διδάσκειν, ἀμφότεροι γὰρ τέλειοι κατ' ἀρετὴν εἰσὶ καὶ οὐθέτερος αὐτῶν δεῖται μαθήσεως, οὗτε ὁ ἄφρων τὸν ἄφρονα, ἀμφότεροι γὰρ χρείαν ἔχουσι μαθήσεως

¹ *οἷον* add. c. Heintz.

* Cf. P.H. ii. 214.

apparent, is perceptible by all alike, and what is perceptible by all alike is incapable of being taught. Therefore what is pointed out by evidence is not capable of being taught. Nor yet is anything taught by speech. For either the speech signifies something 241 or it signifies nothing. But if it signifies nothing it will not be a teacher of anything. And if it signifies something, it signifies either by nature or by convention. But it does not signify by nature,^a because all men do not hear all men,—Greeks, for instance, barbarians and barbarians Greeks. And if it signifies by convention, evidently those who have apprehended 242 beforehand the objects to which the terms are assigned will comprehend those terms, not because they are taught by them things of which they were ignorant but by recalling and being reminded of the things which they knew; while those who need to learn the unknown things, and are in ignorance of the things to which the terms are assigned, will have no comprehension of anything. Therefore, if neither the thing taught exists nor the teacher nor the learner 243 nor the method of learning, learning is nothing.

These, then, are the objections of a more general character brought forward by the Sceptics to show the non-existence of learning^b; and it will be possible also to apply these difficulties in turn to the so-called art of life. For either the wise man will teach this to the wise, or the unwise to the unwise, or the unwise 244 to the wise, or the wise to the unwise. But neither would the wise man be said to teach it to the wise (for both are perfect in virtue and neither of them needs to learn), nor the unwise to the unwise (for both of them have need of learning and neither of

* With §§ 243-246 cf. P.H. iii. 270-272.

καὶ οὐθέτερος αὐτῶν φρόνιμος <έστω>,¹ ἵνα τὸν
245 ἔτερον διδάξῃ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁ ἄφρων διδάξει τὸν
φρόνιμον οὐδὲ γάρ ὁ τυφλὸς μηνυτικὸς γίνεται τῷ
βλέποντι χρωμάτων. λείπεται ἄρα τὸν φρόνιμον
διδακτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἄφρονος. ὁ καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν
246 ἀπόρων. εἰ γάρ η̄ φρόνησίς ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀγα-
θῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων, ὁ ἄφρων μὴ ἔχων
τιὰ φρόνησιν, ἀγνοιαν δὲ ἔχων τούτων πάντων,
διδάσκοντος τοῦ φρονίμου τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ
οὐθέτερα ἀκούσεται μόνον τῶν λεγομένων, οὐ
γνώσεται δὲ αὐτά. εἰ γάρ ἀντιλαμβάνοιτο αὐτῶν
ἐν ἄφροσύνῃ καθεστώς, ἔσται η̄ ἄφροσύνη τῶν τε
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐθετέρων γνωριστική. οὐχὶ²
δέ γε τούτων κατ’ αὐτούς ἔστιν η̄ ἄφροσύνη θεω-
ρητική· ὁ ἄρα ἄφρων οὐκ ἀντιλήψεται τῶν ὑπὸ³
τοῦ φρονίμου λεγομένων η̄ πραττομένων κατὰ τὸν
247 τῆς φρονήσεως λόγον. καὶ δὲ τρόπον ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς
πηρός, μέχρις οὐ πηρός ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔχει ἔννοιαν
χρωμάτων, καὶ ὁ ἐκ γενετῆς κωφός, μέχρις οὐ
κωφός ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται φωνῶν, οὔτω καὶ
ὁ ἄφρων, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἄφρων ἔστιν, οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται
τῶν φρονίμως λεγομένων καὶ πραττομένων. οὐδὲ
οὐ φρόνιμος ἄρα δύναται τοῦ ἄφρονος ἐν τῇ περὶ τὸν
248 βίον τέχνην καθηγεῖσθαι. καὶ μὴν εἰ οὐ φρόνιμος
διδάσκει τὸν ἄφρονα, θεωρητικὴ δόξεις εἶναι η̄
φρόνησις τῆς ἄφροσύνης ὥσπερ καὶ η̄ τέχνη τῆς
ἀτεχνίας. οὐχὶ δέ γε η̄ φρόνησις δύναται εἶναι
θεωρητικὴ τῆς ἄφροσύνης. οὐκ ἄρα οὐ φρόνιμος τοῦ
ἄφρονός ἔστι διδακτικός. ὁ γάρ γενόμενος φρό-
νιμος ἔκ τινος συνασκήσεως καὶ τριβῆς (φύσει γάρ

¹ <έστω> addo (post αὐτῶν add. Mutsch.).

them is wise so as to teach the other). Nor yet will 245 the unwise teach the wise ; for neither is the blind man capable of instructing the man who sees about colours. It only remains, therefore, that the wise man is capable of teaching the unwise ; and this too is a matter of doubt. For if wisdom is “the science 246 of things good and evil and neither,”^a the unwise man, when the wise man is teaching him the things good and evil and neither, will merely hear the things spoken and will not know the things themselves,^b since he does not possess any wisdom but is in ignorance of all these things. For if he should comprehend them while he is in a state of unwisdom, unwisdom will be capable of knowing things good and evil and neither. But, according to them, unwisdom is not capable of perceiving these things ; therefore the unwise man will not comprehend the things said or done by the wise man in pursuance of the rule of his wisdom. And just as he who is blind from birth,^c so 247 long as he is blind, has no conception of colours, and he who is deaf from birth, so long as he is deaf, does not apprehend sounds, so also the unwise man, in so far as he is unwise, does not comprehend things wisely said and done. Neither, therefore, can the wise man guide the unwise in the art of life.— Moreover, if the wise man teaches the unwise, wisdom 248 must be cognisant of unwisdom, even as art is of lack of art ; but wisdom cannot be cognisant of unwisdom ; therefore the wise man is not capable of teaching the unwise. For he who has become wise owing to some joint exercise^d and practice (for no one is such by

^a Cf. § 170 *supra*.

^b Cf. §§ 238, 242 *supra*.

^c Cf. *Adv. Phys.* ii. 175. With § 247 cf. *P.H.* iii. 264.

^d i.e. simultaneous training of several parts or faculties : cf. *Adv. Log.* i. 146.

οὐδεὶς ἔστι τοιοῦτος ἡτοι ὑποκειμένης ἐν αὐτῷ
τῆς ἀφροσύνης προσεκτήσατο τὴν φρόνησιν, ἢ κατὰ
τὴν ἐκείνης ἀποβολὴν καὶ τὴν ταύτης κτῆσιν γέγονε
249 φρόνιμος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑποκειμένης ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς
ἀφροσύνης προσεκτήσατο τὴν φρόνησιν, ἔσται ὁ
αὐτὸς φρόνιμος ἄμα καὶ ἄφρων. δὲ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον.
εἰ δὲ ἀποβολῇ ἐκείνης ἐκτήσατο ταύτην, οὐ δυνή-
σεται διὰ τῆς ὑστερογενοῦς διαθέσεως τὴν προ-
ούσιαν διάθεσιν, νῦν δὲ μὴ παρουσαν γνωρίζειν.
250 καὶ εἰκότως. παντὸς γοῦν πράγματος αἰσθητοῦ
ἡ νοητοῦ γίνεται κατάληψις ἡτοι κατὰ ἐνάργειαν
περιπτωτικῶς ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν περιπτωτικῶν
πεφήνυτων ἀναλογιστικὴν μετάβασιν, καὶ ταύτην
251 ἡτοι ὅμοιωτικήν, ὡς ὅταν ἀπὸ τῆς Σωκράτους
εἰκόνος γνωρίζηται ὁ μὴ παρὼν Σωκράτης, ἢ
συνθετικήν, ὡς ὅταν ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου κατ'
ἐπισύνθεσιν νοῶμεν τὸν ἀνύπαρκτον ἵπποκένταυρον,
ἡ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, ὡς ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀνθρώ-
που παρανηγητικῶς μὲν λαμβάνηται ὁ Κύκλωψ, ὃς
οὐκ ἔώκει

ἀνδρί γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρίῳ ὑλήεντι,

252 μειωτικῶς δὲ ὁ πυγμαῖος ἀνθρωπος. θεον εἰ καὶ
τῇ φρονήσει λαμβάνεται ἡ ἀφροσύνη καὶ τῷ φρο-
νίμῳ ὁ ἄφρων, ἡτοι κατὰ περίπτωσιν θεωρεῖται ἡ
κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς περιπτώσεως μετάβασιν. οὔτε
δὲ κατὰ περίπτωσιν θεωρεῖται (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὡς
λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ γλυκὺν καὶ πικρὸν κατὰ
περίπτωσιν ἔγνω, οὕτω καὶ ἀφροσύνη) οὔτε κατὰ

nature) either has acquired wisdom in addition while his unwisdom still subsists within him, or else has become wise through getting rid of the latter and acquiring the former. But if he has acquired wisdom 249 in addition while his unwisdom still subsists within him, the same man will be at once both wise and unwise, which is impossible. And if he has acquired the former by getting rid of the latter, he will not be able to know his pre-existing condition, which is not now present, by means of a condition of later origin. And 250 naturally so^a; for certainly the apprehension of every object, whether sensible or intelligible, comes about either empirically by way of sense-evidence or by way of analogical inference from things which have appeared empirically, this latter being either through resemblance (as when Socrates, not being present, is recognized from the likeness of Socrates), 251 or through composition (as when from a man and a horse we form by compounding them the conception of the non-existent hippocentaur), or by way of analogy (as when from the ordinary man there is conceived by magnification the Cyclops who was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of
the mountains,^b

and by diminution the pygmy). Hence, if unwisdom 252 is perceived by wisdom and also the unwise man by the wise, the perception takes place either by experience or by inference from experience. But the perception does not take place by experience (for no one gets to know wisdom in the same way as white and black and sweet and bitter), nor by inference from

* With §§ 250-251 cf. *Adv. Log.* ii. 58-60; *Adv. Phys.* i. 393-395.

^b Homer, *Odyss.* ix. 191; cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 45.

τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς περιπτώσεως μετάβασιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἔστιν ἔουκὸς ἀφροσύνη· [εἰ δ' ἀπὸ τούτου ποιεῖται τὴν μετάβασιν ὁ φρόνιμος, ἣτοι ὅμοιωτικὴν ἢ συνθετικὴν ἢ ἀναλογιστικὴν,]¹ ὥστε οὐ 253 λήψεται ποτε τὴν ἀφροσύνην ἡ φρόνησις. ναί, ἀλλ' ἵσως τις ἐρεῖ ὅτι ὁ φρόνιμος τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ φρονήσει τὴν περὶ ἄλλον ἀφροσύνην δύναται κατανοεῖν· ὅπερ ἔστιν εὐηθεῖς. ἡ γὰρ ἀφροσύνη διάθεσίς 254 ἔστιν ἔργων τινῶν ἀποδοτικῆς. εἰ οὖν αὐτὴν ἐν ἄλλῳ θεωρεῖ καὶ καταλαμβάνεται ὁ φρόνιμος, ἣτοι αὐτὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καταλήψεται τὴν διάθεσιν, ἡ τοῦς ἔργοις αὐτῆς ἐπιβάλλων ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ αὐτὴν 255 γνωριεῖ, καθάπερ τὴν μὲν ἴαστρικὴν διάθεσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἴαστρικῶν γνομένων ἔργων, τὴν δὲ ζωγραφικὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ζωγραφικῶν γνομένων. οὔτε δὲ αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς δύναται τὴν διάθεσιν λαβεῖν ἀφανῆς γάρ ἔστι καὶ ἀθέωρητος, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἔστιν αὐτὴν διὰ τῆς τοῦ σώματος μορφῆς περιαθρῆσαι· οὔτε ἐκ τῶν ὑπὸ αὐτῆς ἀποδιδομένων ἔργων· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα ἔργα, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον ἐδείκνυμεν, κοινὰ 256 φρονήσεως καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἔστιν. ἀλλ' ἐπερ, ἵνα ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἀφρονα διδάξῃ τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, δεῖ θεωρητικὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῆς ἀφροσύνης καθάπερ καὶ τὸν τεχνίτην τῆς ἀτεχνίας, δεδεικται δὲ ἀληπτὸς αὐτῷ ἡ ἀφροσύνη, οὐκ ἀν δύνατο ὁ φρόνιμος τὸν ἀφρονα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην διδάσκειν.

257 Καὶ δὴ τὰ συνεκτικώτατα τῶν κατὰ τὸν ἡθικὸν τόπον ζητούμενων ἡ πορηκότες, ἐν τοσούτοις τὴν σύμπασαν τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διέξοδον ἀπαρτίζομεν.

¹ [εἰ δ' . . . ἀναλογιστικὴν] secl. ego (ἀλλ' L, ὦ E, οὐδ' R, εἰ δ' cet., Bekk.: ? ὦ^ι . . . ποιῆται κτλ.).

experience (for no existing thing resembles unwise-dom) [But if the wise man makes the inference from this, it is either through resemblance or through composition or through analogy]; so that wisdom will never perceive unwise-dom.—Yes, but possibly someone will say that the wise man can discern the unwise-dom of another by the wisdom within himself; but this is puerile. For unwise-dom is a condition productive of certain works. If, then, the wise man sees and apprehends this in another, either he will apprehend the condition directly by means of itself, or by attention to its works he will also get to know the condition itself, just as one knows the condition of the medical man from works in accordance with the art of medicine, and that of the painter from works in accordance with the art of painting. But he cannot perceive the condition by means of itself; for it is obscure and invisible, and it is not possible to view it closely through the shape of the body; nor by means of the works which result from it; for all the apparent works are, as we showed above,^a common to wisdom and unwise-dom alike. But if it is necessary that the wise man, in order that he may teach the art of life to the unwise, should himself be capable of perceiving unwise-dom—even as the artist lack of art,—and it has been shown that unwise-dom is to him imperceptible, then the wise man will not be able to teach the unwise the art of life.

So now that we have critically discussed the most 257 essential of the problems which belong to the department of Ethics, we herewith bring to a close the whole of our exposition of the Sceptic Way.^b

^a See §§ 197-209 *supra*.
^b For this expression cf. P.H. i. 4 n.

GLOSSARY

[In the Glossary and Indexes the following abbreviations are used:

- I. = Introduction (in Vol. I.);
P. = "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" (in Vol. I.);
L. = "Against the Logicians" (in Vol. II.);
Ph. = "Against the Physicists" (in Vol. III.);
E. = "Against the Ethicists" (in Vol. III.).]

ἀγωγή, (doctrinal) procedure, method : ἡ σκεπτικὴ ἀγ., "the Sceptic Way," P. i. 4, 7, etc.

ἀδιάκριτος, indistinguishable, P. ii. 152, 155 f.

ἀδιάπτυχος (φαντασία), unerring, infallible, L. i. 110, etc.

ἀδιάστροφος, unperverted, acting instinctively, P. iii. 194.

ἀδιάφορα, "indifferents," i.e. (in Stoic ethics) things which lie midway between "good" and "evil"; see P. iii. 177, Vol. I. Introd. p. xxvii.

ἀδοξάστως (oppd. to δογματικῶς), undogmatically, P. i. 15.

ἀθετῶν, set aside, reject, L. i. 260; so ἀθέτησις, L. ii. 142; ἀθετός πρὸς (τοῦ), unfitted for, L. i. 183.

ἀθεγῆς, intangible, Ph. i. 281, etc.

αἰρεαὐλῆς, leader or Head of a School or sect, P. iii. 245.

αἵρεσις, choice, approval, preference, P. i. 230; "doctrinal rule," P. i. 16; sect, School, L. i. 27, etc.

αἱρέτα, preferred, choiceworthy (oppd. to φευκτά), P. i. 55, etc. αἱκαβεκτούμενον (oppd. to κατεχόμενον), unoccupied (space), P. iii. 124, Ph. ii. 3.

ἀκαρές: πρὸς ἀκ., for a moment, suddenly, E. 154.

ἀκαριαῖος, minute, momentary, P. i. 132, iii. 142: κατὰ τὸ ἀκ., to the smallest extent, a hair's breadth, P. iii. 79.

ἀκαταληπτεῖν, be non-apprehensive, fail to grasp, P. i. 201; so ἀκατάληπτος, P. ii. 22: ὀκαταληπτία, P. i. 1.

ἀκμῆν (adv. accus.), still, just (while), P. ii. 11, iii. 276, L. ii. 257, E. 213.

ἀκολούθια, (logical) sequence, coherence, P. i. 16, ii. 114; pursued method, practice, P. i. 237.

ἀκύλιοτος (Timon), lacking in versatility or energy, Ph. i. 57.

GLOSSARY

ἀμενθήσιος (c. genit., Timon), untroubled by, heedless of, P. i. 224.
 ἀμφίβολη, verbal ambiguity, P. ii. 256 (*cf.* Diog. L. vii. 62).
 ἀναιρέν, abolish (logically), deny (oppd. to *τιθέναι*, posit, affirm), P. i. 19, iii. 119, etc.
 ἀναλογία, proportion, L. i. 106.
 ἀναλογίαμός, (reasoning from) analogy, P. i. 147; so ἀναλογιστικός, E. 250.
 ἀνάλυσις (συλλογισμῶν), analysis, resolution, L. ii. 231.
 ἀναφίλεκτος (oppd. to ἀμφιρρήτοντος), undisputed, E. 231.
 ἀναρτίντος (oppd. to ἀντίτυπος), non-resistant, yielding, Ph. i. 411.
 ἀναπόδεικτοι (λόγοι), indemonstrable (of syllogisms or principles assumed, as not requiring demonstration), P. i. 69 n., ii. 156 ff.; so ἀναπόδεικτως, without demonstration, P. i. 60, etc.
 ἀνασκευαστικός, (logically) destructive, contradictory (oppd. to κατασκευαστικός), L. ii. 196.
 ἀναστροφή: κατὰ ἄν., reversely, *vice versa*, L. i. 430; so ἀναστροφως, L. i. 302, etc.
 ἀνεπίκριτος (διαφανία), incapable of decision, unsettled, P. i. 98, 112, etc.; so ἀνεπικριτικά, E. 182.
 ἀνεπώπτος, inconceivable, P. ii. 22, etc.; so -ήτως, imperceptibly, P. iii. 145.
 ἀνεμίταρος, inextensible, Ph. ii. 272 (*cf.* ἐπίτρασις).
 ἀνετερώτος, immutable, unaltered, L. ii. 455.
 ἀνέφικτος, unattainable, E. 180.
 ἀνηρεμήτως, unrestingly, Ph. ii. 223.
 ἀνθυποθέμη, object, retort, L. i. 440.
 ἀνοχλητικῶς, by heaving up, Ph. ii. 83 f.
 ἀντακολούθειν, mutually follow, involve, be interdependent, P. i. 68 (*cf.* Diog. L. vii. 125).
 ἀντιλήψις, perception, apprehension, P. i. 44, etc.; so ἀντιληπτικός, P. i. 70.
 ἀντιπαρεκτείνεσθαι, be stretched out side by side with, be extended so as to equal, Ph. i. 262, etc.
 ἀντιπαρεξαγωγή: κατὰ ἄντ., by way of attacking, as a counterblast, L. i. 150.
 ἀντιπαρίκειν, stretch parallel to, be co-extensive with, L. i. 361, etc.
 ἀντιπεριέλκειν, draw round to the other side, convert to an opposite belief, L. i. 189.

GLOSSARY

ἀντιπίπτειν, conflict, tell against, refute, P. i. 179, etc.: (c. dat.) L. i. 333.
 ἀντιποίησις, seeking possession of, pursuit of, P. iii. 183.
 ἀντιστρίψειν (Democr.), press against, resist, L. i. 136.
 ἀντιστροφός, corresponding, equivalent, L. i. 6.
 ἀντιτυπία, resistance, solidarity, P. iii. 39, etc.
 ἀνυπαρξία (oppd. to ὑπαρξία), unreality, non-existence, P. i. 21, etc.; so ἀνύπαρκτος, P. i. 104, etc.
 ἀνυπόστατος, non-substantial, unreal, P. ii. 80.
 ἀνυπικάτωτος (λόγος), most effective, Ph. i. 182.
 ἀνυπάρτιος (as adj.), most generic (or inclusive), main types of, P. i. 4, iii. 65; so κατὰ τὸ ἀν., Ph. ii. 38, 45.
 ἀξίωμα, (logical) judgement, proposition, assertion, P. i. 189, ii. 81, etc.
 ἀρρωτία, (Sceptic) indetermination, refusal to define, P. i. 198; so ἀρρωτέων, P. i. 28.
 ἀρώτος (δύνας, Pythagorean), indefinite (Dyad, *i.e.* the "two" as principle of plurality), P. iii. 154.
 ἀρχλησία (Epicur. and Sceptic), unperturbedness, serenity, P. i. 10; so ἀρχλητος, P. i. 29.
 ἀποξία (oppd. to ἀξία, Stoic ethics), worthlessness, E. 62.
 ἀπαράλλακτος, indistinguishable, P. iii. 177, etc.; so ἀπαραλλαξία, L. i. 108, 403, etc.
 ἀπαραπόδιστος, unimpeded, clear, L. ii. 187, E. 76.
 ἀπαρέμφατον, infinitive (mood), P. i. 204.
 ἀπαρτίζειν, complete, express fully, P. ii. 176, E. 257.
 ἀπειρομεγέθης, infinitely large, P. iii. 44.
 ἀπειρον: εἰς ἀπ., (regress) *ad infinitum*, P. ii. 78, etc.; so μέχρις ἀπειρον, P. i. 122, etc.
 ἀπεκλογή (oppd. to ἐκλογή, Stoic), rejection, E. 133.
 ἀπειράνειν, be incongruous, absurd, P. i. 112, ii. 188, etc.; so ἀπέμφασις, P. iii. 61 ("improbable presentation," Carneades), L. i. 169.
 ἀπέραντος (λόγος), indefinite, inconclusive, L. ii. 429.
 ἀπέργυως, simply, not positively or dogmatically, P. 240.
 ἀπερίσπατος (φαντασία), irreversible, indubitable, P. i. 227, L. i. 166.
 ἀπλανής, unerring, infallible, L. i. 138, 146, etc.; so ἀπλανησία, L. i. 394.
 ἀπλατές (μῆκος), (length) without breadth (def. of γραμμή), P. iii. 39, Ph. ii. 279, etc.

GLOSSARY

- ἀπλοπαθεῖς (*αἰσθήσεις*), simply-passive, *i.e.* receptive of only one kind of impression, P. iii. 47, 108.
 ἀπό : *οἱ ἀπὸ* (*τῆς Στοᾶς*), members of (the Stoic School), P. iii. 181 etc.
 ἀποβρασμός, frothy emission (of a fluid), Ph. i. 103.
 ἀπόδοσις, account rendered, description, E. 30.
 ἀποδοτικός (c. genit.), productive of, E. 263.
 ἀποίος (*ἴλη*), devoid of quality, P. iii. 33, Ph. ii. 310, etc.
 ἀποκληρωτικός, acting at random, capricious, P. iii. 79.
 ἀπολέντειν (oppd. to *ἀναφέν*), admit, allow (the existence or truth of a thing), P. ii. 43, 219, etc.
 ἀπόλυτα (oppd. to *πρός τι*), absolute, existing in their own right, L. ii. 273; so ἀπολύτως, P. i. 135, etc., and ἀπόλυμένως, L. ii. 162.
 ἀποπάλλειν, hurl away, Ph. ii. 73: ἀποπαλτικός, by way of rebound, Ph. ii. 223.
 ἀποπρογμένα (oppd. to *προγμένα*), unpreferred, rejected, P. iii. 191, E. 62.
 ἀπορητικός, doubting, sceptical: *οἱ ἀπ.*, Sceptics; *ἡ ἀπ.*, Scepticism; P. i. 7, 221, etc.; so ἀπορητικός, L. i. 30, etc.
 ἀποροποίητον (*οὐδαμα*), made without pores, impermeable, L. ii. 309.
 ἀποσυμβεβηκότα (oppd. to *συμβεβηκότα*), non-attributes, not properties, L. i. 281.
 ἀποσυνέργειν, thwart, counteract, P. i. 212.
 ἀποτέλεσμα, completed result, product, P. iii. 11, 14, etc.; so ἀποτελεσματική, E. 197, ἀποτελεστικόν, P. iii. 27.
 ἀποτομή : *κατ’ ἀπ.*, separately, independently, L. i. 446.
 ἀπόφασις, declaration, formula, P. i. 5; affirmation (*καταληπτικὴ ἀπ.*), P. ii. 123; so ἀποφαντόν, declaratory, P. ii. 104, ἀποφαντικόν, L. ii. 71.
 ἀπόφασις, negation, P. i. 192; ἀποφατικόν, negating, negative, P. i. 192, ii. 161, etc.
 ἀποφορά, effluvia, scent, P. i. 101; so ἀποφόρησις, P. i. 126.
 ἀπτερέως (*Xenophanes*), without wavering, firmly, L. i. 111.
 ἀπτώτως, firmly, securely, L. ii. 187.
 ἀραιώματα (*νοντά*), interstices, pores, L. ii. 220.
 ἀρρεψία (Sceptic), state of even balance, equipoise, mental neutrality, P. i. 190, L. ii. 159, etc.
 ἀρρεῖς (oppd. to *θέτεις*), removal, abolition, denial, P. i. 70, 192, iii. 86, etc.

GLOSSARY

- ἀρχικώτατον (*αἴτιον*), most principal, original, supreme, Ph. i. 5, etc.
 ἀσημος (*φωναῖ*), non-significant, without distinct meaning, P. ii. 130.
 ἀστεία (*κίνησις*), soothing, kindly, P. iii. 184, L. i. 42, 45.
 ἀσυγκαταθετέν, withhold assent (= *ἐπέχειν*), L. i. 157.
 ἀσύνακτος (*λόγος*), inconclusive (oppd. to *συνακτικός*), P. ii. 137, etc.
 ἀσύναρτητα (*λίγματα*), inconsistent, without logical coherence, P. ii. 153 (cf. διάρροις).
 ἀσύνταρκτος, incapable of co-existence, P. ii. 202.
 ἀσύντατος (*επίνοια*), without cohesion, impossible to construct, P. ii. 27.
 ἀταραξία (Sceptic), unperturbedness, quietude (of mind), P. i. 8, 25, etc.; so ἀταρακτεῖν, P. i. 12, etc., and ἀταράχως, E. 118, etc.
 ἀντόθεν, of itself, at once, *ipso facto*, P. ii. 164, *passim*.
 ἀντοτελής, self-complete, P. ii. 104; so ἀντοτελός, wholly of itself, independently, Ph. i. 237, etc.
 ἀντότης : *κατ’ αντότητα* ἔαντις, in its self-identity, Ph. ii. 261.
 ἀφάρεος (oppd. to *πρόσθετος*), subtraction, P. iii. 84, (distingd. fr. *δρός*) P. iii. 86, (fr. *ἀναπέρεος*) Ph. i. 298.
 ἀφάνταστος (*φύσις*), devoid of apprehension, non-perceptive (oppd. to *νοεῖα*), Ph. i. 114.
 ἀφασία (oppd. to *φάσις*), non-assertion, (Sceptic) refusal to say "Yes" or "No" about anything, P. i. 192, ii. 211.
 ἀφορμή (oppd. to *όρμη*), disinclination, aversion (Stoic), P. iii. 177, 273-274, E. 210-211.

 βίος, life, ordinary belief or conduct, P. i. 237; hence ὁ βίος and *οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ β.*, ordinary folk (oppd. to philosophers), P. i. 165, etc., E. 49; so βιωτικός, P. i. 23; βιωτικά (*κριτήρια*), ordinary, taken from common life, P. ii. 15.

 γενικώταται (*αἱρέσεις*), most comprehensive, leading (Schools), L. i. 27.
 γῆθος, joy, delight, E. 106.
 γλυκαντικός (*κινέσθαι*), (be affected by, or taste) sweetness, L. i. 344.
 γνησίη (oppd. to *σκοτίη*), genuine, true (*γνῶσις* Democr.), L. i. 138-139.

GLOSSARY

γυμναστικοί (*λόγοι*), exercitory, providing mental exercise (of the Socratic dialogues of Plato), P. i. 221.

δεδολεινμένος (*λόγος*), cunningly framed (sophism), P. ii. 229. *δεῖγμα*, indication, example, proof, P. i. 85; so *δείγματος χάρις*, by way of example, as specimens, E. 40. *δεῖξις*, pointing out, indicating, P. ii. 25, etc.; so *δεικτικῶς*, L. i. 267.

διαγνωστική, capable of distinguishing, P. ii. 229; so *διαγνωστικός*, ascertaining distinctly, discerning, L. i. 24.

διάθεσις, condition, disposition, state (of mind or body), P. iii. 243, etc.

διαθήκη (Democr.) = *διάθεσις*, L. i. 136.

διαίρεσις, division (4 kinds of), P. ii. 213 ff.; *τέλειος δ.*, E. 10; so *διαιρετική*, P. ii. 213.

διάκενος (*ἐλκυσμός*), vacuous (attraction), of a purely subjective impression, L. i. 241, ii. 67.

διαλεκτική, dialectic, logic (Stoic def., "Science of things false and true and neither"), P. ii. 94, 213, etc.; so *οἱ διαλεκτικοί*, the Logicians, P. ii. 146, etc.

διάληπος (*τρόπος*), circular mode (of reasoning), arguing in a circle, P. i. 117, 164, etc.; so *ὅ δὲ ἀλλήλων τρόπος*, P. ii. 202, L. i. 426, etc.

διά πασῶν (*οὐμφανία*), the octave-scale (ratio of 2 : 1), P. iii. 155, L. i. 95; so *διὰ τεσσάρων* (= 4 : 3), and *διὰ πέντε* (= 3 : 2), *loc. cit.* (all terms of Pythagorean musical theory).

διαπίπτειν, collapse, fail, go wrong, P. i. 185, (oppd. to *κατορθοῦν*) Ph. ii. 252.

διάρροις, inconsistency, lack of congruity (in the premisses of an argument), P. ii. 146, 152, L. ii. 429.

διάστασις, dissension, dispute, L. ii. 11, 118, 177; (Spatial) dimension, P. iii. 44, 125, etc.; so (*τριχῆ*) *διαστατόν*, P. ii. 30, etc.

διαφορά : *τὰ κατὰ δ.* (oppd. to *τὰ πρὸς τι*), things which have a distinct existence of their own, self-existent (= *ἀπόλυτα, absolutes*), P. i. 137, L. ii. 37, 161, Ph. ii. 263.

διαφορούμενον (*άξιαμα*), duplicated, P. ii. 112, L. ii. 108, etc. (cf. Diog. L. vii. 69 : ? *διφορ*, as Prantl).

διενδεικμένη (*φαντασία*), thoroughly scrutinized, tested, P. i. 227, L. i. 181, 438 (cf. *περιωδειμένη*).

διήκεν (Methodic School), pervade, P. i. 240 n.; Ph. i. 40. **διοική**, dissension, dispute, L. ii. 322.

GLOSSARY

διομαλιομός, evenness, uniform quality, P. iii. 244, E. 206; so *διομαλίζειν*, not vary, E. 207.

διοριστικός, capable of distinguishing, L. i. 64; serving to divide, marking off, Ph. ii. 128.

διπλασίαν (*λόγος*), duplicate (ratio), double, L. i. 97. *διχάζειν*, cut in two, divide, Ph. i. 292; so *διχοτόμησις*, bisection, Ph. i. 284.

δογματολογία, expositions of dogmas, L. ii. 367.

δοκιμαστικός, capable of scrutinizing, testing, L. i. 27, etc.

δόκος (= *δόξα*, Xenophanes), opinion, P. ii. 18.

δόκωσις, laying beams, raftering, P. iii. 99, Ph. i. 343. **δοξαστής**, one who opines, conjecturer, L. i. 157; so *δοξαστικῶς*, E. 156.

δόξις (= *δόξα*, Democr.), opinion, L. i. 137.

δραστήριος (*ἀρχῇ*), active, efficient, L. i. 115, etc.; so *δραστική*, P. iii. 1, *δραστικάτον* (*ἄπτον*), P. iii. 2.

δύναμις, ability, potency, P. i. 8, etc.; *δυνάμει* (oppd. to *ἐνεργείᾳ*), potentially, virtually, implicitly, P. i. 11, ii. 225-226; *ἰατρικὰ δυνάμεις* = medicines, P. i. 133, E. 153.

ἔγγράμματος (*φωνῇ*), written (speech), Ph. ii. 249.

ἔγκεκαλυμμένος (*λόγος*), "the Veiled" (classed, with the *Sorites*), among the "insoluble" (*ἄποροι*) arguments by the Stoics, see Diog. L. vii. 82), L. i. 410.

ἐθελοκαψεῖν, affect deafness, be wilfully obtuse, E. 202.

εἴδησις, cognition, awareness, L. i. 163.

εἶδος (oppd. to *ὑλὴ*), form, Ph. ii. 26; (distingd. fr. *γένος*) species, particular, L. ii. 41; so *οἱ (τὰ) ἐπ' εἶδος* (or *κατ'), particulars, individual cases, L. i. 20, E. 9, etc.*

εἰδωλοποίησις, image-formations, imaginary objects, P. ii. 222. **εἰλικρίνεια**, purity, Ph. i. 73; *ἢ κατ' εἰλικρίνεις*, absolute (or complete) motion, Ph. ii. 113; so *εἰλικρινῆς κρήτης*, impartial (perfect) judge, P. i. 113; *εἰλικρινῶς*, clearly, absolutely, P. i. 207, ii. 25, etc.

εἰλέσις (oppd. to *ἀντιτυνία*), yielding, non-resistance, Ph. ii. 221 ff. **εἰσοχή** (oppd. to *ἔξοχή*), concavity, depression, P. i. 92, ii. 70, etc.

ἐκβάλλειν, throw over, reject, P. i. 177, etc.; *ἐκβ. εἰς ἄπειρον*, make regress *ad infinitum*, P. i. 164.

ἐκκαλυπτικός, serving to reveal, disclosing, P. ii. 101, 116, etc.; so *ἐκκαλυπτικῶς*, by way of disclosure, P. ii. 141.

GLOSSARY

ἐκπειροδεύειν, (go right round,) inspect closely, scrutinize, L. i. 188 (*cf.* διεξοδεύειν).
 ἐκπίττειν (c. genit.), be ousted from, lose, L. i. 268, etc.;
 ἐκπ. *eis* (ἀπένειν), be forced off into, be lost (wrecked) in, P. i. 186, ii. 253, etc.; so ἐκπτωσις, P. ii. 207, etc.
 ἀλαστρεῖν (= ἔλανειν, Timon), drive, worry, E. 172.
 ἀλκυομός (διάκενος) (vacuous) attraction, or compulsion (of wholly subjective impressions), L. i. 241.
 ἀμφέθοδος (*λόγος*), orderly, systematic, P. ii. 21, 48.
 ἀμπειρία, practice, experience, P. ii. 256; (medical) empiricism, P. i. 236, L. ii. 191; so ἀμπειρικός (*ἰατρεύειν*), L. ii. 204.
 ἀμπελάσις, approach, impact, Ph. i. 393; so ἀμπελάζειν (Democr.), Ph. i. 19.
 ἀμφασις (reflection), probable subjective appearance (Carneades), L. i. 169; implication, P. ii. 112; indication, allusion, P. iii. 199.
 ἀναλλαγή (*στοιχείων*), interchange (of letters), Ph. i. 278.
 ἀναλλάξ, alternately, in turn, *alternando*, P. i. 9, 186, etc.
 ἀναπτεροκαλέν, (deal tastelessly,) fool with, P. ii. 245.
 ἀναπεσφραγιούμενη (*φαντασία*), stamped (or imprinted) on (the mind), P. ii. 4; so ἀναπεσφραγιαμένας, E. 183.
 ἀναπόθεος (*καταλήψεων*), storing within, deposit, P. iii. 188.
 ἀναπομειαγμένη (*φαντασία*), impressed upon (the mind), P. ii. 4 (*cf.* E. 183).
 ἀνάργεια (oppd. to *λόγος*), sensible evidence, P. iii. 266; sense-impression (= *φαντασία*, Epicur.), L. i. 203.
 ἀναθροεῖ (*φωναί*), articulate, L. ii. 275.
 ἀνένειτικόν (*σημεῖον*), indicative (sign), P. ii. 99 ff., L. i. 161.
 ἀνδεξίζις, indication (techn. term of the Methodic School of Medicine), P. i. 240.
 ἀνάδάθετος (oppd. to *προφορικός*) *λόγος*, internal reason, mental discourse, P. i. 65, L. ii. 275.
 ἀνδιήκονται (*κοινότητες*), pervading (of a class qualifying all its particulars), L. ii. 41.
 ἄνοια (Peripatetic), comprehension, concept, L. i. 223 f.; κοινάί ἄνοιαι, common conceptions, general opinion, Ph. i. 178, 199.
 ἄνομολέσχης (Timon), prating about (discussing) laws or customs, moralizer, L. i. 8.
 ἄντοτασις, objection, (logical) hindrance, L. i. 256; lodgement (of bodies, so as to block a passage,—medical term), L. ii. 220.

GLOSSARY

ἴνστημα, objection, contradictory fact, L. i. 256.
 ἔντασις (*κάνον*), tension (of coniform light, or visual stream), P. iii. 51.
 ἔπειλέχεια (oppd. to *δύναμις*), actuality, Ph. ii. 340.
 ἔξαλλαγή, variety, differing nature, P. i. 36.
 ἔξαπλον, unfold, explain, P. i. 217; so κατὰ ἔξαπλωσιν, when stated simply, L. i. 51.
 ἔξις, state, condition, faculty (oppd. to *στέρσης*), P. iii. 49, 50; cohesion (distingd. from *φύσις* and *ψυχή*, as ground of inorganic unity), Ph. i. 81 (*cf.* Vol. I. Introd. p. xxv).
 ἔξοχη (oppd. to *είσοχη*), convexity, prominence, P. i. 92, 120; κατ' έξ., P. ii. 70, L. i. 372.
 ἔπαγωγή, induction (arguing from parts to whole), P. ii. 204; so ἔπαγωγκός (*τρόπος*), P. ii. 196; ἔπαγωγκός, P. ii. 195, 197.
 ἔπικολονθήμα: κατ' ἐπ. (oppd. to *προηγουμένως*), as a sequel, secondarily, L. i. 34.
 ἔπαναβθρόκος, super-ordinate, (logically) higher or more comprehensive, P. i. 38, 174, iii. 160, etc.
 ἔπεικρινεσθαι, enter in separately, P. iii. 82.
 ἔπεισκυκλέν, roll in on, surround with, P. ii. 210.
 ἔπειχεν, come to a halt, withhold judgement, P. i. 26, 29, etc. (*cf.* ἔποχη).
 ἔπιβαλλειν (c. dat.), approach, perceive, attend to, deal with, P. i. 69, ii. 72, etc.; (c. infin.) undertake, proceed to, P. ii. 16, (mid.) L. i. 37.
 ἔπιβολή, objection, criticism, P. iii. 67, L. i. 65; aspect, occurrence, instant, L. i. 222, Ph. ii. 209, E. 25.
 ἔπιθεωρέν, theorize about, imagine, assume in addition, L. i. 22, P. iii. 162, 164.
 ἔπικράτεια, predominance, P. i. 80; so ή κατ' ἐπ. κίνησις (oppd. to *κατ' εἰλικρίνειαν*), majority-motion (when most parts move, but a few are at rest), Ph. ii. 113 f.
 ἔπικρίνειν, judge, distinguish, P. i. 26, etc.; decide, settle (a controversy), P. ii. 19, 113, etc.
 ἔπικρισις, judging, deciding, P. i. 12; ἐπ. εἰδάλων (oppd. to *ἀποκρίσεις*), immissions, P. iii. 51.
 ἔπιλογιαμός, reckoning, reasoning, P. ii. 123, L. i. 352.
 ἔπιμαρτύρησις, confirmatory evidence, P. i. 181, L. i. 212.
 ἔπιμετρον: έξ ἔπιμέτρου, by way of excess, into the bargain, P. ii. 47, 194, L. ii. 2.
 ἔπιμεξτα, admixture, intermixture, P. i. 36, 126, 128; so ἔπιμηγή, P. i. 124; ἔπιμκτος, P. i. 185.

GLOSSARY

ἐπίνοια (oppd. to *ὑπάρξις*), concept, notion, L. ii. 381; κατ' ἐπ., conceptually, Ph. ii. 348.
 ἐπίπεδος (ἡ), plane surface, plane, Ph. i. 387, 420, 428.
 ἐπιρυμαὶ (δέξις, Democr.), in-flowing, adventitious, L. i. 137.
 ἐπισπαστικῶς (oppd. to *πρωστικός*), by pulling (after, oppd. to pushing), P. iii. 69, Ph. ii. 83.
 ἐπίστασις, attention, close observation, L. i. 23, 114; so ἐπιστακή, attentively, L. i. 182.
 ἐπιστατέων, have charge of, control, L. i. 43, 124.
 ἐπιστημονικός (oppd. to δοκιστὸς λόγος), cognitive, scientific, L. i. 111, 114; (*κατάληψις*), L. i. 110; (*αὐθῆσις*), L. i. 145; so ἐπιστημονικός, scientifically, Ph. i. 283.
 ἐπιστροφή, attention, regard, P. iii. 248, E. 194.
 ἐπισύνθετος, composition, enlargement by addition, P. iii. 153, L. ii. 58, 60, Ph. ii. 302.
 ἐπίτραπος (oppd. to *ἄνευς*), intensification, increase, P. ii. 40; κατ' ἐπ., Ph. i. 408.
 ἐπιφορά, conclusion, Ph. i. 135, 206.
 ἐπιχείρειν, handle, attempt, argue against, object, P. iii. 13, 270, Ph. ii. 69, 305.
 ἐπιχείρημα, (hostile) argument, critique, P. ii. 188; so ἐπιχείρησις, P. ii. 192, 219, E. 217.
 ἐποχή, checking, stopping, P. i. 238; (Sceptic) suspension of judgement, withholding assent, P. i. 5, 8, 11, etc.
 ἐρωτῶν (λόγον), propound (an argument, regarded as in the form of question and answer, or "dialectic"), P. i. 20, 33, ii. 134, etc.
 ἔστω (c. accus. and infin.), let it be granted (that), P. ii. 51, L. i. 423, etc.
 ἔτει (Democr.), verily, in sooth, P. i. 214, L. i. 135, 137, ii. 62.
 ἐτερογενῶς (διαφέρειν), by generic distinction, L. i. 361.
 ἐτερόδοξος (c. genit.), differing in opinion (from), P. ii. 6, 118, etc.
 ἐτεροτοπία, alteration, modification, P. ii. 70, L. i. 230, 372 (as def. of φανασία, Chrysippus); so ἐτεροικός, P. ii. 70.
 εὐαπόδοτος (λόγος), easy to explain, or state, L. i. 343, ii. 85.
 εὐαρέστεων, be well-pleased, Ph. i. 141; so εὐαρέστους, E. 88.
 εὐδόκησις (Cyrenaic), approval, satisfaction, L. i. 200.
 εὐδρομεῖν, run easily, prove satisfactory, Ph. ii. 36 (cf. εὐδεῖν, L. ii. 67).
 εὐεπιβολάρεψ, more sharp-witted, more shrewd, L. i. 322.

GLOSSARY

εὐεπιλόγιστος, easily inferred, L. i. 75.
 εὐθέως, at once, for instance, P. ii. 214, (with οἷον) L. i. 298, Ph. i. 114, E. 35.
 εὐθικὴ (κίνησις), in a straight line, rectilinear, Ph. ii. 51.
 εὐλογχα (εὐώλα, Democr.), lucky, propitious, Ph. i. 19.
 εὐρεσιλογία, word-play, sophistry, P. ii. 9, 84; so εὐρεσιλογεῖν, P. i. 63, E. 7.
 εὐροια (βίον), smooth current, fair course (= εὐδαιμονία, Stoic), P. iii. 172, E. 30; so εὐρόως (βιοῦν), E. 110.
 εὐσημος (διδασκαλία), easily intelligible, plain, P. iii. 158, Ph. ii. 167.
 εὐχρηστέων, be useful, Ph. i. 18.
 εφεκτική (ἀγωγή), suspensive (= Sceptic), P. i. 7, 209, ii. 9; (masc.) P. ii. 10, E. 152; so ἐφεκτός, P. i. 219, iii. 55; ἐφεκτέον, P. ii. 94, iii. 55, L. ii. 160.
 εφιστάντα (c. accus.), check, make pause, P. i. 180; (c. dat.) dwell on, attend to, P. ii. 229, iii. 13, 198, L. i. 410; (c. ὅτι) argue, make out, P. iii. 56.
 εφοδεύειν, inspect, examine, P. i. 200, 209, etc.
 εφοδευτικός (oppd. to ἐκκαλητικός), by (logical) advance, or progression, P. ii. 141-142, L. ii. 307-308.
 εφόδος, mode of approach or attack, counter-argument, method, P. i. 183, ii. 222, 258; L. ii. 140, 142.
 ζητητική (ἀγωγή), (way) of investigation (i.e. Scepticism), P. i. 7.
 ζωγραφικῶς, in accordance with the art of painting, artistically, E. 255.
 ζωνθία, animalcules, P. i. 41.
 ἥγεμονικόν (Stoic), ruling principle, regent part, P. i. 128, ii. 70; L. i. 233 f., etc. (cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxv).
 ἥγονύμενον (oppd. to λήγον), antecedent (clause), P. ii. 111 f., 148, etc.
 ἥμιλος (λόγος), ratio of 3 : 2, one and a half times, P. iii. 155.
 ἥστικῶς (oppd. to ἀλγεωῶς), pleasantly, agreeably, Ph. ii. 225, E. 98.
 θεματίζειν, propose, assume, L. ii. 202; so θέματα, assumptions (distingd. fr. λήγματα), L. ii. 302.
 θεοφορεῖν, deify, Ph. i. 32; (pass.) be god-possessed, in a state of ecstasy, P. i. 101.

GLOSSARY

θέσις, (local) position, P. i. 36, 118; (oppd. to **φύσις**) assumption, convention, P. ii. 214, 256.
θετικός: θ. χρήσις, conventional, agreed use, P. ii. 256; so **θετικώς**, as laid down, on trust, P. i. 38.
θεωρεῖσθαι, be seen, observed, found as a fact (hence almost= *εἶναι*), P. ii. 198, 224; L. i. 183, 362, etc.
θεώρημα, argument, principle, lesson, P. ii. 3, 70, iii. 261; L. ii. 291.
θέξις, touching, contact, P. iii. 56, Ph. i. 260, 265 (*cf.* ἀφῆ).
θυπτικός, by pressure, Ph. ii. 83.

ἰδιάζειν (Heracleit.), be peculiar, act (or think) on one's own, L. i. 133.
ἴδιαζόντως, privately, in a peculiar way, P. i. 182.
ἴδιος: κατ' **ἴδιαν**, privately, by (one)self, solely, P. iii. 259, L. i. 277 f., 296, etc.; **ἴδιατερον**, more particularly, specifically, L. ii. 272, 396; Ph. ii. 182.
ἴδιοσυγκροσία, peculiar constitution (or temperament), idiosyncrasy, P. i. 79, 89.
ἴδιότης, peculiar nature, individuality, L. ii. 41 f.
ἴδιωμα, peculiar property, characteristic, L. i. 55, ii. 425, Ph. i. 410 f.
ἴδιωτική (ἀπόφασις), crude, common-place, L. i. 265, Ph. i. 63 (*cf.* **ἴδιώτης** (*τεχνίτης*, L. i. 55)).
ἴκτερικόλ, jaundiced, P. i. 101, 126, etc.; so **ἴκτεριῶν**(*τες*), P. i. 44, L. i. 192, etc.
ἴσοκρατεῖν, be of equal force, Ph. ii. 81.
ἴσοσθένεια, equality of (logical) force, equipollence, P. i. 8, 190, 196, etc.; so **ἴσοσθενής**, P. i. 26, etc.
ἴσταναι (*λόγου ἐπὶ τινος*), base (an argument on), P. i. 66, 72, 77, etc.: **ἴστασθαι**, halt, pause, P. i. 186, ii. 253: **ἴστηκε** (*ἔστιν*), stands still, remains constant, L. ii. 427.
ἴστορία, inquiry, account, L. i. 140, ii. 1, 14; so **ἴστορικῶς**, as a chronicler, in detail, P. i. 4.

καθάπαξ, once for all, wholly, absolutely, P. i. 104, ii. 97, 208, etc.
καθίστασθαι (= γίγνεσθαι), become, L. i. 130; so **καθεστάναι** (= *εἶναι*), be, L. i. 29, 50, etc.; **καθεστώς** (= ὁν, ὅν), being, L. i. 69, 73, etc.
καθολικός, general, universal, P. ii. 196, E. 8; so **καθολικώτερος**, P. ii. 84, iii. 205.

GLOSSARY

κανονίζειν, measure (by a rule or standard), judge, L. i. 158, 175, etc. (so **κανών**, carpenter's rule, P. ii. 15, L. i. 27).
κανονικά (Epicur.), rules (of thought), logic, L. i. 22.
Καταβάλλοντες (*οἱ*), *The Down-Throwers* (wrestling term, title of a book of Protagoras, also called **'Αλήθεα**), L. i. 60.
κατάκλειστος, shut up, treasured, P. i. 143.
καταλαμβάνειν, grasp, apprehend, perceive, P. i. 26, 99, 182, etc.: **καταλαμβάνεσθαι** (pass.), P. i. 178, ii. 8, etc.; (mid.) L. i. 300, 305, 310, ii. 209, etc.
καταλήγειν (*εἰς*), fall back on, terminate in, P. i. 12, 163, 165, etc.; so **κατάληξις**, end, Ph. ii. 61.
καταληπτικός, apprehensive, capable of perceiving, E. 75: *κ. φαντασία* (Stoic), P. i. 68, 235, iii. 241 f., etc. (*cf.* Vol. I. Introd. p. xxv); so **καταληπτός**, apprehensible, P. i. 235, etc.
κατάληψης, apprehension, perception, P. i. 179, L. i. 151 f., etc.
κατασκεύαζειν, make out, argue, demonstrate, establish, P. i. 32, 61, 168, etc.; so **κατασκευαστικός**, L. ii. 343.
κατασκευή, (physical) construction, constitution, P. i. 48, 54, 217, etc.; (logical) demonstration, P. i. 169, 173.
κατάστημα, (physical) condition, P. iii. 184.
κατάχρονα (oppd. to **ἀκρίβεια**), misuse (of words), loose language, L. ii. 129; so **καταχρηστικά** (*δινόματα*), L. ii. 129; **καταχρηστικός**, P. i. 191, 207; **καταχρηστικώτερον** (oppd. to *κυρώσ*), L. ii. 400.
κατέξαντατικός (c. genit.), fit to resist, impervious to, E. 104, 106 (*cf.* **κατέξαντημα**, P. iii. 275, etc.).
κατηγόρημα, predicate, asserted fact, P. ii. 230, 232, Ph. i. 211, E. 32.
κατηγορικός (*λόγος*), affirmative, categorical (oppd. to hypothetical), P. ii. 163, 166.
κατηγορικόνεστος, necessitated, unavoidable, P. i. 13, 29, iii. 235, etc.
κατόρθωμα (Stoic), right action, L. i. 158, Ph. i. 16 (*cf.* Vol. I. Introd. p. xxvii).
κεκραγμένος, convincingly, E. 42.
κενοπάθεια (Stoic), have empty affections (of illusory sensation), P. ii. 49, L. ii. 213; so **κενοπάθεια** (Democrit.), L. ii. 184; **κενοπάθημα**, L. ii. 354.
κεφαλωαδέστερον, rather summarily, Ph. i. 206.
κινέειν, move, excite, affect, P. i. 193, etc.; remove, overthrow, dislodge, P. ii. 84, iii. 1, L. i. 137, etc.; arouse, set agoing, L. i. 6.

GLOSSARY

- κοωδίτης (medical term), general (morbid) state, type, P. i. 240.
- κοκκινεόμενα (σπέρματα, Democr.), sifted, winnowed, L. i. 117.
- κουφοφορέν, rise lightly, soar, Ph. i. 71.
- κρατύνειν, confirm, establish, P. i. 147, ii. 96.
- Κρατυντήρια, *Confirmations* (title of a work by Democr.), L. i. 136.
- κριτήριον, standard (of belief or conduct), criterion, P. i. 21 f., P. ii. 13 ff., L. i. 26 ff. (cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xxv, xxviii ff.).
- κυκλογράφεν, describe a circle, Ph. i. 420 ff., 426.
- κυκλοφορητικός, moving in a circle, revolving, P. iii. 31, Ph. ii. 51, 316 : -κῶς, Ph. ii. 58.
- κυλίσθαι, be bandied about, be current talk, L. i. 116; (*eis*), be brought up against, involved in, L. ii. 169, E. 89.
- κύνων, dog, P. i. 63, etc.; Cynic, L. i. 48, ii. 5; (various senses of) E. 28 f.
- κωβίός, kind of fish, gudgeon, Ph. i. 278.
- λακεδών (Timon), cry, utterance, E. 171 (dubious word).
- λαρβάνειν, take, accept, admit, P. i. 186, etc.; grasp, discern, diagnose, P. ii. 39, L. i. 179.
- λαμπτῆρόν, sparkle, lustre, P. i. 45.
- λειποψύχειν, lose consciousness, faint, P. iii. 236.
- λεκτόν (Stoic), expressible, expression (= meaning of a name, or mental image evoked by it), P. ii. 81, 104, 107 ff., L. ii. 12, 70, Ph. ii. 218, E. 224 (cf. note on P. ii. 81).
- λέξις, word, part of speech, Ph. ii. 216; κατὰ λ., word for word, expressively, Ph. i. 92.
- λεπτός: τὰ κατὰ λεπτόν, refinements, subtle points, minutiae, L. ii. 295.
- λευκαίνεσθαι, have a sensation of whiteness, sense white colour, L. i. 191, 197, 293.
- λευκανθίζοντες (δέρθαλμοι), flecked with white, albino, P. i. 44.
- λευκαντικώς (διατεθῆναι, etc.), have a feeling, or sense, of whiteness, L. i. 192, 198, 344, ii. 397.
- λήγον (oppd. to ήγουνενον), (logical) consequent, P. ii. 111 ff., etc.
- λήμματα, (logical) premisses, P. ii. 185, etc.
- ληπτός, within reach, attainable, L. i. 124.
- ματαύλειν, speak foolishly, talk nonsense, Ph. i. 282.

GLOSSARY

- ματαοπονία, useless labour, P. ii. 206.
- μάχεσθαι (c. dat.), conflict with, contradict, P. i. 184, etc.; so μάχμον, disputed, L. ii. 45.
- μεγεθοποιεῖν, make great, enlarge, L. i. 108.
- μεγεθῶν: μεμεγεθωμένον, magnified, enlarged, Ph. ii. 240.
- μέθοδος, "Method" (i.e. the doctrinal system of the Methodic School of Medicine), P. i. 236; so μεθοδικός (Ιατρός), P. i. 239 ff.: μεθοδικάτερος, more systematically, in due order, L. ii. 141.
- μειωτικός (oppd. to παραξητικός), by diminution, E. 251.
- μέρος, part, parties to, P. i. 59, 90, etc.: ἀνὰ μ., in turn, Ph. i. 429; ἀπὸ μέρους, in part, L. i. 283; ἐν μέρει, in turn, L. i. 28, ii. 183; (c. genit.) by way of, L. ii. 118; τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους, (logical) particulars (oppd. to "genus," or "universal"), P. ii. 87, L. i. 399, etc.; so (τὰ) κατὰ μέρος, P. ii. 84, 86, 195 f., etc.; παρὰ μέρος, by turns, alternately, L. i. 286, 376, etc.
- μενολαβεῖν, intercept, Ph. i. 265, 386.
- μεταβατική (φαντασία), transitive (impression, i.e. passing on so as to combine with others and form knowledge), L. ii. 276, 288; μ. κίνησις, (distingd. from μεταβλητική κ.) Ph. i. 195, ii. 38, 41. So μεταβατικώς, by transition, P. iii. 97, 129, Ph. ii. 43, 53.
- μεταβλητική (δύναμις), capable of changing, P. i. 103; μ. κίνησις, Ph. i. 195, ii. 42, 321.
- μετάθεσις, transposition, substitution, Ph. i. 328.
- μετακομεσθαῖ, be rearranged, transformed, P. i. 217.
- μετονοία, sharing, participation, P. iii. 153, Ph. i. 375.
- μετριοπάθεια (Sceptic), moderate feeling, P. i. 25, 30; so μετριοπαθεῖν, P. iii. 235 f.; -παθῶς, E. 161.
- μέντροις ἑκείνων, so long as they live, during their lifetime, Ph. i. 62.
- μητριτικός, capable of informing, indicative of, P. i. 187, L. i. 85, ii. 165, E. 245.
- μνημονικός, capable of remembering, retentive, L. ii. 274; -ικῶς, by way of memory, L. i. 347.
- μονολημματος (λόγος), with one premiss only, P. ii. 167, L. ii. 443.
- μονομάχης, fighter in single combat, gladiator, P. i. 156, iii. 212.
- μονόποιος, of one quality only, P. i. 94 f.
- μουσουργός, music-maker, musician, P. i. 54.

GLOSSARY

μοχθηρός (oppd. to *ἀγνής, ἀληθής*), unsound, invalid, P. ii. 105, 111, 146, 175, etc.
μυθοποίησις, myth-making, invention of fables, Ph. i. 192.
μυξωτῆρες, nostrils, P. i. 127.
μύσιορος (*στοά*, oppd. to *σύμμετρος*), running to a point, curtailed, P. i. 118.

ναστὸν (*σῶμα*), solid, impermeable, P. ii. 142, L. ii. 309; (plur.) i. 213.

νηκτικός, able to swim, Ph. i. 171.

νοητοὶ (*πόρου*), intelligible (*i.e.* not perceptible by sense), P. ii. 98, 140, L. ii. 146, 220, 306, Ph. i. 256.

νόστημα: τὸ ν. τῶν καρπῶν produce, yield, richness, L. i. 17.

νυκτερίουν (*φάντασμα*), nocturnal, Ph. ii. 188; so **νυκτεροεδές φ.**, Ph. ii. 184: **νυκτοειδὲς φ.** (Democr., Epicur.), Ph. ii. 181.

νυκτίνομος (*ὅρψις*), (feeding, or) flying by night, Ph. i. 247.

ξέσματα, filings, slivers, P. i. 129.

ἐννός (= *κονός*, Heracleit.), common, universal, L. i. 133.

δύκος, mass, material body, molecule, L. i. 287, 290 f., P. iii. 152; (*δύναμοι*) P. iii. 32, Ph. i. 363, (*νοητοὶ*) L. ii. 220.

δόμασθαι (Democr.), smell, L. i. 139.

δόδεσ, way, avenue (to), P. i. 210 ff.; **δόδῳ** (*ζητεῖν*), methodically, L. i. 2: δόδῳ πάρεργον, as a bye-work on the road, in passing, L. ii. 378.

δύναις, conceit, (idle) fancy, P. ii. 258, iii. 280 f.; (c. genit.) belief in, opinion about, L. i. 5, Ph. i. 74.

δόμισκος, socket of door-hinge, Ph. ii. 54.

δόλοσχερῆς, whole, entire, P. i. 130; so **δόλοσχερέτερον** (*εἰπεῖν*, adv.), in general terms, broadly, P. i. 31: **κατὰ δόλοσχέρειαν** (oppd. to *κατὰ μέρην*), as a whole, totally, Ph. ii. 53.

δόλτης: **κατὰ δόλτην** (oppd. to *κατὰ μέρην*), as a whole, completely, P. iii. 46, 64, Ph. ii. 52, 57, 103.

δόμοιμερεῖαι (Anaxagoras), homoeomeries, substances composed of homogeneous parts, P. iii. 32 f., Ph. i. 6, ii. 252, 254.

δόμοιοτελέν (c. dat.), be similarly affected, share the sensation of, L. i. 301, 363.

δόμοιωτικός: **κατὰ δόμοιωτικὴν μετάβασιν**, by inference based on similarity, E. 250; so **δόμοιωτικός** (*νοεῖσθαι*), Ph. i. 394.

δόμόλογος, agreed, granted, L. i. 75, ii. 183, 194.

GLOSSARY

ὄνειροπολέν, dream of, imagine (vainly), P. ii. 157, iii. 41, 156; (mid.) L. ii. 57; (pass.) P. i. 91, etc.

ὄνοματογράφια, writing down names, E. 67.

όξητηκούστατος, with most acute hearing, Ph. i. 65.

όξυωπεν, have keen sight, be sharp, L. i. 55, Ph. i. 65; so **όξυωπέστατος**, Ph. i. 65.

όρατικῶς (*κωνέσθαι*), (affected) by the sensation of sight, L. i. 355; so **όρατικόν πάθος**, L. i. 355.

όρλεσθαι (mid.=*όρλεσων*), define, P. ii. 101, 207, etc.; so **όριστόν**, object of definition, P. ii. 207.

όρκικῶς, by defining, through a definition, L. i. 426.

όρμη, impulse, instinct, P. iii. 70; (oppd. to *ἀφορμή*), inclination, desire, P. iii. 177, 273 f., E. 59 f.

όρος, (logical) definition, P. ii. 27, 205 ff., (distingd. fr. τὸ καθολικόν) E. 8.

οὐριοδρομῶν, run before the wind, Ph. ii. 56.

οὐσία, being, what exists, P. ii. 5; (material) substance (Δεῖ μέ, ρενοτῇ), P. iii. 82, 115; **τρεῖς οὐσίαι** (Xenocr.), L. i. 147, Ph. ii. 169.

όφθαλμοφανῶς, plainly before their eyes, Ph. i. 39.

όχυρωτικός (c. genit.), serving to fortify, L. i. 23.

πάγιος, firm, certain, (oppd. to *εἰκός*) L. i. 110, ii. 187; so **παγίως**, L. ii. 186.

παθηματικῶς (*ὑποπίπτοντα*), (things experienced) by way of passive affection, P. ii. 10.

παλητῆς (oppd. to *διπλῆς*), subject to affection or change, passible, Ph. ii. 311.

πάθος, suffering, P. i. 70; affection, impression, feeling, P. i. 192, etc.: τὰ πρώτα π. (Epicur.), L. i. 203.

παλαιοτιάς, of a palm's breadth (about 3 inches), Ph. i. 300, 321.

παραβάλλειν (c. dat.), compare, set against, object to, Ph. i. 96, 108, 133; so **παραβολή**, analogous contradictory argument, objection, Ph. i. 97, 109, 134.

παραγγελματικῶς, by way of command, imperatively, P. i. 204.

παραγράψιμος (*φαντασία*), exceptional, rejected, L. i. 170.

παραβλήσιν (*όφθαλμόν*), press at the side, P. i. 47.

παρακεμένως, similarly, in the next place, L. i. 77, 182, 227, Ph. i. 321, etc.

παρακη (medical), post-crisis stage, abatement (of disease), P. ii. 237 f., 257.

GLOSSARY

παρακολούθησις, connexion, comprehension, P. ii. 236, Ph. ii. 220.
παράλευψις (logical, = ἔλλευψις), omission, deficiency, P. ii. 150.
παραλογίζεσθαι, be fallacious, reason falsely, P. ii. 250.
παραμνθεῖσθαι (= διδάσκειν), show, argue, establish, L. i. 66, 344, ii. 17, etc.
παραμνθητικός, capable of relieving, P. i. 70, 72.
παρανθία, proof, confirmatory evidence, L. i. 116, ii. 240, 469, etc.
παραπέμπειν (oppd. to *παραλαμβάνειν*), dismiss, reject, P. i. 183, L. i. 11, 81.
παραπίέσειν, press-on the side, L. i. 192.
παραπλοκή (*χυμῶν*), blending, intermixture, P. i. 102.
παραπορά, extra sprinkling, P. i. 46.
παραστός (*βαλανείον*), vestibule, P. i. 110, ii. 56.
παραστασις, establishing, proof, L. i. 119.
παραστατικός (= μηνυτικός), able to establish, probative, L. i. 85, ii. 202, 214, etc.
παράστασις, extension (in time), P. iii. 107; (in space) Ph. i. 367, ii. 7.
παρατατικόν (oppd. to *συντελεστικόν*), imperfect (or present) time, Ph. ii. 91 f., 97, 101; so -κώς, Ph. ii. 101.
παρατυπωτικός: π. (*φαντασίαι*), incorrectly impressed, fallacious, L. ii. 67.
παραύησις, additional increase, enlargement, P. iii. 80, L. ii. 58 f.; so *παραυητικός*, E. 251.
παρεγχειρένι, hand on to, transfer to, P. i. 234.
παρέκβασις: κατὰ παρέκβασιν, by way of digression, P. iii. 101.
παρέλκειν, be superfluous, redundant, P. ii. 77, 147, 156, 163, 175, L. i. 334.
παρέμπτωσις, occurrence, L. i. 175.
παρενθήκη, parenthesis, supplement, L. ii. 378.
παρηγορία, relief, assuagement, E. 149, 154.
παριστάν (-ιστάναι), set forth, make good, establish, prove, P. ii. 21 f., 108, etc.; (pass.) defend, P. ii. 42.
παρολκή, (logical) redundancy, P. ii. 146, 156, 159, 166, 175, L. ii. 292, 429, etc.
παρόσαν (= παρ' ὅσον), in so far as, inasmuch as, L. i. 405, 407, 419, etc.
παριφέστασθαι (c. dat.), be dependent on, result from, P. i. 205, L. ii. 12.

GLOSSARY

παχυμέρεα, thickness, density of parts, Ph. i. 86; so *παχυμερής* (ἀήρ), P. i. 125.
πένσις, feeling, passive affection, P. i. 22, L. i. 237, 239, 384, Ph. i. 209.
πένσμα, conviction, assurance, E. 149; μετὰ πένσματος, P. i. 18, L. ii. 159, E. 121, 164.
πεποίησις, confidence, assurance, P. i. 60, 197, iii. 238.
περατοῦν: πεπερατωμένον, limited, (spatially) bounded, Ph. i. 431 ff., ii. 27.
περιαντολούειν, to laud oneself, brag, P. i. 62.
περιγράφειν, conclude, P. ii. 259, iii. 279; cancel, annul, P. i. 15, L. i. 268; encircle, enclose, Ph. i. 257.
περιγραφή: κατὰ π. (= κατ' ὅτιαν), separately, by itself, solely, L. i. 277, ii. 161 f., 394, Ph. i. 103, 261, ii. 263.
περιεργία, needless labour, over-elaboration, subtlety, P. ii. 246, iii. 151, (plur.) 167.
περίεργος: οὐ κατὰ τὸ π. (= ἀπεριέργως), not in a special, or technical, sense, P. i. 9.
περιέχειν: τὸ περιέχον (Heracleit.), that which encompasses, the enveloping (atmosphere), L. i. 127, 129, ii. 286, Ph. i. 75, 79.
περίκτητις, acquisition, L. i. 166, E. 127, 146.
περιληπτικός, inclusive, comprehensive, L. i. 143; so *περιληπτός*, comprehensible, L. i. 141 f.
περινοστατος, most keen-witted, cleverest, L. i. 326.
περίπτωσις, occurrence, P. i. 144; actual impression, experience, (κατὰ π.) L. ii. 56 f., E. 252; so *περιπτωτικός*, actually, experientially, P. ii. 8, E. 250.
περισπᾶν, draw away, cause to doubt, L. i. 179 (cf. ἀπερισπάστος).
περίστασις, circumstance, condition, P. i. 30, 100, L. i. 185.
περιτρέψειν, overthrow, confute, P. i. 122, ii. 64, 78, etc.; (εἰς) change over, convert (to), P. i. 81, ii. 76, L. ii. 295 f.; so *περιτροπή* (λόγου), reversal, refutation, P. i. 200, ii. 128, 185, 187.
περιτυπών, mould round, enfold, P. iii. 75, 131 ff.
περιφορητικός (λόγος), bandied about, familiar, Ph. ii. 87.
περιστενμέναι (*φαντασίαι*), scrutinized, fully tested, P. i. 227 ff., L. i. 182, 187, 437 (cf. διεξωδενμέναι).
περιών: ἐκ (τοῦ) περιόντος (lit. from our reserves, or extra resources), over and above, into the bargain, P. i. 63, 78, ii. 96, iii. 273; so ἐκ περιονίας, P. i. 62, 76, ii. 192, L. ii. 183, 262, 296.

GLOSSARY

πιθανότης, credibility, probability, plausibility, P. ii. 79, 229, iii. 281.
πικραπτικός (*διατίθεμα*), am affected by (have a sensation of) bitterness, L. i. 367.
πλασματικός, fictitious, fanciful, P. i. 103; so *πλασματώδης*, L. ii. 367.
πλατύτερον (oppd. to ἐν ὑποτυπώσει, λέγειν), more fully, at length, P. i. 222.
πληκτικός, pungent, overpowering, P. i. 125; striking, convincing, P. iii. 71, 240; (*φαντασία*) L. i. 173, 257 f.
ποιότης, quality, P. i. 94 ff., iii. 32, 57.
πολυμυγία, multi-mixture, amalgam, Ph. i. 6.
πολυπλασισμός, multiplication, Ph. ii. 217.
πολυσχιδεῖς (*γνῶμαι*), much divided, various, L. i. 349.
πολύωρα (Zeno), attention, regard, P. iii. 248, E. 194.
ποριστικός: π. (*τέχνη*), capable of providing, P. i. 66, 72.
πόρος (*νοητοί, q.v.*), (bodily) passages, pores, P. ii. 140, etc.; (sing.) P. i. 50.
ποροποιεῖν: *πεποροποιημένον* (*σώμα*, oppd. to *ναοτόν*), provided with pores, permeable, L. ii. 309.
πραγματικάς (*ἀντιλέγεν*), in a practical way, effectively, P. iii. 13.
πρακτικός (*λόγος*), systematic, direct, P. i. 62.
πρίν (c. genit.), before, L. i. 162, ii. 445, etc.
προάγειν (c. genit.), precede, Ph. ii. 259: *προηγμένα* (Stoic), preferred, P. iii. 191 f., E. 62 ff.
πραγματοθέν, accomplished before, already completed, L. ii. 1, Ph. ii. 248.
πρόδηλογ, pre-evident, quite obvious, P. i. 91, 210, etc.; (oppd. to *ἀδηλον*) P. i. 138, ii. 97 ff.; so *προδηλοτάτη*, P. i. 214: *προδῆλως*, P. i. 226, L. i. 141.
προδιάθετος, predisposition, antecedent condition, P. i. 100, 110.
προδιακρίνεσθαι, be distinguished first, P. ii. 68 (-διευκρινεῖσθαι c. Bekk.).
προδιαρθρόν, enucleate (make clear) beforehand, Ph. i. 338, E. 18.
προδιεξόδευν, go through (make sure by scrutiny) beforehand, L. i. 188.
προηγουμένω λόγω, by direct argument, Ph. ii. 189; so *προηγουμένως*, firstly, principally, directly, P. ii. 16, 247, I'h. i. 390, etc.

GLOSSARY

προθεαμάτια, appointed day: ὑπὸ μίαν προθεαμάτιν, at one and the same moment, L. ii. 165.
προκαθηγούμενον (oppd. to λόγον, logical), antecedent (proposition), P. ii. 101, 106, 115.
προκαταρκτικά, antecedents, immediate causes, P. iii. 16.
προκαταταχέν, get the start of, outspeed, Ph. ii. 145 f., 153.
προκεντήματα, preliminaries, first outgoings, L. i. 107.
προκόπτειν, advance, proceed (of arguments, etc.), P. ii. 240, L. ii. 369, etc.; (spatially) Ph. ii. 57, 60, etc.
προκρίνειν, prefer, P. i. 60 f., 78, 90, etc.; so *πρόκρισις*, preferring, P. ii. 45.
προλήψις (*κοινὴ*), preconception, instinctive judgement, P. i. 211, L. i. 443, ii. 157, 337 ff., etc.
προνοητικά, providentially, by design, L. ii. 286.
προπλάσια (*ἀγγείων*), prominence, swollen state, L. ii. 219.
προπετεία, precipitancy, rashness, P. i. 20, 177, etc.; so *προπετής*, P. iii. 79, etc.: *προπετώς*, P. i. 212, ii. 17, 37: *προπετεύσθαι*, P. i. 20, 205, 237, etc.
πρός: τὰ πρός τι, things related to something else, (logical) relatives, P. ii. 125, 175, 179, L. ii. 38, etc.
προσαλλοτριοῦσθαι (c. dat.), be averse from, L. i. 140.
προσανατλάσσειν, invent besides, fancy in addition, E. 158.
προσβολὴ (*φαντασίας*), impact, application, occurrence, P. ii. 16, L. i. 36 f.; (*μιαντος*) stroke, L. ii. 271.
προσδιαταφέν, explain further, L. i. 114.
προσδοξάζειν, suppose besides, hold the additional opinion, P. i. 30, iii. 236, etc.
προσελεῖσθαι (c. dat.), press against, oppose, Ph. i. 3, E. 7.
προσεχή (*πάθη*), persistent, chronic, P. ii. 240; (*εἰδη*) related, appropriate, E. 15.
προσηρῆς (*κατάστημα*), congenial, agreeable, P. iii. 184, E. 86, 106.
πρόσκλυσις (c. dat.), adherence to, dependence on, P. i. 16; inclination, assent, P. i. 230.
πρόσληψις (logical), minor premiss, P. ii. 149, 234, L. ii. 333, etc.
προσοικειοῦσθαι (c. dat.), be naturally attached to, find congenial, L. i. 140.
προσπεθεία, tendency towards, inclination, consent, P. i. 230.
προστακτικά (*λεκτά*, Stoic), imperative, L. ii. 71, P. i. 204.
προσφέρεσθαι (mid.), give oneself, consume, P. i. 81, 83, 108, 110; (pass.) P. i. 52, 130.

GLOSSARY

- πρότασις* (logical), premiss (esp. major premiss of a syllogism), P. ii. 164 f., 195 ff.
- προφέρεσθαι* (φωνάς, etc.), utter, emit, P. i. 14, 73, etc.; (pass.) L. ii. 182, 290; so *προφορὰ* (φωνῶν), utterance, P. i. 15, 203.
- προφορικός* (λόγος, oppd. to ἐνδιάθετος, Stoic), uttered (reason, i.e. speech), L. ii. 275, 287.
- πρωτικώς* (oppd. to ἐπιπολικώς), by pushing forward, propulsively, P. iii. 69, Ph. ii. 83 f.
- πτώσις* (grammatical), inflexion, case, verbal usage (sense), E. 4, 29; so *ἡ πτώσική*, declinable form, noun, L. ii. 84.
- πυρακτοῦσθαι*, be heated, Ph. ii. 164 f.
- πύρωσις* (medical), feverish heat, inflammation, P. ii. 239.
- πύσμα*, interrogation, question, P. i. 189.
- ῥέων*: *ῥέντα* (στιγμή, etc.), flowing, moving continuously, L. i. 99, Ph. i. 376, 381, 430.
- ῥευστή* (ῥέη), in (constant) flux, P. i. 217, iii. 115.
- ῥῆτος*: *τὸ ῥῆτον*, precise statement, Ph. i. 54, (ρ. λέξεις) Ph. i. 64; so *ῥῆτος*, literally, expressly (in quoting), P. iii. 248, etc.; *ῥῆτοτάτα* (oppd. to δυναμεῖς), most explicitly, distinctly, L. i. 16, 134.
- ῥόνις* (medical), flux, issue (e.g. sweat), P. i. 238; (*ῥήγης*) P. iii. 54, 115; (*γραμμῆς*) P. iii. 154, Ph. i. 380.
- ῥῶσις* (*σωμάτων*), strengthening, E. 97.
- σαλένειν* (ἐν), be engaged in, deal with, P. i. 65; be storm-tossed, in distress, P. ii. 229; shake, upset, L. ii. 56, 837, 339, Ph. i. 3; (pass.) P. ii. 204, L. ii. 385, Ph. i. 417.
- σαρκοδακτής* (*βίος*, Orpheus), flesh-eating, Ph. i. 15.
- σαρκοτοκείαθαι*, be flesh-born (i.e. as fleshy lumps), P. i. 42.
- σαρκοφαγής*, fleshy-looking, coated with flesh, P. i. 50.
- σεμιολόγημα*, proud position, dignity, P. iii. 201.
- σημεῖον* (*ὑπομησικόν*) (*ἐνδεικτικόν*): sign, P. ii. 96 ff., 99 ff., L. ii. 140 ff.; (geometr.=στιγμή), point, P. iii. 39, 154, Ph. ii. 278 ff.
- σημειώσις*, reading signs, interpreting, L. ii. 269; so *σημειωτικῶς*, by means of signs, by interpretation, L. ii. 158: *σημειωτόν*, thing signified, P. ii. 100 f., 116 ff., etc.
- σιλλοί* (title of book by Timon), Satires, lampoons (fr. *σιλλος*, squint-eyed), P. i. 224.
- σκεπτοσύνη* (Timon), speculation, scepticism, P. i. 224.

GLOSSARY

- σκέψις*, the Sceptic way of thought, scepticism, P. i. 185, 209, 213 ff., etc.
- σκηνογραφία*, scene-painting, illusion, L. i. 88.
- σκυδαιφός*, (a meaningless word) "what d'ye call it," L. ii. 183.
- σκολόπορα* (ἄτα), with winding passages, P. i. 126.
- σκοτίη* (oppd. to γηησίη, γνῶσις, Democr.), bastard, inferior, L. i. 138 f.
- σολοκεῖοντες* (λόγοι), solecistic, ungrammatical, P. ii. 231, 235; so *σολοκουσός*, L. i. 44.
- σπᾶν*, draw in, derive (λόγον, φαντασίαν, etc.), L. i. 129, 176, 180, 186, etc.
- σπουδαῖος* (oppd. to φαῦλος), good, virtuous, P. ii. 83, L. i. 410, 418, etc.
- σταθμητικός* (ζυγός), able to weigh, or measure, L. i. 442.
- στάλεξ*, stake for nets, Ph. i. 3.
- στάσις*, rest, immobility, Ph. ii. 46, 81; (doctrinal) position, opinion, school of thought, L. i. 53, 89, 190, ii. 13, Ph. ii. 45, etc.; (= δάστασις) dissension, L. ii. 214.
- στασιώτης* (partisan), stationer, arrester, Ph. ii. 46.
- στερέμιος*, substantial, solid, L. i. 207, ii. 63, 65.
- στέρησις* (logical), privation, negation, Ph. i. 407; so *στερητικά*, negatives, Ph. i. 407.
- στηγή* (geometr.), point, L. i. 99, Ph. i. 376.
- στοά* (porch), the Stoic School, Stoicism, P. i. 235, ii. 5; of ἀπὸ τῆς στοάς, Stoics, P. iii. 181, etc.
- στοιχεῖν* (c. dat.), range oneself with, side with, E. 59.
- στοιχεῖον*, (physical) element, P. ii. 111, iii. 37.
- στοιχειῶν*, teach principles (elements), E. 3.
- στοιχηδόν* (κείμενα), in a row, side by side, Ph. i. 380, 386, ii. 59, 144.
- συγγεγυμνασμέναι* (*καταλήψεις*, Stoic), co-exercised, used in conjunction, P. iii. 188, 251.
- συγκατάθεσις* (oppd. to ἀρνησις), assent, P. i. 7, 13, 16, 19, 233, etc.
- συγκαταλαμβάνειν*, apprehend together with, P. ii. 116 f., 119, etc.
- συγκοινωνίειν*, help to make light, P. iii. 15.
- σύγκριμα* (Democr.), composite substance, compound, P. ii. 24, iii. 56, Ph. i. 97, etc.
- συζυγεῖν* (Stoic), be ranked together, be correlative, L. i. 151, ii. 11, Ph. ii. 5 f., etc.; so *συζυγία*, correlative pair, L. ii. 172, 175.

GLOSSARY

συλλογιστικός (*λόγος*, Stoic), conclusive, demonstrative, P. ii. 149.
 συμβεβηκός (logical), attribute, property, P. ii. 27, 228, L. i. 269 ff., Ph. ii. 220 ff., E. 37 f.
 συνβιβάζειν, conclude, demonstrate, (*συμβεβίασται*) L. i. 283, Ph. ii. 319.
 σύμβολος, comparison, reference, relation; *κατὰ σ.*, L. i. 375, 395, ii. 34, 459, Ph. ii. 198.
 συμμημόνευσ (Stoic), simultaneous recollection, P. iii. 108, L. i. 279, Ph. i. 353 ff., ii. 64, 176.
 συμπάθεια, feeling for, emotional assent, inclination, P. i. 230; sympathy, sharing of affections, Ph. i. 79 f.
 συμπαραγέτοις (c. dat.), be observed together with, P. ii. 100 f., L. ii. 143, 152; so *συμπαραγήρως*, simultaneous observation, L. ii. 154.
 συμπέρασμα (logical), conclusion (*εἰπιφορά*), P. ii. 113 f., 134, 139 ff., L. ii. 140.
 συμπεριγράψειν, cancel (annul) together with, P. i. 14, 206, ii. 47, etc.
 συμπλέκειν, intertwine, combine, (*λήμματα*) L. ii. 416 f.: *συμπληγέμενον*, (logical) combination, complex, P. ii. 137 f., L. ii. 125, 419, 421.
 συμπληρωτικός (Epicur.), serving to fill up, complementary, P. iii. 100, 172, L. i. 98, Ph. i. 337, etc.; so *συμπλήρωσις*, filling up, completion, Ph. i. 338.
 συμπλοκή, (carnal) conjunction, P. i. 41; (logical, cf. *συμπλέκειν*) combination, P. ii. 113, 137 ff., etc.; connexion (of meaning) L. ii. 430.
 σύμπονια (*καὶ συμπλοκή*), accordance, consistency, L. ii. 430; so *συμπνεῖν*, be in accord with, side with, Ph. i. 111.
 σύμπτωμα (medical), symptom; (Epicur.) *σ. συμπτωμάτων* (as def. of Time), concurrence, P. iii. 137, Ph. ii. 219.
 συμφής, of one substance with, P. i. 225; so *συμφύτη*, L. i. 129, *σύμφυτος*, L. i. 130, substantial union, essential connexion.
 συνάγειν (logical), infer, conclude, P. i. 32, 35, etc.; so *συναγωγή*, inference, deduction, P. ii. 143, 170.
 συναγωγός (*αἴτια*), combining, unifying, Ph. i. 7, 10.
 συναδηλέσθαι, be non-evident therewith, be likewise obscure, L. ii. 2.
 συνακαταληπτέοις, be also uncomprehended, E. 38.
 συνακτικός (*λόγος*), drawing a conclusion, conclusive, P. ii. 137 ff., 151, L. ii. 120, etc.

GLOSSARY

σύναμα (= *σὺν ἀμά*), together with, E. 159.
 συνανασκενή, joint refutation, L. i. 214; so *συνανασκενάζεσθαι*, L. i. 214.
 συναρπάζειν, (*τὸ ζητούμενον*) beg the question, P. i. 90, ii. 35, etc.; *σ. (ὑπαρξία)*, assume, P. iii. 121; *συναρπασθεῖς* (*ὑπὸ φαντασίας*), being carried away, influenced, L. i. 186.
 συνάρτησης (oppd. to *δάρτησης*, logical), connexion, coherence, P. ii. 111, L. ii. 265, 430.
 συνεκτικός, conclusive: *σ. αἴτια*, direct, primary causes, P. iii. 15: *συνεκτικάτατον*, most comprehensive, conclusive, L. i. 333, Ph. i. 1, E. 257.
 συνεργάτειν (Stoic), indicate therewith, imply also, L. i. 233; so *συνέψασις*, added implication, L. i. 239.
 συνεξέρχεσθαι (= *συνεκβάλλεσθαι*), pass out with, be rejected along with, L. i. 421.
 συνεργάτειν, contribute: *τὸ συντρανισμένον (ἐκ τούτων)*, the total made up of, L. i. 295.
 συνεργάτη (αἴτια), co-operant, accessory, P. iii. 15.
 συνεργοπονεῖν (c. dat.), be fellow-workers with, help in the toil of, Ph. i. 41.
 συνερωτᾶν, join in asking: *σ. λόγον*, propound an argument (by means of question and answer), P. ii. 131, 162, etc.; *συνερωτητέον*, P. ii. 251; so *συνέργωτος*, P. ii. 160, etc.
 συνέχειν, hold together, retain, L. i. 375: *σ. πρὸς (τὰ θήκα)*, relate to, be concerned with, P. i. 145.
 συνημμένον (*λήμμα*, logical), combination (of clauses or propositions), hypothetical major premiss or syllogism, P. ii. 101, 104, 111 f., 157 n., L. ii. 109, 112 f., 247, etc.
 συνέρθονται, (mental) commotion, perturbation, Ph. i. 169.
 σύνταγμα, treatise, book, P. i. 241, iii. 247, 279.
 συντελεστικός (oppd. to *παρατακός*), perfect (tense), past (time), Ph. ii. 91 f.; so *-τικός*, Ph. ii. 101.
 συνύπαρξις, co-existence, P. ii. 199; so *συνυπάρχειν*, P. ii. 109, 144, etc.
 συνυπότωσις, joint occurrence, being sensed together, L. ii. 174; so *συνυποτίττειν*, L. ii. 165, 174.
 συστατικά (*μέρα*), component, P. iii. 128, L. ii. 84.
 συστηματικός, forming an organized whole, composite, L. i. 40 f.
 σχέσις, attitude, (active) relation, application, L. i. 35 ff., 168, 243, ii. 162.
 σχῆμα (*μοχθηρόν*) (*ὑγέις*, logical), form (of statement of a syllogism), P. ii. 146, L. ii. 413, etc.

GLOSSARY

σχηματισμός, formation, configuration, L. i. 229; so *σχηματίζεσθαι*, Ph. i. 75.
σχολάζειν (c. dat.), devote oneself to, L. i. 8: τὰ σχολασθέντα (περὶ), lectures on, discussion of, E. 167.
σχολικός (*πλάττεοθαι*), after the style of the Schools (i.e. with perverse subtlety), L. ii. 13.
σωματικός, corporeal, E. 61: *σωματικώτερον*, more solidly, thoroughly, P. i. 7.
σωματότης, corporeality, Ph. i. 371 ff.; so *σωματοῦν* (*σεωμάτωται*, is corporealized), Ph. ii. 25.
σωρίτης (logical), the Sorites, (the fallacy known as "the Heap"), P. ii. 253, L. i. 416, Ph. i. 190.
σωριτική (*ἀπόρια*), of the Sorites-argument, P. iii. 80; so *σωριτικῶς*, Ph. i. 182.

ταυτολογεῖν, repeat oneself, L. i. 262.
τελαμών, linen wrapper, swathing-band (for a mummy), P. iii. 228.
τέλος (ethical), final purpose, objective, end, P. i. 25, L. i. 199 f.
τεράστιος (*φύσις*), monstrous, incredible, L. ii. 104.
τερατολογουμένη (*τύπωσις*), marvellous, mythical, P. ii. 70, (ὑλὴ) iii. 31, (δόξα) L. ii. 66.
τερματίζειν, bring to an end, terminate, Ph. ii. 102.
τετρακτύς (Pythag.), the Tetractys (i.e. Ten, as sum of first 4 numbers), L. i. 94.
τεχνογράφος, writer on the art (of logic), E. 8.
τεχνολογία, systematic treatment, logical theory (or rules), P. ii. 205, 249, 255, L. ii. 87, 257, 406; so *τεχνολογούμενα*, P. ii. 247, E. 40.
τήρησις, observance, rule of conduct, (*βιωτική*) P. i. 23, ii. 254; (*κοντα*) ii. 246; (*ἀφιλόσοφος*) E. 165.
τηρητική (*ἀκολούθια*), observant (sense of consequence or power of inference), L. ii. 288.
τίς: τὸ τί (Stoic), "something" (the highest logical genus), P. ii. 86, 223 f.; (plur.) Ph. ii. 234, E. 224.
τιμητικῶς ἔχειν, hold in honour, regard as honourable, Ph. i. 136.
τοιουτόσχημον, of such a shape, L. i. 209.
τοιουτώδης, suchlike, of like kind, L. ii. 206, Ph. i. 52.
τραγή (*φαντασία*), clear, vivid, L. i. 258; so *τρανῶς*, L. i. 172, Ph. i. 23.

GLOSSARY

Ph. i. 164; *τρανότερον*, L. ii. 144, Ph. i. 271; *τρανότατα*, L. i. 404.
τρεπόμενος (*οἶνος*), turning sour, P. i. 41.
τρεπτή (*օντος*), to be changed, alterable, L. i. 434.
τριγένεια (*ἄγαθῶν*), a trinity, threefold class, P. iii. 181.
τροπικόν (*Stoic*, = *συνημμένον*), hypothetical premiss, P. ii. 292, L. ii. 438, 440, 442.
τρόπος (= *λόγος*), "trope," mode (of argument), P. i. 35 ff., 164; (*λόγων*) L. ii. 227, 235, 237, 292.
τυχάνειν (= *εἰναι*), to be, P. i. 105, L. i. 38, 40, etc.: εἰ τύχοι, *verbi gratia*, P. i. 106, ii. 201, 218, etc.
ὑποδιαιρέν, subdivide, P. iii. 75; -*ρεισθαι*, L. i. 35; so *ὑποδιαιρεούς*, E. 15.
ὑπόθεσις, supposition, assumption: καθ' ὑπ., P. i. 73, 79, etc.; εἰς ὑπ., P. i. 168, ii. 20, etc.; so δὲ *ὑποθετικὸς τρόπος*, P. i. 164, 173.
ὑποκέμενον (oppd. to *φαινόμενον*), substantial (or real object, which *underlies* the sensible appearance), P. i. 19, 22, 46, 59, etc.; ὑποκένται = ἐστι, L. i. 183, 278, etc.
ὑπομημήσακειν, suggest, show, teach, P. ii. 76, 80, 177, etc.; so *ὑπόμηντος*, P. ii. 130, L. ii. 327.
ὑπομνησικόν (oppd. to *ἐνδεκτικὸν σημεῖον*), suggestive, commemorative, P. ii. 99 f., L. ii. 151; so -ικῶς, L. ii. 289.
ὑποτίπτειν, occur, be noticed or perceived (*sub sensu caderet*), P. i. 35, 40, 94, etc.: *ὑποπεσεῖται ἀπορίᾳς*, fall under, be faced by, Ph. i. 365.
ὑποτέλειος, occurrence, sense-experience, L. i. 85, 161, 215.
ὑπόστατος, substantiality, real existence, P. ii. 94, 176, 199, etc.; so *ὑπόστατος*, Ph. ii. 60.
ὑποτέλειον (c. dat.), yield, be subordinate to, L. ii. 32, Ph. i. 40 (c. accus.) cloak oneself in, adopt (as a disguise), Ph. i. 35 (= *ὑπόδραμεῖν*, Ph. i. 36).
ὑπότερεψις, rejoinder, reply, L. i. 359, Ph. i. 251; so *ὑποτυχάνειν*, L. ii. 375, 440, Ph. i. 249.
ὑποτίπτωσις, outline, sketch; (ώς ἐτόντοι) P. i. 206, 222, ii. 79, etc.; so *ὑποτιπούσθαι*, P. iii. 3; *ὑποτυπωτικός* (*τρόπος*) P. i. 239; -ικῶς, P. i. 4, ii. 1.
ὑπέ ἐν, in one moment, together, simultaneously, L. i. 229, 231, 303, etc.
ὑφῆρησις, sketch, exposition, description, P. i. 6; guidance, P. i. 23 f., 237.

GLOSSARY

νέφελοασθαι, lay down, suppose, L. i. 14, ii. 11, Ph. ii. 270, (derive) 312 : ὑποστραθεῖν = δοξαζόμενον, E. 113.

φαλάγγιον, venomous spider, P. i. 82, 89.

φαντάζεσθαι, appear, P. i. 47; have a presentation, P. i. 104.

φαντασία, presentation, sense-impression (as appearing to the sentient subject), P. i. 22, 52, etc.; (Stoic def. of φ.) P. ii. 70, L. i. 228 ff.; ἀπλῆ φ., L. ii. 276; καταληπτική φ., P. i. 4, iii. 241, etc.; λογική φ., L. ii. 70; αἰσθητική φ., L. i. 424.

φαντασῶν, cause a presentation, produce a mental image in, L. ii. 406 f.; (pass.) receive an image, be impressed, P. ii. 72, L. i. 99, ii. 397, 402, etc.

φάντασμα, image, imaginary concept, L. i. 222, 224, Ph. ii. 181, 184 ff.; illusory appearance, phantasm, L. i. 256.

φανταστικά (πάσχοντα), (affected) as by a presentation, L. i. 373, ii. 410.

φανταστόν, object presented to sense (the cause of sense-impressions), L. i. 203, 344, 357, etc.

φάσις, affirmation, assertion, P. i. 192, ii. 107, 121, 153, etc.

φαῦλος, (oppd. to σοφός, Stoic), foolish, L. i. 153, 432; (συνημμένον) invalid, P. ii. 191.

φιλαύτως, self-conceitedly, L. i. 314.

φιλοποία, making friends, affection, L. i. 239.

φιμοῦσθαι, be muzzled, silenced, without reply, L. ii. 275.

φωνικτικός (πάσχειν), (have a sensation) of redness, L. i. 198.

φρενήρες (τὸ περέχον, Heracleit.), intelligent, L. i. 127, ii. 286.

φρεντίζειν, be delirious, rave, P. i. 101, ii. 52, L. i. 247; so φρενιτικὸν βλέπειν, look crazy, P. ii. 231.

φυλοκρενεῖν, select with care, scrutinize, L. i. 183.

φυσιογνωμονική (σοφία), physiognomy, art of judging character by features, P. i. 85.

φυσιολογία, study of nature, physical science, P. i. 18, iii. 62, etc.; so φυσιολογεῖν, P. i. 18.

φωνή, vocal utterance, speech, sound, L. i. 119, ii. 130 ff.; φωναὶ (σκεπτικαὶ), formulae, P. i. 14, 187 ff.

φωνομαχεῖν, fight about words or phrases, P. i. 195, 207.

φωρατός, discoverable, detected, explicable, P. i. 183; so φωράσθαι, P. iii. 215, L. ii. 167.

φωτοείδης (δόψις), light-like, resembling light, L. i. 93, 119.

χαλαστικός (τρόπος, oppd. to πύκνωσις), loosening, laxative, P. ii. 240.

GLOSSARY

χαρακτήρ, distinctive nature, form, characteristic, P. i. 191, 209, iii. 37, etc.; (oppd. to χρόα) shape, features, E. 43; so χαρακτηριστικά (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ), distinguishing marks, peculiarities, P. iii. 173.

χαριέτως, aptly, wittily, L. ii. 325: χαριεντίζεσθαι, say wittily, jest, P. ii. 245.

χαροπός, blue-eyed, L. i. 198.

χαρτόν (oppd. to λυπηρόν), joyful, delightful, E. 85.

χεῖν (= τήκειν), melt, Ph. i. 248; (pass.) P. iii. 14.

χειρίζειν (λέγοντας, ἀπορίας, etc.), handle, apply, use (as instruments), L. i. 443, ii. 14, E. 21.

χηνώδης (oppd. to φρόνιμος), goose-like, silly, L. i. 329.

χιτών (όφθαλμον), skin, membrane, P. i. 126.

χνοάδης (oppd. to κρυμνώδης), in a fine state, powdery, P. i. 130.

χολερικά (πάθη), like cholera, P. i. 131.

χολοποιός, bile-producing, Ph. i. 96.

χρεοῖν (πρός τι), be helpful, suffice, L. i. 436.

χρῆμα (= πρᾶγμα, Protag.), thing, object or event, P. i. 216; amount, sum of money, L. i. 107.

χρηματεύειν (πρός τι), be of use, be needed, P. ii. 94, 150, 205 f., 236, L. ii. 143, etc.

χρώειν: κεχρωμένον, tinged, coloured, Ph. i. 335.

χυλοείδης, like juice, flavour-like, L. i. 119.

χύνειν, melting, liquefying, P. iii. 14; so χυτὸν (τὸ πνεῦμα), fluid, mobile, P. iii. 188.

χυλείειν, make lame, maim, P. iii. 217.

χώρα, place, space, (Stoic def.) P. iii. 124, 130, Ph. ii. 2 f.

ψάνσις (Democr.), (sense of) touch, L. i. 139; contact, Ph. ii. 102. ψευδοποιεύειν, give the lie to, falsify, L. ii. 24, Ph. ii. 96, 110, E. 14.

ψηλαφάσθαι, be handled, examined, L. ii. 108.

ψηφοταΐκης, player with pebbles, juggler, P. ii. 250.

ψυλός (φάσις, ἔννοια, etc.), bare, bald, mere (unconfirmed), P. ii. 121, L. i. 182, ii. 179, 459, etc.; so ψυλῶς, separately, taken by itself, P. i. 144, (= κατ' ἔδαφον) L. i. 277, ii. 15, E. 88.

ψυκτικός (χιών), making cold, chilling, P. iii. 179; so ψυχοῦσθαι, be made cold, Ph. ii. 164 f.

ἄμον ἐκβαλεῖν, put out (dislocate) the shoulder, P. ii. 245 (so ἄμος ἐκπεπτακεῖν P. ii. 245).

GLOSSARY

- ώμοπλάτη, shoulder-blade, shoulder, P. iii. 223.
 ώντοκεισθα, be born as eggs (like birds), P. i. 42.
 ὥρα (ἡ πρώτη, δευτέρα), hour (of the day), Ph. ii. 182 ff.; so
 ὥραιον διάστημα, interval of an hour, Ph. ii. 134.
 ὥρισμένως, definitely, L. i. 386, ii. 297; in the limited sense,
 E. 32, 208.
 ὡς . . . ὡδὲ, as . . . so, E. 10: οὐδὲ ὡς, not even so, P. ii. 42.
 ὥσπερ (= τοντέστι), that is to say, namely, L. i. 94: ὥσπερον,
 even as, as in fact, P. i. 57, ii. 101, Ph. i. 88.
 ὥχρα (oppd. to μέλαν), pale, light-coloured (of wine), L. i.
 91; so ὥχρόν, L. i. 193.
 ὥχραίνεσθαι, be made (have a sense of) yellow, or pale colour,
 L. i. 193; so ὥχρατικῶς κινεῖθαι, be affected by yellow,
 see (things) as yellow, L. i. 192, 198.

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